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New Leaders Appointed at the Center of Military History

Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, who had served as chief historian at the Center of Military History since 1990, became the director of the Center and chief of military history in May 2006, succeeding retired Brig. Gen. John S. Brown. A native of New Jersey, Dr. Clarke holds a bachelor’s degree in history from Gettysburg College and master’s and doctoral degrees in that discipline from Duke University. A reserve infantry officer, he served on active duty in 1968–70 and commanded the 17th Military History Detachment in Vietnam, where it was attached to the 1st Infantry Division. He retired from the military as a reserve lieutenant colonel in 1994.

After teaching for a year at Rutgers University, Dr. Clarke became a civilian historian in the Center’s Histories Division in 1971. He there authored *Advice and Support: The Final Years* (CMH, 1988), a volume in the U.S. Army in Vietnam series that covers the U.S. military advisory effort in Vietnam from 1965 to 1973. He then completed the manuscript initiated by Robert Ross Smith on the U.S. 6th Army Group’s drive from southern France to the Rhine in World War II. In 1993 the Center published *Rivera to the Rhine* by Clarke and Smith in its series on the U.S. Army in World War II. Dr. Clarke also authored the pamphlet on the Southern France campaign in the Center’s series of World War II commemorative brochures.

Dr. Clarke became chief of the Center’s Operational History Branch in 1987 and served as acting chief of the Histories Division in 1989, before becoming chief historian. He also taught for nearly twenty years as an adjunct associate professor at the University of Maryland campuses at College Park and Baltimore County and in 1977 was a visiting faculty member at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Col. John J. Spinelli reported to the Center of Military History in July 2006 as its deputy director. He succeeded Col. Donald W. Warner, who had retired in April. An engineer officer, Colonel Spinelli holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in industrial engineering and engineering administration from Penn State University. He has served overseas in Germany, Honduras, and Japan and with engineer battalions at Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Benning, Georgia. In the past decade he has addressed issues of policy and strategy while holding positions in Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the offices of the Army’s deputy chief of staff for operations and plans and the chief of staff of the Army.

Dr. Richard W. Stewart succeeded Dr. Clarke as the Center’s chief historian in September 2006. Dr. Stewart received his bachelor’s degree in history from Stetson University in Florida in 1972 and was commissioned as an Army Reserve military intelligence officer. He received a master’s degree in history from the Univer-
The Chief’s Corner

Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke

As almost the sole member of the Center’s command group for much of the past fiscal year, I want to acknowledge the great debt of gratitude I owe to the outstanding professionals inside the Center and within the larger Army history and museum communities for their hard work and great support. Special thanks certainly go to those Center division and branch chiefs—many serving in an “acting” capacity during this hectic period—who have done some amazing work to keep our programs in full bloom during the Center’s leadership transition. This united effort has kept our publication program on track, addressed our budgetary and personnel challenges, kept pace with the growing unit designation and award demands produced by the Army’s modularity reorganization and two ongoing wars, and secured funding for the extremely important FORSCOM war-fighter museums. Equally gratifying has been the splendid progress of our field history and museum programs, which have not simply carried on but have truly thrived under some very able thinkers and doers. To mention only a few, I must commend the superb publication programs of Col. Tim Reese’s Combat Studies Institute and Dr. Chuck Briscoe’s Army Special Operations Command history office; everyone who contributed to last June’s great Army museum system training course in Salt Lake City and the equally successful history symposium on security assistance held at Fort Leavenworth in August; and all of the wonderful archival and museum work accomplished by Col. Rob Dalessandro’s Carlisle crew. Once again, our ability to do so much with so little has surprised all.

For the Center, the immediate future is clear. Our first task, putting our new leadership team in place, is almost complete. The Center’s new deputy director, Col. John Spinelli, arrived in early July; our new chief historian, Dr. Richard Stewart, in September; the new assistant chief of military history, Dr. John Shortal, a retired Army brigadier general, in early October; and our new executive officer, Maj. James McDonnell later that month. We have also added several other valuable new staff members and some key, new branch chiefs. Our second task—filling in the many administrative holes that I personally have dug since my predecessor, General John Brown, departed last October—is also well in hand, a challenge that John Spinelli has been tackling relentlessly since his arrival. The final task that I have set for myself and my fellow history and museum professionals is to devise a new strategic plan both for the Center and the overall Army history program. Here I see us shaping something that will emphasize specific actions and objectives over platitudes, setting out some markers that can guide us at least through the next three years. In this effort, the Military History Coordinating Committee will have a key role. However, I will also be looking for your support and assistance—in the form of good ideas—as we craft these plans during the winter months and into the spring. At the same time, I ask that you continue your excellent work in everything that you do. You should know that I am reminded on a daily basis how much your work is appreciated by both our senior Army leaders and by our soldiers throughout the force.

The Chief Historian’s Footnote

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

Having been a member of the Army history community since 1987, and in the Army and Army Reserve for fifteen years before that, I hope that I need no elaborate introduction to all of you. (A multivolume biography with photographs is available on demand.) Having said that, I do want to take a moment and use this first chief historian’s column to share with you my sense of where the Army historical community is, where we are going, and how I hope to contribute to guiding our future growth.

First, let me tell you how pleased and proud, and at the same time humble, I am to have been selected as the sixth chief historian. I cannot help but feel such mixed emotions as I look at the pictures in the hallway near my office of such past chief historians as Kent Greenfield, Stetson Conn, Maurice Matloff, David Trask, and Jeffrey Clarke. Their contributions to Army history since 1946 are now almost the stuff of legends, and I can only hope to do my best to live up to their examples.

The Army’s historical program today faces many challenges, both in terms of changes in managing the career field and coming to terms with what path we are on in support of the current Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Administratively, we all confront the new and unsettling challenges of a completely new personnel system, the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). Change is never easy, and much about the new system is foreign to the grade and step progression with which we are all familiar. There will be changes in performance plans, pay bands, job descriptions, pay pools, and other aspects that will inevitably affect our daily lives. However, I urge each of you to roll with this change and not let the new and unfamiliar terminology throw you. Those continued on page 57
“I must see what is going on at the firing line.”

 Maj. Gen. Henry Ware Lawton, December 1899
Seemingly oblivious to the sniper rounds clipping the blades of grass at his feet, the general walked through the rain on 19 December 1899 along the firing line in front of San Mateo in the Philippines, only 300 yards from the enemy riflemen in the town. Wearing a long, yellow rain slicker and the large white pith helmet that had become his trademark since Cuba, the 6-foot 3-inch tall, solidly built man was an obvious target. His officers and men shouted warnings, but the commander shrugged off their concern. He was accustomed to such alarms but never gave them heed, responding, “I must see what is going on at the firing line.” His indifference to danger was buttressed by experience; in almost forty years of active service, Henry Lawton had never so much as been scratched in battle.

As the firing intensified, 2d Lt. Ethelbert L. D. Breckinridge, a young staff officer who had served with the general as a volunteer at El Caney near Santiago, Cuba, fell wounded nearby. (The lieutenant was the son of Lawton’s friend and peacetime department chief, Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Breckinridge, the Army’s inspector general.) Lawton helped carry the lieutenant back to a sheltered location, assured that the injured soldier was tended, and then returned to the open to observe the progress of the fight. Suddenly, Lawton clenched his teeth tightly, clutched his chest, and murmured, “I am shot,” falling into the arms of his aide-de-camp, Capt. Edward L. King. A few minutes later he died. Lawton’s men set him down gently in a clump of bushes and covered his face with his helmet. About an hour later the cheers of American soldiers rushing into San Mateo could be heard over a heavy tropical rainstorm and final rifle volleys. Lawton was the only American to die in what proved to be a skirmish of limited significance.\(^2\)

When he fell a century ago, Maj. Gen. Henry Ware Lawton was one of the most celebrated military heroes of his time. His exploits in four conflicts—the Civil War, Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and Philippine War—spanning four decades, read like fantastic adventure stories. Lawton was a favorite of contemporary journalists and was closely covered by the “mass media” newspapers, as well as *Harper’s*, *McClure’s*, *Leslie’s*, and other illustrated journals hungry for larger-than-life, picturesque figures.\(^3\)

Lawton looked the part. In addition to his imposing height and weight, he was striking in appearance, possessing a forehead that was “high and narrow, his cheek bones prominent, his jaw square, his lips thin, his eyes gray, and his hair stood up like bristles.”\(^4\) Even critics acknowledge the appealing virtues that contributed to his legendary stature.\(^5\) The flowery word portraits of his admirers were supplemented by idealized visual images.\(^6\) Frederic Remington, whose first assignment for *Harper’s* was the pictorial portrayal of the Apache Campaign, made Lawton a subject throughout his career—sketching Captain Lawton on Geronimo’s trail in 1886, as well as the victorious General Lawton at El Caney, more than a decade later.\(^7\)

Although hailed for his victories and personal style, unlike some equally colorful contemporaries—Ranald Mackenzie, George Crook, Nelson Miles, and Leonard Wood—Henry Lawton has never been the subject of a serious biography or a focused consideration of his military service. Apart from the sheer drama and excitement of his life, however, Lawton’s story remains compelling for broader reasons, because in many ways it echoes and mirrors the history of the U.S. Army during the last forty years of the nineteenth century.

“Boy Hero” of the Civil War

Henry Ware Lawton was born on 17 March 1843 near Toledo, Ohio, to George W. Lawton, a millwright, and Catherine (Daley) Lawton. Unsettled in his youth as his father frequently moved to pursue work, Henry was raised, after the death of his mother, by Mrs. E. D. Moore. He eventually reunited with his father and settled in Fort Wayne, Indiana, and in 1858 Henry enrolled at Fort Wayne College, a local Methodist institution. Just four days after the attack on Fort Sumter on 12 April 1861, he left his books and signed up for service in Company E of the 9th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment, a 90-day unit. He was quickly chosen the company’s first sergeant. Lawton served with this unit in western Virginia and participated on 13 July 1861 in the skirmish at Carrick’s Ford on the Cheat River near Parsons, an action that cost the life of Confederate Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett, commander of the Confederate Department of Northwestern Virginia, the first general officer to fall in the war. This action also netted for the Union most of the supplies that Garnett’s fleeing
forces had been carrying. Even at this early stage of the war, “Long Hank” Lawton was conspicuous in battle—not for his size alone—but because of his eagerness to seize the initiative. Lawton soon mustered out of the unit, but on 20 August 1861 he was commissioned a first lieutenant in the 30th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment.8

It soon became clear to the young officer and those around him that Lawton had found his true vocation. In nearly four years of service in the Western Theater, Lawton was under fire repeatedly, fighting in numerous skirmishes and more than twenty major engagements, including such critical battles as Shiloh, Stone’s River, Chickamauga, Franklin, and Nashville. During these engagements, Lawton observed at close hand examples of inspiring leadership as well as monumental folly, moments of what could only be described as blind luck and instances of seemingly futile bravery that altered the outcome of battle. On these bloody fields, his views of regimental combat were formed, including his signature style of personal command marked by stubborn resolve no matter what the circumstances and apparent indifference to mortal danger. Since Lawton essentially went from the command of a depleted regiment at the end of the war to the command of a division decades later with no intervening formal training in the leadership of large formations, his Civil War experiences and views are crucial to understanding his later conduct of combat operations in both Cuba and the Philippines.

Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing (6–7 April 1862), was the first major battle in which 19-year-old Lieutenant Lawton served. His green regiment, the 30th Indiana (Col. Sion S. Bass), was assigned to Fifth Brigade (Col. Edward N. Kirk), Second Division (Brig. Gen. Alexander McCook), Army of the Ohio (Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell). The arrival of General Buell’s men early on the morning of 7 April 1862 allowed Maj. Gen. Ulysses Grant to recover the field that he had yielded the day before and to force the Confederates, already discouraged by the death of their commander, General Albert Sydney Johnston, to withdraw. According to McCook’s report, his two brigades withstood an attack on 7 April by some 10,000 Confederates along the Corinth and Pittsburg Road in the center of the field and then charged the Confederate lines, causing their defenders to flee.9

The regiment’s returns reported that the 30th Indiana lost at Shiloh 12 enlisted men killed, 6 officers and 109 enlisted men wounded, and 2 enlisted men captured. A broader compilation of casualties sustained at Shiloh by the Army of the Ohio shows that the losses suffered by Lawton’s regiment were the third highest of the 28 regiments of that army that were engaged in the battle. The ultimate loss of command personnel in Kirk’s brigade was even greater than these reports suggest. Two of Kirk’s four regimental commanders died of their wounds. Maj. Charles H. Levanway, commanding the 34th Illinois in Kirk’s absence, was mortally wounded by a shell and died on the battlefield. Colonel Bass of the 30th Indiana, who was wounded twice in the battle, died later of his injuries. Kirk was also wounded. West Point–educated General McCook, who would become the highest ranking member of the “Fighting McCooks” of Ohio, took note of the heroism of the men under his command. Not given to idle compliments, McCook called Bass’s wounds “the best evidence of his bearing & bravery.”10 In this first bloody battle in the West, Lawton experienced the desperate fury of battle, observing how quickly one’s fortunes could reverse, learning the importance of steadfast determination in the face of a strong attack, and finally savoring the ultimate joy of triumph at Shiloh. His experience must have also contributed to his belief that he was under some kind of divine protection, as men and officers around him fell dead and wounded while he escaped even the smallest wound.

Lawton’s next major engagement was at Stone’s River outside Murfreesboro, Tennessee, on 31 December 1862. After Shiloh he had been promoted to captain (17 May 1862), and he took command of Company A when Capt. George W. Fitzsimmons was promoted to major. The 30th Indiana (Col. Joseph B. Dodge) was now assigned to the Second Brigade (under now–Brig. Gen. Edward N. Kirk), Second Division (Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson), Right Wing (General McCook), Fourteenth Army Corps (Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans). Johnson’s division absorbed the brunt of Confederate General Braxton Bragg’s initial attack against the Union right at Stone’s River, and over the course of the day the division was driven back almost to the Nashville Pike, the critical Union supply line. Stiffened by the determined stand of the Third Division (Brig. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan), the Union troops held this line until 2 January 1863, when a Union victory on its left induced the Confederates to cede the field.11

Once again, the price paid by commanding officers was high. General Kirk was wounded soon after the start of the battle, thrusting Colonel Dodge, who had been promoted to colonel and assumed command of the 30th Indiana after the death of Colonel Bass, into command of the Second Brigade of Johnson’s division. All three of General Sheridan’s brigade commanders were killed in the battle, including Brig. Gen. Joshua W. Sill, for whom Fort Sill would be named.12

Dodge reported that on 31 December his brigade checked the advancing enemy from a fence on elevated ground until outflanked on its right. The 30th Indiana, now led by Lt. Col. Orrin D. Hurd and Major Fitzsimmons, was in the heart of the cauldron where those two officers, “needlessly, almost, exposed themselves, and were untiring in their efforts to stop the progress of what seemed a victorious enemy.”13 Colonel Hurd’s report painted a picture of desperate struggle with the specter of defeat and destruction hovering over the regiment. He emphasized that the men of the 30th Indiana “would have been cut to pieces or taken prisoners by the enemy” had they not moved back and to the right early on the
Lawton passed into personal conviction. Lawton's peak moment in war came on 3 August 1864, during the campaign outside Atlanta, when he led skirmishers from Company A against front-line enemy rifle pits, seized a trench filled with rebel sharpshooters, and then "stubbornly and successfully" held it against two fierce counterattacks. For these actions Lawton was in 1893 awarded the Medal of Honor. In late September 1864 Lawton became the senior officer in his regiment, when all of its officers and men, except those who had reenlisted, were mustered out. Indiana sent new recruits and conscripts to man the regiment in mid-November 1864, but the regiment remained well below its authorized strength. Lawton would command the regiment as a captain until his promotion to lieutenant colonel was approved in February 1865.

Lawton won the favorable attention of his brigade commander, Brig. Gen. William Grose during the battle at Franklin, Tennessee, on 30 November 1864, in which an outnumbered Union force led by Maj. Gen. John Schofield held off the attacking Confederate army of General John Bell Hood. General Grose wrote in his after-action report, "The Thirty-First Indiana, most of them new recruits, under Captain Lawton, commanding the regiment, stood by the colors and fought well." Lawton's own report that day testifies to the intensity of the combat and suggests his steady demeanor in the midst of the 30th Indiana's role at Stone's River was much less glorious and far costlier than its experience at Shiloh, the survivors, including Lawton, had learned crucial lessons. Perhaps most important was the importance of buying time through a determined though ultimately futile defense of a crucial position even under overwhelming pressure. Such a stand at Stone's River, although it ended in chaos and panicked retreat, altered the ultimate outcome of an important battle. For Lawton personally, his growing conviction that he was indestructible must have been greatly enhanced as he watched the flow of dead and wounded colleagues and counted the cost of the battle.

Nine months later Lawton found himself engaged at Chickamauga, the only clear-cut Confederate victory among the critical battles in which his regiment participated. Fighting under the same leaders as at Stone's River, the 30th Indiana at Chickamauga formed part of the Second Brigade (Colonel Dodge), Second Division (General Johnson), Twentieth Corps (General McCook), Army of the Cumberland (General Rosecrans). When committed to the battle, Dodge ordered his brigade to charge. It drove the enemy back almost a mile, in the process exposing its right flank. The enemy counterattacked after dark and, according to Colonel Hurd, "captured quite a number of men and officers" of the 30th. Overall, the regiment lost 31 killed, 55 wounded, and 61 missing or captured, which Hurd said was a higher proportion of losses than experienced at Shiloh or Stone's River, as by late 1863 the regiment had less than half as many men engaged in the battle. Even Colonel Dodge was taken prisoner, but he managed to escape.

Once more, Lawton was witness to a bloody, seesaw battle, this time ending in defeat. But for the stand of Maj. Gen. George Thomas, "The Rock of Chickamauga," Rosecrans's whole army might have been destroyed. Thomas Dodge's aggressiveness and persistence had, in this case, led to vulnerability and retreat, despite apparent initial success. While the casualties suffered by Lawton's regiment were proportionately very heavy, Lawton still escaped unharmed. Seemingly, the more desperate the situation and the more bravery he displayed, the better his chances of escaping death or injury. The oft-reported sense of indestructibility felt by young men on the battlefield had by this time for Lawton passed into personal conviction.

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the bedlam. Lawton coolly refrained from responding to a charge made by the enemy toward his lines until the Union skirmishers in front of him had reached the cover of his hastily erected works. Only then did he order his men to open fire on the attackers. Although most of his men had not yet become familiar with their weapons, Lawton reported that his unit’s fire, combined with oblique fire from the 9th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment to his right, soon compelled those attacking his lines to retire in disorder.19

Two weeks later at the battle of Nashville (15–16 December 1864), Grose again cited the regiment, writing that Lawton and his “officers and men, have my grateful thanks for their willing obedience to orders, their brave and efficient execution of every duty upon the battlefield and during the campaign.” In March 1865 Lawton received the brevet rank of colonel “for gallant and meritorious services.” After the surrender of the Confederate armies, Lawton and his regiment were assigned to occupation duty in Texas, before being mustered out in November 1865. Henry Lawton was then just twenty-two years old. Except for a brief assignment as a brigade inspector in 1864, Lawton had served in the line for four years and had never been wounded. He had undergone the most intense on-the-job training imaginable for a company-and field-grade officer. In many ways, the lessons learned on the fields of the Western Theater would serve him well, but they would ultimately cost him his life and may have led him to make decisions in combat that would cost the lives of others who served under his command.20

With the recommendation of General Grose, Maj. Gen. David Stanley, and Bvt. Maj. Gen. Nathan Kimball, under each of whom Lawton had served during the Civil War, and with the support of Conrad Baker, the acting governor of Indiana, Lawton sought a commission in the Regular Army upon his return to civil life. Concerned, however, that the limited size of the postwar Army might leave him without that option, he entered the Fort Wayne office of Judge Lindley M. Ninde to “read law,” and in the summer of 1866 enrolled at Harvard Law School. About that time, Lawton was appointed an original second lieutenant in the 41st Infantry, one of four infantry regiments created by Congress in July 1866 for African American enlisted personnel. Lawton completed an academic year before traveling to New York City to appear before a board examining officers appointed in the infantry. He passed their test, accepted his commission on 4 May 1867, and left Harvard in good standing.21

Col. Ranald Slidell Mackenzie (1840–89), one of the most colorful and interesting soldiers in the history of the U.S. Army, became the commander of the 41st Infantry on 25 May 1867, after Civil War volunteer Maj. Gen. Robert Potter declined the position. The decisions of nine other men to decline lieutenancies in the regiment allowed Lawton to be promoted to first lieutenant in July 1867. Lawton served with the 41st along the Rio Grande in Texas until it was consolidated in 1869 with another regiment with African American enlisted personnel to form the 24th Infantry, which Mackenzie also commanded. Mackenzie named Lawton regimental quartermaster of the 41st in June 1868 and Lawton assumed that position in the 24th when he transferred into that unit.22

Colonel Mackenzie was the dominant influence on Lawton’s first decade and a half of Regular Army service. First in his class at West Point in 1862 and a Civil War hero, Mackenzie was an easily irri
tated, tireless worker indifferent to his own comfort, as well as a severe disciplinarian.23 Marked early for high command despite his youth, he was viewed by General Grant at the end of the Civil War as “the most promising officer in the army.”24 Called “Bad Hand” and “Three Fingers” by his enemies because of the two fingers that had been amputated from his right hand after he was wounded during the fight at Jerusalem Plank Road south of Petersburg, Virginia, in June 1864, Mackenzie had become a volunteer brigadier general in October 1864 and commanded a cavalry division at Appomattox. Mackenzie would subsequently earn a formidable reputation as an Indian fighter. Lawton admired and respected Mackenzie greatly, a feeling that was entirely mutual. Mackenzie came to regard his subordinate as “one of the very ablest officer[s] in the Army, and by far the ablest who has ever served under my command.” The two men served together almost continuously until 1883, by which time Mackenzie was a brigadier general.25
The troopers retrieved military equipment bearing 7th Cavalry markings. Crippled by this blow, the warring Indians returned in the spring to their reservations in western Nebraska, ending the Great Sioux War. 26

With the exception of the period from March 1875 through August 1876, Lawton served as quartermaster of the 4th Cavalry from May 1872 until March 1879, when he became a captain and assumed command of the regiment’s Company B. Mackenzie’s high regard for the one-time Harvard law student was continually reinforced by Lawton’s proven ability to keep the regiment’s columns supplied and moving, no matter what the circumstances or natural impediments. As one fellow officer noted, Lawton had “exceptional ability as a quartermaster, both in construction work in a post, and in the field, where his knowledge, practical common sense and resourceful makeshifts made him especially valuable to a man of Mackenzie’s peculiar temperament and demands.” Quartermaster duty was also known to offer financial temptations that could easily lead to corruption. On that issue, Mackenzie was unequivocal, writing that he did “not believe that he has ever made dishonestly one cent.” 27 Lawton held Mackenzie in extremely high regard as well. Many years later, when he faced battlefield difficulties in the Spanish-American War, he would ask rhetorically, “What would Mackenzie do in this situation?” 28

Fellow officers and ordinary troopers respected Lawton. Some fifty years after their first encounter—and twenty years after Lawton’s death—retired Capt. Robert G. Carter, a Civil War veteran, West Point graduate (1870), Medal of Honor recipient, and erstwhile 4th Cavalry lieutenant recalled with great immediacy the powerful impression Lawton inspired. All the companies of the regiment gathered in mid-July 1871, the first time the whole unit assembled since the end of the Civil War, to ride against the Comanche
and Kiowa in the Texas Badlands. As they readied themselves for the pursuit of Chief Kicking Bird, the officers got a chance to meet Mackenzie and his trusted subaltern. Lawton was “rather restless, quick spoken, energetic in his movements, and full of life and fire; in fact, what could be better expressed as—‘a live wire, and hard as nails.’” But there was another, more reserved and hidden side to Lawton, and Carter noted that as well, observing “He seemed, at first glance, diffident, retiring, and rather reserved or reticent in manner; a little stiff, upon first acquaintance.” Of course, Lawton also had his critics and competitors; Carter overheard one jealous, high-ranking West Pointer remark that “He [Lawton] was a mere ‘rough-neck’ wagon master.”

Personality aside, Lawton was known as someone who could cut through red tape and get things done. These characteristics would prove invaluable during Lawton’s many years of hard duty on the frontier, in which the 4th Cavalry endured long, arduous pursuits and scouting missions, endless tracking, ‘hit and run’ tactics, savage fighting punctuated by atrocities on both sides, and operations conducted from far-flung posts often isolated from traditional supply lines. It was grim and brutalizing duty, and the tribes rarely discriminated among the soldiers confronting them. More than one observer noted that immediately after battle Lawton seemed to harbor no animosity toward the enemy. In the relocation of the defeated Northern Cheyenne in 1877, for example, Lawton allowed the old and sick to ride in wagons and made sure they had shelter. This inspired one former enemy to say, he “was a good man, always kind to the Indians.” On that tragic journey they called him “Tall White Man.”

Despite his record and the high regard in which he was held by his superiors, Lawton had to complete nearly a dozen years of Regular Army service, and wait eighteen years after first donning a uniform, before he was promoted to the permanent rank of captain. The grinding routine and loneliness of service bore down heavily on Lawton, who, despite several unsuccessful courtships, remained single until he became a captain. Finally, at the age of thirty-eight, Lawton on 6 December 1881 married Mary (Mamie) Craig (1855–1934) of Louisville, Kentucky. Among the children she bore him, three daughters (Frances, Catherine, and Louise) and a son (Manley) survived infancy. Otherwise, the only break in the monotony came from the fairly relaxed off-duty life on the post, which helped ease the tensions bred by periods of danger paced by boredom. Somewhat free of the restrictions and conventions of normal society, soldiers on the frontier did not as strictly observe the barriers of class and race that elsewhere typically governed both the Army and society in general. Officers and men mixed relatively easily. Lawton’s service with African American troops had moderated, but decidedly not erased, a generally benign, but commonly shared racism. Lt. Henry Flipper, who in 1877 became the first African American to graduate from West Point and later served with Lawton at Fort Elliott, Texas, wrote of his “great admiration” for the veteran, noting that he had helped ease his transition to life in the West and that they had shared a night of comradely drinking. Flipper was naive and probably put at ease by the alcohol. Describing to a friend an encounter with Flipper a few years later, after the younger officer had been dismissed from the Army, Lawton could write that he had been “glad to see even a darkey whom I had known before.”

