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After each world war, the United States participated in the occupation of Germany, hoping thereby to firmly secure the peace that came with military victory. The articles in this issue of Army History consider both of these postwar episodes.

Alexander F. Barnes examines the stationing of U.S. troops in part of Germany after World War I. He considers the policies that U.S. forces implemented and discusses the U.S. soldier’s perspective on this service. The reader will observe how the goals of enhancing U.S. security and promoting economic revival and democratic expression in Germany sometimes clashed and how the impact of U.S. troop supervision of people in a defeated nation could not be easily predicted. Barnes finds, however, that the effort seems to have left a generally positive impression on the residents in the American zone.

Kathleen J. Nawyn focuses on a specific issue confronting the U.S. military in the aftermath of World War II: how to handle Germany’s defeated military personnel in a way that would forestall future aggression. In this case, the U.S. approach to Germany’s military leaders moderated very significantly over the course of the postwar occupation, and the author finds that the ultimate policy yielded some questionable instances of leniency. But this author, too, concludes that the policies that the U.S. military implemented were efficacious in reducing the impact of Germany’s militaristic traditions.

Maj. Gary D. Philman argues in this issue’s commentary that the growing integration of the world’s economy has radically diminished the prospects for military conflict between nations. This interpretation may underlie the U.S. military’s willingness to increasingly focus its resources on enhancing stability within troubled states. In a letter to the editor, meanwhile, Richard L. DiNardo offers opinions about professional military education that conflict with views presented by retired Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales in Army History’s Summer 2010 commentary.

Charles Hendricks
Managing Editor
As I complete my tenure as chief of military history and director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History at Fort McNair, I want to leave you with a few thoughts about the Army Historical Program and its immediate future. First, all of you, historians and curators alike, should be proud of the Army’s history program because it is the best such effort in the entire federal government and in the world, and has been recognized as such since World War II. Its publications, archival holdings, and museum collections have a global reach that is not duplicated anywhere else. It has represented the gold standard against which the historical programs of every Army and every federal agency have been measured, and I see no imminent threat to that reputation.

Second, the Army Historical Program’s primary mission is not to preserve the Army’s history—its records, experiences, materiel, artifacts, and so forth—for posterity. Rather, its main purpose is to support today’s Army in meeting its goals. The United States may not have or aspire to have the largest Army in the world, the most tanks and guns, the most brigades and battalions, the fanciest uniforms, or the most historic units, but, given our nation’s heavy worldwide responsibilities, we must have the smartest Army in the world. And that is where you, the Army’s historical professionals, come in.

In all that your commands do, from acquisition to budgeting, from training to operations, from education to tactics, someone has probably done those tasks before—generally many someones. And as historical professionals, you should be able to provide to the institutions you support descriptions of and insights derived from these past experiences, which will in turn give your commanders and staffs valuable historical perspectives on current problems as well as insights regarding future obstacles. Such analytical work has been the Center’s stock in trade for many decades. Over the last three years or so, we have submitted several hundred such products to Secretaries of the Army Pete Geren and John McHugh, Chief of Staff General George Casey, and their staffs. These have addressed issues like the Army’s changing mix of active and reserve component units since the Korean War and the philosophies behind those changes; wartime recruitment, retention and tour lengths; psychiatric casualty rates since the Civil War; efforts to solve strategic problems through silver-bullet acquisitions; counterinsurgency and occupation-force ratios; and the Department of the Army’s responses to new national administrations and its input to quadrennial defense reviews. Although not every question can be answered from data readily at hand, all Army historians ought to attempt to furnish similar assistance to their commands based on their own specialized knowledge, archival holdings and research experience.

Both the secretary of the Army and the chief of staff have recently observed that the Army will soon focus on reforming the “base” or “generating force,” sometimes called the TDA (table of distribution and allowances) army as opposed to the TOE (table of organization and equipment), or field, army. For command historians, that means scouring your archives and sources to ascertain how your headquarters has approached such exercises before. Have reorganization efforts been spearheaded by existing staffs, by special committees, or by an ad hoc task force? Were missions changed or recombined with others? Was the emphasis placed on accelerating processes or integrating results? Were changes progressive or incremental? And have rationales for reorganization been consistent or fractal? How have personnel and grades been impacted, and what have been the implications for reserve component forces? Providing such data will both assist your command and keep you tied closely to its current missions, easing your efforts to collect and archive the most critical contemporary material.

Our museum curators can certainly play similar supporting roles. The Center has already provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation large numbers of AK47s from its museum stocks for training, and we should be doing no less for our soldiers as we prepare them for the type of combat that the U.S. Army has seen so many times before. We should not be surprised that the Army’s recent designs for everything from pack-animal harnesses to truck-mounted gun systems and even advanced avionics frames have been informed by items in our museum artifact inventories, as these.

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Combat Studies Institute Press Releases New Publications

The Combat Studies Institute Press of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has issued several new publications. It has put out a new book on the U.S. Army’s changing approaches to reconnaissance over the last nine decades and three new contributions to its Occasional Papers series, each of which takes an international look at a military subject relevant to U.S. forces today.

To Fight or Not to Fight? Organizational and Doctrinal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Reconnaissance from the Interwar Years to Operation Iraqi Freedom by Robert S. Cameron is a 631-page study of the evolution between the 1920s and 2009 of the U.S. Army’s reconnaissance doctrine and the organization of forces to accomplish this mission. The volume also evaluates the significance of training, the development of equipment, and the impact of combat operations on Army reconnaissance capabilities. It devotes heavier attention to the more recent decades. Cameron has been the U.S. Army Armor Center’s historian since 1996.

Searching for Stability: The U.S. Development of Constabulary Forces in Latin America and the Philippines (Occasional Paper 30) discusses the development of the Philippine Constabulary under American sovereignty and the relationship between U.S. efforts to develop military and police forces in Cuba, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua with political developments in those nations in the twentieth century. Millett is a professor emeritus of history at Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville.

The Long War against Piracy: Historical Trends by James A. Wombwell (Paper 32) examines the evolution of piracy and privateering since 1500 in the West Indies, the Mediterranean Sea, and Asia and the reemergence of piracy in recent years, illustrating the historical relationship between the phenomenon and discord between rival nations. Wombwell, a retired captain in the Naval Reserve, is a historian at the Combat Studies Institute.

An Ever Present Danger: A Concise History of British Military Operations on the North-West Frontier, 1849–1947, by Matt M. Matthews (Paper 33) explores a century of difficult encounters between British colonial military forces and armed Pashtun tribesmen living in what is now the portion of northern Pakistan near the Afghan frontier. It scrutinizes the lessons learned by the British in these conflicts. Matthews is also a historian at the institute.

Digital copies of each of these publications may be downloaded from http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. Military personnel and federal employees may request printed copies by following the instructions posted at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/PubRequest.asp.

Distinguished Writing Award

The Army Historical Foundation bestowed on Kaylene Hughes a distinguished writing award in the Army professional journals category for her article “The Army’s Precision ‘Sunday Punch’: The Pershing II and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,” which appeared in the Fall 2009 issue of Army History. Hughes is a historian with the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. The award was announced at the foundation’s annual meeting in June.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Alexander F. Barnes enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1974. He served with the Marine Support Battalion at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and with the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade in Norway, Denmark, and West Germany. He later served for twenty-seven years with the Army National Guard in New York and Virginia, retiring in 2004 as a chief warrant officer, CW4. He has held civilian positions with the Department of the Army since 1982, and in that capacity he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Kuwait in support of Army operations. He also worked on the Army's port operations in Europe and the Far East. He is now a logistics management supervisor with the Combined Arms Support Command at Fort Lee, Virginia. He holds a bachelor's degree in anthropology and a master's degree in archeology from the Cortland and Binghamton campuses, respectively, of the State University of New York.
he heavily laden soldiers assembled at the Trier train station early on the morning of 8 December 1918, and when the train pulled out at 0900 it was headed east toward Coblenz on the Rhine. Normally, any infantryman prefers riding to walking, and this must have been especially true for these men, who had just endured a dozen days of strenuous road marching from Commercy, France. But these were not normal times, and for the doughboys of the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, this ride was different; it marked the beginning of perhaps the most unusual mission they would ever perform. Under the terms of the 11 November 1918 Armistice, the retreating German Army was required to make a phased withdrawal to and somewhat beyond the Rhine within thirty-one days. The cities slated for Allied occupation on that river appeared susceptible, prior to the victors’ arrival, to the armed, angry stragglers and deserters from the German Army and Navy, as well as a variety of Bolsheviks, Spartacists, and other highly politicized labor organizers who were provoking violence elsewhere in Germany. Indeed, the lack of clear political authority caused by the abdication of the kaiser and the collapse of the German Army at the end of World War I would lead to outbreaks of revolutionary violence in urban areas across Germany.1

Fearing that their city might be the next site of revolutionary fervor, the German authorities in Coblenz, working through an advance liaison officer from the U.S. Third Army, requested that the Americans dispatch troops in advance of the main force to maintain order in the city as well as to guard the Rhine River crossings until the rest of the American occupying forces could arrive. The honor of being that advance force went to the foot-weary doughboys of the 39th, and, as the train moved down the track, they did not know whether they would meet a hostile, neutral, or friendly reception.2

While no one knew exactly what to expect on this day, the U.S. Army had some practical experience with living in and governing occupied or hostile territory. U.S. troops currently in Iraq and Afghanistan are conducting peacekeeping or stabilization operations, and many think this is a new experience for the U.S. military, but that is far from the case. The two decades before the United States entered World War I saw an almost uninterrupted series of large and small conflicts, which often concluded with Army or Marine officers and noncommissioned officers performing civil affairs duties or exercising governmental responsibility. The deployment of U.S. forces to Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in those decades had provided numerous such occasions, but rarely on this scale and certainly never in a European country. And so, the Third Army was marching boldly but blindly toward its destiny on the Rhine as the American Army of Occupation. Just before the Armistice, the intelligence section of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) began to gather information on the organization and processes of the German government in order to prepare the Third Army for its civil and military missions, but the information it obtained was incomplete and largely outdated. Occupying Germany would
prove to be another on-the-job training event. The story of the American occupation of Germany from 1918 to 1923 provides an often fascinating look into a past with many parallels to today’s ongoing missions.

Honored or not, the 39th Infantry Regiment was certainly a good choice for the mission. As an element of the 4th Division, as today’s 4th Infantry Division was then designated, the 39th was a battle-tested outfit that had seen heavy combat north of Château Thierry in July and August 1918 and near Montfaucon, northwest of Verdun, in September and October 1918. On board the train was Sgt. Bert Fidler, a 19-year-old doughboy from Oswego County, New York, who had survived his share of dangers—snipers, high-explosive artillery fire, machine gun nests, and gas attacks—on the battlefield.

Fidler’s memories of his last months in France were still vivid when, some while later, he wrote to his family from occupied Coblenz. “It still gives me chills when I think of it. It was a case of running into machine gun nests just before we entered the Argonne woods. . . . I dropped as soon as they opened fire and believe me I didn’t fall a second too soon either for a machine gun must have been aimed straight at me. As I fell forward, a stream of bullets cut through the back rim of my helmet riddling my pack. The mess kit in my pack was shot full of holes, my corn willy and hard tack was shot to pieces so I didn’t have anything to eat for nearly 3 days.” Equally upsetting, his canteen was destroyed by the same burst, causing him to go thirsty until he could replace it.
Although not dangerous, the march to the Rhine after the Armistice was itself no small event, as it was longer than any undertaken in France by a U.S. Army unit. The move of the 39th Infantry to Germany involved travel over damaged roads and a week of almost continuous rain. Overall, the 4th Division saw more than 2,000 men evacuated to field hospitals while en route. But for the men of the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, the discomforts of the march were behind them now and, as the train pulled into the main Coblenz Bahnhof (train station) at 1430, the most important question of all was, How would they be received?5

Standing and waiting patiently at railside were two officers, the American liaison officer to Coblenz and a German officer. With few words and no ceremony, the men of the 39th disembarked from the train and were quickly broken into two-man teams to begin their foot patrol of the city. Sergeant Fidler and his patrol-mate were among the first Americans to enter the city; they preceded the American colors with “orders to knock the hats off any body that didn’t salute the flag.”6

For the next three days, the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, would be the only U.S. combat unit in the city of Coblenz.7 And what a city it was. Situated where the Moselle River joins the Rhine, Coblenz derived its name from the Latin word confluentes, signifying a place where rivers come together. Surrounded by nineteenth-century fortresses and packed with well-known landmarks, Coblenz had been a strategically important garrison town since the days of the Roman Empire. Particularly notable among its landmarks was a 40-foot-high bronze equestrian statue of Kaiser Wilhelm I (1797–1888) that stood facing north, atop an even taller monumental base, right at the river confluence; the large “ships bridge” across the Rhine made of pontoons that could be disconnected to allow river traffic to pass; and the massive Ehrenbreitstein castle that looked down on Coblenz from across the Rhine. On 8 December 1918, the men of the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, began walking around these monuments, guarding the city’s streets, and establishing residence in the city.

