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The Professional Bulletin of Army History
The articles and commentary in this issue of *Army History* each demonstrate the importance of innovation and national willpower in military affairs, although they address very different, specific subjects. In “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch’: The Pershing II and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” Kaylene Hughes traces the development by the United States of the highly accurate, nuclear-armed, intermediate-range Pershing II missile, which in the 1980s posed a very credible threat to the growing conventional and nuclear forces of the Warsaw Pact in Europe. The technological success of the United States in developing this missile and the determination of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations to deploy it, despite Soviet warnings and pacifist protests, led to a superpower agreement that banned a substantial class of missiles and significantly reduced international tensions.

James Crider’s article, “Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: One Unit’s Strategy to Build an Alliance with the Iraqi People,” describes the intensive, population-focused approach to neighborhood pacification that the author’s battalion applied in a section of Baghdad during the Surge of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2007–2008. By constantly patrolling, conducting personal interviews with members of every household on selected streets in the troubled neighborhood, making vigorous use of intelligence data, and broadly dispersing development assistance, Crider’s unit occasioned a dramatic drop in insurgent attacks in its sector.

Jon Sumida addresses the applicability to modern conflict of the book *On War* by the early nineteenth-century Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz’s understanding of the nature of war derived primarily from his study of the campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte. Sumida nevertheless observes that this imaginative theorist’s observations on the superiority of the defense over the offense and on the relationship between the defender’s will to resist and the attacker’s determination to persevere provide critical tools to understanding military conflict today.
Over the years Army historical professionals have wrestled with the proper definitions of history and heritage, the roles that both play in the Army, and the standards that ought to apply to the portrayal of each. After so much time, one would think that these issues would have been thoroughly clarified. Unfortunately that is not the case, and the recent trend toward the politicization of history and historical scholarship in the United States has only made the understanding of these matters more difficult and fraught with controversy.

Standard definitions of heritage have always equated the term with traditions—something that has been inherited or passed down from preceding generations. These traditions have been developed and maintained by the members of the organizations to which they pertain, and institutional self-selection of shared memories is an inherently biased task. A cynic applying the term heritage to military affairs might define it as exemplary events in the past, real or imagined, that have been chosen or even enshrined to boost the esprit de corps of the current military force or, worse, to encourage support within society at large for militarism and military adventures. Military heroics might fall into this category, as perhaps would the supposed benefit accrued from the widespread possession of firearms by the U.S. citizenry. On the other hand, the traditional American resistance to the military draft or the extreme distaste of democracies for long wars involving significant sacrifices of lives and treasure might be conveniently omitted from this list.

In short, many have defined military heritage according to how it can be used rather than for what it actually is. Nevertheless, Americans generally recognize that every society has a heritage of certain myths that define its ethos and that those myths are generally based on at least selected historical facts and can be powerful motivating forces for current actions. Good examples of American cultural myths are the self-reliant frontiersman, the wily Yankee trader, the down-home politician, and the soldier-leader who follows no rigid doctrine but improvises spontaneously according to the situation. Valid or not, each mythical ideal can inspire emulation by individuals and affect contemporary policy.

For the purposes of the Army Historical Program, the issue is somewhat simpler. Heritage, in the Army sense of the term, is an amalgamation of ideals and historical facts that can contribute to unit, organizational, and institutional morale, esprit de corps, and cohesion. As such, its development is a command responsibility. In short, morale is a function of command and not the job of the historian or museum curator, whose tasks center around the accuracy of their material and the balance of their presentations. And who will deny that even the Army’s less-than-successful endeavors, from Valley Forge to Custer’s last stand and from the Bataan Death March to the Kasserine Pass, can be inspirational in their own way if truthfully portrayed in text or graphics. A Stuart or a Sherman tank juxtaposed with a larger German adversary tells its own story, as do historical after action reports dealing with the Army’s tactical failures and with the individual travails of those caught in such circumstances.

Inevitably our intellectual quest turns back to the nature of history itself and to the work of its practitioners. At least in our small community of Army historical professionals, as we contemplate our tasks and prepare our products, the older standards still serve us well. To enumerate them once again, they include comprehensiveness of coverage, objectivity, balance, and above all accuracy and, in the sphere of communication, literary merit and organizational clarity. Together these constitute the intellectual obligation of the professional historian.

Accuracy, as attested by adequate research and documentation, still remains one of the paramount standards throughout the larger profession. Elsewhere, however, conflicting values have intruded. The matter was recently underlined by Jonathan Yardley, the well-known Washington literary critic, who lamented the widespread cult of “presentism” in academia and “the hegemony of the ‘Holy Trinity’ of race, gender and class theory [that] has turned the writing of history in too many instances into propaganda machinery for certain political and ideological points

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New Publications

The Army Center of Military History has published a history of the Korean War service of an infantry regiment from Puerto Rico and the final portion of a three-volume study of the U.S. Army’s use of operations research.

Honor and Fidelity: The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953, by Col. Gilberto N. Villahermosa, describes the development beginning in the early twentieth century of a U.S. Army regiment formed of Puerto Rican soldiers and its commitment to combat duty in Korea in September 1950. During the unit’s first year in Korea, the experienced regulars and prior-service volunteers that filled its ranks earned for it the reputation as a dependable infantry unit, but an influx first of Puerto Rican National Guard soldiers and later of draftees subsequently weakened the regiment, and it suffered significant setbacks in September and October 1952. The unit was reorganized as a fully integrated regiment in the spring of 1953 and thereafter garnered renewed respect. This 348-page book provides a detailed account of the 65th Infantry’s combat actions in Korea. It has been issued in paperback as CMH Pub 70–110–1. The author of these volumes is a retired Army lieutenant colonel who has written The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992–1994 (College Station, Tex., 2003) and other books on warfare in the twentieth century.

Army publication account holders may obtain these books from the Directorate of Logistics–Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, MO 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. Individuals may order the books from the U.S. Government Printing Office Web site at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

Army Museum Acquires Bandholtz Artifacts

The U.S. Army Military Police Regimental Museum at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, acquired in October 2008 a rich collection of artifacts and archival materials relating to the career of Maj. Gen. Harry H. Bandholtz (1864–1925), whom the museum and the Military Police School celebrate as the “Father of the Military Police Corps.” The collection includes uniforms, sword belts, whistles, provost marshal general brassards and vehicle placards, awards and decorations, photographs, and correspondence, all of which derive from Bandholtz family holdings. It also features a portrait of General Bandholtz painted by the noteworthy Hungarian artist Gyula Stetka when Bandholtz served as U.S. representative to the Interallied Military Mission to Hungary in 1919–1920.

A U.S. Military Academy graduate, Bandholtz fought at the Battle of El Caney near Santiago, Cuba, in July 1898; served in the Philippines from 1900 to 1913; commanded an infantry brigade in France in 1918; and became the commander of the District of Washington in 1921. Most notably, he successively commanded the Philippine Constabulary in southern and central Luzon in 1903 to 1907, capturing a number of insurgent leaders, and then served as the director of the entire Philippine Constabulary from 1907 to 1913. As provost marshal general of the American Expeditionary Forces in France from September 1918 to August 1919, Bandholtz oversaw the command’s military police, prisoners of war, and criminal investigations. He retired from the military in November 1923.

Following an initial display of the newly acquired artifacts in November 2008, the Military Police Museum opened an expanded, interpretive Bandholtz exhibit in June 2009. The strength of the newly acquired collection will enable the museum to highlight very effectively General Bandholtz’s significant contributions to the development of the Military Police Corps.

Distinguished Writing Awards

Individuals who are or have been part of the Army Historical Program garnered four of the eight distinguished writing awards for 2008 announced by the Army Historical Foundation at its annual membership meeting in June of this year. In the Journals, Memoirs, and Letters category, John T. Greenwood was honored for editing Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army by William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith Jr., a book issued by the University Press of Kentucky as part

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Dr. Kaylene Hughes has been a historian at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, with the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command and its predecessor organizations since 1987. She is the author or coauthor of monographs, studies, and articles on the development and deployment of military aviation and missile systems and on the history of Redstone Arsenal, including the article “Fifty Years of Excellence: The Redstone Arsenal Complex Since 1941,” which appeared in the Fall 1991 issue of Army History. An adjunct history instructor at John C. Calhoun Community College in Huntsville, Alabama, she earned her doctorate from Florida State University in 1985.
The Milestones of Flight exhibit gallery on the first floor of the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum depicts “some of the major ‘firsts’ in aviation and space history.” Within that display area, surrounded by “the machines that made the dream of flight possible,” stand two of the most potent military artifacts of the later Cold War era: the Soviet SS–20 Sabre and the American Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Posed side-by-side, the missiles represent the milestone “international agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons.” This exhibit is an interesting example of one of the disposal methods specified in the 1987 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. More commonly known as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (or INF) Treaty, this historic disarmament agreement permitted each party to destroy fifteen missiles and launchers by disabling them and then permanently displaying them in museums and similar facilities.¹

The development of the Pershing weapon system began during the early years of the Cold War, a period characterized by “brinkmanship” and the threat of “massive retaliation,” as the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower undertook a “New Look” in U.S. defense plans and policies. In October 1956, the Department of the Army tasked the Ordnance Corps to conduct a feasibility study of a ballistic missile with a required minimum range of 500 nautical miles. Ordnance forwarded this request to the U.S. Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal. These actions initiated the development of a system that on 16 January 1958 was officially designated the Pershing missile in honor of General of the Armies John J. Pershing. Unofficially, the weapon would be nicknamed the Army’s “Sunday Punch” because of its ability to deliver a devastating counterblow against invading Warsaw Pact forces.²

The Army’s initial effort on this proposed mid-range missile was, however, almost halted before it really got started. Conflicting views about what each branch of the U.S. armed forces should be doing to prepare the nation for future conflicts almost permanently shelved the program in 1957. On 2 August 1957, in keeping with the New Look defense policy’s emphasis on strategic, intercontinental nuclear weapons and airpower, along with cuts in conventional forces, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rejected the Army’s mid-range missile proposal and advised Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson that no branch of the nation’s military had an operational requirement for a 500-mile tactical nuclear ballistic missile. About two months later, though, the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik I “significantly affected the official position on military equipment. The Russian accomplishment, which cast doubt on the U.S. claim of technological supremacy, liberalized attitudes toward the type and number of missiles needed to insure the country’s defense.” By the time President Eisenhower delivered his next State of the Union address on 9 January 1958, in which he declared “the American military establishment must be equipped with the most modern weapons,” the Joint Chiefs had reversed course and a new secretary of defense had directed the Army to proceed with development of its proposed mid-range missile.³

Subsequent effort on the missile progressed rapidly; less than twenty-four months after the prime contractor, Glenn L. Martin Company of Orlando,
Florida, received its first research and development contract, flight tests began at Cape Canaveral in February 1960. By October 1961, Martin was producing tactical and ground support equipment. The Army activated the first battery of the first Pershing battalion at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in June 1962, while the first U.S. Pershing unit to be deployed overseas became operational two years later. In addition, two groups each in two wings of the air force of the Federal Republic of Germany were equipped with the Pershing. The Pershing’s original mission was to support the field army with nuclear fire. At first the Pershing was seen strictly as a tactical nuclear weapon meant to be used “in a battlefield setting in roughly the same way as non-nuclear munitions.”

Modifications to the 1954 New Look defense policy were suggested in the final months of Eisenhower’s second administration, but a revised defense strategy did not emerge until President John F. Kennedy’s secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, completed a major U.S. nuclear policy review. Less reliance on, the nonproliferation of, and more elasticity in the use of nuclear weapons were key elements in the new “Flexible Response” policy initiated by the Kennedy administration. Instead of being limited to the “all or nothing” choices of “massive retaliation,” U.S. leaders sought a more pliable range of battlefield options for containing the Soviet threat in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ministers formally adopted the Flexible Response strategy in 1967.