Not all of Lawton’s drinking could be so genially described, however, and he gained a reputation as volatile and occasionally violent when drunk. In one episode, Lawton assaulted an enlisted man and avoided disciplinary action only because Mackenzie could not afford to lose him. While not uncommon on the lonely posts of the frontier, Lawton’s drinking clearly went beyond reasonable limits and nearly ended his career on more than one occasion.

The Epic Pursuit and Capture of Geronimo

After more than a decade and a half of obscure service and slow advancement, Lawton’s great opportunity was approaching. In late 1884 Troop B (cavalry companies had been redesignated as troops in 1883) was ordered to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to join the fight against the Chiricahua Apaches, among the fiercest of all the frontier tribes and one of the Army’s most successful adversaries. Their medicine man Goyathlay (One Who Yawns), better known by his Spanish name, Geronimo (1827–1909), had been leading the cavalry on a series of frustrating chases for years. Alternately fleeing to Mexico, raiding the territories of Arizona and New Mexico, surrendering, and escaping, Geronimo had continually outmaneuvered, evaded, and embarrassed his long-time nemesis, the celebrated Indian fighter General Crook. By late March 1886, however, it appeared that the elusive Apache warrior and his small band would finally return to Arizona and submit to two years of imprisonment. After agreeing to come quietly, however, Geronimo escaped yet again. Crook was finished. On 12 April 1886 Brig. Gen. Nelson A. Miles relieved him as commander of the Department of Arizona with orders from General Sheridan, now the Army’s commanding general, to capture or kill the fugitive.

Miles, a thrice-wounded Civil War veteran whose heroism at Chancellorsville would bring him a Medal of Honor, was Crook’s rival as the Army’s most effective Indian fighter. Known as “Old Bear Coat” because of the flamboyant fur-trimmed overcoat he wore on campaign, Miles was well connected politically, having married the niece of Senator John Sherman and General William T. Sherman. Nevertheless, Miles seemed to be perpetually in the middle of a controversy. He was an officer who openly hungered for promotion and whose ambitions very likely reached as high
as the White House. Mindful of the risks and potential impact of success in this new assignment, Miles was determined to avoid the humiliation that had ended the career of his rival and predecessor.\textsuperscript{35}

By this time the desire to finish off Geronimo had become a top priority for the Army. The wily and greatly feared Apache leader had, with a small band of braves and while encumbered by women and children, skillfully evaded the Army’s pursuit for years and achieved almost mythic stature. Miles, as well as top officers all the way up to Commanding General Sheridan, were also anxious to show that Crook’s reliance on Indian scouts—a tacit acknowledgement of the superiority of the Apache warrior in his own territory—had failed, and that ordinary American soldiers were able to meet the Apache on his own ground and prevail. Geronimo’s numerous bloody raids and seeming ability to go where he pleased had sparked considerable citizen unrest, posing a political challenge to the administration of President Grover Cleveland. Further, the Army’s cross-border operations in pursuit of Geronimo had complicated relations with Mexico and led to a clash in which Mexican militiamen had killed a well-regarded American officer, Capt. Emmet Crawford.\textsuperscript{36}

Miles decided to hunt down and finish off Geronimo once and for all. He selected Captain Lawton, whom he described as a “giant in stature, and a man of great energy and endurance,” to lead the major pursuit group into Mexico. Lawton’s orders were simple: “follow constantly the trail, locate their main camp, and destroy or subdue” the hostile Indians. Miles considered the tough, leather-skinned, hard-driving Lawton to be one of his “best athletes”—a hard-edged mustang without a college degree, brevetted on the battlefields of the Civil War, and “educated” by brutal experience in desperate struggles against a half-dozen hostile tribes on the Western frontier. In short, Lawton was a man like Miles, himself, who could stand as an equal with the West Pointers who ran the Army.\textsuperscript{37}

Accompanied by another of Miles’s “athletes,” newly appointed assistant surgeon Leonard Wood (1860–1927), Lawton on 5 May 1886 led a mixed column of 4th Cavalry and 8th Infantry troops, Apache scouts, and packers out of Fort Huachuca, while the post band played “The Girl I Left Behind Me,” and they soon headed south across the Mexican border. Wood shared Miles’s controversial view that Regular soldiers could best the Apaches in their natural environment, and he and Lawton were equally determined to prove it. The two men became very close during the expedition. Rising frequently at 0400 hours, rarely resting, and sometimes going for days without issued rations, the column operated in terrible terrain, with irregular resupply, and in the most extreme and debilitating weather.\textsuperscript{38}

For nearly five months, Lawton led his troops on a grueling 1,386-mile march through the Arizona desert and Mexican Sierra Madre Mountains in pursuit of Geronimo, the resourceful and tenacious adversary. The hardships were beyond anyone’s expectations; at one point, Wood was laid low by a tarantula bite. Despite the extraordinary difficulties, the men retained their trust and confidence in Lawton. Alfred F. Sims, one of the soldiers on the expedition, wrote of his leader, “To his men a kinder of officer never lived, and the one thing that made him so popular was that he would never send any one to a place where he would not go himself.” By the end of the ordeal, the robust, 230-pound Lawton had shed 40 pounds and like his men was reduced to rags and exhaustion.\textsuperscript{39}

The march was punctuated by exhilarating moments of imminent success and long stretches of disappointment and despair. In late July, the column surprised Geronimo’s
camp in the mountains, but the Apaches fled, leaving behind their horses and supplies. Later, the Apaches surprised Lawton’s men and killed five before they were driven off. Lawton’s letters to his wife reveal his frustrations, weariness, and growing doubts about the mission. It was increasingly apparent to General Miles that his hopes for a dramatic—and relatively quick—victory would not be fulfilled. On 13 July 1886, Miles altered his plan and ordered 1st Lt. Charles B. Gatewood—an experienced 6th Cavalry officer, who was a West Point graduate and former aide to General Crook—on a parallel mission to negotiate Geronimo’s peaceful surrender, thus changing the nature of Lawton’s assignment. It was a clear, if belated, acknowledgement that even though Lawton and his men had persevered with superb stamina and tenacity, Crook’s tactics also had merit. Perhaps feeling betrayed, Lawton was initially angry at the change of orders and miffed by Gatewood’s request for help, but eventually he softened his stance. In letters to his wife, Lawton even expressed some concern for Gatewood’s safety.

By the end of August the Apaches were exhausted and willing to capitulate. At the last moment, however, the surrender mission nearly collapsed into violence. On 28 August 1886 after Gatewood had given the Indians assurances of safety, a detachment of Mexican infantry, led by Jesús Aguirre, the prefect of Arispe, suddenly appeared demanding that the Americans turn over Geronimo to them for trial. Despite being on Mexican soil—as well as seriously outnumbered and outgunned—Lawton refused to give up Geronimo, agreeing only to allow the Mexicans to speak with the Apache leader. Wood wrote in his journal that he, Lawton, and an officer of the 10th Infantry actually jumped between the prefect and Geronimo when it appeared that the two adversaries were ready to draw their pistols and fire at each other, a claim that most historians have treated with considerable skepticism. Whatever the truth of Wood’s version, defying the Mexicans at all was certainly audacious as well as honorable, as Lawton had given Geronimo his word that he would be protected from his Mexican enemies. In fact, as soon as the chase was over, Lawton’s hostility toward Geronimo seemed to evaporate, and their first face-to-face encounter—arranged by Gatewood at Geronimo’s request—featured a round of “bear-hugging.”

Finally, on 4 September 1886, after Gatewood’s heroic and dangerous final negotiating effort, Geronimo surrendered personally to General Miles. He was never actually captured, but Lawton’s unrelenting pursuit had clearly exhausted the Apache band and must be considered the major factor in Geronimo’s decision. In a move that generated lasting controversy, Miles publicly and officially lauded both Lawton and Wood, while seeming to minimize the role of Gatewood. The slightly built West Point graduate, who often found his assignments in the West to be physically arduous, died a decade later in obscurity.

Lawton’s career, boosted by the publicity surrounding the Geronimo expedition, soon began a rapid upward climb. After escorting the Apaches to San Antonio, Texas,
where they would be held for a month before being sent to Florida, Lawton returned to Albuquerque, where the grateful citizens of New Mexico honored him at a banquet, during which he was presented with a gold watch and chain. The professional rewards were also considerable. General Miles heaped praise on Lawton, writing in his official report that the intrepid captain had “assumed the arduous and difficult task of pursuing [the hostile Indians] continuously through the broken, mountainous country of Sonora for nearly three months. In this remarkable pursuit he followed them from one range of mountains to another, over the highest peaks, often nine and ten thousand feet above the level of the sea, and frequently in the depths of the canons, where the heat in July and August was of tropical intensity.” In July 1887 the Army transferred Lawton’s Troop B, 4th Cavalry, from the Department of Arizona to Fort Myer, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington, D.C., as General Sheridan transformed that installation from a Signal Corps garrison to a cavalry post.

Seeking to capitalize further on his fame, Lawton sought appointment to the vacancy in the seven-man Inspector General Department that would occur in August 1888 when the Army’s senior inspector general, Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird, reached the mandatory retirement age. General Miles; General Stanley, now commander of the Department of Texas; Brig. Gen. Samuel Holabird, the Army’s quartermaster general; the governors of Indiana, Texas, and the territories of New Mexico and Arizona; all four senators and all but one of the congressmen from Indiana and Texas; and other officials joined in supporting Lawton’s appointment to that department. The campaign proved successful, and on 17 September 1888 President Grover Cleveland nominated Lawton as the juniormost member of the Inspector General’s Department, an appointment that involved his promotion to the rank of major and took effect on 2 October 1888. The deaths of two other members of that department led to Lawton’s promotion on 12 February 1889 to lieutenant colonel.

During his first five years as an inspector general, Lawton served as an assistant in the Office of the Inspector General of the Army, a position held by General Breckinridge from 1889 to 1903. On 22 May 1893, while serving in Washington, D.C., Lawton received the Medal of Honor, an award conferred nearly thirty years after his heroic actions in the Civil War that was undoubtedly pushed through channels by his friends in Washington. In addition to his work in his department’s headquarters, Lawton inspected national cemeteries, disbursing officers’ accounts, and military instruction at civilian colleges. The extent of his inspection trips in this period varied widely. In fiscal year 1892, his inspections involved more than 24,000 miles of official travel, more than any other inspector general, but in 1891 he had traveled less than any of the others.

During Lawton’s second five years as inspector general, he was based successively in Los Angeles, California; Denver, Colorado (1894–95); Santa Fe, New Mexico (1895–97); and again in Los Angeles (1897–98). In December 1894 he peacefully helped persuade Chief Ignacio and some 400 Southern Ute Indian herdsmen to return to their Colorado reservation from eastern Utah, where they had moved for winter grazing without authorization. In fiscal year 1896, after inspecting eighteen Army posts, Lawton severely criticized the condition of the buildings at Fort Grant in southeastern Arizona. The federal garrison would be withdrawn from that post in 1898, never to return. As war with Spain loomed in early April 1898, Lawton hurried to Washington to offer his “services in command of troops.” Several possibilities soon emerged for both staff and line assignments. There was even some “native son” pressure to consider Lawton for command of the Indiana volunteers. General Miles, who since 1895 had been commanding general of the Army, helped arrange Lawton’s appointment as a volunteer brigadier general and his assignment to command the 2d Division of Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter’s 15,000-man Fifth Corps, earmarked for the Cuban invasion.

After a hurried muster in Tampa and a confused, and fortunately unsupported, landing in Cuba on 22 June 1898, Lawton, at Shafter’s order, led the advance from the beacheshead at Daiquiri; occupied Siboney, where additional American troops would debark the next day; and entrenched there to await their landing. Maj. Gen. Joseph W. (“Fighting Joe”) Wheeler, who commanded Shafter’s dismounted cavalry division, including now-Col. Leonard Wood’s 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, or “Rough Riders,” then maintained the tactical initiative, pushing ahead without orders or support against Spanish positions at Las Guásimas. President William McKinley had named Wheeler to his senior volunteer rank, wishing to give the war a bipartisan and multi-regional hue, and Wheeler’s biography made him perfect for that role. An 1859 Military Academy graduate, Wheeler had compiled a distinguished Confederate military record in many of the same Civil War campaigns in which Lawton had fought, leading an Alabama infantry regiment at Shiloh and large cavalry formations at Stone’s River and Chickamauga. By 1898 he was a senior Democratic congressman from Alabama and a strong supporter of war with Spain. Shafter did not reprimand Wheeler because his attack was successful and had secured the avenue of attack on the more heavily defended Spanish positions on a ridge line east of Santiago, called San Juan Hill, that Shafter preferred. The Spanish defensive line was anchored on the north flank by the fortified village of El Caney. Shafter’s willingness to accept Wheeler’s unsolicited initiative would embolden Lawton to act independently as well.

**The Bloody Storming of El Caney**

Situated among a group of small hills, the village of El Caney lay about six miles northeast of Santiago astride the main road linking that city with Guantánamo. The road offered the enemy a route of reinforcement or retreat and represented a potential threat to
the American operation. El Caney was also close to the pipeline that supplied the whole area with fresh water. Any American approach to San Juan Hill and the city of Santiago would find El Caney on the right flank initially and in the rear as an advance gained ground. Shafter thus decided to secure his northern flank before moving against the main objective, the ridge in front of Santiago. He ordered Lawton to first take El Caney and then swing left along the road between Santiago and Guantánamo to join the main attack from a flanking position.50

Lawton and his brigade commanders prepared for the assault by conducting a personal reconnaissance. They were accompanied by correspondent Stephen Bonsal who described Lawton sitting astride his horse as the very “ideal of a beau sabreur (cavalry leader), if ever there was one.” At Shafter’s commander’s conference on the afternoon of 30 June, Lawton gave his assessment that the position would fall in two hours. Everyone agreed. Shafter made his plans accordingly; the main attack on the ridges in front of Santiago would await the capture of El Caney and the consolidation of forces that would follow in the late morning. The plans sounded good, but they were predicated on taking El Caney quickly and painlessly.51

Three companies of the Constitución infantry regiment and a company of riflemen, all under the command of Brig. Gen. Joaquin Vara del Rey, faced Lawton. These 520 Spanish troops were aided by perhaps 100 armed villagers. Despite the overwhelming superiority of the force arrayed against them, the Spaniards had several important advantages. The village was heavily fortified, being protected by a network of rifle pits, barbed wire, and five blockhouses, as well as a commanding stone fort called El Viso, located 400 yards southeast of the village. The fort was surrounded by entrenchments cut into solid rock. A fortified old stone church dominated the center of El Caney, which—as legend recorded—had been the site of the final prayers offered by Hernán Cortés before he set out to conquer Mexico in 1519. The defenders were highly motivated, well trained, and determined to buy as much time as possible for their comrades at Santiago.52

Lawton originally planned a two-pronged attack on El Caney. His Third Brigade (7th, 12th, and 17th Infantry Regiments), commanded by Brig. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, a veteran cavalryman whom Lawton greatly respected, would deploy on Sugarloaf Hill, north of El Caney, and advance on El Caney from the north and east, while Brig. Gen. William Ludlow’s First Brigade (8th Infantry, 22d Infantry, and 2d Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry) would give support from positions south and west of El Caney. Lawton would initially hold Col. Evan C. Miles’s Second Brigade (1st, 4th, and 25th Infantry, the last an African American unit) and Brig. Gen. John C. Bates’s attached Independent Brigade (3d and 20th Infantry) in reserve. Capt. Ally Capron’s light artillery (Battery E, 1st Artillery) would provide support. Altogether Lawton had some 6,650 men and four 3.2-inch guns for the attack.53

Lawton marched his men most of the night, taking position in front of El Caney just before dawn on 1 July 1898. The “boy hero” of the Civil War was about to lead ten Regular Army regiments in the U.S. Army’s largest land engagement since April 1865. Lawton ordered Captain Capron to open fire just after 0630 hours. Unlike the immediately devastating impact Capron’s battery had achieved at the Battle of Wounded Knee seven-and-a-half years earlier, its destructive power in Cuba was more evenly matched by the strength of the Spanish fortifications. The capture of El Caney, it soon became clear, would take considerably longer than two hours. Capron’s battery was initially positioned about 2,300 yards southeast of El Caney, despite the fact that the enemy had no counter-battery capability. This distance limited
the accuracy of the shells against the fortified Spanish positions. Moreover, the fire was not concentrated, continuous, or adequately focused on the main target. Technically, Capron’s guns, which still used black powder and lacked the advances that enabled French artillery to lay down accurate indirect fire, were not well matched to the task of quickly reducing the enemy’s fortifications. Capron was likely distracted, as well. On the march to El Caney, he had passed the grave of his son, Volunteer Capt. Allyn K. Capron, a Regular Army cavalry lieutenant serving in the Rough Riders who had been killed in General Wheeler’s attack on Las Guásimas just one week before.

There was confusion from the beginning. Early on, Lawton ordered an artillery strike “on a column of Spanish troops, which appeared to be cavalry moving westward from El Caney.” They turned out to be friendly mounted Cuban insurgents moving to cut off the possible retreat of the Spaniards northward. Fortunately, that barrage was no more effective than the initial attempt to soften up the El Caney fortifications. After a short time, it was apparent—especially to the correspondents and foreign observers “embedded” with the front line troops—that the shelling was virtually useless in reducing the source of rifle fire raking the U.S. infantry that approached to within half a mile of El Caney.

The Americans had virtually no cover except for scrub brush and other light vegetation. Very soon, the attackers began paying the price of hurried preparations, poor planning, and technical deficiencies. While the Army’s regular infantrymen carried modern Krag-Jorgensen rifles, the 2d Massachusetts Infantry was still using the older Springfield rifles that were fired with black powder cartridges, whose telltale discharge revealed their users’ positions. The Bay Staters suffered terrible losses from the Spaniards’ smoke-free and accurate Mauser rifles and had to be withdrawn under a withering fire. Sir Arthur Lee, a British attache and combat veteran accompanying Chaffee’s brigade, sensed immediately that this fight would be determined by the foot soldier and that it would be long and bloody.

By early afternoon, with the sounds of battle undiminished to the north, Shafter and his aides recognized that reducing El Caney would take substantially longer than two hours. By then Brig. Gen. Jacob Kent’s infantry division and Wheeler’s dismounted cavalry division, led this day by Brig. Gen. Samuel S. Sumner, had approached the base of the ridges in front of Santiago. Aided by a barrage launched by a detachment of three Gatling guns commanded by 2d Lt. John H. Parker, the Americans charged the blockhouse atop San Juan Hill, driving its outnumbered defenders back toward Santiago. Around 1400 hours, as these attacks were succeeding, Shafter sent an aide to urge Lawton to break off his action, march to San Juan Hill, and join the main attack as soon as possible. Shafter’s note read, “I would not bother with the little block-houses. They can’t harm us... [You] should move on the city and form the right of the line.” Lawton, who had been enduring mounting losses while hammering away at El Viso and the blockhouses in El Caney for hours, undoubtedly concluded that a withdrawal under fire would be viewed as a defeat. Having become sufficiently angry about Spanish intransigence at El Caney, Lawton essentially ignored Shafter’s instructions, insisting, as he later wrote his wife, that he was “so hotly engaged with all my troops, that I could not do so at once.” Shafter would ultimately yield to the judgment his respected brother officer made on the field to persist with the capture of El Caney.

By this time, Capron’s battery had moved closer to the objective and his guns were blasting holes in the El Viso fort that anchored El Caney’s defenses. Lawton soon decided the time was right for an all-out effort. At roughly 1500 hours, the 12th Infantry,
supported by several companies of the 25th Infantry, moved forward and took El Viso by direct assault, leaving it, in the words of an eyewitness, “floored with dead Spaniards.” A *New York Times* reporter, reflecting the opinions of the accompanying foreign attachés and officers, described the final infantry assault on the stone fort as “the finest achievement of the entire war.”

After two more hours of conflict with Spanish troops in El Caney proper, where General Vara del Rey continued to rally his troops until he was shot through the legs, the battle finally concluded at 1700 hours. The Spaniards had fought heroically, virtually to the death. Of the garrison of 520 men, some 85, including General Vara del Rey, were killed, 150 wounded, and 120 captured; the rest either escaped to Santiago or sought refuge in the hills. Total American losses were even higher: 81 dead and 360 wounded, with Chaffee’s brigade suffering the heaviest losses. Lawton’s two hours had turned into twelve and produced a bloody, grinding, uninspired, poorly coordinated, and poorly supported infantry assault against a well-entrenched, strongly fortified position held by brave soldiers. In the end, the cumulative effect of hours of artillery pounding, an overwhelming numerical superiority of more than 12 to 1, the Spaniards’ dwindling supply of ammunition, and the wounding and ultimate death in battle of the Spanish commander decided the outcome. Despite the official pronouncements and public adulation that followed, this had not been a moment of great generalship—at least not on the American side.

With his ranks thinned and his men exhausted and disorganized, Lawton rested his troops, albeit only for several hours, and, consistent with his practice in pursuit of Geronimo, began before midnight an all-night forced march to reinforce the attack toward Santiago. A failure to reconnoiter the main road—one of the objectives of the attack—and a change of direction led to further delay. Lawton’s division arrived on the morning of 2 July, well after the battle of San Juan Hill had concluded, but luckily in time to help convince Shafter to hold his position, rather than withdraw, as the tired, sick, and physically exhausted commander considered doing.

A week after Lawton’s victory on the approach to Santiago, President McKinley followed the recommendation cabled to him a day earlier by General Shafter and promoted Lawton to major general of volunteers. An act of Congress passed on 7 July temporarily expanding the Inspector General’s Department, followed by a routine presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, also gave Lawton the permanent rank of colonel in the Regular Army. Lawton’s dream of being named a general in the Regular Army thus seemed within his grasp. Spanish Maj. Gen. José Toral y Vázquez finally surrendered Santiago on 17 July 1898, along with some 23,000 Spanish troops. Lawton served as one of the six commissioners, three from each side, who arranged the terms of the capitulation. Among the American goodwill gestures was the return to the Spaniards of the gallant General Vara del Rey’s sword and spurs.

Evaluation of Lawton’s generalship at El Caney has generally been offered as a sidebar to a critique of the overall Santiago campaign, especially the flawed performance of the Fifth Army Corps’s commander, General Shafter. Lawton did, however, have independent discretion over the attack on El Caney, and his performance should be analyzed in that context, if for no other reason than that the battles of 1 July 1898—especially the attack on San Juan and Kettle Hills—have entered popular mythology as great victories of American arms. The truth may be somewhat less enthusiastically stated: bravery, yes, but inspired military performance, no.

Contemporary scholars of Lawton’s major campaigns have not excused him from criticism. Graham Cosmas, in a fairly mild observation, wrote, “At El Caney, General Lawton certainly bears much responsibility for the delay in developing an effective attack and then the abandonment of fruits of belated victory.” Brian Linn is not so restrained, describing Lawton as “a self-pitying alcoholic who was often lost in the complexities of higher command.”

Lawton’s most serious mistake at El Caney was his faulty assessment of the enemy’s forces. Even after close personal reconnaissance should have revealed the depth and strength of their fortifications, he continued to underrate his opponent. While Lawton deserves some credit for conducting reconnaissance in the field—in sharp contrast to Shafter who was essentially disconnected from the battle—the results were poor. Lt. Col. Arthur L. Wagner, a father of modern military intelligence from whom Lawton received useful information about one of the approaches to El Caney after Shafter declined his services, observed that a handful of patrols would have helped spare an “infinitude of troubles” at El Caney. The excessive optimism expressed by Lawton at the 30 June commander’s conference, however, would be very costly to the men of Lawton’s division, especially Chaffee’s brigade. The defenders of El Caney were tough professionals, determined, brave, tenacious and well led. General Vara del Rey proved to be a heroic warrior and a worthy adversary who finally died while fighting wounded from a stretcher, along with two of his sons. In the words of his surviving aide, the Americans “fought like lions.” It is also true that they met heroes.

The assault plan as it developed had serious flaws. The piecemeal commitment of forces subjected the units that initiated the attack to disproportionate casualties. Lawton’s placement and use of his single artillery battery was faulty and certainly added to the time required to reduce the main defensive fortifications. The artillery played a limited role until late in the battle, and even when it was moved closer to the target, and its fire concentrated, it was not employed as part of a coordinated assault.

On the tactical level, the question remains whether an assault against El Caney was even necessary. A much smaller force could have isolated the fort and cut the Guantánamo road, thus eliminating the threat of reinforcement and allowing the main elements of the
division to support the primary attack against Santiago. When Shafter came to that realization and asked Lawton to shift his focus, Lawton ignored him and continued the attack. Shafter’s change in orders is powerful evidence that there was no real need to capture El Caney.

Like most senior Army officers, Lawton simply lacked any relevant experience or training in commanding large formations. Even those who had previously held high rank and did have such experience—General Wheeler, for example, had commanded a Confederate corps—were unfamiliar with modern techniques. Lawton’s largest prior combat command had been an understrength Civil War regiment, and that had been a third of a century before. Since that time considerable progress had been made in weapons, tactics, and doctrine, but most of the men who had persevered to enjoy high rank had not really kept up. Most, like Lawton, had little formal military education and little knowledge of, or practice in, combined arms tactics or the special logistics problems of leading large formations. Lawton basically attacked El Caney as if he had been his cavalry troop.