Filling the roads between France, Luxembourg, and Coblenz were some 250,000 more doughboys and all of their equipment. Under the terms of the Armistice, more than 2,500 square miles of western Germany with a million inhabitants were assigned to the United States for occupation duty. The Third Army was to set up its positions in a sector running from the Luxembourg border to an area on the east side of the Rhine River that was soon known simply as the Coblenz bridgehead. After the AEF commander, General John J. Pershing, received notification of the requirement, he had selected his occupying force from among the thirty intact infantry divisions in the AEF. Realizing the potential for danger and the inherent complexity of the operation, he chose some of his best units, including the four senior Regular Army divisions, the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th Divisions. From his National Guard divisions,
he selected the 42d Division (the nationwide “Rainbow Division”), and the 32d Division from Michigan and Wisconsin, whose members became known as the “Gemütlichkeit boys” because so many of them spoke German. From his National Army divisions, he added the 89th Division, formed of men from Missouri, Kansas, and Colorado, and the 90th Division, whose men were drawn primarily from Texas and Oklahoma. These eight divisions made up the Third Army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman. The distinctive patch designed for the Third Army was a capital letter “A” inside the letter “O,” symbolizing the army of occupation.

The selected divisions received notification of their new mission and organizational relationships almost immediately after the end of the fighting on 11 November, so they had only a few days to prepare for the move. Following on the heels of the retreating German Army, Third Army units began their advance toward Germany on 17 November 1918 and soon crossed the borders of Belgium and Luxembourg. To the north, elements of the British Army marched toward Cologne and the Belgian Army advanced toward Aachen, while to the south French forces headed toward a section around Mainz. Under the provisions of the Armistice, the victorious armies moved in stages, conscious at all times of the potential for renewed warfare. The Armistice did not permit crossing the German border until 1 December, and this allowed the units to take organized pauses to rest their animals and refurbish some of their equipment.

Once the German border had been crossed, however, the march took on a different tone altogether. Victory flags and pretty girls waving from the windows of the liberated towns of France and Luxembourg gave way to shuttered windows and deserted streets. Even the terrain became more difficult, and the frozen roads and heavy loads took their toll on the troops. After the American army crossed the border, some of the units dropped out of the march and set up in their assigned sectors. During this approach to the Rhine, the 39th Infantry received its mission to move into the vanguard of the Third Army and occupy Coblenz. Finally, on 11 December 1918, all of the Allied forces reached the Rhine and, after a short reorganization, crossed in large numbers on 13 December to establish positions on its eastern shore.

When the main force arrived, the headquarters of the Third Army was established in Coblenz in a large German government building complex located on the waterfront on the west bank of the Rhine. Crossing to the east side of the river, III Corps, composed of the 1st, 2d, and 32d Divisions, took up positions within a large semicircle, 18.6 miles in radius, to guard the bridgehead. The Marine brigade of the 2d Infantry Division, acting as the extreme left flank of the Army, crossed the Rhine via the Ludendorff Railroad Bridge at Remagen, a site that would assume even greater significance in the next world war. Remaining on the west bank of the Rhine was IV Corps with the 3d, 4th, and 42d Divisions. The VII Corps, made up of the 89th and 90th Divisions, occupied the Moselle valley from Trier west to the Luxembourg border. In support roles further to the rear, the 33d Division, an Illinois National Guard outfit, and elements of the 5th Division, a Regular Army organization, were stationed in Luxembourg to protect and maintain the Third Army’s logistics pipeline from France.

Although most of the soldiers assigned to the Third Army would probably have preferred to be heading home, some were so fed up with France and the French that they were happy to try something new. As Robert Koehn, a doughboy from Elyria, Ohio, wrote his mother “no wonder these French don’t get nothing done, they Stand around pretty well all day.” Right after the Armistice was announced, he complained, “these French have raised the price on every thing.” A Third Army civil affairs officer noted, “The average soldier looked forward with curiosity to seeing Germany.”

After arriving in the Coblenz sector, among the first duties of the Third Army was to disarm the new security forces that had been formed in the area. While for the most part the front-line German Army units maintained their discipline during the withdrawal from France, the unorganized, angry stragglers of various units presented a very real threat to lives and property in Coblenz. To maintain order in the city, a local police inspector had recruited and armed citizens of Coblenz with prior military experience to act as a peacekeeping force. Starting with a hundred men, this force had quickly grown to three hundred men led by two infantry captains, and it was
charged with guarding local government arsenals, depots, and ammunition dumps. After the Americans met with the local authorities, they moved quickly to disarm this force. A few days before Christmas, an additional battalion from the 4th Division was dispatched to augment the 2d Battalion, 39th Infantry, in providing security in Coblenz.14

As could be expected, the arrival of the U.S. Third Army was a cause for uncertainty in the local population because the attitude of the Americans toward the Germans was unknown. General Pershing attempted to alleviate the local citizens’ fears by proclaiming, “The American Army has not come to make war on the civilian population. All persons, who with honest submission act peaceably and obey the rules laid down by the military authorities, will be protected in their persons, their homes, their religion and their property. All others will be brought within the rule with firmness, promptness and vigor.”15

On 7 December 1918, just before the arrival of the first American forces, Coblenz’s Burgomaster (mayor) and Police Director Closterman announced to the German population, “We are informed by the American Commission that the civil life will not be disturbed. Under the condition, however, that not the slightest disturbance to public order and security occurs.” Nonetheless, two days later the AEF issued regulations for the American occupation zone banning public gatherings, severely restricting long-distance telephone communications and outdoor photography, censoring the press, and even requiring detailed reports from the owners of carrier pigeons. The Third Army established control soon thereafter, and General Dickman and his staff began to regulate a broad range of social and economic aspects of life in the occupied territory.16

Although preliminary planning had been quite limited, the AEF had wisely decided that officers in charge of civil affairs would assist the commanders of combat units in their designated zones of occupation. This would free the unit commanders to focus their attention on the disposition of their units and to make preparations for restarting combat operations should that be necessary. It also gave the German population the impression that the civil affairs officers had the weight of the combat units behind them in enforcing the American occupation. Operating in the towns and local regions of the American zone, the officers in charge of civil affairs had responsibilities that far outstripped any training they might have received. Their administrative duties came to include supervision of the German police and local jails, liaison with the local government officials, the conduct of provost marshal courts, control of the movement of all civilians in their area, and responding to any complaints by local civilians against the military. Other duties included the surveillance of local food and fuel supplies, supervision of public utilities, and oversight of the local political scene.17

Early in the occupation many of the officers in charge of civil affairs found themselves overwhelmed by the scope of their duties and, when confronted by law-breaking Germans, often simply imposed the most severe punishments allowed. Adding to their struggle was the confusion caused by the fact that the head of civil affairs operations was initially assigned to the AEF advance general headquarters in Trier, eighty miles away from the headquarters of the commanding general of the Third Army Coblenz. The distance from the flagpole and poor communication capability often led to a lack of guidance, conflicting guidance, or an uneven application of the guidance that was offered. Only in June 1919, after four U.S. divisions had left Germany to redeploy to the United States, did the U.S. Army shift ultimate civil affairs authority in Germany to the Third Army headquarters in Coblenz. The remaining officers in charge of civil affairs in each of the local districts were henceforth able to get clearer instructions in the form of Third Army ordinances. Perhaps more important, by now most of these officers and their German counterparts had begun to develop a partnering attitude and had started to work together to resolve issues before they became problems.18

This partnership was critically important because occupied German communities whose war industries had been unable to promptly reconvert to civilian production could neither sustain their people nor pay war reparations to the victorious Allies. It was incumbent on both the occupiers and the occupied to restore the economies of these communities as soon as possible. In the near term, however, the occupying forces’ many rules and proclamations imposed serious impediments to reviving local trade and industry. These regulations severely
restricted all personal movement and allowed U.S. military authorities to keep a close eye on the ownership and use of automobiles. All newspapers and magazines published in the American zone had to be delivered to the local U.S. military commander upon issue for censorship review; any appearance of anti-American sentiment would cause the suppression of the publication. Printing of material other than periodicals also required the approval of American authorities. Allied censorship and control of telegraph and telephone messages and the variations among the occupying powers’ regulations on movement and travel also proved troublesome for the local inhabitants.19

To keep local industrial plants from closing and to reduce unemployment in the American zone, U.S. occupation authorities quickly permitted the transport of raw materials and industrial equipment into that zone. Beginning in January 1919 they also permitted the local industries to sell their products in the rest of Germany. These provisions helped revive the economy of the zone.20

In German cities like Coblenz and Trier, the responsibilities of civil administration were traditionally divided among a burgomaster and several assistant burgomasters. With the advent of the American occupation, these civic leaders functioned as the liaison staff and worked closely with the U.S. officers in charge of civil affairs. The variety of responsibilities held by Coblenz Assistant Burgomaster Rogg was typical of the range of administrative duties of these officials. His assignments included oversight of the Department of Construction, the Department of Street Cleaning, the Municipal Wagon Park, canalization, apartment inspections, the naming of streets, railway construction, streetcar and electricity issues, bath houses, and the management of the huge municipal Festhalle and the municipal wine cellar.21

Of particular importance to Rogg was his role as administrator of the Festhalle. This building served as the cultural center of the town and had even doubled, during some of the economic crises caused by the war, as a homeless shelter and food kitchen. During the occupation, the Festhalle was requisitioned by the Army and turned over to the YMCA to serve as a massive recreation center for the troops of the Third Army. Later intelligence summaries would indicate that requisitioning the Festhalle was one of the U.S. Army’s more aggravating acts, as it deprived Coblenz’s citizens of their social center and dance hall.22

Although Coblenz had been a military garrison town for many years, there was a severe shortage of billeting space throughout the entire occupied zone for the 250,000 doughboys initially assigned to the Third Army. Quartermaster officers thus had to house many of the officers and soldiers in local hotels and homes. Invariably this led to some antagonism between
the Americans and their German landlords. Billeting officers for the 4th and the 89th Divisions reported that some of the wealthier landowners in their areas attempted to hide the number of potential billeting rooms they owned in order to avoid having them occupied. Conversely, the 42d Division reported that it had been easier to obtain billets in the occupied zone than it had been in France. For daily payments of 2 marks per officer and 4 pfennigs per enlisted man, the landlords were expected to provide a bed with clean linen, clean living space, light, and heat. Many landlords saw this as inadequate compensation—with the economic fluctuations and inflation, the mark’s value rate went from 7.8 to the U.S. dollar in 1918 to 109 to the dollar in February 1920—and they complained that “American troops use and waste more light daily than the Germans [do] weekly.” Hotel owners were also upset that the compensation they received did not fairly reimburse them for the loss in revenue from commercial customers or for the excessive wear and tear their furniture received from the American soldiers.

Other businesses in the occupation zone, however, benefited from the American presence. The local stonemason, lumber, and sawmill businesses saw a nice upturn in trade as they were called upon to supply the Third Army’s need for construction materials. Similarly, the tailors, laundries, photographers, barbers, and shoemakers found their businesses booming as the doughboys took advantage of their services. In both Coblenz and the smaller towns, the troops also visited and spent freely in jewelry shops, souvenir stands, stationery stores, and other small retail establishments to satisfy their quest for souvenirs and items to send to the folks back home. And while some Germans were upset at the relative wealth of the American doughboy compared to the average German, an American officer noted “the important fact that the well-paid troops spent their money for the necessities of life or the satisfaction of their personal inclinations on the same generous scale as that on which they received it.”

