In This Issue

Grenada Revisited: Four Perspectives on the Importance of Operation Urgent Fury
By Edgar F. Raines Jr.

Airborne Forces and the American Way of War
By Robert K. Wright Jr.
This issue presents three essays that examine developments during the last seventy years whose significance for the Army, the authors believe, has not been fully understood.

In the first article, Army historian Edgar Raines explores the impact that the 1983 U.S.-led invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada had on the countries most directly affected by the operation. Conducted at a contentious period in the Cold War, the action restored parliamentary democracy to a small Western Hemisphere nation and encouraged military reforms and, ultimately, a more assertive foreign policy in the United States; the author concludes, however, that the operation had only a slight impact on subsequent developments in Latin America and the Soviet Union.

In a commentary on the historical background of U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine, U.S. Military Academy history professor Gian Gentile argues that the Army remains deeply indebted to an approach to guerrilla warfare developed in the 1960s primarily by French officers. Those authors proposed combating insurgencies by focusing broadly on entire populations, a soldier-intensive approach that was molded by their experiences fighting revolutionaries in Vietnam and Algeria. Gentile argues that this four-decade-old perspective now smothers other methods of counterinsurgency warfare that would not be as burdensome to implement.

While Raines ponders the consequences of a single operation and Gentile discusses the continuing impact of a group of military thinkers, retired Army historian Robert Wright considers how the capacity developed by the Army to insert troops from the air affected the nation’s approach toward waging war. Chronicling not merely U.S. airborne operations but also the Army’s evolving airborne doctrine, Wright argues that the capabilities of airborne forces enabled the Army to develop a contingency-based rapid-reaction approach to the commitment of military forces. This approach, he argues, differed markedly from the heavy-force mobilization model that had underlain the earlier demands for absolute victory and unconditional surrender.

I think the reader will find that each of these contributions uses historical analysis to raise interesting questions about how the Army has handled its missions.
The Center continues to juggle a seemingly never-ending series of changing priorities without surrendering its commitment to crucial long-term goals. Among the latter are maintaining accountability for the vast artifact collections of the Army’s museums; ensuring the preservation of electronic records of current operations for future historians (not the Center’s regulatory responsibility but an immensely vital task nonetheless); tracking all Army unit designations, awards, and lineages, both in the Regular Army and the reserve components; and, what is often considered its core mission, publishing new volumes in its various series on Army operations and issues. Nowhere are the Center’s hard choices more clearly illustrated than by the work of the two dozen or so research and writing historians in its Histories Division. There, valid demand projects from the Army Staff and Secretariat have continued to force the postponement of work on Vietnam and Cold War volumes, even as many were approaching completion. However, the resulting “quick reaction” products have been essential to the Army leadership. Recent examples include a major study of the Army Requirements Process for the chief of staff of the Army; another on the Army’s historic approach to presidential transitions; information papers on the promotion and fielding of major weapons systems in the past; investigations into the historical accession and retention rates of both officers and enlisted personnel during times of national stress; and in-depth examinations of various issues associated with regional and ethnic minorities and women in the military. A broad variety of reports relating to historic commemoration would also fall into this category, as would a number of “smart books” for Army leaders in key positions, which showcase the unvarnished experiences of their predecessors during their first years on the job to provide the new officeholders with a broader idea of how the challenges of their positions have been handled.

Also meeting critical needs have been some monographs and studies devoted to current topics, such as the modular Army reorganization and the first Stryker units deployed to Iraq. Other such products have included a compendium of observations by key Army leaders serving in Afghanistan and articles featured in such journals as Army History and the Journal of Military History. Some similar studies nearing completion on aspects of ongoing missions include accounts of the Multi-National Corps–Iraq and the 4th Infantry Division during the recent “surge” period; another on the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC, pronounced See-flick) in an earlier period of the Iraq War; and a short history of the Future Combat System, the Army’s controversial family of electronically interconnected combat platforms, that promised different things to different people. At the same time, the division has continued to shepherd a number of contract histories written either for the Center or for other organizations, to include the Army’s Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (a history of public affairs in the Army), the Army Medical Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Army Training and Doctrine Command (the “mixed-gender” training experience), and the Army’s operations research community. Along these lines, the Center recently issued a two-volume

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**New Publication from the Center of Military History**

The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a two-volume account of the strategic air- and missile-defense efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the period from 1945 to 1972. Entitled *History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense*, this recently declassified study was completed by the BDM Corporation in 1975 under contract to the Center. The volumes examine the evolution of air defense strategy and the development and deployment of strategic defense systems. The 287-page first volume covers the years 1945 to 1955 and the 387-page second volume covers the years 1956 to 1972. Together they form CMH Pub 40–5–1.

Military users may request a copy of this two-volume set by writing to Bryan Hockensmith, the Center of Military History’s distribution editor, at army.history2@conus.army.mil.

**Army Historical Offices Issue New Books**

Two Army command historical offices have issued new books. The Military History Office of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command has published *Mixed-Gender Basic Training: The U.S. Army Experience, 1973–2004*, by Anne W. Chapman, who was a historian in that office. This 197-page volume discusses the expanding opportunities that were opened to female soldiers in the first three decades of the modern all-volunteer Army and analyzes how the Army provided initial training to female recruits to enable them to pursue these service options.


Each of these books may be ordered from the Government Printing Office at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/. *Mixed-Gender Basic Training* is available in paperback under stock number 008-029-00466-6 for $20. *Answering the Call* is being offered for $43 under stock number 008-023-00136-7.

**2009 Conference of Army Historians**

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will hold its biennial conference of Army historians on 28–30 July 2009 at the Doubletree Crystal City Hotel located at 300 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia. The theme of the conference is “Exiting War: Phase IV Operations.” Conference organizers expect presentations to address a wide range of topics related to postconflict military operations, including peacekeeping, occupation, nation building, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and withdrawal.

Information about the conference and a link to the registration form is posted at http://www.history.army.mil/2009CAH/index.html. The registration form contains a link to a hotel Web site at which those who plan to attend the conference may arrange room reservations at special conference rates. The block of rooms set aside for conference registrants will remain available at the special rate until 24 June or until it is completely booked, whichever comes first.

**Combat Studies Institute Press Issues New Historical Publications**

The Combat Studies Institute of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has issued three new works: a history of U.S. Army amphibious operations in the Korean War, an account of the Army’s support of recovery efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and a compendium of proceedings of the institute’s 2008 military history symposium on interagency cooperation in military operations.

*Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* by retired Col. Donald W. Boone Jr. reviews U.S. Army amphibious operations during World War II and postwar amphibious training prior to examining the Army’s amphibious landings in the Korean War. The book covers landings before, including, and after the one at Inch’on and also discusses amphibious evacuations, the siege of Wonsan, and river and reservoir operations. The author is an instructor at the U.S. Army War College.

*Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster* by James A. Womblew is the latest title in the institute’s Long War series (Occasional Paper 29). This 277-page study analyzes the work of some 22,000 active-duty soldiers and 50,000 National Guard personnel from all fifty states who assisted with the rescue and relief missions that followed the storm’s...
ABOUT THE AUTHOR


A U.S. marine holds a Soviet RPG2 rocket-propelled grenade launcher and a British Bren light machine gun seized on Grenada, 2 November 1983.
A little more than twenty-five years ago, on 25 October 1983, the United States invaded the small island-nation of Grenada in the eastern Caribbean. Four states—the Soviet Union, Cuba, Grenada, and the United States—had substantial interest in the outcome of the operation. From the perspective of a quarter of a century, this essay will explore the impacts of the operation, named Urgent Fury by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, on these four countries and the incursion’s long-term significance for them.

Grenada was a member of the British Commonwealth in 1983, but a rather unusual member of that organization in that it had, for all intents and purposes, a communist government. Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, a London-educated barrister, and his party, the New Joint Effort for Welfare, Education, and Liberation Movement Party (known as the New JEWEL Party), had come to power as the result of a coup in March 1979. Despite an attempt to posture as left-leaning neutralists, Bishop and his associates had exhibited strong affinity toward Cuba before they gained control of the government. Their ties only deepened afterward. They also established close relations with the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact. Then on 12 October 1983, following a long and arduous meeting of the party’s Central Committee, Bishop was deposed by a clique led by his deputy prime minister, Bernard Coard. A week later, a crowd of Bishop’s supporters rescued him from house arrest, but the Grenadian Army remained loyal to Coard and counterattacked. In the end, the soldiers executed Bishop and his senior supporters.

Popular revulsion at this act led the Revolutionary Military Council that now proclaimed itself the interim government to decree a 24-hour curfew, in effect putting the entire island under house arrest. Headed by General Hudson Austin, the minister of defence in the Bishop cabinet and now a Coard ally, the new government also cut links to the outside world, closing to all traffic both Grenada’s port of St. George’s and its only operational airport at Pearls. The U.S. government became concerned because there were about one thousand Americans resident on the island, of whom some six hundred or more were associated with the St. George’s University School of Medicine. Efforts to negotiate a safe departure foundered on “technical” objections raised by the new Grenadian leadership. The U.S. response was to intervene.

While fighter planes from the USS Independence carrier battle group and the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command deterred Cuba from sending reinforcements, marines, Rangers, and special operations forces landed on the island. Shortly before 0530 on 25 October the marines made a helicopter assault at Pearls. A few minutes later, the first Rangers landed by parachute at Point Salines on the extreme southwestern tip of the island. There, the Grenadians with Cuban assistance were building a large international airport with a 9,000-foot runway. Its ostensible purpose was to handle the trans-Atlantic tourist trade. Somewhat later, special operations forces sought to seize various pinpoint targets in the vicinity of the capital, St. George’s, including the governor general’s residence; Fort Rupert, formerly the command center for the Grenadian Army; Richmond Hill Prison, where many political prisoners were held; and the broadcast studios and transmitting tower of Radio Free Grenada.

The fighting lasted three days, with the Grenadians and Cubans
Troops of the 82d Airborne Division began arriving at Point Salines during the afternoon of 25 October. The division gradually took over the combat role from the Rangers, but confusion in the airflow to the island meant that after its first airborne infantry battalion closed, it received follow-on units slowly. Elements often arrived in no particular order. As a result the Rangers continued to draw difficult assignments. On the twenty-sixth, using Marine Corps helicopters, they staged a raid on the Grand Anse campus of the medical school, about whose existence they had not known before the operation, and successfully evacuated all the students there. The next day at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they made an air assault onto the Calivigny Peninsula that cost three helicopters and many casualties. They redeployed to the United States on 28 and 29 October.

The marines, who had been on their way to Lebanon before President Ronald W. Reagan diverted them to the eastern Caribbean, resumed their journey to that Middle Eastern trouble spot on 2 November. As they did, the 82d, which ultimately sent two brigades to Grenada, became heavily engaged in stability operations—maintaining the peace and public confidence while Governor General Scoon created a government of technicians to rule until holding democratic elections became possible. At the same time, he purged the civil service of New JEWEL Party supporters, reconstituted the police, and disbanded the Grenadian Army. The 82d gradually withdrew its forces as the conditions on Grenada returned to normal. The last combat troops departed on 13 December 1983.5

Until Scoon could revitalize Grenadian institutions, a 350-person Caribbean Peacekeeping Force, consisting of police and military contingents drawn from the neighboring islands, maintained the peace. The United States provided equipment, supplies, and training for this multinational force. At the same time, a small Army Special Forces team concentrated on training a paramilitary Special Services Unit within the Grenadian police that could deal with any armed insurgency that the greatly weakened supporters of Coard or Bishop might mount in the future. The last U.S. trainers withdrew on 30 September 1985.6

The Soviet Union had committed only a minimal amount of military equipment and public support to the New JEWEL Party government. As a consequence, this reversal in the Caribbean directly affected it the least of any of the parties involved. In an ironic way, the U.S. invasion dovetailed with and furthered a recent shift in Soviet grand strategy. In March 1983, the new general secre-
tary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Yuri Andropov, had called the head of the Cuban armed forces, Raúl Castro, to Moscow for secret consultations. Andropov had made clear to Castro that the Soviet Union could no longer guarantee Cuba’s independence. The Soviet Union had very quietly assumed the strategic defensive in its worldwide competition with the United States. This shift profoundly influenced the Soviet reaction to events in Grenada. The Coard faction was more closely aligned with the Soviet Union than were Bishop and his supporters. As a result, the outcome of the coup may not have been completely distasteful to the Soviets. No evidence has surfaced to date, however, to suggest that they fomented the dispute between Bishop and Coard. The Soviet ambassador may have had some advance warning about the course of events, given Coard’s close ties to the embassy, but the speed and contingent nature of all that happened suggest that Soviet influence on events was minimal. This conclusion, of course, can only be tentative and will be subject to revision when and if the Russian government ever opens the Soviet archives for this period.7

To say that the consequences of the successful U.S. invasion of Grenada were minimal for the Soviet Union is not the same as suggesting that they were positive. They were, in fact, unrelievedly negative. In terms of geographic spread, Soviet influence was at its peak in the Caribbean on 24 October 1983, the day before the Americans landed. Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua (under the Sandinistas), and the Marxist revolutionaries in El Salvador all fell under its sway. The Grenadian leadership was poised to make public its allegiance to the Soviet system in March 1984 at the gala opening of the international airport at Point Salines on the fifth anniversary of the Grenadian revolution. Only the fact that the U.S. intervention antedated this proposed ceremony by five months allowed the Soviets to assert publicly that the loss of Grenada did not represent any rollback of the Soviet bloc. At the same time, following a vehement public protest, Andropov and conservatives in the Soviet Foreign Ministry were quite content to accept quietly the fact that the United States had defended its sphere of influence. In return, they expected that the Americans would recognize similar Soviet spheres in Poland and Afghanistan.9

At the very least, the success of the invasion emboldened the enemies of the Soviet Union. In his memoirs, the then-deputy director for intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert M. Gates, called the period between the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan “the ‘Third World’ war.” During these years, the intelligence services of the two superpowers, with only occasionally the direct involvement of their militaries, waged a conflict for power and prestige using third world proxies in Central America, Africa, and Central Asia. Grenada was the first instance in which clearly the outcome had gone against the Soviets.10

Grenada was but a pebble in the avalanche of bad news that overwhelmed the Soviet system in the 1980s and early 1990s and led to its collapse and breakup. Certainly other foreign events, notably the insurgency in Afghanistan, were much more important. Just as obviously, the basic causes of the crisis were internal to the Soviet economy, society, and political system. Grenada in this perspective was not so much a cause as a symptom of imperial overstretch and a harbinger of what was to overtake the Soviet Union.11
Although it publicly applauded the 1979 Sandinista and Grenadian revolutions, in private the Cuban leadership was ambivalent about them. Before the election of President Reagan, Cuban leader Fidel Castro had hoped to establish more normal relations with the United States. On the other hand, he did not want to repudiate the image of revolutionary fervor that had defined his regime since the fall of Havana in January 1959. This reputation was the source of much regional influence. It was this image that caused both the Sandinistas and the Grenadians to actively seek Cuban support. These contradictory impulses caused the Cubans to continue a practice begun in 1967, following the death of Che Guevara, of not publicly calling for the export of Marxist revolution. At the same time, however, they quietly provided both moral and material support to the revolutionaries. All the while, Castro counseled moderation to his would-be protégés.12

In the years before 1983, the Soviets had proved coy supporters of the Grenadian revolution. They had not established an embassy on the island until 1981. The Cubans had acted as go-betweens to bring the reluctant Soviets and ardent Grenadians together. This mirrored the relations of the Soviets and the Cubans in the rest of the Caribbean and Central America in the 1970s and early 1980s. The Cubans supported, however hesitantly, the export of Marxist revolution—or as Castro phrased it “proletarian internationalism”—to the Caribbean basin, South America, and Africa and drew the somewhat reluctant Soviets along in their wake. In a sense, the junior partner in the Soviet-Cuban relationship determined the direction and tempo of action, but this junior partner was in thrall to its own revolutionary image. Consequently, the client regimes in Grenada and Central America had great influence on the pace of revolutionary change in the region.13

Cuba’s commitment to the success of the Grenadian revolution in both material and psychological terms was much greater than that of the Soviet Union. Cuba had trained many more members of the Grenadian Army than had the Soviet Union. In addition, it had provided a substantial number of doctors, nurses, and medical supplies to establish free medical clinics in the Grenadian countryside where no
medical care had previously been available. It sent Cuban “workers” to help build the airport at Point Salines. In actuality, they were Cuban Army reservists organized and armed as an engineer battalion. The Grenadians set up training areas in which to instruct potential Marxist revolutionaries from the neighboring islands, training to which the Cubans lent their technical expertise. The Grenadians then outfitted the graduates of these programs with arms and ammunition. Although several of the Grenadian leaders expressed sympathy with the idea of Grenada serving as a transshipment point for Cuban arms destined for other countries in the region, there is no evidence that they had actually undertaken this role on a large scale by the time of the U.S. invasion.¹⁴

Although the American invasion made all these investments in Grenada a total loss, in many respects the coup and Bishop’s execution were more traumatic events for the Cuban leaders than the subsequent U.S. intervention. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop had enjoyed a personal relationship. Bishop regarded Castro as a role model, while Castro saw Bishop as a special protégé. In the weeks before the critical New JEWEL Party Central Committee meeting that deposed Bishop, he was in Eastern Europe trying to obtain support for the failing Grenadian economy. On his way home, he stopped in Cuba and had a long meeting with Castro. Bishop, however, did not discuss his political problems at home. Almost the next thing the Cubans knew, Bishop was under arrest—then he was dead.¹⁵