Lawton was far from unique in that regard, however, and this criticism is as much a general observation about the entire professional officer corps at the close of the nineteenth century as it is a specific criticism of Lawton. In the end, his well-earned reputation for determination, dogged perseverance, and single-minded pursuit of the mission was rewarded by general acclaim after El Caney fell, but his was one of the bloodiest engagements of the entire Cuban campaign. One of every three battle deaths that the U.S. Army suffered in Cuba in 1898 and 22.5 percent of the Army’s combat casualties in the Spanish-American War were incurred on the heights of El Caney.67

**A Career-Ending Scandal Barely Avoided**

Less than a month after U.S. forces took Santiago, the War Department established a military department for the area of Cuba that the United States controlled around that city and appointed Lawton as its commander. He would effectively head a military government of Cuba’s Santiago Province. Shortly before taking that post, Lawton had become involved in what became known as the “Round Robin Letter affair,” in which a number of Shafter’s subordinates, including Lawton, signed an unusually blunt missive to support their corps commander’s call for the withdrawal from Cuba of his increasingly unhealthy troops. Quickly leaked to the press, the letter did not enhance its signatories’ standing with the War Department, as it appeared to criticize the administration’s handling of American troops on the island. Before serving long as department commander, Lawton also began quarreling over the funding of public works projects in Santiago with his erstwhile companion of the frontier, now-Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood, who held a subordinate role in the department.68

The frustrations of his new assignment, and perhaps loneliness and other personal concerns, put increasing pressure on Lawton. By late September, he had fallen into his old habit of binge drinking. This time, however, Lawton’s behavior nearly ended his career. He went on a weeklong rampage, during which he assaulted several local citizens, including Santiago’s police chief, and nearly destroyed one of the city’s taverns in a brawl. A reporter for New York’s *Evening Sun* witnessed that episode and contacted his editor, William Mackay Laffan, before filing the story. A scandal of monumental proportions was avoided only because Laffan decided to quietly inform President McKinley of this episode rather than publish the story, and the president chose to give Lawton another chance, saving him from an ignominious, or at best, uncERemonious conclusion to his career.69

In early October, the War Department recalled Lawton to the United States, an action the press would later imply resulted from Lawton’s contracting a tropical fever once the campaign had ended.70 After accompanying President McKinley on a victory tour, during which he was able to regain the president’s trust by swearing to stop drinking, Lawton took command of the Fourth Army Corps, a kind of “probationary” assignment.71 According to Dean C. Worcester, a prominent member of the Philippine Commission who would befriend Lawton in Manila, he honored his pledge to McKinley and henceforth “never allowed a drop of alcoholic stimulant to pass his lips.”72

The administration’s effort to avoid embarrassment is as understandable as it is indefensible. Lawton’s outrageous behavior was clear evidence that he was prone to uncontrolled and dangerous outbursts and was unfit for further command. He should have been quietly retired as a Regular Army colonel on account of his reckless behavior. Instead, Lawton was given an important field command in the Philippines—America’s first major attempt to bring democracy to an Asian people.

The Philippine War—A Laboratory for Fighting Insurgency

On 19 January 1899, accompanied by his entire family, Lawton boarded the USS *Grant* and began a 55-day voyage to the Philippines. The newly appointed military commander there—Eighth Army Corps commander Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis—was not happy about Lawton’s appointment, although he was pleased with the two regiments that landed with the newcomer. The contrast between the tall, handsome, and charismatic Lawton and the dull, lumbering, and cautious Otis was not lost on the local press corps, which was critical of Otis’s policies and outraged by his ongoing attempts at censorship. They quickly embraced Lawton, lionizing his victories and ignoring his failings. The hero of El Caney had learned the importance of cultivating the correspondents, and soon they were suggesting that perhaps Lawton ought to be in charge.73

Otis’s early treatment left Lawton both disappointed and surprised. According to his friend, Robert Carter,
President McKinley had told Lawton that he was going to the Philippines to relieve Otis. It is more likely that the president, who supported Otis and a strategy of “benevolent assimilation,” offered a somewhat more vague assurance that in the event that Otis stepped down, Lawton would be the natural successor. Sometime between his discussions with the president and Lawton’s arrival in Manila, however, Otis had succeeded in reversing the negative sentiment in the press, and Lawton found himself a not very welcome subordinate. Still, Lawton’s ambition to succeed Otis persisted, fueled in part by his political and military supporters.

By the time Lawton arrived, the situation in the Philippines had exploded into large-scale hostilities with Manila itself under siege. The American military strategy was to secure the capital and other major population centers, initiate public works projects to cultivate good will, build up forces, and then take the field to isolate and defeat the army of about 30,000 men loyal to independence leader Emilio Aguinaldo, who had led an insurrection against Spanish rule in 1896–97. Otis began the war against Aguinaldo’s forces with fewer than 21,000 regulars and volunteers, too few to accomplish the mission, and domestic pressure to bring home the volunteers was growing. On 17 March 1899 Otis placed Lawton in command of the 1st Division, relieving Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Anderson, and in early April Otis allowed Lawton to take the field.

In his initial campaign, Lawton’s forces were organized into a provisional brigade comprising parts of several regular and volunteer regiments, numbering all together about 1,500 men and a few artillery pieces. With Lawton in overall command, the brigade steamed south up the Pasig River and across Laguna de Bay toward Santa Cruz, a major enemy stronghold in Luzon’s southern interior. On the second day of the operation, Brig. Gen. Charles King, Lawton’s tactical commander, suffered a heart attack, and Lawton quickly assumed direct control of his forces. He took Santa Cruz on 10 April 1899 and then marched south, taking other towns, only to abandon them all by 16 April in line with Otis’s orders.

Lawton took his eleven-year-old son Manley along on the expedition, and, after bullets struck the ground between the young boy’s feet, his father remarked to an officer, who expressed concern, “Why, sir, he would make a first class soldier right now! Did you see him under fire?” At one point, Lawton himself came under rifle fire from a single Filipino soldier who fired three times at the general from 30 yards away. It was a close call, but the newspapermen loved it. Despite the headlines proclaiming a great victory, however, the operation was a real eye opener for Lawton. After this encounter, he reckoned it would take 100,000 troops to pacify the islands. He was not far wrong. By the end of the war, nearly 125,000 Americans had served in the Philippines, and 4,000 did not return.

Within two weeks of the capture of Santa Cruz, Lawton’s men were back in the field, advancing north through the foothills and battling Filipino insurgents on the march. Making excellent use of the natural cover, the Filipinos had been so effectively harassing the communications of Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur’s 2d Division between Manila and San Fernando, some forty miles to the northwest, that they had halted his advance. Otis had hoped to have MacArthur and Lawton envelop the insurgents, but when Lawton’s advance to Norzag Baray in southern Bulacan Province proved arduous, Otis advised his 1st Division commander to halt until his logistics could be assured. Lawton, however, soon shaped the campaign to his will, pressing ahead on 1 May. In fighting reminiscent of his frontier days, he marched his men 120 miles in twenty days over poor roads and trails in unforgiving terrain, destroying the enemy’s supplies, capturing towns, traveling light, moving quickly. His forces finally took San Isidro, Aguinaldo’s new capital, on 17 May 1899, prompting President McKinley to send Otis a telegram instructing him to convey the commander-in-chief’s congratulations to Lawton and his men.

Along the way, on 6 May 1899, Lawton had hosted a town meeting that elected a local government in the village of Baligat, the first such U.S.-authorized government in the Philippines. Once again, however, Lawton’s tactics had nearly put his division out of action—by the time they took San Isidro the men were exhausted,
sick, and out of supplies. Just as he had done the previous month when Lawton had captured Santa Cruz, Otis recalled Lawton to Manila and allowed Aguinaldo’s forces to reenter San Isidro.79

The Bridge at Zapote River—“The Liveliest Engagement of the War”

Otis again sent Lawton into the field in early June 1899 with orders to attack insurgent forces active east and south of the capital. Lawton first drove east to Morong on the north shore of Laguna de Bay, scattering but not soundly defeating the 2,500 troops of Brig. Gen. Pio del Pilar operating in the area. Lawton then attacked south with 4,000 men toward Cavite, Aguinaldo’s hometown, to expand the security perimeter south of the capital. The insurgents made a determined stand at entrenchments on the west bank of the Zapote River, from which Philippine independence fighters had won a noteworthy victory against the Spanish in 1897. Here Lawton’s division faced “the largest and best organized body of men which has yet to meet American troops.” The battle started when “a large body of insurgents” ambushed and nearly surrounded two companies of the 21st Infantry that were reconnoitering in advance of the rest of the division, forcing the companies to retreat after losing two men killed and two officers and eleven enlisted men wounded. At the critical moment, Lawton arrived and rallied the men, personally picking up a rifle and shooting several enemy snipers hidden in the treetops. Finally, their ammunition exhausted, Lawton led the survivors back to the remainder of his division, carrying their wounded. Lawton then advanced again with his main force, and the fighting rapidly developed into the largest battle thus far in the war with the insurgents, with naval participation as well as at least one fierce artillery duel.80

Accurate American rifle and artillery fire proved decisive, the latter neutralizing the advantages of the Filipinos’ fortifications, from which the insurgents withdrew after engaging in what Lawton called, in its midst, “a beautiful battle.” An enemy rear guard, however, held off the Americans long enough for the main Filipino force to escape inland. Both sides suffered heavily. The Americans reported more than 54 casualties, including 8 killed, and Otis reported that enemy casualties exceeded 1,300.81
Shortly after the victory, Lawton implemented a well-publicized policy of turning power over to the local population by recognizing the municipal governments in Cavite Province, most notably that of the town of Imus, the center of the 1896 rising against the Spanish colonial regime. The Philippine Commission supported this policy and a member, Professor Dean C. Worcester, began to advise Lawton on civil matters. This effort was often cited as an example of Lawton’s views on winning the hearts and minds of the people. Coupled with the carrot was the stick. Lawton pushed hard for the recruitment of local forces, which could help fight the insurgency. One of Lawton’s subordinates, 1st Lt. Matthew Batson, formed such a unit in September 1899, drawn largely from a Pampanga Province town that became part of its name, the “Macabebe Scouts.”

In October Otis assigned Lawton to lead one of three U.S. Army elements he sent into north-central Luzon in an effort to finally surround, defeat, and capture Aguinaldo, his ministers, and the troops that protected them. Lawton’s division, spearheaded by a brigade led by Brig. Gen. Samuel Young, would advance north by river and road on a more easterly route through San Isidro, San José, and Tayug to San Fabian on Lingayen Gulf. At the same time General MacArthur’s division would advance further west along the rail line through Tarlac to Dagupan, just south of San Fabian, and Navy ships would land a force under Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton in the San Fabian–Dagupan area to intercept the insurgent leaders once MacArthur and Lawton had defeated their forces. Young recaptured San Isidro on 19 October, and he and Lawton pushed north, along the western edge of Luzon’s mountainous interior, seeking to block escape routes. MacArthur, meanwhile, took Tarlac, Aguinaldo’s new capital, on 12 November and Bayambang on 19 November, before reaching Dagupan the next day. Just six days before MacArthur had entered Bayambang, the Philippine independence leader had in that very town ordered his army to disperse and fight in small detachments. Aguinaldo then made a dash to the north and managed to pass through Pozorrubio just before Lawton and Wheaton closed the noose. Lawton sent Young after the insurgent leader, and although on 2 December a battalion under Maj. Peyton March caught up with and defeated Aguinaldo’s sixty-man select guard on the trail to the Tila Pass east of Salcedo, as the fleeing independence leader attempted to cross from the coastal Ilocos Norte province to the interior, the Americans failed to capture Aguinaldo.

The day before the battle of Tila Pass, Otis ordered Wheaton to report to Lawton’s headquarters to relieve him, so that Lawton could return to fight the insurgents still active nearer to Manila. Lawton then drove the troops of General Pio del Pilar from San Miguel in Bulacan Province. On 16 December Lawton returned to Manila to visit with his family before undertaking a new offensive aimed at recapturing San Mateo on the Mariquina River just eighteen miles northeast of the capital. The attack sought to permanently sever the lines of communication between insurgents in the northern and southern halves of Luzon, and this time, Lawton intended to take and hold the town. On the evening of 18 December 1899, before leaving for the field, Lawton met with his close aides and a trusted reporter, William Dinwiddie of *Harper’s*, at his Manila home, a grand Spanish colonial mansion. The conversation ranged over many subjects, political, military, and personal. Among the most painful was Lawton’s expressed disappointment over not having been promoted to general officer rank in the Regular Army. Lawton feared that he might be paying a price for having stated publicly that 100,000 troops would be required in the Philippines. Lawton said goodbye to his wife and children and rode all night in the rain with his escort from the 4th Cavalry, arriving on the outskirts of San Mateo at 0630 hours on 19 December 1899. Three hours later, he was dead.

Lawton’s body was returned to the United States, and his funeral in Washington and burial in Arlington National Cemetery on 9 February 1900 was a national event, attended by President McKinley and his entire cabinet, members of Congress, justices of the Supreme Court, hundreds of lesser ranking officials, all the senior Army and naval officers in the Washington area, and thousands of ordinary citizens. Tributes flowed from those who knew him. Retired Maj. Gen. Oliver Otis Howard, the one-armed Civil War hero, famed Indian fighter, peacemaker, and philanthropist who had been General Miles’s superior during the Geronimo campaign, mourned his
fallen comrade with a special poignancy, observing that his own son, Lt. Col. Guy Howard, who “loved General Lawton and often praised him without stint,” had been killed on 22 October 1899 while serving as Lawton’s chief quartermaster.85

Lawton was eulogized as a great warrior, but he was also described as a proponent of enlightened colonial administration. Sensitive to the political and social aspects of America’s new global role, Lawton was sympathetic to the Filipinos’ desire for independence and had been critical of some aspects of American policy, for example, the early “conquer and relinquish” strategy. His support for a benevolent approach, however, was essentially personal and rooted in his character, as he was anxious to “impress the inhabitants with the idea of our good intentions and destroy the idea that we are barbarians or anything of that sort.”96

Lawton supported the establishment of local government—as he demonstrated after his first Cavite campaign—and delegations from the towns and villages where he established civil rule presented wreaths at his Manila funeral and flowers to his widow.87 In a tribute shortly after Lawton’s death, Jacob G. Schurman, president of the Philippine Commission, said, “no man more loyally or cordially adopted the policy of conciliating the Filipinos. . . . He heartily advocated displacement of military power by civil government, in which the natives should manage their own affairs throughout all the regions in which American sovereignty has been established.”88

Lawton’s sympathy for the Philippine people, however, did not mean he sided with the anti-imperialists. In a November 1899 letter to former ambassador to Siam John Barrett published just after his death, Lawton wrote, “If I am shot by a Filipino bullet, it might as well come from one of my own men, because I know from observation, confirmed by captured prisoners, that the continuance of fighting is chiefly due to reports that are sent out from America.”89 At the beginning of America’s colonial experiment, Lawton was a proconsul who, while successful in war, also tried to establish the conditions that would make peace possible. Later soldiers turned rulers were not always so wise.

When assessing Lawton, it is easy to succumb to the seductive praise of contemporary admirers. Certainly, the catalogue of his heroic deeds rivals the most exciting adventure tales. But, against these appealing images, his limitations must also be measured, and they were considerable. The effects of his lack of professional education, a fundamental failure of enemy assessment, and a lack of experience with large force operations led to costly mistakes at El Caney. At the tactical level, his faulty field reconnaissance at El Caney and consistent lack of logistics planning are difficult to fathom, considering his long service as a company-grade infantry and cavalry officer and a quartermaster. His decision to take position there with his artillery—and to act as his own artillery officer—was a clear mistake on several levels. The artillery fire was initially ineffective and Lawton was in a poor location to coordinate his infantry brigades.

At the operational and command level, Lawton’s performance was scarcely exemplary. His disregard of Shafter’s order to break off the action at El Caney might have had a serious impact had the outcome of the 1 July attacks on the Santiago ridges been less successful. Lawton’s recurrent alcoholism, which flared up during his service as a military governor in Cuba and nearly ended his career, points to many unresolved conflicts. Finally, his field performance in the Philippines was mixed, although he understood the fundamental necessity for establishing a strong political effort as well as achieving military success. In the end, however, his core strengths as a soldier and a man—a strong personal code of honor, unflinching loyalty to his comrades and they to him, cool personal courage under fire, extraordinary physical endurance, and good will towards his fellow man—overshadowed his flaws. In several notable instances, even those who were once his enemies came to regard him with respect.

A dedicated soldier for almost forty years, Lawton died with relatively modest assets, but he was so respected and admired that ordinary citizens quickly raised $100,000 for the benefit of his widow and children. His boyhood home city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, erected a monument in his honor topped by a cannon he had captured in the Philippines. Fort Lawton, Washington, and Lawton, Oklahoma, were named in his honor.90

Henry Ware Lawton was the only general officer awarded the Medal of Honor during the Civil War to be killed in action, the first serving American general to be killed outside of North America, and the only serving general lost in the Philippine War.91 On the day before his death, his commission as a brigadier general in the Regular Army—the great prize that had seemingly eluded him—was being prepared in Washington by order of the president, and it was ready for submission to the Senate on the day he died.92 In a stroke of almost unbelievable irony, the Philippine forces Lawton faced at San Mateo were commanded by a general whose last name was Geronimo.93

The Author

Steven L. Ossad ended a successful 23-year Wall Street career as a technology analyst in January 2002 to work as an independent military historian and leadership consultant. As senior managing director of Applied Battlefield Concepts LLC, he now specializes in adapting the U.S. Army’s battlefield staff ride methodology to provide lessons in decision-making to senior corporate executives. He is the co-author of Major General Maurice Rose: World War II’s Greatest Forgotten Commander (Lanham, Md., 2003) and has contributed articles on heroes, leadership, and command failure to Army, Military Heritage, Military History, World War II, and WW II History magazines. He received a Distinguished Writing Award from the Army Historical Foundation for his article “Command Failures: Lessons Learned from Lloyd R. Fredendall,” which appeared in Army magazine in March 2003. Steve holds a master’s degree in political philosophy from the New School, a university in New York City, and another in business administration from Harvard Business School.
Notes
3. The Lawton Papers contain newspaper clippings and magazine articles from across the nation. Uniformly positive in tone, they begin just after the capture of Geronimo in 1886 and reach a crescendo in 1898–99. I have followed Brian Linn’s use of the name “Philippine War” for the struggle waged from 4 February 1899 to 4 July 1902, rather than any of the alternatives, Philippine Insurrection, Philippine-American War, or Filipino-American War. See Brian McAllister Linn, The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1989), p. xii.
5. Linn, The Philippine War, p. 123.
6. In his eulogy, Professor Melancthon Woolsey Stryker compared Lawton to Richard the Lion Heart, Bayard, and Gustavus Adolphus, all rolled up into one. See M. Woolsey Stryker, In Memoriam, Funeral Oration at Obsequies of Major General Henry W. Lawton, U.S. Volunteers (Washington, D.C., 1900).
7. After studying at the Art Student’s League in New York, in 1886 Remington went West to illustrate the campaigns of the U.S. Cavalry, beginning with Lawton’s pursuit of Geronimo. During the Spanish-American War, Remington worked as an artist/correspondent in Cuba, where he created images of Lawton and his men at El Caney. See Howard F. Kuenning et al., eds., Frederic Remington, The Soldier Artist (West Point, N.Y., 1979) and Peter H. Hassrick and Melissa J. Webster, Frederic Remington: A Catalogue Raisonne of Paintings, Watercolors, and Drawings, 2 Vols. (Cody, Wyo., 1996).
9. Fort Wayne College has become Taylor University.
21. Bvt Maj Gen William Grose to Stanton, 8 Dec 1865; Maj Gen D. S. Stanley to Stanton, 19 Sep 1865; Bvt Maj Gen Nathan Kimball to Brig Gen L.
Thomas, 9 Sep 1865; Lt Col A. J. Slemmers to Lawton, 3 May 1867, all in box 1; “Certificate of Enrollment of Henry W. Lawton,” Harvard University, 15 Sep 1866, box 3, and “Certificate of Attendance and Recommendation for Henry W. Lawton by Prof. Joel Parker, Royall Professor of Law,” Harvard University, 6 May 1867, box 4, all in Lawton Papers;


25. 1st Ind, Mackenzie to General William T. Sherman, 25 Jun 1876 (quote), to Lawton to Mackenzie, 19 Jun 1876, box 1, Lawton Papers. Mackenzie remained Lawton’s regimental commander until his promotion to brigadier general in 1882, and he named Lawton to his staff when serving as commander in 1881 of the Department of Arkansas and in 1882–83 of the District of New Mexico. See Cullum, Biographical Register, 2: 841; Mackenzie to Brig Gen R. C. Drum, Adjutant General of the Army, 7 May 1881, and GO 11, District of New Mexico, 23 Oct 1883, box 1, Lawton Papers.


27. Army Register 1880, pp. 24, 123; R. S. Mackenzie, “Endorsement on an Application for appointment to the rank of Captain and Assistant Quartermaster,” 25 Jun 1876, box 1, Lawton Papers.


45. Miles to the Adjutant General of the Army, 18 Feb 1888; Stanley to President Grover Cleveland, 20 Dec 1887; Holabird to the Secretary of War, Dec 1887; Isaac P. Gray, Governor of Indiana, to Secretary of War William Endicott, 22 Dec 1887; L. S. Ross, Governor of Texas, to the Secretary of War, 24 Jan 1888; C. Meyer Zulick, Governor of Arizona Territory, to the president, 23 March 1888; Edmund G. Ross, Governor of New Mexico, to the president, 6 Jan 1888; Congressional delegation of Indiana to Endicott, 25 Feb 1888; Congressional delegation of Texas to the secretary of war, 6 Feb 1888; Col Z. R. Bliss, 24th Infantry, to whom it may concern, 14 Dec 1887; Leonard Wood to Lawton, 10 Dec 1887, all in box 1, Lawton Papers; Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year 1888, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1888), 1: 98–99; David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1775–1903 (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 306, 318. The Indiana congressman who did not join in recommending Lawton was Jonas G. Howard.


48. Lt, Lawton to the Adjutant General of the Army, 14 Apr 1898 (quote), with 1st Ind, General Breckinridge, 14 Apr 1898, and 2d Ind, General Miles to Secretary of War Alger, 15 Apr 1898, box 3, Lawton Papers.


61. McKinley effected on 8 July 1898 all six of the promotions recommended the previous day by Shafer. Among those promoted to major general, Chaffee and Bates had also fought at El Caney. Colonel Wood, whose regiment gained fame at San Juan Hill, became a brigadier general. See telegram, Shafer to Alger, 7 Jul 1898, printed in Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, 2 vols. (reprint ed., Washington, D.C., 1993), 1: 104; GO 96, Adjutant General’s Office, Headquarters of the Army, 13 Jul 1898, p. 5; Official Army Register for 1900 (Washington, D.C., 1899), p. 9.


64. Ibid., p. 145; Linn, The Philippine War, p. 101.


69. Lane, Armed Progressive, p. 64–65.

70. Ibid., p. 64; Matthews, “Henry W. Lawton,” p. 4. In this biographical account published after Lawton’s death, Matthews reported that in Cuba Lawton’s “health became impaired after the fighting, and he took a rest.” With most of the occupation forces in Cuba suffering from various tropical diseases as well as exhaustion, it was a plausible explanation.
75. Linn, The Philippine War, pp. 42–64, 88–90, 95, 101–02.
80. “All-Day Battle with Filipinos,” New York Times, 14 Jun 1899 (quotes); Linn, Philippine War, pp. 118–20; Annual Reports of the War Department for 1899, vol. 1, pt. 4, pp. 137–38; ibid., pt. 5, pp. 368–69. General Otis termed the Filipino defeat of the Spanish at the Zapote River a “great victory” for that independence movement and dated the battle to 1896. A modern history of the Philippine War of 1896–98, Andrés Mas Chao, La Guerra Olvidada de Filipinas, 1896–1898 (Madrid, 1997), p. 118, places the unsuccessful Spanish effort to cross the Zapote River on 9 March 1897 and downplays the battle’s military importance. As one of the few Filipino victories against a substantial body of Spanish troops, however, this battle assumed significant moral importance for the insurgents as they resumed their struggle against the Americans.
81. Annual Reports of the War Department for 1899, vol. 1, pt. 4, pp. 138–39, quote, p. 138; Linn, Philippine War, p. 120.

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“If you need combat soldiers, and especially if you need them in a hurry, don’t put your time upon Negroes.”¹

Retired Maj. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, 1925

“I feel that in existing circumstances I cannot deny the Negro volunteer a chance to serve in battle.”²

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 7 January 1945
On 24 March 1945 the 14th Armored Division completed its drive through a heavily defended portion of the West Wall in the Rhenish Palatinate and reached the town of Germersheim, Germany, on the Rhine. Like most of the combat divisions in the European Theater of Operations, the 14th at this point was sorely in need of replacements, particularly infantry riflemen. Three days later, four platoons of hastily trained, replacement infantry riflemen that had been combined to form the Seventh Army Infantry Company Number 4 (Provisional) arrived in the division’s rear area at Altenstadt in northern Alsace, France, and joined the division. Each of the 240 soldiers who stood in this company’s ranks was an African American enlisted man who had volunteered for combat duty as an infantry rifleman.

Initially, the new company was attached to the division’s 19th Armored Infantry Battalion (AIB), but division headquarters reassigned the unit to Combat Command R, where it became known as CCR Rifle Company. Although the war against Germany was entering its final phase, the volunteers would have ample opportunity to prove themselves in combat, not only to the enemy, but also to themselves and to their white comrades in arms. CCR Rifle Company served in combat from 1 April to 8 May 1945. Only the severe and growing shortage of infantry riflemen that plagued the American ground forces after the Normandy landings made such an opportunity possible.

Shortages of Replacement Infantry Riflemen

The hard fighting in which the Army engaged in the dense hedgerows of Normandy produced substantially higher losses among infantry riflemen than American military planners had anticipated. The infantry replacements arriving from the United States quickly proved insufficient to compensate for these combat losses, and by the end of July 1944 the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), had developed a sufficient shortage of infantry riflemen to ask the War Department for emergency shipments. In November 1944, as American ground forces intensively renewed their efforts to advance into Germany, the number of American casualties, particularly among infantry riflemen, escalated dramatically, and the shortage grew even more severe. Theater strength planners concluded that ETOUSA might have a deficit of more than 53,000 infantrymen, mostly riflemen, by February 1945. Stimulated to action, the theater initiated training courses to convert infantry replacement personnel who were not trained as riflemen to the required specialization, to convert combat personnel in other branches to infantry riflemen, and to retrain selected support personnel and replacements to serve as infantry riflemen. The theater subsequently cut by half or more the training time required to convert other specialties to riflemen. It also urged the War Department to increase the rate at which it was shipping replacement riflemen from the United States but had little success in this endeavor due to the virtual exhaustion of the available manpower pool.

Despite these efforts, losses continued to exceed the supply of replacements. Once the German Army launched its counteroffensive in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944, the shortage of infantry riflemen quickly reached critical proportions. As the casualty rates soared, so too did the shortage of replacements. A week after the German offensive began, the theater estimated that by the end of the month its combat divisions would be operating with just 78 percent of their authorized rifle strength. The senior officers in the theater, realizing that more had to be done to increase the supply of riflemen, redoubled their efforts to locate and use additional sources of manpower.

Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, commander of the theater’s Communications Zone, recognized that the large number of African American service troops in his command represented a previously untapped source of potential replacements for infantry riflemen. During World War II, the Army assigned most of its black soldiers to service units, influenced substantially by criticism of the combat record in World War I of the 92d Division, one of two comprised of black enlisted personnel. Lt. Gen. Robert L. Bullard, whose Second Army had included

Photo at left: Volunteer African American infantrymen march through Noyon, France, en route to their training area, 28 February 1945
forces continued the costly struggle in the Ardennes, Eisenhower faced another crisis nearly 100 miles away in northeastern France. There, during the waning hours of 31 December 1944, the German Army initiated a fierce 25-day battle in Lorraine and Alsace when it launched Operation NORDWIND, opening the last major German offensive of the war against the thinly spread lines of the Seventh Army. Thus as 1945 began, all three army groups under Eisenhower’s control were engaged in heavy fighting defending large portions of a broad front. On 7 January 1945 Eisenhower wrote to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that “we must expect” the Germans to launch additional attacks. “It is imperative,” Eisenhower wrote, “that we meet this all out German effort by an all out effort of our own. To meet this possible eventuality drastic steps are being taken in this theater: (a) To comb out personnel from the Communications Zone, Lines of Communications units, and Army Air Forces and to train these personnel as replacements for combat units, (b) To convert units which are the least essential to our requirements, (c) To make the maximum use of liberated manpower, both for combat and rear area duties . . .” Beyond his own efforts, Eisenhower asked the Combined Chiefs to send him more combat units, including the two American divisions he understood had not been allocated and any regiments or brigades that could be spared from the United States and the United Kingdom; to consider diverting combat units from other theaters to the European Theater; to equip three existing and two planned French divisions; and finally, “that the maintenance of the fighting efficiency of ground and air forces in this theater be assured by the prompt provision of the necessary ammunition and replacements in personnel and material.”

Receiving no instructions to the contrary, Eisenhower rewrote a memorandum prepared by General Lee and Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, the Army’s senior black officer who was serving on the European Theater staff, announcing to Communications Zone troops that black soldiers who wished to volunteer would be accepted for replacements, Eisenhower observed that he had more than 100,000 black service troops in his theater and concluded, “I feel that in existing circumstances I cannot deny the Negro volunteer a chance to serve in battle.” Addressing the Army’s segregation policies, Eisenhower added, “If volunteers are received in numbers greater than needed by existing Negro combat units I will organize them into separate battalions for temporary attachment to divisions and rotation through front line positions. This will preserve the principle [segregation] for which I understand the War Department stands and will still have a beneficial effect in meeting our infantry needs.”

Receiving no instructions to the contrary, Eisenhower rewrote a memorandum prepared by General Lee and Brig. Gen. Benjamin O. Davis, the Army’s senior black officer who was serving on the European Theater staff, announcing to Communications Zone troops that black soldiers who wished to volunteer would be accepted for training as infantry riflemen. General Lee promptly instituted the program with the following stipulations:

- Only volunteers with Army General Classification Test scores falling within the top four categories would be accepted.
• Only volunteers in the rank of private or private first class would be accepted. However, noncommissioned officers who wished to volunteer could do so by accepting a demotion to private first class.

• No more than 3.5 percent of the enlisted personnel in any individual unit could volunteer.\(^\text{12}\)

The Eisenhower-Lee-Davis memorandum offered potential volunteers nothing but the opportunity to fight for their country. In response to Eisenhower’s offer, 4,562 black soldiers volunteered in January and February 1945 for the most hazardous combat assignment in the Army’s ground forces, that of infantry rifleman. Among them were the men destined to serve in CCR Rifle Company, 14th Armored Division. Because of the 3.5 percent limit on personnel from any single unit and the lack of available training facilities, not all of those who volunteered could be accepted. Most of the volunteers came from six military occupational specialties: truck driver, duty soldier, basic, longshoreman, construction foreman, and cargo checker. Many were noncommissioned officers who offered to take the reduction in rank required for their acceptance.\(^\text{13}\)

The Ground Force Reinforcement Command trained approximately 3,200 African American volunteers as infantry riflemen.\(^\text{14}\) Training was conducted at the 16th Reinforcement Depot at Compiègne, France, 45 miles northeast of Paris. The installation could not accommodate all of the black volunteers at one time, so they were instructed in two successive groups with the smaller, second group waiting until late February to begin training. In order to produce as many replacements as possible in the shortest time, all soldiers, black and white, who were being converted from specialties other than infantry, received only four weeks of training. The black volunteers received training in basic weapons and tactics at the squad and platoon levels. Additional training at the company and battalion levels, as Eisenhower had evidently envisioned, proved impossible as the Ground Force Reinforcement Command was capable of training individual replacements only in units no larger than platoons.\(^\text{16}\)

Eisenhower advised General Marshall of this problem in early February saying, “Because of lack of time and facilities to train specialists, it appears that I’ll have to use negro volunteers by platoons.” With this decision Eisenhower substantially set aside the Army’s policy of segregation of enlisted men in regimental organizations, as the African American platoons would have to fight with white companies and battalions. Once again, General Marshall did not object.\(^\text{15}\)

The African American soldiers that completed training by 1 March were organized into 37 platoons. The 12th Army Group received 25 of these platoons, which were assigned to various infantry divisions, primarily reporting to the First Army. Each platoon was then assigned to a white company, where it was used as a fourth rifle platoon. The remaining 12 platoons arrived in the 6th Army Group’s area of operations on 10 March and were assigned to the Seventh Army. The army’s commander, Lt. Gen. Alexander Patch, ordered the platoons combined to form four-platoon companies designated as Seventh Army Infantry Companies (Provisional), Nos. 1–3. All three companies were then assigned to the 12th Armored Division, which, having lost an entire armored infantry battalion in January 1945, had a critical need of infantry riflemen. A few weeks later, sixteen more platoons left the 16th Reinforcement Depot. Of these, four platoons went to 6th Army Group’s Seventh Army where they were combined to create Seventh Army Infantry Company (Provisional) No. 4, before being assigned to the 14th Armored Division.\(^\text{16}\)

When this company joined the division at Altenstadt, it had no officers or, for that matter, anyone ranking above private first class. The division, therefore, provided a command staff for the company using white officers and noncommissioned officers drawn from its three armored infantry battalions.\(^\text{17}\) These units had suffered a considerable number of casualties since November 1944 while fighting primarily in northeastern France, and by late March they were understrength in junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Thus, the levees placed on the battalions for officers and

\[\text{A former first sergeant in an engineer unit, top, and a former staff sergeant in the Quartermaster Corps, bottom, receive training as volunteer infantry privates, February 1945.}\]
noncommissioned officers were an added burden, which promotions from within and the replacement system, would, at best, be slow to correct.

The division assigned Capt. Derl J. Hess of Headquarters, 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, to command the new company. Captain Hess had commanded his battalion’s Company C from shortly after the formation of the division at Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, in November 1942 until December 1944. He had been serious about his duties and responsibilities as a company commander and had a reputation for being very strict with his men. Although Captain Hess’s company had been in several firefights since arriving at the front, it did not receive its “formal battle christening” until mid-December 1944, when the battalion was ordered to attack a strongly defended portion of the West Wall. During the five-day struggle to breach the German defenses, Captain Hess “broke down under fire” and was relieved of command. He was clearly a poor choice to lead inexperienced troops in combat.18

While some headquarters preferred to assign officers from Southern states to lead black soldiers, the 14th Armored Division gave its CCR Rifle Company a complement of six officers and five noncommissioned officers from geographically diverse origins. (See Table.) Four of the officers were Southerners, but the company commander and the noncommissioned officers were not.19

To further compound the problems of command, CCR Rifle Company received only five noncommissioned officers of the twenty-seven authorized for an armored infantry company by the applicable table of organization and equipment.20 The personnel shortages in the division’s armored infantry battalions prevented the transfer of additional white noncommissioned officers to the new company. The theater eventually agreed to allow the divisions to promote black soldiers to fill these critical vacancies, but this permission did not arrive before victory in Europe had been achieved.21 Without the stability and control provided by some form of noncommissioned officer leadership, the company’s squads could not have functioned properly in combat. Evidently, the natural leaders among the company’s enlisted men, including those who had been noncommissioned officers before volunteering for combat duty, unofficially assumed leadership roles on their own accord, at least while in combat.22

The 240 enlisted men of CCR Rifle Company reported to the division without weapons, equipment, or even enough clothing. Working with the Seventh Army G–4, the division equipped the new company as well as it could at a time when many items, including radios, half-tracks, and trucks, were in short supply. When the black troops arrived, the division had just completed its mission in Operation UNDERTONE, the Seventh Army operation to breach the West Wall and clear the west bank of the Rhine within its zone of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>19th AIB</th>
<th>62d AIB</th>
<th>68th AIB</th>
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Source: Dickson, History of 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, p. 97.
The division was in the process of reorganizing and reequipping in preparation for crossing the Rhine and only with difficulty could it locate the necessary equipment and supplies and make them available for issue. As a result, much of the equipment given to the company was in poor condition. Many of the weapons drawn from division stores were battle-worn and required cleaning and repair before they were ready for use in combat. Even some of the clothing issued was worn and in need of mending. The G–4 did manage to issue 500 division patches to the new company, enough to enable each soldier to affix the item to the left shoulder of two sets of combat uniforms.

**Operations of CCR Rifle Company**

Under the supervision of their white officers and noncommissioned officers, the soldiers of CCR Rifle Company hurriedly readied themselves and their equipment for action. On 1 April 1945, just four days after joining the division, they accompanied Combat Command R as it crossed the Rhine River near Worms and rushed headlong into the final battles of the war against Germany. Regardless of color, the men of the 14th Armored Division would soon discover that although the war was nearly over, there was still plenty of fighting left to be done.

On 3 April CCR Rifle Company was attached to the combat command’s 25th Tank Battalion. The two units would fight side by side, except on one or two days, until the end of the war. The company first saw action on the night of 9 April when its 2d Platoon joined elements of the 25th Tank Battalion in an attack on Frickenhausen, a village 25 miles north of Schweinfurt in northern Bavaria. The attack met only light resistance and ended quickly. Two enemy soldiers were killed and seven others were captured.

Three days later, the 2d and 4th Platoons, led by 1st Lt. George Irwin and 2d Lt. Raymond Gravelle, fought the company’s “first real engagement” at Lichtenfels, a town about 10 miles southeast of Coburg. At 1000 hours on 12 April, Combat Command R reached the Main River across from Lichtenfels and found the bridge into it destroyed. Covered by a smoke screen laid down by the mortar platoon of the 25th Tank Battalion, the black infantrymen forded the river under fire and entered the town. Supported by the tanks of the battalion’s Company C firing across the river, they succeeded in taking the town “after a brisk fight.”

Guarding the long, exposed left flank of the Seventh Army, the 14th Armored Division continued its rapid advance, crossing the Bayreuth-Munich autobahn just south of Bayreuth. Its mission was to cut the autobahn and secure the left flank of the 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions as they moved to attack the relatively well defended...
city of Nuremburg. Late on 14 April the armored division’s 94th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, less Troops B and C, reached Creussen, seven miles south of Bayreuth. The squadron was several miles in advance of the main body of Combat Command R when it settled into the town for the night. In the early morning hours of the 15th, the squadron found itself in the midst of a sizeable counterattack. The attacking force, **Gruppe Grafenwoehr**, named for the nearby panzer training center, consisted of two battalions of infantry and 35 tanks. The German force quickly surrounded Creussen and, with it, the 94th Cavalry Squadron.\(^{28}\)

On learning of the situation, Combat Command R ordered two platoons of medium tanks from Company B, 25th Tank Battalion, and the 4th Platoon of CCR Rifle Company to reinforce the 94th. About one mile west of Creussen, near the town of Gottsfeld, this small armored-infantry task force came under heavy fire from enemy tanks. Two of the ten medium tanks in the American column were destroyed, and two more were damaged. With their supporting tanks held up by enemy fire, the 4th Platoon went ahead to clear Gottsfeld. The soldiers attacked the town across a broad, open field. They were met by small-arms fire as they advanced. Entering Gottsfeld they were subjected to “considerable enemy artillery” fire but managed to clear the town by mid-afternoon. Three soldiers from the 4th Platoon were wounded in the fighting. Unfortunately, they did not receive prompt medical attention because the company did not have its own medics. Improvising, Sgt. Robert Lavelle confiscated a truck to transport the wounded men back to an aid station. Just before dark, the remaining American tanks arrived on the outskirts of Gottsfeld, where they were again taken under fire by enemy tanks located in a nearby woods. In the ensuing fight, five German Mark IV tanks were destroyed. Having eliminated enemy resistance at Gottsfeld, the small task force moved out at 1700 to join the 94th in the defense of Creussen. Its actions that day, the battalion’s journal reported, “helped considerable [sic] towards relieving the situation in Creussen.”\(^{29}\)

The 94th, meanwhile, remained under substantial pressure from the larger enemy force. When the squadron had first entered Creussen, it liberated some 600 forced laborers who had been working in a large munitions factory. Among them were a number of Czechs who were eager to help fight the Germans. The squadron’s commander, Maj. George W. England, who had graduated from West Point the year before the United States entered the war, quickly accepted their services as infantrymen. Equipping his “irregulars” with weapons presented no problem. They were armed with the very rifles and ammunition they had been obliged to manufacture for the Germans. The 94th had also been helped by the timely arrival of a company of the division’s 62d Armored Infantry Battalion shortly before the first German attack. The arrival late on 15 April of the 4th Platoon of CCR Rifle Company and the two platoons of tanks further bolstered the town’s defenses. At times completely surrounded by the enemy, the squadron called in repeated air strikes, which succeeded in knocking out some of the German tanks. When the German attacks pressed uncomfortably close to the American defenses, they were broken up by the massed fires of division artillery. Some German soldiers managed to enter the town, where they took up defensive positions in some of the houses, but they were quickly killed or captured by the Americans and their “irregular” infantry.\(^{30}\) The historian of Combat Command R, Maj. Leland J. Whipple, summarized the actions at Creussen as follows: “Reinforced by CC ‘R’ Rifle Company, the squadron beat back all attacks successfully and destroyed 19 enemy tanks to a loss of two for itself.” Martin Burke, who as a first lieutenant had been a platoon commander with the 94th at Creussen, observed later that CCR Rifle Company was among the most notable of the units that reinforced the squadron at Creussen, all of which “performed admirably and we could not have gotten out of the hole we dug without them.” Official Army historian Charles MacDonald reported, “Within two days, **Gruppe Grafenwoehr** had ceased to exist.”\(^{31}\)
For the next few days, two platoons of tanks from Company C, 25th Tank Battalion, and two platoons of CCR Rifle Company patrolled in and around the towns of Gottsfeld and Creussen. These patrols captured twenty-seven enemy soldiers. In addition, they killed one and wounded two others who chose not to surrender. On 18 April CCR Rifle Company was placed in division reserve along with the rest of Combat Command R. While in reserve, the soldiers of CCR Rifle Company manned roadblocks and outposts in two small towns.\(^{32}\)

On the afternoon of 20 April, Combat Command R moved to join the rest of the division south of Nuremberg, where German resistance had ended that day. Their mission was to move south along the autobahn to secure a bridgehead across the Danube River. By late afternoon, the leading elements of the column, which consisted of one platoon of medium tanks from Company C, 25th Tank Battalion, and a platoon of infantry from CCR Rifle Company, had advanced to a point on the autobahn less than a mile south of the village of Altenfelden, when a German force of unknown strength opened fire on it from positions in and around Allersberg, a mile and a half to the east of the highway. CCR Rifle Company was ordered to advance and clear Allersberg. Before it had gone very far, the company’s 4th Platoon was hit by heavy small-arms and artillery fire. One soldier was killed, and five were wounded in the fusillade. The intense enemy fire compelled both the battalion and the black infantrymen to pull back about 1,000 yards. Combat Command R then assumed defensive positions for the night in Altenfelden, while its 501st Armored Field Artillery Battalion fired on Allersberg and nearby enemy positions from time to time during the night. This action initiated a three-day battle.\(^{33}\)

After the fall of Nuremberg, several German divisions, including the 17th SS Panzergrenadier, had concentrated near Allersberg, fifteen miles southeast of Nuremberg.\(^{34}\) Although badly depleted in men and material, these exhausted German organizations proved that they could still fight. Before the battle ended, two of the 14th Armored Division’s three combat commands had joined the engagement. CCR Rifle Company played a prominent role throughout the fighting.

Just after sunrise on 21 April, three enemy tanks moved onto the high ground southeast of Allersberg and opened fire on targets in Altenfelden. Gunfire from the American tanks and tank destroyers there neutralized two of the enemy tanks. The combat command then attempted to resume its march south on the autobahn. At the
front of the column were a platoon of tanks from Company C, 25th Tank Battalion, and the black infantrymen of 1st Platoon, CCR Rifle Company. Shortly after 0900 hours, as the column reached a road junction on the autobahn just west of Allersberg, it came under heavy fire from German artillery and tanks. CCR Rifle Company lost two vehicles and suffered several casualties.\(^{35}\)

As the two lead platoons began clearing the road junction, the remaining three platoons of CCR Rifle Company pushed on to the nearby town of Polsdorf. The German gunners opened fire on the infantrymen as they raced through the deadly intersection mounted in their open, 2½-ton trucks. Fortunately, none of these vulnerable vehicles was hit, and there were no casualties. Others in the column were not so fortunate. A medium tank and a tank destroyer were knocked out by antitank fire as they attempted to cross the intersection. So great was the volume of the antitank fire that swept the intersection that the tankers of Company C nicknamed it “88 Junction,” after the 88-mm. antitank rounds fired at it by a German Mark VI Tiger tank.\(^{36}\)

Inside the stricken American medium tank, the crew scrambled to exit their vehicle. Opening the hatches, they were met with a hail of accurate machine-gun and small-arms fire that effectively prevented their escape. Trapped inside their tank, the men waited in fear of being hit by another antitank round. Seeing that the tank crew was trapped, soldiers from the 1st Platoon of CCR Rifle Company braved the heavy enemy fire and made their way to the immobilized tank. Talking with the vehicle’s commander via the tank’s external communications system, the infantrymen learned the general location of the enemy machine gun. They went after it. In a brief firefight, they succeeded in knocking out the machine gun, killing and capturing several enemy soldiers in the process. No longer pinned inside by the German machine gun, the crew exited their tank and made their way back to Altenfelden.\(^{37}\) Once there, the tankers found their safety to be tenuous, at best.

At 0915, while the road junction remained under attack, division solders still in Altenfelden spotted approximately 100 enemy troops moving toward the town. Supported by artillery fire, small groups of SS soldiers soon began to make their way into Altenfelden, where they sewed confusion and inflicted a few casualties. Combat Command R responded with an urgent radio call for reinforcements. As most of the 25th Tank Battalion had not yet reached “88 Junction,” the bulk of the unit was able to return to Altenfelden without additional losses, but of the four platoons of CCR Rifle Company, only the 3d managed to rejoin the battalion there. Two companies of the 62d Armored Infantry Battalion joined these black infantrymen in the support of the 25th Tank Battalion in Altenfelden.\(^{38}\)

Despite being subjected to accurate shelling by German artillery, the elements of Combat Command Reserve in Altenfelden managed to defeat the attacking Germans by 1500 hours. An attack the Americans launched toward Allersberg an hour later, however, proved unsuccessful. The combat command lost two tanks, a tank destroyer, and an assault gun in the defense of the town on 21 April.\(^{39}\)

As the fighting subsided in Altenfelden, a platoon of Company C, 25th Tank Battalion, accompanied by the 2d and 4th Platoons of CCR Rifle Company, advanced down the autobahn to Göggelsbuch, two miles south of Altenfelden. Later that evening, the 1st Platoon of CCR Rifle Company joined the American forces in Göggelsbuch. Combat Command R issued orders for the units in Göggelsbuch to attack Allersberg the following morning, 22 April. During the night, American XV Corps and 14th Armored Division artillery bombarded the German forces in Altenfelden in preparation for the impending attack.\(^{40}\)

The attacking force consisted of six platoons of infantry, three from CCR Rifle Company and three from Company A, 62d Armored Infantry Battalion, which had arrived the previous day in response to the combat command’s call for reinforcements. The infantrymen were supported by eight medium tanks manned by Company C, 25th Tank Battalion, two assault guns, and one tank destroyer. CCR Rifle Company led the attack. Moving from Göggelsbuch through a wooded area toward Allersberg, the black infantrymen were confronted at close range by two Tiger tanks that had been concealed among the buildings at the edge of town. The black soldiers held their ground, firing on the advancing tanks with their rifles and submachine guns, while their bazooka teams took up positions and opened fire. Several bazooka rounds found their targets but did not penetrate the thick armor of the German tanks. As the enemy tanks closed to within 15 yards of the infantry positions, Pfc. Percy Smith of the 1st Platoon fired his bazooka and succeeded in disabling one of the Tigers. Private Smith was killed by return fire from the same tank, and other soldiers were wounded. Both
infantry companies were then ordered to withdraw and return to Gögelsbuch. As before, without medics of their own, CCR Rifle Company’s wounded men had to wait for medical treatment until 1st Lt. George Whiten could arrange for their evacuation to the rear.\(^{41}\)

The infantry units that attacked Allersberg in the morning launched another attack on the town at 1630 hours. This time the attack was supported by the tanks of Company B, 25th Tank Battalion, firing from positions near Altenfelden. CCR Rifle Company again led the attack, with the three platoons of Company A, 62d Armored Infantry Battalion, in direct support. The infantrymen were met with heavy fire from tanks, machine guns, and small arms, and this time they made little headway. The attackers withdrew as darkness approached, and CCR Rifle Company arrived in Altenfelden at 2000 hours.\(^{42}\)

Because of the continued enemy resistance at Allersberg, division headquarters assigned the direction of the attack to Combat Command A and ordered Combat Command R to move on to the southeast. The 25th Tank Battalion and CCR Rifle Company were attached to Combat Command A. During the night, enemy troops cut the autobahn yet again, this time north of Altenfelden. The following morning, two platoons of CCR Rifle Company led another attack on Allersberg. They soon discovered that the bulk of the German defenders had withdrawn during the night, and the black infantrymen captured the town, overcoming what the operations journal of the 25th Tank Battalion described as “light, fanatical resistance.”\(^{43}\)

At a time when organized German opposition was collapsing all across the front, the three-day battle at Allersberg had been particularly fierce. The fighting there impressed even the veterans of the 62d Armored Infantry Battalion, whose unit history reported that the battalion’s “A Company made the attack with CCR Rifle Company (Colored). They will long remember the fighting there and the Krauts [sic] ‘Tiger’ tanks.” Maj. Leland Whipple, the S–2 (intelligence officer) of Combat Command R, who also served as its historian, characterized the fighting at Allersberg as “one of the most intense and savage of all battles participated in by CC ‘R.’ ”\(^{44}\)

CCR Rifle Company led each of the attacks on Allersberg, but the unit was not to blame for the repeated failures in capturing the strongly defended town. As Maj. William E. Shedd III, the S–3 of the 25th Tank Battalion, observed in his battalion’s operations journal on 22 April, “More Infantry was needed to make a successful attack.” A 1942 Military Academy graduate who would serve as an Army major general from 1970 to 1977, Shedd was a competent analyst.\(^{45}\)

On 15 April General Eisenhower issued orders that moved further west; the zones of advance of the Seventh and Third Armies as they began offensive operations aiming deep into southern Germany. This reorientation left the 14th Armored Division within the zone of advance newly assigned to the Third Army. General Patch and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., the Third Army’s commander, met the following day and agreed to transfer the 14th to Patton’s army. The division was transferred to the Third Army on 23 April and remained attached to it until after victory was achieved in Europe.\(^{46}\)

On 24 April CCR Rifle Company advanced south a dozen miles through Untermässing to Schutzendorf. Learning that a group of enemy soldiers were in the woods nearby, the company’s officers ordered patrols from each platoon to sweep the woods. Within an hour, they returned, having captured eight enemy soldiers and killed several more. Afterwards, another patrol, made up of men who volunteered for the duty, reentered the woods and captured four more prisoners. CCR Rifle Company and the 25th Tank Battalion returned to the control of Combat Command R on 27 April, crossed the Danube River at Ingolstadt, and moved to Furth, 35 miles northeast of Munich. Over the next two days, rifle company patrols in this area captured 42 prisoners.\(^{47}\)

On the afternoon of 29 April, Combat Command R advanced another five miles to the small town of Altdorf, leaving it just three miles northwest of the Isar River city of Landshut. Its mission was to clear the portion of the city on the north side of the river and establish a bridgehead to the south. That evening a rifle platoon of Company A, 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, made a probing attack into the outskirts of Landshut. The platoon soon ran into strong resistance and was forced to fall back to Altdorf. Remnants of the 36th and 256th Volksgrenadier Divisions and the recently formed 38th SS Panzergrenadier “Nibelungen” Division were in Landshut, prepared to put up a strong defense as they bought time to complete their withdrawal across the river.\(^{48}\)

The following morning several elements of Combat Command R moved from Altdorf to attack the enemy in Landshut. CCR Rifle Company and the medium tanks of Company A, 25th Tank Battalion, were attached to the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion for this effort. The initial attack, made by Companies A and C, 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, was successful in capturing the area north of the city’s rail center. The rail center had been so badly damaged by heavy Allied bombing that much of it was a veritable no man’s land, carpeted with bomb craters and littered with twisted, broken railcars and steam engines. Beyond, between the rail center and the river, were the bombed-out buildings and rubble-filled streets of Landshut. The fact that none of the bridges over the canals in the area remained intact added to the overall difficulties of the terrain. As a result, the second phase of the attack had to be made without tank support.\(^{49}\)

At 1100 hours Company B, 62d Armored Infantry Battalion, on the left and CCR Rifle Company on the right attacked into the rail center from positions on the right flank of the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion and then pushed on into the devastated city. The two companies soon came under intense fire from artillery and antitank guns located across the river. The unit history of the 62d records that “with some of the bitterest fighting of the war, the town was taken house[,] the enemy utilizing to its fullest extent its artillery, mortar, and direct fire with SP’s [self-propelled artillery pieces] and AT [antitank] guns. Withering MG [machine gun] and rifle fire was encountered. At 1400 all of Landshut north of the Isar River was clear.” In three hours of hard
fearing, CCR Rifle Company suffered twenty-one casualties.\textsuperscript{49}

As the war in Europe entered its final days, CCR Rifle Company again operated with the 25th Tank Battalion. The two units continued south, crossed the Isar River at Moosburg on 1 May, and pushed rapidly toward the Inn River. On 2 May, supported by the tanks of Company A of the tank battalion, two platoons of CCR Rifle Company cleared the towns of Hilpolding and Dorfen, 13 and 18 miles south of Landshut, respectively. Finding no enemy opposition, they moved to the southeast and crossed the Inn River. The advance ended late that afternoon at the town of Stephanskirchen, where the black soldiers took 110 prisoners of war. The division was then ordered to halt and secure the area. The next day, elements of CCR Rifle Company, supported by a few light tanks, cleared the surrounding towns. A week after it arrived in Stephanskirchen, the war in Europe was over. In 38 days of campaigning, CCR Rifle Company had lost 6 men killed, 37 wounded, and 1 man missing in action.\textsuperscript{50}

CCR Rifle Company and the 25th Tank Battalion remained in Stephanskirchen until 11 May. The two units were then ordered north to Ingolstadt on the Danube to take over security duties for a week from the 8th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The tank battalion

The black rifle company’s service with the 14th Armored Division did not end without incident. A few days after the company returned to the control of Combat Command R, some of its men were drinking alcohol and making noise in their quarters, when Maj. John P. Campana, the division’s Assistant G–1, came in and tried to quiet them down. As Campana chewed out some of the black soldiers, someone fired an errant shot at him. In response, Col. James P. Hill, the division’s chief of staff, a Regular Army officer who came from South Carolina, ordered that the company be taken to the field and drilled eight hours a day.\textsuperscript{52}

To carry out these orders, the division chose Capt. Jack R. DeWitt, a 1942 University of Wisconsin Law School graduate who was the commander of Company C, 19th Armored Infantry Battalion. Summoned to division headquarters, Captain DeWitt learned of his additional responsibilities from the division G–1, or personnel officer, Lt. Col. Albert Stephens. DeWitt later re-
counted the conversation as follows: 

He said, “Jack, you’ve been tough as hell with those krauts and we need someone who is going to be tough. We have this nigger company that has been raising hell here and we want you to take them out in the field and drill them eight hours a day. They took some shots at a white officer from Division Headquarters. The officer they had [Captain Hess] is afraid of them, and we knew you originally came from the south [Oklahoma] and that you can handle these niggers.”