The local beer and wine merchants also quickly discovered the doughboy trade to be good for business. Fortunately, many breweries were located in the Coblenz area. Especially well known were some of the larger ones, the Königsbacher Brauerei, the Schultheis Brauerei, and the Klosterbrauerei. The large local wineries and world-renowned mineral water businesses in the Ahrweiler area in the U.S. occupation zone also benefited from the thirsty doughboys.

In an attempt to control this thirst, the AEF in December 1918 ordered that U.S. soldiers would be allowed to purchase beer and wine only between 1100 and 1400 and between 1700 and 1900, and that no stronger liquors were to be sold in the occupation zone at any time. To make this rule more easily enforceable, all patrons were required to leave cafés and restaurants by 2100. Beginning in February 1919, however, these establishments were allowed to remain open and to sell beer and wine to all until 2200, and in 1920 closing hours were further relaxed. Any German businessman breaking these regulations was subject to a fine or imprisonment. Children were also forbidden to loiter in areas where the Americans were billeted, and parents were warned that if they could not control the “unnecessary inquisitive-ness of their children” around the American soldiers, legal proceedings might be taken against them.

Along with the regulation of drinking hours, the Coblenz “red light” district was placed strictly off limits to the Americans because it was deemed too small to handle the large influx of American soldiers Coblenz received on a daily basis. Soon after, as travel restrictions between zones were lifted, an American officer noted that “professional prostitutes flocked to Coblenz. Under their influence—or sometimes, perhaps, unable to discriminate—soldiers occasionally requested permission to marry women of this class.” In 1920 and 1921, U.S. military provost courts convicted defendants of 6,746 charges of violation of military government regulations. More than 65 percent of these convictions (4,416) were for prostitution or the associated offense of “vagrancy.” The next largest category was “unlawful possession of United States government property” with a comparatively few 437 offenders.

The red light district notwithstanding, the increased desire by the doughboys for haircuts, photographic portraits, dress uniforms, fancy perfumes, and stationery quickly drove up the prices for these services and products. This increase in cost did not negatively affect the local
population as most of these items were seen as luxuries by the German people who, after four years of war rationing, were concerned mainly with staying warm through the winter and trying to get enough to eat.

Although legal businesses began to thrive and the friendly nature of the American doughboys and the local Germans made for a fairly easy transition from conquered populace to congenial host, some Germans could not avoid breaking the American ordinances. In February 1919, a U.S. military commission tried two German citizens, wholesale liquor merchants Mathias Scheid and Jacob Ring, for attempting to smuggle some seven hundred cases of cognac into Coblenz by boat from Oppenheim am-Rhein, a small town south of Mainz. After their arrest, they pleaded “not guilty” to charges of smuggling and procuring fraudulent documentation. The commission found both men guilty and sentenced each to a year at hard labor and a fine of 250,000 marks. This punishment was later reduced by General Dickman to six months at hard labor and a 100,000-mark fine.31

Even as the occupation became more settled and some restrictions were lifted, the variety of crimes inside the American zone continued to run the gamut from attempting to start a “Spartacist movement” to insulting the United States flag, the United States Army, and a female YMCA worker. More common, however, were convictions for the purchase or possession of U.S. property. U.S. officers soon began to notice that the local inhabitants’ attitudes were changing from apprehension to more assurance in dealing with American soldiers. One observed that “when they saw that we were not inclined to treat them harshly, they changed very rapidly, in a few days, and from an attitude of cringing servility they became loud, a bit aggressive and assertive.” At first this created other problems, but when the Germans realized that the Third Army really did intend to occupy the zone in a fair but firm manner, some of the aggressive attitudes were relaxed.32

By April 1919, just a few months after all of the units were set in place, the 42d Division received orders to move back to France and sail to the United States. This started the rapid demobilization of the divisions that had been assigned to the occupation force, with the last division leaving Germany in August 1919.33

One factor that helped smooth the rough edges between the U.S. Army and the German population was the success that U.S. Army remount units in Coblenz, Sinzig, Wengerohr, Trier, and elsewhere in the American occupation zone were having in nursing the 50,000 horses and mules of the Third Army back to health. Each wartime U.S. infantry division was authorized almost 4,000 horses and 2,700 mules under its table of organization. With the return to the United States of the divisions in France and subsequently the divisions in the occupying force, along with the motorizing of previously horse-drawn artillery pieces, the Army no longer needed many of these animals and they could be offered for sale to the local population. From March to May 1919, the Third Army auctioned more than 5,500 animals for farm work and another 192 for butchering.34 The results were immediately positive. Germany had been stripped of draft animals to support its army in France, so local farmers were very eager to obtain healthy horses and mules. In one case, fervor ran so high that the doughboys in the area’s remount squadrons had to be called out of their barracks with weapons and field gear in order to maintain order among the unruly buyers during the auction.35

Around the same time the Army began to auction a large number of...
vehicles, carts, and wagons captured from the German Army. Equally important were the salvage sales of thousands of pairs of repaired shoes, scrap metal, excess automobile parts, tires, miscellaneous kitchen tools, and other equipment. All of these provided much-needed products and materiel, serving to boost the local economy and help restore its normal peacetime functioning.

In addition to keeping U.S. troops occupied with guard mounts, city patrols, or border crossing duties, American commanders carried out vigorous combat training programs and conducted large field maneuvers culminating in “live-fire” exercises that used some of the substantial quantities of excess ammunition available in the zone. These exercises employed artillery and aircraft in both offensive and defensive roles, and time was set aside for in-depth performance critiques. The American forces also ultimately set up a number of schools to prepare the doughboys for their return to civilian life by teaching skills such as auto repair, welding, electronics, and agricultural science. The last of these topics was taught successfully at a small farm operated by the quartermaster of the American Forces in Germany near Mühlheim (today Mühlheim-Kärlich), a town six miles northwest of Coblenz. The farm provided fresh meat, vegetables, eggs, milk, and flowers to the soldiers and produced enough extra to sell locally. 36

As the weather improved with the advent of spring each year, the doughboy’s life in the zone became even more pleasant. Sergeant Fidler wrote his family back in New York, “This is a very beautiful morning and I haven’t anything better to do than write letters . . . since we have been here in Coblenz I have got mail nearly every day.” The doughboys were encouraged to take sightseeing trips to France and England, and some even traveled as far as Italy.37

On 2 July 1919, the Third Army headquarters demobilized and was replaced by a new command designated American Forces in Germany. General Pershing selected Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen to lead this new organization. Allen was particularly well suited for this position as he had been a U.S. military attaché first in Russia and then in Germany in the 1890s. He served several months in 1901 as military governor of the island of Leyte in the Philippines, and then organized and for four years led the native-manned Philippine Constabulary, the U.S. civil government’s law enforcement
organization in the Philippines. During World War I, Allen organized and led the 90th Division through the St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns, and in the months after the Armistice he held a succession of corps commands in France and Germany.\(^38\)

During the course of 1919, a large majority of the U.S. soldiers and combat units that had served on occupation duty redeployed to the United States, leaving fewer than 20,000 U.S. Army officers and enlisted men in Germany as the year ended.

Among Allen’s early guidance to the American Forces in Germany was the notification that all assigned soldiers would now wear the “AO” patch that the command had assumed when it replaced the Third Army in lieu of their individual division or unit patch. Though unpopular at first with soldiers justifiably proud of their own unit’s insignia, this order helped General Allen to mold his command into a cohesive organization able to focus on its unique military and civilian missions. Its qualities impressed many military leaders. General Pershing was reported to have declared “that the American Forces in Germany have been the best unit in the United States Army.”\(^39\)

Because the United States had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles and thus was still technically at war with Germany, the question arose, once that treaty took effect on 10 January 1920, whether any of the ordinances approved by the other victorious nations on the Interallied Rhineland High Commission would be binding in the American zone. General Allen defused this potentially difficult situation by publishing, with a few exceptions, the commissions’ ordinances as official orders from his headquarters.\(^40\)

By the end of 1919, the American Forces in Germany had been reduced to two small brigades built around the 5th, 8th, and 50th Infantry Regiments. Even as the number of soldiers in the Coblenz area declined, however, their impact remained substantial, particularly after September 1919, when U.S. troops were permitted to fraternize with the German population. Between 1 December 1919 and 1 January 1922, the U.S. Army became responsible for providing passage back to America, along with rotating soldiers whose tour was completed, for 782 dependent wives and their 267 children. Nearly 90 percent of these women were German and 6 percent were French.\(^41\) In April 1920, General Allen attempted to limit his command’s approval of overseas marriages to requests submitted by soldiers above the rank of staff sergeant, believing this was necessary to prevent his organization from becoming a “partially Germanized command.” The U.S. War Department, however, disapproved this policy. Instead, it simply permitted Allen to limit the command’s approval to the marriages of those doughboys whose character was “very good or excellent” and to deny approval when the woman’s character was “questionable.” Only spouses whose marriages had been approved by the command could, with their children, obtain dependent billets on ships returning soldiers to the United States. In spite of this relaxation of the marriage guidelines, roughly an equal number of marriage-approval applications were approved and disapproved. Doughboys were alleged to be fathers of 36 percent of the illegitimate children born in the occupied zone in 1920 and of 42 percent of those born in 1921.\(^42\)

The American Forces in Germany cooperated actively in the occupied zone with a program initiated in 1920 to provide food aid to undernourished German children. The
American Friends Service Committee conducted the program in coordination with the official American Relief Administration, headed by Herbert Hoover. The children the program aided had suffered from poor diet during the war, and many were extremely malnourished. This became fully apparent when German physicians conducted physical examinations of more than 100,000 children aged twelve and under in the American zone and found over 15 percent of them to be in very poor condition. The relief program provided one healthy meal a day to the most undernourished. The children’s condition was monitored and, as their health improved, they were removed from the program and other children were added. In 1920 alone, more than 23,000 children in the American zone received meals. This number dropped to 5,400 in 1921 as the general health of the population continued to improve. General Allen was so convinced of the importance of this work that in 1923, after his retirement, he assumed the leadership of a committee of prominent Americans that would raise more than $4.3 million to continue feeding children across Germany, where significant needs persisted.

During 1922, the German government’s failure to meet the reparation requirements of the Versailles Treaty, along with other concerns, led France to contemplate military enforcement action. Congress and the administration of President Warren G. Harding had supported the continued service of U.S. troops in the Rhine occupation so long as this commitment appeared to be restraining French aggressiveness toward Germany and contributing to peaceful reconstruction in Europe. By the end of 1922, this effect seemed to have run its course. Moreover, Americans had clearly wearied of the effort. On 7 January 1923, the Senate voted 57 to 6 to call for the return of U.S. occupation troops. When, three days later, France announced that it would occupy the Ruhr to seize its mines, hoping thereby to obtain full reparations, the United States decided to withdraw the last of its occupation forces.

When the American flag was lowered at Ehrenbreitstein on 24 January 1923, control of the Coblenz bridgehead passed to the French Army, and the last American soldiers left the occupation zone. In his final public remarks as commanding general of the American Forces in Germany, General Allen said, “With deep affection in our hearts for our Allies and sympathy for our former foes, our highest ambition has been to act with such justice towards all as would insure a lasting peace in Europe.”

The American flag would not fly again in that part of Germany until twenty-two years later, when American GIs in March 1945 once again crossed the Rhine in a second, more successful attempt to obtain a lasting peace.

What are we to think of that first occupation of part of Germany by the American Army? While its scale and length were overshadowed by the post–World War II occupation of Germany and the stationing of U.S. forces there during the subsequent Cold War, the American occupiers of 1918–1923 experienced many of the same ups and downs, problems and successes, of the later, larger versions. The administration of an occupied territory, though challenging, was certainly not outside the capabilities of the U.S. Army in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and the American soldier proved to be an amiable yet effective occupier. A 1919 report from the military commander of occupied Coblenz points out key attributes of successful occupation that still ring true today. “It will always be necessary to protect and regulate the following: public utilities, war materials and supplies, food stores—clothing stores, bridges and ferries, control the civil population, control circulation of civilians.”

