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By William M. Hammond

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By Richard N. Grippaldi
The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes *Army History* (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, *Army History*, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5058, or sent by e-mail to charles.hendricks1@us.army.mil.

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
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Cover Photo: Composite Image by Michael R. Gill

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Fiscal Year 2008 has marked another extremely lean time financially for the Army Historical Program and the Center of Military History’s budget. Nevertheless, the Center can boast a record number of publications and information papers produced over the last twelve months and a considerable number of new project starts. Moreover, enough end-of-year funds were garnered to support most of our printing needs as well as to support a significant number of history and museum projects in the field, especially for the Training and Doctrine Command.

Right now the Center is devoting an ever-increasing proportion of its resources to the Pentagon Corridor Project, a key effort of the Office of the Secretary of the Army. Its centerpiece is some forty large exhibit cases for the newly renovated Pentagon outer, or E-ring, corridors with a 15 December opening date. Three Center teams are currently at work: a main exhibit group led by Dr. John Shortal and reinforced with Army Heritage and Education Center exhibit experts from Carlisle Barracks; a smaller artwork cell from the Center’s Museum Division; and support from the Center’s Histories Division. All three groups are working closely with the Secretary’s Office of the Administrative Assistant, while a fourth team has been formed to provide similar aid to the Office of the Army Chief of Staff.

Meanwhile, the Center’s direct support to the field continues unabated. Currently, Dr. Rob Rush is preparing to replace Bill Epley as the Multinational Corps–Iraq historian, while two CMH reservists, Col. Gary Bowman and Maj. Ken Foulks, are scheduled in December to depart for a yearlong tour in Afghanistan. There, they will join our combat artist, M. Sgt. Martin Cervantez, who deployed recently for a ninety-day stint. Unfortunately, all of the above commitments have reduced our ability to provide significant support to the many command history offices in the field and to move ahead with our own strategic plan in an expeditious fashion. Next year, one of our major objectives will be to correct these shortcomings.

Finally, I would like everyone to welcome our new deputy, Col. Kim Hooper, and to share our deep appreciation for the work of our outgoing one, Col. John Spinelli. John’s tremendous experience, common sense, and well-known capacity for hard work explain a lot of the Center’s success over these past two years. Both the Center and the Army will miss him dearly when he formally retires in January. Kim, a special operations officer coming to us from an extended tour in Afghanistan, is just the right person to continue John’s work. The overlap in the assignments of the two deputies will also afford us a smooth transition. Colonel Hooper and I look forward to working with all of you in the years ahead.

In December 2008, the Center of Military History will begin making Army History accessible online on its public Web site. Back issues through Summer 2007 (no. 64) will be available, as will each successive new publication according to the quarterly schedule. Issues can be viewed or downloaded in Adobe PDF format at no cost. An index page of the available issues can be found at the following address: www.history.army.mil/armyhistory.html.
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Sources of Weapon Systems Innovation in the Department of Defense: The Role of In-House Research and Development, 1945–2000, by Thomas C. Lassman, explores the historical evolution of weapon systems innovation during the Cold War. After World War II, the military services did not possess the requisite in-house expertise to develop nuclear submarines, jet aircraft, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and other state-of-the-art weapon systems incorporating the latest advances in science and technology. Because of this deficiency, the Department of Defense increasingly acquired new knowledge and technical skills through contracts with industrial firms and colleges and universities. At the same time, however, the services continued to expand and diversify their own internal research and development (R&D) programs to complement the growth of weapons research and development in the private sector. The author worked at the Chemical Heritage Foundation in Philadelphia and the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics in College Park, Maryland, before joining the Center as a contract historian. Sources of Weapon Systems Innovation has been published as CMH Pub 51–2–1.

Operation Urgent Fury: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, prepared by Richard W. Stewart, is an edited extract of Center historian Edgar Raines’ larger account of U.S. Army operations on Grenada entitled The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, October–November 1983. The brochure tells the story of the U.S. Army’s “no-notice” joint force contingency operation on the island of Grenada. Because of a deteriorating political situation on Grenada after the deposing and execution of the leader of the government by its own military, the perceived need to deal firmly with Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean, and the potential for several hundred U.S. citizens becoming hostages, the Ronald W. Reagan administration launched an invasion of the island with only a few days for the military to plan operations. While the U.S. military’s capabilities were never in doubt, the unexpectedly strong Cuban and Grenadian resistance in the first two days of the operation and the host of American military errors in planning, intelligence, communications, and logistics highlighted the dangers of even small contingency operations. As the first joint operation attempted since the end of the Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada also underscored the problems the U.S. Army faced in trying to work in a joint environment with its Air Force, Navy, and Marine counterparts. The general editor of this work is the chief historian of the Center and the former chief of the Histories Division. The pamphlet is CMH Pub 70–114–1.

Center of Military History Announces Collins Writing Competition Winners: The Army Center of Military History has selected the winning essays in its 2008 James Lawton Collins Jr. Special Topics Writing Competition. The goal of this contest was to obtain firsthand accounts of small unit actions from junior leaders in the Army describing how their units responded to the challenges they faced in Afghanistan. The Center of Military History wants to capture the small unit–level view of this conflict for inclusion in its publications.

Maj. Dirk D. Ringgenberg authored the first-place entry, “The Battle of Bulac Kalay.” The essay describes an intense battle fought in May 2005 between Company C, 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry, an element of the 173d Airborne Brigade, and a strong Taliban force near the village of Bulac Kalay in the remote Arghandab Valley in Zabol Province, Afghanistan. Two factors enabled the American company to decimate the Taliban in this day-long contest: fortuitous placement of critical American suppressive fire and a fast-paced attack on a hidden enemy whose whereabouts had been betrayed by a captured comrade. Ringgenberg commanded the company from May 2004 to July 2005. He was awarded a Bronze Star and a Silver Star for heroism in Afghanistan. He holds a bachelor’s

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By William M. Hammond

he month of January 2008 marked the fortieth anniversary of the first phase of the Tet offensive. There were two other offensives, a second in May and a third in August, but the first is the one that everyone remembers, probably because of the negative press and television coverage that accompanied it. As can be expected, the anniversary evoked considerable commentary, not all of it favorable to the news media. “The Americans had won a tactical victory,” historian James H. Willbanks asserted in a 5 March commentary in the New York Times. But the sheer scope and ferocity of the offensive and the vivid images of the fighting on the nightly television news convinced many Americans that the Johnson administration had lied to them, and the president’s credibility plummeted. Perhaps more important, the offensive shook the administration’s own confidence and led to a re-evaluation of American strategy. On March 31, 1968, [President Lyndon Baines] Johnson went on national television to announce a partial suspension of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam and call for negotiations. The following year, President [Richard M.] Nixon began the long American withdrawal from Vietnam, paving the way for the triumph of the Communist forces in 1975.

Willbanks, the director of the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, blamed no one for anything, but he left no doubt that media coverage of the offensive played an important role in the formation of both public opinion of the war and President Johnson’s own decision to seek negotiations. Another historian, writing in the Wall Street Journal, Arthur Herman, was hardly as restrained: “On January 30, 1968, more than a quarter million North Vietnamese soldiers and 100,000 Viet Cong irregulars launched a massive attack on South Vietnam,” he declared. “But the public didn’t hear about who had won this most decisive battle of the Vietnam War... until much too late. In truth, the war in Vietnam was lost on the propaganda front, in great measure due to the press’ pervasive misreporting of the clear U.S. victory at Tet as a defeat.”

Yet a third historian, Lt. Col. Robert Bateman, responded to Herman on the same day his commentary appeared. Noting that the U.S. commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, had conducted a whirlwind tour of the United States in November 1967 in support of President Johnson’s policies on the war, he emphasized that the general had set up false expectations within the American public by claiming that the enemy was on the ropes. “With 1968,” the general had insisted, “a new phase is starting, we have reached an important point where the end begins to come into view.” Two months later, the Tet offensive occurred. In that light, Bateman said, it was “intellectually dishonest” for any historian to pretend that Westmoreland and the Johnson administration had not created the context within which the negative news coverage had occurred and to blame everything that had happened on the press. “It is counterproductive
for our current efforts, dangerous for our country, and a bad history lesson for our developing junior officers to pretend that the media lost the Vietnam War.”

So, what actually happened? Who is right? Did media coverage of the Vietnam War poison American public opinion of the conflict and lead to the U.S. defeat in Vietnam as Herman charges? Did it distort President Johnson’s view of the war and that of his administration as Willbanks suggests? To get an answer, we have to look at the whole of the news media’s coverage of the conflict, not just that of the Tet offensive.

The Media and Public Opinion

At the start of the war in Vietnam in 1965, the Johnson administration considered press censorship but rejected the idea as impractical and unnecessary. Although a few newspapers such as the New York Times questioned American strategy in South Vietnam, most of the news media supported it. If they disagreed at all, it was with the tactics the United States was using. Both they and their reporters in the field believed that Americans should take charge of the war and carry it to a quick, clean conclusion.

Under the circumstances, the United States adopted a policy of voluntary cooperation with the press that succeeded in preserving military security without infringing on the rights of reporters. In exchange for an agreement to observe guidelines that banned all mention of plans, operations, air strikes, and other sensitive information, the U.S. command provided the press with 24-hour consultation services, daily briefings, and transportation into the field. Those who obeyed the rules could accompany the troops anywhere in South Vietnam on a space-available basis. Those who broke them would lose all the advantages the system provided. The press responded. Only eight of the more than six thousand reporters who served in Vietnam suffered disaccreditation for security violations.

General Westmoreland set the tone for how his command dealt with the press by holding background briefings for selected reporters and by inviting individuals to accompany him on trips into the field. Between 1965 and 1968, reporters often criticized the general’s strategy of attrition, the violence of American tactics, clandestine U.S. operations in Laos and Cambodia, and the corruption and ineptitude of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Even so, Westmoreland’s chief of public affairs, Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, insisted that the bulk of news reporting favored the American cause. A survey of television reporting before the Tet offensive of 1968 found the same thing. According to its author, researcher Daniel Hallin, spokesmen for the war predominated over critics on news programs during the period by a ratio of 6 to 1. After 1968, the supporters still predominated but by a much narrower margin of 1.5 or so to 1. In that sense, far from being critics of government, some would say the media were its lapdogs.

The effect, however, did not last. Whatever the good results of Westmoreland’s public affairs policies, there was no way to compensate for flaws in the American strategy. By choosing to leave enemy sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia intact and by declining to invade North Vietnam or to block its ports, the Johnson administration left the initiative to the enemy, who could control the rate of his own casualties by choosing when and where to fight. For the war to succeed, moreover, President Johnson had to persuade the Communists that they could not prevail, but, to do that, he had to convince Americans that South Vietnam was worth the cost. For many reasons—immaturity brought on by years of French misrule, corruption, a lack of will induced by the “can-do” attitude of American forces—the South Vietnamese were incapable of the political and military reforms that would have made their cause attractive to the American public.

In fact, public opinion of the war had been on a downward slide almost from the beginning of the war. As researcher John Mueller has noted, American public support as measured by the Gallup poll’s famous “Mistake Question” (“In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?”) was highest when the troops went in, but the number of those who did not regret the war or consider it a mistake fell progressively as casualties rose, decreasing 15 percentage points every time the total of killed and wounded increased by a factor of ten (going from 100 to 1,000, 1,000 to 10,000, 10,000 to 100,000, and so on). The falloff was steepest at the beginning of the conflict, with those who were most reluctant turning away quickly. Then it slowed because those with stronger opinions were harder to move. The number fell to 48 percent in September 1966, but a series of successes in the field seems to have provided a tonic of sorts. A minor surge of support followed between November 1966 and May 1967, when Operations ATTLEBORO, CEDAR FALLS, and JUNCTION CITY made heavily publicized inroads into enemy base areas in South Vietnam, uncovering great stores of enemy supplies, weapons, and ammunition. After that, however, the decline continued, turning definitively negative in July 1967, when the figure fell to 48 percent and never recovered. (See Table 1 and Charts 1 and 2.) The pattern is especially remarkable because
much the same correlation between casualties and public opinion occurred as well during the Korean War.8

To allay public concern, Johnson conducted public relations campaigns to show that the South Vietnamese armed forces were effective, that programs to win the hearts and minds of the country’s peasantry were working, and that the American effort in Vietnam was succeeding. The press replayed all those themes, but since each assertion of optimism had a pessimistic counterpart and each statistic showing progress an equally convincing opposite, it noted those aspects of the war as well. The president turned to Westmoreland for help in making his case. Questioning the propriety of returning to the United States for public appearances while the fighting continued, the general demurred for a time, but he eventually yielded out of loyalty to his commander in chief. Returning to the United States in April 1967, he joined the president’s efforts to market the war with an address to Congress. The optimism campaign that followed extended to Vietnam, where military spokesmen, despite their own judgment that the justification of war was best left to the political sector, sometimes became as involved in selling the conflict as the presidential appointees they served.9

The effects of those efforts were of little avail. According to General Sidle, prior to Westmoreland’s first trip to the United States, the general’s credibility was so high that a rash of favorable news stories almost inevitably appeared after he gave a background briefing for the press. Some repeated the general’s remarks almost word for word. Everything changed afterwards. The reporters became more critical. The general was no longer a soldier doing his job. He had become a possible tool of the Johnson administration with a line to spin. Westmoreland compounded the error in November by returning to the United States and remarking during a speech at the National Press Club that the enemy was so worn down he could no longer mount a large-unit operation near any of South Vietnam’s major cities. The enemy responded two months later with the Tet offensive, attacking every city in South Vietnam over a two-day period.10

As the offensive lengthened, reporters questioned every word the general and his public affairs officers spoke. The stories the reporters produced, as a result, were often overblown or in error, but what happened was still understandable in context.11 In covering the enemy’s attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, for example, correspondents at the scene got their stories from military policemen who mistakenly believed that the enemy had entered the building and had been firing at them from the roof. When official spokesmen issued a correction, the reporters had to balance the command’s record of overoptimism against the word of the troops who were fighting the battle. They sided with the troops.