I said, “Sir, did all of these men screw up?” He said, “No, but Colonel Hill wants you to take the whole bunch and drill them eight hours a day.”53

After his meeting with Colonel Stephens, Captain DeWitt decided to learn more about the soldiers of CCR Rifle Company. He asked his friend 1st Lt. John P. Meyer about them. Lieutenant Meyer was an officer in the 501st Armored Field Artillery Battalion who had been assigned as forward artillery observer for CCR Rifle Company for much of its time in combat. He had thus had ample opportunity to observe the conduct of the black infantrymen under fire. DeWitt learned from Meyer that the soldiers in CCR Rifle Company had fought Tiger tanks with rifles and submachine guns and that they had gone into combat, even under fire, mounted in open trucks. Captain DeWitt also found out that these men were all volunteers and that some of them had accepted demotions in rank in order to be allowed to fight for their country as infantrymen. Hearing these things, he realized that the men of CCR Rifle Company had demonstrated “a good deal of bravery” and concluded that they had earned the right to fair and equitable treatment. He reported,

Since I thought that this was an injustice, I made up my mind to treat these men as fairly as I possibly could. When they reported to our area, I arranged for them to have the same kind of quarters that C Company had, namely the platform tents, and I told the men that I did not care whether they were black, white or striped. If they did a good job of soldiering, we would get along in fine shape and they would be treated fairly, and if anyone got out of line, I would find a way to take care of them the same way I would with the white soldiers.54

Captain DeWitt’s white company was guarding a prisoner of war camp that held a number of high-ranking German Army officers and SS troops. He sought to use the black soldiers to help guard these prisoners, but his request was denied by division headquarters. True to his word, DeWitt treated the black soldiers fairly. Those who failed to adhere to the requirements of good order and discipline were punished in the same manner as were white soldiers. While the company was under his command, it experienced no more shooting incidents or other major breaches of discipline. In his final evaluation of the black soldiers, Captain DeWitt observed, “Nearly all of them were good soldiers. After all, they were volunteers and had enough courage to go into the infantry when they could have had a safe spot in the quartermaster [Quartermaster Corps] or some port battalion. We had about the same percentage of them get into trouble as got into trouble in the white company.”55

Disbandment

With the war over in Europe, the emergency that had led to the assignment of black volunteers to previously all-white divisions was at an end, and General Eisenhower moved promptly to reestablish the three-decade-old tradition of racial segregation in the Army’s divisions. Consequently, on 4 June CCR Rifle Company was disbanded, and its men were transferred to the 395th Quartermaster Truck Company, which was attached to the 14th Armored Division.56

In late June the 14th Armored Division’s headquarters expressed some dissatisfaction with the performance of CCR Rifle Company to Maj. Gen. Louis A. Craig, the new commander of XX Corps, to which the division was then assigned. The specifics of this assessment are not known, but they appear to be at odds with the observations of eyewitnesses and the historical record of CCR Rifle Company’s performance in combat.57

For its part, the Seventh Army, under which the 14th Armored Division had served until 23 April, criticized the provisional rifle companies, pointing particularly, as historian Ulysses Lee summarized its objection, to “poor control and discipline within the companies, especially after taking towns.” General Patch, the army commander, informed General Davis of the European Theater staff that the platoons had not been able to function effectively as companies and did not perform very well as armored infantry.
Davies responded that the black infantry platoons had not been trained to fight as companies, since the original plan was to employ them as individual platoons attached to white companies. General Jacob L. Devers, the 6th Army Group commander, told General Patch that “a better solution would have been to use them as rifle platoons in an Infantry Division.” It is not known what opinions General Patton or his headquarters staff had regarding the performance of CCR Rifle Company, 14th Armored Division, or the black rifle platoons in other divisions briefly attached to Third Army in April and May 1945. 8

The lack of discipline displayed by soldiers of CCR Rifle Company in the “shooting incident” is obvious. At least some of the black soldiers in the unit engaged in serious misconduct when confronted by a critical officer. Where the company’s officers and noncommissioned officers were at the time of the incident is not known. If they had become inattentive, it may be fair to lay part of the blame for the breakdown of discipline in the company on inadequate leadership. Captain DeWitt’s positive experience with the same black soldiers soon afterwards indicates that the conduct of the black soldiers improved to acceptable levels when they were exposed to good leadership and proper discipline.

Before going into combat, the soldiers of CCR Rifle Company received only minimal training as infantry riflemen and no training whatsoever as a full company. Their company commander was an infantry officer who had previously broken under fire and, as a result, been relieved of command. They were sent into action with less than one-fifth of the complement of noncommissioned officers authorized for an armored infantry company. To further complicate their situation, the four platoons were often used together as an infantry company, expected to function as a single unit within a complex combined arms organization. Despite these sizeable handicaps, the black soldiers, in the words of General Shedd, the wartime S–3 of the 25th Tank Battalion, “attacked when ordered to do so, they continued to advance even when they were under heavy enemy fire, they never broke in combat or withdrew from an engagement without orders, and they maintained proper discipline on the battlefield. They were no different than the white soldiers of the division.” The division’s soldiers, at least those who had seen the black infantry riflemen in action, seem to have shared this appraisal. The esteem in which these veterans of the division held the soldiers of CCR Rifle Company was evidenced by the 1966 election of wartime Pfc. Dennis C. White, a veteran of the company, as the second president of the 14th Armored Division Association. Thanks, at least in part, to African American volunteers like those of CCR Rifle Company, the nation as a whole had by then come to accept the view that American soldiers, black and white, could best serve their country in an Army undivided by racial segregation. 9

### Notes


6. Ibid., pp. 321, 324.


14. None of the official histories gives a definitive total of the number of volunteer black riflemen trained in Europe. Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, states (p. 695) that 2,253 soldiers had finished training by 1 March and were formed into 37 Platoons. These platoons had an average strength of just over 60 men each, which accorded with Eisenhower’s wish that they be formed overstrength so they could absorb combat losses without the need for additional replacements. Lee adds (ibid.) that another 16 Platoons completed training later in March but does not state the number of men who formed them. Again assuming an average strength of 60 men per platoon, the author calculates the strength of these platoons at 960 men, bringing the total number of men trained to just over 3,200. CCR Rifle Company, 14th Armored Division, was comprised of 4 of these latter 16 Platoons, and it had 60 men in each of its platoons. The figures of 2,250, 2,500, and 2,800 given, respectively, by Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, 2: 322; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 52; and Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 693, apparently represent substantial portions but not all of those trained.


18. Typescript, “Unit History: 68th Armored Infantry Battalion from Port of Embarkation to V-E Day,” p. 10, first quote, copy in author’s possession; Interv, author with Lester D. Lamb, wartime captain and commander of the Service Company, 68th Armored Infantry Battalion, 29 Jul and 8 Aug 2004, second quote; Typescript, Jack R. DeWitt, “Soldier Memories,” p. 132, copy in author’s possession. None of the veterans interviewed about CCR Rifle Company for this article remembered seeing Captain Hess with his unit in combat, nor has the author found any reference in printed sources or documents relating to Hess’s actions with CCR Rifle Company between the day he assumed command and V-E Day.


20. Table of Organization and Equipment No. 7–27, War Department, 15 Sep 1943, pp. 2–3, copy in Force Structure and Unit History Branch, Center of Military History.


23. G–4 Journal, 14th Armored Division, 26–31 Mar 1945, in box 16311, World War II Operational Reports, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Record Group 407, National Archives, College Park, Md. (hereafter RG 407, NA); Interv, author with retired Maj Gen William E. Shedd III, wartime S–3 (Operations Officer) of the 14th Armored Division’s 25th Tank Battalion, 7 and 15 Jan 2001; Dickson, History of 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, pp. 97–98. According to the G–4 Journal, CCR Rifle Company was provided with the following vehicles: four half-tracks, two jeeps (jeeps), and seven 2½-ton trucks. The half-tracks were drawn from the division’s armored infantry battalions.


34. HQ Twelfth Army Group situation map, 22 Apr 1945, posted at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/milmapquery.html, search for April 22.


40. S–3 Journal, 25th Tank Battalion, 20–21 Apr 1945; Dickson, History of 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, p. 99; Typescript, “A History of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 14th Armored Division Artillery, Oct. 14, 1944–May 8, 1945,” p. 58, copy in author’s possession. The last account states that division fires on Allersberg were reinforced by the following field artillery battalions from the XV Corps Artillery: 250th (105-mm. howitzer), 961st (155-mm. howitzer), and 989th (155-mm. gun).


43. Ibid., 22–23 Apr 1945.


50. Franklin Wallace, ed., History, 125th Armored Engineer Battalion: Camp Shanks, New York to V-E Day Inclusive (Diissen, Germany, 1945), p. 85; S–3 Journal, 25th Tank Battalion, 1–3 May 1945; Dickson, History of 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, p. 100; Interv, author with Charles J. Brix, a veteran of the Service Company, 25th Tank Battalion, 20 Jul 2006. There are three towns named Stephanskirchen in southern Bavaria, each located east of the Inn River and each within twenty miles of the others. The Stephanskirchen five miles east of Wasserburg am Inn appears the most likely stopping point of CCR Rifle Company.


53. Ibid., p. 131. DeWitt was one of the most highly decorated soldiers in the 14th Armored Division, having received the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star, and the British Military Cross. After the war he taught at the University of Wisconsin Law School, served as president of the State Bar of Wisconsin, and rose to the rank of brigadier general in the Army Reserve. See Wisconsin Law Foundation, The Letter of the Law 4 (Winter 2005): 4.


56. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, p. 53; Dickson, History of 19th Armored Infantry Battalion, p. 100.

57. Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, p. 700, citing a Ltr, Hq, 14th Arm Div, to CG, XX Corps, 20 Jun 45. The author has not been able to locate this letter.

58. Ibid., pp. 700–01, quotations, p. 701. Patton was in the United States when XX Corps forwarded the 14th Armored Division’s letter of dissatisfaction to him. See Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 2 vols. (Boston, 1972–74), 2: 720–22, 727. The 1st and 99th Infantry Divisions were among those that received infantry platoons with African American personnel. The 99th Infantry Division was assigned to the Third Army on 19 Apr 1945; the 1st Infantry Division was assigned to the Third Army on 6 May 1945.


★★★★★
The National Guard: An Illustrated History of America’s Citizen-Soldiers
By Michael D. Doubler and John W. Listman Jr.
Potomac Books, Inc., 2003, 191 pp., $29.95

Soldiers of Freedom: An Illustrated History of African Americans in the Armed Forces
By Kai Wright

Review by Roger D. Cunningham

In 2001 Michael D. Doubler, a retired Army National Guard colonel, wrote I Am the Guard, the Army National Guard’s first official history. (See the review in Army History, Winter 2003, No. 57.) Colonel Doubler’s subsequent work, The National Guard: An Illustrated History of America’s Citizen-Soldiers, combines a much abbreviated version of I Am the Guard’s text with many more illustrations (459 vs. 70) and new information on the Air National Guard. The National Guard’s co-author, John W. Listman, a retired chief warrant officer who was command historian of the Virginia Army National Guard for many years, apparently gathered and captioned the book’s many illustrations and performed essential research, just as he did for I Am the Guard.

The National Guard’s authors divide their subject into five chapters—the enrolled militia, 1607–1794; the volunteer militia, 1795–1902; the National Guard, 1903–1945; the Army National Guard, 1946–2002; and the Air National Guard, 1946–2002—which capably summarize the key developments in the militia’s evolution from colonial times through the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The accompanying illustrations are primarily drawn from the holdings of the National Guard Educational Foundation, in Washington, D.C.; the National Archives at College Park, Maryland; and the Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection of Brown University’s John Hay Library in Providence, Rhode Island. Generally well chosen as far as their subject matter is concerned, they include drawings, paintings, and photographs depicting men, major items of equipment, and a few of the medals and patches that have been worn by Guardsmen over the years. The illustrations visually represent at least once the citizen-soldiers or airmen from each state, territory, and the District of Columbia.

Three aspects of The National Guard’s layout, however, weaken its visual appeal. First, all of the illustrations are reproduced on cheaper stock in black and white—a great mistake! Although only the authors know for sure, it appears that at least 10 percent of the illustrations could have been depicted in color, which would have produced a much more attractive book. Second, captions and text use the same size font, causing lengthy captions to take up a lot of space, sometimes almost as much as the illustration. A smaller caption font would have prevented this and avoided the excessive cropping of some photos. Finally, there are too many illustrations—five or even more, on several pages—giving the book quite a crowded look.

One of this reader’s criticisms of I Am the Guard was that it did not take advantage of the National Guard Bureau’s excellent Heritage Series of historical paintings. The National Guard also generally ignores this series, depicting only four heritage paintings. One could argue that photographs are generally preferable to paintings—they are certainly more accurate—which would perhaps justify not using them for the period since the Civil War, but the omission of ten of the thirteen heritage paintings that cover the period before the Civil War weakens the book visually.

A few photographic essays on interesting subtopics also could have enlivened The National Guard. As an example, there are four separate photos of Guardsmen who attended the Yorktown (Virginia) Centennial celebration in 1881 (pp. 44–45), yet the text is mum on the subject. Combining those images with a few paragraphs on militia participation in that historic event in a sidebar would have been informative.

In sum, The National Guard is well written and fairly priced. To reduce publishing costs, however, Potomac Books printed the book on cheaper stock, crowded too many illustrations on too few pages, and imposed a “black and white” restriction that greatly limits its visual appeal.

An interesting contrast to The National Guard may be found in Kai Wright’s Soldiers of Freedom—a visually attractive and economically priced volume that unfortunately suffers from a flawed text. Wright, a journalist based in Washington, D.C., clearly did not do his homework as he researched the almost 235 years of African American participation in the armed forces. This is made quite obvious in his one-page bibliography, which omits most of the black military history classics—Thomas Wentworth Higginson’s Army Life in a Black Regiment and Joseph T. Wilson’s The Black Phalanx, both on the Civil War, and Herschel Cashin’s Under Fire with the Tenth U.S. Cavalry, on the Indian and Spanish-American Wars, to name only a few. The author similarly ignored most of the essential secondary sources written over the past forty years, including Noah André Trudeau’s Like Men of War (Civil War); William Leckie’s The Buffalo Soldiers (Indian Wars); Willard Gatewood’s Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898–1903; John Weaver’s The Brownsville Raid, and Arthur Barbeau’s and Florette Henri’s The Unknown Soldiers (World War I). Wright also did not consult the Center of Military History’s definitive volume on the 24th Infantry in the Korean War, Black Soldier, White Army, although he devotes several pages (pp. 214–20) to that subject.

Wright’s cavalier approach to research is all wrong, and his text clearly demonstrates that any historian who ignores so many key sources will make scores of errors. To cite but a few examples, he states that Sgt. Emanuel
Stance earned his Medal of Honor battling Kickapoo Indians, when in fact Stance and his men fought Apaches near Kickapoo Springs, Texas (p. 104); maintains that Cadet Henry O. Flipper graduated 15th vice 50th (out of 76) in the West Point Class of 1877 (p. 107); and erroneously claims that the battalion of the 25th Infantry that was sent to Brownsville, Texas, in 1906 went there to train with the Texas National Guard (p. 118). Wright also makes embarrassing American history errors, like confusing President Andrew Jackson with Andrew Johnson (p. 61) and saying that President Woodrow Wilson headed a Republican administration. (p. 125)

In fairness to the author, the publisher seems to have provided very little editorial assistance, as evidenced by a few contradictions within the text, as well as many caption errors. In addition to misspellings (“calvary” in lieu of “cavalry”) and word omissions, one caption oversight that especially stands out is a 1968 photo of an integrated formation of WACs, who are described as “Women’s Artillery Corps members.” (p. 251)

The good news about Soldiers of Freedom is that it is visually attractive. Its more than 240 illustrations, about half of which come from the National Archives, are generally well chosen. They are all black and white (or sepia-toned), but they are displayed on a high-quality stock, with a far less crowded layout (an average of less than one illustration per page vs. The National Guard’s 2.8 per page) that does not require color to be pleasing to the eye. The cropping of the illustrations is much more effective, and the best of the photos, such as the one of Sgt. Charles Gilbert “Hashmark” Johnson addressing a formation of black Marines during World War II, (p. 168 and book jacket) are depicted one per page. In no case does the size of a caption steal attention from its illustration.

All eras and military services are represented, and in most cases the images are among the best available. The author points out that in most early illustrations, when black soldiers were depicted at all, they were rarely active participants in the scene. This did not change until the Civil War, when publishers such as Kurz and Allison began to market prints focusing on black valor.

Thus, readers are presented with two interesting but flawed illustrated histories—one with a solidly researched text but poor visual appeal and one with an error-ridden text but an attractive layout. It would seem that an optimal illustrated history of America’s citizen-soldiers and airmen or of African American participation in the armed forces remains to be published.

Roger D. Cunningham is a retired Army lieutenant colonel. He began his military career as a military police officer and in this capacity served for three years as a branch adviser to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units in Texas and Louisiana. He later served as a foreign area officer in Pakistan, Egypt, and Nepal. He was the U.S. defense attaché in Kathmandu in 1991–92. His article “Black Artillerymen from the Civil War through World War I” appeared in the Spring 2003 issue of Army History (No. 58).
The Last Word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth
Edited by Jeffrey Grey
Praeger, 2003, 178 pp., $78.95

Review by W. Shane Story

Jeffrey Grey’s *The Last Word?* defends official history against charges that it is statist and militarist, that it conceals more than it reveals, and that it fails the standard of producing timely, definitive work. To be sure, nine essays by different authors offer reasons to doubt the accomplishments of official efforts in the British Commonwealth and the United States in the twentieth century. Too often at first, official histories were beset by bombast, jingoism, and censorship and suffered the trials of ill-qualified authors and a subject matter so vast that it crushed unfocused endeavors. Fortunately, professionalization made great, if unsteady, strides through the century, such that laudable works on the Second World War emerged in subsequent decades while leaving a legacy of established, capable programs and a worthy standard of scholarship. Often, however, there were few reasons to hope for a positive outcome. The vicissitudes of war—and the upheavals of peace—in Britain, Australia, South Africa, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States often obstructed diligent research and calm reflection. Those who captured enemy capitals were no less determined to capture the past. Grey’s authors, eight of whom are identified as having served with official military history programs, recounts official history as a battle joined.

The first four essays review programs in Canada, South Africa, New Zealand, and Australia. The Canadian experience suggests a nation so unburdened by threats that its governments often sensed little need to recall or learn from military history. Sparse resources and even less guidance have limited production. Despite its “near-extinction” in the government’s post-Cold War budget cuts, Canada’s program “appears to have survived” to fight another day. (p. 19) In sharp contrast to Canada’s relatively bland experience, the passionate history of South Africa’s official programs reflects all of that country’s troubled twentieth century. From rebellion to colonial wars, to resented absorption into Britain’s world conflicts, and through the international isolation of the apartheid era and the development of a new post-apartheid leadership in African and world affairs, South African governments have tended to use official history as a weapon against both foreign and domestic opponents. The ruinous effects of such a practice mirror the consequences of generations-long conflicts over sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation. If nothing else, South Africa’s official military history reflects its country’s record of national turmoil.

Australia’s and New Zealand’s official programs struggled through myriad challenges: identifying who was qualified for the work—officers, journalists, or scholars; scrambling to collect, organize, and preserve documents; and negotiating military hierarchies disorganized by mobilization, deployment, and combat and often insensitive to careful record keeping. Both countries waged war because of their reliance on global security systems underwritten by Great Britain and the United States. Both spent lives and treasure in the Great War, Korea, and Vietnam for nuanced interests, which further complicated official historians’ efforts to explicate the causes and consequences of their country’s participation in these conflicts. In any case, their political systems have been sufficiently stable and foreign threats sufficiently dire that their official history programs have developed steadily.

The U.S. Army’s Green Book series on the Second World War illustrates all the trials of the genre from defining official history to garnering support, securing academic legitimacy, preserving documents, and balancing analysis and production against the press for immediate “lessons learned” for use in the field. Such challenges laid a path to ruin for many official histories; hence contributor Edward Drea argues for a “great man” theory: whether as managers or authors, official history demanded uniquely talented individuals to slay bureaucratic dragons and to wrest coherent pasts from the chaos of military operations. The Australian experience also confirms the importance of the individual. Charles Bean’s project on the Great War and Gavin Long’s project on the Second World War demonstrated that it took individuals with imagination, drive, and flair to parent projects to maturity.

The last three essays emphasize problems of national policy, an etiquette of power for good or ill to which official history defers. In an early Cold War example, the United States and Britain curtailed official historians’ use of captured German and Japanese records. Policy discouraged offending the former enemies because they were now potential allies against a growing Soviet threat. Similarly, British air power historians wrote more to shape national strategy and budgetary debates than they did to comprehend the wartime campaigns that were their putative subjects. Policy also required a careful regard for reputations. Hence, a draft history that accused a commander of having “virtually abdicated” responsibility absolved him in the final version; it adopted the position of ranking officials that the commander had taken what seemed the lesser of bad choices. (p. 157)

Grey’s interesting collection of essays conveys great appreciation for official military history in the English-speaking world. It is a revealing survey of how various nations recorded and comprehended their experiences of war in the last century. It also exemplifies two problems common to the authors’ work: fidelity and policy. The official historian owes fidelity to the documents, to soldiers, to commanders, to the government, and to the public. In explaining what happened, official history suggests roads not taken, thereby contributing to policy debates. These challenges sustain tension in the field. Grey encourages
book reviews

official historians to manage this tension by offering work that is as preliminary as it is earnest.

Maj. W. Shane Story is assigned to the Histories Division of the Center of Military History, where his work has focused on the role of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. He earlier taught history at the U.S. Military Academy and Rice University and served as a military historian in Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq. He holds a doctorate in history from Rice University. His review essay, “Transformation or Troop Strength? Early Accounts of the Invasion of Iraq,” appeared in the Winter 2006 issue of Army History (No. 62).

A Proper Sense of Honor: Service and Sacrifice in George Washington’s Army
By Caroline Cox

Review by Alan C. Cate

One of the paradoxes embedded in the American War of Independence is that George Washington, a conservative and wealthy aristocrat, commanded what was, in effect, a revolutionary peoples’ army. Washington, and most other ranking Continental Army officers, considered “democracy” a pejorative term and deeply distrusted the base passions of “the mob.” Colonial America’s culture, while more fluid and less structured than Europe’s, was still distinctly hierarchical, and men were expected to recognize and defer to their betters. At the same time, the revolutionary struggle created enormous social ferment, accelerating an already nascent democracy in America. As Caroline Cox’s informative book makes plain, the Continental Army was an institution where old patterns of deference and new ideas about democracy managed to coexist.

Previous examinations have led scholars to widely varying conclusions about the American Revolution’s political culture. Some have proclaimed the Revolution’s essential radicalism, in a few cases even discovering an unlikely Marxist “class consciousness” at work. Others have described the conflict in an oxymoronic fashion as a “conservative revolution.” Additionally, some superb recent works, while richly detailing soldiers’ daily lives, have illuminated the ideologies that animated these fighters. Books by Alfred Young, Charles Neimeyer, and Charles Royster represent particularly noteworthy examples in this latter regard. Cox, an assistant professor of history at the University of the Pacific in California, imaginatively combines both political and military social history in her study of the Continental Army.

Cox focuses on the physical treatment of soldiers. Her premise is that disparities in the experiences of officers and enlisted men can carry much political and social meaning. She explains that “Physical treatment was the most visible distinction . . . between officers and men, so it became an area where the values of the army were both instilled and challenged.” (p. xviii) At first blush, her assertion that officers were generally better treated than their men seems hardly profound; after all, RHIP (Rank Hath Its Privileges) has long been the rule in virtually all militaries. Nevertheless, Cox manages to tease unexpected significance from this commonplace. For her, the key concepts are those of honor and status.