Castro was enraged. He immediately began distancing Cuba from the Austin regime. He declined to send any reinforcements to Grenada before the Independence battle group arrived in the area. Furthermore, he ordered the Cubans in Grenada to stay in their “camp sites” and “work places close by.” They were not to fire on any invasion force unless it first fired on them. The joint Cuban-Grenadian defense plan envisioned that the Cubans would defend the Salines Peninsula. Not only did Castro’s orders prevent the reservists from taking up their prepared defensive positions, but he directed that the Grenadians stay out of the area as well. Castro, either deliberately or inadvertently, had thus rendered the international airfield indefensible. He did send a Cuban infantry officer with previous experience in Grenada, Col. Pedro Tortoló Comas, to organize the Cuban defenses. Tortoló, however, arrived less than twenty-four hours before the invasion and was as hamstrung by Castro’s instructions as everyone else.¹⁶

When the Cubans captured on Grenada returned to Havana, Castro greeted them at the airport and publicly gave them each a hero’s welcome.
licly gave them each a hero’s welcome. Shortly thereafter, however, the Cuban government stripped the former Cuban ambassador to Grenada of his diplomatic rank, expelled him from the Communist Party, and confined him to prison without even a hearing. The Cuban Army court-martialed all the Cuban officers assigned to Grenada in secret trials, convicted them of cowardice, and reduced them to enlisted ranks. Tortoló was assigned to the Cuban expeditionary force in Angola and died there in 1986 as a private. The Cuban Army had earned a reputation in its African campaigns as a tough, professional field force. The regime, in effect, blamed the failure in Grenada on Cuban officers as a class.\textsuperscript{17}

The defeat in Grenada, particularly the orders from Havana that prevented an effective defense, had the potential for dealing a considerable blow to Castro’s prestige and power if Castro’s role in the debacle became widely known. One of the advantages of a dictatorship—from the dictator’s perspective—is the ability to shift blame for mistakes onto subordinates. This Castro very effectively did.\textsuperscript{18}

At most, for the Cubans, \textit{Urgent Fury} underlined the implication of Andropov’s withdrawal of the Soviet guarantee; they had to quickly assume sole responsibility for their own security. Moreover, the decline and fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting evaporation of the Soviet subsidy to the Cuban economy quickly followed the Grenada intervention. Cuba then went from being an exporter (however erratically) of revolution to a society focused on defending the essential aspects of the revolution at home, while accepting a degree of liberalization in some arenas, such as religion and tourism. Whatever long-term results Grenada might have had on the Cubans were simply swamped by the sudden and irreversible turn of fortunes experienced by their patron and protector.\textsuperscript{19}

Arguably, the greatest impact of the U.S. intervention was on Grenada itself. In effect, the Grenadians suffered through four traumas—Bishop’s arrest, his execution, the period of curfew, and the combat surrounding the U.S. landings. The evidence currently available suggests that the Bishop-Coard collision resulted entirely from local problems—the dismal performance of the partially nationalized Grenadian economy; impatience with Bishop’s leadership style that was oriented toward consensus-building, which his critics considered temporizing; and simple human emotions such as envy, jealousy, and lust for power. The critical New JEWEL Party Central Committee meeting revealed that, at bottom, Bishop was a populist. Legitimate power in his view rested on popular consent. His personal popularity was the basis for the New JEWEL Party’s authority and his own premiership. Coard, on the other hand, was the one real expert in Marxist-Leninist dogma among the Grenadians. He saw the superior knowledge and insight conferred...
by that analytic framework giving legitimacy and ultimate authority to the party, acting on behalf of the people. The Central Committee was the only authoritative interpreter of dogma for the party.20

Bishop’s popularity was genuine. His removal from office and death provoked great revulsion among ordinary Grenadians and de-legitimized the Austin regime for a broad swath of the public. This intense popular reaction apparently took Coard and Austin by surprise. Their response, the curfew, indicated just how serious they judged the situation. Some foreign observers believed that Grenada teetered on the brink of civil war—with the Austin government having a near monopoly on weapons. Whether the government could retain that monopoly once violence broke out must remain uncertain, as it had many small, inadequately guarded arms caches spread throughout the island. Whatever happened was quite likely to be very bloody and rend the social fabric for generations. Instead, the Americans landed, overthrew the Austin regime, and in the process removed any reason for civil war. The response of ordinary Grenadians to treat the Americans as liberators testified to the stress that they had endured and the relief they felt at this turn of events.21

The U.S. intervention allowed the Grenadians to restore the democratic system of government that had existed in form, if not always in practice, prior to the New JEWEL Party coup. In December 1984, the interim government held national elections. A coalition led by Herbert Blaize won fourteen of fifteen seats in the House of Representatives of the Grenada Parliament, and Blaize became prime minister. Grenada has retained a vibrant democracy ever since—and with it the associated freedoms of speech, press, and religion, an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and peaceful transfers of power, all conspicuously absent from Bishop’s Grenada.22

Shortly after the fighting ended, U.S. forces apprehended Coard, Austin, and their supporters who were implicated in the death of Bishop and the others and turned them over to the interim government. Eventually, a Grenadian court tried, convicted, and sentenced the principals to be executed and gave lesser, if lengthy, sentences to the other participants. Collectively, they became known as the Grenada 17. Under intense pressure from international opponents of capital punishment, Prime Minister Nicholas Braithwaite of Grenada in 1991 commuted the sentences of those facing execution to life imprisonment. Nine years later, Grenada’s high court granted Coard’s wife Phyllis extended medical leave for cancer treatment.23

Grenadian opinion remained fractured on the subject of the revolution and especially about the imprisonment of Coard and his supporters. In 2000, Prime Minister Keith Mitchell with the help of South African advisers established a Truth and Recon-
The country’s economic recovery failed to match its political renewal. The Reagan administration pumped funds into the island to repair the damage caused by the fighting and to undo some of the economic distress caused by the New JEWEL Party government’s attempt to create a command economy. Commendably, Reagan and his advisers showed flexibility on the question of the international airport. Suspicious of Bishop’s intentions in building it, the administration initially planned to suspend construction. Local business leaders convinced the Americans that Grenada really did need such an installation to attract tourists and the foreign exchange that they would bring with them. The airport opened to commercial air traffic on 28 October 1984. While the tourism that resulted was hardly the economic panacea many Grenadians expected, it did strengthen the economy.\(^{27}\)

The short-term aid the Reagan administration lavished on the
island returned economic activity to the levels that had existed before Bishop came to power in 1979, but that had been a period of high unemployment that facilitated the rise of the New JEWEL Party to power. The administration sought to solve the problem of persistent poverty, unemployment, and underemployment through a long-term development strategy that relied on private investment capital to generate private sector jobs for the Grenadian people.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative, as this program was known, proved an abject failure in Grenada. The economy limped along with high unemployment. No one had any solutions. In the 1990s, a sense of drift and hopelessness became more prevalent, and, inevitably, a certain nostalgia for the Bishop regime set in. People remembered the era as a time of excitement and, before Bishop’s arrest, unity of purpose. The public also reassessed the role of Cuba in the Grenadian revolution. People particularly missed Cuba’s public health program. U.S. Army medical teams had continued this work in the immediate aftermath of the fighting, but, when the combat units that they supported returned to the United States, so did they, leaving a void in the Grenadian countryside. This reexamination created a climate that permitted the Grenadian government to reestablish the diplomatic relations with Cuba that Governor General Scoon had severed in late 1983. Fidel Castro visited the island in 1998 and received a warm welcome. For some, the great power rivalries that had shaped the Grenadian intervention were a part of history that could be forgotten.

For the United States, Grenada was a very modest operation. The combat elements of the ground forces involved eventually amounted to 2 airborne brigades, 2 half-strength ranger battalions, 1 Marine battalion, and a handful of special operations teams. With them, the Reagan administration achieved four major objectives during the course of the operation: safeguarding U.S. and foreign nationals on the island without harm to any of them, restoring democratic government in Grenada, eliminating an outpost of Soviet and Cuban influence and power in the eastern Caribbean, and accomplishing the first three without massive U.S., Grenadian, or Cuban casualties. Despite these accomplishments, the operation was very controversial and its impact was out of proportion to its size.

Going into the operation, no one was certain what its impact would be. In the meetings leading up to the final decision to commit the troops, Reagan and his advisers worried that the public reaction might cost him the 1984 presidential election. That may have been a danger. Lou Cannon, Reagan’s most perceptive biographer, observes that those who perceived Reagan as a hard-
line Cold Warrior were less likely to vote for him in 1984. Clearly, though, the invasion did not generally lead to that perception. A snap poll by Newsweek taken in the week after the U.S. intervention showed 53 percent of Americans approving the invasion, 34 percent disapproving, and 13 percent undecided. As he sought a second mandate, one of President Reagan’s most appealing claims was that “he brought the country together.” Grenada obviously cut both ways, but the success of the intervention and the patriotic displays that it engendered appear, if anything, to have contributed to his lopsided reelection.30

Reality confounded hopes and fears in the foreign policy arena as well. Except for the period of crisis between Bishop’s arrest and the landings, 12–25 October 1983, Grenada was never the focal point of the administration’s foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, which instead concentrated on what the president considered communist subversion in Central America. Because observers soon realized that the invasion of Grenada was an isolated event rather than the opening of a coordinated campaign, it had only a transitory impact on events in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In the United States, Operation URGENT FURY produced a brief outpouring of public support for the administration’s activist Central American approach, but the president was not able to convert this temporary popularity into bipartisan congressional support for those policies. The Central American conflicts had local causes, played out between local forces (with considerable outside assistance), and ended with local solutions. In 1990 the democratic opposition in Nicaragua won a presidential election, after which, to the surprise of most observers, the Sandinistas followed the Nicaraguan constitution and allowed the democrats to take power. Two years later, a negotiated settlement in El Salvador ended the insurrection there. Both these events occurred after the Reagan administration had ended and Soviet power had collapsed in Eastern Europe.31

The Grenada operation did demonstrate—as commentators at the time noted—that ten years after withdrawing the last of its troop units from Vietnam the U.S. government was again prepared to use force in an unstable foreign country. The operation did not, however, fully exorcise the Vietnam syndrome—a reluctance to send U.S. troops to tough foreign trouble spots. The debates aroused by the 1989 intervention in Panama, the Gulf War in 1991, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq have shown that any such expectation was overly optimistic. For the young Americans who served or avoided service in Vietnam, that conflict was a searing, generationally defining event that will almost certainly influence their beliefs and behavior until they, too, pass into history.32

The Grenada operation had a major long-term impact on the United States in three areas—defense organization, national defense strategy, and military-media relations. Dissatisfaction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the way that institution operated dated back at least to the Vietnam War. Critics argued that the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 had left the individual services with too much power. The Joint Chiefs of Staff operated on the basis of consensus, which meant that its policy recommendations represented the lowest common denominator among the services. The commanders of the major joint commands had too little
control over their theoretically subordinate service component commanders, who owed more fealty to their service chiefs in Washington. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines produced by this system were well equipped and trained to fight as members of their services, but not as a part of a joint team. In 1980, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, began an effort to reform the system. URGENT FURY, with its communications difficulties and lack of coordination between service components, appeared to buttress the reformers’ case and played a large role in congressional passage of reform legislation, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, over the opposition of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. 33

Weinberger had an entirely different view of the operation. In the context of national security strategy, Grenada was a stunning success and stood in marked contrast to America’s military failures in Vietnam and the Iranian hostage rescue attempt of 1980. Operation URGENT FURY became the model for the six tests Weinberger devised to guide future U.S. interventions, what the press labeled the Weinberger doctrine. Under this system, an administration should only intervene when and where “vital national interests” were at stake and only after policymakers had carefully defined their goals and objectives; had developed a clear strategy to achieve those objectives; had committed sufficient force to execute that strategy; had done everything possible to secure the support of Congress and the American people, preferably in advance of any military actions; and had exhausted all other alternatives before using force. This matrix, later called the Powell doctrine after General Colin L. Powell, who as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enunciated a variant of it, was the central organizing idea for U.S. national security strategy from its first delineation in 1984 until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001. 34

While Weinberger clearly believed that President Reagan had exhausted all alternatives before resorting to force in Grenada, his cabinet colleague Secretary of State George P. Shultz did not. Shultz argued that the lesson of the operation was that sometimes using force was wise before it became an action of last resort. In this way, the legacy of Grenada became part of the tangled skein of ideas that culminated in President George W. Bush’s doctrine of preemption that replaced the Weinberger doctrine in 2001. 35

The Grenada operation also represented one of the lowest points of U.S. military-media relations during the twentieth century. Two institutional dynamics met head-on in 1983. On the one hand, the U.S. press corps had become increasingly the preserve of young men and women with no military background and hence no deep understanding of military institutions and how they functioned. Reporters also reflected an intellectual climate of public distrust of American leaders and institutions stemming from the Vietnam War and Watergate. The investigative journalism that had become the norm in the 1970s produced reports of real substance on some critical issues but could also generate a crude form of “gotcha” journalism when reporters in unfamiliar settings relied on gut instincts rather than facts. At the same time, the military had left Vietnam deeply wounded in spirit. Many officers believed that they had won the war on the battlefield only to lose it to the peace movement on the home front. In their view, the press bore a major share of the blame for the defeat because it insisted on transmitting an excessively negative view of conditions in Vietnam to the American public. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further roiled the situation. Wishing to keep knowledge of the size, composition, and equipment of its special operations forces secret, it directed the joint task force commander, Vice Adm. Joseph Metcalf III, to keep reporters off the island until the special operations forces left. This he accomplished by threatening to use force. Only after two days of combat did Metcalf allow pool reporters onto the island. 36

U.S. Army Rangers move to a defensive position near the Point Salines airfield, visible in the background.
In the ensuing media storm, Secretary of Defense Weinberger appointed a commission headed by retired Army Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle to examine the state of military-media relations and committed publicly to including pool reporters in all future operations. The Sidle Commission report was the first of several examinations of this relationship that culminated in the embedding of reporters in U.S. units during the 2003 invasion of Iraq.37

Given the different objectives of the military and the media in a free society, some friction between them is almost inevitable. Grenada, however, provided a toxic example of what to avoid and in that fashion encouraged both the press and the military to find different and better ways of interacting with one another.

Of the four countries most impacted, the importance of Operation URGENT FURY ranged from minor for the Soviet Union, which had provided only modest materiel assistance to the revolutionary regime on the island, to overwhelming for Grenada itself in that it averted a civil war, avoided the economic misery that a command economy would have entailed for the inhabitants, and changed the polity from authoritarian (aspiring to dictatorship) to democratic. The two other countries present more of a puzzle. For Cuba, the nation’s assistance to Grenada had constituted a major focus in its Caribbean policy in the early 1980s. It had invested much more prestige and materiel in support of the New JEWEL Party experiment than had the Soviets, yet apart from fairly fervid rhetoric in the immediate aftermath, the collapse of this approach apparently produced few tangible consequences for Cuba or the Castro regime. On the other hand, Grenada was only briefly a matter of principal concern to policymakers in Washington, but the operation seems to have had much greater long-term significance in the United States than its size or duration would have suggested. What appears to be operating is the principle that historians refer to as contingency, “the quality or condition of being subject to chance and change, or of being at the mercy of accidents.” In this instance, it specifically refers to the ability of previous, contemporary, and subsequent actions to shape the perception of an episode and to define its importance. For the Cubans, Grenada was but one of a series of efforts to spread Marxism during the Cold War, a drive the Cuban regime largely put aside after the Soviet empire began to collapse, leaving the Cuban economy unable to vigorously support foreign adventures. On the other hand, Grenada provided an opportunity for the U.S. Congress to critically examine U.S. military institutions, something the legislators had not chosen to do in the immediate wake of the Vietnam defeat. Vietnam was also a theme in Secretary Weinberger’s casting of doctrine and in the post-Grenada debate over military-media relations. In essence, Vietnam framed the debate while Grenada provided the impetus for reform. Extraneous events thus largely determined whether Grenada would have a slight impact, as it did in Cuba, or a major impact, as in the United States.38

**Notes**


5. Ibid., pp. 193–312.

12. Gott, Cuba, pp. 269–72, has a perceptive discussion of the Cuban regime’s relationship to revolution in the 1970s.
14. On the training and equipping of region-

Grenada Document Collection, Record Group (RG) 373, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C. On the judgment that no large-scale transfers of arms were taking place, see Jiri Valenta, “Findings and Recommendations,” in Valenta and Ellison, Grenada and Soviet/Cuban Policy, pp. 241–56. On other forms of Cuban aid, see Falcoff, “Bishop’s Cuba, Castro’s Grenada,” pp. 67–75, and Cotman, Gorrión Tree, pp. 83–143.


The Selective Use of History in the Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine

By Gian P. Gentile

The air arm makes it possible to reach the civilian population behind the line of battle, and thus to attack their moral resistance directly.¹

Giulio Douhet, 1921

Thus the battle for the population is a major characteristic of revolutionary war.²

David Galula, 1964

The people are the prize in a counterinsurgency operation, they are the key terrain . . . on which victory or defeat rests.³

Peter Mansoor, 2008

The problem with history in the U.S. Army’s new, vaunted, and widely read counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, Field Manual (FM) 3–24, is simple: it draws narrowly on a body of writing on counterinsurgency warfare from the French Revolutionary War School of counterinsurgency theory and practice of the early 1960s.⁴ As a result, the Army’s new COIN doctrine is singularly premised on what has become known as the population-centric theory of counterinsurgency warfare.⁵ This theory, derived from ideas of the French Revolutionary War School as well as other Western writers on COIN, posits that a nation’s people (or population) are the key to defeating an insurgency. It holds that, if the people are properly handled and controlled, the insurgency, which must use the people for cover and concealment, can, over time, be defeated. The problem is that by its narrow selection of history and theory, the U.S. Army’s new COIN doctrine actually pushes the Army toward a new dogmatism in its approach to the challenges of insurgency throughout the world today and in the future.⁶

The French Revolutionary War School emerged in the early 1960s from a particular set of historical circumstances.⁷ At that time, a group of French Army officers that included Lt. Col. David Galula and retired Col. Roger Trinquier devised a theoretical and practical approach to dealing with Communist revolutions in countries emerging from colonial empires in the aftermath of World War II. Trinquier had fought the Communist Viet Minh in Vietnam in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and Galula had served in China after World War II; both had fought the insurgency in Algeria in the second half of the 1950s. Reflecting on their experiences, they produced a body of written work on the theory and practice of countering revolutionary Communist insurgencies and rebellions. An essential principle they derived from their experience, which governed the tactical and operational methods they proposed, was the need to protect and control affected populations in order to separate them from the insurgents, preventing the revolutionaries from using the populations for concealment. The term population-centric reflected their focus. Army officers from other countries also contributed to this body of thought. These included the British officer and counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson, who practiced a similar approach to countering a Communist insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s.⁸ The U.S. Army, as it began to increase its involvement in Vietnam in the early 1960s, was also influenced indirectly by the French School.⁹ Common to the understanding gained by the French, British, and Americans was that a counterinsurgency campaign against a Communist revolutionary insurgency would extend over many years and would require a substantial
Involvement with a nation’s people. Communist revolutionaries like Mao Tse-tung referred to it as “protracted struggle.”