As with Herman, many believe the exaggerated press coverage that occurred turned the American public against the war. In an extended analysis of the period’s public opinion surveys, however, pollster Burns Roper argues that Americans, for all of their doubts, clearly suspended judgment during Tet in anticipation of a presidential response. Forty-five percent responded yes to the Mistake Question, the same percentage that had given that answer in December 1967; 42 percent answered no, a drop of 4 percent from the previous poll; and 12 percent had no opinion, an increase of 3 percent. More to the point, rather than suffering a loss of morale or fighting spirit, a majority of Americans rallied to their president. Before the offensive in January 1968, 56 percent of those responding to a Gallup

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poll had classed themselves as “hawks” on the war, 27 percent as “doves,” and 17 percent had no opinion. By contrast, at the height of the fighting in early February, 61 percent considered themselves hawks, 23 percent doves, and 16 percent had no opinion. Meanwhile, the number of those who expressed confidence in U.S. military policy in Vietnam rose from 61 percent in December 1967 to 74 percent in February 1968. If Johnson had decided to escalate the war at that point, author Peter Braestrup argued, the public might well have sided with him.12

Press Coverage and the President

As with Willbanks, some will argue that if the public mind was already set, press coverage of Tet turned the president and his administration against the war. They call on two famous quotations for support. The first is a remark by presidential speechwriter Harry McPherson, who told an interviewer that as the Tet offensive proceeded,

I was extremely disturbed. I would go in two or three mornings a week and study the cable book and talk to [National Security Adviser Walter W.] Rostow and ask him what had happened the day before, and would get from him what almost seemed hallucinatory from the point of view of what I had seen on network television the night before. . . . Well, I must say that I mistrusted what he said. . . . I put aside my own interior access to confidential information and was more persuaded by what I saw on the tube and in the newspapers.13

The second quote came from Lyndon Johnson. When CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite returned from a fact-finding trip to Vietnam, he summarized his conclusions by asserting that the United States was “mired in stalemate” in Vietnam and should negotiate with the North Vietnamese “as an honorable people who lived up to their pledge to victory and democracy and did the best they could.”14 Learning of the report, the president is supposed to have
said, “If I have lost Walter Cronkite, I have lost Middle America.”15

McPherson’s comment is the speechwriter’s own personal testimony to how he felt. Those who cite it fail to note the second part of what he said:

I assume the reason this is so, . . . was that like everyone else who had been deeply involved in explaining the policies of the war and trying to understand them and render some judgment, I was fed up with the “light at the end of the tunnel” stuff. I was fed up with the optimism that seemed to flow without stopping from Saigon.16

Once this is added, it becomes clear that a number of Johnson’s staff members had strong misgivings that predated the offensive. Like reporters in the field, they were also suffering from the same lack of trust in official assessments of the war.

The impact of the Cronkite remark on the American public, to whom it was directed, and on the president himself is difficult to gauge. According to the commander of the region around Saigon, Lt. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Cronkite wanted to have an effect. During the reporter’s trip to Vietnam, the general had revealed to Cronkite at General Westmoreland’s request that during the weeks preceding the Tet offensive his command had learned from the interrogation of captured enemy soldiers, captured enemy documents, and other intelligence that the enemy was planning an all-out offensive. The command even had the name the enemy had given the attack, “General Offensive, General Uprising.” Weyand added that U.S. intelligence had indicated that the attacks would come on or close to 30 January at the beginning of the traditional Tet holiday celebrations. As a result, on the night of the offensive, all of his units were on alert. Cronkite took it all in, Weyand said, and responded that the story I had to tell was a very heartening one but that he would
probably not use any of it in his documentary because he had been in Hue and had seen the open graves containing the bodies of hundreds of innocent South Vietnamese civilians who had been slaughtered and he had decided that he was going to do everything in his power to see that this war was brought to an end. I never saw the final documentary, but I am told that Cronkite did not use any of the information I had given him... I don’t mean to imply any Machiavellian motives to Cronkite in this instance nor that his documentary had any great impact upon the American conscience, but it does bother me that a journalist of his stature would report [at the conclusion of each of his newscasts] “and that’s the way it was” when, in actuality, he was reporting only part of the “way it was.”17

The reporter’s idea of what was important was different from that of the general. As far as the public is concerned, whether Cronkite’s comment had any effect is difficult to determine. The best information seems to indicate that people imposed their own preferences on the anchorman and his reporting. Northwestern University researcher Lawrence Lichty, for example, found during a 1968 public opinion survey that 75 percent of those interviewed who favored the war considered Cronkite and the other anchormen hawks while a majority of those who opposed the war considered them doves.18

As for Johnson himself, whatever his remark about losing Middle America, he had been on a downward course with regard to Vietnam for close to a year before Tet, if not longer. His difficulties came to a head in August 1967, when an article in the New York Times alleged that the war was in stalemate and quoted an anonymous senior American general in Vietnam to the effect that, “I’ve destroyed the __ Division three times, ... I’ve chased main force units all over the country, and the impact was zilch: it meant nothing to the people.” The last comment anyone responsible for the war wanted to hear, the report disturbed both Johnson and General Westmoreland. Years later, Westmoreland would avow that no general of his would ever have said such a thing. In fact, the source would be revealed in 2006 as none other than a future chief of staff of the Army, General Weyand himself.19

Hard on the heels of that story came a leaked revelation in the New York Times that Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had questioned the value of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam in an executive session before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. After 2½ years of escalation and a buildup to 500,000 troops, the paper charged, the secretary’s testimony had shown that the military situation was little better than it had been when U.S. forces first entered the war: “The stalemate has merely ... moved to a higher level of combat, casualties, and destruction.”20

In mid-October, with questions mounting in Congress and public opinion on the slide, Johnson conducted a private, confidential survey of where the members of his own
Democratic Party in both houses of Congress stood on the war. The results were chilling. Of the 137 congressmen and 32 senators interviewed, 104 were negative on the subject of the war, 25 were noncommittal, 18 expressed reservations of one sort or another, and only 22 were outright positive. A comment by Rhode Island Senator John Pastore was particularly troubling. A long-time supporter of the president’s policies on the war, the senator remarked that “our problem is Vietnam—boxes coming back, casualties going up—back home not a good word from anyone. . . . We’re losing Democrats in droves. . . . Attitude now is any Republican can do a better job.”

The report on Pastore was written by a trusted adviser to Johnson, Postmaster General Lawrence O’Brien. “It didn’t much impress Johnson to learn that, say, Senator [George] McGovern was talking against the war,” O’Brien later recalled, “because he’d been against it for a long time. But when someone like Pastore questioned the war, someone who’d been a staunch supporter, . . . the President had to be impressed with the seriousness of the situation.”

As the bad news mounted, the president became increasingly defensive. Between 30 October and 1 November 1967, Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey visited South Vietnam. The conclusions he reached during the trip were deeply pessimistic. “I’m damn sure we’re not doing the Vietnamese or ourselves any good,” he told a friend. “We’re murdering civilians by the thousands and our boys are dying in rotten jungles for what? A corrupt, selfish government that has no feeling and no morality. I’m going to tell Johnson exactly what I think, and I just hope and pray he’ll take it like I give it.” Whether Humphrey did as he said is unknown, but before an 8 November briefing on the trip for the National Security Council, Johnson handed him a note across the table that read, “Make it short, make it sweet, and then shut up and sit down.” Humphrey’s assessment was brief and upbeat.

By that point, President Johnson was himself developing a sense of impending doom. On 21 November, he held a meeting on the war with U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker, General Westmoreland, Vice President Humphrey, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and the heads of other government agencies that had important roles in the war. During it, he asked if the State and Defense Departments had done all they could to obtain additional troops from other allied countries as well as those promised by the South Vietnamese. “The clock is ticking,” he said. “We need to get all the additional troops as fast as we can.” Later, when the subject of the air war came up, he repeated that “the clock is ticking.” It was necessary, he said, to “get the targets you have to hit. The bombing arouses so much opposition in this country.”
On 18 December, after studying a proposed course of action for the war drafted by McNamara, Johnson wrote a memorandum for the file stating where he stood. Under the circumstances prevailing at the time, he remarked, a unilateral and unrequited stand-down in the bombing would be interpreted on all sides as a sign of weakening American will. “It would encourage the extreme doves; increase the pressure for withdrawal from those who argue ‘bomb and get out’; decrease support from our most steady friends; and pick up support from only a small group of moderate doves.” He refused to rule out a change in his position, but he insisted that anything of the sort would come only when “hard evidence” appeared that such a course would be profitable. For the same reasons, he declined to announce a policy of stabilization, but he remained unconvinced that there was any basis for increasing U.S. forces above the approved level of 500,000 men. As for the movement of U.S. forces across South Vietnam’s frontiers, he was “inclined to be extremely reserved unless a powerful case can be made.” The political risks were grave, and the process would divert the force from its most important goal, the effort to push the Viet Cong away from populated regions so that the pacification program could proceed unimpeded. Johnson concluded by agreeing that one of McNamara’s recommendations had particular merit. “We should review the conduct of military operations in South Vietnam,” he wrote, “with a view to reducing U.S. casualties, accelerating the turnover of responsibility to the GVN [Government of South Vietnam], and working toward less destruction and fewer [civilian] casualties in South Vietnam.”

Johnson’s memorandum showed clearly that if he agreed the war would have to continue until the Communists either surrendered or decided to negotiate, he still questioned whether military victory was any longer possible and doubted whether airpower could either break the will of the North Vietnamese or prevent them from continuing to infiltrate men and materiel into the South. In the same way, he accepted the word of his advisers that the war had to be won in the South by the South Vietnamese. But given the slow progress the Saigon regime was making in achieving effective self-government, he still doubted whether enough time remained to achieve that end before public discontent in the United States forced him to pull back.

In effect, whatever the facts of the Tet offensive and the way the news media reported them, the president was contemplating an effort to pull U.S. forces back and to “Vietnamize” the war over a month before Tet. As historian Graham Cosmas observes, his approach had yet to be “embodied in formal operational plans and orders, but the direction seemed clear. For the Military Assistance Command, as for the rest of the U.S. government, the years of escalation in Vietnam were nearing an end.”

Did press coverage of the offensive have any effect on Johnson? Although we will never know for certain, a case can be made that it did, by giving the president the leverage he needed to begin the process he had already decided on of pulling U.S. forces back and of turning the bulk of the fighting over to the South Vietnamese. In a private meeting with General Westmoreland during November, the president had given clear indication that he would not seek a second term in office: “He was tired,” the general later observed; “his wife was tired; he was concerned about his health. He had obviously made up his mind.”

On 31 March 1968, acutely aware that support for the war by the American public and Congress was falling and that some of
the most forceful proponents of the conflict to that date were wavering, he made his move. In a televised speech to the American people, he announced the deployment of 13,500 more troops to Vietnam in response to a request from Westmoreland but balanced it with a partial bombing halt in North Vietnam in the hope that the move would lead to early negotiations. He stated no time limits after which the bombing would resume and laid down no conditions for the North Vietnamese to fulfill. Issuing a plea for national unity, he then underscored everything by announcing that he would not accept the nomination of his party for a second full term as president.

A situation that occurred in 1993, when President William J. Clinton decided to pull the United States out of Somalia, bears a striking resemblance to what occurred with Johnson at Tet. As researcher Warren Strobel observed in his study of the so-called CNN effect:

There is little doubt that the [televised] image of a dead U.S. soldier being desecrated in October 1993 forced President Clinton to come up with a rapid response to calls in Congress for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. . . . Often forgotten, however, is that by September 1993 the Clinton administration already was making plans to extract U.S. troops. Just days before the images of the dead soldier were aired, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had told U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Washington’s desire to pull out. Congress had withdrawn its approval, and public support for the mission, documented in opinion polls, began falling well before the gruesome video started running on CNN.

In that case, according to Strobel, the Clinton administration had allowed the mission in Somalia to evolve from humanitarian relief to nation building without explaining to the public and Congress the new costs, risks, and goals. The images were, as one U.S. military officer observed at the time, “a graphic illustration of the futility of what we were doing.” As with press coverage of the Tet offensive, the news media here appear to have set the stage and to have given the president the context he needed to explain actions he already wanted to take.