The book takes its title from Washington’s stricture that the prerequisite trait for officers was “a proper Sense of Honor.” According to Cox, “honor was to the cornerstone for creating a self-confident officer corps and a subordinate soldiery.” (p. 40) This transformation was easier said than accomplished. Unlike Great Britain, in colonial America there was no nobility and only a relatively small landed gentry—composed of men like Washington—to furnish officers with the required honorable sensibility. The army needed to reach down in society to find officers. The result, for Cox, is another sort of paradox. The army’s rigid enforcement of hierarchy allowed for considerable social mobility by permitting “ambitious men of even moderate means” to distance “themselves clearly and emphatically from the lowest levels of society.” (p. 25) One thinks—although Cox doesn’t mention them—of the bookseller Henry Knox, the teamster Daniel Morgan, and many more, who in their strivings resembled nothing so much as proto-Gatsbys, ambitiously trying to emulate their social superiors. As an exasperated John Adams colorfully complained to his wife about the officer corps: “They quarrel like cats and dogs. They worry one another like mastiffs, scrambling for rank and pay like apes for nuts.”

Closely aligned to honor was the idea of status. In the heady, early days of the war immediately following Lexington and Concord, when the rage militaire burned through the colonies, a number of idealistic men of property enlisted as “gentlemen rankers.” The heroic Dr. Joseph Warren of Bunker Hill fame springs to mind as the exemplar of this type. As the struggle wore on, however, the Continental Army’s ranks were increasingly filled by the transient and working poor. Cox maintains that this “declining social status of the soldiers facilitated discipline and subordination,” although she wisely notes that longer enlistments and the efforts of the Prussian drill master Friedrich von Steuben also contributed to the Army’s growing professionalism. (p. 23)

Throughout the book, Cox deftly glosses a number of familiar ideas. She neatly limns eighteenth century Americans’ attitudes toward military affairs. These, of course, were largely inherited from Great Britain and modified by the colonial experience. Heirs of England’s Whig tradition and the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, which limited the king’s powers in favor of Parliament, Americans despised and feared “standing armies.” Britain’s attempt to strengthen
its control over its North American colonies following the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763, which ultimately included the stationing of redcoats among a rebellious civilian population, further increased this disdain for regulars. Paralleling this animosity toward professional soldiers was a celebration of the militiaman or virtuous citizen soldier. All of this holds importance for Cox’s arguments about the lowly status of Continental Army soldiers.

Successive chapters investigate that Army’s messing and billet arrangements, discipline and punishment policies, medical care, and burial rituals. A final section touches on each of these areas under the special circumstance in which patriot troops were British prisoners of war. Each of these discussions, inter alia, rewards the reader with intriguing nuggets about service in Washington’s army.

Cox’s analysis of military discipline is especially fascinating. The army’s first judge advocate general flatly declared that “when a man assumes a Soldier, he lays aside the Citizen, & must be content to submit to a temporary relinquishment of some of his civil Rights.” (p. 78) Incidentally, this makes an interesting contrast with Washington’s more famous statement, “When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen.” Cox shows how Continental Army punishments were shaped by the British Army example, civil practice, and even Biblical injunctions prescribing how many lashes a miscreant might receive. A heavy dose of corporal punishment was generally the order of the day for enlisted men. On the other hand, whipping gentlemen was unthinkable. Punishments for officers struck at their honor and consisted of public reprimands or even cashiering in egregious cases. Cox perceptively observes how the worst penalty for an officer was to be dismissed from service, while in the cases of some soldiers, their lot was to have their terms of service extended.

Likewise with medical practice, social status determined the level of care one received, although given the primitiveness of eighteenth-century medicine, it’s debatable whether a doctor’s ministrations were really all that helpful. Cox makes clear that officers’ major advantage in this regard was that they generally had sufficient money or social connections to convalesce from illness or wounds in private homes, thus avoiding unsterile hospitals, which were little more than charnel houses.

Memento mori. Death comes for all, high and low alike, and the paths of glory may lead but to the grave, but Cox demonstrates that in “the disposition of its dead, the Continental army gave its final and most unequivocal affirmation of military hierarchy.” (p. 162) In everything from funeral rites to remembrances, officers and men were separated in death. Officers’ funerals included parades, bearers of appropriate rank, music, and graveside volleys; enlisted men typically merited none of these. Post-battle reports, private journals, and letters listed officers killed by name—often describing them as having “fallen gallantly”—while a number sufficed for the anonymous men of other ranks, along with the prosaic annotation “killed in battle.” Cox is quick to point out that when officers distinguished between their fellow gentlemen and their troops, it wasn’t because they didn’t care for their men. Rather, this was simply another means of affirming their own status and “the social distance between themselves and those beneath them.” (p. 172)

A Proper Sense of Honor depicts the Continental Army’s officers and men as being united not only in a common struggle for liberty, but also in their shared understanding and acceptance of conceptions of personal honor and status. And it sheds new light on the everyday experiences of these soldiers. As such, it stands as an original and frequently engrossing contribution to the social history of that army.

Retired Col. Alan C. Cate teaches history at the University School in Shaker Heights, Ohio. During his Army career, he was at different times the director of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and an assistant professor in the History Department of the U.S. Military Academy. He is the author of Founding Fighters: The Battlefield Leaders Who Made American Independence (Westport, Conn., 2006).

NOTES
3. George Washington, Address to the New York Provincial Congress, 26 June 1775, in Philander D. Chase et al., eds., The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, 16 vols. to date (Charlottesville, Va., 1985–), 1: 41. The contrary statement of Judge Advocate General William Tudor was made a month or two later in remarks sent to the Continental Congress.

Commander of All Lincoln’s Armies: A Life of General Henry W. Halleck
By John F. Marszalek

Review by B. Franklin Cooling

Few Civil War historians would dispute that Henry Halleck was an indispensable contributor to the Union war
Marszalek’s chapter on Halleck’s theater command in the Mississippi valley during the first year of the war parallels the interpretations of Ambrose and Anders. All three authors suggest that Halleck proved marginally adept at field command, profiting from subordinates’ success to vault him to Washington despite an aversion to such assignment in a politically charged capital. Marszalek’s key chapters, as in the other studies, relate to Halleck’s performance there as supreme commander, ably exploiting modern telegraphic technology to serve as an intermediary and interlocutor, translating the administration’s war policies for his subordinates in uniform. While Halleck was hardly a devotee of emancipation, for instance, his embrace of Lincoln’s evolving stance on that issue and of the president’s intense concern for the city’s protection, as well as his involvement in the endless search for the right Army of the Potomac commander, all couple dismally with the general’s virtually incomprehensible shirking of decision-making responsibility. Evidently, Halleck’s declining health and indecisiveness, alongside his sufficiently capable service as senior staffer under Grant, represent a manifestation of the “Peter Principle.” All of this has been covered by Ambrose and Anders as well as traditional students like Kenneth P. and T. Harry Williams and that army of armchair buffs who have plowed Civil War furrows for years. Marszalek is simply the latest contributor, adding a touch about Halleck’s psychological factors and physical ailments to the usual interpretations.

When Marszalek finally consigns Halleck back to the obscurity from whence he came following his brief administrative contribution to postwar Reconstruction, a reader is left principally with the feeling that childhood torments and wartime hemorrhoids may have blunted the man’s drive to succeed and impeded proper recognition of his many accomplishments. If Halleck’s memory seems captured only by an obscure statue in San Francisco, perhaps it is because we continue to compare him to Union operational commanders rather than to members of a different wartime team. Halleck, indeed, was part of the Washington management team of President Abraham Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and the War and Navy Department officials who directed the overall effort. If at times amateurish, this team profited immensely from Halleck’s presence, counsel, and on occasion even his indecision. He was the perfect translator, the prototype for later chiefs of staff like Peyton C. March and George C. Marshall, who themselves today screen Henry Halleck from view. Marszalek’s balance and solid research restore the Civil War general to his rightful place of prominence. Still, in many ways, Anders’s more florid though integrated study, alternating Halleck’s own words with the author’s interpretation, proves even better in this regard, and for that matter one could do worse than actually consult the still-available original Halleck source documents in the published Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
Otherwise, we have not advanced very far past Russell F. Weigley’s observations in his *History of the United States Army* (New York, 1967). To that distinguished scholar, Halleck was “little more than an agent for the translation of the President’s will into military terms and its transmission to field commanders.” Moreover, he “also served as a gossipy gatherer and purveyor of miscellaneous military information and rumors.” He “confined his central direction of the Army,” said Weigley, who has been echoed by other commentators, “to the proffering of good advice, consistently couched in such terms as would avoid responsible involvement.” To Weigley, at least, Halleck’s “familiarity with military rules, customs, and practice made his presence near Lincoln a convenience, but he was not a real general in chief.” (p. 249) Students of military history and readers of Marszalek’s biography must be the ultimate judges. Given the twenty-first century’s need to make relevant sense of history for application, we may still lack the definitive biographical analysis of Henry Halleck. With Professor Marszalek’s work, however, we inch closer and perhaps, in the long run, that will be sufficient.

Dr. B. Franklin Cooling is professor of national security studies at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, where he was formerly associate dean of academic programs. He has also served as chief historian of the Department of Energy and with the Office of the Chief of Military History, the Military History Institute, and the Office of Air Force History. He has authored or edited numerous books and studies in military, air, and naval history. The University of Nebraska Press plans to publish his forthcoming book, tentatively titled Counter-Thrust: From the Peninsula to the Antietam, in the autumn of 2007 in its Campaigns of the Civil War series.

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**Voices of the Buffalo Soldier: Records, Reports, and Recollections of Military Life and Service in the West**

By Frank N. Schubert

University of New Mexico Press, 2003, 281 pp., $24.95

**On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier II: New and Revised Biographies of African Americans in the U.S. Army, 1866–1917**

Compiled and edited by Irene Schubert and Frank N. Schubert

Scarecrow Press, 2004, 502 pp., $150

**Review by Geoffrey R. Hunt**

Books about “buffalo soldiers” sell. Historians are often struck by the level of popular interest in the topic of black soldiers in the West, while the story of their more numerous white counterparts attracts far less attention. Of all the troops that served in the Army between the Civil War and Spanish-American War, when it was most heavily engaged in the West, African Americans made up 20 percent of the cavalry and 8 percent of the infantry—less than 12 percent of the total. On the other hand, the white regiments served their time in the West and rotated out, while the black regiments tended to remain on Western duty. To focus on the black soldier, then, is to focus on the frontier Army as well, with the role of race and prejudice as a powerful distinctive element in the narrative. Readers with a general interest in the role of African American troops in the frontier Army can find an excellent overview in *The Black Regulars, 1866–1898*, by William A. Dobak and Thomas D. Phillips (Norman, Okla., 2001). Those wishing to delve deeper into the topic will be interested in Frank Schubert’s *Voices of the Buffalo Soldier* and *On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier II*, compiled by Irene and Frank Schubert.

In *Voices*, Frank Schubert presents a broad selection of primary documents, written by the soldiers themselves, by their officers, and by contemporary civilian observers. Unable to fit the excerpts into a topical framework, the author instead organizes the sixty chapters chronologically. Half of those chapters consist of first-person stories by the blacks themselves. The range of those records serves to illustrate just where pertinent material can be found. Schubert uses official records, soldiers’ accounts, and even the slave narratives recorded by the Works Progress Administration. He also mines contemporary newspapers, particularly the black press, making the point that the black press nationwide was especially interested in the black soldiers, and so covered their actions and affairs to a far greater degree than the white press covered white soldiers. Generous use of photographs of the protagonists enhances the narratives.

Schubert prefaces each chapter with a commentary, setting the place and situation for the narratives. The soldiers tell of fights with Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Utes, Apaches (including the Mescaleros Victorio and Nana and the Chiricahua Geronimo and Mangus), Mexican and U.S. bandits and cattle thieves—and repeatedly, with townspeople. Col. George Hamilton’s chronology of the 9th Infantry’s service in the field against the Apaches in 1879 to 1881, compiled while the author was a captain, yields a clear picture of constantly reliable service in rough conditions. Schubert also includes Army wife Frances Roe’s first documented use of term “buffalo soldiers” in a letter written in 1872 (but only published in 1909) and reaffirms Dobak’s and Phillips’s observation that blacks themselves almost never referred to themselves as buffalo soldiers.

In his selections, Schubert notes a recurring theme of soldiers’ organized and planned retaliation against murderous local civilian bigots in San Angelo, Texas, in 1877–79 and Crawford, Nebraska, in 1893 and examines the famous “Brownsville Affray” of 1906. Scholars have detailed each event, but there is room for a comprehensive treatment of soldier-civilian conflict in the West. Another
route for further inquiry lies with the pension records that reveal so much of the details of soldiers’ daily existence. Citing Donald Schaffer’s study of pension discrimination against black veterans of the Civil War, Schubert suggests the need for a similar study of the treatment of black and white veterans of the Indian Wars. (p. 227)

Such assemblages cannot, by definition, tell a coherent narrative tale. But, in presenting the actual words of the principals, both enlisted and officers, they carry a direct immediacy and flavor that transcend time. It’s a quirky compendium—the “voices” resonate, but less as a complete conversation than as snippets of conversation overheard while walking through a crowd. Schubert puts a fascinating collection of primary documents in the reader’s hands and whets the appetite for more. And in the end, as he notes, “They are not just black voices; they are American voices.” (p. 4)

Irene and Frank Schubert’s On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier II is a very different book, intended for a specific audience and purpose. Frank Schubert published the first volume of this reference work in 1995, somewhat in the style of the first volume of Francis Heitman’s Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army (Washington, D.C., 1903), only focusing on African American soldiers. What, then, to do with all the information that comes in after publication? Any author finds that the best way to discover mistakes is to go to press, and then at last the corrections come in. Since 1995 the Internet has expanded access to databases, new works have been published annually, and descendants of the black soldiers have contributed additional information. This ambitious work is a companion volume to the 1995 edition of On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier, but it does not stand alone; the reader will need both volumes.

On the Trail II contains 2,000 new biographies not included in the 1995 original. Each biographical sketch contains the soldier’s name, highest rank, and unit, and then presents details of his service and post-military life, if available, with source data for each entry. In addition, the new work revises some 1,000 entries from the original book, expanding or, occasionally, correcting the data, as necessary. Rather than force researchers to jump back and forth between the two volumes, the compilers have reprinted the entire original entry and amended it, but the reader will still need the first volume for the biographies for which there is no new information. On the Trail II features a master index for both volumes, referenced by names rather than by page numbers, with names from the original in boldface. This index would be more useful, in my view, if the names were in alphabetical order.

The authors have included two valuable appendixes. One lists the sixty-one black recipients of the Certificate of Merit from 1881 to 1914, along with details of the award; the second lists the 168 fights between black soldiers and Indians between 1867 and 1890, complete with location, units involved, and commander. The bibliography includes all sources new to the work, including for the first time a category for “Electronic Sources.”

This volume of biographies, along with its 1995 predecessor, represents a massive undertaking and an invaluable tool for scholars seeking information on specific soldiers. Spanning the years between 1866 and 1917, it yields rich details on the Indian Wars, the War with Spain, and the conflicts in the Philippines, as well as on garrison duty and life after the military, for the African Americans who served in either Regular Army or volunteer regiments. It represents a valiant effort to update and expand a unique and important research tool. It is not, however, the sort of resource that encourages casual reading. For the next update, it might be wise to “publish” the multiple volumes together, integrated into one searchable CD-ROM.

Dr. Geoffrey R. Hunt is professor of history and chair of the Social Sciences Department at the Community College of Aurora in Colorado. He is the author of Colorado’s Volunteer Infantry in the Philippine Wars, 1898–1899 (Albuquerque, N.M., 2006) and the coeditor of The Prairie Frontier (Sioux Falls, S.D., 1984). He holds a doctorate in history from the University of Colorado at Boulder. Frank N. Schubert served as a historian with Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; the Center of Military History; and the Joint History Office from 1977 until his retirement in 2003.

The “Casualty Issue” in American Military Practice: The Impact of World War I
By Evan Andrew Huelfer
Praeger Publishers, 2004, 244 pp., $69.95

Review by Stephen C. McGeorge

In The “Casualty Issue” Maj. Evan Huelfer, a former history instructor at West Point, makes a compelling argument that America’s aversion to accepting casualties in any conflict is deeply rooted in the experience of World War I, and not, as one might today assume, entirely a reaction to the war in Vietnam. This book is all the more interesting when viewed against the growing casualty lists from our current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the public reaction to them. While Huelfer does examine American popular opinion and sentiment on military involvement, he focuses on the Army’s institutional reaction to the wartime experiences of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in 1917–18 and on the policies, plans, and doctrines the Army subsequently developed to reduce American casualties.

The participation of the United States in World War I was mercifully brief compared to that of the other major combatants. Where America suffered some 356,000 casualties in the war, the total losses of the seven most heavily
impacted nations exceeded 36 million. Nonetheless both this nation and its military leaders found the war a bloody and disillusioning experience. Huelfer shows that it was predominantly the younger AEF officers, the lieutenants and captains of 1918, who saw first-hand the effects of immature tactical doctrine, poorly focused or insufficient tactical training, and headlong rushes into battle, and swore “never again.” These leaders sought in their later careers to ensure that in future conflicts the Army would minimize the loss of American life as much as possible. The same officers, of course, by 1944 included the division and corps commanders of the American Army then fighting a global conflict that dwarfed their own previous experience. Notably, these officers crafted far better models for training and fielding the Army that won World War II.

The first three chapters of the book focus on the experience of combat in World War I, the national reaction to the war, and the immediate efforts in the early interwar period to gain from the lessons learned in the AEF and adjust tactics and doctrine to reduce combat casualties. While Huelfer argues convincingly that contemporaries recognized shortcomings in the training of the AEF and made some significant efforts to remedy the problems, his use of supporting evidence is at times faulty.

For example, he posits that the “Summary of Operations in the World War” prepared for each division by the American Battle Monuments Commission was designed as an operational history to be used in examining the World War I experience. While accurate as to their intent, this statement neglects the fact that these works were not finally in print until 1944. Other resources compiled by the Army War College’s Historical Section, such as the massive compilation of orders and memoranda of the First Division and its extensive reproduction of documents of the German units opposing that division were in fact used for that purpose in the interwar Army school system.1

Similarly Huelfer addresses the institution of the AEF Army Candidates School (ACS) to generate new junior officers to replace losses from combat casualties, a 1918 version of an officer candidate school. Huelfer argues that this school was ineffective, a debatable assertion, and states that by the time of the Armistice the school was producing some 5,000 infantry officers per month, inferring that the result was quantity rather than quality. The total number of infantry officers produced over the entire life of the ACS, however, was only 6,900.2 It is thus unlikely that the ACS could have reached, no less sustained, a monthly output approximating Huelfer’s figure, particularly since finding quality officer candidates from the ranks of the ACS was becoming ever more difficult.

These may be minor quibbles in regard to what is otherwise an excellent narrative, showing mastery of the historical evidence. In the main the author does a fine job revealing the difficulty the AEF had in integrating tactical innovation while engaging in demanding daily operations. He also points out quite clearly the problems of understanding new weapons of war: poison gas, the machine gun, indirect fire artillery, and the airplane.

The military education system of the interwar years and the application of military power are the focus of the book’s two middle chapters. These chapters are very well done. They argue that the robust military school system championed by George C. Marshall was both innovative and rigorous. Concurrently, Huelfer offers evidence that in terms of tactical doctrine and organization the Army made tremendous strides in coming to grips with new technology, especially in understanding mechanization. The intent, and eventual result, of the Army’s interwar efforts to apply the lessons of World War I was to consistently seek to maximize military effectiveness at the least possible cost in American blood. The author rightly points out that the intellectually challenging work of the interwar years was done in times of severe budget constraint. Thus, if little in the way of concrete reorganization and modernization could be accomplished, critical thinking and conceptualization was encouraged and flourished relatively unconstrained. The resulting body of knowledge was put to use constructively in the mobilization for war in 1939–1941, when national defense was more adequately resourced.

Huelfer’s sixth chapter offers an overview of strategic war planning in the interwar era, most conspicuously the development of “the Color plans.” Beyond pointing out that most of these plans greatly overestimated the strength of potential enemies, little evidence is offered to demonstrate that such planning was intensely driven by the need to avoid American losses. The chapter really offers so little support for the book’s central thesis that it could very well have been omitted.

Huelfer’s final chapter, “Preparing For War, 1939–1941,” and his conclusion bring together the major threads of his argument very coherently. He skillfully argues that the “Germany first” strategy of World War II, while entailing a costly invasion of Europe and the annihilation of Germany’s armed forces predominantly through ground force operations, was in fact the implementation of a plan wrought with aversion to American casualties well in mind. Simply put, the strategy stemmed from the conviction that a short war was imperative and that attrition must be avoided.

In reviewing more recent military operations in Grenada, Panama, and the first Gulf War, the author rightly points out that these relatively inexpensive victories—at least in terms of American losses—were achieved over incompetent and inferior forces. Consequently, he argues, the American people have come to expect that bloodless victory can and will be the norm. Although this expectation would be unreasonable against more militarily skilled and determined opponents, it has become a predominant factor in the calculus of our national leadership’s decision making. Huelfer leaves the reader with a mixed message, that we should rightly cherish our traditional aversion to...
accepting losses and simultaneously understand that recent experience has built an unrealistic belief in our ability to fight and win wars without paying the butcher’s bill.

Stephen C. McGeorge retired as an Army major in 1996. His seventeen years in active service included assignments in Korea, Italy, and Turkey and as a military history instructor at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He was director of the Oregon Military Museum from 1997 to 2002 and the historian with the Office of the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, at Fort Lewis, Washington, in 2003 and 2004. Since then he has been the curator of collections in the Office of the Director of the National Museum of the United States Army at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Notes


A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the Far East and the Pacific, 1921–1942

By Haruo Tohmatsu and H. P. Willmott

SR Books, 2004, 169 pp., cloth $72, paper $21.95

Review by James C. McNaughton

In December 1941 the United States was plunged into war when Japan attacked the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and seized American and European possessions in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Historians ever since have sought to understand how American efforts to maintain regional stability and deter Japanese aggression failed so catastrophically. A recent contribution to this debate is A Gathering Darkness: The Coming of War to the Far East and the Pacific, 1921–1942. This short survey is intended as a prologue to a series by SR Books on “Total War: New Perspectives on World War II.” Haruo Tohmatsu is an associate professor of international relations at Tamagawa University in Tokyo. H. P. Willmott, better known to American readers, is an independent historian who has taught at the National War College and is the author of numerous works on World War II, including two well regarded studies of the opening months of the war in the Pacific, Empires in the Balance (Annapolis, Md., 1982) and The Barrier and the Javelin (Annapolis, Md., 1983). The authors previously collaborated on a book for a popular audience, Pearl Harbor (London, 2001), published on the sixtieth anniversary of the Japanese attack.

In the two decades before 1941 American leaders were repeatedly frustrated by perplexing regional issues of colonial empires and mandated territories, civil war in China, arms limitation, changing naval technology and doctrine, the failure of collective security, the collapsing world economy, political changes inside Japan, and Japan’s designs on China and Manchuria. German attacks on Western Europe in 1940 and the Soviet Union in 1941 precipitated a crisis in the Asia-Pacific region, during which Japan lashed out with bold but foolhardy action. Unfortunately, these same issues seem to have equally perplexed Tohmatsu and Willmott, who are no more successful than American leaders were at the time in gaining an understanding of the root causes. Perhaps their difficulty derives from the fact that they overlook much of the relevant scholarship, such as standard works by Herbert Feis and Akira Iriye, as well as more recent treatments by Walter LaFeber and others.

The authors focus not upon the failings of the international system but upon Japan and seek answers to the basic question, “Where did it all go wrong?” (pp. 1, 7) They begin with a chapter entitled “Japan the Taliban, 1921–1941.” By this they mean “the turning of a collective back on Western values, a return to one’s own historic values and history, and a recourse to armed struggle alongside a belief in force as the means of forging a distinctive national identity and ensuring national liberation.” (p. 11) However, they later pull back from this analogy and invite readers simply to consider this as “the starting line of detailed examination and inquiry, not as the final answer that explains everything.” (p. 96) Throughout the book the authors display this sort of reluctance to draw conclusions, commenting that “it is far easier to describe events . . . than it is to provide an explanation of the changes that took place.” (p. 7) Well, yes. But explanations are what readers look for in surveys that purport to “synthesize the best of recent scholarship.” (p. i) More often the authors simply offer “points,” rather than historical arguments, such as, “Suffice it to note here four related sets of events,” (p. 65) or, “Whether matters might have been worked to a different conclusion is hard to judge, but one would note two points.” (p. 93) Such lists in lieu of arguments, more suitable to PowerPoint than the printed page, soon become an annoying tick.

The authors tell the story of the 1930s with particular attention to Japan’s actions in China, much of which will be new to American readers, and point in particular to Japan’s strategic bombing in China after 1938 as being innovative. (pp. xvii, 75–80) However, their account is repeatedly frustrated by inadequate maps. For example, in describing Japan’s 1937 offensive, the authors name 25 cities and hampered by inadequate maps. For example, in describing Japan’s 1937 offensive, the authors name 25 cities and geographical features in two paragraphs (pp. 60–61), but only 13 can be found on the accompanying maps. (pp. 56, 77) Their discussion of Japan’s decision for war provides economic data that make clear that Japan’s leaders ought to have known they were taking an enormous gamble.
However, A Gathering Darkness does not address the issue of Emperor Hirohito’s responsibility, which scholars and the general public once again pondered following his death in 1989. The final third of the book sketches the first six months of the war, during which Japan seized territories whose populations were double those conquered by Nazi Germany: “Probably the only parallels in history are the conquests of sixteenth-century Mexico and Peru by Cortés and Pizarro.” (p. 143) Two military figures in particular come in for sharp criticism. In 1941 Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of Japan’s Combined Fleet, demanded the attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. “Yamamoto invariably was to be found at the cutting edge of these navy demands, which triumphed over the more cautious deliberations of such persons as Admiral Nagano and Vice Admiral Ito Seiichi,” the authors observe. (p. 97) On the American side, General Douglas MacArthur arouses their ire for his clumsy handling of the defense of the Philippines. “Since World War II a school of thought, or perhaps more accurately a school notable for its lack of thought,” they note with sarcasm, “holds the general [MacArthur] in great esteem as one who could do, and did, no wrong.” (pp. 112, 114) However, they have nothing to say about the responsibility of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, the senior Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii, nor about the possible shortcomings of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, commenting only that “the failure of the American high command to realize Japanese intent has proved to be one of the most vexatious aspects of this episode.” (p. 107) They conclude with Japan’s strategic dilemma in the spring of 1942 when the high command realized that, despite their stunning victories, “the fundamental Japanese plan for a war with the United States was nonsensical.” (p. 152)

Tohmatsu and Willmott have missed a strategic opportunity to write a fresh survey of an important and tragic historical era. Instead, they have written a book that, marred with stilted writing, is unsuitable for introductory students and will be unsatisfying for specialists. Readers interested in a stimulating synthesis or new interpretations would be advised to begin elsewhere.