Since the COIN doctrine that the U.S. Army is currently applying in Iraq is population-centric, its guiding principle is that the people must be protected from the insurgents. To protect the people, the tactical method derived from the French Revolutionary War School of placing large numbers of American combat soldiers among the population is usually deemed necessary. For this reason, I argue that the U.S. Army’s new COIN doctrine is narrowly defined and has become dogmatic, as it demands a certain prescribed tactical and operational method in the employment of American military combat power to deal with insurgencies. It imposes a method that relies heavily on a template devised by the French Revolutionary War School’s approach to counterinsurgency from the early 1960s.

There are other histories and theories of counterinsurgency warfare available, but the new American COIN doctrine chose not to rely on them. The most common alternative theory supported by numerous historical cases is the “enemy-centric” theory of counterinsurgency warfare, in which the enemy insurgents are the primary focus of a counterinsurgency campaign. An early twentieth-century British Army officer, Maj. Gen. Charles E. Callwell, was the most noted proponent of this school of thought. Even in the enemy-centric theory, however, the population of the nation where an insurgency exists is not unimportant. Instead, the various counterinsurgency methods differ in their priority and focus.

Understanding the theoretical and historical premises of the U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine is important because it has had a profound effect on how both the Army and the nation’s political leaders envision future conflict and America’s military role in the world. If U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is right and future conflict for the United States will be along the lines of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, then the world can expect more instances of U.S. military forces in foreign lands protecting the world’s people from “violent jihadist networks.”

Focusing on populations did not originate with the U.S. Army’s new COIN doctrine or with the French Revolutionary War School of counterinsurgency theory in the early 1960s. In the 1920s, shortly after World War I had ended, airpower theorists started to think of using the airplane in war directly against the people of a nation by dropping bombs on them.

A historical comparison between airpower theorists of the 1920s and the French Revolutionary War School of counterinsurgency can bring into view these two discrete historical cases and the salient features of each by juxtaposing one to the other. This comparison can also shed light on the U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine.

When making these comparisons a central theme stands out as common in all three cases: a deliberate focus on peoples and populations as the key element to victory or defeat in war. In each of these theories, if a military force properly handles the people, victory in war can be achieved. Of course, airpower theorists and counterinsurgency theorists differ radically in how they believe a military force should handle the population in war. Airpower theorists sought to bomb civilian populations from the air in order to break their will and thus bring about a quick end to a war. The counterinsurgency theorists of the early 1960s and their disciples in the U.S. Army currently fighting in Iraq sought a radically different approach toward handling peoples and populations in war. For them, the people were to be protected so that insurgents operating within the population could be removed and destroyed; once that was done, victory in counterinsurgency war could be accomplished.

All three groups—airpower theorists, adherents of the French Revolutionary War School, and the proponents of the new U.S. COIN doctrine—inverted the way military forces had traditionally fought wars. The first actions in wars fought between nation-states normally involved large battles between the military forces of the opposing sides. Depending on the nature of the war, at some point as the war progressed the civilian population might to some degree become involved in the fighting. But the airpower and counterinsurgency theorists reversed this process so that the first step in war would be to involve the people. For the airpower theorists, involvement would mean bombing them from the sky. For the counterinsurgency theorists, involvement would be securing the population with military force in order to get at the insurgents. After this
involvement between the people and the military, in either of the two cases, military forces might be engaged along the lines of more traditional warfare.

Both airpower and counterinsurgency theorists believed that they had identified a new form of war that was radically different from the warfare of the past. Common to these two groups was hubris; in their minds they alone had discerned a new form of warfare and they alone held the keys to its success. In making such claims both groups reduced the complexity of traditional wars to the absurdly simple. The U.S. Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine continues this sentiment by proclaiming that counterinsurgency warfare “is the graduate level of war.” Implicit in this statement is the notion that other forms of war that involve mass armies fighting one another are less complex and may be considered the undergraduate level.

In both cases the people of a given country became the focus of war because each set of theorists perceived that large battles between opposing armies would no longer occur. Direct involvement with populations by military forces became a surrogate for fighting between large armies on open fields of battle. As airpower and counterinsurgency theorists viewed the world around them, they assessed that war had fundamentally changed, requiring radically new and revolutionary approaches to fighting it. They then built theories and practices of their new kind of war that saw people and populations as the decisive element that if dealt with properly would produce victory, and if not, defeat.

Ironically, both sets of theorists believed that by focusing on the people as the central element in war they could make war less destructive and less harmful to the populations. At first glance, this seems to be an absurd assertion for the airpower theorists, who envisioned approaching the population of an enemy country via aerial attack and killing. But airpower theorists such as the Italian Army officer Giulio Douhet reasoned that, compared with the seemingly interminable fighting in the trenches in World War I in which millions of soldiers were killed, an aerial attack against enemy populations would wreak its havoc quickly, break the morale of the population, and force the enemy nation to surrender. Conversely, the counterinsurgency theorists reasoned that, because it was so difficult to find and kill insurgents who could use the population to conceal themselves, protecting the people from insurgent violence would be the easiest way to turn them against the insurgents.

In the years following the end of World War I, Douhet imagined a way to avoid the bloody ground warfare that had been so costly to Italy and other European countries. For Douhet, the airplane offered a revolutionary change to warfare. Douhet thought that the recent experience of trench fighting on the western front in World War I, which produced huge numbers of deaths and for years resulted in little beyond stalemate, assured that future wars would not be fought along those lines. Douhet believed that the advent of the airplane would change the nature of warfare. Airplanes carrying bombs could bypass land armies fighting on the ground and hit directly the most decisive and vulnerable part of an enemy nation, the people concentrated in cities. Douhet believed that because of the limitlessness of space and what he perceived as the airplanes’ potential to move through it unhindered regardless of defensive measures taken on the ground by the opposing nation, war had been transformed to where the decisive fighting would occur in the air and not on the ground. The goal of air combat would be the gaining of “command of the air,” which would enable a nation’s airplanes to fly over enemy cities without opposition and drop bombs on them with the primary intention of killing large numbers of civilians. Such action would produce, Douhet argued, a cracking of the enemy nation’s “material and moral resistance,” which by implication would force its government to sue for peace.

In Douhet’s conception of future war, the enemy nation’s people would be the direct focus of an aerial bombing campaign because he believed that in modern, industrial societies the people as a collective whole were weak and could not withstand the pounding of aerial bombardment for long. Before the age of industrialization and urbanization, in many European countries the people were largely perceived to be stronger due to the difficulty of rural life. Douhet and other military theorists viewed urbanized societies as tied to the amenities of modern life and their ability to withstand punishment by military force in war as low.
For Douhet, therefore, a quick, ruthless, and overwhelming attack by airplanes dropping bombs from the air against enemy cities and their populations would be enough to force capitulation. According to Douhet, such a bombing campaign would bring about "a complete breakdown of the social structure . . . subjected to this kind of merciless pounding" and would lead "the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation," to "demand an end to the war." 18 There were other airpower theorists from various countries that adopted at least in principle Douhet’s conception of future war with a focus on enemy populations. 19 For Douhet and other airpower theorists, attacking people—civilian populations—had become decisive in war.

But the conception Douhet developed in the 1920s of a future war in which populations in cities would quickly break after an onslaught of aerial bombing did not accurately forecast how events would actually play out in World War II, two decades later. The populations of Germany and Japan that took the brunt of intensive and extended conventional Allied bombing campaigns did not break under that assault. The peoples of these two nations proved to be much more resilient and adaptive to bombing attacks from the air than Douhet had anticipated. In the case of Germany, in addition to the strategic bombing campaign, a major land invasion of the continent of Europe, culminating with British, American, and Soviet armies advancing into the heart of Germany, was ultimately required to bring about unconditional surrender. In the Pacific, only a combination of fire-bombing air raids against Japanese cities, American naval encirclement of the Japanese islands, the threat of a major American land invasion of Japan, and the release over Japanese cities of two atomic bombs could force Japan to surrender unconditionally.

The strategic bombing campaigns against German and Japanese cities certainly had an important effect in leading to unconditional surrender. 20 But if Douhet’s conception had worked in practice, both of these countries would have given up in a matter of months with no land armies needed. And while Douhet’s notion of aerial warfare involved making war more merciful, the Allied bombing campaigns that killed so many civilians while failing to reduce the duration of World War II substantially had the opposite effect.

The war brought about many fundamental changes to the international state system and to the use of military force. World War II shattered an already tenuous set of European colonial empires. Much of the conflict in the era after World War II centered on the devolution of the authority of these empires and the governing of the states created from them. 21

The advent of nuclear weapons threatened such massive destruction that it restrained the states that possessed them from fighting major wars in all of their totality along the lines of World War II. Although a military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union involving nuclear weapons was a possibility, conflict in the postwar world would not include wars between the superpowers. 22 What ensued instead was an age of limited wars, as it became called, during which the breakup of many European empires created the conditions in which nationalist movements of different ideological orientations could compete for power as their former imperial masters were departing.

People’s wars of revolution and nationalism—also called wars of national liberation—emerged out of this mix. There are many examples. For instance, a Communist-inspired rebellion in China led by the revolutionary leader Mao Tse-tung overthrew the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. 23 When France reasserted its colonial rule in Vietnam after World War II, Vietnamese Communists known as the Viet Minh became a powerful insurgent force that ultimately pushed the French out in 1954 and left the country divided with a Communist North Vietnam and a United States-supported South Vietnam. In Malaya, the British-supported colonial government successfully
fought a Communist-backed insurgency of indigenous ethnic Chinese in a conflict that lasted most of the 1950s. Shortly after their defeat in Vietnam, the French became involved in suppressing another nationalist-inspired insurgency in their North African colony of Algeria. And the United States, in trying to prevent the spread of communism from North Vietnam into the South, fought a major war in that country from 1965 to 1972. These are just a few examples of the wars of Communist and nationalist revolutions that occurred during the decades following World War II.

Military force was often directly applied in an effort to end the rebellions. Many French officers who fought first in Vietnam and then in Algeria were especially traumatized because the French lost both of these wars. Out of this French experience emerged a very distinct body of knowledge concerning the theory and technique needed to understand and defeat revolutionary insurgencies.

Like the earlier airpower theorists, counterinsurgency theorists believed that the people of a nation would be decisive in determining the outcome. But unlike the airpower theorists, the counterinsurgency theorists of the French Revolutionary War School sought to protect and control civilian populations rather than target them with military force. In both cases, however, civilian populations were seen ultimately as controllable and malleable—by airpower theorists through killing, by counterinsurgency theorists through protection.

French Army officers of the French Revolutionary War School anticipated that they would be fighting future wars against revolutionary insurgent movements within their own colonies or within states that were allied with France or other Western nations. According to these French officers, the underlying cause of these insurgencies was Communist expansion inspired by the Soviet Union and China. For them, the spread of communism not only threatened their colonial empires but involved a total war between what they saw as the Western free world and the forces of communism. They believed that, although nuclear weapons would not be used, these emerging wars of insurgency would in effect become total because they would be fought among the peoples of the world and because winning them would require a total commitment of the French nation and of other Western nations as well. Their conception of future war and of the approach to fighting it would change the world.

The French officers of the Revolutionary War School constructed a simplified model to explain these insurgencies based on Mao Tse-tung’s overthrow of the Nationalist Chinese government in 1949. Mao referred to the internal war within China that led him to power as revolutionary war. The French officers reduced Maoist revolutionary war into a simplified and rigid template for action that, they believed, other Communist-inspired insurgencies would follow. Historian and strategist Peter Paret, in a largely overlooked but brilliant study of French Army officers written in the early 1960s, observed that the construct of Maoist revolution created by the French was highly simplistic. These officers spent their time constructing a doctrine and methods to counter the simplified type of insurgency they posited instead of gaining a deeper appreciation and more sophisticated explanation of what Maoist revolutionary wars really entailed.

The French officers essentially reduced Maoist revolutionary war to a set of uncomplicated steps that would occur during the process of internal revolution or insurgency. The first step would see nonviolent actions by “agitators” to arouse the interest of the people to their cause. Next would follow the organization of groups of people in different localities into alternate structures of government, which the insurgents would rely on as a base of operations for later stages of the revolution. The third step in the process was the formation of armed bands that would start to attack government forces through ambushes and small raids. This would be followed in the fourth stage by increased insurgent military activity, leading to the complete withdrawal of government forces from certain areas of the country.
would result in the creation of secure base areas within the state from which the insurgents could organize for larger military activities. The last and final step of the process would be a general offensive by insurgent forces against the government and its armed forces, which would lead ultimately to the seizure of complete political power by the insurgents. This reduced and oversimplified construct was how officers of the French Revolutionary War School viewed a Maoist insurgency. Whether or not this was a realistic, complete, and accurate depiction of what actually occurred in Mao’s accession to power in China was beside the point. A simple template that explained Maoist revolutionary war was needed to construct a counterrevolutionary-war method and doctrine to confront it.  

The counterrevolutionary approach that these French Army officers produced, in contrast to their simplification of Maoist war, was actually quite sophisticated. They sought to counter Maoist tactics by turning the process leading to Communist revolution on its head. At a most basic level, they offered a symmetrical response to insurgencies. Like the airpower theorists before them, the French officers’ central focus was on people. Since the ultimate goal for Maoist revolutionary war was to use the Communists’ domination of the people to overthrow the government, the officers’ goal in fighting it was to de-couple the people from the revolutionary insurgency.  

Countering a Maoist revolutionary war required an intricate, step-by-step approach to separate the people from the insurgency. The focus of this method became not so much directly attacking the enemy insurgents bent on the overthrow of the government but more securing and controlling the population, which would in turn result in the eventual removal of the insurgents. Galula, for example, stated that the objective in any counterinsurgency operation was “the population.” Trinquier observed that “since the stake in modern warfare is the control of the populace, the first objective is to assure the people their protection by giving them the means of defending themselves, especially against terrorism.” As the counterinsurgent force secured the population, it would also begin to restructure the government and carry out projects to improve the lives of the people, further separating them from the grips of the insurgents. As long as the counterinsurgent’s nation maintained the political will to continue this type of war, victory could be achieved, although it would come about only after many, many years of involvement in countries where internal revolutions were occurring.

A common theme of these French officers was that countering Maoist revolutions was the face of future war. Gone were the days when armies would fight each other on open fields of battle. Trinquier faulted his army for studying “a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again.” Trinquier and his contemporaries believed that contests between the counterinsurgent and his insurgent enemy happened in the midst of populations. Those populations had to be secured and controlled to defeat the insurgents. This focus on populations was much like the airpower theorists’ approach to bypassing armies fighting in the open and instead going directly after the people through bombing. In both cases, the theorists saw their new form of war as total. For airpower theorists, the bypassing of field armies meant that the people of warring nations would come into direct conflict with each other, hence the totality of war. French officers like Trinquier reasoned along similar lines. Because modern war would be fought among the people and armies would no longer fight each other as in the past, winning these wars would require a total national effort. Trinquier’s theories, in a sense, sought to militarize the entire French nation to a total war effort.

In the field and in practice, a number of prominent French Revo-
a counterinsurgent army to apply in revolutionary war.

One of the specific techniques Galula recommended to ensure that a counterinsurgent force would become firmly ensconced within the population was the establishment of small combat outposts manned by counterinsurgent soldiers scattered among the villages of a region. As an infantry company commander fighting Algerian insurgents, Galula’s area of responsibility was initially very small—about four kilometers square—located deep inside the north Algerian mountains. The population of this area totaled about 13,000, and it was isolated from the few major urban areas in Algeria. With his infantry company of about 150 men, Galula could easily control the few villages in his area from the outposts. Still, in this relatively straightforward counterinsurgency environment, Galula and his company required close to a year and a half to pacify this area and the smaller adjacent sector his company took over three months later by using the techniques he developed to separate the insurgents from the people.

Colonel Trinquier accepted the same basic premises, namely that revolutionary war was radically different from previous forms of war and that to fight it successfully armies would have to be transformed. Trinquier also agreed that the people were the key to victory or defeat in a revolutionary war.

What made Trinquier’s writings troubling was his advocacy of the use of torture against insurgents. Trinquier rationalized this endorsement by arguing that revolutionary war was total war. According to him, in traditional wars, when armies fought one another, a soldier accepted hardship, suffering, and death as a condition of fighting. In revolutionary wars, the insurgent’s main weapon in fighting the government was to use terror attacks to control the people. But since it was nearly impossible for the counterinsurgent to strike back at the insurgent when terror was used, the insurgent, unlike the conventional soldier in traditional war, did not suffer the hardships of war. Trinquier reasoned that torture should be used against captured insurgents because it would inflict on them an equal measure of suffering and hardship as they had dished out to the civilian population through acts of terror but would otherwise not get back in return. Torture applied by the counterinsurgent became the reciprocal response to the insurgent’s use of terror attacks.