**Conclusion**

In the end, when problems with press coverage arise, they are usually not problems with the press at all; they are policy problems. Either the policy or the strategy or something else is defective. When a line of action loses its bearings or becomes fractured in some way or another, consensus within and outside of the government also fractures. And if the fracturing is serious enough, it will be reflected in media coverage, particularly where a war is concerned. In the case of Vietnam, the war itself rather than the news media alienated the American people. Despite some very tough stories of the sort that almost always occur in any war reported by a free press, the United States began the conflict with a largely compliant media and a public affairs program that upheld military security without violating the rights of reporters. The Saigon correspondents followed along, replaying official statements on the value of the war and supporting the soldier if not always his generals. Over time, under the influence of many deaths and contradictions, American society moved to repudiate the commitment. As it did, the nation’s establishment reflected the trend. When protest moved “from the left groups, the anti-war groups, into the pulpits, into the Senate,” Max Frankel of the *New York Times* remarked, “. . . it naturally picked up coverage. And then naturally the tone of the coverage changed.”

Overall, General Sidle remarked years after the war, “You don’t need much public affairs when you are winning. Your success shines forth. The opposite, however, is also true. The best public affairs program imaginable will not disguise failure.”
NOTES
This piece is derived from the author’s presentation at the 2008 Australian Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, “The Military, the Media and Information Warfare,” held in Canberra, Australia, 8–10 October.


5. Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based on William M. Hammond, Reporting Vietnam: Media and Military at War (Lawrence, Kans., 1998).


8. John E. Mueller, “The Iraq Syndrome,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (November–December 2005): 44–54. See also Hazel Erskine, “The Polls: Is War a Mistake?” Public Opinion Quarterly 34 (Spring 1970): 134–50. Often taken as a measure of opposition to the war, the so-called Mistake Question measures only regret. Many people, for example, consider their marriages “mistakes” but for reasons of their own would never seek a divorce. So it was with the Vietnam War.


10. Interview with Maj Gen Winant Sidle, 5 Jun 73, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) files. Address, Gen William C. Westmoreland to the National Press Club, 21 Nov 67, CMH files. See also Msg, Westmoreland HWA 3455 to Gen Creighton Abrams, 26 Nov 67, Westmoreland Papers, CMH.


14. CBS News Special Report on Vietnam, 7 Feb 68, in Department of the Air Force, Radio-TV-Defense Dialog. (This daily publication paraphrases the previous day’s defense-related television and radio news stories for distribution to key figures within the Defense Department and the federal government.)


31. Ibid.


33. Conversation, Winant Sidle with the author, n.d.
There are many lessons from the past several years that are changing the way the U.S. defense establishment operates. The purpose of this short essay is to highlight some of those changes and foster discussion about how they will impact the future of warfare. Understandably, the first question many might ask is “why would a judge advocate—a lawyer—be addressing this topic?” The answer reflects one of the most important changes I will discuss. Law and order plays an ever larger role in military operations, certainly more so than at any other time in history. As General James Jones, then the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), famously observed in 2003 Parade magazine article that “to go to war today, you “have to have a lawyer or a dozen. It’s become very legalistic and very complex.”

Indeed, the most devastating setback in the entire war in Iraq involved not force of arms, but law, more specifically illegalities. I am speaking of Abu Ghraib. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, then the senior American commander in Iraq, rightly used customary military terminology in saying that the lawlessness of Abu Ghraib was “clearly a defeat.” The effect was indistinguishable from a conventional military disaster.

In today’s world, Clausewitz’s maxim that war is a continuation of politics by other means has a distinct legal flavor. We increasingly find that our adversaries’ principal means of trying to counteract the superiority of our equipment—airpower, for example—is to claim we are using it illegally in some way.

This has had an effect on our procurement. Some weaponry, such as the Small Diameter Bomb, was explicitly developed to help minimize collateral damage so as to limit the enemy’s opportunity to propagandize such incidents. Billions of dollars worth of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are being brought to bear for this purpose as well.

Meanwhile, leaders today readily seek advice from nontraditional sources, particularly when they provide what they need to hear, versus what they want to hear. These days an overly enthusiastic “can-do” attitude can prove disastrous if it causes the staff to be less than candid with the decision maker. Candid advice, even when unwelcome, is the military lawyer’s stock and trade.

Different perspectives are useful. Lawyers are trained to dispassionately scrutinize contentions, analyze data, and effectively articulate a range of solutions sensitive to the political dimension that pervades national security matters today. This is what senior decision makers really need.

Other nontraditional advisers are also proving valuable. A striking example is the development of the much-heralded Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. In drafting what has proved to be a bestseller, the Army cleverly assembled what one writer called an “odd fraternity” of experts including “representatives of human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, academic experts, civilian agency representatives, [and even] journalists." Although I have critiqued parts of the manual, this is one aspect that I think was sheer genius, and a model for development of government policy.

Even the widest range of expertise, however, cannot definitively predict the future. To restate President Dwight Eisenhower’s dictum, “Every war is going to astonish you in the way it has occurred and in the way it is carried out.” Although most people would agree that we need to be prepared to conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict, there is real debate as to where the weight of the effort ought to go. Columnist Jim Hoagland probably went too far recently in characterizing these discussions as “The War at the Pentagon,” but it is true that there are diverse and strongly held opinions on the subject.

Plenty of experts insist that we are in an era of persistent conflict. Such conflict, the thinking goes, will take place in failing or failed states and will often involve nonstate actors employing nontraditional means. This is no doubt true, but, in my opinion, the problem arises when people insist that war with peer and near-peer competitors is unlikely, and therefore, the overwhelming focus of the U.S. military should be to prepare to conduct operations at the low end of the spectrum.

This is not to suggest that such operations do not deserve to be given resources. They do, and indeed are, to a very high degree. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), the 92,000-troop increase in Army and Marine forces over five years is “an adaptation [for today’s] prolonged, irregular type of campaign.” Additionally, the DoD reportedly is planning to spend $22 billion to acquire Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, which are mostly limited to counterinsurgency situations.

Surprising to me, one expert says (and others may agree) that for America in the next decade, “colossal boots-on-the-ground efforts are not only possible, they also are likely.” Given America’s experience in Iraq, I am not so sure. Despite the real success there over the past year, a recent poll found that 62 percent of Americans still think that the United States should have stayed out of Iraq.

In any event, we must do more than just assess the likelihood of conflict occurring at a particular point on the spectrum; we must also calculate the magnitude of the potential loss. Thus, in making decisions in a resource-limited environment, strategists ought to distinguish carefully between extremely dangerous threats and the genuinely existential ones.

There can be no doubt that in an interconnected, globalized world, what happens in a failing state impacts U.S. interests. It is also unquestionably true that terrorists and other nonstate actors who operate in such a state could cause horrifying harm to this country, especially if they obtained one or more weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Nevertheless, I would argue that only peer-competitor nations have the ability to end the existence of the United States. Among other things, only a nation-state could...
acquire—and deliver to our shores—WMD in sufficient numbers and sophistication to destroy our country.

Therefore we must first and foremost be absolutely certain that we have done everything possible to prevent such a terminal catastrophe. We must be able to deter and, if necessary, have the conventional means to defeat adversaries able to wage war at the high end of the spectrum. Thus, even if one accepts that the likelihood of a peer-competitor war is small, the magnitude of the potential loss is just too great to make national security decisions simply based on the expected frequency of conflicts where the stakes are not as great.

For a number of reasons, I believe, to paraphrase an axiom attributed to Plato, that “only the dead have seen the end of war between peer-competitor, nation-states.” Yet too many people—including young officers who seem captured by their experiences in today’s conflicts—are convinced that tomorrow’s wars will be some replay of Iraq or Afghanistan.

Dealing with this conundrum brings us to the importance of finding ways to prevent the next failed state. The military calls this “Phase Zero” operations—that is, efforts aimed at stabilizing a country before it collapses. I certainly would count myself among those who would like to see the capabilities of the military’s interagency partners become stronger. For example, the secretary of defense has repeatedly made the point that better funding of foreign affairs is in our national security interest. Few in uniform would disagree.

Of course, the military also has Phase Zero responsibilities. Indeed, the DoD declared in 2005 that “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that . . . shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” But given our tradition of civilian control of the military and our respect for the free enterprise system, there is something disquieting about deploying America’s most authoritarian and socialistic arm, our armed forces, to teach struggling foreign countries how to build social, political, economic, educational, and other democratic institutions. I would much prefer civilians—even contractors—to be the face of America in those situations.

Along those lines, if we are talking about nonmilitary instruments that might help us avoid future war, consider the president’s clean energy initiatives. The development of eco-friendly alternative fuels technologies, if shared with the rest of the world, may be among the most fruitful national security investments possible.

The pendulum has swung too far in denigrating the value of technology in war. In some quarters, belittling the role of high technology has become the sport of choice. Anything that smacks of high-tech war fighting is ridiculed as “legacy” or “Cold War” thinking. I fully appreciate the dangerous potential of low-tech war. In 1996, I wrote a cover story for the *Weekly Standard* entitled “How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007.” In that fictionalized piece, I warned against adversaries who would use terrorism and other asymmetric techniques to defeat an overly high-tech U.S. military. Likewise, in a 1998 essay, I warned of enemies using airliners as asymmetric weapons. Today, however, we are at risk of overcorrection and dangerously undervaluing high technology.

Historians Ronald Haycock and Keith Neilson make an important point: “Technology has permitted the division of mankind into ruler and ruled.” Technology is part of our culture; it is, in fact, our asymmetric advantage. Recently, strategic theorist Colin Gray noted, “High technology is the American way in warfare. It has to be. A high technology society cannot possibly prepare for, or attempt to fight, its wars in any other than a technology-led manner.”
Some underrate technology because they are drawing the wrong lessons from history. For example, in writing the new counterinsurgency manual, the drafters relied heavily on lessons learned from insurgencies of the 1950s to 1970s. These were eras when, significantly, high technology generally, and airpower specifically, had little to offer. Hence, it is no surprise that the discussion of airpower in the 2006 counterinsurgency manual is limited to a five-page annex, and that short discussion is leery of airpower out of fear of collateral damage.

Ironically, current precision air weaponry, especially the new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, have produced what retired Army General Barry McCaffrey insists is “a 100-year warfighting leap-ahead” that has “fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.” The result? Human Rights Watch activist Marc Garlasoc recently conceded that he thinks “airstrikes probably are the most discriminating weapon that exists.”

Equally important, today’s insurgent is not low tech. In a recent article, retired Army officer John Sutherland invented the word iGuerilla for what he describes as the "the New Model Techno-Insurgent" who exploits technology in a wide variety of ways. Sutherland argues that the iGuerilla “cannot be swayed by logic or argument” and insists this kind of insurgent is markedly different from those of the twentieth century who, he contends, are relegated to the “dustbin of history.” Yet much of our current doctrine is premised on twentieth-century insurgents.

To me, this risks missing the opportunity to exploit technological opportunities. We may be reaching the tipping point where the research and development capabilities of the nation-state can significantly exceed the abilities of an adversary dependent on improvising from off-the-shelf technologies. Further, iGuerrillas, I submit, are growing up addicted to the Internet, cell phones, PDAs (personal digital assistants), electronic transfers, credit cards, and other technological artifacts of globalized society. Therein lies a huge vulnerability. Anything that emits or connects to an emitter brings us closer to General Ron Fogelman’s prediction in 2000 that we will be able to “find, fix or track, and target anything that moves on the surface of the Earth.”

This brings us to our final point: we need to look for ways to substitute machines for the boots of young Americans wherever possible. This is emphatically not a call for smaller numbers of the superb ground forces in our military. The point is that we need to provide decision makers with options that can minimize the need for U.S. troops to go in harm’s way.

Leveraging technology will have to play decisively in the answer. We should favor equipment that is useful across the whole spectrum of conflict. A quick illustration: air strikes in Iraq increased fivefold in 2007 over 2006. Perhaps equally or, probably, more important, is the almost unbelievable growth in ISR, particularly in unmanned aerial platforms that General McCaffrey references.

I would suggest that the marriage of persistent ISR with precision-strike capability is the single most important military equipment innovation of the decade thus far. Unsurprisingly, recent reports name ISR assets as General Petraeus’ “top hardware priority in Iraq.” These developments, facilitated by advances in command, control, and communications, have turned such warplanes as B–52s and B–1s, as well as a range of fighter aircraft, into close
air support platforms equally able to strike a single insurgent in an urban setting, or attack a high-tech armored brigade charging across a plain.

I am not advocating airpower-only or even airpower-centric solutions. I am just pointing out that this is one area where capabilities that have tremendous value in irregular war also can be flexibly employed at any level of conflict. There are certainly other technologies out there that have similar utility; the Army’s satellite-guided Excalibur artillery round is one example.