As part of this new policy, McNamara assigned a quick reaction alert (QRA) mission to the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command, the Navy’s Polaris submarine-launched missile, and the Army’s Pershing missile system. “For the first time ever the Army had a weapon system in its inventory with a strategic as well as a tactical mission.” Added in January 1964, the QRA role became the Pershing system’s primary mission while support to the field army became a secondary assignment to be
undertaken once the QRA task was accomplished.\textsuperscript{5} To better fulfill its QRA responsibilities as well as to correct some “operational and logistic problems and deficiencies,” the Army initiated an improvement program that transformed the original Pershing weapon system into the second-generation Pershing 1A. On 24 May 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara approved a three-phase program. The first stage increased the number of launchers assigned per battalion from 12 to 36, raising the total number of launchers in Europe to 108. The second portion—known as Pershing 1A—covered improvements to the system’s ground support equipment and a change from tracked to wheeled vehicles. The final segment—to be known as Pershing 1B—projected an improved missile along with modifications to the ground support equipment to support the new missile. The first continental U.S. Pershing unit received its new equipment in May 1969 and hand-off to units in West Germany began in September.\textsuperscript{6}

To further enhance the Pershing 1A’s QRA capabilities and extend its service life, on 18 December 1971 the Department of the Army approved additional upgrades to the weapon system as part of the Pershing Alternatives Plan. This effort included refinements to reduce countdown delays and to allow three separate missiles to be launched from a single programmer test station, which functioned as the system’s “portable blockhouse.” Another significant element of the alternatives plan was the terminal radar area correlation guidance system. Originally designed to make the Pershing “a super accurate 400-mile range missile that would have a smart end using the original... motors,” this innovative guidance and control technique was the forerunner of the Pershing II missile.\textsuperscript{7}

In keeping with the type of guidance and control technology available in the 1960s and 1970s, the basic Pershing missile was equipped with an inertial guidance system designed to put it into a predetermined flight path using information inserted by the firing data computer before liftoff. Because the trajectory was established early in the missile’s flight, the weapon was prone to “tiny errors in direction or motor cut-off time... [that magnified] through the remainder of the ballistic flight to produce significant errors at the impact point.” The lack of more precise targeting meant that a tactical missile like the Pershing had to carry a larger nuclear warhead to accomplish its mission.\textsuperscript{8}

At first this destructive potential was exactly what NATO leaders wanted to support their nuclear deterrence strategy. But perceptions began to change in the 1970s as policy makers and citizens alike envisioned more clearly the enormous losses of human life and property that would result from unleashing such a powerful nuclear weapon in battle. Consequently, the destructive potential once considered part of an effective defense against Warsaw Pact aggression became the main factor eroding the Pershing missile’s deterrence credibility as Western military leaders grew increasingly reluctant to use it. As one U.S. Army officer remarked at the time, “Unless you can drive down those yields, you will never get to use Pershings on NATO soil.”\textsuperscript{9}

The new terminal guidance system devised for the Pershing II missile addressed the weapon’s deterrence credibility by significantly increasing its accuracy. On 7 March 1974, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Clements authorized the Army to proceed with advanced development of the radar area correlation guidance system. Using “an all-weather radar-correlation unit that compares the live radar returns with a pre-recorded and stored radar image of the target area,” the terminal guidance system, which worked independently of range, would maneuver the reentry vehicle carrying the warhead onto the designated target with pinpoint precision. This greater degree of targeting accuracy, in turn, made possible the use of a very low-yield nuclear warhead “capable of carrying out the... mission against military targets... with far less damage to cities and the civilian population of Europe.”\textsuperscript{10} These technological successes, however, actually raised more doubts about the advisability of continuing effort on the Pershing II. In its appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1975, Congress cut funding for the system from the $11 million requested by the Army to $2 million. The Senate Armed Services Committee objected to the weaponization of the terminal guidance system because the missile’s decreased collateral destructiveness might increase the likelihood that the Pershing would be used in combat. “The precise qualities of Pershing II which tend[ed] to enhance its credibility in the eyes of Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and the Army...[were] seen as a dangerous weakening in the great 'firebreak' which...exist[ed] between nuclear
and conventional weapons.” But it was not until the NATO ministers adopted their “Dual Track” strategy in December 1979 that the Pershing weapon system was engulfed by international controversy.

The 1970s are often referred to as the decade of détente. In this interval of thawing Cold War relations, the superpowers signed various treaties to limit where nuclear weapons could be deployed, who could develop and field such weapons, and what kinds of and how many nuclear weapons could be held by the superpowers. During this same period, though, the governments of both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States continued to invest substantial amounts of money, time, and manpower in developing and deploying improved versions of older nuclear weapons or new missiles designed to ensure nuclear superiority. The Soviets, in particular, were determined to surpass their nuclear rivals in Europe.

Simultaneous with its pursuit of détente with the West, the Soviet Union embarked on the greatest military buildup in its history. Starting in the mid-1960s, the USSR began steadily increasing and improving not only its nuclear stockpile but its conventional forces and weapons as well. Within a decade the Soviets had achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States. By the mid-1980s, the numbers of Soviet troops, tanks, and naval vessels had mushroomed. The most threatening development from the viewpoint of Western Europeans was the Soviet deployment of the SS–20 long-range intermediate nuclear force (LRINF) missile. An accurate weapon with a 3,000-mile range, the Soviet Sabre missile’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload carried three 150-kiloton nuclear warheads, each of which had a target radius of a quarter of a mile. The highly mobile system could operate easily both on and off road, making it harder to detect and target. It was more precise and could be launched very quickly. All told, 243 of the 378 SS–20s fielded by 1984 were aimed at Western Europe. In addition, the Soviets also retained 224 SS–4s, the so-called Sandal IRBM, which, along with the SS–5, had been one of the principal missiles the Soviet Union deployed to Cuba in 1962. The Soviets also upgraded three other aging theater nuclear weapon systems into the more sophisticated, higher yield, and more accurate division-level, 75-mile SS–21; the 550-mile SS–22; and the tactical nuclear, surface-to-surface, 300-mile SS–23 missiles.

The Soviet buildup naturally attracted the attention of and raised concerns among members of the NATO alliance. While the Soviets had been busily reinforcing and expanding their already considerable conventional and nuclear forces, the United States in the 1970s, along with several of its NATO allies, had scaled back the size of its armed forces, cut military spending, and publicly debated the role of nuclear weapons. The resulting military imbalance raised questions about the continuing viability of NATO’s long-standing “Deterrence and Defense” strategy. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt set the stage for NATO’s response in an October 1977 address made at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Recognizing the serious threat posed by the SS–20 deployments, Schmidt called on NATO to counteract the Soviet military buildup through arms control or by equivalent Western intermediate-range nuclear
Interestingly, one important group who believed the Pershing II flight test results proved the validity of the Army’s new INF weapon was the Soviet leadership.

The Dual Track strategy the ministers endorsed combined the introduction of the new Pershing II IRBMs and Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with an offer to commence negotiations to limit INF weapons in Europe. In addition to reestablishing nuclear parity and maintaining the alliance’s original deterrence policy, the NATO ministers’ decision was designed to preserve the “linkage between the US and its NATO Allies.” Keeping the Soviet Union out of Western Europe meant keeping the United States in. After World War II, Western Europeans had asked for and had received “an explicit and unambiguous American security guarantee.” By the late 1970s a renewal of that guarantee seemed necessary to many NATO members. Some later analysts argued that the NATO ministers’ Dual Track decision was as much a reaction to growing doubts about President Jimmy Carter’s handling of foreign affairs and general leadership ability as it was a response to the Soviet military buildup. Ultimately, the Carter administration’s promise to back the Dual Track strategy by developing and then deploying two new INF weapons restored alliance members’ confidence and reinvigorated the credibility of NATO’s Deterrence and Defense policy toward the Soviet Union.13

Once the Pershing II missile became an element of NATO’s Dual Track decision, the Army had to make both technological and programmatic changes to meet the new requirements for how and when the system would assume its enlarged mission. The new conditions dictated not only significant alterations in the missile itself but also modifications to other elements of the weapon system. By the time the NATO ministers formally adopted their Dual Track strategy, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) had approved a revised Pershing II system configuration that transformed the missile into a serious intermediate-range nuclear threat. Indicative of the heightened emphasis placed on the Pershing program was President Carter’s approval of the weapon system as a Brick-Bat (DX) program on 19 February 1980, a designation given to only the highest national priority programs.

Like other highly technical projects undertaken by DoD, the Pershing II encountered its share of difficulties to be rectified before production could proceed. Unlike other programs, however, technical problems that would have been easily resolved under routine conditions, suddenly had to be identified and corrected under the unrelenting pressure of the glare of the public spotlight on the Pershing II development effort more apparent than in the media coverage of the integrated flight test program that began when the first missile was fired at Cape Canaveral on 22 July 1982. Approximately forty reporters, “most with television cameras,” witnessed the “inglorious start” of the Pershing II test flights. Although investigators quickly identified the test flight failure as a quality-control problem rather than a basic design flaw, the system’s critics still reacted harshly. For example, Joseph P. Addabbo of New York, chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, dismissed the Pershing II as “the biggest waste of defense dollars.” This unfavorable view was reinforced by problems encountered during the second and third test flights at White Sands Missile Range in November 1982.14

Congress reacted to the Pershing II’s less than stellar performance by deleting all FY 1983 production funds for the program in December 1982. The U.S. Army Missile Command (MICOM) argued unsuccessfully that failure to approve the project’s FY 1983 budget request would cause a nineteen-month delay in deployment and additional costs of $150 million. Though Congress refused to relent at that time, influential members indicated it would consider restoring the funds if the results of the ongoing flight tests improved. With the support of Under Secretary of the Army James Ambrose, who was also the service’s chief acquisition officer, MICOM Commander Maj. Gen. Robert L. Moore and Pershing Project Manager Col. William J. Fiorentino kept the program going for about eight months by borrowing funds from other missile accounts, which at that time was still a legal accounting practice. A series of ten successful flight tests combined with persuasive lobbying by Under Secretary Ambrose finally convinced Congress to provide $443.3 million for the program before the end of the fiscal year.

Interestingly, one important group who believed the Pershing II flight test results proved the validity of the Army’s new INF weapon was the Soviet leadership. According to Dave Harris, former Public Affairs Officer and spokesman for the Missile Command,

The fact that every Pershing II was fired in front of the media impressed the hell out of the Soviets. A reporter for the Washington Post told me one day in the Spring of 1983 that he had talked to the Soviets at their embassy and they believed the Pershing II would work and that the Army would make it work. They also
believed we were lying in our teeth when we said it had a range of 1,200 nautical miles. They never believed we would build a missile that lacked the range to reach Moscow from its firing sites in Germany.\textsuperscript{15}

The added pressure of conducting a closely monitored flight test program at the same time as the initial INF negotiations were under way in Geneva was another element that served to set apart the Pershing II development program from other weapon projects in the early 1980s. The question of whether or not the United States would actually be able to meet its promised deployment date was debated publicly after every test launch. Fielding of the system, which was the key issue of the Geneva negotiations, was dependent on the successful conclusion of flight testing. Though much of the press coverage of the tests could (and sometimes did) lead readers to conclude otherwise, the Pershing II development program was not plagued by an unusually large number of failures. As Harris wrote in an article published in October 1983, “There is little incentive to bargain over a missile that does not work. The verdict of the flight test program is that Pershing II works.”\textsuperscript{16}

The Pershing II weapon system that emerged from this grueling and highly public process retained all of the characteristics that had distinguished the missile system from its inception. A two-stage, solid propellant, intermediate-range ballistic missile whose crew could “shoot and scoot,” the Pershing II was still the same length and diameter as the basic missile, but it now weighed 16,500 pounds and had a range of 1,200 nautical miles. Although it had a much shorter range and carried a lower-yield warhead than the SS–20, the Pershing II’s short flight time (under ten minutes) and pinpoint accuracy were unmatched by anything in the Soviet arsenal. The system also incorporated several other features that improved its mobility, maneuverability, flexibility, and survivability and decreased its operating costs. Designed with the soldier in mind, the rapid-reacting Pershing II was a “powerful part of . . . [NATO’s] tactical nuclear force in Europe.”\textsuperscript{17}

Contrary to negative predictions by the system’s detractors, the Pershing II met its promised December 1983 initial opera-
A Soviet inspector examines a U.S. ground-launched cruise missile at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, prior to its destruction, October 1988.


among those denouncing this decision was the Soviet government. While its diplomats labored in Geneva to block the fielding of the Pershing II and Gryphon missiles, the USSR also initiated an extensive propaganda effort to sway European public opinion against the NATO policy. The Kremlin supported the peace movement in Western Europe by providing encouragement and funding for massive antinuclear demonstrations. West Germany became “the main
debate of the anti-nuclear drive,” partly because the Soviets focused much of their antideployment propaganda campaign on this pivotal NATO member nation. During the two years preceding the fielding of the Pershing and Gryphon missiles, hundreds of thousands of protesters marched through the streets of major European cities in opposition to the weapons’ arrival in Europe. Antinuclear activities also flourished in the United States. A Harris poll conducted in November 1983 reported that 62 percent of those Americans surveyed favored a delay in the deployment schedule if such action might lead to an arms agreement with the Soviets.19

In spite of the Soviets’ best efforts and the intense political pressure exerted by the antinuclear demonstrators and the force of public opinion, the NATO allies stood firm. Even the last-ditch efforts of the most vociferous opponents could not overcome the alliance’s determination to carry out its stated policy. Once the deployment was under way, protesters still hoped to limit the number of missiles actually handed off. But the peace movement’s influence began to wane after 1983 as the activists and their organizations splintered into smaller components again. West German public opinion polls also reflected more clearly the widely held view that the Soviet Union had provoked the new arms race by placing hundreds of SS–20s within range of targets located throughout Western Europe. In addition, many people were increasingly suspicious of the Soviets’ “keen interest in the peace movement in Western Europe.”20

The Soviet Union made its most dramatic protest against the deployment of U.S. INF weapons on 23 November 1983, when its diplomats walked out of the intermediate nuclear force negotiations that had begun in Geneva two years earlier. The strategic arms reduction talks, initiated in 1982, also broke off. After two decades of arms-control discussions, the Soviets and Americans were no longer speaking. The demise of dialogue between the two superpowers was a matter of grave concern among antinuclear activists such as the editors of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, who set forward the minute hand of their “doomsday clock” to 11:57 p.m. The world seemed poised on the brink of nuclear disaster, and many observers were reminded of the Cuban missile crisis twenty years before.21
But once again leaders on both sides of the divide stepped back and the search for a peaceful resolution of this particular conflict resumed. President Ronald Reagan softened his former confrontational attitude and in January 1984 invited the Soviets to return to the bargaining table. The deaths of Soviet leaders Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko delayed U.S. efforts, but negotiations resumed in 1985 after Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. Numerous interpretations exist to explain the relative speed with which the two superpowers conducted the final phase of their INF negotiations. Some authors emphasize the roles of such political leaders as Reagan, Gorbachev, or West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; other analysts detect the influence of economic or sociopolitical factors in the United States and the Soviet Union, while still other writers argue that the efforts of various reformers and activists backed by an informed and aroused public helped stem the rush toward nuclear holocaust.

What is known with certainty is that over the course of two years and four summit meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed for the first time to eliminate “an entire class” of nuclear weapons. On 8 December 1987, the two leaders signed the INF Treaty, which required the elimination of all 2,692 ground- and sea-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (roughly 300 to 3,500 miles). Both the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet ratified the agreement in May 1988.

One of the most reliable, accurate, and formidable weapons ever developed and fielded by the U.S. Army, the Pershing missile system fulfilled its assigned mission of protecting the nation and its NATO allies by becoming part of the historic INF Treaty. It accomplished this task without once being fired in anger. Dave Harris recalled, “I don’t think anyone anywhere ever built a big missile that worked better than this one.”