An American officer wrote in a 1921 report on the occupation, “The well-behaved and self-respecting American soldier found himself a respected member of the community, and he was not slow to take advantage of a welcome that except in time of war his own countrymen have never extended him. At the same time he never forgot that he was the representative of a victorious people, he continued to preserve a tactful attitude of superiority, and in every way he showed himself worthy of the country from which he came.” Though his report was also brutally honest in describing many of the crimes committed and mistakes made by doughboys and Germans alike during the period, the officer concluded, “The departure of a train filled with soldiers bound for the United States furnished evidence of the friendly relations mentioned above. The sight of the throngs of Germans gathered about the train, of the sorrowful and in some cases tear-streaked countenances, and the shouted farewells made it difficult to realize that those leaving were soldiers of an army of occupation or that the crowds were composed of...
inhabitants of an occupied area. One could but reflect that the departing soldiers would probably meet with no such cordiality upon their arrival in their own country.” He was right. The return of the last of the doughboys drew no acclaim in the United States. Indeed, the medal created to honor the doughboys’ service in the occupation of Germany would not be authorized by Congress until November 1941, as the United States was on the verge of entering another world war.48

Notes


2. Bach and Hall, Fourth Division in the World War, pp. 221–22.


12. Ltrs, Pvt Robert Koehn to Mrs. Charles Koehn, 24 Sep 1918, first quote; Robert Koehn to Mrs. Charles Koehn, 25 Nov 1918, second quote. Private Koehn was a prolific writer and documented his experiences well, but he did not believe in the use of punctuation and many of his letters appear to be single sentences. All spelling and punctuation quoted here are his. Bach and Hall, Fourth Division in the World War, p. 233, reports the view that the French were overcharging as a way of “making the Americans pay for the war.”


15. Ltr, General John J. Pershing to all inhabitants, no date [evidently mid-December 1918], printed in Report of the Military Commander, Coblenz, p. 79.


17. Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, p. 86.


20. Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, pp. 185–89; Smith, Military Government, pp. 27, 35–36; Nelson, Victors Divided, pp. 44–45.


23. Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, p. 39.


25. Ibid., pp. 64–65; Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, American Forces in Germany [Lt. Col. Henry Hossfeld], American Representation in Occupied Germany, 1922–23 (Coblenz, 1923?), p. 244, quote.


27. Ibid., pp. 76, 80–82, 88–91, 94, quote,
If all of our historical professionals can do that, I know missions and should strive to do so at every opportunity. A somewhat different function than historians in this arena speed and mass production.) Thus, although curators have had on equipment development and the advantages pos-
sessed by the more expensive but generally better armed and armored German machines. (We put our money into
in research, while a comparison of the armor used by
from Normandy, for example, underlines the importance
of unit cohesion, while a comparison of the armor used by
the U.S. Army and its foes during World War II dramati-
cally illustrates the impact that different armor doctrines
had on equipment development and the advantages poss-
sessed by the more expensive but generally better armed
and armored German machines. (We put our money into
speed and mass production.) Thus, although curators have
a somewhat different function than historians in this arena
of support, they too can supply concrete aid for current
missions and should strive to do so at every opportunity.
If all of our historical professionals can do that, I know
that we will have a smarter and a better Army and that
the Army Historical Program will have made a lasting
contribution to the national defense.

I recently returned from a great visit to the Grafenwöhr
training area, where Elvis Presley was serving in 1960
when I first donned an Army uniform. Certainly I have
watched great changes in the U.S. Army since then. Now,
after forty years of service to that Army, I will be retiring
as this issue of Army History goes to press. But as one who
has specialized in military history, I consider myself ex-
tremely fortunate to have had such a great career working
and sharing wonderful experiences with so many terrific
people. I sincerely wish all of you well. I ask only that you
build on the fine work done by your predecessors and
ensure that our historical programs remain the best in the
world as you continue to provide tangible support to our
soldiers and leaders.
A surrendered German officer consumes a can of rations among the ruins of Saarbrücken, Germany, March 1945.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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During World War II, American officials planning for the occupation of Germany were very conscious of the country’s recent past. Germany had lost World War I, its dead had numbered in the millions, and its defeat had spawned revolution, inflation, social unrest, and political instability. The Treaty of Versailles, the peace settlement signed in 1919, had shackled its war industries, abolished its general staff, and slashed the size of its armed forces. Yet just twenty years later, Adolf Hitler had attacked his neighbors with a vast army. In light of this history, the Americans were convinced that even if Germany lost the current war, it would eventually reconstitute its military strength and start another one.¹

Integral to this problem was the German officer corps, particularly the general staff. “The German military class has proved itself to be a war-glorifying and peace-disturbing caste,” one State Department working paper on disarmament declared.³ The post-hostilities planning staff of the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), similarly called the general staff corps the “high priesthood of the German cult of war” and argued that even if the Allies dissolved the Wehrmacht, its officer corps would have the desire and skills to build a new German army.⁴ Simply put, Germany’s officers were deemed a continuing threat to world security, and U.S. policymakers were determined to curb their influence.

American thinking regarding exactly what to do with Germany’s potentially dangerous high-ranking officers and general staff corps evolved over time, however, partly in response to talks with the other occupation powers, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Not entirely by design, the United States kept the Wehrmacht’s elite officers in captivity for nearly two years, effectively preventing them from contributing to Germany’s social and political life during a critical period of its postwar history. But U.S. policies also eventually encouraged the officers’ reintegration into German society, helping to limit their resentment and lessen the chances of unrest.

Upon establishing control in its zone of occupation, which included most of southern Germany and a small area in the country’s northwest, the United States implemented a number of policies aimed at reducing military influence in
German politics and society. The Americans disbanded the Wehrmacht, banned veterans’ organizations, and terminated military pensions in anticipation of integrating veterans into a unified social insurance system. In addition, U.S. troops confined all active German officers in prisoner of war camps and interned anyone who had ever been a member of the general staff corps or its navy and air force equivalents.

What would become of Germany’s captive military elites remained an open question, however. Because Allied policymakers were convinced that the German officer corps represented a real threat to the world’s future security, most believed that at least a portion of the men would have to be controlled for some period of time. In particular, few doubted the dangers posed by the German General Staff or questioned the need for its abolition, and many concluded that members of the general staff corps would require special attention. For example, certain SHAEF officials staked out a relatively extreme position in late April 1945 when considering what to do with Germany’s general staff officers and general officers. Arguing that “drastic steps must be taken to render innocuous all members of [the] general staff corps and the more dangerous elements of the professional officer corps,” they suggested that the “most effective method would be their physical extermination.” If this approach was not “acceptable,” they recommended that the officers “be transported into permanent exile and life imprisonment in a suitable place.” General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of SHAEF, echoed these thoughts two months later when he told reporters assembled at a Pentagon press conference that the German General Staff should be “destroyed—never to rise and make war again.” Pointing out that this group had been intent on ruling the world since 1806 and saw World War II as “just another incident,” he argued that the Allies “must not only destroy all their archives, but also segregate them—keep them apart where they can never go back where they were.”

Any decision regarding the fate of Germany’s elite officers would have to be a quadripartite one, however. And when the war ended in May 1945, although Allied officials organized a quadripartite control authority for Germany, the staff of the U.S. military government’s Army (Ground) Division worked on a plan for Germany’s officers. In an August 1945 paper, the division, headed by Maj. Gen. Ray W. Barker, admitted that identifying dangerous officers was difficult because they were dispersed throughout the armed services and represented a threat because of their “personal potentialities,” not their positions. But despite a professed desire to offer a “set of specifications” to use in classifying each individual, the division went on to describe two groups defined mostly by rank and military position. In its Group I, the division placed “the elite” of the militarists” who it considered “a
marked military menace,” that is, men who it assumed had the will and skills to rebuild Germany’s military power and who would be its future military planners, instructors, and commanders. These included all general staff officers, all general officers and flag officers, and the most promising and accomplished lower-ranking officers, who the division thought could be identified by their backgrounds and career achievements. In its Group II, the division put officers who it also deemed potentially dangerous owing to their “military capabilities and tendencies,” but less so. These included all other career officers; all reserve officers above the rank of army captain who had served on a military staff at the military district level or above, unless they were deemed harmless; and any other officers—especially young Luftwaffe officers—whom a zone commander believed should be controlled in some fashion. The Army (Ground) Division staff thought that the total number of men in the two groups would be about 58,000.12

The division also considered how to handle the officers, noting that its analysis was “predicated upon the generally accepted thesis that, wholly aside from the problem of punishment for complicity in war crimes, it is necessary to take positive restrictive measures to render innocuous those German officers who might foster a resurgence of militarism in Germany.” The division then evaluated three possible courses of action—establishing colonies of officers in isolated locations outside of Germany (“exile of the ‘St. Helena’ nature”), dispersing and monitoring the officers in territory under Allied control, and leaving the men in Germany subject to severe restrictions and surveillance.13

Although SHAEF officials had from time to time discussed the possibility of exile, the Army (Ground) Division staff rejected not only this idea but that of dispersal as well. It concluded that exile would cut the officers off from any accomplices but that making the necessary arrangements would pose daunting political challenges. In addition, the Western powers would probably be reluctant to commit to such a long-range policy, while the policy itself would likely make the officers martyrs and heroes in German eyes. The dispersal option suffered from similar weaknesses, and the division’s leaders speculated that “political and social assaults” would gradually cause such a program to break down. They therefore recommended the third option, proposing that Group I officers be allowed to return home but be forbidden to leave the country, change their domicile without permission, hold office, or assume public positions above the rank of laborer. In addition, they should have to report periodically to local occupation officials, with their homes subject to unannounced searches, their communications censored, their activities monitored, and their jobs approved by military government authorities. Group II officers would be monitored, barred from public office, limited in their job options, and required to report in regularly.14

Circulated among policymakers at U.S. military government headquarters, the plan encountered some resistance. Officials from the Office of the Director of Intelligence, for instance, worried about an insufficient supply of surveillance personnel and argued that clandestine activities would be “inevitable,” with German officers free to carry out their secret plans after U.S. troops withdrew in a few years. They called for “banishment of the St. Helena type.” Taking a different tack, the staff of the Office of the Director of Political Affairs suggested that a rehabilitation program be added to the plan, reasoning that men without productive work would undoubtedly “attempt subrosa propagation of militarism” and undermine Allied control or the authority of a new German government.

The director of the Legal Division, meanwhile, wanted to ensure that plans for the general staff were intended to accomplish the Allied goal of permanently eliminating German militarism and not meant as a punishment for war crimes. Any war criminals, he assumed, would be “tried and punished in due course.”15 At the time, the United States and its allies were developing a multipronged program for trying suspected war criminals. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg would eventually find five high-ranking military officers guilty of war crimes, with subsequent proceedings before American tribunals convicting twenty other senior officers.16 In addition, U.S. military courts would punish lower-ranking officers for murdering surrendered American soldiers or mistreating those held in prisoner of war camps.17
The Army (Ground) Division staff dismissed the objections raised by the military government’s intelligence officials, contending that the proposed control system would render any clandestine activities “innocuous” and that economic and political changes made during the occupation would reduce the security threat German officers posed after the Allies left. But they did insert a reference to rehabilitation in the proposal before the United States submitted a streamlined version of the plan to the new Allied Control Authority’s Military Directorate for consideration at a September 1945 meeting.

The British did not like the plan. Backed by the French and Soviets, they pushed for holding Germany’s most dangerous officers—its generals, admirals, general staff officers, and “any other officers who, as a result of investigation are militarily dangerous in any way”—outside of Germany. They believed that the total number of men affected would be about 3,000; the Americans thought the number might reach twice this. Despite the original American position, the head of U.S. military government operations, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, told the American delegate that if the directorate could develop a “sane and practicable” exile plan, he would “consider such a plan favorably” and present it to Washington. His political adviser later informed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that Clay intended to show any such plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the Allied Control Council approved it for implementation.