The bottom line is that we must have a full-spectrum military that recognizes the gravity of peer-competitor war, that leverages our technological inclinations, and that operates in a genuinely joint and independent way. As Billy Mitchell put it, “Nations nearly always go into an armed contest with the equipment and methods of a former war. Victory always comes to that country which has made a proper estimate of the equipment and methods that can be used in modern ways.”

**Notes**

This article is an edited version of a copyrighted essay that was distributed as an enote in June 2008 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and was posted on the institute’s Web site, http://www.fpri.org.


13. See, for example, Robert M. Gates, Secretary of Defense, Remarks Delivered at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 Jan 2008.


25. See, for example, Daily Report, “Some Staggering Data,” 7 Apr 2008, airforce-magazine.com. Specifically, “For those of us wondering about the importance of overhead intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to the ongoing fight, here are some illuminating numbers told to the Daily Report by Air Combat Command. Airborne ISR sensors monitored 60 targets in calendar year 2001 for change detection—to observe deviations over time that might indicate threat developments, such as variations in roadside pavements that might warn of the recent planting of a roadside bomb. In 2007, that number grew to 70,542, a whopping increase of 117,470 percent, according to ACC spokesman Maj. Tom Crosson. RQ/MQ–1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles logged 4,380 hours in the air in 2001, providing overhead streaming video to support ground forces. In 2007, that number rose to 63,186 hours, he said. Further, E–8C Joint STARS tracked 12,000 moving targets in 2007; they tracked none in 2001. RQ–4 Global Hawk UAVs collected imagery intelligence on 3,687 targets in 2001, and 96,349 six years later, he said. U–2 manned surveillance aircraft collected Imint on 26,749 preplanned targets of interest in 2001, compared to 52,000 in 2007. Finally, in 2001, RC–135 Rivet Joints flew 3,360 hours; six years later, the hours increased to 8,184.”


Nevertheless, when we consider Clausewitz’s stated intention and the purpose and organization of *On War*, the title “philosopher of war” is not entirely appropriate. *On War* is not a philosophical treatise, despite its obvious debt to Immanuel Kant and others. Nor was Clausewitz a philosopher by trade or ambition. He advanced nothing that would qualify as a philosophical system in the way his contemporaries Friedrich Schopenhauer and Georg F. W. Hegel attempted to do and had little patience for indulging in abstract thinking. Indeed, in contemporary usage, the term philosopher carries some baggage that would be unfair to heap on Clausewitz. The term implies a certain amount of self-indulgence because philosophy is often dismissed as an irrelevant activity rather than a prerequisite for practical success. For instance, Clausewitz did not appear to spend time debating whether his world existed or was an elaborate illusion.

What Clausewitz did endeavor to do, and in this author’s estimation largely succeeded in doing, was advance a theory of war—a corpus of observations—validated and arranged as a coherent body of objective knowledge. As he remarked in an early essay on tactics and strategy, “Science is a collection of observations (in the broadest sense). . . . Theory is a collection of observations and it is scientific the instant it is systematically ordered; it is a rational science when its propositions are not merely ordered, but are deducible from one another.”

In Clausewitz’s view, the military theories of his day were little more than a “whirl of opinions, which had no firm point or discernable laws around which to revolve.” They
were “rhapsodies,” individual experiences or case studies, “arranged in a defective manner, with principles and rules being drawn from insufficient bases, and with inconsequential views often being presented as if they were essential.”

Consequently, unless properly validated and arranged, Clausewitz’s observations would amount to little more than rhapsodies. The remedy was to bring scientific precision, rigor, and order to the study of war. For that he needed a method by which he could validate his concepts and establish whether or not they were universally true. It appears he found that method in the Kantian doctrine of concepts, which he was introduced to by means of the lectures and textbooks of a professor of mathematics and logic named Johann G. K. Kiesewetter (1766–1819).

The doctrine of concepts necessitated establishing the validity of an idea or concept (Begriff) through parallel lines of inquiry, one logical and the other material, and then situating the concept correctly within or among other known concepts. The first line of inquiry entailed examining the concept only according to the laws of logic to determine whether it contained any contradictions or inconsistencies that would render it logically invalid. A concept is logically true if it meets any of the following three conditions. First, it contains no contradictory characteristics, that is, it is conceivable; a “round square” is inconceivable and would, therefore, be logically false. Second, it is of a sufficient basis—that is, it is derived from another true concept. The concept of a rectangle being derived from a square has sufficient conceptual basis. Third, it emerges as a unified whole from two contradictory characteristics; the concept of a “four-cornered circle” combines the characteristics of a square and a circle but does not emerge as a valid unified whole and is therefore false. The color gray, however, emerges from black and white and therefore is as true as black and white are.

The second line of inquiry necessitated investigating whether the concept actually could exist, or already existed, in the physical world and, if so, in what form. For this line of inquiry, Clausewitz relied on his own experience as well as on military history, since he realized his own experience in war was too limited to provide a sufficient basis for drawing firm conclusions. A concept has material truth if it corresponds with an object in the physical world. For example, a “machine enabling one to fly” could be conceived even in Clausewitz’s day and therefore would possess logical truth. But at that time (aside from balloons) one did not exist in the physical world, so the concept lacked conclusive material truth. In this case, our investigation would conclude that a flying machine could indeed exist, logically, but whether it could exist materially was not yet clear.

Finally, the doctrine of concepts also obliged arranging the idea or concept within, or among, other known concepts in the same or a related field. This step amounted to a sort of finishing touch that completed the examination. The concept of a human, for instance, has demonstrable logical and material truth. Closer examination under the third line of inquiry reveals that a human belongs within the larger concept of animal, rather than plant, for instance, and this step completes the examination by fixing a human’s proper place in the order of things and helps establish the concept’s validity. At the same time, the third line of inquiry reveals something more about the concept and its relationship to other known concepts, thus adding yet another piece to the general mosaic of knowledge.

A quick glance at On War’s first chapter demonstrates how Clausewitz applied this methodology to his concept of war, which he defined early on as “an act of violence to force our opponent to fulfill our will.” Whenever he referred to the “pure concept” (bloß or reine Begriff) of war, this is typically what he meant. While examining this concept from a strictly logical perspective
(sections 3–5 of Chapter 1), with the political object removed and without physical conditions or constraints, he discovered that it contained no inherent contradictions. However, there was also nothing about the concept to prevent the forces it described from escalating ad infinitum. Each side of the conflict would attempt to outdo the other in terms of the intensity of the violence and the amount of effort it would employ, as well as the aim it would pursue. In terms of pure logic, this limitless escalation would have to go on forever: there could be no conceivable end. Logic simply would not allow it. The moment one side relented the advantage would go to the other and the conflict would be lost. In the physical world, finite material resources would prevent limitless escalation. However, the physical world cannot come into play when considering a concept from a purely logical standpoint. Absolute war (absolute Kriege), as it appears in On War’s opening chapter, was merely Clausewitz’s term for the idea of limitless escalation, which was all but inconceivable. It is not equivalent to the concept of total war, with which it is often confused. Limitless escalation represents an impossible outcome, whereas total war could actually occur and, in many cases, essentially has. Moreover, as “total” as real war might become, it would always do so because of, rather than in the absence of, political forces.

Clausewitz then examined his concept from a material standpoint (sections 6–10). When he did so, he discovered that what kept his concept from escalating was something that came from outside war itself: policy—the trustee or custodian for the collective interests of the state. Policy, or the will of one’s political leadership, always existed prior to war and thus was not part of war itself but external to it. Policy decided the purpose for which the war would be fought, estimated how much effort should be expended, and how much violence should be used. It made these decisions based on the value of the purpose it wanted to pursue, and its estimation of how much its opponent would resist. Accordingly, in the material world, the escalation of war was a matter of probability and not, as pure logic demanded, one of necessity. Whether escalation would occur was for judgment to estimate, and, in so doing, it would naturally have to take into account many factors. Interestingly, the concept of probability and the doctrine of chance were both rather nascent at the time, having until the late eighteenth century appeared mainly in texts written in Latin. Probability and chance were regarded by the educated elite as explanations for laws yet to be discovered; they were considered a scientific way of accounting for uncertainty with respect to outcomes as well as beliefs.

As the final step in the examination (sections 24, 25, and 26), Clausewitz determined that war was not a separate phenomenon—not a thing-in-itself—as presupposed by the purely logical concept. Instead, war was a subordinate activity of policy and was thus included within it as a secondary concept in much the same way as the concept of a human being within the larger one of animal. Indeed, perhaps his most famous expression—that “war is nothing but the continuation of political intercourse (Politik) by other means”—reflects his ordering of the concept of war within the hierarchy of other known concepts, in this case politics or what today might be called international relations. In Clausewitz’s view, this was an objective observation. It gave the necessary form to the substance of his concept of war. His unfinished manuscript only partly touches upon the implications of this ordering. One thing is certain: the observation did not upset his overall organization of On War itself, which was founded on the relationship between purpose and means. So, we should not expect that he would have carried out a complete overhaul of his opus, despite what some have claimed.

Clausewitz also used this method when examining other concepts, such as engagement, defense, and attack; yet, its form is clearest in the first chapter. Of course, the principal danger with this method is that for readers to miss subtle but crucial turns in his argument is all too easy and, thus, to mistake the observations or findings drawn from his theoretical analysis of a concept for more than they are. A point made at the beginning of a chapter based on a search for the logical truth of a concept might be contradicted later when its material truth was considered. In the case of absolute war, for instance, Clausewitz actually showed that this extreme of extremes possessed neither logical nor material truth. Yet some maintain he attempted to establish a theory of absolute war, whereby a nation waged war by going all out from the start, regardless of the political purpose. Such misunderstandings can be avoided by first appreciating Clausewitz’s method before reading On War.

While the method Clausewitz employed was drawn from philosophy, the concerns that drove him were more those of a scientist, determined to examine and classify a phenomenon or a type of organism and to organize knowledge. He was, after all, a product of his times in important ways. He might be more accurately referred to as a scientist. Indeed, he might well be considered the first true military scientist because he sought to produce a military theory that was a corpus of substantiated knowledge rather than a haphazard collection of individual theorems.

As others have noted, Clausewitz used the terms philosophical and scientific interchangeably. To be sure, he was not so different from his contemporaries in that respect. Accordingly, we can continue to refer to Clausewitz as a (or even the) philosopher of war. However, when we do, we would do well to remember that the term implies a certain amount of self-indulgence,
which in turn suggests that reading *On War* is for the self-indulgent and has little to offer those who want to enjoy practical success. To counter that poor notion, we ought to allow ourselves to use the term *scientific* on occasion to help describe Clausewitz’s method for validating and classifying his concepts and for arranging his individual theories into a coherent body. The term also assists in capturing his underlying desire to distinguish between subjective preference and objective truth, a quality that sets him apart from most of his contemporaries.

The term *scientific*, too, comes with considerable baggage of its own, not the least of which is the unfounded yet persistent notion that warfare itself can somehow be reduced to a scientific process. Clausewitz would never have wanted to say that. To apply scientific standards to the development of military theory is one thing, and to distill that knowledge into prescriptive doctrines is quite another.

**Notes**


9. Although *Vom Kriege* clearly reflects the influence of Kant, it is unlikely that Clausewitz actually read any of Kant’s works. However, we do know he was exposed to the principal doctrines of the German philosopher through the lectures and textbooks of Kiesewetter, whose principal work was *Grundriss einer Allgemeinen Logik nach Kantischen Grundsätzen zum Gebrauch für Vorlesungen*, 2 vols., 3d and 4th eds. (Leipzig: H. A. Kochly, 1824–25). Volume 1 deals with pure logic (or reason), while volume 2 pertains to applied logic. Kiesewetter’s value to Clausewitz is discussed in Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1985), p. 69; Hans Rothfels, *Carl von Clausewitz: Politik und Krieg* (Berlin: Dümmler, 1920), pp. 23–24; and Werner Hahlweg, “Philosophie und Theorie bei Clausewitz,” in *Freiheit ohne Krieg? Beiträge zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorien von Carl von Clausewitz*, ed. U. De Maizière (Bonn: Dümmler, 1980), pp. 325–32. Some in Berlin society referred to Kiesewetter fondly as the “national professor.”


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In March 1833, Congress created the Regiment of Dragoons, the Army’s first new regiment since the War of 1812. Many junior Regular Army officers sought a transfer to, or promotion in, this new unit. Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a captain of infantry serving as the commandant of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, was among the most prominent of these would-be dragoon officers.

Hitchcock sought one of ten captaincies in the dragoons on the basis of his military credentials. He secured recommendations from the deputy commander of the regiment, the adjutant general of the Army, and its commanding general. Hitchcock’s superiors not only supported his quest, but also confided that they expected his request to be granted. Nonetheless, the captain did not get a transfer. His aspirations clashed with the iron will of what he termed “an opponent much more formidable.” That opponent was President Andrew Jackson, who simply refused to appoint him. Hitchcock attributed this to a personal animus stemming from a policy disagreement the pair had had over cadet discipline at West Point.