French officers were not the only ones writing about how to defeat an insurgency in a revolutionary context. Other Western army officers engaged in counterinsurgency efforts after World War II also wrote about their experiences. Sir Robert Thompson highlighted aspects of his experiences in Malaya as a senior leader of British forces and as an adviser a few years later to the early U.S. effort in Vietnam. Thompson proposed essentially the same approach to counterinsurgency warfare as had the officers of the French Revolutionary War School.

The British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya from 1951 to 1960 was successful in defeating a Communist-backed insurgency. The conditions that the British faced there were relatively simple, especially compared to what the United States would face in Vietnam in the 1960s and in Iraq recently. The Malayan insurgency had no external support and the Communist Malayan insurgents were ethnic Chinese who could easily be identified by the British counterinsurgent forces. Still, as Galula discovered in Algeria in the 1950s, progress was slow, and the British took almost ten years to defeat the insurgents. This consideration is important when we consider how heavily the experiences and writings of Thompson and Galula shaped the current American approach to counterinsurgency in Iraq and ponder the vast differences between these historical cases and the present U.S. force deployments.

In fact, what is important to remember when considering the numerous studies written by Western military officers on conducting counterinsurgency
campaigns after World War II is their very specific and discrete historical contexts. We should also observe that, by and large, Galula, Trinquier, Thompson, and their contemporaries all devised the same approach to fighting insurgencies. That approach revolved around a simplified conception of the Maoist revolutionary war process, a symmetrical and procedural approach to countering that process, and a fundamental belief in the importance of civilian populations as the key to success in any counterinsurgency effort. With these basic tenets common to all of the writings and thinking on counterinsurgency at the time, the differences between them were primarily the past experiences, methods, and techniques each chose to highlight. But they were all written at a time when Communist-inspired wars of revolution appeared to be the basic security threat confronting Western nations and their allies. So the ways to counter these wars of revolution as conceived by writers like Galula, Thompson, and Trinquier were specific to the time, place, and context in which they were written. Such books and writings should be seen as primary texts and not as contemporary analyses offering templates for action in current and future wars of insurgency.

Three sources are listed in the section headed “Acknowledgements” in the preface of the U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency manual, FM 3–24, published in December 2006: David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964), Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgencies: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (1966), and an article by Dan Baum that appeared in the New Yorker magazine in 2005 entitled “Battle Lessons: What the Generals Don’t Know.” These sources were selected for this mention to avoid copyright disputes, and justly so, for they manifest the manual’s overall thrust, which is to teach the reader how to make his or her command into a learning organization in counterinsurgency operations. The article by Baum argues that in Iraq Army and Marine officers well below the rank of general were learning and adapting. But that learning, as it is expressed in FM 3–24, should inevitably lead to an overall method based on the writings of David Galula, Robert Thompson, and the approach best summarized by the French Revolutionary War School—a population-centric, protracted people’s war approach demanding close and lengthy involvement of U.S. combat forces in populations to defeat insurgencies.

If history would always repeat itself, one could be content with a contemporary U.S. Army counterinsurgency doctrine that turned its lessons learned into templates for action on the ground in Iraq today and in the future. Yet the Thompson and Galula approach of the 1960s envisioned countering Maoist revolutionary wars that appeared—just appeared—to be the wave of future conflict. That was then, and the war in Iraq and the security challenges that the United States faces today and in the future is now. Iraq in 2009 is not the world of 1964.

One of the principal authors of FM 3–24 recently observed that he did...
not think that the manual was heavily reliant on the framework of protracted people’s war and the writings of Galula and Thompson. Yet a close reading of the document shows that it is heavily dominated by the notion of countering an insurgency by using methods established in the early 1960s. The manual views counterinsurgency wars as radical departures from more traditional forms of warfare. The quotation that introduces the first chapter of the manual states that counterinsurgency warfare “is the graduate level of war,” implying that it is not only very different from conventional war but more difficult too. The majority of highlighted quotations are drawn from Thompson, Galula, and other authors who favor the protracted people’s war approach, and the historical vignettes in the manual relate primarily to episodes those authors highlighted. FM 3–24 posits as a fundamental principle for any counterinsurgency that the focus of all operations be the people; the people are to be protected and secured so that the insurgents can be separated. The people are decisive. And the manual’s chapter on conducting counterinsurgency operations is premised on the same methods promoted by writers like Galula and Thompson of clearing, holding, and building.

Other approaches to counterinsurgency than the protracted people’s war approach replicated in FM 3–24 have been developed theoretically and applied in practice. The manual does acknowledge a “limited support” option, which it manages to explain in one five-line paragraph tucked away in a manual of over 250 pages. Yet the subject of limited support to counterinsurgency efforts could have produced a doubling of the size of the manual, or the manual’s authors could have cut back on the protracted people’s war approach to offer other options to contemporary practitioners of counterinsurgency. Sometimes, the best approach to dealing with an insurgency is not to focus on the people, per se, but on the insurgent enemy instead. The enemy-centric approach does not involve, as many uniformed critics like to assert, scorching the earth of a country by killing innocent civilians to get at the insurgents. Yet that is the criticism often directed at suggestions to respond to insurgencies in ways other than by a protracted focus on populations, demanding substantial involvement of U.S. combat troops. As a result, when problems of insurgencies present themselves to American military planners, the only options that seem to be available are those offered by Galula and Thompson. That is, large numbers of U.S. combat boots on the ground, protecting the people from the insurgents. This is how the U.S. Army has become dogmatic.

Echoing the voices of Galula and Thompson and population-centric counterinsurgency methods, Col. Peter Mansoor, a member of General David H. Petraeus’ “brain trust,” commented in a recent review that “in modern war the people are the prize.” Mansoor was one of a group of colonels advising President George W. Bush on his options for Iraq in November and December 2006 when Mansoor reviewed a book by French Army officer and war correspondent Jean Lartéguy that had appeared in English in 1961 under
the title *The Centurions*. The book is a fictional account of a band of young French paratroop officers fighting in their nation’s wars of counterinsurgency in Vietnam and Algeria, where they learn how to fight insurgencies among the people. Mansoor thought of the war in Iraq as he called Lartéguy’s story “timely” and observed that the author’s characters learned the “truths of modern war.” In the book, Mansoor informs his readers, one finds “many of the principles and paradoxes of counterinsurgency warfare,” among others, “the need to secure the population.”

In February 2006, about eight months before Mansoor’s review was published, the authors of FM 3–24 held a conference at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to review drafts of the manual, at which one of the primary authors asked if there was “too much Mao in it.” That question has more recently been answered by scholars reviewing FM 3–24 in the American Political Science Association’s journal *Perspective on Politics*. Yale University political scientist Stathis N. Kalyvas observes that FM 3–24 “breaks little new ground.” The “substance” of the manual, he argues, can be found in classic works on counterinsurgency by Galula, Frank Kitson, Thompson, and Trinquier. Kalyvas concludes that FM 3–24, “beyond a substantial dose of practical, technical instructions on operational matters, . . . is an elaboration and reformulation of a body of work that emerged in the 1960s, primarily in response to anticolonial or Communist insurgencies in such places as colonial Algeria or Malaya.”

Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, pointed out in his review that the manual places its emphasis on “the winning of hearts and minds,” as the United States tried to do in Vietnam, and on the “defense of civilian populations” rather than “on offensive action against enemy forces.” Serving Army officer and proponent of the surge in Iraq and FM 3–24, Lt. Col. Douglas A. Ollivant, likewise acknowledges that the manual is premised on the writings of David Galula, among others, as well as on lessons learned in Afghanistan and Iraq.

FM 3–24 played an integral role in the recent troop buildup in Iraq, known as the surge, under the leadership of General Petraeus. As the apparent template for action on the ground in Iraq since the surge began in February 2007, FM 3–24 and its doctrinal precepts and methods for counterinsurgency have been credited with the recent lowering of violence.

Yet the surge and the allegedly new counterinsurgency methods outlined by FM 3–24 were not the primary causes of the reduction of violence in Iraq. Instead, the key factors were the decision by senior U.S. officers to pay large amounts of money to some of our former enemies—the non–al Qaeda Sunni insurgents—to ally with us against al Qaeda along with Moqtada al-Sadr’s decision to end his militia’s attacks against coalition forces and civilian Sunnis. Without those two developments, it is hard to imagine how a few more American combat brigades using the new field manual would have substantially lowered violence.
Some senior military leaders look to the surge and argue that the U.S. Army has finally figured out how to defeat insurgencies. Colonel Mansoor wrote in the widely read online *Small Wars Journal* that “the Surge succeeded on a number of different levels.” Echoing FM 3–24 and its reliance on earlier counterinsurgency writers like Thompson and Galula, Mansoor argued that before the surge the majority of U.S. units had been “more intent on finding and killing the enemy than they were on protecting the Iraqi people.” That failed strategy, Mansoor argued, “only changed when General Dave Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno came to Iraq and implemented the new counterinsurgency doctrine in the recently published FM 3–24.”

Surge architect Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute recently argued that it is time to recognize that the surge, with its additional brigades practicing new counterinsurgency methods, “has stabilized central Iraq, reduced violence overall and provided space for the Iraqi government to undertake important reconciliation efforts.”

Emphasizing the purported success of the surge may encourage policymakers to order more of these types of operations and more building of nations. Reminiscent of the way airpower theorists like Douhet and the French Revolutionary War School advocates so assured themselves that war in the future would look as they had conceived of it in the present, the current bevy of U.S. Army counterinsurgency proponents appear to be supremely self-confident. Army Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, commander of the Army agency that writes combined arms doctrine, argued recently that the days of large engagements between armies on an open field of battle are over. Instead, Caldwell believes that war and conflict in the future “will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.”

Retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, a counterinsurgency expert and a principal author of FM 3–24, believes that the U.S. Army must make careful investments to succeed in conflicts fought and waged among the people and that winning these wars will require the capability “to change entire societies.”

In both Nagl’s and Caldwell’s conception, just like Douhet’s and the French Revolutionary War School’s, battles between armies are things of the past. Populations are now decisive. Even a cursory view of events after the proclamations of Douhet and the Revolutionary War School, however, shows the fallacy of this kind of thinking. Yet if history does provide guidance, we can observe that its dustbins are full of individuals who thought that they had accurately (and narrowly) conceived of future war. The future of war is not limited to counterinsurgencies like Iraq and Afghanistan because we can certainly imagine a range of possibilities covering the full spectrum of war and conflict. A movement by a U.S. ground combat brigade to gain...
contact with Iranian forces inside Iran is a hypothetical that today certainly appears within the realm of the possible. Turmoil within the regime in North Korea might lead to fighting on the Korean peninsula that could involve conventional U.S. combat forces. These are just two examples of possible future scenarios where the U.S. Army would need to be able to fight on multiple operational levels.

The U.S. Army must break out of the self-built counterinsurgency box inspired and dominated by FM 3–24 and its reliance on the outmoded protracted people’s war approach to counterinsurgency. Once it does, the Army will see how atrophied its conventional capabilities have become after six years of engaging in nothing but counterinsurgency warfare. It will also see that it is trying to redeem a failed counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam by pursuing in Iraq the methods of Galula and Thompson that some incorrectly argue could have produced victory in the earlier conflict. And it will see how dogmatic it has become in looking toward the future of warfare and seeing only irregular war and counterinsurgency, just as Thompson and Galula envisioned in the early 1960s.

In a masterful intellectual history of the United States Army, *The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War*, historian Brian Linn identifies three intellectual trends that have dominated the U.S. Army’s thinking since its inception. The first revolved around the protection of the American homeland. The second centered on the notion of the science of managing wars. The third intellectual theme that Linn identifies within the U.S. Army is a heroic vision of war. Linn argues that there has not been any single, established and accepted “way of war” within the Army. Instead the Army’s conceptions of war have been highly contingent, contextual, and contentious. The “echo of battle” has pushed and pulled the Army in different directions toward war and conflict over the years.

Reviewing Linn’s book, Nagl sees the Army’s focus on counterinsurgency as an opportunity to break out of the “intellectual rigidity” into which Linn’s three intellectual groups had sometimes confined it. After carefully reading Linn’s book, however, one could also conclude that especially after World War II and the rise of the counterinsurgency intellectuals like Thompson and Galula in the 1960s and Mansoor and Nagl today that a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency is actually a fourth intellectual theme with its own narrow and carefully defined predisposition about war and conflict and with its own discrete view of the future. In this sense, the counterinsurgency officers are hearing their own, narrow echo of counterinsurgency battle to the exclusion of other forms of war that might be looming on the horizon.

Perhaps the American way of war that Linn so expertly describes and analyzes is by its nature as contentious as the democracy it serves. In this sense, the interplay among the three or four intellectual themes might be as good as we can get it. If nothing else, the tension between the disparate groups might...
keep us from falling dangerously into any one channel. And that seems to me to be the real danger that the U.S. Army faces today with its hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency warfare.

A senior military adviser to Soviet Premier Josef Stalin in 1939, General Dmitri Pavlov, told Stalin that mechanized warfare involving independent tank formations had no place in the future. How surprised he and Stalin must have been when German armor thrust into Russia in the summer of 1941.61 Giulio Douhet believed that the airplane had so revolutionized warfare that battles between armies would no longer occur. Roger Trinquier believed likewise that battles between armies were things of the past. The U.S. Army’s current seduction with counterinsurgency war has pushed it toward an especially narrow view of present and future conflict. What the U.S. Army does not seem to understand is that history should inform, not prescribe and direct.

Col. Gian P. Gentile is a professor of history at the U.S. Military Academy and is currently in charge of its military history program. An armor officer, he commanded in 2004–2007 the 8th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, an armored reconnaissance unit, and led it in western Baghdad, Iraq, in 2006. He has also held command and staff positions with armor units in Germany, Korea, and the United States. He received a doctorate in history from Stanford University in 1998, and he is the author of How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons learned from World War II and Kosovo, a book published by New York University Press in 2001.

NOTES

This article is a revised version of a paper read in September 2008 at the 34th International Congress of Military History held in Trieste, Italy.


5. For a detailed explanation of the terms population-centric and enemy-centric, see “Transcript: Charlie Rose Interview with David Kilcullen,” International Herald Tribune, 8 Oct 2008.


12. C. E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice, 3d ed. (1906; Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). See also “Transcript: Rose Interview with Kilcullen.”


14. FM 3–24, p. 1–1. See also “Transcript: Rose Interview with Kilcullen.”


19. Most notably from the American perspective, see William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of Modern


30. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, p. 3.

31. Ibid., pp. 26–28; Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, pp. 5–8. Paret names a half-dozen French officers who were proposing the militarization of French society to confront the Communist threat. See also on this subject Raoul Giradet, “Civil and Military Power in the Fourth Republic,” in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, ed. Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 121–49. There is also an interesting correlation between these French officers and the postwar U.S. airpower advocates who called for a defense establishment completely focused on nuclear war and for the mobilization of American society and its reorganization toward the possibility of fighting a total, nuclear war. Airpower advocate Alexander de Seversky, for example, argued in 1950 that the “atom-wise housewife” will know where to hide in her home when nuclear war begins. Alexander De Seversky, Air Power: Key To Survival (New York: Simon & Schus- ter, 1950), p. 173.


34. On Galula’s experiences as an infantry company commander in northern Algeria, see his memoir Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2006), an account originally printed as a classified document in 1963.


37. For a comparative view of the counterinsurgency efforts of the British in Malaya and the Americans in Vietnam, see John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002). While this book is an important work on military culture and organizational learning and adapting, it should not be viewed as a work of history. Nagl’s sweeping comparisons between the U.S. effort in Vietnam and that of the British in Malaya and the conclusions he draws—that the British Army learned and adapted while the U.S. Army did not—do not take into account historical complexity, contingency, and context, which should have at least qualified and tempered some of Nagl’s grandiose conclusions.

38. FM 3–24, p. viii. Baum’s article is posted at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/01/17/050117fa_fact. For an analysis focusing on the Arab world that concludes that the insurgency in Iraq is substantially different from most of the insurgencies during the Cold War, see Ian F. W. Beckett, Insurgency in Iraq: An Historical


ABOUT THE AUTHOR


*Signal Corps*

**Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, 1944**
he United States was not the first nation to develop an airborne force, nor was it the first to conduct vertical operations successfully. It did, however, quickly build the largest and most powerful airborne capability in the world. Starting as an idea in the mind of Maj. William C. Lee as World War II began, the U.S. Army’s ability to strike from the sky soon became an important weapon in the nation’s arsenal, and it has remained so down to today’s Global War on Terrorism. No other nation can match this capability.

They say everyone knows the airborne story. Ste. Mere Église, Nijmegen, and “The Rock” of Corregidor are places that immediately conjure up images of open parachutes. Through the years, many people have told that story in words and motion pictures. But it has been a story of combat and as such has caught only part of a much greater reality.

To identify and understand the full airborne reality requires some basic understandings. Because paratroopers jump from airplanes, the airborne experience is inherently joint. Army tactics, techniques, and procedures can only be understood in the context of Air Force technology and vision. Advances on one side of the equation produce advances on the other, a dynamic that has been a constant since 1st Lt. William T. Ryder’s Parachute Test Platoon made its first jump at Fort Benning, Georgia, on 16 August 1940.

“Train as you fight, fight as you train,” is not a mere slogan; it is hard cold reality. Understanding the airborne concept requires paying attention to more than just the highlights of combat signified by the gold star on jump wings. Insight comes only from probing deeply into peacetime exercises, tests, and maneuvers. Nuggets found in staff studies and after action reports are needed to assemble the complete mosaic.