Dr. James C. McNaughton was the command historian of U.S. Army, Pacific, from 2001 to 2005 and has been command historian of U.S. European Command since 2005. He holds a Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins University and is a retired Army Reserve lieutenant colonel. His article, “Japanese Americans and the U.S. Army: A Historical Reconsideration,” appeared in the Summer–Fall 2003 issue of Army History (No. 59). The Center of Military History will publish his book Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II in 2007.

Note

The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940
By Henry G. Gole
Naval Institute Press, 2003, 226 pp., $34.95

Review by Thomas Goss

“American strategic planning may have come of age in 1939–41, but the ‘spade work’ done by students and faculty during the period 1934–40 at the U.S. Army War College was very important to the maturation process.” (p. xii) This is the starting point and thesis of Henry G. Gole’s The Road to Rainbow: Army Planning for Global War, 1934–1940. Gole is a retired U.S. Army colonel and combat veteran, and this book is based on the doctoral dissertation he submitted to Temple University. Gole’s book challenges earlier works on American interwar planning that emphasized the development of the 1940–41 Rainbow series of war plans. In particular, Gole critiques Maurice Matloff’s and Edwin Snell’s Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, D.C., 1953), and Louis Morton’s Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (Washington, D.C., 1962) for focusing their reviews of prewar strategic planning for World War II on the two years prior to the bombing at Pearl Harbor. In the introduction to The Road to Rainbow, Gole states that the traditional interpretation he is trying to change is best expressed in Strategy and Command where Morton asserts, “In some cases the early war plans were little more than abstract exercises and bore little relation to actual events.” (Morton, p. 22)

Gole believes this concentration on war planning during 1940–41 and the dismissal of earlier planning efforts inside the U.S. Army obscures a more complex picture of how the war plans and war planners that won World War II were developed and shaped. Gole examines the Army War College program from 1919 through 1940 and concludes that the foundations of the later Rainbow plans and the Victory Program had been developed long before the war started in Europe. As early as 1935, war plan exercises at the Army War College were concluding that in a conflict in both the Atlantic and Pacific, Germany must be defeated first. This would require sending an expeditionary army onto the European continent, while the U.S. Navy would need to maintain a strong defense in the Pacific. These were the guiding strategic principles of later U.S. war plans. Additionally, Gole reveals that the Army
War College conducted systematic planning for coalition warfare against Germany and Japan, undertaking planning exercises involving the participation of anticipated allies as early as 1934. The next year witnessed the first concern with a conflict pitting the United States, Britain, France, and Italy against an emerging “Nazi Confederation” in Central Europe, with Japan taking advantage of this war to launch attacks in the Far East. In 1936 Italy, having invaded Ethiopia, was shifted to the “Central Coalition.” For most readers, the detailed description of these war planning exercises during the mid-1930s will demonstrate that Army War College students and faculty anticipated the very conditions the military would later face in 1939–41, with the exception that the active involvement of the Soviet Union in a European war was not yet anticipated.

The Road to Rainbow begins with the contextual background of how professional officers operated and how they were educated during the interwar period. Then, the focus narrows to the role of the Army War College in developing strategic thinking for the Army General Staff and the field army along with a brief examination of professional military education in the other services. Gole next presents, year by year, the war plans that were produced at the Army War College between 1934 and 1937 and goes into detail on how the faculty and students addressed the challenges inherent in a global war against Germany and Japan. Shifting to the key planning years of 1938–40, Gole details the change in focus to the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the challenges of projecting power abroad. The book concludes with a lengthy discussion of the linkages between the war planning done at the Army War College and plans that emerged at the War Department General Staff and would shape the war effort. The result of this study is the filling of a void in the evolution of strategic thinking and planning in U.S. Army history.

By maintaining a strict focus, the book demonstrates clear intellectual linkages between the interwar planning done at the Army War College and the color plans developed by the War Department General Staff. These links involved both the planning efforts and the commanders who would execute the war plans in World War II. The narration of the interwar Army War College’s work is filled with the names of the commanders who would lead American forces in the Second World War, including Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, Jonathan Wainwright, and even the Navy’s William “Bull” Halsey. These prewar field grade officers, among other future leaders, each played a role in developing strategic plans at the Army War College and carried this experience forward into the war. Because officers like these went back and forth between the War College and the General Staff, Gole boldly concludes that there was no significant distinction between the Army War College plans and the “official” War Department color plans. While many will question this assertion even after finishing this book, Gole supports the argument well by showing linkages both in strategic thinking and in the officers doing the planning.

The book’s weaknesses also are directly related to the fact that the book is very focused. The Road to Rainbow is exactly what its title implies, a “road” that stops before the development in late 1940 and early 1941 of Plan Dog and the ABC–1 Plan and makes little reference to subsequent planning like the Victory Program. The book is also repetitious, as it demonstrates and supports similar points throughout the introduction, body, and conclusion. However, the author cannot be faulted for a lack of truth in advertising, and he accomplishes exactly what he sets out to do. In American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration (Baltimore, 1963), Kent Roberts Greenfield, who had been the U.S. Army’s chief historian from 1946 to 1958, concluded that eight major decisions shaped the Allies’ conduct of World War II. What Dr. Gole accomplishes in this book is to show the creation and evolution of both the thinking and the thinkers who would make these critical decisions and how interwar planning shaped the conduct of that conflict.

Army Lt. Col. Thomas Goss is currently assigned as a strategic planner on the International Military Staff at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. He has a doctorate in history from Ohio State University, has taught the subject at the Military Academy, and is the author of The War within the Union High Command: Politics and Generalship during the Civil War (Lawrence, Kans., 2003).

The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West
By Karl-Heinz Frieser
Ed. and Trans. John T. Greenwood
Naval Institute Press, 2005, 507 pp., $47.50

Review by Eugenia C. Kiesling

In the preface to The Blitzkrieg Legend, Col. Karl-Heinz Frieser thanks the Military History Research Office of the German Armed Forces, commonly known by its German initials as the MGFA, for the opportunity to expand his original operational study of the 1940 campaign into “a broad account” intended “to clear up the scintillating blitzkrieg problem with its operational-strategic ambivalence,” (pp. xiii–xiv) but the community of military historians may regret the MGFA’s generosity. Where it sticks to operational history, The Blitzkrieg Legend is a useful study—thoroughly researched, detailed, critical, and accompanied by superb maps—of a campaign that cried out for such a monograph. The sentence quoted above gives a fair warning, however, of the work’s literary and analytical weaknesses.

In every respect except writing style, The Blitzkrieg Legend is probably the best English narrative of the German invasion of France. Thanks to his purely operational focus...
Frieser offers his own definition of blitzkrieg as “the concentrated employment of armor and air forces to confuse the enemy with surprise and speed and to encircle him, after a successful breakthrough, by mean of far-reaching thrusts.” (p. 6) Is blitzkrieg merely a version of Moltkean envelopment, as suggested on page 333? Instead of offering clarifications, Frieser further confuses the picture with such catch-all definitions as “the term blitzkrieg is extensively [sic] a synonym for the modern operational war of maneuver,” (p. 7) a “war of movement,” (p. 197) and “the superlative escalation of the short war.” (p. 330) Surely not every short war is “blitzkrieg,” and, if Germany’s 1940 campaign in the west and 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union represent blitzkrieg, (pp. 5, 351) the word has little meaning. In any case, historians have long understood that the interesting question is not whether the Germans had a doctrine called blitzkrieg (let alone a blitzkrieg strategy to conquer the world) but how they arrived at the methods that served them so well in the early stages of the Second World War. In that exploration, Matthew Cooper’s study of the German Army is a more useful place to start, while Michael Geyer reaches a more satisfying conclusion by treating blitzkrieg as “operational opportunism” and “the opposite of a doctrine.”

Frieser’s operational narrative fails to clarify blitzkrieg doctrine. Instead, Rommel achieved his “breathtaking victories . . . because he knew so little about Panzer operational principles.” (p. 224) If his methods were “unorthodox,” either they were not blitzkrieg or blitzkrieg was not German doctrine. Frieser further loses sight of internal inconsistencies within German doctrine when he criticizes the French Army for not employing “German employment principles.” (p. 243) Wer the French supposed to emulate official doctrine or the behavior of the mavericks, who are, depending on the moment, treated either as “progressive(s)” (pp. 102, 253, 256) or crazy? It is symptomatic of the book’s analytical deficiencies that Frieser insists (pp. 60–61) on the inaccuracy of label “Sickle Cut” for the German plan but then fails thereafter to call it anything else.

Like the terminology, the book’s assessment of the German army is unclear. Some aspects of the argument rightly challenge commonplace assumptions about German military perfection. Frieser points out that Germany did not intend a lightning operation against France in 1940 but stumbled into one. Some German mistakes, like cramming too many tanks on too few roads through the Ardennes, could have had serious consequences. (p. 110) Far from being the outcome of reasoned calculation, blitzkrieg was “an operational-level act of desperation to get out of a strategically desperate situation.” (p. 98) The methods that ultimately defeated France were often created by men acting contrary to official doctrine and the plans, even the commands, of their superiors. The campaign’s success owed as much to French mistakes as to German skill and led the Wehrmacht to disastrous overconfidence in planning operations against the Soviet Union. Moreover, although blitzkrieg was revolutionary in

Previous discussions of the role of the Luftwaffe in 1940 tended either to presume the existence of “flying artillery” techniques not developed until the Barbarossa campaign or to attribute to the Germans the capability only for pre-planned saturation bombings. Frieser’s careful discussion of Guderian’s air support during the Meuse crossing lays to rest both myths by showing how complex events led the Luftwaffe to fly a combination of missions. He also is careful to distinguish between the enormous psychological effect of Luftwaffe sorties and the minor physical damage they inflicted. The single example he provides of close air support leaves the reader wishing for enough additional evidence to produce a comprehensive picture of German methods.

However valuable on the operational side, The Blitzkrieg Legend is an analytical mess. Even when the German edition appeared in 1996, Frieser’s criticism of the word “blitzkrieg” as the invention of “a few historians only after World War II” was not novel. Moreover, the notion of blitzkrieg under attack here, “a blitzkrieg strategy that aimed at nothing less than world rule,” (p. 3) hardly deserves serious consideration. Having eviscerated this pathetic straw man, Frieser offers his own definition of blitzkrieg as “the concentrated employment of armor and air forces to confuse the enemy with surprise and speed and to encircle him, after a successful breakthrough, by mean of far-reaching thrusts.” (p. 6) Is blitzkrieg merely a version of Moltkean envelopment, as suggested on page 333? Instead of offering clarifications, Frieser further confuses the picture with such catch-all definitions as “the term blitzkrieg is extensively [sic] a synonym for the modern operational war of maneuver,” (p. 7) a “war of movement,” (p. 197) and “the superlative escalation of the short war.” (p. 330) Surely not every short war is “blitzkrieg,” and, if Germany’s 1940 campaign in the west and 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union represent blitzkrieg, (pp. 5, 351) the word has little meaning. In any case, historians have long understood that the interesting question is not whether the Germans had a doctrine called blitzkrieg (let alone a blitzkrieg strategy to conquer the world) but how they arrived at the methods that served them so well in the early stages of the Second World War. In that exploration, Matthew Cooper’s study of the German Army is a more useful place to start, while Michael Geyer reaches a more satisfying conclusion by treating blitzkrieg as “operational opportunism” and “the opposite of a doctrine.”

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and comprehensive German sources, Frieser offers a much more detailed and balanced story than Alistair Horne’s To Lose a Battle, while he takes the campaign beyond Robert Doughty’s narrow study of the Sedan breakthrough. Had this English translation of Frieser’s work appeared simultaneously with the original German publication in 1996, fewer people would have fallen for Ernest May’s claims to offer in Strange Victory a radical new interpretation of German success.

The best thing about the book, other than the wonderful maps, is a degree of detail allowing for a genuinely useful evaluation of the conduct of the battle on both sides. Frieser is also very good on the improvisational nature of German planning and operations at every level. One gets a good sense of the role intramural struggles among German leaders and downright disobedience along the chain of command played in shaping the campaign that defeated France.

Especially useful in theory, though tantalizingly incomplete in practice, are Frieser’s observations about two poorly understood parts of the campaign: logistics and close air support. Frieser introduces the subject of logistics with a short paean to “the perfection with which the problem of logistics was solved during Operation Sickle Cut.” (p. 107) The reader who searches the rest of the narrative for concrete examples of German logistical methods will be doubly disappointed. Frieser explains the paucity of logistical material in the sources with the observation that “logistics can become a topic only when there are breakdowns,” (p. 109) but it would be nice to see illustrations of the alleged German proficiency. Instead, however, supplies are mentioned mostly in the context of dire ammunition shortages (for example, p. 217).

Previous discussions of the role of the Luftwaffe in 1940 tended either to presume the existence of “flying artillery” techniques not developed until the Barbarossa campaign or to attribute to the Germans the capability only for pre-planned saturation bombings. Frieser’s careful discussion of Guderian’s air support during the Meuse crossing lays to rest both myths by showing how complex events led the Luftwaffe to fly a combination of missions. He also is careful to distinguish between the enormous psychological effect of Luftwaffe sorties and the minor physical damage they inflicted. The single example he provides of close air support leaves the reader wishing for enough additional evidence to produce a comprehensive picture of German methods.

Like the terminology, the book’s assessment of the German army is unclear. Some aspects of the argument rightly challenge commonplace assumptions about German military perfection. Frieser points out that Germany did not intend a lightning operation against France in 1940 but stumbled into one. Some German mistakes, like cramming too many tanks on too few roads through the Ardennes, could have had serious consequences. (p. 110) Far from being the outcome of reasoned calculation, blitzkrieg was “an operational-level act of desperation to get out of a strategically desperate situation.” (p. 98) The methods that ultimately defeated France were often created by men acting contrary to official doctrine and the plans, even the commands, of their superiors. The campaign’s success owed as much to French mistakes as to German skill and led the Wehrmacht to disastrous overconfidence in planning operations against the Soviet Union. Moreover, although blitzkrieg was revolutionary in

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operational terms, Frieser astutely concludes that German leaders archaically ignored the role of industrial potential, rather than operational excellence, in determining the outcome of twentieth-century war.

This useful and well-deserved criticism of the German Army rests uneasily alongside uncritical admiration for the Wehrmacht. Surely no soldiers have ever been the beneficiaries of perfect training. (p. 150) Despite the role of interpersonal strife in shaping the campaign, Frieser praises the German general staff as “an intellectual elite whose decisions were guided by sober professionalism.” (p. 257) The group that acquiesced in what General Walter von Reichenau called (p. 57) a “just about criminal” plan to attack France was, in Frieser’s view, an “excellently functioning military brain.” (p. 314) For a more thoughtful view of the relationship between the German generals and their führer the reader would do well to consult Geoffrey Megargee’s Inside Hitler’s High Command (Lawrence, Kans., 2000).

The analysis of the French side ignores that nation’s strategic concerns, most notably the role of the long-war strategy (mentioned in passing on p. 46), the constraints imposed by unhelpful allies, and the absence of political objectives justifying the creation of an offensive army. The claim that “Hitler actually managed to put the French to sleep behind the Maginot Line” (p. 324) grossly distorts the French operational plan.

The book would read very quickly were it not for ambiguities and general infelicities created by the jarringly literal, almost parodic, translation of the German. What is implied by the obscure “the Panzers of Werner were in a situation of dramatic inferiority after Rommel’s Panzers had left the battlefield in a completely surprising manner”? (p. 236) Does “obviously, the German general staff had too much respect for the reputed Swiss bravery” (p. 247) imply that the Swiss were not brave? The translator is not to blame for such phrases as “this operationally construed strategy, with its strategically construed operations,” (p. 11) but someone ought to have checked the translation for smoothness and warned against using the phrases “ran” or “punched smack into” more than once per book, let alone every fifteen pages. (pp. 82, 92, 114, 130, 267)

The Blitzkrieg Legend is an invaluable resource for anyone seeking to understand what happened when Germany invaded France in May 1940. For deeper understanding of the events, the reader would be well-advised to look elsewhere.


Notes

Memoir of a Cold War Soldier
By Richard E. Mack
Kent State University Press, 2001, 216 pp., $30

Review by Stephen A. Bourque

Historians generally identify the “Cold War” as the era that began with the clash of American and Soviet ambitions in Germany after World War II, developed into worldwide competition in every corner of the globe, and ended in 1989 and the early 1990s as Berliners tore down their wall and spearheaded the unification of their nation. By the middle of the decade the Iron Curtain itself was torn down, and the old border crossing sites on the autobahns were transformed into truck stops and travelers’ rest areas in an expanding European Union. Depending on when they served during this fifty-year period, American soldiers participated in three major activities related to the superpower conflict. Many, in its early stages, found themselves fighting in Korea to repulse the invasion from the north and confront Chinese reinforcements. The focus of the middle period of this era was the war in Vietnam, where career officers often served two or more tours in the role of adviser or combat leader, or as a member of one of the many staffs that coordinated reinforcements. The period of the middle period of this era was the war in Vietnam, where career officers often served two or more tours in the role of adviser or combat leader, or as a member of one of the many staffs that coordinated the war effort. Throughout the entire period, American soldiers rotated in and out of Europe, living in kaserne, patrolling the border zone, and practicing their military art at training areas with names like Hohenfels, Grafenwöhr, and Wildfliessen.

This was the general pattern of Richard Mack’s career. Inducted in 1942, he found himself shunted around the Army’s training system. He finally arrived in France at the end of 1944 as part of a maintenance battalion and began repairing equipment that had been damaged since the Normandy landings. With the end of the war against Germany, the Army sent his unit to the other side of the globe to assist in the invasion of Japan. Arriving after the Japanese surrender, he helped to dispose of the large amounts of materiel assembled for the canceled invasion. After the war, Mack returned to college, joined ROTC, and was commissioned as an infantry officer. He had been ordered to join the 1st Cavalry Division in Japan when
North Korea attacked across the 38th Parallel. Soon sent to Korea, he endured a year and a half of intense combat as a company-grade officer. Over the next twenty-five years, his career included two tours in Germany, two rotations to Vietnam, several postings either as student or instructor in the Army’s extensive school system, and a variety of staff assignments. He retired in 1976 as a colonel with a chest full of hard-earned medals and a mind full of memories. This memoir is Mack’s effort to make sense out of his experiences and pass on some of what he learned to those who would follow.

Of course, as is the case of every memoir, the author has a bias. Mack resents not having been selected for general officer. The reader senses this irritation in Mack’s criticism of those officers superior to him. Examples include his obvious disgust with his unnamed company commander in Korea, his brigade commander in Vietnam, and his senior leaders in the Canal Zone in the early 1970s. While his criticisms make sense as part of the narrative and belong in his memoir, they tend to truncate the author’s evaluation of what was transpiring in order to support the author’s perspective. Certainly, the manuscript ends with more than a hint of bitterness. My sense is that while Mack was a successful officer, he was also a bit abrasive to his superiors. This trait, along with an absence of Pentagon or senior aide assignments, probably ensured his failure to achieve flag rank.

Mack’s memoir also has several flaws that limit its value. There is no unifying thesis, other than that the author did the best he could in each assignment. Providing only standard secondary sources, he lists no special primary sources that would be helpful to a historian attempting to follow his career or reconstruct some of the interesting activities he describes. Apparently, most of the evidence is drawn from his own personal notes and memory. Certainly, the use of unit journal logs, after-action reports, and other official documents would have added considerably to the manuscript’s value. Mack probably has a collection of those little green notebooks that most troop leaders used during the period, yet we find no reference to them or other personal notes. The book includes a number of basic maps and an interesting array of personal photographs but no organizational charts or sketches of any of the personalities that the author encountered during his extensive career. Mack’s epilogue is little more than a superficial list of lessons that are already taught or considered in service schools.

Despite these shortcomings, however, this book is valuable for historians and soldiers alike. Its detailed descriptions of small unit combat operations in Korea and Vietnam are excellent. The reader accompanies Lieutenant Mack and the platoon he leads as they defend a portion of the Pusan perimeter, assault “Sugarloaf Ridge,” and resist the ferocious Chinese offensive in the fall of 1950. Although his Korean tales end with his wounding that November, Mack’s accounts include details of platoon life that are invaluable to understanding the nature of small unit combat. His description of his advisory duty in Vietnam in 1963 and 1964 is equally engrossing. Mack’s detailed narrative provides a lucid explanation of the problems faced in that period by field-grade officers loyally attempting to implement a flawed, and often incoherent, policy. I especially enjoyed the author’s description of a successful attack in Vietnam by a reconnaissance platoon equipped with an M114, an armored vehicle not renowned for its tactical prowess.

After field-grade assignments to tidewater Virginia, Germany, and the Army War College, Mack returned to Vietnam and commanded the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry. Although the narrative expresses pride in the author’s performance as a combat commander, it here takes on a critical, but still insightful, tone. Mack concludes that, despite the rhetoric of the early 1960s that Americans could fight the war better than the French and South Vietnamese, the United States Army made the same mistakes. The only real difference was that American mobility gave an appearance of military prowess, while avoiding tough issues of small-unit operations. Mack describes the defeatism that was creeping into the Army by 1970 as he details the inactivation of his battalion. His narrative of his assignment as chief of staff for Saigon’s Army Headquarters Area Command is priceless. Mack ended his career with assignments at the Strategic Studies Institute, the staff of U.S. Army South in the Canal Zone, and an Army Reserve Command in Pennsylvania, and he describes, in some detail, his problems and frustrations with the life of a colonel in the world of backwater, but essential, assignments.

Cold War Soldier, therefore, is rather uneven. As a historical source, it suffers from lapses in detail and an absence of documentation or even reference to the notes Mack probably maintained throughout his career. The writing is often choppy, and the author does not always adequately lead the reader into the incidents that he knows so well. Yet, I found myself engrossed in the details of his story and his progression through a successful Army career. Certainly, this memoir should be included in university and service school libraries and purchased by those military historians interested in recent military history.

Retired Army Maj. Stephen A. Bourque is an associate professor of history at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served in the 1st Infantry Division during the Persian Gulf War and in 1992 commanded the Army’s only Regular Army military history detachment. He wrote the chapter on Operation DESERT STORM in George Hofmann and Donn Starry, eds., Camp Colt to Desert Storm: The History of U.S. Armored Forces (Lexington, Ky., 1999) and is the author of Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War, published by the Center of Military History in 2002.

★★★★★
William Gardner Bell
(1914–2006)

William Gardner Bell, who was a historian at the Office of the Chief of Military History for 27 years, died in May 2006 at the age of 91. A native of New York, Bell was inducted into the Army in 1941, served as a horse trooper on the Great Plains, earned a commission at the Cavalry School in 1943, and was an officer in a horse cavalry regiment on the Mexican border. He then served in Italy as a company commander and battalion staff officer with the 350th Infantry, an element of the 88th Infantry Division, and was awarded a Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster. After the war he served for two years as associate editor of the Armored Cavalry Journal and three years as editor of its successor, Armor magazine. He served as a uniformed historian at the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1956 to 1962, before retiring from the military in the latter year as a lieutenant colonel. He was a civilian historian at the same office from 1963 to 1984 and became chief of its Staff Support Branch.

Bell drafted a dozen annual reports of the secretary of the Army; wrote the chapter on the Army in the Indian Wars in the textbook edited by Maurice Matloff, American Military History (OCMH, 1969); prepared compilations of short biographies and portraits of the secretaries of war and secretaries of the Army and of the Army’s commanding generals and chiefs of staff first published in 1981 and 1983, respectively; and wrote an illustrated pamphlet on the history of Quarters One at Fort Myer, Virginia, home to the Army’s chiefs of staff since 1908. Colonel Bell’s love of the history and art of the American West found expression in more than a half-dozen articles, pamphlets, and books he authored, including a delightful, lavishly illustrated biography of a Western artist and writer, Will James: The Life and Works of a Lone Cowboy (Flagstaff, Ariz., 1987).

Marian R. McNaughton
(1925–2006)

Marian R. McNaughton, who in a three-decade-long career organized, curated, and arranged for the exhibition of the Army’s very substantial collection of fine art, died in February 2006. She was 80.

The Historical Division of the Army’s Special Staff took responsibility for the Army’s collection of American and captured German art in 1949 from the Military District of Washington. McNaughton soon after joined the Office of the Chief of Military History, the Historical Division’s successor. By 1954 she had become chief of the OCMH Historical Properties Office, which oversaw both this art collection and a small number of other historical objects. McNaughton led the Historical Properties Office for eight years, but as the office’s broader museum-collection responsibilities grew, she yielded that position and remained focused on the Army’s art collection. She preserved and loaned for display works done by artists working for or with the Army in World War II and acquired similar pieces from earlier wars. She also organized the return of many art works to the Federal Republic of Germany, as mandated by Congress. During the Vietnam War, she supervised a revived Army soldier-artist program. Taking a year of leave from the office, McNaughton obtained a bachelor’s degree in art history from the American University. She also developed her own skills as a painter and sculptor. She retired from the Center of Military History in 1980.

Joseph H. Ewing
(1909–2006)

Joseph H. Ewing, who headed the museum-related activities of the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1966 to 1980, died in August 2006. He was 97.

A native of New Jersey, Ewing graduated from the University of Notre Dame, where he was a member of the cross country team. He worked as a journalist before enlisting in the Army in 1942. After graduating from officer candidate school and the infantry officer advanced course at Fort Benning, Georgia, Ewing joined the 175th Infantry, an element of the 29th Infantry Division, as it prepared to assault the city of Brest in Brittany, France. He led a rifle platoon as the division advanced through Germany and was awarded a Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster.