By the 1830s, Regular Army officers had begun to see themselves as members of a nascent profession, with skills and outlook distinct from those of civilians. Hitchcock’s approach, while ill-fated, illustrates the concept that other officers were the men best suited to judge an officer’s merits. In this, Hitchcock participated in bureaucratic politics. President Jackson, on the other hand, did not feel bound by military recommendations in his appointments. He handed captaincies in the new regiment to several men who had been volunteer officers during the Black Hawk War, as well as to one regular lieutenant who appealed to Vice President Martin Van Buren for assistance. Jackson’s willingness to let partisan politics or personal dislikes influence officer appointments rejected the regular officer corps’ worldview and retarded its efforts to professionalize itself.

Historians long believed the regular officer corps did not begin to professionalize until after the Civil War, but that has changed in the past generation. William Skelton argues that the Army’s senior officers and secretaries of war in the years following the War of 1812 oversaw a series of broad-based reforms. These included the development and standardization of Army administration and the emergence of permanent staff corps (quartermaster, ordnance, inspector general, and so forth).

Perhaps the most important reforms made the U.S. Military Academy the primary source of officer education and socialization. Between 1817 and 1833, under the leadership of Maj. Sylvanus Thayer, West Point adopted a systematic and rigorous academic curriculum, primarily in engineering and associated subjects. Equally important, cadets spent their time in a thoroughly military environment. They lived by academy codes as well as Army regulations and the Articles of War. The commandant of cadets, who ranked second only to the superintendent, handled matters of cadet discipline and administration as well as teaching military tactics. By 1833, Ethan Allen Hitchcock had spent eleven of the past twenty years at West Point as a cadet, instructor, and (since 1829) the commandant. He later idealized the academy as a self-sustaining meritocracy, removed from improper influence:

[Superintendent] Thayer . . . had introduced a body of regulations for its government, which appeared hardly to admit of improvement. The system of studies had been perfectly arranged and the discipline of the corps was unexceptionable. A due enforcement of these regulations was all that was required. Semi-annual examinations took place with the most admirable results, the meritorious cadets receiving due commendation, and the idle and negligent receiving fitting rebuke. When
serious misconduct occurred the culpable were brought to trial before duly organized courts-martial, and allowed all the privileges of a defence before a judgment was rendered.4

By the 1830s, the academy graduated enough cadets to fill all officer vacancies in the grade of second lieutenant, the lowest commissioned rank. Between 1817 and 1830, the percentage of West Point graduates serving in the Army increased from 14.8 percent to 63.8 percent.5 The officers’ shared experience of the academy, reinforced by each graduating class, established an intellectual underpinning for military officerhip as a profession. Skelton defined this as “a claim to the exclusive control of a body of specialized knowledge essential to the fulfillment of an important social need.” Such a professional culture, he continued, “is in a sense democratic, emphasizing merit—the mastery of the profession’s esoteric skills, as defined and certified by one’s colleagues—rather than wealth, family, or social class as the primary determinant of status.”6

The Army did not permanently detail officers to serve at West Point. Captain Hitchcock was on detached service from the 1st Infantry. In March 1833, he learned of the new Regiment of Dragoons through a published general order and applied for a transfer.7 During the 1820s, he served with Stephen Watts Kearny, a War of 1812 veteran newly appointed the regiment’s lieutenant colonel. “It was my wish to be with Col. Kearny,” Hitchcock wrote a friend that spring. “He has had abundant opportunities for knowing me & has expressed his wishes to have me in the Regiment.”8

The Regiment of Dragoons represented Congress’ belated recognition of the need for a strong, mobile unit to deal with frontier military concerns. Between 1815 and 1833, the Army had no permanent cavalry units. During the 1820s and early 1830s, the Army responded to a series of Indian disturbances across the frontier. Missouri merchants started trade caravans to Santa Fe following Mexican independence in the 1820s. The Santa Fe Trail followed the Arkansas River, the international boundary between Mexico and the United States, for much of its route. The middle of the trail, between the Arkansas and Canadian rivers, lay beyond the lines of both Mexican and American settlement. The Kiowa, Comanche, and Wichita nations lived in this area and occasionally accosted the caravans. Westerners and their allies in Congress constantly called for military protection along the American portions of the route.9 In 1829, infantry commanded by Capt. Bennet Riley of the 6th Infantry escorted that year’s caravan. After skirmishing with Indians, Riley concluded that the escorts could not adequately defend the caravan so long as the Indians were mounted and the regulars were not.10

In this period, emigration increased to Arkansas Territory and beyond. Not all of them were whites. Indians from the Five Major Tribes began their trek west after the War of 1812. Conflicts among emigrating Indians, between them and the Osage, and between all these nations and the nomadic nations to the west led to the founding of Forts Smith (1817, at the present city of that name) and Gibson (1824, on the Arkansas near the mouths of the Neosho and Verdigris rivers). By 1830, Fort Gibson held five companies of the 7th Infantry. Without the mobility of mounted troops, however, the Army could not apprehend, let alone punish, Indians who attacked whites and emigrant Indians alike under government’s protection.11

The Winnebago and Sac and Fox nations, living in present-day Wisconsin and Illinois, also persuaded government officials that the Army needed a mounted unit. In 1827, the Winnebago reacted to white squatters and tensions with other Indian nations by murdering a white family and attacking travelers on the Mississippi. To help put down the uprising, the Army raised a unit of local mounted volunteers.12 In 1831 and 1832, Sac and Fox, under the leadership of Black Hawk, occupied lands formally sold to white settlers in western Illinois. A large number of mounted militiamen helped persuade Black Hawk to leave peacefully in 1831. The next year, mounted riflemen attacked Black Hawk while under flag of truce, setting off the Black Hawk War.13

Black Hawk proved more persuasive than any number of Army officers and western traders in convincing Congress that the Army needed a mounted unit. It created the Battalion United States Regiment of Dragoons, 1836

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of Mounted Rangers in June 1832.\textsuperscript{14} All the officers and men came from civilian life and agreed to serve for one year. Near the end of the year, Lewis Cass, the secretary of war, advised Congress that a permanent regular cavalry regiment would save money.\textsuperscript{15} Ever concerned with economy, the national legislature replaced the rangers with the dragoons on 2 March 1833.\textsuperscript{16}

The new regiment added more than an important military capability. In a small Regular Army where promotion occurred slowly, any force augmentation added opportunities for career advancement. The regiment needed thirty-one company grade officers (second lieutenants, first lieutenants, and captains), one major, one lieutenant colonel, and one colonel. Because the Army had no cavalry officers, the government could appoint officers to that arm without respect to previous seniority in the infantry or artillery. Each graduated cadet in those arms entered his regiment ranked by his final standing at West Point. Thereafter, the Army promoted the officer most senior in his current grade to a vacancy in the next grade. Promotion through the rank of captain depended on seniority in the regiment. Promotion to major and above relied on a captain’s seniority by arm. Regiments held one major for every ten captains. Promotion in the company grades was slow enough; promotion in the field grades, glacially so.

Officers might earn a promotion in transferring to the dragoons. Capt. Richard B. Mason of the 1st Infantry obtained the appointment of major, reaching that rank ahead of seventeen more senior infantry captains.\textsuperscript{17} But merely transferring in grade to a new arm could dramatically improve prospects for future promotion. Edgar S. Hawk-
against a European force, but he carried out his Indian missions to President Jackson’s satisfaction. He resigned to become the first governor of Wisconsin Territory in July 1836 and spent the next twenty-one years as governor, territorial delegate to Congress, or (after 1848) U.S. senator.

Regular officers grudgingly accepted Colonel Dodge as a trade-off for western political support for the regiment. But the War Department went beyond one volunteer appointment. It allowed all company grade mounted ranger officers to transfer to the regiment if they wished. In the mounted rangers, as in the dragoons, each company had one captain, one first lieutenant, and one second lieutenant.20 Six companies formed the battalion, so this set aside eighteen of the thirty-one appointments for volunteer officers.

Predictably, regulars grumbled about how men they considered “civilians in uniform” gained appointments. Colonel Kearny complained to the adjutant general that the former rangers “have not an equal claim, to be transferred to the Dragoons, with officers of the Army, long distinguished in their Profession.”21 A letter published in the Military and Naval Magazine of the United States declared, “The idea, that [the rangers] will make better cavalry officers, from having rode up and down the frontier once or twice, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment; and as to discipline, why! It is a perfect farce.”22

Captain Hitchcock agreed wholeheartedly. He called the appointment of former rangers, all men from western states or territories, “a most preposterous presumption—altogether a new & ridiculous species of local internal improvement.”23 Preposterous or not, their appointments threatened to doom Hitchcock’s efforts before he began in earnest. The general order announcing the new regiment also named the four regulars appointed as captains. Fortunately for Hitchcock, one of the six mounted ranger captains rejected his appointment as a dragoon captain. The Army decided to appoint a regular officer to the vacancy. Hitchcock sought the help of his military superiors, trusting that his military skills and service reputation would earn their recommendations. In turn, he hoped their influence would persuade the president to appoint him. Only at the end of his quest, on the advice of a superior, did he seek a congressman’s help.

Colonel Kearny was Hitchcock’s first supporter, and arguably his most ardent. “Knowing the worth & merit of Captain H.,” the colonel wrote Secretary Cass in April 1833, “& having the interest & advancement of the Regt. truly at heart, I take the liberty of recommending, that his wishes be complied with.”24 The colonel bombarded the War Department with additional recommendations in the coming weeks. He submitted a list of officers he wanted for the regiment, with Hitchcock’s name at the top.25 He called for Hitchcock’s transfer on the grounds that “the Rangers we must necessarily get, will be a dead weight upon the Regt.” and that qualified officers were necessary to whip the regiment into shape.26 In a September letter to Hitchcock, Kearny stated, “I have kept up for a long time a steady fire upon Washington, in relation to yourself & trust in this, you have been transferred to the Dragoons.”27

Hitchcock also gathered support from Maj. Gen. Alexander Macomb, the commanding general of the Army. In May, the captain asked for his assistance.28 Macomb responded, “I am well convinced of your qualifications for the active service you seek and of the great advantage which your military knowledge and experience would give” to the dragoons.29 In June, he added, “The recommendations in your favor are of the strongest and most respectable character. You may rely on my backing them.”30

Hitchcock used a friend on duty at the War Department to gain access to Col. Roger Jones, the adjutant general of the Army, and Secretary of War Cass. Hitchcock wrote Capt. John Garland, enclosing a letter to Jones. Hitchcock asked Garland

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to look the letter over and have Jones show it to Cass. Garland responded that Jones liked the letter, but that it should go through proper military channels. Garland included that “It affords me great pleasure to give you positive assurance of your high standing with the Secretary of War. . . . I think you may calculate upon a transfer to the Dragoons.”

Unbeknownst to Hitchcock, a great military hero also supported his candidacy. Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott, who rose to fame in the War of 1812 and commanded the Eastern Department in the 1830s, lobbied Cass as well. “I have been requested (not by the captain) to unite” with Hitchcock’s other supporters, the general revealed. In his grandiloquent style, he proclaimed, “I can only state what I believe to be the unanimous opinion of the army . . . that, to the highest moral worth, [Hitchcock] unites as much professional knowledge, zeal & activity, as any officer of his rank in the service.”

Hitchcock, befitting someone staking his candidacy on military merits, assembled an impressive collection of military recommendations. The senior regular officer in the Regiment of Dragoons demanded an officer of his qualifications. Staff officers and military administrators seconded Colonel Kearny in their appreciation of Captain Hitchcock as an officer. Clearly, Hitchcock embodied this new professional outlook. Equally telling, his military superiors believed merit would be enough to secure the promotion. Kearny and Garland told Hitchcock as much.

But months passed, and the vacancy remained unfilled. The Army relieved Hitchcock as commandant of cadets and posted him to recruiting duty in Boston. While he waited for an answer, the officers and men of the Dragoon Regiment assembled at Jefferson Barracks, near St. Louis, and began training. In late September, after Hitchcock could wait no more, he wrote the adjutant general, expressing concern that “an active opposition . . . against my being transferred to the Regt. of Dragoons” existed.

Colonel Jones responded with a pair of letters. Officially, he told Hitchcock that he “will not be appointed, but for what reason, I do not know. But you may consider it as now decided.” In a private letter, he added, “Six weeks ago, I considered your transfer to the Dragoons as a point settled and determined—but, now, and for some weeks past, my impressions are just the reverse. . . . I can only add, that I have never been more disappointed in all my life than now.”

Hitchcock never did learn an official reason for his rejection. As noted earlier, he suspected Andrew Jackson actively opposed his appointment. Fittingly, the captain attributed his disappointment to having once made a principled stand for meritocracy against a crass partisan interloper. According to Hitchcock, cadets dismissed from West Point by due process went to the president and repeatedly convinced him to reverse their dismissals, making a mockery of academy regulations in the process.

Matters came to a head in November 1832, when the commandant traveled to Washington and met with the president. Old Hickory thundered and raged at Hitchcock at the meeting’s outset, citing the supposed tyrannical nature of academy officials in dismissing the cadets. While the two parted on amicable terms, within a few months Jackson again overruled an academy court-martial and reappointed a dismissed cadet.