“The past is prologue” and “those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it” too often are glib statements used as titles in a PowerPoint presentation. The historian’s dispassionate insight, looking across time, is the best vehicle to use in order to arrive at real understanding. That is why at the end of World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered the Army’s historical program to seek out the truth—warts and all. Without unvarnished facts, mistakes cannot be fixed, and lives will be lost needlessly.

My exploration of the use of American airborne forces began in the tumultuous decade of the 1970s. The Army then witnessed a transition from the draft to an all-volunteer force, and it returned its focus to the central front of the Cold War in Europe and to the heavy forces needed there. But the 1970s also brought substantial changes to the practice of military history. World War II veterans gave way to a new generation on university campuses, a generation shaped by protests against the Vietnam War and the military in general. War became evil, and universities purged courses on military history from the curriculum. In order to survive, academe’s remaining military historians created the so-called new military history, which continues to dominate the field to this day. On campus, some professors dismissed all government history programs as “court history” and viewed their products as lies told in a deliberate cover-up comparable to Watergate.

This is not to say that the study of battles, campaigns, and weapons ended because the general public remained intensely interested in these subjects. But within the historical profession, that study was viewed as mere “drum and trumpet” history. The new military history asked different questions of the data. Comprehensive records about the common soldier, far more detailed than for the general population, attracted social analysis. Leaders, especially general officers, served as subjects for historical psychoanalysis. Weaponry became a source for stories of bureaucratic
inertia and examples of corruption by something called the military-industrial complex. To the extent that anyone focused on combat, they tended to view it through the prism of guerrilla warfare as practiced by Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, and the Viet Cong. That is, through a limited or distorted perception.

In the midst of the intellectual turmoil, the Macmillan Company issued under the general editorship of Professor Louis Morton a multivolume series called The Wars of the United States. Morton had earlier been a section leader in the Office of the Chief of Military History, and the authors who had been selected to write the individual volumes in this series had each established a substantial reputation before the academic transition. The series was an attempt both to appeal to a general audience (so that it would make money), while retaining the footnotes and bibliographies of scholarly treatises.

In 1973, Temple University Professor Russell F. Weigley completed the capstone volume for Macmillan. He titled it The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. It is a substantial work that remains influential to this day; it appeals even to the new school as a form of intellectual history. Weigley presented an account of the evolution of what he considered to be the unique American vision of war and raised questions about where it was headed. The series’ mandate focused on the Army, but Weigley incorporated joint aspects by introducing the Navy and Air Force when they had an impact on the Army’s vision.

The most influential contribution of that book was the identification of a distinctly American way of war. Weigley’s account began at the Revolutionary War, in which he saw General George Washington pursuing a strategy of attrition. Over the next two centuries, the nation built on that foundation. The result was a comprehensive military strategy that had as its objective the total destruction of an enemy’s armed forces and often his nation’s social structure as well. The unconditional surrender demanded in World War II and the Cold War’s mutually assured destruction brought the development of the American way of war to its modern apex. In addition, Professor Weigley, like many others, recognized a dynamic tension between those who argued for a perennially strong professional army and those who thought it best to mobilize masses of citizen-soldiers in emergencies. The former group followed the total victory approach. The latter drew from a secondary American vision of combat. Its roots lay in Nathanael Greene’s supposed partisan war in the South during the Revolution. The military sometimes used this approach, for example, when it supported the resistance in the Philippines following the fall of Corregidor. This alternate vision also provided a framework to understand and cope with enemies conducting “wars of national liberation.”

I contend that there is yet another uniquely American way of war—contingency warfare. It is imbedded in our history of airborne forces at war and in peace and is a vision with strategic, operational, and tactical implications. It has remained hidden up to now from academics with no military background and even from the majority of our soldiers whose experiences come from service in heavy forces. But it clearly emerges from an examination of the Army’s large number of oral interviews, “hot washes,” and after action reports. It is not about special operations forces, except when employed conventionally as part of an airborne mission. It does, however, involve combat, combat support, and combat service support units and operations other than war. Above all, it is fundamentally a vision, a way to approach military action that has grown steadily in response to old limitations and new potential.

So far the airborne story has been described by a host of skilled authors, many of whom are distinguished soldiers. It appears in books published for the popular market, in unit histories aimed at participants, in articles in service journals intended to provoke discussion, and in manuscripts preserved in Army archives. “Fly” Planagan, Jim Gavin, Bill Yarborough, Edson Raff, and “Slam” Marshall are among the important writers read by soldiers. So, too, are less well-known military men like John Westover or Lane Toomey. And popular writers like Cornelius Ryan, Gerry Devlin, and Stephen Ambrose have reached vast audiences.

Their works generally focus on combat jumps. Most deal with World War II, especially actions in the European and Mediterranean theaters of operations. As a result, the major events of airborne history are found easily by any researcher: the test platoon expands into five full divisions, a corps headquarters,
and assorted independent formations; the 82d Airborne Division marches in a victory parade in New York City before taking up permanent residence at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

After World War II, the accounts become more episodic and harder to find. The two combat jumps in the Korean War and one in Vietnam appear most often in official histories. Some attention has also been given to the jumps in Operations JUST CAUSE and IRAQI FREEDOM. Deployments to the Dominican Republic or Grenada only occasionally appear in the literature while airborne troops’ participation on the ground in the two wars with Iraq does not attract much attention. Instead, a substantial amount of literature deals with how airmobility emerged from airborne roots, usually with the implication that the helicopter has relegated the paratrooper to an anachronism. He seems to have pretty much faded away like an old soldier.

If, however, we cast a wider net and pay particular attention to the full span of time and an unrestricted range of places, a much more coherent pattern emerges. To this end, I will touch lightly on the well-known episodes and instead highlight the less-publicized path to these heroic moments. I will describe not only obvious changes like the disappearance of the glider, but also the surprising continuities across time.

In the beginning—that is the time between the War Department’s decision to create a test unit in April 1940 and the nation’s entry into World War II—the Army watched Germany successfully employ paratroopers and glider troops in a series of blitzkrieg actions. These specially trained German troops captured key airfields, bases, and critical terrain in Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. German innovation culminated in the invasion of Crete, where large numbers of troops landed quickly at airfields secured by aerial assault. Although not realized at the time, the Battle of Crete was a Pyrrhic victory that ended German airborne development. But by that time, Americans were studying British parachute and glider developments using larger formations.

The success of the original American test platoon led to the formation of parachute and glider infantry battalions, regiments, and a full range of other kinds of units—always composed of volunteers, not assigned draftees. Performance in various large-scale maneuvers brought about the creation of both a full training command and complete airborne divisions. At first the U.S. Army believed in allocating a ratio of one-third of combat strength to paratroopers and two-thirds to the more heavily armed “glider riders” arriving in later waves. But by 1945 experience in actual combat reversed the proportion in order to put more troops on the ground in the critical opening hours of battle.

In 1943, following jumps in North Africa, Sicily, and New Guinea, the Army solidified airborne doctrine. A review panel, the Swing Board chaired by Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, took a look at existing practices and especially at the design of the airborne division. Then on 9 October of that year, the War Department published the eight-page Training Circular (TC) 113, Employment of Airborne and Troop Carrier Forces.

Although generally unknown today, TC 113 is the origin of America’s “other” way of war. First and foremost, it identified eleven missions for airborne operations in support of conventional forces: seize and hold key terrain; attack the enemy rear to assist a breakthrough; isolate the battlefield by blocking enemy reserves; capture enemy airfields; destroy enemy command and control, communications, and supply; create diversions; delay a retreating enemy until conventional forces could destroy him; reinforce threatened or surrounded units; seize weak positions that the enemy cannot reinforce easily; create confusion and disorder; and as a realistic threat cause the enemy to scatter his strength trying to protect multiple possible targets. During World War II, Army leaders quickly recognized that real-world operations actually required airborne forces to execute multiple mis-
missions simultaneously. As a result, the eleven missions should be combined into general categories: seizing an airfield or other specific target; supporting ground action by isolating the battlefield, blocking a retreat, or creating an avenue for a breakthrough; disrupting enemy command and control, communications, or logistics; reinforcing threatened units; and acting as a force in being to cause the enemy to dissipate his strength.

Taken together, the tasks in TC 113 represent a distinct vision of combat. They envision a fluid battlefield requiring agility and flexibility. They demand that the airborne commander be able to think faster than his opponent—to turn inside the enemy’s decision circle in order to offset problems created when things go wrong during the landings. This is not to say that heavier forces do not require such ability, merely that these capabilities are particularly integral to airborne forces from corps to squad. The tempo of insertion and buildup and the need to adjust to enemy reactions and new intelligence make that ability highly valued, since adjustments normally have to be made swiftly.

During World War II, airborne planning faced unique challenges. Airborne troops’ limited ground mobility required suitable drop zones (DZs) close to tactical objectives. Each transport or glider had to be meticulously loaded in order to place assets where they would be needed. Air Force planners needed to develop intricate flight plans to assemble the aerial armada and move it safely to the objectives. Aircraft needed to fly along a precise axis at the proper height and speed to enable each jumpmaster to put his contingent, or stick, on the ground compactly and ready for action. Shortages of aircraft invariably meant that multiple waves would be required to accomplish the mission, and en-route losses frequently eliminated mission-essential elements. Moreover, the available transports all had limited ranges.

Veterans identified a number of the key issues that have persisted to this day. With a limited number of transport planes available, the multiple lifts needed by the full force committed to an operation could never be executed rapidly enough to build adequate combat power. Nighttime insertions inevitably experienced confusion and multiple problems. Daylight drops normally put more men on the target but usually ran into stronger opposition. The need to keep weight as low as possible limited the types of usable weapons. For all practical purposes, ground movement after the initial jump meant walking. And aircraft range and logistical problems restricted operations to short distances behind the front lines. Gliders enhanced combat power slightly, but only at a high cost in flexibility because they required more complex landing zones. And perhaps most significantly, airborne commanders found that once their forces entered ground combat it became exceptionally difficult to pull them out of the line and reconstitute their airborne capability.

Some major innovations during World War II took place outside of general notice in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. These opened the door to significant postwar advances. The Army Air Forces’ 1st Air Commando found innovative ways to support columns moving behind enemy lines. Improved packaging, the practice of “kicking out” bundles, techniques for low-level drops, the ability to “snatch” undamaged gliders without having to land the tow plane, and configuring gliders and transports to build up the airhead much faster combined to enable commanders who relied on air support in Asia to exceed the capabilities of those in the better-known theaters. World War II’s other major insight, the value of habitual relationships between troops and transports, was a universal truth. Moreover, a little-known contribution came from the Caribbean. There, reinforced airborne battalions based in Panama offered a quick-reaction force to deal with potential sudden emergencies.

As Weigley correctly observed, Americans fought to achieve total victory in 1945. The nation then made the traditional American demand for immediate demobilization and the retention of only a small peacetime force. As it executed the drawdown, the War Department drew on an important wartime lesson about the airborne divisions. Given their bare-bones organization, they had proved to be much easier to move than infantry or armored

Maj. Gens. Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, wearing hand grenades on his battle dress harness, and James Gavin, commander of the 82d Airborne Division, converse in Belgium, 20 January 1945.
outfits. This had been true even for long- 
distance ground movement, as commands observed during the Battle of the Bulge. Therefore, when the Pentagon carefully chose the postwar force, it recog-
nized the airborne potential. The 82d at Fort Bragg became the nation’s global strategic reserve and the only division in the Army retained at full strength. A second airborne division, the 11th, also remained in the reduced force structure. It spent a few years on occupation duty in Japan before moving to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, albeit at a lower level of manning. The division’s 187th Airborne Infantry, however, stayed in the Pacific.

During the Korean War, all of World War II’s airborne issues came into play. Despite short-fuse planning, the 187th in October 1950 and March 1951 smoothly executed daytime drops in support of advances by ground forces, the first north of P’yongyang and the second near Munsan-ni, north of Seoul. New types of planes put each group of paratroopers on the ground swiftly and in much more compact drop zones. That both failed to trap large hostile forces was a func-
tion of the enemy’s rapid retreat—the same issue that had canceled numerous operations in France. After General Matthew B. Ridgway took command of the Eighth Army, he expanded on his earlier airborne experiences and used the 187th, which had been relieved from its divisional assignment, as his special on-call reserve.

The Cold War held much greater long-term significance for the creation of a new American vision of conflict. More troops went to Europe than Asia during the Korean War as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) grew into the key defensive alliance containing the Soviets, and Germany emerged as the probable main battlefront. Other regional alliances followed. At the same time, Europeans began withdrawing from former colonies, creating a power vacuum. As a result an emerging “third world” became yet another area in which the West confronted the Communists. The need to react to the Soviet threat provided the inspiration that took airborne developments beyond what had been essentially a tactical level and into a contingency paradigm.

After World War II, mobility and increasing resources gave innovative airborne thinkers a chance to experi-
ment and grow. So did the Air Force’s fielding of new generations of aircraft. The C–82 Packet and C–119 Flying Boxcar extended airborne forces’ tactical reach, and more importantly they could put out two sticks at a time and, using a rear door, could deliver signifi-
cantly larger cargo pallets and equipment. Advances in aircraft capacity quickly eliminated gliders, converting all airborne units to the use of par-
achutes. (The ubiquitous T–10 parachute system began its half-century of service in the 1950s.) At the same time, the Army searched for new weapons to overcome the relative lack of combat power of airborne units that left them vulnerable to counterattack.

An evolutionary process began. Its roots lay in the various joint exercises carried out as readiness training for the 82d, starting with SNOWDROP in 1947 and COMBINE in 1950. The exercises had a secondary role as experiments with new equipment and techniques. For example, Exercise SWARMER (1950) conducted the first heavy-drop of how-
iters and jeeps on pallets. Exercise TEST DROP explicitly evaluated new heavy-drop ideas derived from the CBI initiatives, increasing the size of loads to over ten tons.

The vision continued to grow during the 1950s. Each new plane entering the Air Force inventory expanded the potential for airborne employment. Larger capacity transports, like the 200-
man C–124 Globemaster II, al-


towed swifter reinforcement of an airhead. The C–130 Hercules and C–132 Provider, both designed to use dirt airstrips, also extended the practical range of drops and their accuracy. With the C–130’s capacity of sixty-four jumpers and the Air Force’s ability to conduct in-flight refueling, airborne operations now entered the operational level of warfare.

At the same time that new equipment and techniques moved beyond the limita-
tions faced in World War II and Korea, the world continued to change. The possibility of a nuclear battlefield seriously challenged the Department of Defense and produced an interservice scramble for dollars. For the Army at large, these years, the so-called Pentomic Era, ap-
ppeared to be a period of constant change and experimentation. The Army developed a longer-range plan that provided more responsive unit organization and a new generation of weapons. General Maxwell D. Taylor, the Army’s chief of staff, selected the airborne division for the first scrutiny in the reorganization process in order to strip it down and make it fully deployable by air.
The imminent possibility of a massacre of European hostages... demanded a swift rescue mission.

Not every development came in the realm of organization and equipment. As the buildup in Europe progressed, a better means of command and control had to be found for the general reserve forces in the continental United States. On 21 May 1951, the Army reactivated the XVIII Airborne Corps to perform this mission. Exercise SAGE BRUSH, involving 140,000 men, realistically tested large-scale deployment in 1955, as did SWIFT STRIKE I and II in 1960 and 1961, respectively.

For the Army, the key organizational innovation came in May 1958 with the formation of the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC), using XVIII Airborne Corps as a base. A joint headquarters, U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM), followed in 1962. Unity of action and the impetus of the Berlin crisis quickly expanded STRAC into a two-corps formation, adding III Corps as a heavy force. The added element would have to move at a slower pace and arrive at the location as a second layer of reinforcement. Throughout these years, Washington assumed that the deployment would be to Europe.

The 82d, however, had been given an additional mission in 1953 to act as the Western Hemisphere reaction force—an expanded vision of the Caribbean force of World War II. Smaller exercises such as BANYAN TREE and TOWERS MOON validated this tasking by successfully moving elements to Alaska, Panama, and Greenland. But the Army also considered basing some airborne troops closer to threatened areas. In 1956, the 11th Airborne Division deployed to Germany and provided the U.S. European Command with a theater airborne capability. The experiment proved to be less than fully successful. The command did not have the capability to sustain the specialized training and equipment required, nor did the Air Force keep enough transports in Europe to sustain an airborne division's proficiency. And the fact that paratroopers were all volunteers made operating within the GYROSCOPE system of unit rotations extremely difficult. The 11th was inactivated in Germany in mid-1958.

Two of the 11th’s airborne battle groups were, however, retained in Germany and assigned to the 24th Infantry Division. One of these airborne elements proved its worth in July 1958 when concerns about the security of the government in Lebanon led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to dispatch a joint task force to calm that country, a commitment given the name Operation BLUE BAT. The 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, flew to Beirut as the heart of the Army’s contribution to the force, arriving four days after the Sixth Fleet had landed the initial contingent of marines. The other airborne battle group remained on standby but did not need to deploy. The mission succeeded without the need to resort to violence, and the Army troops returned to their home stations in October.

A second, less widely known operation that took place six years later confirmed the belief that rapid reaction to crisis suited airborne forces. A complex and bloody civil war erupted in the Congo Republic (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in the years after it achieved independence from Belgium in 1960. The imminent possibility of a massacre of European hostages by the troops of one faction in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) in 1964 demanded a swift rescue mission. While the disorder in the Congo was not directly an
American problem, the United States was concerned that the Soviets might attempt to exploit the crisis. In Operation DRAGON ROUGE and the follow-on DRAGON NOIR, U.S. Air Force planes from Europe moved a parachute battalion task force into position and then conducted several successful drops and extractions, which resolved the hostage crisis. This time, however, the airborne troops were Belgian, not American.