Notes


The information supporting this essay was drawn primarily from local and Internet resources. The history office of the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) holds a substantial collection of documents and audiovisual materials relating to the missile programs managed by the command’s predecessor organizations. Included in these materials are annual historical reviews, missile system monographs and program records, installation chronologies, public affairs office press releases and fact sheets, articles on the Pershing missile system from inception to elimination that appeared in the post newspaper and other local and regional newspapers, and citations of related articles published in national magazines.

Most of the information used to place the Pershing missile system within the context of its time and strategic mission was derived from resources posted on the Web sites maintained by such public entities as the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, the U.S. State Department, the North Atlantic...
Treaty Organization, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Library of Congress, and the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Also researched were resources posted on a host of Web sites sponsored by private groups such as the Federation of American Scientists, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, GlobalSecurity.org, Columbia International Affairs Online, the Public Broadcasting System, and numerous educational institutions.

A complete listing of the sources used in preparing this essay is available in the AMCOM history office’s files. The author will send a digitized copy of the fully annotated version of this essay to any reader who requests it by writing to her at kaylene.hughes@us.army.mil. The following citations identify the sources of the direct quotations and some of the statements in the article.


9. Ibid., p. 18.


15. Ltr, Harris to Martel, 13 Aug 99.


25. OSIA, the original INF Treaty implementation oversight organization, merged in October 1998 into the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, which assumed responsibility for INF inspections until the end of that treaty activity on 31 May 2001.

On War by Carl von Clausewitz is widely believed to be the greatest study of armed conflict ever written. In the United States Army, this book is therefore assigned at all levels of officer education. Recognition of On War as an authoritative text, however, is not supported by agreement about what it means. For historians and political scientists, On War has provided fertile ground for multiple and conflicting interpretations. While scholarly study and debate has improved the understanding of Clausewitz’s difficult writing, the lack of consensus about On War has placed the American military educational establishment in the uncomfortable position of requiring officers to read a book in spite of a very high degree of uncertainty about the identity and nature of its main arguments. Acceptance of this pedagogically unsatisfactory state of affairs has been rationalized in two ways: first, by the attitude that confusion over Clausewitz—as in the case of the poor—will always be with us, and second, the belief that reading Clausewitz—like eating spinach—is good for you whether you like it or not. Neither proposition, however, is helpful or convincing to most officers, for whom On War remains either a mystery or no more than an anthology of platitudes. Insofar as the professional military education requirements of the U.S. Army are concerned, the “Clausewitz problem” is thus defined by two questions: First, does On War contain a comprehensible general theory of war? Second, is it productively applicable to present conditions and as such a worthy component of officer professional development?

I addressed these issues in Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War, which was published by the University Press of Kansas in the summer of 2008. In the present article, I use the findings of this monograph as the basis of a condensed explanation of the major characteristics of Clausewitzian thought. I also offer some reflections on the U.S. Army’s use of history and theory in officer education and on its approach to strategy.

Three propositions have conditioned the attitude of most readers to On War. First, the book is an unfinished draft that Clausewitz would have heavily revised had he lived and thus constitutes a highly imperfect representation of the author’s views on armed conflict. Second, Clausewitz’s masterpiece is a phenomenology of war—that is to say, that its purpose is to provide a description of the essential nature of armed conflict. And third, Clausewitz favored offensive action. All three statements are either misleading or false. Azar Gat has persuasively challenged the supposition that On War was far from complete at the time of Clausewitz’s death in 1831. Clausewitz did not believe that any set of general statements about war could encompass this subject’s difficult, complex, and contingent nature, and for this reason he rejected the phenomenological approach as incapable of representing the nature of war accurately. And Clausewitz insisted in no uncertain terms that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense. Three alternative arguments thus serve as points of departure for analysis. First, the text of On War is sufficiently complete (and the standard English translation of that German text sufficiently accurate) to reveal Clausewitz’s considered major concepts. Second, Clausewitzian theory is about learning how to do something—namely, how to exercise
supreme command in war—rather than a representation of war as such. And third, the concept that the defense is superior to the offense must be, given the enormous amount of space Clausewitz devoted to the subject, a matter of critical theoretical significance.

Clausewitz’s major arguments in On War were prompted by his extensive military and political experience during the Napoleonic Wars, his scholarly study of and reflection on the history of this event, and his desire to use his findings to address problems arising out of Prussia’s difficult strategic circumstances in the postwar era. In 1806 the strategic and operational blunders made by inexperienced Prussian military leaders had resulted in catastrophic defeat at the hands of Napoleonic France, the effects of which were exacerbated by weak political direction. On the other hand, the more successful resistance of Spain and Russia to French occupation, which set the stage for the destruction of Napoleon’s empire, demonstrated that protracting hostilities could enable a defender to foil the intentions of a much more powerful attacker. After the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz believed that Prussia faced the prospect of a revival of French expansionism, which again might have to be met by an inexperienced military leadership. To deal with these dangers, he developed two lines of thought. First, he formulated a radically innovatory method of officer education, which he believed could significantly improve the ability of inexperienced senior officers to exercise supreme command. And second, Clausewitz argued that, because the defense was a stronger form of war than the attack, a defender could preserve its existence even when militarily much inferior to the attacker; he maintained, furthermore, that this could be the case even after the complete defeat of the defender’s army through resort to the protraction of hostilities by means of guerrilla war.

Clausewitz developed his approach to officer education in reaction to existing methods, which called for the study of historical narratives based on verifiable facts and for obedience either to rules or to guidance from less binding but still prescriptive principles. His rejection of these approaches was based on his conviction that effective command performance in war—and especially at the level of strategic decision—is the product of genius. Genius, defined as the command capability of the commander in chief, consists of a combination of rational intelligence and subrational intellectual and emotional faculties that make up intuition. Intuition, in particular, becomes the agent of decision in the face of difficult circumstances such as inadequate information, great complexity, high levels of contingency, and severe negative consequences in the event of failure. Clausewitz had observed that during the Napoleonic Wars, intuition had been improved by experience. He thus reached two conclusions. First, the primary objective of officer education should be the enhancement of intelligent intuition. And second, the only effective means of doing so during peace is to have officers replicate the experience of decision making by a commander in chief through historical reenactment of command decisions and reflect on that replicated experience. Replication, moreover, had to be based on actual events in the past because Clausewitz was convinced that resort to hypothetical case studies increased the possibility of setting up unrealistic governing conditions. Clausewitz recognized, however, that the historical record does not include many of the factors that affected the performance of commanders in chief of the past. That is to say, the domain of verifiable historical fact is critically incomplete, and thus an insufficient basis for productive historical reenactment. In order to remedy this deficiency, Clausewitz specified that verifiable historical fact had to be augmented by surmise about factors that are supposed to have been important. The basis of this surmise is a body of theory about those forces that affect decision making in war.

This body of theory has six salient characteristics. First, theory directs attention to the factors that promote self-doubt in the commander, including danger, complexity, contingency, and the unreliability of information about what is going on, and to the emotional resources needed to counter them. Second, it supports conjecture about the factors that inform the commander’s judgment, which encompasses his knowledge of policy and politics, assessments of people and issues, and comprehension of the quality of the forces commanded. Third, theory provides the basis for the consideration of the multitude of operational facts and the motives for action of many individuals that were never known or, if known, were either never recorded or were intentionally obscured. Fourth, it permits one to take proper account of the nature...
of the relationship between cause and effect in war (including such factors as the relative strength of the defense and the attack, about which there will be more later), especially with respect to the play of unintended consequences and complexity. Fifth, theory mandates consideration of alternative courses of action as an essential part of the process of replicating command dilemmas. And sixth, it recommends use of knowledge of outcomes (that is, the success or failure of the operation) to influence surmise about the roles of the unknowable variables just described and their complex interactions when evaluating the character of decision making.

Clausewitz called the combination of historical reenactment and reflection on reenactment “critical analysis.” These processes can be represented instructively as shown in the following equations and diagram in the Figure.

Verifiable Historical Fact (VHF) + Theory-Based Historical Surmise (THS) = Synthetic Experience (SE)
Synthetic Experience (SE) + Reflection on Synthetic Experience (RSE) = Improved Intuition, or what can be called Improved Capacity for Judgment (ICJ)

Clausewitz’s second major theoretical construction, which was intended to stiffen Prussian strategic resolve in the face of the threat posed by a militarily superior France, is his contention that the defense is the stronger form of war. For Clausewitz, successful resistance to invasion is possible even when the attacker is much stronger than the defender. He supported this general contention with two main subordinate propositions—that the conduct of war is shaped by political, or policy, considerations at all times, and that politics, or policy, affects the attacker more than the defender. Although Clausewitz formulated these ideas with the strategic relationship of France as the attacker and Prussia as the defender in mind, he believed them to be valid for any situation. His positions do not prescribe action; rather they describe certain governing dynamics—what we shall henceforward call “the nature of things”—that are supposed to be taken into account when reenacting command decisions. Indeed, Clausewitz regarded the greater strength of the defense over the offense as the main reason for the suspension of action in war. The defensive advantage was, for this reason, a major source of strategic dilemma.

Clausewitz maintained that his several arguments work in combination as follows. In war, the political, or policy, motive of the attacker—to compel the defender to act against its interests—is opposed to the political, or policy, motive of the defender—to discourage the attacker. In addition, the policy motives of both sides are conditioned by internal political considerations involving the extent of agreement or disagreement within governing circles or between governors and governed. As a general rule, the energy required to sustain an offensive is greater than that required to maintain a defense. This is especially true when topography favors defensive fighting or when expansive territory allows the defender to retreat to buy time. All else being equal, an attacker will likely reach critical thresholds of internal political difficulty over the escalating costs and risks of war before a defender does. And the disproportionality of the costs of the attack compared to those of the defense is so substantial that this holds true even when the attacker is considerably stronger than the defender. In either case, the ultimate effect of political crisis is to reduce the attacker’s aspirations and thereby bring hostilities to a close.

In a war in which the objective of the attacker is the destruction of the defender’s sovereignty, the difficulties for the attacker are increased by the inherently greater strength of the defender’s political, or policy, motive. This is because the moral stakes for the defender are about existence, which is essential, whereas the attacker is concerned simply with gain, which is discretionary. Moreover, the resources available to the defense for military action can overmatch those of the attacker if the defender government’s will to resist enjoys broad internal political support. Under these circumstances, the regular forces of the defender can be augmented by the armed action of an aroused citizenry—that is, by guerrilla war—while the attacker cannot count on counterbalancing involvement from its own civilian population. A defender that has demonstrated a determination to resist even a greatly superior attacker can also expect the assistance of other powers, which are likely to recognize that their own independence is threatened by the offensive success of a state with aggrandizing or even hegemonic
intentions. In short, effective defense against attack is not just about military action, but the interplay between military performance and a variety of internal and external political dynamics. This is probably what Clausewitz had foremost in mind when he stated that “war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”

Clausewitz’s views on defense challenge the universal applicability of Jomini’s cardinal principle of war: concentration of force. Clausewitz recognized that concentration of force is desirable, if not essential, to winning battles, but he did not believe that victory in battles determines the outcome of all wars. In cases of conflicts in which the sovereignty of the defender is at stake, Clausewitz maintained that even when the concentration of greatly superior forces results in the destruction of the defender’s army, this success will not suffice to end hostilities if the defender possesses the will to continue fighting by all available means, including guerrilla war. Concentration of force on the part of the defender is required to achieve decisive victory through counterattack, a course Clausewitz favored whenever circumstances permit. He insisted, however, that a defender that is too weak to launch an offensive can still obtain favorable terms by discouraging the attacker through the protraction of hostilities. Thus, given the defender’s will to resist at all costs, decisive battle is unobtainable for an attacker, and strategic victory highly unlikely or even impossible. This is not to say that the offense will inevitably fail, but rather that the balance of military force is not the critical strategic variable. Instead, what matters is the relative strengths of attacker and defender determination.

Clausewitz did not believe that any theoretical formulation, including his own theoretical statements on the relative strengths of the defense and attack, can prescribe the actual conduct of war. But this does not rule out the use of theoretical propositions to set the terms of thinking about a strategic problem. Theory accomplishes this by identifying the nature of things in war. By so doing, it pushes deliberation in directions in which it might otherwise not have gone, raising questions rather than providing answers. The purpose of such a process is to prevent bad intellectual habits, such as maintaining belief in the decisive strategic significance of concentration of force, from determining strategic courses of action. In the specific case of attack and defense, the value for a potential attacker of contemplating the superiority of the defense over the offense is not to learn to reject offensive action, but to be able to consider the strategic implications of fighting a defender that possesses the will to protract the war. Conversely, from the defender’s point of view, such an exercise provides an opportunity to consider protraction of hostilities as a practicable alternative to surrender in cases of catastrophic military defeat and occupation. Or, to put it in more general terms, Clausewitz’s dictum is supposed to counteract any predilection on the part of either the attacker or the defender to believe that a very great military success at the outset of hostilities is ipso facto tantamount to a political decision.

The eight books that constitute On War can be divided into four groups. Books I and II present the case for Clausewitz’s theory of reenactment as an alternative to a conventional phenomenology and introduce his views on the relative strengths of defense and attack; Books III through V describe the kind of theoretical propositions required to augment verifiable historical facts in order to reenact past decision making; Books VI and VII explain the author’s views on the defense as a superior form of war to the offense; and Book VIII brings his exposition to a close by integrating and clarifying the earlier analysis. On War should be read in its entirety by those who wish
to come to terms with the full range and depth of Clausewitz’s remarkable general theory of armed conflict. For those without the time to follow counsels of perfection, intelligent abridgement may be the preferred course. A minimally adequate comprehension of Clausewitz’s two main arguments described in this article can be achieved through attentive reading of Books I and II, along with chapters 1 through 8 and chapters 25 and 26 of Book VI, and chapters 1 through 6 of Book VIII. Understanding the analysis presented in Decoding Clausewitz, which has been summarized here, does not make On War an easy read. What it does do is transform the task of coming to terms with its meaning from one that is virtually impossible for most readers into one that is merely extremely difficult.