It is possible, however, that Jackson did not deliberately seek to spite Hitchcock. Eustace Trenor, a lieutenant in the 4th Infantry, received the captaincy Hitchcock sought. The records of the adjutant general reveal that Trenor persuaded an important Jacksonian politician to weigh in on his behalf. In April 1833, he wrote Jones, expressing his “great desire to join the Corps of Dragoons” and his wish to be considered if the president “deems it advisable [sic] to take any more Officers from the Infantry” for the regiment.

Lieutenant Trenor, unlike Captain Hitchcock, did no lobbying for six months. Trenor had graduated from West Point in 1822, ranked twenty-third out of forty graduates,
and earned promotion to first lieutenant in 1826. Otherwise his record was unremarkable. Trenor obtained only one recommendation, but it carried more weight than all of Hitchcock’s.

In September 1833, Trenor wrote Vice President Martin Van Buren. Trenor opened by mentioning “my father, who is an old and a warm friend of yours.” He then went on to say how he had not heard of any action on his request. “If the President would grant it,” he concluded, “I would be greatly pleased.”

The exact machinations of Van Buren and Jackson are lost to history, but this much is known. Officials routinely “endorsed,” or marked on the outside of letters, various administrative details. Both the adjutant general and the commanding general endorsed having received Trenor’s letter on 11 October 1833. (Presumably it arrived from Trenor’s station at Key West that day.) Another endorsement, in Secretary Cass’ handwriting, reads, “Let the applicant be appointed. L.C.” Macomb recorded, “The President has selected Lt Trenor 4 Infantry to be Captain of Dragoons,” signed his name, and added “17 October 1833 ½ past two o’clock.” Jones endorsed Trenor’s original letter: “Appointed accordingly by will of the President, Oct 17th 1833.”

Trenor’s actions, and the willingness of the Jackson administration to go along, demonstrate the limits of the merit-based professional outlook. Congress and the president played an important role in officer appointments from the beginning of the Republic. In the generation before the War of 1812, a flood of applications from civilians accompanied every expansion of the Army. In the 1820s, appointments to West Point institutionalized the role of politicians in the selection process. The War of 1812 had demonstrated, and the Mexican and Civil Wars would confirm, that some of the best nineteenth-century soldiers came from civilian life and learned on the job.

Arguably by the 1830s, Army officers had become as professional as they could, given the times. Officers sought to control entry into their profession (via West Point) and to foster specialized military knowledge so as to separate themselves from civilian life. But politics could not be completely excluded from the officer selection process. Officer appointments made on the basis of politics reminded regular officers of the limits of their capability to professionalize themselves in Jacksonian society.

Stephen Watts Kearny recognized this. He and Hitchcock continued to exchange letters. In October, Hitchcock stated he would visit the president again and discuss his candidacy. Kearny replied approvingly, adding, “If the Presdt. is unwilling to transfer you, on the urgent recommendations of Military Men—then you must set some Politicians on him.” The colonel’s concern above all else was obtaining the most qualified officers for the regiment, and the ends justified the means:

You must not say, that if your merit & claims backed by Military Officers and your own solicitations cannot procure you the appointment, that you will not ask the assistance of those who know nothing upon the subject—you must not reason in that way—but must do everything that an Honorable man may do to succeed.

Eventually, Hitchcock did get a member of Congress to inquire on his behalf. Representative Clement C. Clay, a Democrat from Alabama, wrote General Macomb in March 1834, “anxious that [Hitchcock] should be gratified” in his desire for an appointment. Macomb replied that no more original appointments would be made to the dragoons. With this, Hitchcock’s application for a transfer formally fell by the way.

In a small irony, Van Buren later confirmed Hitchcock’s belief in merit-based promotion during his term as
president. In 1838, Congress authorized an eighth infantry regiment and Van Buren successfully nominated Hitchcock as its major. The promotion vaulted Hitchcock over eleven more senior captains. Future seniority-based promotions followed, to lieutenant colonel in 1842 and colonel in 1851.

In the long run, the delayed promotion to major may not have hurt Hitchcock much, if at all. Clifton Wharton became major of dragoons in 1836 but waited ten years for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Both Wharton and Thomas T. Fauntleroy became lieutenant colonels of dragoons on the same day. Depending on the listing in the Army Register, Hitchcock might have become colonel of the 1st Dragoons in 1850, as Fauntleroy did. (Wharton died in 1848.) Alternatively, Hitchcock might have resigned a lieutenant colonel in 1855, as Col. William S. Harney commanded the 2d Dragoons between 1846 and 1858.

In any case, Hitchcock’s superiors recognized his abilities and appointed him to key positions during his later career. During the Mexican War, Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott appointed Hitchcock his inspector general. In this capacity, he earned brevets to full colonel and brigadier general. Between 1851 and 1854, Hitchcock commanded the Army’s Pacific (or 3d) Division. In addition to the standard duties of a frontier military commander, he also had to deal with notorious filibuster William Walker. Hitchcock interrupted Walker’s 1853 attempt to seize the Mexican state of Sonora by detaining Walker’s ship, the Arrow, in San Francisco Bay.

Hitchcock resigned from the Army in 1855 and devoted himself to intellectual pursuits. During the Civil War, he served as a major general of volunteers on duty at the War Department. Hitchcock was the senior of four generals who worked with noted jurist Francis Lieber to develop the Lieber Code. Issued to the Union Army as General Order 100 in 1863, the Lieber Code governed the behavior of occupying armies and represents an important development in what modern soldiers call counterinsurgency doctrine. He also served as the commissioner for the exchange of prisoners of war from 1862 and, from 1865, the commissary general of prisoners. In these last capacities, he remained on duty until October 1867.

Of course, all that was in the future. Ethan Allen Hitchcock’s attempt in 1833 to gain an appointment in the Regiment of Dragoons demonstrates that Regular Army officers had made great strides in transforming their occupation into a profession to that point. The most important aspects of that transformation had been the reliance on the U.S. Military Academy to provide both new officers and military socialization to cadets. These encouraged a professional ideology and outlook. Merit, ideally speaking, should determine professional advancement. Those with military experience, such as regular officers, were best suited to judge another officer’s merits.

At any point in the process Hitchcock could have appealed to political partisans for help. Instead, he relied on evaluations from military superiors to aid him in his desires. It is noteworthy that these senior military officials believed their testaments to Hitchcock’s martial skills would win him the coveted appointment.

Eustace Trenor’s use of a politician to gain the final dragoon captaincy helped define the maximum limit of officer professionalization in antebellum America. Congress and the president played an intimate role in setting the size and composition of the Army. Because politicians controlled appointments to both West Point and the Army at large, they influenced officer selection. Awarding appointments to civilians and politically connected officers, while relatively rare, stood opposed to the professional outlook. But in the game of patronage, one vice president beat a pair of generals and a pair of colonels.

**Notes**

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2008 Annual Conference on U.S. Federal Government History held in College Park, Maryland, on 13 March.


2. The classic example remains Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). Huntington believed officers’ attempts to professionalize before the Civil War uneven at best, citing the engineering-based curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy and the proclivity of presidents to fill wartime regiments with civilians on the basis of political
recommendations. Other military historians making a similar argument include Marcus Cunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775–1865 (Boston, 1968) and Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peace time, 1784–1898 (New York, 1986). Historians of civil vocations generally discount officership as a profession, as the state holds a monopoly on violence, and thus officers are severely restricted from plying their trade in the marketplace. See the Marxist Margali S. Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley, Calif., 1977), and the Weberian Jeffrey L. Berlant, Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain (Berkeley, Calif., 1975). Samuel Haber is more sympathetic to the idea of an earlier genesis for military professionalism, although he too placed it as a phenomenon of the 1880s. Haber, The Quest for Authority and Honor in the American Professions, 1750–1900 (Chicago, 1991), pp. 200–201.


4. EAH, Fifty Years in Camp and Field, p. 64.


6. Ibid., p. 88.

7. Ltr, EAH to Lewis Cass, Secretary of War, West Point, New York, 30 Mar 1833, enclosed with Ltr, EAH to Maj Gen Alexander Macomb, Commanding General of the Army, West Point, 2 May 1833, file H 59 1833, Letters Received, 1805–1889, Main Series (LR 1805–1889) (National Archives Microfilm Publication [NAMP] M567, roll 84), Correspondence, 1800–1917 (Correspondence), Record Group (RG) 94, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1780s–1917, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.


12. Documents related to the Winnebago uprising can be found in “Letter of the Secretary of War, Transmitting the Information Required by a Resolution of the House of Representatives of the 12th Inst., in Relation to the Hostile Disposition of Indian Tribes on the Northwestern Frontier,” 20th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 277, serial 175, pp. 3–19.

13. Recently, historians have taken a fresh look at the Black Hawk War. New histories include Patrick Jung, The Black Hawk War of 1832 (Norman, Okla., 2007); Kerry Trask, Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America (New York, 2006); and John William Hall, “Friends Like These: The United States’ Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War, 1832” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 2007).

14. The Senate had approved a bill to mount regular infantry companies at the end of 1831, but the House took up debate on the bill in June 1832, a month or so after open warfare broke out. In turn, the House amended the bill and returned it to the Senate for more debate. For the House, see 8 Cong. Deb. (Register of Debates) 3388–97 (1832). For the Senate debate, 8 Cong. Deb. 1068–70, 1075–79, 1083–88 (1832). The bill, as approved by both houses, became the act of 15 June 1832, ch. 131, 4 Stat. (Statutes at Large) 533. The definitive chronicle of the Battalion of Mounted Rangers’ short life remains Otis E. Young, “The United States Mounted Ranger Battalion, 1832–1833,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (December 1954): 453–70. A brief account appears in Francis P. Prucha, Sword of the Republic: The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783–1846 (New York, 1968), pp. 240–45.


17. For the infantry seniority list, see “Army Register for 1833,” 26 January 1833, ASP: MA, 5:143. Individual officers’ careers can be traced by looking at their respective entries in Francis B. Heitman, ed., Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from Its Organization, September 29, 1789, to March 2, 1903, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903).

18. Before the act, there had been a regiment of light artillery (commanded by a colonel) and eight artillery battalions, commanded by lieutenant colonels or majors. The act reorganized the artillery into four regiments, each commanded by a colonel. President James Monroe nominated Nathan Towson, the paymaster general, to one of the col facingies. The Senate insisted that the paymaster general did not hold an officer’s commission and therefore could not legally be appointed. In 1826, John Quincy Adams attempted to appoint Daniel Bissell, the man the Senate felt should have been the colonel, but that nomination foundered upon the legal niceties of the Senate’s rejection of Towson. In 1832, Andrew Jackson nominated William Lindsay, the senior lieutenant colonel of artillery, to the disputed position, and the Senate assented. See Act of 2 March 1821, ch. 13, 3 Stat. 615–16; Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 470–510; “Proceedings on the Nomination of Daniel Bissell to be Colonel of the Second Regiment of Artillery,” 22 May 1826, ASP: MA, 3:28–30; “On the Execution of the Act to Reduce and Fix the Military Peace Establishment and the Appointment of a Colonel for the Second Regiment of Artillery,” 6 February 1827, ASP: MA, 3:590–91; Senate Executive Journal, 22d Cong., 1st sess., 27 December 1831, pp. 189–90; Senate Executive Journal, 22d Cong., 1st sess., 26 April 1832, p. 243.

19. Ltr, Lt Col Stephen Watts Kearny to Cass, New York, 23 Jan 1833, file K 28 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.

20. The mounted rangers, as a volunteer unit, also had one-third lieutenant per company. These men were not allowed to transfer because there was no such rank in the Regular Army.
21. Ltr, Kearny to Col Roger Jones, Adjutant General of the Army, New York, 30 Apr 1833, file K 32 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
23. Ltr, EAH to Garland, West Point, 12 May 1833, EAH Papers, LC.  
24. Ltr, Kearny to Cass, New York, 1 Apr 1833, enclosed with Ltr, EAH to Macomb, West Point, 2 May 1833, file H 59 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
25. Ltr, Kearny to Jones, New York, 15 Apr 1833, file K Unregistered 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 85), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
26. The quote is from Ltr, Kearny to Jones, Albany, 1 May 1833, enclosed with Ltr, Kearny to Cass, Albany, 1 May 1833, file K 35 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA. See also Ltr, Kearny to Jones, New York, 30 Apr 1833, file K 32 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA. Kearny expressed similar sentiments in Ltr, Kearny to Jones, Louisville, 3 Jul 1833, file K 49 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
27. Ltr, Kearny to EAH, St. Louis, 2 Sep 1833, Hitchcock Family Papers (HF Papers), Missouri Historical Society (MHS), St. Louis.  
28. Ltr, EAH to Macomb, West Point, 2 May 1833, file H 59 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
30. Ltr, Macomb to EAH, Washington, 20 Jun 1833, EAH Papers, LC.  
31. Ltr, EAH to Garland, West Point, 12 May 1833, EAH Papers, LC. The "enclosed letter" is most likely Ltr, EAH to Jones, West Point, 12 May 1833, file H 73 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
32. Ltr, Garland to EAH, Washington, 17 May 1833, HF Papers, MHS.  
33. Ltr, Brig Gen Winfield Scott to Cass, New York, 29 May 1833, enclosed with Ltr, EAH to Macomb, West Point, 2 May 1833, file H 59 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 84), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
34. Ltr, EAH to Jones, Boston, 28 Sep 1833, EAH Papers, LC.  
35. Ltr, Jones to EAH, Washington, 7 Oct 1833, EAH Papers, LC.  
36. Ltr, Jones to EAH (private), Washington, 6 Oct 1833, HF Papers, MHS.  
37. EAH, *Fifty Years in Camp and Field*, pp. 64–65.  
38. Ibid., pp. 66–67.  
39. Ltr, 1stLt Eustace Trenor to Jones, Key West, 14 Apr 1833, file T 65 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 88), Correspondence RG 94, NARA.  
41. Ltr, Trenor to Martin Van Buren, Vice President of the United States, Key West, 18 Sep 1833, enclosed with Ltr, Trenor to Jones, Key West, 14 Apr 1833, file T 65 1833, LR 1805–1889 (NAMP M567, roll 88), Correspondence, RG 94, NARA.  
42. Ibid.  
43. Ltr, Kearny to EAH, St. Louis, 1 Nov [1833], HF Papers, MHS, emphasis in original.  