Soon after President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he initiated a doctrine of “flexible response.” In addition to preparing to confront the Communists in large-scale conventional or nuclear conflict, the United States sought an enhanced capacity to react to indirect attacks in the third world. Lebanon had made clear that speed rather than size mattered most in putting out “brushfires.” Paratroopers were ideally suited for such action. At home, the XVIII Airborne Corps had two full divisions, the 82d and 101st. In 1963, a brigade of the 8th Infantry Division in Germany assumed the airborne capability of the 24th Infantry Division, and the 173d Airborne Brigade stood up in Okinawa to respond to rapid-reaction requirements in the Pacific. Smaller airborne elements in Alaska and Panama had more limited assignments.

As a result of the challenge to “think outside the box” posed by flexible response, the Army set about trying to find new ways to employ combat power. Lt. Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, commanding the XVIII Airborne Corps, chaired a special study group composed primarily of paratroopers. The Howze Board was as influential as the Swing Board and TC 113. The report the board issued on 20 August 1962 discussed how the Army could best employ helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to carry out vertical operations. It recommended three different types of light, easily deployable units designed to fight in Europe.

Howze’s proposed airmobile division would have 450 aircraft, making it capable of inserting an entire brigade combat team in a single lift, a goal that had never been attained during World War II or the Korean War. Unlike an airborne division subject to separate Army and Air Force chains of command, the ground commander of an airmobile division would exercise total control. Helicopters did not have the range to create airheads as deep as the airborne could, but they furnished significantly better mobility once committed and like the old gliders could move more powerful weapons into position to support the lightly armed infantry. In that respect, an airmobile force complemented paratroopers. The other two proposals met stiffer resistance. The Air Force successfully turned back the notion of an all-Army fixed-wing air transport brigade in a roles-and-missions disagreement. The Howze Board’s proposed air cavalry combat brigade, which would have been ideal for tank-killing in economy of force terms, had to be deferred because the required weapons and equipment were not yet off the drawing board.

Washington authorized the formation of units to carry out detailed testing. In October and November 1964, Exercise AIR ASSAULT II completed the evaluation. It was a high tempo exercise in the Southeast that pitted the 82d Airborne Division against the 11th Air Assault Division. The exercise
demonstrated that the new light combat unit could have enough power to fight on the European battlefield without having to sacrifice the strategic or theater mobility found in an airborne division. The Department of the Army thereupon again inactivated the 11th and drew on its resources to reorganize the 1st Cavalry Division as an airmobile organization. With this step, the XVIII Airborne Corps in July 1965 controlled two airborne divisions—the 82d and 101st—and one airmobile division.

In many ways 1965 was the pivotal year for an emerging third American way of war. Exercise DEEP FURROW sent the 3d Brigade of the 82d to Turkey to carry out joint airborne operations with that NATO ally. Instead of using units based in Europe, this time STRICOM furnished the troops. It was a notable success. The exercise also included the first use of the C–130 mounted “Jackpot” Army–Air Force command and control platform, which significantly reduced coordination difficulties encountered in previous drops.

That same year, an even more important demonstration took place in the Dominican Republic. Marines had gone ashore to secure the U.S. Embassy after fighting broke out in April between competing Dominican factions. President Lyndon B. Johnson determined that the addition of U.S. Army forces in a combined task force commanded by Army Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr. was necessary to thwart possible Cuban support for the leftist faction. As the new commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Palmer drew heavily on his Fort Bragg staff as he built his task force headquarters. His combat troops came from the 82d, as did most of the support elements. The division could have jumped in, but because friendly forces controlled the airport there was no need. Ironically, it took longer than expected to offload supplies, introducing a major potential problem. Operation POWERPACK ended the strife in the Caribbean nation. Most Americans, however, overlooked the operation because of events in Vietnam.

President Johnson also ordered U.S. ground units into action in South Vietnam in 1965, putting airborne evolution on hold. The Pacific ready reaction force, the 173d Airborne Brigade, became in May the first U.S. Army combined arms organization to go in, and it could use deployment experience gained the previous year in an exercise in Thailand. It would remain on jump status and on 22 February 1967, during Operation JUNCTION CITY, dropped a battalion team to reinforce ground elements. This was one of the original missions set out in TC 113, and yet it drew intense criticism within the Army from soldiers who did not realize that it is the fastest way to put additional combat power into action. In this case, despite having to make two passes because the DZ was so narrow, the insertion took only ten minutes.

Three other airborne brigades also served in Vietnam. The 1st Brigades of both the 101st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions deployed in 1965 on jump status but did not remain on that status very long because the Army could train only enough qualified parachutists to sustain the 82d in a posture to meet its reaction force responsibilities. After the 1968 Tet offensive, Washington dispatched that division’s 3d Brigade to Vietnam on a limited tour and activated a 4th Brigade at Fort Bragg in its absence. None of the divisional brigades carried out an airborne operation in Vietnam. On the other hand, several less visible developments with airborne significance took place during the Vietnam War. The air-droppable M551 Sheridan armored reconnaissance vehicle entered combat for the first time, making it possible for paratroopers to have an armored vehicle at last. And the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (LAPES) created yet another way to deliver supplies and heavy equipment without having to land.

Losing sight of what happened to the airborne community during the 1970s due to the turmoil caused by the need to rebuild the Army is easy. Because paratroopers had always been volunteers, adjustment to an all-volunteer military posed less of a problem than elsewhere. Outwardly, the biggest change came from opening airborne qualification to women. Institutionally, however, the most important development was the increased continuity of personnel produced by an expanded professional cadre. A number of airborne units survived the armed forces’ sharp reductions in this decade—most at Fort Bragg, but also small elements in Germany, the Pacific, Alaska, and Panama. Individuals desiring to serve in airborne units therefore had a well-defined career pattern of repetitive assignments. And those led, in turn, to an enhanced “learning curve” for both officers and noncommissioned officers.

In October 1983, the armed forces received a major wake-up call. Turmoil in the small Caribbean island of Grenada coupled with the possibility of Cuban involvement led President Ronald W. Reagan to initiate Operation URGENT FURY. To say that this joint enterprise went less than smoothly would be an understatement. The Army’s role began with the seizure of the Point Salines airfield by members of a ranger battalion.
inserted by parachute assault, but, due to aircraft mechanical problems, difficulties ensued. No one in the U.S. Atlantic Command headquarters that conducted the mission understood airborne operations. To compound matters, the planners bypassed the XVIII Airborne Corps and dealt directly with the 82d, not realizing which echelon conducted the key planning activities. As a result, the division did not jump and had to make a last-minute adjustment to land in C–130s. That, in turn, caused logistical chaos because critical support units were pushed to the tail of the airflow.

Many reforms followed Operation URGENT FURY. The most important of these created an explicit, defined approach to urgent military operations as a complement to the two traditional ways of war identified by Professor Weigley. The concept of contingency operations represents the culmination of the innovations started with the creation of the Parachute Test Platoon. For forty years, airborne units had clearly made the best rapid reaction force, and they amassed a long record of aggressively exploiting tactical situations when committed. Improvements in Air Force capabilities had steadily extended the range of their operations, the speed of getting the force on the ground, the precision of landings, and the compactness of drop zones.

However, several defects remained troublesome. Airborne soldiers still suffered from being less heavily armed than most enemies’ conventional forces. And an airborne contingency force still lacked a robust support structure.

Experimentation over time went a long way toward solving the former problem. The introduction of drop-pable weapons like the TOW antitank missile and the M198 155-mm. howitzer added punch. Replacing the jeep, Gamma Goat, and other small vehicles with the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) added very important ground mobility after the drop. Intense effort also went into a constant search for new tactics to increase lethality. In 1990, for example, a brigade of the 82d went to the National Training Center specifically to test itself against an armored foe.

The Army solved the second large problem by expanding the XVIII Airborne Corps to include the full range of combat support and combat service support units, all with rapid deployment capability, including parachute elements in most cases. And with the corps working habitually with airborne, air assault, light, and even heavy divisions, it could tailor a force for any mission with a minimum of confusion. Furthermore, the closer coordination with the Air Force stimulated by AirLand Battle doctrine led to more efficient use of jet transports such as the C–141 Starlifter and to the development of aerial refueling capability that literally placed the entire globe within reach. In turn, this let the corps concentrate its units at bases in the United States, facilitating enhanced training and simplified loading.

Many of the smaller defects that had plagued World War II jumps were also solved during the 1980s. For example, cross-loading units eliminated the risk of a vital capability being lost if a plane were shot down or had to divert. The creation of light divisions revitalized the TC 113 mission of securing an airhead for landing follow-on forces. This option became so important that a basic airfield seizure package became a routine contingency capability, especially since it was easily adjusted to fit a specific mission.

A rigorous program of emergency deployment exercises ensured that within eighteen hours of notification the first planeload of troops would be “wheels up.” A radical change in how force packages were built brought about another huge advance. Instead of identifying units and then having to decide what to cut if enough planes didn’t arrive, the corps designed standard “packets” built around weapons systems. This one step made accomplishing last-minute changes a relatively simple matter. Taken together, the tactical and logistical growth completed the transformation of traditional airborne missions into a self-contained contingency capability. During the opening days of Operation DESERT SHIELD in 1990, when the XVIII Airborne Corps learned about an aircraft’s availability only as the plane landed at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, having a variety of packets ready to load provided total flexibility and avoided wasting precious time.

But most of all, such operations became viable because the airborne community learned how to think in a very specific way. Mental agility achieved through constant practice and study kept challenges from becoming
overwhelming. Contingency planners expected the unexpected and learned to anticipate problems as a result of innumerable exercises and simulations. Repetitive assignments turned officers and senior noncommissioned officers into a close-knit community founded on trust and shared experiences.

The first indication of how well these changes had been internalized came in 1988 when troops of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua raided Contra rebel weapons caches near the border with Honduras and failed to respect the international frontier. The corps reacted quickly, dispatching a task force drawn from the 82d and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) for Operation GOLDEN PHEASANT. Such speed intimidated the Nicaraguans, especially after the airborne troops conducted several demonstration jumps.

The definitive proof that contingency operations worked came the following year in Panama. Operation JUST CAUSE benefited greatly from almost a century of U.S. Army presence in that country and from adequate time for a deliberate planning process, and it was developed with greater sophistication than any prior operation. The planners introduced a number of new objectives that helped to strengthen the contingency approach. They explicitly tried to minimize casualties on both sides and to avoid collateral damage. They intentionally applied overwhelming force to bring combat to a rapid conclusion. And most importantly, they created a mechanism for avoiding “mission creep”—the old airborne problem of not being able to pull out of the line so that it could reconstitute and resume the ability to jump again.

The result was one of the most complex (but not complicated) operation plans in history, requiring the simultaneous execution of twenty-seven separate missions and utilizing troops from the 82d and 7th, in-country forces, and the entire 75th Ranger Regiment. Meticulous planning and rehearsals continually adjusted and improved the plan. Then on 20 December 1989 the XVIII Airborne Corps, serving as a joint task force, unleashed a lightning strike. The Rangers carried out two separate airfield seizures by parachute assault. A brigade task force of the 82d then jumped onto one of those fields in order to place three battalions on the ground as fast as possible. It then swiftly performed three separate air assaults using in-country helicopters. Other paratroopers went into action from landing craft and wheeled vehicles. Operation JUST CAUSE lasted slightly more than a month, and, while it was under way, the XVIII Airborne Corps retained the capability to execute two other airfield seizures anywhere around the world.

As soon as the corps returned to Fort Bragg, it began instituting further advances. The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) brought their deployment methods into line almost immediately, and the remaining corps units began to do the same. Then, in August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The U.S. response marked the pinnacle of contingency warfare. The XVIII Airborne Corps immediately deployed its lead elements by air and shipped its heavy equipment by sea.³ While the deployment substantially resembled the 1960s STRAC approach, it was carried out on a much more massive scale, across much greater distances, and in less time thanks to evolving contingency techniques.
At the peak of Operation DESERT SHIELD, the corps controlled four divisions—one airborne, one air assault, one mechanized, and one armored—along with an armored cavalry regiment, two combat aviation brigades, and a complete array of supporting forces, all told well over 100,000 soldiers. When President George H. W. Bush ordered offensive action, Operation DESERT STORM, the corps shifted its troops undetected several hundred miles inland and then swept across Iraq to the Euphrates River and victory in a mere one hundred hours. The incredible difficulty of changing its posture and mission so swiftly and of advancing across distances that no American land force had ever before conquered so quickly is hard to appreciate. That it was done without crisis and with minimal casualties is almost unbelievable. After this triumph, the corps promptly returned to Fort Bragg and reconstituted its forced-entry capability.

The Gulf War remains the ultimate expression of American contingency warfare. Under the guidance of XVIII Airborne Corps commanders James J. Lindsay, John W. Foss, Carl W. Stiner, and Gary E. Luck, each of whom would become a four-star general, the various strands of airborne development had by 1991 come together to form a different way of thinking. Contingency operations are characterized by speed and ferocity, by mental and physical agility, and by an ability to think in three dimensions. They are as inherently joint as the original parachute and glider efforts. They are intentionally short in duration to preserve the nation’s ability to react to new threats—if a longer presence is required the mission is handed off to conventional forces.

Since 1991 the contingency way of war has been expanded to include employment in support of civilian authorities and to deal with natural disasters. The former role can actually be traced back to 1957 when the 101st was sent to Little Rock to protect the civil rights of African-American students. The latter has its roots in the use of the 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion during World War II to jump into forests to combat fires set by Japanese balloons and includes more recent responses to hurricanes. Sometimes the contingency method can succeed without the need to carry out an assault. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in 1994 was to have started with a full division jump into Haiti by the 82d—the first division-size jump since 1945 and the only one that would have ever been accomplished in a single lift. In this case, the division turned around in the air; the mere knowledge that it was on its way proved enough to cause capitulation.

What sets contingency warfare apart from Professor Weigley’s two “ways”? Unlike the conventional method, contingency does not seek to destroy an enemy’s armed forces or society—it aims for surgical precision. Decapitating an opponent and convincing him that he cannot resist are achieved without inflicting any more casualties or damage than is absolutely required. Speed of action and reaction take the place of bombardment and relentless attack. Unlike “partisan” warfare, the contingency approach is very much a function of highly trained regular forces. It does not attempt to blend into the population, quite the contrary. It is an open show of power intended to convince an opponent to neither resist nor to initiate a guerrilla war.

The Global War on Terrorism poses challenges to the Army that it has not faced before. As in other times, it must devise a strategy, appropriate tactics, techniques, procedures, and organizational models to meet the current situation. Part of that process draws on the contingency approach, part on the older ways. Which path the military will eventually select and where it will wind up are yet to be determined. But they are questions for prophets, not historians.

Notes
This article is an edited version of a presentation made on 16 September 2008 in Arlington, Virginia, in the Lemnitzer Lecture Series sponsored by the Institute of Land Warfare of the Association of the United States Army.

1. The Pentomic Army was a term coined by General Maxwell B. Taylor in an effort to compete for funds with the Air Force and Navy.

2. On 14 December 1973, Pvt. Rita Johnson and Joyce Kutsch received their jump wings. The one-hundredth graduate, Pvt. Rita Lewis Los, earned hers on 18 April 1975 and went on to become the first female pathfinder, jumpmaster, and “Black Hat.”
3. The first plane departing Pope Air Force Base carried the corps assault command post, and it was followed almost immediately by the lead company team from the 82d.

Sources
The complete story of contingency warfare’s evolution is contained in the retired records, command or after action reports, annual histories, and collections of oral histories. Numerous published works, including detailed accounts of every combat jump and biographies of many airborne leaders, illuminate points in the evolution of vertical envelopment. The following represents a short list of such items, along with others that concentrate on key developments in doctrine, training, and equipment. Many of the latter were written for a strictly military audience and were thus produced in limited quantities.


______. "Tactical Employment of the Air Assault Division." Army 14 (September 1963): 35–53.

Kassing, David B. Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope. Santa Monica, Calif.: Arroyo Center, RAND, 1994.


Moore, Samuel T. Tactical Employment in the U.S. Army of Transport Aircraft and Gliders in World War II: A Study Based on Histories of Troop Carrier Command and Other Pertinent Data. 1946.


In addition, the manuscript holdings of the U.S. Army Center of Military History contain a number of extremely important monographs and studies, which were essential in tracing the emergence of contingency warfare, especially through peacetime exercises.


______. "Exercise WINTER EXPRESS (February–March 1966)." 1966. Operations Division, United States Army, Europe. USACMH file HMC2 #209.


Review by William A. Dobak

“The cold passed reluctantly from the earth, and the retiring fogs revealed an army stretched out on the hills, resting. As the landscape changed from brown to green, the army awakened, and began to tremble with eagerness at the noise of rumors.” So the novelist Stephen Crane described the Army of the Potomac in April 1863, waking like a huge beast from a winter’s hibernation. During the American Civil War, opposing forces fought no great battles between the beginning of January (Murfreesboro, Tennessee) and early May 1863 (Chancellorsville, Virginia). Nowadays, people speak of twenty-four hours when few newsworthy events occur as “a slow news day.” In nineteenth-century wars, winter and early spring were slow news seasons, as great armies waited for the dirt roads of that era to dry out before they attempted any overland movement.

This was not true of Union troops in tiny coastal enclaves farther south. Established as a supply base for the naval blockade of Confederate ports, the beachhead around Beaufort, South Carolina, was home to thousands of former slaves who simply remained on offshore islands when their masters made for the mainland at the first sight of a Union war vessel. Too few in number to advance inland, federal troops moved from point to point along the coast by ship, then up tidal rivers and through swamps in river steamers and small boats. During the first week of March 1863, one such expedition steamed away from the federal base at Beaufort, bound for Jacksonville, Florida, and Confederate-held territory along the St. John’s River. The nine hundred troops aboard the transports made this venture different from any previous raids. Nearly all were black men, former slaves freed from bondage just months earlier. Their officers, white men appointed from Union regiments serving near Beaufort, were not the only ones eager to see how the troops would behave in action; high-ranking Union generals and civilian officials of the Lincoln administration also took a keen interest in the project of arming black soldiers, especially former slaves.