Clausewitz’s concepts of reenacting command decision and the superiority of the defense over the offense challenge existing standard approaches to the study of war and conventional attitudes about strategy. U.S. Army professional education still bases instruction about strategy on a combination of conventional historical narratives and more or less prescriptive theory, which are studied largely in order to consider the rightness or wrongness of past decision making. The adoption of Clausewitz’s method of instruction would involve the augmentation, if not replacement, of such activity by the reenactment of historical cases of supreme command using both verifiable historical facts and theory-based surmise to come to an understanding of why decisions were difficult rather than whether they were good or bad. U.S. Army professional education has also, until recently, focused on the development of the capacity to defeat conventional forces quickly through offensive action. Clausewitz’s contention that the defense is a stronger form of war than the offense and his associated views on the efficacy of guerrilla warfare offer a powerful theoretical counterweight to the propensity to assume that the destruction of the enemy army is the equivalent of strategic victory. Clausewitzian thought can thus be used to improve on-going discussion of the strategic dimensions of insurgencies and terrorism and to deepen reflection on the nature of the relationship between conventional and so-called unconventional warfare. And finally, it is worth noting that Clausewitz argued that a properly constituted military education has to address the nature of man as a maker of important decisions under difficult conditions. He was convinced that this could only be accomplished by a program of learning informed by a mix of historical narrative, philosophical rigor, political understanding, and psychological insight. Or to put it another way, for Clausewitz the foundations of a sound military education are to be found in the liberal arts.

Notes


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"Counterinsurgents need to get as close as possible to the people to secure them and to glean the maximum amount of quality information. Doing this helps counterinsurgents gain a fluidity of action equal or superior to that of the enemy."

U.S. Army Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, p. 5-12
provided hope to Iraqi citizens trying to survive. While field grade and flag officers develop the strategy for this war, our sergeants, lieutenants, and captains are the talented people who execute it at the ground level. Their initiative and decision making are integral to progress. It is also important to note that no one area is an island. We were surrounded by superb units and were certainly the benefactors of their tactical success as well. Their contributions were immeasurable.

The Problem

As I stood in the courtyard of a home in southwest Baghdad on 17 April 2007 talking to my Troop A commander, Capt. Nick Cook, a frantic call came over the radio alerting us that one of our own had been shot. We ran about half a block to an intersection where some of our soldiers were placing well-aimed suppressive fire down the street while others calmly but pointedly guided one of the unit’s uparmored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) to a covered and concealed position around the corner. Some troops helped remove the wounded soldier from the turret of the vehicle to be treated by our medic, but the soldier had been killed instantly. Less than twenty-four hours later, the squadron’s battle captain, Capt. Theron Ballard, rushed up to my vehicle as I was preparing to depart from Forward Operating Base Falcon, where I was living, and told me that another of our troopers had been killed from the blast of a deeply buried improvised explosive device (IED). We immediately went to the site to find one soldier killed in action and another trapped in the wreckage. Four short days later, a third soldier was killed by yet another deeply buried IED just out of view of our newly established combat outpost. My squadron thus had suffered three soldiers killed in a single week less than a month after we assumed complete responsibility for eastern Dora. We did not know who was responsible for any of these attacks, and no one would tell us anything. The members of our partnered National Police (NP) unit were no help, as the residents of our predominantly Sunni neighborhood hated them. Indeed, the policemen were probably more of a target than we were. We were on our own in a fight against an invisible enemy, and we still had over a year left on our tour.

How, we asked, was it possible for insurgents to emplace an IED under a paved road in the middle of an urban area without being seen?

Introduction

The war in Iraq is very complex. Almost everything about fighting it is counterintuitive. This article attempts to describe the application of doctrine at the tactical level to military personnel who will face similar challenges in the future as well as to anyone who wants to understand what happened on Baghdad’s streets. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, an element of the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, served during the Surge of 2007 primarily in the eastern part of the Sunni-dominated neighborhood of Dora (Hayy ad Dūrah) in southern Baghdad. Dora was saturated with al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) operatives and served as a headquarters for that organization, making it one of the most contested neighborhoods in all of Baghdad. What follows is a description of how one unit, given its assigned mission and available resources, successfully applied doctrine and
Clearly, it was not possible. Someone knew who was responsible for these attacks, but everyone we talked to in the area claimed they knew nothing. Frustrated but not hopeless, we were at a critical juncture in our deployment. Do we assume a defensive posture and react to the insurgent or do we go on the offensive? Going on the offense was the obvious choice, but how would we go about it? We had already conducted several large "cordon and knock" operations in which we searched hundreds of homes hoping to find some evidence to tie a resident to the insurgency, but so far the searches had not yielded any clues. Insurgents had learned over five years not to hide things in their homes. Without specific intelligence as to who and what we were looking for, these operations were a waste of soldiers’ time and energy. They also irritated people, no matter how polite one tried to be while searching. Once we identified an insurgent, detaining him was a relatively simple process. However, his single greatest advantage was his ability to hide in plain sight. In fact, this was decisive for him, and we instinctively knew that taking this away from him would cripple his capacity to attack us and to terrorize the population among whom he was hiding. All we needed was for the local population to point him out, and to achieve this we would have to form an alliance with the people.

We had phone lines for tips that people could call to report crimes or insurgent activities, but they were not enough. Tips were not always reliable, and the platoons had to be cautious about being set up. We had one or two informants that we had inherited from the previous U.S. Army unit in eastern Dora, but they did not provide enough to enable us to really turn a corner. There were only a small number of people on the street due to the intense heat and daily violence. Those that were out refused to do much more than exchange pleasantries as the result of intimidation by agents of al-Qaeda in Iraq or other Sunni insurgent groups. Unfortunately, we found that local leaders were of little value in our effort to gather intelligence because they were largely driven by self-interest and the imperatives of survival.

**Operation Close Encounters**

Our adjacent unit was conducting an operation it called **CLOSE ENCOUNTERS**. An initiative of Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, the operation involved soldiers engaging the residents of their area in a deliberate effort to meet people in their homes. We felt that we could use this idea not only to collect census data within our operational environment but also as a way to start breaking down cultural barriers and building relationships with the people around us. We determined this was how we would go on the offensive in our efforts to separate the insurgent from the average local citizen.

Shortly after we began conducting Operation **CLOSE ENCOUNTERS** on a daily basis, we arranged a patrol schedule that placed soldiers in eastern Dora twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Initially, this was to protect ourselves. The Dora neighborhood was one of the most contested in all Baghdad in early 2007, and, with no one talking to us, we did not know what was going on during the periods when no patrols were in the sector. Our new constant presence had an immediate effect on insurgent activity, as attacks decreased in number and became less effective. Our 24-hour presence also had a resounding effect on the local people. They actually began to feel more secure. This tactic was an essential part of Operation
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS because it gave people the confidence necessary to tell us what they knew and to feel less imperiled by the insurgents. The enemy could no longer threaten individual residents with violence after we left because we did not leave. We were not just protecting ourselves but the population as well.

This was a modern-day movement-to-contact against a wily insurgent in an urban environment. The true goal of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS was to build relationships with the Iraqi citizens among whom we were living and to transform these individual relationships into an alliance with the population based on trust, mutual respect, and shared interests. This partnership would then lead to specific information on who the insurgents were, where they were, and what they were planning, and this would ultimately allow us to place them in detention. The process would require real action on our part over a considerable period of time to demonstrate to the people that we were serious. Pleading for information, using defensive tactics, and offering money or civil improvements for intelligence would never work. We had also found that threats and other forms of coercion largely failed to obtain cooperation. We had to reach out to the people in the neighborhood first in order to change the conditions that allowed the insurgency to flourish and to erode the insurgents’ support base. It was time for a new beginning.

HOW IT WORKED

In the planning and preparation for our daily patrols in support of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, a troop commander selected a street or a specific area in which to conduct the mission. The choice could be based on intelligence (such as a tip from an informant), a recent contact from that area, or personal intuition. This selection method kept our visits unpredictable and helped swing the initiative in our direction.

The patrol then secured the street and visited every home, occupied or not. Going to every house on the street was important, as this created an environment where people felt reasonably free to talk, knowing their home had not been singled out. This kept insurgents guessing as to who was providing us with information and thus

Pleading for information, using defensive tactics, and offering money or civil improvements for intelligence would never work.

A soldier with Company B, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, which initiated Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, patrols the neighborhood of Toma on the outskirts of Baghdad.
protected potential informants. There were no time constraints for completing a street. We took as much time as we needed. We were not really looking for insurgents per se (although we did find them on occasion) but rather for people who could tell us who the insurgents were.

Once security was established, the dismounted element, consisting of the platoon leader, a security element, and possibly the troop commander, knocked on the gate of the first house and asked to come in. After quickly looking around to ensure the inside of the home was secure, the soldiers would invite the residents to sit down and respond to some basic questions on the prepared CLOSE ENCOUNTERS form: How long have you lived here? Who else lives in the home? Where do you work or where did you work? What are your concerns? Who are your neighbors and how long have you known them? As the questions were asked in a manner that was curious rather than threatening, a normal give-and-take conversation would frequently ensue. All of this was done while sipping hot tea and often with children staring at soldiers up close for the first time. The soldiers not engaged directly in the activity would interact with the children in the courtyard or make small talk with others in the street. The encounter would end with the head of the household and the adult males posing for a photo for our records.

**The Benefits**

Over time, these meetings with the residents of both the neighborhood and the area as a whole produced several benefits. First, we cleared up misconceptions on both sides. The American soldier was no longer a mysterious authority figure speeding by in a HM-MWV behind two-inch-thick glass who occasionally rifled through their home. Despite cultural differences, finding things in common was easier than you might think. Sharing a laugh together or even just listening to one another went a long way toward building relationships. We also learned that most people in the neighborhood were not al-Qaeda supporters and that they desperately wanted security to improve. These people had families, hopes, and a desire for normalcy. In other words, we had mutual goals. This brought us closer to the people and increased our desire to help them. We were much more likely to exercise caution before applying escalation-of-force steps and less likely to jump to hasty conclusions when there was a significant activity close to the home of a family that we had met. After repeated encounters, our soldiers began to learn who was re-
lated, which families did not get along, who provided useful insight, and many other intimate details about the neighborhood in which we operated.

**Dealing in Reality**

Our casual discussions also allowed us to gauge the people’s perceptions of Coalition forces and what we were doing. We also learned how people felt about the National Police as well as their views on the current government of Iraq. These kinds of insights were important because they helped us develop effective information operations and that we were not sure what the answers were, but we were there to assist them. This was much more effective and helped us win their allegiance, not to mention the fact that it was true! We also began to understand their feelings about the National Police, which was also dominated by Shi’ites. In order to break the cycle of violence, we decided to deny the NP access to the neighborhood unless accompanied by a Coalition patrol until we determined how to integrate them into the community. Like two children fighting on a long trip together, they both needed a period of separation. Denying the National Police the ability to operate unilaterally in the neighborhood greatly increased our credibility. With a better comprehension of the recent history of violence between the NP and locals, we could make determinations based on reality rather than wishful thinking or perceptions. We calculated every decision, talking point, and action to show that we were working in the best interest of the members of the community because we now understood their plight.

We did not realize it immediately, but Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS also empowered local citizens. As we became more familiar with residents, we learned that they had tremendous respect for our capabilities. People truly believed that we had the power to solve all of their problems if we really wanted to. In fact, citizens frequently told us that they considered us the real government. Repeated personal discussions with the citizens of our Sunni neighborhood revealed that they had no confidence in their national government and felt that it was hopelessly sectarian. Knowing this was crucial to understanding how to deal with this population because it meant that they believed that improving their conditions was our responsibility, not theirs. Although our relationship with the people eventually grew into a partnership, the initial effort had to start with our soldiers extending a hand. When our junior leaders sat in residents’ living rooms, paper and pen in hand, having removed their helmets and eye protection, and asked people how we could help and what their concerns were, they were empowered. A comparable situation would be if a U.S. senator sat down in your living room and asked what he could do to
help. Many Iraqis later told us that they felt obligated to assist us after a CLOSE ENCOUNTERS visit. They felt mutual respect in having us come to their home for reasons other than a search. Often, we could only listen and absorb the complaints, but sometimes we could address a problem or find someone who could. Either way, the CLOSE ENCOUNTERS visit was a quick victory.

**Effective Nonlethal Targeting**

Learning the people’s real concerns also allowed us to focus our nonlethal efforts—community projects, psychological operations, civil affairs, and information operations—on issues that really mattered to them. We realized that it was important to initiate projects that provided tangible benefits. If a citizen could walk outside of his home and point to where we had spent our money on a project or provided an essential service, then he could really start to believe that conditions were getting better. Since people felt that we were the de facto government, ineffective services were blamed on us rather than on the government of Iraq. Despite all of the money spent in previous years, the average citizen could not walk around his neighborhood and really see what the expenditures had built. This contributed to a perception that we were nothing more than occupiers. We learned through Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS that we had to reestablish services while we enhanced security; the two had to be accomplished hand-in-hand rather than sequentially. Improved services showed people that we were working in their best interest. Our projects were visible and necessary. They provided jobs and were not contingent on the whims of local residents or insurgent activities. Even when we were attacked, projects continued. Our desire was to achieve lasting results and not to succumb to emotional desires to punish the populace for insurgent activity.

The first priority was reestablishing electrical power. Power affects every facet of life, especially for a people trapped in their homes. Additionally, welders, carpenters, and other tradesmen found working without electricity very difficult, and the black-market fuel rate made providing their own power prohibitively expensive. While we could not produce more electricity for the power grid, we could repair the transmission system by replacing burned out transformers and destroyed power lines. This project was quickly followed with a microgeneration project for large neighborhood generators that permitted people to pay for power to run directly into their homes. These large generators were distributed across our sector in order to reach more people, and each was operated by a local resident. The monthly power fees covered the cost of the fuel, basic maintenance, and a small salary for a manager.