During the next few months, Military Directorate officials attempted to devise a workable program. By the end of October 1945, they had created a plan that cut both broadly and deeply. Describing four large categories of potentially dangerous men, including even civilian Luftwaffe officials and any regular noncommissioned officers who were considered especially dangerous, the directorate officials prescribed restrictions on the rights and activities of most of the military men. But officers in their Category I—including all general staff officers, general officers, and men who had commanded divisions—were to be exiled until at least 1960 and re-leased only when they reached the age of seventy. Placed in isolated locations under guard, in living conditions equal to those of a typical workingman of the country that detained them, they would work as manual laborers and be barred from teaching or writing books. Their families might accompany them, however, with their children given access to a democratic education.

After discussing this plan with American policymakers during a visit to Washington, Clay instructed U.S. officials to seek instead an agreement allowing the most dangerous Germans to be interned in Germany. The British and French now endorsed this approach as well, but the Soviets did not. Accordingly, in January 1946 the Military Directorate drafted a new plan with just two disposition categories. Under the revised plan, all Category I personnel were to be held in guarded camps either in or outside of Germany, at the discretion of the detaining power. The other conditions originally laid out in the exile plan remained largely unchanged.

But the issue was not yet decided. Before the Military Directorate could finalize its proposal, Clay sent the plans for Germany’s officers spinning in a different direction. In March 1946, a new denazification law took effect in the U.S. Zone of Occupation. Promulgated by German leaders but substantially in-
denazification and replaced category-based decision making with individual investigations that assessed a person’s support for the National Socialist regime and the degree to which he or she had participated in or benefited from its transgressions. The new law placed less emphasis on excluding Nazis from German political and social life and more on evaluating, punishing, and rehabilitating individuals. Under its terms, every German adult residing in the U.S. Zone had to complete a questionnaire, which a government-appointed prosecutor used as a basis for either exempting the individual from further obligations or assigning the person to one of five categories—major offender, offender, lesser offender, follower, or exonerated person. Where applicable, the prosecutors followed instructions in the law specifying where Nazi officials, paramilitary leaders, and others should be presumptively slotted. A local tribunal of non-Nazi Germans then considered the cases of those assigned to the first four categories and made a final classification, subject to appeal. The tribunals also imposed penalties within a framework the law established. Thus a major offender might be sent to a labor camp for two to ten years and an offender might face an array of restrictions on his activities, while a follower might only pay a fine. Throughout the process, the onus was upon the accused to disprove the initial charges by providing exculpatory testimony and evidence.

Clay now instructed U.S. officials to prepare a new plan for Germany’s military officers consistent with this denazification law. The revised American proposal that emerged still required zone commanders to assign Germany’s elite officers to one of two groups, which remained demarcated primarily by rank and military position. However, the groups themselves were substantively different; for example, they encompassed fewer lower-ranking officers and distributed general staff officers between the two. More important, the new plan allowed the officers to challenge their placement, with a tribunal determining how potentially dangerous they were. Each occupation zone commander was to create or designate tribunals to consider these cases, and he would establish their operating principles and procedures. In other words, as Clay’s legal adviser noted approvingly upon reviewing a draft of the plan, the United States could use its zone’s denazification tribunals for this purpose. Much like the denazification law, the new plan also stipulated that any men the tribunals judged to be security threats would face the possibility of restrictions and prohibitions, the confiscation of property, and confinement for two to ten years in a labor camp to “perform reparations and reconstruction work.”

A number of factors influenced the seemingly abrupt shift this plan represented from a policy that sought to control Germany’s officers by first categorizing them chiefly on the basis of their ranks and military positions and then imposing restrictions for precautionary purposes to a policy that involved evaluating individual officers and doling out punishments. Most notably, U.S. military government officials developing the new denazification program had concluded that all zonal programs for denazification, security arrests, war crimes trials, and personnel controls should be coordinated and integrated. In particular, because some of the controls envisioned for Germany’s officers were similar to penalties authorized under the denazification law, they believed the controls should be applied using similar procedures. But other, related strains of thinking may also have played a role. State Department officials, for example, had previously argued that it would be “psychologically advantageous” to correlate treatment of potentially dangerous officers with that of active Nazis “in order to emphasize to the German people the nefarious association of these two groups.” In addition, certain American officials believed it was necessary to punish Nazis and militarists for their past activities and beliefs, whether inherently criminal or not, and their influence was probably felt here, as it had been in denazification discussions. On the other hand, some military government personnel appear simply to have lost sight of their original ideas.

In the end, the Military Directorate delegates from the other powers chose...
to ignore the American plan and to continue revising their existing proposal instead. The plan approved by the directorate in May thus retained the categories and disposition provisions originally laid out in its January draft, although the period of internment for an individual would now be at the discretion of the detaining power, based on an investigation, and was not to be longer than ten years. In addition, the other powers acceded to the wishes of the United States in granting those affected the right of rebuttal and providing for tribunals to review these cases. The new U.S. stance, moreover, continued to affect Allied deliberations. The Military Directorate eventually sent its plan to another Allied directorate, which incorporated the plan’s key ideas into a broader directive covering, as its title proclaimed, “the arrest and punishment of war criminals, Nazis and militarists, and the internment, control and surveillance of potentially dangerous Germans.” The new directive closely followed the American zone’s denazification law in its categories of offenders and its penalties. But pasted into this basic framework were bits and pieces of language from the Military Directorate plan. For instance, in a strange semantic twist, a list describing those who should be assigned to the “follower” category now included any veteran whom a zone commander thought “liable by his qualification to endanger allied purposes.”

This Allied directive helped to settle the fate of the elite Wehrmacht officers held by the Americans. Just days after it took effect on 14 October 1946, U.S. military government officials announced that in the American zone the existing denazification law was “an implementation” of the Allied directive. The United States eventually sent home all of the elite officers in its prisoner of war camps who did not need to participate in war crimes trials, either as witnesses or defendants, and required only that each plead his case before a German denazification tribunal and accept any punishment it might impose. At Clay’s direction, all general staff corps officers remained interned until German tribunals had ruled on their cases. Because the discharge and release process was complex, most officers did not arrive home until 1947.

By late 1946, then, the overarching American approach to dealing with what one Anglo-American staff paper called the “hard centre of German militarism” had changed perceptibly. There had always been those who opposed the long-term confinement of Germany’s elite officers. And in some respects, the new directive was right in line with early U.S. proposals that looked beyond an officer’s rank and allowed for rehabilitation. But American policymakers had effectively abandoned their early distinction between restraint and retribution and, notably, also dropped their plans to control or monitor the activities of all of Germany’s elite officers.

While assessing each officer on his own merits was undoubtedly more equitable than sorting the men on the basis of rank or position, the mechanism the Americans chose for this purpose did not work. Using the existing German denazification apparatus was a reasonable choice from the standpoint of uniformity and efficiency. Yet it also meant there was little chance the officers would be pronounced security threats and subjected to controls or constraints. The U.S. Zone’s denazification law did not ask tribunals to judge a person’s probable future conduct, but rather to evaluate his beliefs and actions during the Third Reich to determine the extent of his support for the Nazi regime and its offenses. Furthermore, although penalties could keep individuals out of influential positions or locked up temporarily, they did not include reporting requirements or other restrictions on officers’ movements. Most important, the Germans staffing the denazification tribunals showed little interest in sanctioning their country’s military elites.

A good example of this leniency appears in the case of General der Infanterie Walter Buhle, who served as chief of the Organization Department of the German General Staff from 1938 to 1942 and as chief of the Army Staff with the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW), representing the army’s interests with respect to organizational and armament questions, from 1942 to 1945. After examining his personal history, a denazification tribunal in 1948 decided Buhle was not incriminated under the law. Ultimately, the tribunals did not address the concerns American officials had repeatedly expressed regarding the war-planning and war-making capabilities and the intentions of Germany’s military elites.

Nonetheless, the long policy-making process did have some positive results.
First, most of Germany’s elite officers remained in captivity until 1947. Some historians have suggested that this lengthy confinement allowed German officers to establish new networks and deepen their relationships with other officers, which worked against Allied interests. Internment of uncertain duration and unpleasant prisoner of war camp conditions also stirred up hostile feelings toward the Allies, which later hampered efforts to rearm West Germany. Yet animosities also arose between officers in the camps. More significantly, well-connected and capable officers were excluded from German society for some two years. During this time, they could not threaten Allied security, nor could they deflect criticism of their wartime conduct or participate in conversations about Germany’s future.

Describing his internment some years later, one former general officer recalled that, at the time, the “fatherland” for which German soldiers had fought was “dismembered and bleeding from many wounds, [and] helplessly exposed to an unknown fate,” while the “propaganda” carried in newspapers and radio broadcasts seemed to validate the “worst fears” of its captive officers. “Malicious and dishonest elements proclaimed themselves the rightful representatives of the German people,” he remembered, “and had the impunity of trying to impress on everybody a feeling of collective guilt.” These conditions had been “disheartening” and, in some officers, had produced “symptoms of mental depression.” But the officers could do little about the situation.

That they might readily have challenged any disparaging comments and contributed to ongoing political discussions is suggested by their later actions. Many were eager to serve their country after being released. And there were those who within weeks of arriving home were discussing with former colleagues how they could undo the damage to their reputations and economic circumstances caused by the war and occupation. Some became tireless, vocal advocates for the restoration of military pensions and achieved their goal in the early 1950s. It is unlikely they would have reacted less quickly and energetically had they returned just after Germany capitulated.

In the meantime, American and German reeducation initiatives had worked on the minds of the German people, and a dialogue on German history, the war, and the Wehrmacht unfolded free of the voices of many of the officers most passionately condemned by the Allies, and, it might be added, by their fellow citizens. Political leadership patterns were also established while the officers were interned. Once released, they were unable to negatively influence German political life to the extent they had in the past.

Finally, American decisions ensured that when these officers did return home, they were reintegrated into German society and faced few lasting sanctions. In the end, the absence of tight controls may well have avoided creating a pool of aggrieved outsiders and so best served American interests. German veterans already felt defamed and abused, and the extent of pension activism suggests that stronger measures might have incited even more dangerous resentment and agitation. Thus, American policies, shifting and flawed though they were, were not without effect.

**Notes**

This article is a slightly expanded version of a paper read at the conference of Army historians held in Arlington, Virginia, in July 2009.

1. See, for example, H-3018, 5 Jun 1943, in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 27 vols. to date (Frankfurt am Main: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1961–), series 1, vol. 4, p. 327; Memo, Meeting on the German Problem, 31 Aug 1944, file Conferences – Mr. White’s Office, box 21, entry 360P, Record Group [RG] 56, General Records of the Department of the Treasury, National Archives, College Park, Md. [NACP]; Memo, Col Tom Neville Grazebrook, Ch, Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Section, G–3 Div, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force [SHAEF], to Commander Hilary Dorsett Owen, Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (Post-Hostilities), SHAEF, et al., 16 Sep 1944, and attachment, file 388.4-1 Disposal of the German Military Staff, box 92, entry 26, SHAEF, RG 331, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, NACP.

2. Kathleen J. Nawyn, “‘Striking at the Roots of German Militarism’: Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945–1949”
file 388.5-1 Disposal of the German Military Staff, box 92, entry 26, SHAEF, RG 331, NACP.

8. Memo, Maj Gen Kenneth William Dobson Strong, Asst Ch of Staff, G–2 Div, SHAEF, to Ch of Staff, SHAEF, 27 Apr 45, and attachments, file 387.4/1 Armistice, Control and Disposal of German Armed Forces Vol. II, box 30, entry 6, SHAEF, RG 331, NACP. Although this language was included in a draft cable that SHAEF’s G–2 Division prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the material quoted is nearly identical to that contained in a staff study developed by SHAEF’s Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Section, an element of its G–3 Division, during the fall of 1944. See, for example, Memo, Grazebrook to ANCXF et al., 12 Nov 44.