After World War II, Ewing authored 29, Let’s Go! A History of the 29th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1948). He served from 1950 to 1953 in the Military History Section of the Far East Command in Tokyo. He later served as historian of the First Army in New York and became the curator of its museum. Ewing
headed the Historical Properties Branch of the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1966 to 1971, when the branch was absorbed. Subsequently, as the Army’s staff curator, he assisted the Army’s field museum directors and led Army museum conferences. By 1975 the Army’s active elements were operating sixty-three museums around the world, a third of them created since Ewing had come to OCMH, and the Army National Guard operated fifteen more, seven of them opened since 1966. Ewing retired from the Army Reserve as a lieutenant colonel in 1969 and from the civil service in 1980. He received the Department of the Army’s Distinguished Civilian Service Award.

Ewing made another contribution to military history in 1987 when he published an article entitled “The New Sherman Letters” in American Heritage magazine. The piece brought to light two dozen previously unpublished letters in which General William T. Sherman discussed the challenges of his Civil War assignments. These letters focused particular attention on the harm that indiscreet newspaper reporters covering his operations caused for his forces. Sherman had written the letters to former Senator and Secretary of the Treasury Thomas Ewing, who was General Sherman’s foster father and Joseph Ewing’s great-grandfather, and to Thomas Ewing’s son Philemon, the author’s grandfather.

Elizabeth H. Branch
(1917–2006)

Col. Elizabeth H. Branch, who headed the Military History Branch of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for eighteen months, died in February 2006. She was 88.

A native of Connecticut, Branch enlisted in the Army in 1942. She earned a commission and served during World War II in England, France, and Belgium and immediately afterwards in China. After earning a bachelor’s degree from George Washington University, she became the first female officer to head a division of the Army Ordnance Guided Missile School. She served as commandant of the Women’s Army Corps School and was one of the first women officers assigned to the Joint Staff. Two annual histories of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, appeared between February 1971 and August 1972, when she led its Military History Branch. She retired from the Army in the latter year and later served for nineteen years as a trustee of Norwich University. She also served on the Board of Directors of the Women’s Army Corps Foundation and developed the foundation’s oral history program.

who continue to work hard and set high professional standards for themselves and their subordinates will continue to do well. Take the time to learn the new system rather than fight against it; you’ll just waste your time and that of others if you take the latter course. Focus on setting high standards and achieving your goals, and most of the pay-for-performance issues (after some inevitable growing pains) will take care of themselves. And there may also be some chances for more rapid promotions and attaining some new financial incentives at all levels for astute employees and managers. The flip side of change is always opportunity. Grab it!

Other challenges to us Army historians will be more existential in nature. What will be our continuing value to a necessarily present-focused Army as the GWOT continues? How do we work to preserve and present to the Army leadership the whole of our military past as relevant to contemporary events? Army historians provide a deep well of experience to the Army; that is our greatest single strength. No one else does this. We need to preserve this capability and not be dragged into competing with public affairs specialists or even operations research analysts. At the same time, we have to work harder to show that that the materials that we can bring to the table—a powerful narrative and a deep and sophisticated analysis of the past—are valuable and relevant today. This will be a constant challenge to us all. Nor can we allow ourselves as a community to be relegated to the role of simply document collectors. We have to help Army leaders recognize the importance of preserving their organizations’ current experiences and records, upon which we as historians will eventually rely, without undertaking the task of becoming records managers ourselves. Finally, we need to continue to focus on preparing historical studies of all shapes and sizes, from information papers to scratch a current itch, to pamphlets, to monographs, up to large official histories. We can prepare tailored products that will fit the Army’s needs if we think through its needs and match them with our capabilities. Relevance will come from what we do best—preparing a sophisticated analysis of the past packaged in the appropriate form and presented to the right customer.

All of these issues and concerns must be part of our regular dialogue as we seek to find the right balance between history and heritage, between service that a command wants and what it needs, and between focusing on the past and yet using history carefully to help inform and guide the Army as it addresses its current issues. Only through such open dialogue and candid, professional debates within our community can we move ahead to help our Army when it needs us most. I will be an active participant in this debate, and I pledge to each of you my full commitment to working together with you to grapple with these issues with the goal of helping to ensure the health, prosperity, and growth of Army history.
The Center of Military History has issued new books on the United States joint command in the first half of the Vietnam War, on the lineage and heraldry of Army Signal Corps units, on Army engineer work in Europe during the Cold War, on the evolution of operations research in the two decades after the United States’s entry into World War II. The Center has also published pamphlets on the U.S Army’s occupation of Mexico in the Mexican War and the Battle of Antietam in the Civil War; Department of the Army historical summaries for fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999; the proceedings of the 2005 Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference; and new editions of the three volumes of the pictorial record of the U.S. Army in World War II.

MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967, a volume by Graham A. Cosmas in the United States Army in Vietnam series, describes the growth of the command from a small organization administering a military assistance program to a headquarters that directed more than half a million American military personnel. It explores the viewpoints and decisions of the MACV commander and his staff and discusses their relationships with the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs, and the U.S. Pacific Command. Cosmas was a historian at the Center of Military History for many years and is now deputy director of the history office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the author of several earlier books. A companion volume, in which he will cover MACV’s history from 1968 through 1973, is scheduled to be published in 2007. The Government Printing Office is offering the first volume for sale in a cloth cover for $53 and in paperback for $50. The books carry the numbers CMH Pub 91–6 (cloth) and CMH Pub 91–6–1 (paper).

Signal Corps, compiled by Rebecca Robbins Raines, is the latest publication in the Army Lineage Series. It incorporates the lineage and honors of each of the 176 signal units of battalion size or larger organized under tables of organization and equipment that formed part of the Regular Army and Army Reserve’s force structure between 1963 and 2001 or were federally recognized Army National Guard units on 15 June 2001. The information has been updated through the middle of 2001. The volume features color illustrations and textual descriptions of the units’ heraldic items. Unit bibliographies provide a selected list of publications that mention the unit and its activities. The compiler is a historian at the Center of Military History and the author of Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps (CMH, 1996). The new lineage volume is CMH Pub 60–15 (cloth) and CMH Pub 60–15–1 (paper). The cloth edition may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $72 and the paperback for $58.

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 1945–1991, by Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, is the first volume in the U.S. Army in the Cold War Series. Published jointly by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Center of Military History, Building for Peace examines U.S. Army engineers’ construction activities in Europe from the end of World War II in 1945 to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Army expended more than $5 billion on this construction work to accommodate the forces that defended Western Europe during the Cold War. Grathwol and Moorhus are also coauthors of American Forces in Berlin: Cold War Outpost, 1945–1994, a 1994 publication of the Department of Defense. The Government Printing Office is selling the cloth edition of Building for Peace, CMH Pub 45–1, for $78 and the paperback version, CMH Pub 45–1–1, for $62.

“Ruck It Up!” The Post–Cold War Transformation of V Corps, 1990–2001, by Charles E. Kirkpatrick, chronicles the transformation of a tank-heavy corps configured to counter Soviet threats to Western Europe into a lighter reaction force more readily deployable across the area of operations of the U.S. European Command. This transition presaged the reorganization of the entire Army from the force that emerged from the Cold War to a more agile modular organization designed to address diverse regional contingencies. The author was the historian of V Corps for the thirteen years prior to his death in 2005. Issued in paperback as CMH Pub 70–94–1, this book may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $73.
The Center of Military History published the History of Operations Research in the United States Army, 1942–1962, by Charles R. Shrader for the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research. Listed as CMH Pub 70–102–1, it is the first of three planned volumes that will be organized chronologically. Operations research emerged during World War II as an important means of assisting civilian and military leaders in planning scientifically sound improvements in the design and performance of weapons and equipment. Operations research techniques were also applied during the war to questions of tactics and strategy and after the war to issues of political and economic policy. This comprehensive account offers insights into the natural tension between military leaders and civilian scientists, traces the establishment and growth of Army operations research organizations, and evaluates the contributions of these institutions to the Army. The author, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, is the author of The Muslim–Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992–1994 (College Station, Tex., 2003) and other books on warfare in the twentieth century. The Government Printing Office is offering the first volume of the History of Operations Research in the United States Army for sale for $28.

The Occupation of Mexico, May 1846–July 1848, by Center historian Stephen A. Carney is the third pamphlet in a series on U.S. Army campaigns and actions in the Mexican War. This 48-page illustrated booklet relates how a U.S. Army force of no more than 30,000 men managed to occupy successfully the key population centers and supporting lines of communication in a nation of 7 million Mexicans and to dispel the irregular forces that came to oppose the occupiers, thereby facilitating the negotiation of a favorable settlement of the two nations’ territorial conflicts. This pamphlet is CMH Pub 73–3 and is being sold by the Government Printing Office for $3.75.

The Battle of Antietam Staff Ride Guide by Ted Ballard is the third in the Center’s new series of guides to battlefields in the national capital area. Containing fifteen situation maps, four tables, and eighteen illustrations, this 108-page publication contains a narrative of the battle, a detailed chronology, an order of battle, and biographical sketches, along with short discussions of casualties, organization, tactics, small arms, artillery, logistics, and selected battlefield stops. The pamphlet is CMH Pub 35–3–1.

Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1997, CMH Pub 101–28–1, was begun under contract and completed by the staff of the Center of Military History. W. Blair Haworth, a historian at the Center, wrote Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1998, CMH Pub 101–29–1. Jeffery A. Charleston, who was a Center historian, authored Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1999, CMH Pub 101–30–1. These documents are the latest in a series of annual reports on the major issues confronting the Army and how they were handled covering the years beginning in 1969. They are distributed only to Army publication account holders.

The proceedings compiled in Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Conference, 2005, edited by Army Capt. John E. Prior, contain the presentations made by twenty distinguished speakers at a conference held in Washington, D.C., in September 2005 that focused on national sovereignty, strategic surprises, nuclear proliferation, and humanitarian organizations. The speakers included retired Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Congressman Ike Skelton; Dr. David A. Kay, who led the Central Intelligence Agency’s search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in the second half of 2003; and retired Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, President George H. W. Bush’s assistant secretary of state for African affairs. This book is CMH Pub 70–103–1.

The second editions of the three volumes of the U.S. Army in World War II: Pictorial Record reproduce from original prints on glossy paper the photographs originally printed by the Office of the Chief of Military History on coarser stock in 1951 and 1952. These new editions also identify for the first time the source and catalog number of each of these photos. The second edition of the pictorial record of The War against Japan has been issued in cloth as CMH Pub 12–1 and in paperback as CMH Pub 12–1–1; that of The War against Germany and Italy: Mediterranean and Adjacent Areas as CMH Pub 12–2 (cloth) and CMH Pub 12–2–1 (paperback); and that of The War against Germany: Europe and Adjacent Areas as CMH Pub 12–3 (cloth) and CMH Pub 12–3–1 (paperback). The Government Printing Office has offered the new paperback editions of these pictorial volumes for sale at $41, $43, and $46, respectively.

Each of the aforementioned publications may be obtained by Army publication account holders from the Directorate of Logistics—Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, Missouri 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. The facility accepts customer service inquiries by phone at 314-592-0910 and by e-mail at the customer service link at the aforementioned Web site.


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sity of Florida in 1980 and a doctorate in that discipline from Yale University in 1986. He also holds a master’s degree in national security strategy from the National War College. Dr. Stewart served in a civilian capacity as historian with the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1987 to 1990 and as director of history and museums at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from 1990 to 1998. He was chief of the Center’s Histories Division from June 1998 to September 2006.

Dr. Stewart is the author of Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1991); The English Ordnance Office, 1585–1625: A Case Study in Bureaucracy (Rochester, N.Y., 1996); and CMH pamphlets on the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, the U.S. Army in Somalia, and the first six months of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. He served in uniform as a combat historian in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Bahrain, and Afghanistan, before retiring from the Army Reserve as a colonel in 2002, having completed thirty years of active and reserve military service. He was general editor of the revised, two-volume edition of American Military History (CMH, 2005).

Dr. John F. Shortal joined the Center in October 2006 as its assistant chief of military history, a revived position in which he will engage in strategic planning, assist the Center’s field support programs, and engage in historical writing. A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Dr. Shortal holds master’s and doctoral degrees in history from Temple University, and he taught history at the U.S. Military Academy. He is the author of Forged by Fire: General Robert L. Eichelberger and the Pacific War (Columbia, S.C., 1987). A career infantry officer, Dr. Shortal recently retired from the Army as a brigadier general after thirty-two years of active military service. His military assignments included tours as assistant commander of the 2d Infantry Division in Korea and deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command.

**Combat Studies Institute Press Issues New Historical Publications**

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center has issued a substantial number of new books and bound papers on military history, many of which address topics that involve or parallel recent military actions. Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities by CSI historian Kendall D. Gott, a retired armor officer, examines the use of tanks in urban fighting by the United States in Germany in 1944, Vietnam in 1968, and Iraq in 2004; by the Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon in 1984, and by the Russian Army in Chechnya in 1995. These deployments of armored forces were often, but not always successful. The Government Printing Office is selling this 144-page book for $12.


CSI staffers Curtis S. King, William Glenn Robertson, and Steven E. Clay have authored a new 469-page Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864: A Study in Operational-Level Command. Also pertaining to the nineteenth-century Army, Stephen D. Coats, a professor of joint military operations and history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, has written Gathering at the Golden Gate: Mobilizing for War in the Philippines, 1898. This 302-page book contains over 100 black-and-white illustrations.

The Combat Studies Institute’s Global War on Terrorism occasional papers address both current and historical issues pertaining to the Army. The most recent titles in this series are Circle the Wagons: The History of US Army Convoy Security by Richard E. Killblane (Paper No. 13); The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective (No. 14) and Ope ration AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations (No. 20), both by Matt M. Matthews; The US Military’s Experience in Stability Operations, 1789–2005, by Lawrence A. Yates (No. 15); Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations by John J. McGrath (No. 16); Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare by Thomas A. Bruscino Jr. (No. 17); and Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (No. 18) and Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present (No. 19), both by Robert D. Ramsey III. Boots on the Ground analyzes the number of troops committed to the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, to Germany and Japan after World War II, to Malaya during the insurgency of 1948–60, the Balkans in the 1990s, and Iraq in 2003–05. Killblane is the command historian of the U.S. Army Transportation Center and School; Matthews, Yates, McGrath, and Bruscino have worked for CSI as staff or contract historians; Ramsey taught at the Command and General Staff College. The Government Printing Office is selling copies of Occasional Papers 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 20 for $7.50, $17, $10, $15, $18, and $9, respectively. Digital copies of each of the publications mentioned in this news note except for Faith and Hope in a War-Torn Land can also be downloaded in digital form from

Army Elements Issue Books on Service in the Global War on Terrorism

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office has published an illustrated, 517-page history of U.S. Army special operations forces in the invasion and initial occupation of Iraq. Entitled All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special Operations Forces in Iraq, the book describes the planning and preparation for these forces’ participation in the invasion, the execution of their missions as coalition forces overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein and occupied all parts of Iraq, and the activities of Army special operations forces in occupied Iraq through June 2003. Senior writer and editor Charles H. Briscoe, chief of the History Office; his office colleagues Kenneth Finlayson, Lt. Col. Robert W. Jones Jr., and Cherilyn A. Walley; and writers A. Dwayne Aaron, Michael R. Mullins, and James A. Schroeder share author credit. The book may be purchased from the Government Printing Office bookstore for $61 under stock number 008–029–00431–3. The new edition adds an index and enhances the resolution of the book’s illustrations, and many more photos now appear in color. This edition is available from the Government Printing Office bookstore for $45 under stock number 008–070–00801–7. Army publication account holders may order copies at http://www.apd.army.mil.


The 98th Division (Institutional Training), an Army Reserve organization headquartered in Rochester, New York, has issued an illustrated historical account of the actions of its soldiers in the Global War on Terrorism. The book is entitled An Encounter with History: The 98th Division and the Global War on Terrorism, 2001–2005. Written and edited by Lt. Col. Timothy J. Hansen and Sgt. Maj. Jocene D. Preston of the division, the book describes the contributions of members of the division beginning on 11 September 2001. The division’s most important assignment in that period involved the yearlong deployment of substantial elements to Iraq to train Iraqi soldiers. This deployment began in September 2004 and represented the first deployment to Iraq of any of the Army’s six institutional training divisions. The book also reports on the work of a detachment from the 98th Division that at the same time assisted in the training of cadets at Afghanistan’s National Military Academy. This book may be purchased from the Government Printing Office bookstore for $19 under stock number 008–029–00441–1. Bookstore orders may be placed at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

Army Corps of Engineers Issues Book on the Development of the Nation’s Capital

The Office of History of Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has issued a new, beautifully illustrated account of the role of the Corps in the development of Washington, D.C. Authored by Pamela Scott, Capital Engineers: The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Development of Washington, D.C., 1790–2004, narrates how engineer officers and commissioned engineers designed, built, maintained, and improved thoroughfares, water supply systems, military defenses, public buildings, memorials, parks, bridges, highways, and waterway improvements in and around the nation’s capital over a span of more than two centuries. Released in May 2006, the first printing of this popular book, distributed as EP 870–1–67, has already been depleted. When the book is reprinted, copies will be available from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Publications Depot, 2803 52nd Avenue, Hyattsville, Maryland 20781-1102. Requests, which should cite the EP number, may be faxed to the depot at 301-394-0084. The Office of History also plans to post the book on its Web site, http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/history/pubs.htm, early in 2007.

Army Military History Detachments Focus on Operations in Iraq

Reserve component military history detachments continued to document ongoing U.S. Army operations in Iraq during 2006, but the military history detachment that deployed to Afghanistan in March 2005 left that country in November 2005 and was not replaced. Three full detachments and personnel from a fourth served six months or more in Iraq in 2006. The 35th Military History Detachment, based in California, deployed to Iraq in October 2005 and served there for a year. The 126th Military History Detachment, based in Massachusetts, deployed to Iraq in December 2005 and returned in November 2006.
The 50th Military History Detachment, based in Utah, deployed in January 2006 and returned home in the summer of 2006. The enlisted personnel of the 51st Military History Detachment, based in California, deployed to Iraq in March 2006. Most recently, the 90th Military History Detachment, based in Texas, deployed to Iraq in October 2006 and the 141st Military History Detachment, based in the state of Washington, was called into active federal service in November 2006 for service in Iraq. The 126th and 141st Military History Detachments are Army National Guard units; the remaining units are in the Army Reserve. The mission of these detachments is to conduct interviews and collect documents and artifacts for use by military historians and museums.

Five military history detachments assisted more briefly in the period September through December 2005 in the collection of historical records generated by the Army forces assigned to assist recovery efforts after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These were the 44th, a Regular Army unit that assisted for three weeks; the 50th, which served in Mississippi for about two weeks; the 90th, which documented Hurricane Rita recovery work; the 102d, a National Guard unit based in Kansas that assisted the Katrina recovery efforts in Louisiana for just over a month; and the 305th, an Army Reserve unit based in Pennsylvania that focused on the New Orleans efforts initially but then moved in October 2005 to Fort Gillem, Georgia, where until December 2005 it documented the overall military effort while collocated with Headquarters, First Army, which oversaw the military response.

**Army Historian Helps Document U.S. Reconstruction Work in Iraq**

Dr. Robert S. Rush, a historian at the Center of Military History, returned in September 2006 from six months of service in Iraq as command historian for the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Rush collected documents and conducted oral history interviews relating to the origin and evolution of the division’s missions, structure, achievements, and challenges, as it worked on the physical reconstruction of Iraq and built and maintained American military installations there. He prepared studies of past reconstruction efforts, presented his conclusions to senior Army leaders, and discussed the subject on Iraqi television. Rush also wrote a thematic historical summary of the Gulf Region Division and a history of its organizational changes.

**Army Museums Open New Exhibits**

Several U.S. Army museums have opened new exhibits. The 1st Cavalry Division Museum at Fort Hood, Texas, in January 2006 opened an exhibit on the division’s operations in the War on Terrorism. The exhibit explores the role of elements of the division in the air defense of the nation’s capital after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the elimination of terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan, and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The service of the entire division in Iraq in the years after the invasion, when it supported efforts to reconstruct and democratize that country, is featured in the exhibit.

The 4th Infantry Division Museum, also at Fort Hood, opened a new World War I and World War II gallery area in its annex building on 6 June 2006, the anniversary of the division’s landing on Utah Beach in Normandy. The exhibit examines the actions of the division in both wars, drawing upon soldiers’ letters, journals, and diaries, as well as artifacts of the conflicts.

The Army Quartermaster Museum at Fort Lee, Virginia, in July 2006 opened an exhibit on Army music. Entitled “Bands of Brothers: The Army’s Musical Heritage,” the exhibit displays historic band instruments and bandsmen’s uniforms and interprets the role of Army musicians in contributing to soldiers’ morale. The exhibit will be on display at the Quartermaster Museum through May 2007.

The 1st Infantry Division Museum, which closed in Würzburg, Germany, in July 2006, reopened at Fort Riley, Kansas, the following month. Also at Fort Riley, the Cavalry Museum will be hosting an exhibit of costumes worn by actors portraying cavalrymen on the wide screen. This exhibit of movie costumes will be on display at the Cavalry Museum from December 2006 to August 2007. It was previously exhibited at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

The Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor at Fort Knox, Kentucky, completed a new post–World War II gallery in August 2006. The new exhibit area displays tanks, armored personnel carriers, and uniformed mannequins and features six video documentaries shown in separate kiosks. The exhibits relate the actions of U.S. Army mobile forces in the occupation of Germany and the subsequent protection of Western and Central Europe during the Cold War and in operations in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.

In September and October 2006 the National Infantry Museum at Fort Benning, Georgia; the Patton Museum at Fort Knox; the U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Engineer, and Military Police Museums at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; and the 45th Infantry Division Museum in Oklahoma City opened displays of four of the eight copies that have been produced of the new exhibit “When Humanity Fails.” This exhibit commemorates the liberation of Nazi concentration camps in Europe by U.S. soldiers. It was developed by the Afikim Foundation under contract to the Center of Military History, which administered a $1 million appropriation for the project. The exhibit will also be displayed in nine other Army museums beginning in the first half of 2007. It will remain on permanent display at the National Infantry Museum.

**Army History Article Wins Two History Writing Awards**

“John J. Pershing and Relief for Cause in the American Expeditionary Forces, 1917–1918,” an article by Timothy K. Nenninger that appeared in the Spring 2005 issue of
Army History (No. 61), received the Charles Thomson Prize of the Society for History in the Federal Government and the Army Historical Foundation’s 2005 Distinguished Writing Award in the Professional Army Journals category. The Society for History in the Federal Government awards the Charles Thomson Prize annually for an article or essay dealing with an aspect of the federal government’s history written in or for a federal history program, evaluated on the basis of significance of subject matter, depth of research, rigor of methodology, clarity of presentation, and quality of style. The Army Historical Foundation makes five writing awards each year for books and articles on military history. The awards honor authors who, in the foundation’s judgment, made “a significant contribution to the literature on U.S. Army history.”

Military History Institute Opens Collections

The U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, has opened for research use three collections of particular historical significance:

The Army Nurse Corps Collection contains documents, diaries, drafts of manuscripts, files, memorandums, reports, and studies compiled by the historical program of the Army Nurse Corps to preserve the history of the Nurse Corps in the U.S. Army. The collection spans the years 1935 to 1989, but a majority of its items were created between 1965 and 1989.

The All Volunteer Army Collection, partially compiled by Robert K. Griffith Jr., consists of official documents, correspondence, papers, interoffice memorandums, and printed material related to the U.S. Army’s transition to an all-volunteer force. The collection covers the time span 1973 to 1985.

The papers of the DCSPER (Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel) Policy Files on Discrimination in the Army cover the years 1940 to 1971, with the bulk pertaining to 1964 to 1971. This collection documents the oft-renamed element of the Office of the DCSPER responsible for monitoring racial discrimination and racially motivated incidents in the U.S. Army. The collection includes briefings, complaints, Congressional inquiries, correspondence, files, investigations, memorandums, news clippings, notes, and reports.

Collection descriptions and folder lists may be found at the Army Heritage Collection OnLine Web site, http://www.ahco.army.mil, by clicking first on the Resource Guides/Finding Aids box and then on the List of Collections with Finding Aids or Inventories line, under Manuscript Holdings.

Upcoming Military History Conferences

The Royal Military College of Canada will host a military history symposium on 22 and 23 March 2007 at its Kingston, Ontario, campus. Its theme will be strategic planning and the origins of World War I. David Stevenson of the London School of Economics will be the keynote speaker. Eugenia Kiesling of the U.S. Military Academy, Bruce Menning of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and Annika Mombauer of Britain’s Open University will also address the gathering. Profs. B. J. C. McKercher, at mckercher-b@rmc.ca, and R. A. Prete, at prete-r@rmc.ca, can provide further information.

The Society for Military History will hold its 2007 annual conference from 19 to 22 April at Holiday Inn and Conference Center in Frederick, Maryland. It will focus on “Crossroads of War.”

The Council on America’s Military Past will hold its annual conference from 9 to 13 May 2007 at Hampton, Virginia. The conference will highlight papers and site tours related to military activities around the lower Chesapeake Bay and papers on the impact of the Indian Wars on the settlement of the American West. Further information on the conference may be obtained by contacting the council’s executive director, retired Marine Corps Col. Herbert Hart, at camphart1@aol.com.

Army Historian Authors Book on Mexican War

Retired Army Lt. Col. Sherman L. Fleek, the command historian of the Army’s Iraq Project and Contracting Office, has written a new book on the Mormon Battalion, a volunteer organization uniquely raised by a religious community that marched from Iowa to California during the Mexican War in support of Brig. Gen. Stephen Kearny’s Army of the West and helped garrison that newly conquered territory. Entitled History May Be Searched in Vain: A Military History of the Mormon Battalion, the book was published in 2006 by the Arthur H. Clark Company in its Frontier Military Series. Colonel Fleek served as chief of historical services for the National Guard Bureau from 1999 to 2002.

Former Army Historians Author New Books

Two former Army historians have authored new books on military history. Alfred M. Beck has written Hitler’s Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933–1941, a book published in 2005 by Potomac Books. Beck served as a historian with the Army Corps of Engineers and with the Historical Services and Histories Divisions of the Center of Military History before retiring from the civil service.

The Missouri Society for Military History has issued Evolution of the Missouri Militia into the National Guard of Missouri, 1804–1919, by John G. Westover, a book based on a dissertation that the author completed at the University of Missouri in 1948. Westover served in uniform on the historical staff of the European Theater in 1944 and 1945 and at the Office of the Chief of Military History from 1951 to 1953. Orval L. Henderson, treasurer of the Missouri Society for Military History, prepared the book’s index. Further information about the book may be obtained from Henderson at ohmilitia@sbcglobal.net.

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New CMH Publications

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