These microgeneration locations enhanced participation in decision making at the neighborhood level. Citizens were encouraged to bring their grievances to these operators who, in turn, brought them to a weekly meeting with our captains and local neighborhood leaders. The microgeneration system also served as an additional layer of security. Each resident was required to provide his or her name, address, and family member names and to show a ration card. This helped keep us abreast of new residents and provided an additional...
way to find people without knocking on the door. While enhancing the electrical system, we also began to ameliorate the significant sewage problems afflicting the neighborhood. The public sewage system suffered damage from broken pumps and other maintenance problems, as well as from IEDs, causing sewage to back up onto streets and into people’s homes. Our enterprising captains and junior leaders urged government sanitation workers to bring their sewage trucks into the neighborhood and to clear individual septic tanks for the first time in years. We supplemented that effort with a contract for more trucks. You can imagine the gratitude of a family when their overflowing septic tank was emptied. This strongly influenced the perception that we were there to help people in every way, not just with security. Over time, we learned that residents also wanted small parks for children and soccer fields for young athletes. Projects for refurbished sidewalks and streetlights were started to provide jobs and to physically enhance the area. These types of improvements were visible and tangible signs that we were working for the people. These and many other ideas were generated through personal and private discussions with the citizens of our area during Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS.

We also used these visits to deliver talking points directly to the people. This was not the most efficient approach, but it may have been the most effective. Unlike a newspaper or a loudspeaker truck, there was give and take during personal talks, and we could obtain some level of assurance that our interlocutors could understand the points we made. We explained directly to people why we needed to place walls around their neighborhood, how a microgrant worked, and why it was important to use the trash points that we built for them. As security slowly began to return to the area, our messages were spread further by the people themselves as they socialized and passed our talking points by word of mouth.

The Human Terrain

Though we worked our way through several versions, each patrol conducting Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS had a standard form that compiled the census information that it found useful. For example, the names of all residents of the house, a phone number, their English-speaking ability, and many other details were recorded to provide us comprehensive information on who lived in our neighborhood. This type of information paid off very early and in more ways than one.

After a targeting meeting, one troop commander briefed his platoons on a particular individual that reportedly lived in the area. From the source, we knew the target was over six feet tall, balding, and in his early sixties. His vehicle was a Kia van with the image of a dolphin on the side. A platoon sergeant immediately recalled seeing that van and said he was sure he had met the owner during Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS. Knowing the man was a contractor from the census data collected, the platoon sergeant went back to visit his new friend. He was welcomed in and quickly served some hot tea, over which he told the man about a water break in the neighborhood and asked if he would come with the platoon to take a look at it and maybe get a
contract to fix it. The unwitting target quickly agreed and freely jumped into the HMMWV. He was taken directly to a detention facility, not a water break.

Taking pictures of the men in every home also helped a great deal. With these photos and those we took of military-age men walking on the streets, the platoons quickly amassed a large collection of potential targets. We organized this resource, kept it on laptop computers, and carried it with every patrol. Our platoon leaders and tactical human intelligence teams were able to show selected pictures to informants and sources, allowing them to identify both local persons of influence (POI) and insurgents.

Many of the POI were talented people who were willing to contribute to improving their neighborhood with whatever skills they possessed. We met a former international basketball referee who had also worked in the intelligence field under the previous regime. His next-door neighbor was a trained artist who produced numerous high-quality paintings for our soldiers for very reasonable prices. One of the most famous sculptors in Iraq lived on one of our streets, as did one of the best-known comedic actors in the country. Our interpreters frequently asked to have their picture taken with him! We met doctors, magazine editors, builders, welders, restaurant owners, and even a former provincial governor, each of whom provided excellent insight into the issues of the neighborhood and the nation. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the POI allowed us to direct local citizens to doctors and others of their neighbors who could help them and to target microgrants to people who could best use them. It also gave us better insight into the educational level of the local population.

By far, our biggest find was a local cardiologist, Dr. Moayad M. Hamad al-Jabouri. No longer able to work at a hospital due to sectarian bias, he had become an accomplished contractor after the 2003 invasion. He owned several businesses and spoke excellent conversational English. He turned out to be a man who, having grown up in the area, truly wanted to help those around him. He not only had the means to do it but the drive and determination as well. He advised us that projects should create jobs and contribute to the perception of progress by being highly visible. Most important, he made things happen in a timely manner—a trait that is unusual in Iraq, a place that is notoriously slow and cumbersome when it comes to progress. Not only did he come through with quality work on every project, but he also invested his own capital in streetlights, a small metal factory, and a restaurant. Because he understood our strategy so well and was such an integral part of it, he actively participated in at least fifteen VIP visits to our area, during which he explained progress from an Iraqi perspective. He even appeared on Iraqi national television to speak of the new levels of security in Dora. He did this to encourage the original residents of Dora to return and to begin to remove the stigma of being a Dora resident. In addition, we hoped to remove any excuse the government of Iraq might have for denying help to the citizens in this formerly contested neighborhood. He also appeared on American national television when ABC News Nightline did a story on him. Prior to our “discovering” him through Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, he had been virtually unknown.

Geraldo Rivera of Fox News interviews Maj. Paul Callahan, the operations officer of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, about improvements in Dora, as Col. Ricky Gibbs, commander of the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, center, and Dr. Moayad Hamad, right, listen, November 2007.
Early in our tour, many of the houses in the area had been vacant or abandoned. Catching thieves stealing furniture from these vacant homes and using the profits to fund the insurgency was not uncommon. Confronted, the thieves would tell our patrols that it was their home or that they had permission from the owner to move the furniture. Our platoons were trained to be curious, so this led them to ask for proof of ownership, which normally motivated the would-be thieves to quickly depart to “find the right papers.” The troop commanders and platoon leaders carried this over to Operation Close Encounters and began to ask each resident for proof of ownership or a legitimate rental contract so we could distinguish between legal residents and squatters. People illegally residing in a home had either been displaced from their previous homes and were now legitimately seeking refuge in a Sunni area or they were insurgents “bedding down” for a short time, conducting reconnaissance, planning, or preparing to execute some type of attack.

As Operation Close Encounters progressed, our patrols would find “families” of three military-age males living in a home, or one man all by himself, or even a male without a spouse yet a number of children. After we took their pictures, reviewed their identification cards, requested proof of home ownership or a rental agreement, and posed some tactical questions—Where are you from? How long have you lived here? Where is the rest of your family? Are you all related? Is that your vehicle? How come you do not have any furniture in the house? Where do the children attend school? What are the names of your neighbors—antagonistic residents frequently realized we had their number and moved on. Our patrols continued to visit until a resident could produce a legal housing contract or until he departed. While we never actually forced anyone from a residence, we did not hesitate to get the National Police involved in resolving such a situation. Whether or not the squatters left, we had their pictures to show our informants and sources. Hiding in our area became very difficult for insurgents.

Building Intelligence Networks

By far, the most effective result of Operation Close Encounters was that it allowed us to build intelligence networks by developing sources and informants. We were very visible, whether patrolling the street on foot or in a military vehicle, so for us to blend into the population was next to impossible. We were able to stealthily establish observation posts for limited periods of time, and dismounted patrols at night allowed us to surprise the occasional curfew violator. But observation posts and patrols are not enough to win this complicated fight. Our enemies used children and teenagers to win the complicated fight. Our enemies used children and teenagers.
to report our locations and movements. They knew where we were at all times, while we frequently stood next to our enemy without knowing it. We needed dependable sources to report who our enemies were, where they were, and what they were planning.

As noted, most of the individuals we met during Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS were average citizens, and, while they could inform us when they saw an insurgent emplace an IED on their street (and they often did so), most were not knowledgeable about the AQI network. We needed to know information that would allow us to detain insurgents before they could attack. This required us to form alliances with people close to the insurgent groups, a seemingly impossible task. On occasion, our platoons came across an individual during a CLOSE ENCOUNTERS interview who would comment that he had served in the military under Saddam Hussein. Our interest piqued, we would follow up with questions about what rank he had held and what his specific job had been. Often, the individual had been involved in the intelligence field and had some level of experience in collection and analysis. This was exactly the kind of person we needed to help us and one you would never find by chance on the street. We also learned that some of these experienced men were running their own source networks and had an excellent feel for exactly the kind of information we needed. Better yet, since it had been their profession, they actually enjoyed the work and were eager to share what they knew. With accurate intelligence, we could move directly to the home of an insurgent with a photo and an evidence packet in hand. The days of large cordon-and-search operations and hoping to find something or someone we could link to the insurgency were over. With insurgents positively identified by sources at regular meetings, we were able to take them right off of the street.

On or about 15 July 2007, the 1st Platoon, Troop C, was conducting home visits as part of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS when, as often happened, it encountered an Iraqi who stated that he had information that could be of use to Coalition forces in identifying insurgents in the area. The man spoke to the platoon leader about known insurgent personalities in Dora and the larger East Rashid sector of Baghdad in which Dora was located. He seemed to have a great deal of detailed information on the operations of AQI in southern Baghdad, so the platoon leader informed the squadron’s human intelligence team of the man’s potential to be a helpful source. Further discussions with him revealed that he ran a network of ten other individuals in Dora and areas south of Baghdad, all of whom had been collecting information about AQI on his behalf before Coalition forces met him. Eventually, two of these subsources would become registered Coalition sources in their own right.

The source whom the Troop C platoon leader met provided information to Coalition forces that formed the basis of twenty-six draft intelligence and information reports. Documents of this type were the foundation of all intelligence for Coalition forces in Iraq and the primary evidence used to detain

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**Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps—Iraq, left, speaks with Colonel Crider and Capt. Bret Hamilton, right, at the combat outpost in Dora of the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 8 December 2007.**
After June 2007 was tied to that operation in some way. Time after time, the squadron could draw upon information obtained in this fashion to confirm or deny the identity and location of a target prior to a planned operation to detain the individual. Although more than 180 individuals were detained on the basis of data gathered during Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, three examples best illustrate how the operation helped us to rout the insurgents systematically in eastern Dora.

First, during the summer of 2007, a man known as Abu Sadiq became the squadron’s third highest value target due to his position as the AQI leader of eastern Dora. He and his subordinates were responsible for nearly all of the attacks conducted by AQI in this area between late 2006 and August 2007, many of which caused Coalition casualties. In particular, Abu Sadiq had been given orders to launch specific attacks, including a 25 June 2007 IED attack in Dora that killed five Coalition soldiers and wounded nine others. Although many sources reported on this target, no one could identify his location until 22 July 2007, when a Troop A patrol, conducting routine Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS procedures on the street along which the target occasionally lived, acquired a photo of Abu Sadiq, as well as his address. During a regular meeting later that day with one of the squadron’s sources—coincidentally, with a source uncovered during Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS—the photo of the target was confirmed. The squadron detained Abu Sadiq later the same night at the location where the photo had been taken.

Second, on 25 October 2007, the 2d Platoon, Troop C, detained several members of a family that had recently moved into the area from south of Baghdad, including the squadron’s fifth highest value target. The father and two of his sons had been identified by multiple sources as AQI operatives from Arab Jabour, a rural area just south of Baghdad, who had moved to Dora to avoid Coalition efforts to detain them and to resume operations against the Coalition. The three were directly linked to IED attacks against Coalition forces, including a 28 August 2007 detonation against the 3d Platoon, Troop C, and a substantial number of murders of Shi’a and Christian Iraqis in Hawr Rajab, a suburb southwest of Baghdad; elsewhere in Arab Jabour; and in Dora. All three men were accused of attempting to establish a large AQI cell in eastern Dora in order to resume attacks against Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and Sunnis who were friendly to Coalition forces in the area. By the time Coalition sources reported that these men were operating in the area, Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS

**Efficient and Effective Targeting**

Approximately 68 percent of the detainees taken by the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, were located using knowledge gathered exclusively through Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, and nearly every detention made by the squadron targets. Even better, the information that the source and his subsources gathered allowed Coalition forces to detain ten wanted individuals, including the squadron’s seventh highest value target, a man who was responsible for IED emplacements on 3, 16, and 17 January 2008. The source was subsequently employed with some success by corps-level task forces in an effort to capture high-level AQI leaders in and south of Baghdad. Before 15 July 2007, he was unknown to Coalition forces, and he would likely have remained so had not the 1st Platoon, Troop C, engaged him in conversation in the privacy of his home. Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS gave this man a veil of anonymity and thus protected him from insurgent reprisals.
had been completed on the street on which they were said to live. The names provided by the sources matched several individuals living in homes on this street, and the sources confirmed the identity of the targets using the photos of these residents collected during the operation. With this information, Troop C was able to detain all three targets without difficulty. The men were sent to the Theater Internment Facility for long-term criminal detention. Once again, a large search operation was avoided as the responding troop, who conducted Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS in the area, knew who they were looking for and where to find them.

Finally, on 26 February 2008, the 1st Platoon, Troop B, detained the squadron’s seventh highest value target, a man who was a weapons trafficker and IED emplacer, after his identity and location were confirmed through Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS. This man had been responsible for an early morning IED emplacement that targeted a local Sons of Iraq leader, and after the blast the target had narrowly escaped detention. He was also identified by reliable sources as the person responsible for the movement into the squadron’s area of responsibility of materials used to produce IEDs. In source meetings, we determined his location to be near an old Ba’ath Party building, but information from Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS on that area included no data on a person with his name. However, the data was about six months old, so a decision was made to update the facts by conducting another iteration of CLOSE ENCOUNTERS in the vicinity of the old Ba’ath Party building. Upon completion of the second round of CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, the squadron found that a man with the target name did indeed live in the area indicated by sources. One of these sources confirmed that a photo of the suspect was a picture of the target. Shortly thereafter, the platoon that had conducted Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS returned to the area and detained him without incident.