Review by Terrence J. Gough

Along with its War Department parent, the U.S. Army faced critical and often intertwined issues of mission, structure, doctrine, professionalization, command and control, civil–military relations, technology, mobilization, and logistics, among others between the late nineteenth century and the passage of the National Defense Act amendments of 1920. For good reason, then, military historians have devoted significant attention to the period. Daniel R. Beaver traverses much of the terrain in Modernizing the American War Department: Change and Continuity in a Turbulent Era, 1885–1920. The result is narratively engaging, interpretively both conventional and provocative, and methodologically problematic.

After a preface describing themes and a background chapter on the years 1820–1885, the book’s arrangement is chronological-topical. Three topical chapters extend through 1916, covering the War Department’s command-and-control system; bureau achievements in supply and technology; and weaponry, doctrine, and reform of military policy, particularly for manpower and industrial preparedness. The next six chapters deal with World War I. Focusing on 1917, Chapter 5 addresses U.S. war strategy and policies, expansion and deployment of the Army, and major aspects of supply. War Department reorganization and the development of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France, both through the end of the war, are detailed in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 examines industrial mobilization and domestic and overseas transportation. In a shift away from the book’s main focus, coalition war-making is the subject of Chapter 8, with some fascinating material on interallied dealings that could usefully stimulate further research. Chapter 9, the first of two allotted mainly to hardware, skims procurement of general supplies, such as clothing, and scrutinizes production of artillery and smokeless powder. The development, production, and use of emerging technologies—motor transport, tanks, aircraft, and communications equipment—are treated in Chapter 10. As its title suggests, Chapter 11, “Digesting the War Experience, 1919–1940,” does not encompass, either in summary or analytically, the pre–World War I period. A thirteen-page essay on sources complements the endnoted text.

Beaver views his subject through the lens of “modernization.” As he applies the term to the War Department, it involved a process of incremental and ultimately incomplete change in which “nineteenth-century bureaucratic coalitions, which emphasized informal connections and individual consultation, were modified to become formal twentieth-century corporate systems” that stressed “the importance of rationality, efficiency, predictability, and unambiguous lines of command and control” (p. ix). He places this process within a broader one in which the United States experienced “massive industrial and technological change” and “moved from a traditional rural–agricultural and market-based commercial system toward a more integrated national order characterized by interconnected corporate enterprises” (pp. viii–ix). This is the thesis of a school of history that Beaver calls the “current” organizational synthesis. Since its emergence about forty years ago, the organizational approach has certainly been useful in explaining important aspects of the national experience, but the historiography has moved on. And in fact, much of what Beaver says about the dynamics of change reflects the argument of Stephen Skowronek in Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). Skowronek showed that the Army’s institutional adjustment to the changes that the organizational synthesis described was constrained by existing institutional arrangements and was therefore incomplete. In any case, although the theme of modernization—and resistance to it—is implicit in much of Beaver’s narrative, he does not carry it through in a sustained analytical thread.

Beaver’s account of the era is novel, however, in its use of “consultation” as an explanatory device. Beginning around the 1820s and continuing throughout the nineteenth century, he maintains, officers used informal consultation, either individually or through boards and committees, to solve problems among elements of the Army—a tradition that persisted well...
into the more hierarchically oriented War Department of the twentieth century. Doubts about this interpretation arise as Chapter 1 fails to provide concrete examples of how this reputed consultation functioned from 1820 to 1885. Those doubts persist later in the book as a 1904 multibranch committee on coastal defense fire control degenerates into a "nest of vipers" (pp. 58–59) and intra-Army rivalries weaken the Board of Ordnance and Fortifications (an entity often neglected by historians and commendably examined here). It is hard to square the consultative concept with the abundant literature on line-staff and other intra-Army conflicts. Confrontation seems a more credible motif. The resistance to a more unitary command structure in the War Department stemmed not from officers preferring to talk out their differences but rather from staff officers' fear of losing power.

The book’s virtues lie more in its insights on certain issues than in its development of an overall thesis. For instance, Beaver’s attribution of professionalism to all branches of the service, not just the combat arms, helps redress the analytical imbalance of Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957). Moreover, Beaver adds complexity by asserting that each branch, or even each less structured interest group, defined professionalism differently and that officers often belonged to several groups. This is a challenging and potentially enlightening proposition that could fruitfully have been expanded. Beaver also shrewdly observes that in the early twentieth century, “branch and bureau leaders protected their interests while appearing, through the use of the language of fashionable trendsetters in the factories, the board rooms, and the engineering schools, to be on the cutting edge of management and organizational theory” (p. 33). He effectively cautions against facilely equating business and military organizations of the time (but his use of corporatist to refer to government entities’ adoption of corporate organizational forms may confuse historians who commonly mean by it the state serving as handmaiden to corporations).

To a greater degree than many historians, Beaver looks favorably on the officers of the supply and technical bureaus. For example, he considers William Crozier an effective chief of ordnance and argues that Crozier’s removal from running the Ordnance Department and appointment to the War Council in December 1917 were not done to get him out of the way. But much contrary evidence is untapped here. Beaver himself strikingly observes that ordnance officers’ prewar perfectionism in weapons design hindered wartime mass production and forced U.S. reliance on European weapons—and Crozier had been chief of ordnance since 1901. In reality, Crozier and Quartermaster General Henry G. Sharpe stumbled in 1917 because they could not fully adjust, psychologically or organizationally, to the huge bureaucratic and industrial expansion that the war demanded. Yet if Beaver is a bit too tender toward the technologists, his understanding of technology and relishing of its details provide much salient commentary on the Army’s development and use of it. And he is properly critical of the AEF’s logistical planning and attempted dictation to the War Department on supply matters.

Unfortunately, research choices and methodological problems detract from the book’s value. His use of scholarship published in the last twenty years is spotty. More archival research during the project’s four decades of gestation would have afforded even deeper insights. Most of the book’s citations to National Archives records are inadequate for finding the material. Documents are sometimes misread: Guy E. Tripp did not plan the Ordnance Department’s functional reorganization of January 1918; the April 1918 report of the “committee of three” did not recommend the creation of the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of the War Department General Staff. The sources for some questionable statements are not given, cited pages in secondary works are not always relevant, and sometimes cited sources do not support what is claimed. Errors of fact number in the dozens, as do inaccurately rendered proper names.

Written in a lively narrative style, *Modernizing the American War Department* will not revolutionize the overall historiography but should provide something of interest for any military historian of the period. Beaver often generates attention-grabbing ideas and runs with them. Because he sometimes outruns his sources, however, it is advisable to be selective in joining the chase.

Dr. Terrence J. Gough retired as chief of the Center of Military History’s Historical Support Branch in 2005. He is the author of *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach* (CMH, 1987) and several articles on Army-business relations and officer professionalism between the late nineteenth century and World War II.
the American and British attempts to deceive their German adversaries about the location, timing, strength, and intentions of the largest amphibious assault in history proved vital to the success of the operation. She provides a full understanding of the operation by examining the many disparate threads of information, ranging from the use of double agents to the creation of entire imaginary armies. This is an extremely complex topic, further complicated by the clandestine nature of her subject, and she does an exceptional job of bringing the elements together into a single narrative.

A key point of interest throughout Barbier’s narrative is the interplay between the Allied powers. British intelligence services entered the war with considerably more experience than their American counterparts and spent 1939–1941 honing their techniques and developing their human resources. The United States, in contrast, had devoted little energy and few resources into intelligence operations prior to entering the conflict, yet American leaders often proved unwilling to accept British guidance in clandestine matters. In particular, J. Edgar Hoover, the legendary director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, often obstructed counterintelligence operations. The Soviet Union plays a much smaller role in Barbier’s narrative, rarely factoring directly into deception operations and occasionally becoming the unexpected victim of Allied counterintelligence agencies.

Barbier divides the overall deception effort into two key components, **Fortitude North** and **Fortitude South**. While both occurred simultaneously, she deals with them in separate sections of her work to ease the narrative flow. Given that members of each effort were often unaware of the particulars of the other operation, Barbier’s compartmentalization mirrors the reality of the Fortitude campaigns. Previous works have treated both operations as a single effort, with the unfortunate result that two separate, simultaneous efforts have become blended in the historical narrative.

**Fortitude North** sought to convince the German High Command that the Allies intended an attack against German-occupied Norway. Such an assault would threaten vital Swedish iron and Finnish nickel supplies, potentially crippling the German war machine. To support the threat, British authorities created false military organizations in Scotland and Northern Ireland, complete with unit designations, inflatable tanks and trucks, and a massive scripted radio transmission campaign, all to create the illusion of an assault in preparation. The deception proved an unqualified success, triggering a German decision to maintain twenty-seven divisions in Denmark, Finland, and Norway. Even in the months after D-Day, Hitler continued to fear an assault on Norway, ordering the retention of over 300,000 German troops on occupation duty until the final German surrender.

**Fortitude South** primarily attempted to convince Hitler and his advisers that the main assault on continental Europe would occur near Pas de Calais. To sell this fabrication, the Allied plan called for another phantom force, commanded by the flamboyant Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. Because the Germans considered Patton the most gifted Allied field commander, his role as commander of the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) lent tremendous credibility to the campaign. Even after the D-Day landings, Hitler remained convinced that the assault on Normandy was a diversion, and that the real assault could begin at any time.

Barbier strongly emphasizes the role of double agents in the misinformation effort. During the war, British intelligence agencies claimed to have detected and captured every German agent operating on British soil. Many of these agents were convinced to switch sides and provide false information to their handlers, in the hope that they could deceive the Germans on a massive scale. Barbier accepts the British claim uncritically, which is unfortunate because it is impossible to prove—a successful agent, by definition, remains undetected. Although the Germans may have had other agents operating in Britain, they certainly relied heavily on individuals compromised by the Allies, and this had a major effect on German strategic planning. Barbier believes that the double agents were the primary reason that the **Fortitude** operations succeeded. She finds little evidence for the utility of hundreds of fake machines, the preparatory air raids on Norway and Pas de Calais, and the scripted radio transmissions, beyond that they reinforced German assumptions.

Arguably, the only significant weakness in Barbier’s work, aside from the lack of a single decent map, is her treatment of German reactions to Allied disinformation efforts. The German response remains largely confined to a single chapter, rather than blended into the narrative of the rest of the work. This separate treatment makes assessing the effectiveness of the deception campaigns harder for the reader and also forces Barbier to repeat information for contextual purposes. The separation of German responses is exacerbated by a paucity of German sources, which might have provided an excellent resource for analyzing **Fortitude**’s success.

Overall, Barbier’s work provides a much-needed, thorough examination of intelligence and counterintelligence operations surrounding the Normandy invasion. She demonstrates the utility of the **Fortitude** campaigns without falling into the trap of presenting her topic as the sole, or even the primary, reason for the Allied victory. Rather, she presents a detailed explanation of how the campaign was carried out, linking it to an assessment of its effectiveness. This work is well worth examination by experts and lay readers, both of whom will benefit from her clear prose and exhaustive coverage.

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Dr. Paul J. Springer is an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy, where he teaches senior courses in military history. He is finalizing a book on the history of American treatment of enemy prisoners of war between 1775 and the Global War on Terrorism.
Review by Jason N. Palmer

Professor Emeritus Harry M. Ward of the University of Richmond has spent much of his career explaining the American War of Independence with a particular empathy for the common soldier. In his most recent book, George Washington’s Enforcers: Policing the Continental Army, Ward “probes the efforts of the army command to coerce men, many of whom were unaccustomed to any strict discipline or direction in their lives, to become competent warriors” (p. x). Unfortunately, the book lacks a unifying thesis to draw together the interesting results of Ward’s research. There are many different arguments he might have made from his plumbing of orderly books and correspondence, but Ward’s major failing in George Washington’s Enforcers is that no such effort was made. Ward notes how the “Continental army adopted almost totally the table of organization and military code of justice of the British army” (p. x), while making light of key differences in the execution of military justice in the American corps. The result is a frustrating series of chapters that only describe the role and purpose of the various elements of the Continental Army’s administrative apparatus—Washington’s “enforcers”—with little analysis of the contradiction inherent in the American experience of forging a purportedly republican army committed to overturning tyranny. Despite his introduction of the tools commanders used to enforce discipline and regulations, Ward makes little progress toward explaining how Washington and his subordinates learned how to lead America’s first citizen-soldiers.