11. The Army (Ground) Division was an element of the U.S. Group Control Council for Germany (USGCC). During the period immediately after the war, the USGCC was responsible for developing policies for the U.S. occupation zone and helping to establish policies for all of Germany through the deliberative bodies of the Allied Control Authority. While the commanding general of United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), served as both theater commander and U.S. military governor, military government operations fell largely under the purview of the deputy military governor, Lt. Gen. Lucas D. Clay, who headed the USGCC. At the start of the occupation, USFET’s G–5 Division was responsible for executing and supervising American and Allied Control Council policies in the U.S. Zone. A reorganization in autumn 1945 began the process of officially consolidating the two military government structures. In October 1945, the USGCC became the Office of Military Government (U.S.) (OMGUS) and the Army (Ground) Division became its Armed Forces Division. On the history of the USGCC and its sometimes contentious relationship with USFET’s G–5, see Harold Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: Macmillan, 1947), ch. 4; Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation, pp. 221–24, 402–03.

12. Memo, Maj Gen Ray W. Barker, Director, Army (Ground) Div, USGCC, to Deputy Military Governor, 9 Aug 1945, and attachments, file AG 388.4 Militarism (Dissolution of German Armed Forces & Paramilitary Organizations, etc.). The paper stated that general staff officers, general officers, and flag officers could be excluded from Group I only if they were explicitly exempted from it by the Allied Control Council (ACC). The ACC was composed of the four occupation zone commanders and all of its decisions had to be unanimous.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.


18. Memo, Barker to Deputy Military Governor, 9 Aug 45, and attachments.

19. Staff Paper, DMIL/P(45)6, 5 Sep 1945, file DMIL/P(45)1–29, box 425, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Military Directorate, RG 260, NACP.

20. Memo, Brig Gen Vincent Meyer, Director, Army (Ground) Div, USGCC, to Ch of Staff, 18 Sep 1945, file AG 091.711 Army & Navy (German), box 6, Records of the USGCC, RG 260, NACP.

21. Telg, Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, U.S. Political Adviser for Germany, to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1945, file 740.00119 Control (Germany)/10-745–10-1045, box 3661, Decimal File 1945–1949, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, NACP.

22. Min, DMIL/Committee(45)16, 31 Oct 1945, file DMIL/C(45)46), box 427, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Military Directorate, RG 260, NACP.

23. Staff Paper, DMIL/Committee(45)17, 2 Nov 1945, file DMIL/C(45)46). In this paper, Category I encompassed all general officers, all general staff corps members, and all officers who had served in the Air Ministry or commanded divisions or equivalent units, as well as “all officers known to be, or who may later be known as particularly dangerous.” Because the directorate had also been given responsibility for dealing with Germany’s paramilitary organizations (it would soon be divested of this), Category I contained high-ranking officers from paramilitary groups as well. Assigned to Category II were mid-level officers of paramilitary groups. Category III included all other regular military officers and, unless they were deemed “not particularly dangerous,” all reserve officers above the rank of captain who had served “on the General Staffs of the Wehrkreise [military district], of the Army or above”; their navy and air force counterparts; air force Beamten (civilian officials); officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of air crews; and low-ranking officers and high-ranking NCOs of paramilitary organizations. All officers and air force Beamten not assigned to other categories who had served at any point since 1936, except those “recognized as innocuous through age or incapacity,” fell into Category IV, along with all regular NCOs considered dangerous and low-ranking paramilitary NCOs.

24. Memo, Maj Gen Robert W. Harper, Director, Armed Forces Div, OMGUS, to Deputy Military Governor, 30 Oct 1945, file Demob. Br Files Reading File November and December 1945 1 of 2, box 24, entry UD3, RG 466, Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, NACP; Ltr, Col Thomas B. Whitted Jr, Ch, Demobilization Br, Armed Services Div, OMGUS, to CG, U.S. Forces, Austria, 10 Apr 1946, file Reading File 1 Jan 1946–22 Apr 1946 1 of 3, box 24, entry UD3, RG 466, NACP. Who ultimately made this decision, and why, is not entirely clear, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff were almost certainly involved. As noted above, in early October, Clay’s political adviser informed the secretary of state that an exile plan was being developed and that Clay “intends that Joint Chiefs of Staff should examine any project of this nature prior to Control Council approval.” General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, commanding general of United States Forces, European Theater (USFET), also told the War Department that any such plan would be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for approval. But the JCS, State Department, War Department, and State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee files most likely to include evidence of such a review do not contain any references to the plan. Since Clay personally carried it to Washington and issued new instructions to U.S. Military Directorate representatives just two weeks later, the decision may have been made informally—although the volume of paper typically associated with any major Washington decision also makes this seem unlikely. See Telg, Murphy to Secretary of State, 10 Oct 1945; Cable, CG, US Forces, European Theater, Main, to War Department, 17 Oct 1945, file CCS 321 Germany (5-30-45), box 62, entry UD2, RG 218, Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, NACP; Ltr, Whitted to CG, U.S. Forces, Austria, 10 Apr 1946.

25. Staff Paper, DMIL/Committee(45)21, 31 Dec 1945, file DMIL/C(45)46). The Soviets apparently continued to reserve the right to exile their group of officers.


29. Ltr, Whitted to CG, U.S. Forces, Austria, 10 Apr 1946.

30. Staff Paper, DMIL/P(46)23, 9 Apr 1946, file DMIL/P(46)1–53. The U.S. plan also stated that zone commanders should make their assignments based on an “individual investigation.” What they meant by this is not unambiguous. In the paper, general staff officers, general officers, and officers holding certain positions—such as “heads and deputies of the military and civilian administration” in regions Germany had occupied—were listed as falling into specific classes. Here, the “investigation” may have referred primarily to the work of the tribunal reviewing a particular case. At the same time, the paper also referenced categories such as “individuals of the former German Armed Forces whom the Allied Control Authority or the zone commanders may consider, either now or later, to be particularly dangerous.” These men could presumably not be identified without an investigation. It should be noted, too, that the paper did not explain clearly what role the tribunals would play in the review process, merely that any challenges would be referred to them. That the Americans expected them to assess the potential danger represented by individual officers can be inferred from other sources. See Memo, Charles Fahy, Legal Adviser, OMGUS, for Lt Gen Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Military Governor, 8 Apr 46, file LA 26.1 Denazification Board, Box 52, Legal Division, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP; Memo, Col Frank E. Emery Jr, Deputy Director, Armed Forces Div, OMGUS, to Ch of Staff, OMGUS, 23 Apr 1946, file German General Staff Corps, box 799, Adjutant General’s Office, Executive Office, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP.

31. Memo, Fahy for Clay, 8 Apr 46.


33. Rpt, Denazification Policy Board to the Deputy Military Governor, 15 Jan 1946, file AG 014.13 Relationship of Military Gov’t pers. Thru AG 104.3. Denaz. (Policy) Law of Liberation 45–46, box 16, Adjutant General’s Office, Executive Office, OMGUS; No author, To the I. A. and C. [Internal Affairs and Communications] and Armed Forces Divisions, n.d., and attachment, file Control Program of Armed Forces Personnel, box 448, Civil Administration Division, OMGUS, both in RG 260, NACP. The latter document originally may have been enclosed in Memo, Lt Carl A. Auerbach, Economic Div, OMGUS, and member of the Working Committee of the
Denazification Policy Board, to Lt Col Robert R. Bowie, Executive Secretary, Denazification Policy Board, 3 Jan 1946, located in the same file.


35. Niethammer attributes this conviction especially to the military government’s Legal Division. Key members of the division were indeed among those who believed that plans for the control of dangerous German officers should be coordinated with the denazification program. They expected that the Armed Forces Division, which represented the United States in Military Directorate discussions, and the Internal Affairs and Communications Division would “look primarily to us for guidance in ironing out the points of conflict.” See Niethammer, Entnazifizierung in Bayern, pp. 300–305; Memo, Philip Elman, Legal Div, OMGUS for Fahy, 16 Jan 1946, file Denazification Policy Board, box 454, Civil Administration Division, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP.


37. Memo, Emery to Ch of Staff, OMGUS, 23 Apr 1946; Min, DMIL/M(46)13, 10 May 1946, file DMIL/M(46) 1–30; Staff Paper, DIAC/P(46)170, 30 May 1946, file DIAC/P(46) 151–73, box 244, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Directorate of Internal Affairs and Communications, RG 260, NACP. This version of the plan went forward as a Military Directorate document, but a covering letter noted that the Soviets objected to the right of review by a tribunal and did not want a ceiling established on the possible length of internment. The British preferred a limit on internment of fifteen years. The United States had proposed ten years.

38. Staff Paper, DIAC/P(46)275, 26 Aug 1946, file DIAC/P(46) 271–300, box 245, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Directorate of Internal Affairs and Communications, RG 260, NACP.


40. Memo, Henry Parkman, Acting Director, Internal Affairs and Communications Div, OMGUS, to Ch of Staff, OMGUS, 6 Jan 47, file Transfer of Former General Staff Corps Officers of German Armed Forces to German Authorities, box 461, Civil Administration Div, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP. The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was one of the reasons for the continued retention of general staff officers. Although the judges had concluded that what prosecutors termed the “General Staff and High Command” was not a criminal organization, their verdict (dated 30 September–1 October 1946) stated that individual officers belonging to this group had clearly committed crimes and should not be considered exonerated. From OMGUS’s perspective, the denazification tribunals could ensure that any guilty men were identified before their release. See Ltr, Brig Gen Charles K. Gailey, Ch of Staff, OMGUS, to Maj Gen Clarence R. Huebner, Ch of Staff, USFET, 11 Jan 47, file Transfer of Former General Staff Corps Officers of German Armed Forces to German Authorities.

41. Various U.S. organizations desired the continued internment of certain individuals, whether for further investigation, testimony, trial, or history writing. During the fall of 1946, those interested in the fate of Germany’s general officers included officials at the Office of Military Government (U.S.); Justice Robert H. Jackson’s prosecution staff at Nuremberg and, later, the Subsequent Proceedings Division there; the office of the deputy theater judge advocate for war crimes, which handled trials involving concentration camp guards and Germans accused of mistreating and murdering Allied soldiers; the headquarters of U.S. Forces, European Theater, especially its intelligence section and historical division; the headquarters of Third Army; and the military units, such as the 9th Infantry Division, that were responsible for operating the prisoner of war camps. At least four American organizations typically had to consent to each general officer’s discharge from prisoner of war status and release. Members of the general staff corps were, however, still not released until they had been cleared by a denazification tribunal. See, for example, Ltr, Lt Col Peter Calza, Asst Adjutant General, USFET, to CG, Third US Army Area, 22 Nov 1946, and attachments, file 383.6 Vol. XIX, box 366, entry USD73, RG 498, Records of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (World War II), NACP.

42. Memo, Grazebrook to Brooks, 24 Sep 1944. On these points, see also Rpt, “Control of German Personnel,” n.d., [received by Legal Division 7 Nov 1945], file Control Program of Armed Forces Personnel; Ltr, Whitted to Ch of Staff, OMGUS, 20 Apr 1946, and attachments, file German General Staff Corps, box 799, Adjutant General’s Office, Executive Office, OMGUS, RG 260, NACP; Staff Paper, JJS (USGCC)2, 25 Jun 1945, file USGCC Joint Intell Committee Report “German Officer Corps” (25 Jun 45).

44. Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” pp. 198–211.


52. Manig, Politik der Ehre, and James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), discuss in detail the evolution of Allied and German regulations pertaining to military disability and long-service pensions and the political maneuvering they provoked into the 1950s among Allied authorities, veterans, private organizations, German government officials, and the new political parties.

Historically, nations with very strong commercial ties rarely wage war on one another, as they are dissuaded by their economic dependence. The dramatic growth in recent years of commercial exchange among many of the nations of the world has created a truly global economic interdependence among them. As globalization has developed, leaders have recognized that nations significantly involved in the global economy will likely not resort to war with one another. The world today, I posit, is thus experiencing a new military revolution created by the interdependent nature of the global economy, in which conventional war equates to mutually assured economic destruction. To consider this argument, we must define a military revolution, examine the mechanics of the global economy, explore the deterrent effect of globalization, and analyze the effects that large-scale war would have on national economies.