**CACHES**

We found several caches of weapons and IED materials as a result of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS as well. Because we searched every house on a street, we went through empty homes too. Sometimes our patrols would stumble upon a cache this way, but often a neighbor would tell us to look through the tall grass in the empty lot next door, or to be very careful around a certain trash pile, or that he had seen people he did not know staying in a certain home down the street. Between gathering information on suspicious people moving into our operational environment and picking up insurgent caches, we severely disrupted the insurgents’ ability to execute attacks locally.

**NUMBING THE INSURGENTS**

We conducted Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS every single day (and sometimes twice a day) as a regular part of each patrol. Over time everyone, even the insurgents, viewed our visits as a routine occurrence, and there was no particular reaction to them. The insurgents essentially grew numb to our presence. On one occasion, a platoon acted on a tip from an informant that a major AQI financier named Abu Zahra was living in the neighborhood. “Abu” means “the father of” in Arabic, so we knew this man had a son named Zahra. The platoon moved to the street where the informant had indicated that this man lived with his family. Under the guise of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS, the platoon leader and his soldiers conducted the now normal procedure of talking to families and taking pictures of the males. Through casual discussion, someone pointed...
out Abu Zahra’s home, so the platoon leader and his group went to find out if the target was actually there. Upon knocking on the door and being invited in, the group found only an adult female and several children. The platoon leader sat down and began talking to the woman about her children, asking their names, ages, and so forth. As it turned out, one young boy was named Zahra. The unsuspecting wife of our AQI financier also told the patrol that her husband would definitely be home that evening. The patrol even let the woman know they would return later to collect a photo of her husband just as we did for every other male in the neighborhood. Later that evening they detained Abu Zahra with no disruption to the remainder of the neighborhood and without endangering anyone.

Insurgents had no way of knowing if we were looking for them or just conducting a routine Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS. Even when we had a specific tip, we did not always go directly to the house of the target. We might start Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS a few houses down, hit the target house, and then go to one or two more to prevent insurgents from becoming suspicious. We also revisited areas in order to see if anyone new had moved in or out as well as to revisit informants without raising suspicion. Since we went into every home, the insurgents had no way of knowing who was talking. On other occasions, if we had a source who was willing to show us the exact house of the targeted individual, he would ride with us in a HMMWV and point out the house. We established security, walked to the door, knocked, and were usually welcomed in. We were in the area twenty-four hours a day, and for us to stop and visit people was common. Consequently, insurgents rarely tried to run anymore. With a vibrant and growing source network across the operating environment, the tables had turned, and now the enemy had no idea who was watching him. We now had the initiative.

**Summary**

Alliances are formed for a mutual benefit through close relationships.

**Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS** combined with constant presence helped us achieve those relationships with the citizens whom we were charged to protect and whose cooperation we needed. Over the course of the first thirty days in our operating environment, we saw fifty-two enemy-initiated attacks, including small arms fire, IED emplacements, hand grenade attacks, and murders, but only detained sixteen people. Worse yet, we had no sources. However, in less than three months we had accumulated close to sixty sources, detained ninety insurgents in a single month, and decreased enemy-initiated events to fewer than twenty. Deeply buried IEDs became a relic of the past, and citizens reported other types of IEDs as soon as they were emplaced. With their weapon of choice, the IED, now rendered ineffective, the insurgents switched to hand grenades and small arms fire as their primary means of attack. Hand grenades required the insurgent to get close to us, and small arms fire required cooperation from the public, which was quickly waning. In just over 120 days from the start of Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS and with 24-hour coverage, we eliminated the insurgents’ capability and will to attack us. In a final act of desperation, the insurgents began a murder campaign, killing approximately nineteen people in and around our area over the course of one month. This had surprisingly little effect. Businesses continued to open, and the streets teemed with life. We were able to continue meeting our sources surreptitiously and to share enough information with neighboring units to permit Coalition forces to eliminate the cells responsible for these attacks in a few weeks. Having made a solid alliance with the people around us, our forces had denied the insurgents the ability to conduct an attack or to even hide without being caught.

**Conclusion**

Understanding that we were working in their best interests and doing so effectively, citizens in our operational environment had changed their way of thinking and frequently declared that they were our soldiers too. We were once contacted eleven different times by informants and local citizens in a 48-hour period when a former insurgent returned to the neighborhood after he was legitimately released from a detention facility. We immediately visited the man and his family, took his photo, and spoke to him about how circumstances had changed. He never caused any problems. After five months, those insurgents who had not been detained had either fled the area or quit the insurgency. While many factors contributed to the turnaround, including the installation of walls, a maturation of the Iraqi Security Forces, and superb work by our neighboring units, Operation CLOSE ENCOUNTERS was the centerpiece in returning our part of Baghdad to a sense of normalcy and providing a reasonable opportunity for political progress.

**Notes**

The author thanks Capt. Travis Lee for his assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. This is an improvised explosive device buried in the ground so as to explode underneath a passing vehicle.
2. “Informants” and “sources” both provide information, but sources are registered and can be tasked to find out specific intelligence by our tactical human intelligence teams. Initially, we had no sources.
3. Sunni residents were forced to use blackmarket fuel at prices as high as five times the government rate because fuel stations were controlled by Shia militias, making Sunnis vulnerable to kidnapping. We eventually reached an agreement with the Dora oil refinery to provide a fuel truck to come into the neighborhood under our protection and sell fuel at the government rate in order to mitigate this problem.
4. By late 2007, our part of Dora had become a frequent stop for visitors, both military and civilian, who came to assess progress on the ground.
5. Dora was linked so closely with the Sunni insurgency that officials and residents in other parts of Baghdad assumed that anyone from there must be involved with al-Qaeda in Iraq.

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Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad

By Jim Lacey
Naval Institute Press, 2007, 304 pp., $29.95

Review by Frederick H. Black Jr.

From Audie Murphy to Paul R. Smith, the 3d Infantry Division, or the “Marne Division,” enjoys a legacy of heroic actions in the defense of our nation that dates back over ninety years. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the Marne Division spearheaded the assault from Kuwait to Baghdad in March 2003. While none of the soldiers involved in that campaign gained the notoriety of Audie Murphy, their exploits certainly deserve notice and credit. Jim Lacey does a commendable job of telling the division’s story in Takedown: The 3rd Infantry Division’s Twenty-One Day Assault on Baghdad.

Lacey labels Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the “Colonel’s War,” playing off the book title The Generals War written by Bernard Trainor and Michael Gordon after DESERT STORM. Lacey traces the campaign by focusing on three colonels, the brigade commanders, along with a host of lieutenant colonel battalion commanders. The story he tells moves as fast as the events on the ground did to those involved, thus it will not take long for most readers to finish this well-written book. By concentrating on the colonels, Lacey captures decisions made at a high enough level to influence hundreds to thousands of soldiers. At the same time, those officers remained relatively close to the action such that they often based decisions on their gut instinct and the ability to view the front and observe the enemy’s movements. While the division commander and one of the assistant division commanders appear throughout the narrative, they are not the focus of the story. Lacey uses dialogue between the division leadership, Maj. Gen. Buford Blount and Brig. Gen. Lloyd Austin, and the brigade and battalion commanders to illustrate the difficulties experienced at the tactical level and to show the challenges that the entire division faced. These issues included communication over extended ranges, fuel shortages, and ammunition resupply. Lacey demonstrates the ways effective and inspirational leaders found to triumph in the face of adversity.

One point that Lacey never makes clear is the intended audience for this book. Based on the writing style and documentation, it was not intended as a scholarly work. The study rests entirely on either the author’s experiences as a correspondent with another unit during the war or personal interviews conducted after the war, as opposed to any primary documents. Because of the short amount of time elapsed between the events discussed in the book and the volume’s publication, the lack of released documents would have made the scholarly standard difficult to achieve even if he had intended to do so. The next question centers on whether the author wrote this for a military or civilian audience. At times the prose seems focused on civilians such as explaining that the word out ends a radio transmission. On the other hand, the reader is left with no explanation of military graphics used on the maps and no details on important and confusing issues such as mechanized task organizations within the brigades and battalions. Even some military readers may have a difficult time following the series of attachments and detachments of companies and battalions throughout the operation. A comprehensive map, glossary, and task organization would have helped military and civilian readers alike.

Lacey uses pieces of his extensive interviews throughout the text to give invaluable firsthand perspectives. Some of these capture the perceptions of the sergeants and lieutenants in the lead platoons of the attack and provide wonderful contrast to what the colonels saw or thought. In every case, these insights lead to a better understanding of the dynamic of close combat, especially in those instances where reality did not match the expected enemy reaction. In fact, the book would have benefited from more of the lower-level accounts. For example, the 3½-page depiction of S. Sgt. Dillard Johnson’s experiences in Najaf made for a magnificent read. Coupled with the earlier part of his story recounted in the introduction, these recollections relate a personal sense of combat action that one could never gain from CNN or the pages of the New York Times.

The interviews with the various colonels also illustrate that American intelligence estimates missed the mark in several important aspects. The title of Chapter 5, “Samawah: We Planned a Parade,” effectively...
summarizes the prewar attitude of many in the American military and civilian leadership. The 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, found out that plans for a parade in Samawah proved premature at best. Likewise, templates of which locations the enemy would defend more heavily than others often proved invalid. Regardless of the incorrect early assessments, leaders across all levels of the division quickly adapted and accomplished their missions regardless of the conditions they encountered. Units also used their experiences from the initial days to shape their plans and expectations for later engagements as they approached the capital city.

The two “Thunder Runs” into Baghdad will likely remain among the most enduring images of the first phase of OIF for many Americans. Lacey has done an admirable job of describing the thoughts and emotions of the leaders who planned the operations, along with the harrowing memories of those who implemented the plans. Ably executed by the “Spartans” of the 2d Brigade and enabled by the other brigades in the division setting the conditions, the two raids led to the final toppling of Saddam Hussein’s government. Baghdad Bob’s proclamations notwithstanding, U.S. tanks had in fact arrived in the city and fulfilled an earlier prophecy by Col. David Perkins, the 2d Brigade commander. Prior to leaving Kuwait, he had told his leaders “we can end this war quickly if we put a tank on Saddam’s palace grounds.” While he correctly predicted the effect of the division’s operations on the collapse of the dictatorship, six years later we know that the war has still not ended. The division’s third OIF tour stands as further evidence of the continued dedication on the part of the “Dog Face Soldiers.”

Remaining true to the subtitle, the author ends the story with the successful conclusion of the assault. The reasons for this choice are both numerous and logical. The recounting of the subsequent phases of OIF would require a significantly different pace and tone than that of the initial attack. That task gets more complicated by the contentious political concerns surrounding the transition from the assault to the stability phase. In addition, it will require many years for authors to gain access to government documents in order to fully examine all of the issues. Lacey wisely avoided these problems by stopping on 7 April 2003 at the conclusion of Thunder Run II.

By way of drawbacks, the author has largely overlooked the nonmaneuver units that played a critical role for the 3d Infantry Division. He acknowledges this in the last chapter by stating that artillery, engineer, aviation, and logistical units did not receive the credit they deserved in the book. He specifically notes the key contributions of Brig. Gen. Louis Weber, the assistant division commander for support. Perhaps Lacey has left the door open for another book project. Acknowledging this important shortcoming in no way lessens the effect of the omission. The soldiers outside the maneuver formations performed as well as those they supported, and their stories deserve recognition. More to the point, their herculean efforts in many cases made the continued northward movement possible when the circumstances seemed to dictate otherwise. Neither weather nor the perceived lack of resources prevented the Marne Division from getting to Baghdad and ousting Saddam’s regime.

On the whole, Jim Lacey has produced a well-written book that captures the essence of the U.S. soldier in the 3d Infantry Division over those few months in 2003. The same traits exhibited in this story could have applied to thousands of other soldiers in many other units just as easily. Despite the shortcomings already noted, as well as some editing and typographical errors that made it to final press, the book tells the division’s heroic story in a superb manner. Hopefully, more books on this topic will get published over the next several years so that the American public can get a better sense of the true heroes in their armed services. This volume will serve as an excellent study of the initial months of the conflict for many years to come.
tecture. John Grenier’s new book, *The Far Reaches of Empire: War in Nova Scotia, 1710–1760*, scrutinizes British attempts at pacification on Britain’s frontier and does so while viewing the conflicts that arose on the country’s northwestern frontier as ones of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This approach not only places the diaspora of the Acadians from 1755–1760 in a new light but also makes this work relevant to the problems faced by many in this new era the Bush administration termed the Global War on Terrorism.

Grenier argues that while the displacement of Acadians from their farms from 1755 to 1760 is well-documented by historians, the subject has been previously approached from primarily a narrow social perspective. By ignoring the military milieu within which this policy was pursued by the British imperial government, historians have missed the agency of the Acadians and their Indian allies that was evident from the beginning of English occupation in Nova Scotia. From 1710 to 1760, British and Anglo-American forces were caught in an Acadian insurgency that employed Mi’kmaq and Maliseet allies to resist British rule and aid France’s attempts to maintain that country’s presence in North America. Acadian refusals to take an oath of allegiance to their new British masters and their stated neutrality in regards to the imperial struggles of the eighteenth century frustrated local governors and quickly placed the population under suspicion of French leanings during times of military crisis. Until the Seven Years’ War, Acadians and Native Americans of the region were successful in resisting British pressures. Acadian farmers were needed for food production due to the Board of Trade’s inability to motivate Protestant colonization, and therefore governors’ threats of deportation lacked substance. When hostilities resumed between France and Great Britain in 1755, however, these recalcitrant subjects of the British crown had to choose between competing armies, and their choices soon led the leadership of Nova Scotia to decide that only mass deportation of the Acadian population could solve the problem. As Acadians and Indians realized French assistance would not change their fate, these peoples elevated their resistance to that of overt violence and lost their lands in the process.