In Firebrand of Liberty, Stephen V. Ash tells the story of this force: the black men who joined the first two regiments of South Carolina Colored Infantry, the Northern abolitionists who organized them, the mission of the units during their short stay in Florida, and Ash’s opinion of the results of the expedition. This distinguished historian is the author of Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860–1870: War and Peace in the Upper South and When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861–1865, among other books. In this volume, he draws on a rich variety of sources: besides official documents, the New Englanders who officered the regiments left rich troves of personal papers, and the federal base in South Carolina was only a few days by ship from New York City, where newspapers published accounts of the expedition as fast as they arrived during the season when most armies slept.

Ash has produced a well-researched and readable account of the expedition’s beginnings and the few weeks the force spent in Florida before an indecisive general in South Carolina recalled the troops to take part in his offensive against Confederate-held Charleston. The cast of characters alone is worth the price of the book: Prince Rivers, former slave, sergeant, future state legislator; Thomas W. Higginson and James Montgomery, the first a New England abolitionist, the other a veteran of “Bleeding Kansas,” two colonels with vastly different styles of leadership; other officers and men of the two regiments; and the “Gideonites,” New England teachers and social reformers who descended on the South Carolina Sea Islands soon after a Union force landed there in late 1861. Nor does the author neglect Lyman D. Stickney, an associate of President Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of the treasury, who hoped to make a fortune in occupied parts of the South. Such men followed federal armies wherever cotton could be found, seized or bought, and sold.

Ash’s contention, included in the book’s title, that the South Carolina Colored Infantry “changed the course of the Civil War” is open to question. He believes that newspaper accounts of the expedition, especially one in the Washington Evening Star of 24 March 1863, moved Lincoln to act on the intention he had announced months earlier in the Emancipation Proclamation to recruit black soldiers for military and naval service. Fortunately for the au-
is valuable for several reasons. One of these is that the action takes place outside the major theaters of the war. Until early 1864, when Grant assumed overall command of Union land forces, roughly half of federal soldiers spent their time guarding lines of communications or occupying Southern cities and coastal enclaves, rather than serving with the main armies. A book like this may help to dispel somewhat the public’s “battlefield park” image of the Civil War. Another of the book’s valuable characteristics is its illustration of relations between the Army and other federal agencies, in this case the Navy and the Treasury Department. Treasury agents swarmed throughout the occupied South, buying and selling cotton to finance the Union war effort and trying to organize the labor and, to some extent, the personal lives, of former slaves, while the Army, Navy, and Treasury competed for that labor. Army officers themselves differed as to whether black Southerners should be enlisted and put in uniform or employed solely as manual laborers. Events in the coastal region around Beaufort offer a concentrated look at problems that occurred across the South as Union armies advanced. *Firebrand of Liberty* therefore deserves the attention of any reader interested in the Civil War.

**Notes**


**Review by Frank N. Schubert**

Over the last decade or so, Roger Cunningham has made a name for himself with his articles on black participation in state military units in the post–Civil War nineteenth century. Some of these essays appeared here in *Army History*; others were published in state journals, and some of these have won awards. All of them have been meticulously researched, well organized, and clearly written. This book, the author’s first, reflects the diligent scholarship that has marked his previous work.

*The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas* starts with a review of black volunteer soldiers in the Civil War Army and ends with a discussion of the role of the 23d Kansas Infantry in the postwar occupation of Cuba. These are the bookends; the main focus is on the years between, and the handful of company-size organizations in various towns. Chapter 2 looks at the organization, training, and distribution of state forces, and the next four deal with specific African-American organizations in particular towns: Chapter 3 covers Topeka and Lawrence; Chapter 4 concerns Wyandotte, Olathe, and Atchison; Chapter 5 revisits Topeka and looks at Leavenworth; and Chapter 6 covers Wichita and Kansas City. These chapters tell the stories of the particular companies

that emerged in these towns clearly and well, while giving us a feel for the
details of the lives of some of the men
who participated in units and who in
several cases served in the Civil War
and the Indian-fighting Army. The
stories also document the racism that
condemned these people to inferior-
ity in their roles, their equipment,
and in-state financial support.

This same racism gave rise to the
establishment of a wide range of
separate black social institutions
throughout the country and only
intensified toward the end of the
century due to white violence and
the spread of institutionalized seg-
regation with the blessing of the
Supreme Court. The state of Kansas
made sure these black companies
would not “serve,” first by denying
them entry into the Kansas National
Guard, when it was established
in 1885, then by refusing to allow
the companies to organize into a
larger battalion or regiment. In 1887,
when Kansas voters struck the word
“white” from the state constitution,
they relegated blacks to the “reserve
militia.” Blacks were on the bus, but
nowhere near the front. Their situa-
tion differed little from that of black
militia in the staunchly segregation-
ist state of Texas.1

And so it remained. In parades
they marched at the rear, and when
the state armed them at all, they
received poor and often unservice-
able weapons and equipment. As the
author notes, the following says it all:
“Issuing defective arms and equip-
ment to the black companies was a
pretty clear indication that the state
did not envision using them for any
serious purpose, such as activating
them during instances of domestic
disorder” (p. 183). Indeed, they
almost never deployed anywhere,
except in 1894, when the Garfield
Rifles of Leavenworth were ordered
to duty guarding company property
during a coal-mine strike, one of
many manifestations of the indus-
trial warfare that swept the West
that summer. This, the author notes,
“appears to have been the only time
that a black militia unit was officially
activated in Kansas, although . . .

white companies had been activated
on several occasions” (p. 125).

Given this blatant consignment
to irrelevance, why would these
African-Americans want to join the
Kansas militia? Cunningham raises
a number of reasonable possibilities,
including some military motives
such as patriotism and nostalgia for
the camaraderie of Civil War service
among the veterans who participated
in these companies. There was also
the social side, the interaction and
mutual support, excursions and enter-
taiements, and the possibility
that a woman might be attracted to
a snazzy uniform. Of course, these
reasons were just as likely to lure
white recruits. Special elements
of the recent past also would have
driven blacks to sign up. First, there
were the pre–Civil War southern
proscriptions against blacks carrying
arms. Second, there was emancipa-
tion itself. Freedom was not so far
in the past that African-Americans
would have forgotten that Union
arms, including nearly 200,000 black
soldiers, had brought it about and
made it stick. For these blacks, the
right to bear arms probably reso-
nated with particular force.

Cunningham does make a reso-
case that they were an important
part of the black community in their
towns. These black militia members
were able to raise funds for their
own use to compensate for lack of
state support through various en-
tertainments, excursions, bazaars,
sham battles, and the like. They did
parade as well as raise money, bol-
stering community pride, and they
had a positive relationship with the
black press, which supported them
by praising their marching and drill,
by announcing their social functions,
and by encouraging citizens to at-
tend their events.

This useful book plumbs an ob-
sure phenomenon in the social life
of black Kansas communities. It nec-
essarily leaves us with unanswered
questions about why they did what
they did and most essentially about
what they were. The author calls the
companies “units” and refers to their
activities as “service.” Yet there was

almost no “service” in what they did,
and they were certainly not “units”
in the sense of being part of larger
military organizations.

So what were they? Journalist
George Schuyler, in his autobiogra-
phy Black and Conservative, suggests
a possible answer. Schuyler recalled
being a teenager in Syracuse, New
York, in 1909 when he saw his first
black soldiers, real soldiers from the
black regular regiments, there for
maneuvers in upstate New York.
He was “impressed by their superb
order and discipline, their haughty
and immaculate noncommissioned
officers and their obvious author-
ity.” He contrasted them to “the
only colored men in uniforms that
we had seen . . ., our fathers in the
uniforms of the Knights of Pythias
and the Odd Fellows, and they
were simply ludicrous, representing
nothing.”2 Black militiamen of the
late nineteenth century, it seems to
me, were more like members in a
club than real soldiers. Additional
research into black militiamen, in
Kansas and elsewhere, may shed
more light on the individuals who
organized, led, and participated in
these militia organizations, as well
as on their role in African-American
society and culture, but their impor-
tance appears to center on their own
communities rather than on their
military contributions.

Notes
1. Alwyn Barr, Black Texans: A History of
African Americans in Texas, 1328–1995 (Nor-
2. George S. Schuyler, Black and Conserva-
tive: The Autobiography of George S. Schuyler

Dr. Frank N. Schubert is a retired
Department of Defense historian
and has written extensively on black
soldiers in the frontier Army. He
divides his time between homes at
Mount Vernon, Virginia, and Győr,
Hungary.
Dual Review by Victoria Campbell

Very few Soviet soldiers and junior officers have written memoirs about their experiences on the Eastern Front during World War II, and such works are nearly impossible to find in English. Stuart Britton, however, has translated and edited two such memoirs, both of which stand out not only for their reliability and their degree of detail, but for the interesting and very human stories they tell. The two works, *800 Days on the Eastern Front: A Russian Soldier Remembers World War II* by Nikolai Litvin and *From Stalingrad to Pillau: A Red Army Artillery Officer Remembers the Great Patriotic War* by Issak Kobylyanskiy, present uncommon perspectives of Soviet society and the Soviet military experience from 1942 to 1945. The first is particularly valuable since it was written during Khrushchev’s thaw. Soldiers were not allowed to keep diaries under Stalin, so with the exception of officially sanctioned memoirs during the postwar period, the vast majority of accounts were recorded long after the war. The second was written in 1994 but is based on the letters Kobylyanskiy sent to his wife. *From Stalingrad to Pillau* thus retains a high level of detail and is historically more accurate than many contemporary accounts. Britton’s genius in selecting these two accounts, however, lies not so much in their accuracy, but in the interesting individuals who tell their fascinating stories so well.

In *800 Days on the Eastern Front*, anyone experienced with the military will recognize Litvin as the quintessential commander’s driver: intelligent, resourceful, and an outstanding problem solver. A military professional, he demonstrated great courage and coolness under fire and accepted deserved punishment in a penal battalion without complaint. Charismatic and helpful, he forged relationships to mutual benefit. One always wonders just what he will do next, and reading his story is a pleasure. In *From Stalingrad to Pillau*, Kobylyanskiy, an ethnic Jew always seeking to prove himself, provides a more serious and introspective look at his military experience and the society around him. Promoted from the ranks for his mastery of artillery battery operations, he refused to accept full Communist Party membership until he felt he had proved himself on the field of battle. A serious family man, he created opportunities to keep in touch not only with his own family, but also that of his sweetheart’s. Kobylyanskiy’s story is not only one of a man driven to give his best in all situations, but a poignant love story under the most challenging of circumstances.

Collectively, *800 Days on the Eastern Front* and *From Stalingrad to Pillau* paint a complementary and detailed picture of Soviet wartime society and how the Soviet Army fought at the lowest levels. Both books provide great insight into life on the front lines of the Eastern Front. The descriptions of fighting the Germans in villages and trenches, the constant struggles with lice, the unending foot marches, and the continual encounters with artillery bombardments come as no great surprise. Nor do the details of how the Soviet Army reorganized after major losses and trained its troops for critical engagements, although they demonstrate the great coordination of the Soviet war machine and the importance of individual leaders in its success or failure. However, the discussion of topics such as attitudes toward propaganda and commissars, the perpetration of war crimes, perceptions of life in other countries, the role of personal relationships and patronage in the Soviet system, religion in Soviet society, and the experiences of women and various national groups serving in the Soviet Army is what makes these volumes so different from other World War II memoirs. In addressing topics that would have been off limits under the Soviet regime, Litvin and Kobylyanskiy honestly express their feelings and explain their actions, even when these might be viewed unfavorably, lending great credibility to their stories. While both were loyal Soviet citizens and proud of fighting for their motherland, their accounts also question the system they fought to defend and admit that system was not infallible. Such sources are very valuable to scholars of the Eastern Front.

In spite of their similar qualities, the two works differ in structure and focus. *800 Days on the Eastern Front* is Litvin’s story of how he served as an antitank gunner, machine gunner, commander’s driver, mechanic, and line soldier over the course of his 2½ years in the war. Litvin’s account is predominantly a work of military history, consisting of detailed tactical vignettes framed by Britton’s explanations of the overall operation. Although Litvin rarely comments on social aspects of the war, his vast network of personal contacts and his exposure to frontline soldiers, rear area troops, and commanders and staff indirectly illustrate
Soviet social history. Litvin’s chronicle was written in the glow of the glory of victory in the Great Patriotic War and focuses primarily on the tactical level. In contrast, Kobylyanskiy explicitly sets out to provide a social commentary on the war and its impact on the Soviet Union and clearly writes from a post–Cold War perspective. Only about one-third of Kobylyanskiy’s book details his tactical military experience, while the remaining two-thirds is devoted to commentary on life in the prewar Soviet Union and his thoughts on how the war impacted society. Chapters in the final section deal with how soldiers handled fear; nighttime foot marches; being (ethnically) Jewish in the Soviet Army; noncombat activities, such as meals, hygiene, and leisure; women in the Soviet Army; propaganda; and relating to the Germans during the war. Unlike 800 Days on the Eastern Front, Britton’s voice is rarely noticeable in From Stalingrad to Pillau, only entering the narrative on rare occasions to provide immediate context.

In both works, Britton does a masterful job of providing supplementary information in the body of the text and in endnotes. His operational context for Litvin’s work is essential to making the memoir meaningful at anything beyond the individual level and accomplishes its task without being intrusive. Additionally, Britton’s endnotes make clear that he has read many accounts of the Eastern Front, including some of the memoirs written by much higher level commanders, and his comments enhance the reader’s understanding of the stories. Besides addressing military topics, Britton also touches on the nuances of language and culture. As a Russian speaker, I enjoyed the explanation of terms such as grabbing a tongue (taking a prisoner) and the drop-marsh (the panicked retreat that takes place when an army is routed). Britton could have chosen, instead, to provide a simple translation, but in doing so, these works would have lost some of their color. Britton also provides historical context for references made by his memoirists, thus giving the reader an understanding of where Litvin and Kobylyanskiy are coming from.

Given the very thorough military and social background Britton presents in his editorial notes and the abundant examples of the importance of personal relationships in circumventing the system in both books, it is surprising that he failed to mention the role of patronage and bribery in Soviet society. Both Litvin and Kobylyanskiy benefited from exploiting personal relationships, and each chose at certain times to bend or ignore the rules when it was to his personal benefit. Both authors also commented on the role of bribery in daily life. Such attitudes toward the rule of law and their acceptance of such practices as bribery and patronage are Soviet legacies that many scholars feel help explain why Russia is struggling with democracy today. It would seem appropriate to have remarked on this aspect of Soviet society in such thoroughly researched and documented works as 800 Days on the Eastern Front and From Stalingrad to Pillau.

That slight criticism aside, these are both must-reads for scholars of the Eastern Front, researchers interested in Soviet social history, and military history enthusiasts. The fusion of the accounts of tactical battles with the stories of the soldiers and young officers who fought them provides a perspective that is not available in the officially sanctioned memoirs of senior Soviet commanders. Where else could five soldiers singing a song earn dinner and win over an anti-Soviet Belorussian family, who received in return a note that perhaps saved their lives in the years to come? Or could the Soviets surprise the Germans by conducting a flank attack through a bay filled with knee-deep water? Or could you find the repeated questions and concerns of Belorussians, Ukrainians, and others about collectivization, or witnesses’ accounts of the deportation of the Crimean Tatars, or a discussion of Muslims in the Soviet Army? Where else can you read accounts of lice exploding by toasting clothing over a campfire, tanks driving over soldiers in trenches and artillery dropping around them as part of training, Soviet soldiers wearing only their underwear attacking the Germans at night, the Soviets getting their tanks through the Pripiat swamps, or a description of swimming a tank? Read 800 Days on the Eastern Front and From Stalingrad to Pillau—you will not be disappointed.

Maj. Victoria Campbell is an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy, where she teaches the history of imperial and Soviet Russia and a senior seminar course on Russian and Soviet unconventional warfare.
confront the Nazis along the Dyle River where the Allies could engage the German force on French terms. However, the Wehrmacht broke through just north of the barrier line, crossed the Meuse, and drove deep into the French rear area. A lasting symbol of this fight is the stark German cemetery along the Chemin des Dames, northeast of Soissons, which attests to the difficulty the Germans actually had in penetrating this gap between the Maginot Line and the Allied forces. Few of the German casualties took place in front of the French fortifications, which the Nazis wisely chose not to attack.

J. E. and H. W. Kaufmann wrote a comprehensive study that strives to place this barrier system, named for Great War veteran and politician André Maginot, in the context of French history and military doctrine. In addition, as good researchers, the authors describe the minute details of this massive barrier system. The principal author, J(oseph). E. Kaufmann, is a member of the international Site O Society, which studies military fortifications. He wrote several other books on the Maginot Line and modern fortifications in general. The authors are well versed in the literature of the French defenses, and *Fortress France* provides the reader with a robust bibliography of works and documents in English, French, and German for further research.

Organized in seven chapters, the authors tell a detailed story of French fortifications. The initial chapter visits the nature of the construction debate and the roles of prominent leaders from Maginot, minister of war four times between 1922 and 1932, through commanders of the postwar French Army, including Marshal Henri-Philippe Pétain and Generals Marie-Eugène Debeney, Maxime Weygand, and Maurice Gamelin. As the Kaufmanns point out, the experience of the Great War led these officers, especially Pétain, to conclude that a methodical doctrine based on firepower was in the best interests of France. Those who advocated a way of war based on maneuver, most notably General Jean-Baptiste Estienne and, later, Col. Charles de Gaulle, were out of touch with the realities of French political and economic difficulties.