The trend in recent historiography has been to investigate the nature of America’s first Army. Fred Anderson clarified how tumultuous the relationship was between America’s first commander in chief and his New England soldierly in “The Hinge of the Revolution: George Washington Confronts a Peoples Army,” Massachusetts Historical Review 1 (1999). David Hackett Fischer highlighted the differences between Washington’s “army of liberty” and the King’s “army of order” in Washington’s Crossing (New York, 2004). Caroline Cox explained the attitudes and expectations that the colonists brought to military life in A Proper Sense of Honor (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2004). Ward’s lack of analysis fails to continue this trend with George Washington’s Enforcers. Ward’s first three chapters—“Preconditions,” “The Common Soldier,” and “Military Justice”—led this reader to expect a comparison and contrast of the American Army with contemporary European forces and methods of enforcing discipline. Ward concludes, however, that “although they showed greater tactical adaptability and improvisation than the British army, the American forces subscribed to the principles and practices of organization and discipline learned from their British counterparts” (p. 12). This oversimplification glosses over the complexities and birth pangs of the Continental Army outside Boston in 1775 and the actual practice of discipline (or the failure thereof) during the course of the Revolutionary War’s several campaigns.

Ward confines himself for the remainder of the book to an examination of the bits and pieces of the Continental Army’s administrative apparatus. Chapters on “Washington’s Life Guard,” “General’s Guards,” “Camp and Quarter Guards,” “Picket Men and Safeguards,” “Temporary Police Patrols,” “Provost Marshal,” “The Maréchaussée Corps,” “Drummers and Fifers,” and “The Executioners” are filled with detailed research and interesting anecdotes that give one a sense of the monotony and repetitious nature of Army life. The book trails off without any summary or making any grand statements about the specific employment or even the nature of the tools of discipline employed by commanders in the Continental Army. The best part of the book is its rich footnotes, which future scholars will mine to go beyond Ward’s narrative to continue to analyze the similarities and differences between the American experience and the European armies from which they drew their basic organization.

Review by Kwok Chiu

Peter Worthing adds to a growing body of English language works that place warfare and military developments at the forefront in the shaping
of China’s modern history. He outlines some of the key Chinese military developments from the Manchu conquest in 1644 to the role of the People’s Liberation Army by the 1990s. Worthing makes use of an extensive bibliography of secondary literature and incorporates the authors’ scholarly interpretations of events into his argument, rather than trying to engage the problematic dynastic cycle approach with its teleological implications, as Bruce Elleman does in a similar work, *Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989* (New York, 2001).

The author organizes his fourteen chapters based on highlights of what he considers the most significant military history events that have affected China’s development. In the first half of the book, Worthing begins with a brief overview of the decisive role of the military in the shaping of imperial China up to the conquest by the Manchus. He then briefly summarizes the period of the height of the Manchu Qing Empire known as the High Qing period. He quickly transitions to the decline of the Manchus as they dealt with a series of mid-nineteenth century foreign and domestic conflicts, such as the Opium Wars, Taiping Rebellion, and the lesser known Sino-French War, until they were finally overthrown in the 1911 revolution. In the second half of the book, Worthing accounts for the rise of both the Nationalist and Communist armies and how the Communists emerged as the victors by 1949. Finally, the last three chapters of the book describe the border conflicts since 1950, such as the United States in Korea, the Soviet Union, India, its former tributary state Vietnam, and Taiwan, underscoring China’s quest to reassert its territorial integrity.

Worthing states that his primary goal for this work is to focus on the “causes, conduct, and consequences of war and the role of the military in the historical development of the modern Chinese nation” (p. vii). While the reader will find understanding the causes and consequences of the major events in China’s military developments informative, he may be disappointed with the author’s analysis and discussion of the actual conduct of war. His discussion of operational military history, such as the military campaigns, tactics, and strategy, varies in specificity, with much greater detail devoted to conflicts of the mid-twentieth century than to Qing or early Republican-period military developments. As a result of this emphasis on the causes and consequences of war, it is hard to ascertain how the less-discussed conduct of war impacted either the political or social developments in the history of modern China. While the reader may find Worthing’s discussion more historically significant, it presents a shortcoming for the military history reader looking for a comparative history.

The secondary purpose of this work, where Worthing is much more successful, is to present the historical context of the behavior of the Chinese state, given its emergence as a military and economic power, in the twenty-first century. This objective may explain why his discussion of Qing military developments in the nineteenth century is relatively concise while more detail is given to a discussion of Chinese military developments since the 1930s, covering the rise of the Nationalists and Chinese Communists. This emphasis is reinforced by the fact that the relevant maps he utilizes are from the period of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) through the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979. Worthing attaches particular importance to China’s military policy in preserving its territorial integrity (p. 193) as a source of political legitimacy to explain China’s border tensions and its need to modernize its military to support “limited, local wars under high-tech conditions” in the 1990s (p. 189). The reader should note that China has since revised its strategy to support “limited, local war under the conditions of informationization” in the twenty-first century.

In summary, this volume is a welcome addition to the growing bibliography of Chinese military history and will be a worthwhile addition to the collections of military historians or as an initial guide for the specialist who wishes to pursue further bibliographic research in the specific military events outlined in it. This work will prove a useful textbook in undergraduate courses dealing with modern Chinese or comparative military history.
in history from Columbus State University in Georgia and is currently attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he is enrolled in a master’s degree program.

The second-place award went to Capt. Christopher S. Nunn for his essay describing the defense of the Lwara area in mid-2006 by Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment. This essay describes how the company under Nunn’s command acted to prevent insurgents from infiltrating from Pakistan into Afghanistan through the Paktika Province border region. Nunn commanded the company from August 2004 to July 2006, deploying with the unit to Afghanistan in February 2006. He holds a bachelor’s in history from the University of Mississippi and is currently a resident student at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, pursuing a master’s in national security studies.

The first- and second-prize winners received monetary awards of $1,000 and $250, respectively. Each also received a certificate signed by the chief of staff of the Army. *Army History* plans to publish the winning essays.

*Sfc. Timothy Lawn, “NIGHT RAID”:* The winning piece of art in the 2008 James Lawton Collins Jr. Art Competition is a depiction of a daring nighttime raid conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom III. The mission was to seize a suspected terrorist ringleader during the early morning hours. The raid ended successfully, with complete surprise being achieved and without a shot being fired. The terrorist was captured with no loss of life. The artist of this work, Sfc. Timothy Lawn, served as an infantryman in the United States Marine Corps from 1983 to 1993. His duties included leadership roles at the fire team, squad, and platoon levels and a deployment to northern Iraq in 1991. He has a Bachelor of Fine Arts degree in computer graphics and interactive communication with a minor in photography from Ringling School of Art and Design in Sarasota, Florida. Sergeant Lawn joined the Army Reserve after graduation and deployed with a public affairs unit for Operation Iraqi Freedom III from 2004 to 2005. During this time, he sketched, inked, and painted more than thirty-five pieces of art, all of which were donated to the U.S. Army Art Collection. Lawn is currently assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida. He has donated the $500 prize to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation, a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing college scholarships and educational counseling to the surviving children of special operations personnel killed in action.

**IN MEMORIAM: WILLIAM T. BOWERS (1946–2008)**

Col. William T. Bowers, a former chief of the Histories Division of the Center of Military History and a coauthor of a book on the Korean War published by the Center, died in September 2008. He was 62.

A native of Fort Worth, Texas, Bowers earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees in history at Texas Christian University before receiving a commission in the Army in 1969. He served with the 1st Cavalry Division in Vietnam, commanded field artillery units in the United States and Germany, and served on the staff of the Joint Headquarters of the NATO Central Army Group in Heidelberg, Germany. He taught history at the U.S. Naval Academy from 1976 to 1979 and headed the Center’s Histories Division from 1992 to 1995. During the latter period, he led a three-historian team that completed research on the operations of the 24th Infantry Regiment during the Korean War and became a coauthor of the product of that work, *Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea* (Washington, D.C., 1996). He retired from the Army in 1995. The University Press of Kentucky published in 2008 a book Bowers edited, *The Line: Combat in Korea, January–February 1951*, which uses interviews conducted by contemporary uniformed Army historians to explore the difficult combat the Army experienced during the first winter of the Korean War.

(Continued from page 5)
While working on professional development guidelines for the Center’s Strategic Plan, I was struck by the wide variety of duties performed by historians throughout our Army. Some historians are primarily writers. Those can most often be found in the larger historical offices at Army commands, at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), or at CMH. Others are mainly teachers, such as the historians at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Other historians spend most of their time working on staffs as action officers, collectors of documents, and (when they can find the time!) writers of annual histories. Although historians’ duties involve different tasks and their job descriptions may vary, some form of professional development should be an important aspect of each historian’s career plan.

Generally, professional development for any Army historian should include, at a minimum, maintaining contact with the latest advancements and standards within the historical profession; keeping oneself current in the major historiographic arguments within an area of specialization; maintaining a record of scholarly presentations and writings for professional journals and societies; and taking advantage of the progressive and sequential schooling opportunities within the Army Civilian Education System to become a better Army civilian, supervisor, and leader. In short, continuing to grow both as professional historians and professional Army civilians will make historians better in their jobs and position them to compete successfully for positions of greater responsibility within the Army historical community.

However, because of the great differences between types of historians serving in the various headquarters, schools, and commands in the Army, a “one size” professional development plan will not “fit all” historians. It is therefore incumbent upon all historians to create, in conjunction with their supervisors, an Individual Development Plan (IDP). Beginning in the next rating year, the Center has instituted IDPs for all of its personnel, whether they fall under the old TAPES system or the new National Security Personnel System. Field history offices should seriously consider doing the same for their historians if not for all specialties within their offices.

The Center’s IDPs will project forward at least two years to allow for long-term forecasting of schools, courses, conferences, or other activities requiring planned allocation of resources such as course quotas and travel money. These plans will establish reasonable objectives both for the professional development of the employee as an expert in his or her field (historian, curator, editor, museum specialist, librarian, and so forth) and as a career Army civilian employee. Thus a development plan for a historian may include goals both for his or her professional development as a writer, historical action officer, and presenter of papers at conferences and for his or her attendance at the appropriate level of Army school as part of the Civilian Education System or other leadership or management courses. The specifics of development requirements and opportunities may change from command to command (and are very different in the main teaching installations at CGSC and USMA), but both elements should be considered if a historian wishes to grow, move, and be promoted within the Army Historical Program.

IDPs are one of the keys to achieving such development and should be a priority. They also help find the resources and carve out the time to work on development; both are always in short supply, especially in the smaller historical offices. Specifically, the following professional development elements should be incorporated into any IDP for Army historians:

a. Attend the Conference of Army Historians each time it is held (every other year). This is the premier professional development conference for Army historians and should be a priority for the historian and for the command he or she represents. It keeps a historian current in the particular subspecialty of U.S. Army Historian.

b. Command historians of the twenty-two Army commands, Army service component commands, and direct reporting units should also attend the annual Army Historians’ Council. The council is where policy matters and professional concerns can best be aired and solutions initiated. It is the best venue for the chief of military history to discuss issues of Army Historical Program management with those who make it happen in the field.

c. Attend, funding dependent, at least one other professional historical conference every other year. This is always difficult to justify to a non-historical supervisor, but it is a key way to stay current and connected to the profession. The Society for Military History is one of the best ways to do both and should be considered as a priority conference for all Army historians.

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THE CHIEF HISTORIAN’S

FOOTNOTE

Dr. Richard W. Stewart
d. Write and submit one journal article to a historical journal on the subject of your current research and writing project or other public history issue or concern or write and present a historical paper to a scholarly gathering, at least every other year. Regardless of job description or position, historians by profession must remain writers, and presenting their works at professional venues helps refine their skills and arguments.

I believe these are modest goals that will enhance the professional standing of all Army historians and improve their duty performance without unduly interfering with any other major duties.

I recommend that supervisory historians in all commands and headquarters from CMH to AHEC to CSI to USMA to the twenty-two Army commands, direct reporting units, and Army component commands accept the responsibility to establish IDPs for each of their historians. They should also insist that they themselves have such plans. As with other elements of any historian’s performance, professional development has to be encouraged by the supervising historian; made an important part of a historian’s duties; resourced, articulated, and defended to any higher supervisor; incorporated into the yearly performance plan; and sustained as a high priority. Without active and continued professional development, future generations of historians will not be prepared to do their jobs as Army historians, Army civilians, and Army leaders.

Call for Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at charles.hendricks1@us.army.mil.

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