Military Revolution

British historian Michael Roberts introduced the concept of a military revolution in early modern Europe in a 1955 lecture at Queen’s University, Belfast. He observed that in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the creation of disciplined professional military units, the development of conscription and recruitment practices, changes in tactics, and advances in military technology combined to give national leaders standing armies of unprecedented power. These developments combined to revolutionize the ability first of the Netherlands and Sweden, where they were introduced, and later of larger states to wage war effectively.1

Other authors have further refined the concept of the military revolution. Introducing a collection of essays on the subject, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray observed in 2001 that military revolutions not only “alter the capacity of states to create and project military power” but also bring systemic changes to politics and society and thus “recast society and the state as well as military organizations.” Using these criteria, they listed five military revolutions in modern Western history, of which Roberts had identified the first. Knox and Murray’s subsequent military revolutions were tied to the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the First World War, but notably they identified the fifth military revolution as “the advent of nuclear weapons, which contrary to all precedent, kept the Cold War cold in the decisive European and northeast Asian theaters.” The nations possessing these weapons managed to prevent global warfare through a strategy of mutually assured destruction.2

If we extend this notion of a military revolution that deters war to the concept of mutually assured economic destruction, the modern world’s interdependence within the global economy should also deter nations from warring with other nations. Much as the invention and development of nuclear weapons created a stalemate between superpowers—limiting fighting to small wars for fear that large-scale conflict would escalate to involve the use of nuclear weapons and produce mutually assured destruction—the global economy creates an environment where major economic powers will not go to war because of the devastating effect war will have on the global economy, and consequently on their economies.

Global Economy as a Deterrent

The advent of the personal computer, the creation of the Internet and the World Wide Web, and the ingenious use of online collaboration tools have had a flattening effect on the world, allowing near-instantaneous sharing of ideas and massive amounts of data. Aided by these developments, businesses have found creative ways to outsource some of their functions and to move some of their facilities abroad. The dispersion of many of their functions to countries with lower labor costs effectively streamlined these businesses’ production. This outsourcing drew numerous nations and their economies into supply chains for trade goods, resulting in growing economic interdependence.

Author and columnist Thomas L. Friedman has argued that “to the extent that countries tied their economies and futures to global integration and trade, it would act as a restraint on going to war with their neighbors.”3 To support his hypothesis, Friedman cited the example of tensions in 2002 between two nuclear-armed nations, Pakistan and India. Both nations went so far as to mass troops on their borders, and the threat of a nuclear exchange was considered very real. By that time, Indian companies had become significantly intertwined in the world’s knowledge and service industries. Many large global corporations stood to lose millions of dollars if the services provided by India were disrupted by a war with Pakistan. Such disruption would likely have caused these businesses to permanently withdraw from India.
This threat put significant pressure on Indian business and, consequently, on the Indian government. The Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, toned down his rhetoric, and tensions slowly eased. While nuclear deterrence and other international pressures also certainly affected his actions, for perhaps the first time the detrimental effect that a war would have on the Indian economy weighed just as heavily. Let us then consider the devastation that large-scale warfare between any of the world’s largest economic powers would have on the global economy.

Mutually Assured?

If India and Pakistan had gone to war without involving other nations in the conflict, what would have happened to the global economy? Likely, very little. While businesses receiving services and supplies from India would probably suffer short-term losses, the free-market economy would quickly fill the void. These businesses would shortly find new suppliers, probably in other low-cost, emerging economies. Therefore, regional conflicts between nations with second-tier economies would result in a short-term or negligible drop in the global economy. However, the result would be vastly different if the United States and China went to war.

The economic dislocation the world is currently experiencing has shown that most of the world’s economies suffer when one of the leading economic powers experiences a financial crisis. As Anup Shaw has observed, “With a globalized system, a credit crunch can ripple through the entire (real) economy very quickly turning a global financial crisis into a global economic crisis.” Banks with little confidence may lend with higher interest rates. People find it harder to pay their mortgages. In the business sector, the credit crunch and higher costs of borrowing lead to job cuts. As people cut back on consumption to weather the economic storm, other businesses struggle to survive.

Because of the interdependence of the global economy and international lending and borrowing, the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers, a major U.S. financial institution, triggered the failure of a number of large European counterparts; other companies on both sides of the Atlantic were rescued or nationalized by their governments. Many Asian countries saw their stock markets suffer and the value of their currencies drop. Asian products and services are also global, and the economic dislocations suffered by wealthy Western countries produced an Asian recession involving job loss and social unrest. China and India experienced significant declines in their rates of economic growth, and both poured huge sums into recovery packages. Nearly 50 percent of Latin American exports are sold in the United States. With U.S. consumers spending less, Latin American businesses have suffered. Increases in fuel prices and volatility in the international commodity markets have meanwhile retarded economic growth in the developing world. Poor nations not directly affected by market declines still experienced hardships due to significant reductions in foreign aid from donor nations suffering from the financial crisis. Perhaps the simplest way to see the direct effect of the U.S. financial crisis is through analysis of the world’s major stock markets. Market closing values everywhere showed nearly identical, proportional drops for months beginning around September 2008.

Yet the U.S. financial crisis has affected the world in a time of relative peace and stability. International trade and interdependent supply chains have survived, despite the strains. However, if leading economic powers were to go to war, international trade would grind to a halt. Supply chains involving many nations would be shattered instantly. International tensions and instability would greatly hinder the acquisition of materials from alternative sources. International businesses would suffer significant financial losses in their overseas investments, as assets would be frozen or seized by the nations in which the businesses were operating. Second-tier and developing economies would lose access to their richest markets and business partners. Trade routes and shipping would also be restricted, further limiting any remaining international trade. Large-scale warfare would devastate not only the antagonists’ economies, but those of nearly every other country as well. The result would be mutually assured economic destruction.

Bad Business

The interdependent nature of the global economy has thus created conflict stalemate between powerful potential antagonists. Warfare would have a devastating effect not only on those antagonists, but on the entire world. This has created an environment where nations are deterred in their ability (or willingness) to project power through military means. Therefore, following the precedent of a military revolution caused by nuclear deterrence, mutually assured economic destruction now constitutes the sixth military revolution, preventing global warfare because warfare is so bad for business. The insight that where goods cross borders, armies do not has never been more valid than it is today.

Notes

6. Ibid.
Douglas Scott, Lawrence Babits, and Charles Haecker have selected papers that analyze some of the best-preserved battlefields in history from an archaeological perspective. Over the past two decades, battlefield archaeology has emerged as a legitimate field of study, complete with its own journal and academic conferences. These excellent volumes are the result of a series of papers presented at the 2004 American Battlefield Protection Conference and demonstrate that battlefield archaeology is an important asset that enhances our knowledge of history.

Moreover, the user-friendly format lets the reader peruse through the volumes according to his or her specific interest, be it ancient, medieval, or modern. Volume 1 covers the Roman Empire to the American Revolution and considers issues ranging from how to identify a battlefield based on features and artifacts, to the ways looting affects the interpretation of a site, such as at Kalkriese, which is better known as the Battle of Varus of 9 AD.

The study of the American Civil War has benefited greatly from extensive archaeological investigation. Although well documented, troop positions and movements that took place during many battles are unclear. However, the use of archaeology, spatial analysis, and digital landscapes at engagements, such as Wilson’s Creek and Lookout Mountain, produced significant information on troop deployments. In addition, modern firearms identification made it possible to designate the weapons used in battle, including particulars like models and manufacturers. Moreover, innovative studies on musket and minie balls pinpointed possible campsites as well as locations of field hospitals.

Currently, most battlefield archaeology concentrates on the post-medieval world. However, over one hundred battles have been fought on British soil since the Roman invasion of 43 AD. At the same time, seventy melees that occurred before the Norman Conquest of 1066 still have not been located. Fortuitously, the papers on medieval conflicts emphasize the potential of, as well as the need for, a comprehensive recording of all battle sites in Britain because of the danger of looting. In spite of extensive artifact removal at the site of the 1461 Battle of Towton, many remaining arrowheads identified the location of burials. Scholars also gained significant insight into the manufacture of these projectile points.

Finds from the Mixton War of 1541–1542 at Peñol Nochistlán were also examined. The evidence suggests that Cerro El Tuiche and Peñol Nochistlán are one and the same location. Natives from Caxcan, under a charismatic leader Tenamaxtil, successfully destroyed Spanish settlements in an effort to drive the foreigners from their land. After the Spanish reestablished control, the Caxcan urban centers were razed and the Caxcan people who were left were either killed or enslaved.

Another study elaborated on the archaeological findings at Zboriv in the Ukraine. The artifacts signal how the Cossacks adopted new military techniques, defeated the Polish Army, and created an autonomous Ukrainian Cossack Republic. Until 2000, the Revolutionary War battlefield of Camden, South Carolina, which originally spread over six hundred acres, was limited to a six-acre tract owned by the Daughters of the American Revolution. Relic hunters had also collected artifacts for over thirty years. Luckily, much of the acreage has been restored and consequential information has been gleaned thanks to the use of metal detectors and the help of relic hunters, who happily gave scholars access to their collections.

Battlegrounds of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are the topic of Volume 2. Once again, the utility of metal detectors pointed out the exact location of the Battle of Cieneguilla, New Mexico, site of a conflict between the Jicarilla Apache and the 1st Dragoons in 1854. Meanwhile, remains from the Confederate cantonment at Evansport, Virginia, which shut down most Union traffic along the Potomac River for a six-month period from October 1861 to March 1862, exemplify how diverse factors contributed to troop
placement in this region during the Civil War.

In another investigation, a joint venture between a state historic park and a private engineering firm also generated significant results on the 1864 conflict at Fort Davidson, Missouri. Once again relic hunters provided information to scholars that otherwise would be lost.

Urban sprawl has unfortunately damaged or covered many Civil War battle sites. One wonderful exception involves the Confederate forward line from the Battle of Nashville, Tennessee. Amazingly, urban development actually preserved the Confederate entrenchment when the soil placed over the entrenchment line added another layer of protection to the trench below. Nineteenth-century topographic maps were also useful in this case, in that the area had changed little from the time of the war to the time of urban development.

An ambitious partnership involving Great Britain, Argentina, and Paraguay highlighting the potential of the War of the Triple Alliance sites is the focus of the next paper. Albeit this war took place at the same time as the American Civil War, it is poorly documented and subsequently is a promising candidate for future research.

A long-term struggle by the Warm Springs Apaches to preserve a reservation at Ojo Caliente culminated in the Victorious War, named after their celebrated chief is also presented. This war included an important conflict, which was the last major offensive in the south by the North Korean military.

In conclusion, this two-volume set is an outstanding source on battlefield archaeology. Additionally, the numerous photos, maps, diagrams, and an extensive bibliography are very helpful. This work will be useful for the general public, archaeologists, relic collectors, and military historians.

Editors Note: Potomac Books has recently published a single volume paperback edition of this title which retails for $19.95.

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Since the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and New York City’s World Trade Center in September 2001, more than fifty-six hundred servicemen and women have died in the bloody fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of July 2010, at least eighty of those fatalities in the “Global War on Terrorism”—seventy-nine officers (including one retiree) and one civilian working in the World Trade Center on that fateful day—were graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. It seems quite safe to say that no other educational institution in this country, with the possible exception of the United States Naval Academy, has suffered (or will suffer) greater personnel losses.

Shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States Military Academy began celebrating its bicentennial year. Because of the great amount of publicity that surrounded such a noteworthy event, that year’s graduating seniors were “quickly nicknamed the Golden Children by the envious cadets ahead of them” (p. 7). In a Time of War, by Bill Murphy Jr., a lawyer and former Army Reserve officer who reported from Iraq for the Washington Post in 2007, takes a look at the Golden Children, following the military
careers of selected members of the class of 2002 as they do their best to wage the nation’s War on Terrorism. Several of the lieutenants who are profiled in the book had been assigned to West Point’s Company D-1—Company D of the 1st Regiment—and they referred to themselves as “the Ducks.” During the four years that they spent together in the Corps of Cadets, the men and women understandably developed very close bonds of friendship, and many of them continued to stay in touch with one another as they spread out across the Army, attending their basic branch and specialty courses before reporting to their initial assignments at posts such as Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Stewart, Georgia.