*The Far Reaches of Empire* accomplishes more than simply highlighting how Acadians and Indians played an important role in the history of imperial struggles on the North American continent. Grenier’s stated objective is to place this story within the greater historiography of frontiers, which illuminates the primacy of Nova Scotia in influencing British policy in Britain’s new empire and its growing frontiers (p. 5). He minces no words: from the beginning of British occupation in 1710, local officials rejected the notions that Acadians could ever become British or that assimilation would ever take place. Deportation was the only sure method to secure the region. Although implementation and completion took fifty years, this policy of removal became the Anglo-American solution to frontier dilemmas of the future.

Empire building has been historically a complex and long-term commitment that Grenier argues must be studied in increments of decades rather than years to understand fully. In his first work, *The First Way of War*, Grenier asserts that Anglo–American understandings of war and empire were unique and often brutal. Following this thesis, Grenier concludes that the American empire was created on the North American continent through a policy of removal that required counterinsurgency tactics of attrition and deportation on U.S. frontiers. The original inhabitants of the Great Plains, for example, were not assimilated; they were removed to reservations, and their lands repopulated by those already considered members of American society.

While removal has not explicitly been the foreign policy of the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century, Grenier’s thesis raises interesting questions about the current problems faced by the U.S. military in its ongoing conflicts. When has America been effective in quelling insurgencies since 1950? Has it ever been possible to win the “hearts and minds” of the local populace so as to end popular support of competing unconventional forces? While these questions lie outside the scope of Grenier’s study, that his work suggests these queries to the reader is the strongest endorsement of his book. If the surest solution to ending an insurgency has already been discovered but that solution is no longer acceptable to the sensibilities of a modern democracy, can that democracy ever successfully engage in the kinds of foreign policies that seek to impose a similar form of governance on a people unwilling to accept it, in part or in full? History does not repeat itself. A good study of history, such as *The Far Reaches of Empire*, can, however, direct us to look to the past for guidance and lead us to pertinent questions for the present.
causing both Hindus and Muslims to violate religious taboos. The military situation initially seemed bleak, as the 40,000 European troops in India were “a mere drop in what suddenly seemed a hostile ocean of millions” (p. 27). The mutineers lacked effective central leadership, however, and European reinforcements were summoned to the heart of the revolt. Also, the Madras army remained loyal, as did all but two battalions of the Bombay army. After much hard fighting, the mutiny finally “sputtered out” in 1858–1859, and it “permanently changed the way the British governed, defended, and thought about their Indian empire” (p. 17). As far as India’s defense was concerned, the company’s European regiments became part of the British Army, castes and faiths began to be mixed in Indian units, and the British began to rely more heavily on the Gurkha and Sikh troops that had remained loyal. Gurkhas came from the neighboring kingdom of Nepal, while Sikhs generally lived in the Punjab (a province later split between India and Pakistan). By the eve of World War I, the Punjab supplied over half of the men in the Indian Army.

David Omissi, a senior lecturer in modern history at the University of Hull, contributes an essay on “The Indian Army in the First World War, 1914–1918.” In the summer of 1914 four of the army’s divisions (two infantry and two cavalry) deployed to Europe, and, by the end of the year almost one-third of the British Army’s wars with Pakistan and China include select bibliographies. Some essays are illustrated with maps and photographs.

Raymond Callahan, an emeritus professor of history at the University of Delaware, discusses one of British India’s most important events in “The Great Sepoy Mutiny.” Sepoys were the native soldiers who served in the three East India Company armies—the Bengal, Bombay, and Madras armies—in nineteenth-century India. In May 1857 the Bengal army’s sepoys began to mutiny after being told that the new rifle cartridges they had to tear open with their teeth were greased with fat from cattle and pigs, to almost one-quarter of the world’s population and although its two largest countries, India and Pakistan, had nuclear weapons, many Americans did not begin to pay attention to that part of the world until the United States began fighting in Afghanistan. Although they do not discuss Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Daniel P. Marston and Chandar S. Sundaram have assembled thirteen interesting essays covering more than 250 years of the region’s martial past in A Military History of India and South Asia. Marston is a senior lecturer in the Department of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, in the United Kingdom, and Sundaram teaches South Asian, European, and military history at the United International College in Zhuhai, China.

The first nine essays cover the period of the British presence in the Indian subcontinent, beginning with “The Armed Expansion of the English East India Company: 1740s–1849,” by Kaushik Roy, and continuing to “End of the Raj, 1945–1947,” by Marston. The last four essays cover topics after the 1947 partition of Pakistan from India—the three Indo-Pakistani wars, the Sino-Indian war, the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, and India’s nuclear policy. All of the essays are footnoted, and the two covering India’s wars with Pakistan and China include select bibliographies. Some essays are illustrated with maps and photographs.
Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium was drawn from India. The terrible living conditions and losses on the Western Front came “as a great shock to the Indian soldiers, who were more used to the small-scale skirmishes of colonial campaigning” (p. 77). Morale began to suffer, and the Indian infantry divisions were ordered to the Middle East in October 1915, with the cavalry divisions remaining in France until early 1918. Mesopotamia (modern-day Iraq) became India’s main military undertaking from 1915 until the war’s end. Indian operations were initially successful, but in April 1916, after a siege of almost five months, 3,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops surrendered to Turkish forces at Kut-al-Amara. More than half of them would later die in captivity. Indian Army troops continued to serve in the Middle East, eventually constituting thirteen of seventeen British and imperial divisions in Palestine and Mesopotamia, and more than 1.1 million had served overseas by the end of 1918. The author concludes that “India provided a vital contingent of trained troops during the emergency of 1914 and subsequently made a large-scale effort, especially in the Middle East, throughout the war” (p. 86).

Channa Wickremesekera, who is currently affiliated with Monash University in Australia, tackles the only non-Indian topic in “Peace Through Military Parity? The Tamil Tigers and the Government Forces in Sri Lanka.” The British colony of Ceylon gained its independence in 1948 and became the republic of Sri Lanka in 1972. The island’s population (currently almost twenty-one million) was predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese, but almost one out of five Sri Lankans were Hindu Tamils, who became frustrated with Sinhalese domination. Some Tamils became increasingly militant and pressed for the creation of an autonomous region in the north and east called Tamil Ealam (or Eelam). In 1981 Tamil separatists killed their first Sri Lankan soldier, and soon a group called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (“Tamil Tigers”) began openly fighting the state. In 1987 the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) arrived in the north and east to supervise a Tiger weapons handover. Within a few months, however, the IPKF found itself at war with the Tigers, and, after suffering more than a thousand fatalities, the force was withdrawn. In the conflict with government forces that racked Sri Lanka over the next fifteen years, the Tigers used terrorist tactics aggressively, with suicide bombers assassinating Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1991) and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa (1993). The Tigers also emerged as an effective conventional force, and neither side was able to achieve a decisive advantage until this year, when the government was finally able to corner and kill the leader of the Tigers. The insurgency seems to have died with him, but the thousands of Tamils who remain confined in refugee camps face an uncertain future.

Although the book is a bit pricey, those who are interested in the military history of South Asia since the mid-eighteenth century will find it a great pleasure to read. If it sells well, perhaps the editors will consider a follow-on volume that pays greater attention to military events that have affected the region’s smaller countries, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or the recently settled Maoist insurgency in Nepal.
to the United States for stops at the Command and General Staff College and the Pentagon at the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. Finally, in 1993 Odom was sent to Zaire as the FAO.

In 1991 the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) mutinied and destroyed much of the capital of Kinshasa, prompting a major evacuation of Westerners (p. 54). By 1993 Zaire was more stable, but most of the surrounding countries were in trouble. Angola, Congo, and Rwanda all endured internal strife if not outright civil war. On 6 April 1994 the situation in Rwanda spiraled out of control with the crash of the plane carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. In three months “at least one out of every seven Rwandans died” (p. 76). Odom knew about the war in Rwanda; in fact, the embassy staff was “directed not to refer to the slaughter as genocide” (p. 76). When the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) finally stopped the genocide after three months, a civil war ensued. Defeated remnants of the Rwandan Army and Interahamwe militias, who committed the massacres, and their supporters fled the country crossing into Zaire at the town of Goma. Odom was sent to Goma to report on the growing refugee crisis.

At Goma, Odom witnessed mega-death, when a cholera epidemic killed 6,700 refugees a day for nearly a week (p. 105). He also had a front-row seat during Operation SUPPORT HOPE, which had the very narrow goal of halting the deaths in the refugee camps (p. 155). This mission ignored the largest problem of twenty-thousand armed ex-Rwandan soldiers (ex-FAR) camped in Zaire and other countries. Odom fought an uphill battle trying to convince officials that these armed soldiers were a serious threat to any lasting stability in the region.

In 1994 Odom also moved across the border, but, instead of moving out of Rwanda, he moved into the country as the defense attaché. He confronted the controversial Ger-sony Report that was widely quoted but never actually written (p. 173). He was also instrumental in creating the U.S.-Rwandan Demining Office. Time and again Odom sounded the alarm that a larger war was on the horizon and candidly reported his frustration with Washington when his predictions were ignored. Unfortunately, sporadic fighting broke out between the RPA and ex-FAR in 1995, right after Odom left Rwanda and retired. Zaire (now named the Democratic Republic of the Congo) descended into civil war, sparked in large part by the ex-FAR living in its refugee camps, not to mention the periodic fighting between Uganda, Zimbabwe, Zambia, the Congo, and Rwanda. He estimated that as of 2005 the casualties in this “African World War,” exceeded three million (p. 272).

Journey into Darkness is a fascinating insider’s look at how U.S. foreign policy works on the ground. Odom’s account of the horrible events in Rwanda illustrates how errors in intelligence and policy occur. Odom deftly demonstrates that “historically, what are commonly referred to as intelligence failures are usually failures to heed intelligence” (p. 273). This book is also a recounting of the very personal journey of Thomas Odom. From college cadet to retired colonel, the reader is drawn into Odom’s chaotic world. The only distraction from this compelling story is a lack of date references. This volume should be required reading for every student of U.S. or international affairs. The lessons learned by Odom in Rwanda during the early 1990s are eerily similar to events in Africa today.

Dr. Lisa Beckenbaugh completed her Ph.D. at the University of Arkansas in 2002. She is currently the dean of students at the University of Saint Mary in Leavenworth, Kansas.

The Lost Battalion of Tet: Breakout of the 2/12th Cavalry at Hue

By Charles A. Krohn
Naval Institute Press, revised paperback ed., 2008, 210 pp., $23.95

Review by Gregory A. Daddis

Because of its intrepid stand in Hue City, the U.S. Marine Corps has earned much historical attention on the 1968 Tet offensive in South Vietnam’s northern provinces. Charles Krohn’s account of a U.S. Army infantry battalion working to relieve enemy pressure on the besieged marines illustrates that fighting outside the city’s walls could be as harrowing as within. In the process, this work helps provide a more complete picture of American actions in the I Corps Tactical Zone during one of the war’s few turning points. Part memoir, part unit history, The Lost Battalion of Tet chronicles the exploits of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, in late 1967 and early 1968. During the six-week period surrounding Tet, the 2d Battalion suffered 60 percent casualties, and Krohn’s purpose is to present an accurate accounting of the unit’s failures so that future leaders might gain perspective from past mistakes. Krohn argues forcefully for deploying infantry battalions into battle with their full complement of artillery support and for unit training that emphasizes operating under “system failure.” While the soldiers of the 12th Cavalry’s 2d Battalion earned a dozen Distinguished Service Crosses during the Tet offensive, ultimately this is a story of what happens when a unit’s command
and logistical support systems break down in combat.

Krohn, a retired lieutenant colonel and the 2d Battalion’s intelligence officer during Tet, opens *The Lost Battalion of Tet* with insightful commentary on U.S. Army operations prior to the enemy’s 1968 general offensive. A light infantry battalion in the 1st Cavalry Division, Krohn’s unit carried out reconnaissance and security missions to counter North Vietnamese Army (NVA) infiltration into I Corps. However, reliable information on enemy activity eluded the Americans. The author recalls that “as hard as we tried, we couldn’t locate any signs of significant buildup” (p. 20). Frustrated by the enemy’s resourcefulness, the 2d Battalion commenced in early January to clear a nearby valley of all civilians and turn it into a free-fire zone. The ensuing operation resulted in more than fifty U.S. casualties, perhaps predictably, the alienation of local Vietnamese. Despite being ambushed by a competent enemy, the Americans assumed no serious risk when ordered to relieve allied forces defending the besieged city of Hue. Krohn recounts a “horribly disorganized” movement toward Hue that left battalion soldiers with little ammunition reserves and no artillery reinforcement (p. 47). Operating in poor weather conditions that limited U.S. airmobility support, NVA forces checked the cavalry’s progress and then surrounded the Americans with a more than three-to-one advantage in manpower and firepower. After nearly two full days of encirclement and a daring breakout, the battalion had suffered 311 casualties. The 1st Cavalry’s journey to reach Hue would take more than a month.

While much of this is a chronological unit history, the strength of *The Lost Battalion of Tet* lies in its honest narrative. Few, if any, of Krohn’s characters are flawless. The 2d Battalion commander who was killed immediately prior to Tet had performed many of the battalion’s reconnaissance missions himself. Krohn contends, however, he “was not prepared for the subtleties of guerrilla war” (p. 18). His successor seemed to better understand the capricious nature of counterinsurgency fighting and was well-placed to lead the battalion out of its encirclement. The author presents the division commander as too enamored with airmobility to comprehend its limitations and under pressure to get a battalion to Hue yet disinclined to manage his own support systems to ensure mission success. A frontal assault without artillery or air support against a vaguely defined enemy position resulted. In one of the most damning passages of the book, Krohn argues convincingly “the fact is that the NVA had better senior leadership on the field than we did” (p. 51). Even the battalion chaplain does not escape criticism. The pastor offered to give a prayer to a group of soldiers about to undertake a dangerous mission, “but instead of saying something inspirational—he asked God to be with the boys who were going to die” (p. 111). These critiques are balanced by accounts of company commanders, platoon sergeants, and young enlisted men performing admirably under the strains of combat. Indeed, the human element is what makes this story so compelling.