The French government did not construct a simple barrier line but enacted a comprehensive defensive system designed to stop an initial German attack. The fortification system consisted of three major sections in northeast France and a barrier system opposite Italy in the south. In Chapter 2, “The Maginot Line,” the authors describe these fortifications in minute detail. Tomasz Idzikowski’s illustrations amplify the various aspects of the fortifications from entrances, to weapons, to individual turrets and aid the authors’ literary efforts. The chapter’s ten tables provide comprehensive explanations on topics including specific weapon systems, concrete protection, and fortification funding. Subsequent chapters look at other aspects of the French military in the 1930s, such as tank construction and design, air bases and aircraft; warships and naval bases, fortifications in French colonies, and the manning and organization of the French Army on the eve of war.

The final substantive chapter, “The French Army and the Maginot Line at War,” describes how the Third Republic waged its campaign, starting with the 1939–1940 “Phony War.” The Kaufmanns’ assessment accurately describes the conduct of the French Army during the German assault in May. They point out that, while French soldiers and equipment were generally equal to the forces they faced and superior to German tanks and artillery, French senior officers and staffs failed and “its (French) military doctrine encouraged poor leadership at a time when independent action was needed” (p. 160). The operational breakthrough at Sedan, as most military historians know, paralyzed the French high command and ensured that it would never, politically or militarily, recover from the German drive to the English Channel. As the Germans drove west, they encountered the far left flank of the Maginot Line. Capturing this small and poorly equipped installation, called La Ferté, was a propaganda victory that, according to the authors, enhanced the Germans already impressive success. After two days of heavy artillery bombardment and several failed assaults, a German engineer team entered the fortification and found almost all one hundred French defenders dead. Other smaller French fortifications delayed the Germans as they continued to attack the French flanks and rear. As most of the French Army retreated, commanders either integrated the fortifications into the new defensive plan or, later, developed a method of withdrawing the fortress troops. The Kaufmanns excel in explaining the role of these fortifications in the final hours of French agony and in describing the fighting in the north and on the Alpine front against the Italians.

Several aspects of this book bothered me. I believe the authors could have provided a more robust conclusion. What did the fortifications really mean in the context of the Second World War? They could have elaborated on the use of the fortifications by the Germans and the French after the war. Also what are the lessons of war and society for the reader? How do French soldiers, politicians, and citizens view the Maginot Line today? In addition, I am unsure of the sources of the fine illustrations. What blueprints or charts did Idzikowski use when he prepared his drawings? The tables do not identify the source information that would allow a researcher the chance for further investigation without a careful study of the bibliography.

These are minor quibbles. *Fortress France* is an excellent guide to all aspects of French military doctrine and policy in the decade before the German invasion. Full of details, it would make an excellent addition to the collection of any historian interested in the other side of the 1940 campaign or the minutiae of fortification construction. Service school libraries would certainly benefit by adding this book to their collections.

Stephen A. Bourque retired from the U.S. Army in 1992 after twenty years enlisted and commissioned service. He holds a Ph.D. from Georgia State University and is the author of *Jayhawk! The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, D.C. 2002) and *The Road to Safwan* (Denton, Tex. 2007), as well as numerous articles, chapters, and reviews. He is an associate professor of history at the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
Review by Bryan Gibby

Despite being popularized as “forgotten,” there is no shortage of books about the Korean War. In fact, with the passing of the fiftieth anniversary of that conflict (1950–1953), it is becoming increasingly difficult to defend Korea as forgotten. Most Americans likely remember Korea as the war before Vietnam or as the first conflict of the Cold War. What is too often neglected are the nuances, the in-depth perspectives, and the personal tragedies of that destructive conflict, which involved dozens of nations and resulted in millions of casualties among soldiers and civilians alike.

Voices from the Korean War is therefore an unusual book. It is not a history of the Korean War, although there is a brief, fifty-page section that describes the major points of the war. Rather, it is a collection—organized thematically—of previously unpublished personal memoirs. The editors, one a Korean War veteran and the other a scholar of the Chinese military, have assembled a work that gives texture and depth to the more sanitized and generalized narratives that begin and end at the 38th Parallel. For example, in these “war stories,” Communist soldiers are no longer a faceless horde driven by ideological zeal or officers who cared little about the butcher’s bill so long as enemy positions were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. Rather, they are purposeful, skilled, and perhaps more committed to their cause than the average American GI, who typically spent more time reflecting on the weather, food, and smells of a foreign land than on ideas of freedom and individual liberty.

Following the overview of the Korean War, the reader is introduced to the subject with a section entitled “Many Faces, One War.” These first chapters effectively capture the variety of wartime experiences from the American, Chinese, and North Korean perspectives. Above all, these tales are genuine examples emphasizing the unique expectations different combatants brought to that conflict and their reactions to the reality of war: the lieutenant crammed aboard a troopship with only boredom, claustrophobia, and bouts of nausea for company; the artillery gunner who witnesses a howitzer battery (six tubes) firing in three directions at once in a vain attempt to stem the advance of Chinese infantry; the Chinese officer who kept his unit together and fighting in the face of bitter cold, low supplies, and U.S. Marine firepower.

Soldiers from the major combatant armies are not the only ones to tell stories of great value. To the editors’ credit, they included chapters involving the experience of the overlooked belligerents: Koreans who fought for the North and South. “A North Korean Officer’s Story” provides a rare glimpse at the Korean People’s Army, which nearly drove the United Nations Command (UNC) into the sea prior to MacArthur’s Inch’on landing in September 1950. “A Korean Youth Serves in Both Armies” and “A ROK Lieutenant Survives the Bloody Ridges” will introduce Western readers to the destructiveness of the ideological civil war and the valor of freedom-loving Koreans. The resilience of the Korean people (North and South) in the face of what became a near-total war is an underappreciated aspect with broad ramifications for the military and political future of the Korean peninsula.

The final section of the book is devoted to life in prisoner-of-war (POW) camps on both sides. For the Americans, the majority of whom became prisoners during the first six months of the war, life in captivity was a razor’s walk between survival and insanity. How these soldiers endured forced marches in poor weather with little food and no sympathy from their guards, unsanitary living conditions, political “reeducation,” and months of waiting for repatriation is a remarkable tale of leadership, personal faith, endurance, and a cooperative will to live. Life for Communist POWs was no less difficult but for different reasons. Behind the lines of barbed wire, the United Nations Command was unprepared for the ideological violence between loyal Communist POWs and those demanding not to be repatriated forcibly. Well-planned and orchestrated riots resulted in many POW fatalities, the capture of the camp commandant (an American one-star general), and the UNC’s “admission” to prisoner mistreatment. In terms of influence at the front, the Koje-do uprising was meaningless; in the battle for prestige and posture, the riots were a propaganda coup of great magnitude for the Communists. The riots were indeed a “second front” that diverted attention and resources away from the UNC’s main effort at the front line.

Another strength of the book is the number of photographs (twenty-seven). Pictures of the “Punchbowl,” with its barren hills and reinforced dugouts, tell a story just as forceful as the image showing a thirsty Chinese soldier, far below the surface of the earth, patiently waiting to fill his cup from a small run of water dripping from a rock. If there is a weakness with Voices from the Korean War, it is that although the stories are naturally grouped together, there is no sense of context. The editors would have done well to provide a short paragraph prior to each account that would put each individual’s story into the bigger picture of the war. This would help readers less familiar with the war to follow the thematic story line better.

Voices from the Korean War is a fine book of tragedy, heroism, and survival that will hopefully spark a deeper interest in this pivotal conflict. Although many in the English-speaking audience may regard Korea as a footnote of the Cold War, the reality is that in Asia, the war was a defining
moment in the post–World War II era. Even if forgotten in the West, it is not forgotten in Seoul, P’yongyang, or Beijing.

Maj. Bryan Gibby is a military intelligence officer assigned to Fort Carson, Colorado. He is a two-tour veteran of Iraq and an alumnus of the History Department at the United States Military Academy. A graduate of West Point, Major Gibby served as a brigade and battalion staff officer and as a company commander in Korea. He received his master’s degree and doctorate in history from Ohio State University.

The Center of Military History now makes current and recent back issues of Army History available to the public on its Web site. The posted issues begin with that of Winter 2007 (no. 63), and each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the available issues may be found at www.history.army.mil/armyhistory.

contract study of the early evolution of air and ballistic missile defense in the United States. Finally, I would draw your attention to our new electronic publication on the Center’s Web site featuring contemporary Global War on Terrorism art as well as our recently conceived Operation IRAQI FREEDOM poster series for company day rooms and troop billets. These projects are a reminder that our customer base is indeed diverse.

Although, as noted earlier, the heavy demands for topics of current interest have often forced the Center to delay work on its more definitive histories, I find it heartening that older works have recently gained renewed relevance. For example, our volumes on past counterinsurgency campaigns, advisory efforts, foreign language programs, and public affairs policies—to name only a few—have suddenly become germane to a new generation of Army leaders, as have various pieces of the defense acquisition histories that are being written under contract. Interest exists as well for data from the more mundane annual command histories produced by the Center and the command history offices throughout the force and the many oral histories completed by our deployed field historians. The fact that our supposedly aged World War II histories are the case study “weapons of choice” for instruction in amphibious operations, large and small, at the U.S. Marine Corps University at Quantico, Virginia, is always gratifying. All told, Defense Department customers draw on average 4,000 Center historical products from the Army’s St. Louis depot monthly, a level of usage that all Army historians should take pride in. In sum, it is often easier to critique what we are not doing at any one time—a glass that is forever half empty—than to focus on our many achievements. And if I, myself, often fall into the critical category, I apologize to my fellow professionals, all of whom are committed to making the Army a better, and especially a smarter, organization for both the Department of Defense and the nation.
passage through Louisiana and Mississippi. Wombwell, a retired captain in the Naval Reserve, is a historian at the institute.

The US Army and the Interagency Process: Historical Perspectives—The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium, edited by Kendall D. Gott, presents the papers and some of the discussion offered at a September 2008 gathering at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that explored the cooperation from 1875 to the present between the U.S. Army and other U.S. government agencies in attaining national objectives. Symposium presenters included Col. Gary M. Bowman, William A. Dobak, Edgar Raines, and Richard Stewart of the U.S. Army Center of Military History; Robert T. Davis II and William Glenn Robertson of the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, along with Lawrence A. Yates, formerly with that organization; Maj. Eric Nager, deputy historian of U.S. Army, Pacific; professors at both civilian and military institutions; senior military officers; and an assistant secretary of state.

Digital copies of each of the publications mentioned in this news note may be downloaded from http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/ssi/ssi.asp.

The Generals and the Germs

David I. Goldman, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, has written an article entitled “The Generals and the Germs: The Army Leadership’s Response to Nixon’s Review of Chemical and Biological Warfare Policies in 1969.” The piece appeared in the April 2009 issue of the Journal of Military History. It discusses the scrutiny of the nation’s chemical and biological weapons programs undertaken by the National Security Council during the first year of the administration of Richard M. Nixon and the impact on the group’s deliberations of deficiencies in the Army’s handling of the toxic agents. Those widely publicized failures encouraged the panel to advise the president to abandon unilaterally the nation’s offensive biological warfare program and to restrict the use of offensive chemical agents to retaliation, recommendations he approved. The article also examines the limited participation of the Army’s leaders in the policy review, their initial opposition to the president’s decision, and their ultimate acquiescence in and, in some cases, endorsement of the changes.

Army History Articles Reprinted

Two articles by retired Lt. Col. Taylor V. Beattie, “In Search of York: Man, Myth & Legend,” which appeared in the Summer–Fall 2000 issue of Army History (No. 50), and “Continuing the Search for York,” which appeared in the Winter 2008 issue (No. 66), have been reprinted in Unknown Soldiers: The American Expeditionary Forces in Memory and Remembrance, edited by Mark A. Snell. In the anthology, the second article is presented as a postscript to the first. Unknown Soldiers was published in 2008 by the Kent State University Press. Beattie retired from the military in June 2005.

In Memoriam: Jay Luvaas (1927–2009)

Dr. Jay Luvaas died in January 2009 at the age of 81. He was a specialist in the history of the Civil War and its impact on contemporary military thought and had taught for many years at a private Pennsylvania college and at U.S. Army institutions.

A student of Theodore Ropp at Duke University, where he earned his doctorate in 1956, Luvaas taught history from 1957 to 1982 at his alma mater, Allegheny College, in Meadville, Pennsylvania, and from 1983 to 1995 at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. In 1972, he became the first civilian to serve as visiting professor of military history at the U.S. Military Academy, and ten years later he was appointed Harold K. Johnson visiting professor of military history at the U.S. Army Military History Institute.

Luvaas authored The Military Legacy of the Civil War (Chicago, 1959) and The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815–1940 (Chicago, 1964). He edited Frederick the Great on the Art of War (New York, 1966); Dear Miss Em (Westport, Conn., 1972), a selection from the wartime letters of General Robert L. Eichelberger to his wife; The Civil War in the Writings of Col. G. G. R. Henderson (New York, 1996); and Napoleon on the Art of War (New York, 1999). He also compiled, variously with one or two colleagues, guides to the Civil War battles of Antietam, Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, and Shiloh and to the Atlanta and Vicksburg campaigns that were published by the University Press of Kansas.
Over the past few years, especially after 9/11, there has been much discussion (often by those, interestingly enough, who know the least about it) about how the Center of Military History and the Army historical community have not fulfilled their responsibilities in collecting the operational records of our Army at war. Some presenters and commentators at one recent session of the prestigious Society for Military History held in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, even went so far as to say that CMH was “failing soldiers and the American people” by not doing more in records collection and generating quick historical studies on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While all organizations in the Army should feel that they can and should do more to support the soldier, let me take a moment to respond to one part of the accusation—that CMH does not do enough to collect the Army’s records.

First, it is important to remember that neither the Center of Military History nor any other historical organization in the Army is responsible for managing the Army’s official records collection program. That is literally not our job. The responsibility to create the record-keeping policies of the Army and to manage this function has belonged, since the gutting of the Office of the Adjutant General in the mid-1980s (and a short stint with the Army’s Information Systems Command), with the Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) in the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (OAA). But even RMDA and the OAA can only establish policy, set regulations in place, and push Army leaders at all levels to make records collection and retirement a priority.

With a small Army that is constantly stretched to perform its many missions worldwide, the Army leadership has not consistently supported, resourced, inspected, or enforced records management procedures, especially for operational records created in joint theaters. With the increasing prevalence of electronic records, files, servers, removable hard drives, and massive electronic databases, the size of the records problem has grown larger each year. This is compounded by the fact that fewer and fewer people are dedicated to the mission of the preservation and retention of the records in any systematic fashion. This is an Army leadership problem, and only the Army’s leaders can provide the command emphasis, resources, training, and inspections needed to ensure that this vital job is handled effectively.

Second, those who criticize CMH for not doing more to collect records even though it is not our job, ignore what is being done. In fact, CMH and other elements of the Army Historical Program have deployed literally hundreds of historians, as individuals and in small Military History Detachments (MHDs), to Iraq and Afghanistan to save copies of as many of the operational documents as possible. These are not the official records, but only non-record copies, most of them electronic, that are meant to help historians write the history of the wars. They are not the record copies because only RMDA is responsible for official records. However, since that system is obviously broken, often the selected documents that historians collect are effectively the only copies that are preserved. They exist only because of the extraordinary effort made by hundreds of dedicated personnel throughout the Army historical system—historians from CMH, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Training and Doctrine Command, Forces Command, Army Reserve Command, Army Special Operations Command, Corps of Engineers, Army Materiel Command, and many other organizations—who train, deploy, interview, capture copies of documents, and return them to Army historical depositories here in CONUS. CMH alone has captured over twenty terabytes of electronic documents, and other organizations’ collections are quickly reaching similar sizes. This success is creating the additional challenge of sifting and organizing the huge amounts of data in a coherent way which the Center and others are trying to address.
Given the small number of trained historians in the Army (fewer than three hundred civilian and uniformed historians including instructors at the U.S. Military Academy and Command and General Staff College) we can be proud of saving at least some portion of the records that the Army otherwise deletes, shreds, destroys, or wipes clean from hard drives every day.

All of this collection effort is undertaken at a cost to our primary mission. CMH and the Army historical community have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars and many thousands of man-hours capturing documents that are not otherwise being captured by any official records retirement program. We have paid for data-mining experiments downloading whole Web sites' worth of information from both classified and unclassified nets. Just recently we have worked with RMDA and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) to publish a Commander’s Guide to Operational Records and Data Collection (posted on the CALL Web site at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-22/toc.asp) in an attempt to emphasize to the Army the importance of maintaining and retiring operational records. We make copies of our electronic documents (at least we did until DoD shut down all USB ports in November, effectively eliminating our ability to use removable hard drives to download records, but that is another story) and share them with the joint history world, CSI, and other official researchers as fast as we can get them back from theater and organize them. We send our historians out to returning units—National Guard, Army Reserve, and active component units alike—and work with them to download copies of any files they brought back before the records are deleted. All of these efforts in collecting and managing documents use historical resources and man-hours that are taken from our principal mission of analyzing the data and writing the official histories. We recognize, however, that if we do not do this, historians will not have the materials they will need in a few years to write that history. But make no mistake, we do it at a cost to our mandated missions—missions that only historians can perform. In a perfect world, the Army would follow its own regulations and capture its own records, which historians could then mine to write the official history. But this does not happen, so we must do the best we can to fill the gap using the limited resources at our disposal. We are not records managers, cannot become records managers, and cannot collect copies of more than a small percentage of important documents. But we are doing all that we can to save what we can in default of a coherent Army approach. Anyone who claims we are not is simply misinformed.

Army History welcomes essays between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing, including commentaries, that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at army.history1@conus.army.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and art works to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Charles Hendricks, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 103 Third Avenue, Fort McNair, DC 20319-5058.