The author’s commitment to uncovering battlefield truths for future generations of warriors is admirable. At times, however, his conclusions can be somewhat jarring. Despite the inventory of U.S. failures in this work, Krohn’s final assessment that the enemy lost the battle of Hue and that “one-on-one the 2/12th beat the NVA on the ground” is questionable (p. 113). No doubt the soldiers fighting to reach Hue performed admirably, if not heroically. However, the reader leaves this work with the impression that the enemy held the initiative throughout, deciding when to attack, how much force to use, and when to withdraw. More problematic is Krohn’s evaluation of U.S. strategy during the Vietnam era and the “lessons” for today. His judgment that elected civilian officials should not “meddle in operational matters” not only undervalues the political nature of the Vietnam conflict but, more importantly, implies that Johnson, Nixon, and their secretaries of defense should not have been overseeing strategy (p. 143). Of all the lessons to be taken from this work, subverting civilian control of the military in time of war should best be excluded. Thankfully, such ruminations constitute only a minor portion of *The Lost Battalion of Tet*. This work remains a highly valuable study in battlefield leadership, logistical planning, and combined arms coordination. Krohn has succeeded in recounting the experiences of the soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, in Vietnam. Perhaps more notably, he has succeeded in providing a functional narrative for examining the implications of failed leadership and combat support systems in battle.
changes in the experience of nineteenth-century soldiers. He argues convincingly that “soldiers became much closer reflections of the societies that produced them” and that their growing, fundamentally political socialization in nationalism and institutional discipline motivated them to fight harder and longer than before (p. 191). Despite mutiny and revolution during the First World War, these national professional soldiers endured and sustained the most intense conflict the world had yet seen.

Neiberg’s analysis goes beyond the narrow periodization military historians often denote by the term nineteenth century. Rather than concentrating on the years of European and North American warfare between 1815 and 1871, or even 1914, like most such studies, he divides his work into the years from 1789 to 1871 and those from 1871 to 1918. Including the great conflicts that began and ended this era enables him to better explore origins and outcomes. Each of the two sections is divided into four chapters on “recruitment, evasion, and desertion,” “training and leadership,” “weapons, uniforms, and daily needs,” and soldiers’ experiences of the battlefield. These titles suggest a focus on the minutiae of daily life with a dose of tactics, but the author goes beyond these limits to suggest the significant role of the military in the development of more nutritious diets, the growing political role (not just conservative, but often reactionary) of veterans’ groups, and the relationship between military and industrial discipline, particularly in the experience and sense of time regulated by clocks.

Given the scope of his book and the intent (surveys for the general reader) of this series, the analysis inevitably varies in depth. Neiberg is especially strong on the growth and impact of conscription, particularly its role in nationalist political socialization, the development of a national consciousness outside elites, and the growth of compulsory education and the welfare state. Evacuation and desertion get less attention, apart from that during the Napoleonic Wars, before the extension of a national bureaucratic administration and of a coercive capability to the European countryside, which made evasion more difficult. Nevertheless, Neiberg does not present a one-sided story of “modernization,” social rationalization, and nationalism. Apart from France, where the revolutionary levée en masse was thought a sine qua non of egalitarian nationalism, conscription was consistently most popular among nobles and conservatives, who recognized its potential for social (meaning, in that context, class), and thus political, discipline, an indirect weapon against peasant or working-class unrest and revolution. Indeed, the shift from local orientation and loyalties encouraged by conscription could also lead to military isolation and a potential for coups, particularly, and only somewhat ironically, in France, where conservative elites as well as egalitarian liberals saw the army as a way to breed political loyalty. Thus, even when the Third Republic (1871–1940) turned away from the long-service volunteer forces of the Restoration (1815–1830), the July Monarchy (1830–1848), and the Second Empire (Napoleon III, 1851–1871), modeled on eighteenth-century visions of isolation from popular ferment, the conscript army of the 1880s still seemed prone to praetorianism, in the person of General Georges Boulanger.

On the other hand, Neiberg observes that the largest volunteer army in history appeared in World War I—not the U.S. Army that might spring to mind, wrongly since most American soldiers were drafted, but the Indian Army of 1.3 million men. Canada put forth 600,000 volunteers, a force larger than that of the southern Confederacy in the American Civil War (which had resorted to conscription early in 1862, a year before the United States did so). Australia sent 322,000 volunteers, of whom 280,000 became casualties, and New Zealand dispatched 124,000, more than a third of its adult men (pp. 114–15). Yet he does not discuss an actual mutiny just as threatening as Boulangerism, the Curragh incident in 1914, in which leaders of the British Army refused to execute national policy (supporting Irish Home Rule against Protestant loyalists), and he provides rather less attention to mutiny and revolution in World War I than his chapter titles lead one to expect. Indeed, unrest among soldiers in 1917 and 1918, in Germany as well as France and Russia, suggests the complexity of European nationalism: conscription was insufficient to save autocratic czarist Russia from the strain of war; soldiers were at the heart of the Russian Revolution, the German Revolution, and the latter’s repression in 1918 and 1919. (Nor was a second Curragh mutiny likely while working-class British citizen-soldiers were demanding “a home fit for heroes” during the postwar recession.)

Acknowledging the vast span of time with which Neiberg has to deal, there are nevertheless several further points that could bear fruitful examination. One is the soldier’s experience of his missions, specifically in domestic policing, aid to the civil authorities, and colonial campaigns. Also, I would have liked to have had a more explicit analysis of lethality and its psychological, social, and political impact, as battles became ever larger and longer. In particular, the author repeatedly notes the difficulty of quickly training soldiers to effectively use the more lethal weapons developed by industry, and the tendency of average tactical capability to decline over the course of extended wars (Napoleonic, world, and perhaps American civil) as veterans became casualties and training time decreased. These are profound observations, and one should seek as much insight as one can from a historian of Neiberg’s caliber.

The author begins with two theses: that military service became more than the experience of a class (the noble elite or the locally oriented peasantry) and that technological change was less influential, certainly...
prior to 1870, than “the development of the professional, national soldier” (p. xiii). Both revelations connect military history to the bigger picture, and both deserve much further elaboration, research, and discussion by military and nonmilitary historians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Dr. Samuel Watson is an associate professor of history at the United States Military Academy, where he teaches a senior course on the nineteenth-century Army. He is the editor of Warfare in the USA, 1784–1861 (Burlington, Vt., 2005), and is working on several books dealing with civil–military relations and constabulary duties on the frontier between 1784 and 1861.

### The Chief’s Corner

**Dr. Jeff Clarke**

*Continued from page 3*


Along these lines, I note that in 2000 the American Historical Association’s “Statement on Standards of Professional Conduct” stressed the importance of “intellectual diversity” and, for whatever reason, advised that “the political, social, and religious beliefs of historians may inform their historical practice” (p. 2). Happily the association withdrew this troublesome assertion from the latest version of its standards, issued in 2005. The new statement instead affirms in boldface that “the practice of history requires awareness of one’s own biases and a readiness to follow sound method and analysis wherever they may lead” (p. 7).

Sound method and sound analysis—now there are qualities that we can believe in and that match our traditional values. Indeed, were we to succumb to the banalities of historical cheerleading for the institutions we represent and become part of the public affairs or “strategic communications” operations that are so prominent today, we would lose the respect not only of our colleagues in academia but also of our primary historical customers, for without our reputation for professional integrity we would have little to offer them. In truth, our foremost obligation is to provide to Army leaders, civilian and uniformed alike, the historical perspectives that can assist them in successfully grappling with current issues. Such presentations put a premium on the ability to communicate clearly and succinctly, and even to tell a story in a compelling manner. But above all, they demand the ability to convey information that is balanced and factually accurate as well as to provide insights, analyses, and conclusions that flow logically from the facts presented.

If we can satisfy our primary audiences in this manner, we can successfully use the same approach in the Army schoolhouse and in the material we offer to members of the general public, be they veterans, buffs, academics, or just average citizens. In the end then, we ourselves must uphold the standards of our profession without the expectation that anyone else will do that for us, but with the confidence that we are on the “right” side of history.
The Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee

The Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee, or DAHAC, is a longstanding Army committee composed of members from inside and outside the Army whose purpose is to advise the Army on how to keep its history program strong and vital. Formed in May 1943 by order of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and initially placed under the authority of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, it has functioned continuously since that time. It is one of the oldest federal advisory committees in the Army. Its members are drawn from academia, Training and Doctrine Command, the Army War College, the Combined Arms Center, the U.S. Military Academy, and even from the media and civilian think-tanks. Throughout its existence, the committee has served a valuable and, to my mind, irreplaceable function in strengthening the Army history program over time. However, I think that many historians throughout the Army do not know of the committee or may be unaware of its importance in raising the profile of history generally and the Center of Military History specifically with the Army’s senior leadership.

The primary purpose of the DAHAC is to provide the Chief of Military History, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Secretary of the Army with advice and counsel regarding the conformity of the Army’s historical work and methods to the highest professional historical standards. Its scope of responsibility covers all aspects of the Army Historical Program, including historical education throughout the Army, historical publications, staff support, museums, commemorative events, and even, indirectly, archival collection and management. DAHAC membership consists today of seven leading civilian scholars and writers of military history, five senior representatives of the Army’s major educational centers and commands, the deputy director of the Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, and a representative of the National Archives. Historians from outside the government are recommended for membership by the DAHAC itself, with final approval coming from the White House. Appointments for nongovernmental members are generally for two years, with an optional, renewable second term. The members meet to perform their advisory duties once a year, generally in October, and, while they receive some travel funds, they otherwise provide their services to the Army for free. Their commitment to improving the quality of Army history is truly their only reward.

The issues raised by the DAHAC are forwarded by the chairperson of the committee, currently Dr. Reina Pennington of Norwich University, through channels to the Secretary of the Army. Many of the issues raised in the past few years should be familiar to any intelligent observer of the Army history program. They include the training of Military History Detachments (MHDs); MHD force structure expansion; support of the Army’s official history writing program; support for the National Museum of the Army; more effective modalities to hire the highest quality historians (despite the often astonishing ineptitude of the Army’s civilian personnel system); and improving the quality of history education at the Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, and in the rest of the Army educational structure. Most recently the committee has especially highlighted the continuing failure of the Army’s records management system to do its basic task of preserving the operational records of an Army at war for future generations of citizens and historians. (For more on this issue see my footnote in the previous number of Army History.)

On all of these important issues—issues that affect historians and curators at the Center and throughout the Army history program—the DAHAC has weighed in and provided advice and guidance while also increasing the visibility of these challenges to the highest levels of Army leadership.

The question is often asked, sometimes even by DAHAC members, “Does the DAHAC make a difference?” And it is often difficult to demonstrate a direct one-to-one cor-
relation between an issue raised by the DAHAC one year and a subsequent decision or solution to that problem by the Army leadership. Yet, over time, the DAHAC has a positive influence that justifies its continued existence. I compare it to water dripping on limestone. The water seems to have no immediate effect but in the long run it shapes and carves the stone in incalculable ways. The very existence of the DAHAC, I am convinced, has ensured that the Army’s senior leadership has never made a concerted effort to disband the Army history program or to emasculate it by trying to turn historians into public affairs flacks. The DAHAC’s continuing adherence to the importance of official history and to the requirement that it be written as carefully and as objectively as possible is a powerful bulwark against the current flood of relativism and bias that seems to have crept even into the historical profession. The focus of the DAHAC on creating and resourcing history teaching positions or visiting professorships in the Army’s education system continues to make such improvements possible, even if the battles have to be fought and refought every year in every school.

In short, the Army’s historical program—in my opinion the finest historical program of any of the services and of any department in the federal government—is in its position of strength today in considerable part because of the service of the DAHAC to the cause of strengthening military history in the Army. Like a board of visitors at a college, the DAHAC reafirms the essential value of history to an often “presentist-minded” Army leadership, clearly posits the Army history program’s strengths and weaknesses to that leadership, and provides a continuing dialogue to highlight issues and concerns for all of us. The members of the Army history program are lucky to have the DAHAC, as is the Army we serve.

Continued from page 5

of the Association of the U.S. Army’s American Warriors series. Greenwood retired in 2007 after having headed the Army’s engineer history office, served as a division chief at the Center of Military History, and finally led the Army’s medical history office.

Col. Robert J. Dalessandro and Michael G. Knapp received the award in the Reference category for their book, Organization and Insignia of the American Expeditionary Force, 1917–1923, issued by Schiffer Books. When the awards were made, Dalessandro was director of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Knapp was head of that center’s Collections Management Directorate. Having subsequently retired from the military, Dalessandro is now assistant chief of military history for museums at the Center of Military History.

The foundation recognized Army historians for both of this year’s awards for outstanding articles on the history of the U.S. Army. Andrew J. Birtle won the award in the general Journals and Magazines category for “PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal,” which appeared in the October 2008 issue of the Journal of Military History. Birtle is chief of the Military Operations Branch of the Center of Military History’s Histories Division.

John A. Boyd won the foundation’s award in the Army Professional Journals category for “Intimidation, Provocation, Conspiracy, and Intrigue: The Militias of Kentucky, 1859–1861,” an article that appeared in the Fall 2008 issue of Army History. Boyd is the historian of the 81st Regional Support Command (Southeast) at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and the commander of the 20th Military History Detachment, an Army Reserve unit. He holds the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve.
New CMH Publications

See page 5 for more information.

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CHARLES R. SHRADER

HONOR AND FIDELITY
The 65th Infantry in Korea, 1950–1953

GILBERTO N. VILLAMOROSA

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U.S. Army Small-Unit Action in Iraq, 2004–2007
GENERAL EDITOR
JON T. HOFFMAN

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