Between graduation day and being deployed overseas, many of the young officers got married, in a few cases to their classmates. Sadly, two of the married officers whose careers are highlighted in the book never returned to their loved ones from their assignments in Iraq. They were killed in action—one in 2003 and one in 2006—as were seven other men from the class of 2002. Only West Point’s class of 2004 has lost more of its members (eleven) to the Global War on Terrorism. The author effectively describes the tremendous sadness that these two deaths created for the officers’ families. Indeed, one of the young widows became so distraught that she attempted to take her own life. Some of West Point’s “Old Grads” may be disappointed that the author does not craft a thoroughly “gung ho” narrative. He certainly does not ignore myriad examples of exemplary courage and devotion to duty, but he also highlights the many great sacrifices that the young officers and their families endure, pointing out that the cumulative weight of these many hardships increasingly convinces graduates that it is in their best interests to leave active duty after they complete their five-year active military service obligations. The pain of repeated family separations is underscored at the end of the book, as one of the Ducks flies away from his wife and infant daughter to begin his third deployment to Iraq. The author notes that by the spring of 2008, over fifty thousand other soldiers had done that as well.

Over the past twenty-one years, there have been at least two excellent books about West Point classes—Rick Atkinson’s The Long Gray Line (New York, 1989), which looked at the class of 1966, and David Lipsky’s Absolutely American (New York, 2003), which examined cadet life during the same four-year period that created the class of 2002. In a Time of War is not quite as good as those two volumes, but it comes very close, and it is strongly recommended. Many high-level government decision makers will probably not read the book, and that is unfortunate because if more of them understood the true costs of the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq they might be less inclined to commit American blood and treasure to poorly conceived wars in the future. Perhaps the most enlightening quote in the book comes when Joe DaSilva, the president of the class of 2002, recalls the words of Winston Churchill, who once observed that “Americans could be counted on to do the right thing, but only after exhausting all other options” (p. 314).
laws governing war, both works will be of interest to military historians. The War on Terror is very much a book for the specialist or, at least, someone with a working knowledge of the law of armed conflict. The book’s purpose is to “provide a military perspective on the difficult task of ensuring adherence to the law under circumstances hardly imaginable only a decade ago” (p. ix), by looking at six topics: the laws generally applicable to the so-called War on Terrorism; the rules applicable to the targeting of persons and property; the detention of combatants in such a war; interrogation and treatment of those detained; trial and punishment for battlefield misconduct; and command responsibility and accountability. The final chapter, titled “Battlefield Perspectives on the Laws of War,” offers just that.

The common theme running through each essay in the book is that al-Qaeda’s strike on the World Trade Center and Pentagon turned the law of armed conflict on its head because that law has been structured to deal with only two scenarios: international or state-on-state war and state against nonstate conflict. While terrorism had traditionally been handled in the United States and elsewhere as a domestic criminal law matter, the scale and ferocity of al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 attack triggered state combat operations against a nonstate actor, which the law of armed conflict had not envisaged.

But, because America’s armed forces are required to comply with the laws regulating armed hostilities when they conduct military operations, this created a significant problem: how were military lawyers—trained to advise on the laws regulating state-on-state conflict—going to counsel commanders on the targeting of terrorists, and their detention and interrogation, when these lawyers were not certain how the law of armed conflict applied to combat operations against these nonstate actors?

Geoffrey S. Corn, a professor of law and retired Army lawyer, argues that the world legal community must recognize that the existing legal framework that contemplated only two types of armed conflict, state against state and state against nonstate actor, is inadequate. Rather, he insists, the events of 11 September ushered in a third, “hybrid category of armed conflict,” which he calls “transnational armed conflict” (pp. 14–32). Corn’s point is that the second traditional category, state against nonstate actor, contemplated internal or intrastate armed conflict, for example, an insurgency, guerrilla movement, or revolution against an existing state. Corn’s view is that the rise of a “transnational non-state enemy,” like al-Qaeda, capable of launching armed assaults across national borders, makes the traditional view obsolete, especially since traditionalists insist that the law of armed conflict applies only to state-against-state hostilities; conflict between a state and nonstate actor generally is governed by domestic law.

Corn declares that, although not required by the Geneva Conventions, the law of armed conflict should be applied in hostilities between a state and a transnational nonstate enemy. In his view, if the United States applies “combat power” against a transnational terrorist organization, such military operations logically should be governed by the laws of armed conflict (pp. 30–34). The problem with this perspective is that it undercuts one of the chief goals of the law of armed conflict: restricting the use of force by nation-states so as to reduce the suffering of civilians. That is, if one adopts Professor Corn’s position that the law of armed conflict should be applied to hostilities with al-Qaeda, that gives an enhanced legal status to a nonstate actor that potentially includes combatant immunity. Consequently, if al-Qaeda members began wearing insignia, carried their arms openly, and professed obedience to the law of armed conflict, they would have combatant immunity for their attacks on U.S. military targets. This reviewer is not persuaded such an enhanced legal status (even potentially) should be given to a nonstate actor and, consequently, does not agree that there is a need for this new approach to the law of armed conflict. But Corn should be commended for his thoughtful efforts to arrive at a practical solution for those fighting terrorism in the twenty-first century.

At the root of Professor Corn’s proposal, and underlying all the essays in this important book, is a desire to provide helpful guidance for the military professional. For example, commanders planning and executing military operations want rules or clear standards governing the treatment of combatants they capture on the battlefield. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, generally accepted as the most significant component of today’s law of armed conflict, envisage men and women in uniform, wearing identifiable insignia and fighting in units led by officers (or at least noncommissioned officers). These personnel have combatant immunity for their lawful battlefield conduct and are given prisoner-of-war status when captured. But what is the legal status of individuals dressed in civilian clothing, who have no allegiance to any nation-state and who carry out indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians?

James Schoettler, a professor of law at Georgetown University with extensive experience as an Army judge advocate, concludes in his essay that while the “terrorist-combatant” (p. 70) does not qualify for prisoner-of-war status because he is an unprivileged belligerent (a synonym for unlawful combatant), this terrorist may be detained, although for how long and under what conditions remains unsettled (pp. 95–123). Schoettler resolves, however, that for two reasons it would be wise to ensure that the conditions of a terrorist-combatant’s detention are equivalent to those afforded prisoners of war. First, such treatment would be consistent with the law of war. Second, such a course of action would probably avoid U.S. federal civilian court inquiries into the military detention of terrorists.

Similarly, Richard B. “Dick” Jackson, a retired judge advocate who now serves as the Army’s special assistant for law of war matters, has written a concise, clear, and helpful essay on the interrogation and treatment of terrorist detainees (pp. 125–59). This is the best essay in The War on Terror. It traces the evolution of the U.S. military’s treatment of captured terrorists. Jackson is critical of the role played by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, which permitted civilian leaders in the Pentagon “to apply only a vague ‘humane treatment standard’” (p. 139) to enemy combatants.
in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. This bad decision ultimately led to the use of sleep deprivation, death threats, and waterboarding (pp. 141–42). The real heroes of Jackson’s story are Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora and a handful of senior uniformed lawyers who protested these harsh interrogation techniques and insisted that the United States must “stick to the moral high ground” in advising commanders on the law applicable to interrogation and detention of terrorists. Ultimately, the arguments of Mora and these lawyers prevailed—that it “was essential to establish and maintain a Geneva Convention–based human treatment approach” (p. 159).

Like all books, *The War on Terror* has some shortcomings. First of all, the essays are uneven in quality and vary widely in writing style. This is perhaps understandable because the volume has six authors. Second, it lacks a bibliography, and this would have been a welcome addition. But these are minor criticisms of an otherwise useful and valuable work.

Gary Solis’ *The Law of Armed Conflict* is very much a book for the generalist—someone with little or no knowledge about the laws regulating hostilities. Solis, a retired marine who spent two combat tours as an amphibious officer in Vietnam, served as a lawyer in the Marine Corps and later taught law for seven years at the United States Military Academy. He is ideally suited to write about the law of war because he has experienced combat firsthand and has a thorough knowledge of the nuances of the laws regulating armed hostilities.

The strength of *The Law of Armed Conflict* is that it starts with the basics and then moves to increasingly complex matters in the law. Solis begins by examining the history of the law of armed conflict and its civilian counterpart, “International Humanitarian Law.” He then looks at nation-state practice, conventions and treaties, and declarations and regulations before discussing a wide variety of issues and concepts (pp. 3–67). These include legal status of prisoners of war and Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters; the principles of distinction, military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality; obedience to orders and command responsibility; targeting and rules of engagement; and rules of perfidy.

Solis devotes considerable space to a discussion of war crimes (pp. 301–40), including an examination of the practice of “double-tapping” used by some U.S. soldiers and marines in Afghanistan and Iraq (pp. 327–30). Double-tapping, also known as a dead check, is the “shooting of wounded or apparently dead insurgents to ensure that they are dead” (p. 327). *The Law of Armed Conflict* explains that, while it is a war crime to indiscriminately shoot a wounded or apparently dead enemy combatant because this is simply murder on the battlefield, it is lawful to shoot a wounded insurgent who appears to be reaching for a weapon. The value of this book, however, is that it illuminates the issue of double-tapping and other thorny subjects. Using the following e-mail poem reportedly written by an enlisted soldier in the 101st Airborne Division, the author demonstrates how some soldiers feel about these topics:

> You media pansies may squeal and squirm/But a fighting man knows that the way to confirm/That some jihadist bastard is finally dead/Is a brain-tappin’ round fired into his head/To hell with you wimps from your Ivy League schools/Sitting far from the war/To me your wrong-headed contention/That I should observe the Geneva Convention” (p. 338). As this poetry makes clear, not all soldiers are accepting of the laws of war, and Solis is to be commended for using this real-world example to underscore this reality.

The author does not shy away from identifying U.S. perpetrators of war crimes. He insists—in this reviewer’s opinion—that the skipper of the submarine USS *Wahoo* (SS–238) committed a war crime in January 1943 when he ordered his men to machine gun the defenseless Japanese survivors of the troop-carrying freighter that the *Wahoo* had sunk (p. 353). The fact that the skipper of that submarine was lauded as a hero when he returned to Hawaii and decorated with the Navy Cross does not make the crime any less repugnant.

The Army also does not escape scrutiny. In discussing the defense of superior orders, *The Law of Armed Conflict* examines the general courts-martial of an officer and enlisted soldier in the 45th Infantry Division. During the hard fighting in the conquest of Sicily during World War II, both men had formed firing parties and then executed German prisoners of war. At their trials, the Americans claimed that they were “only following orders” given by Lt. Gen. George S. Patton in a 27 June 1943 speech in which Patton proclaimed that “if the enemy resisted until we got to within 200 yards, he had forfeited his right to live” (pp. 385–86). Again, the use of real-world examples is what makes *The Law of Armed Conflict* both meaningful and practical. As a resource, Solis’ book is unrivaled because it has more than two thousand footnotes, an extensive bibliography, and a superb index.

Yet the Solis book is not without its shortcomings. Missing is a discussion of the law governing reprisals and, since *The Law of Armed Conflict* seems to have covered every other imaginable topic, it should have devoted a few pages to this thorny issue. During World War II, reprisals against civilians and prisoners of war were legal under the laws of war. Today, however, reprisals against both categories are absolutely prohibited. But those looking for a discourse on this topic will have to look elsewhere. Additionally, while *The Law of Armed Conflict*’s index has an entry for military commissions, there is no in-depth examination of them in the book. While the lawfulness of using such military tribunals to prosecute nonstate actors for war crimes is arguably outside the scope of Solis’ book, the ongoing employment of military commissions by the United States has been a contentious topic among both policy makers and lawyers. An analysis of tribunals’ place in the law of armed conflict would have been useful. These two criticisms, however, are minor flaws in an otherwise impressive work that is certain to become the standard teaching text in both undergraduate and graduate curriculums.

Both *The War on Terror* and *The Law of Armed Conflict* accomplish their goals: to educate the lawyer and nonlawyer on the laws governing armed conflict. While historians will find both books of interest, *The Law of Armed
Conflict is the best one-volume source in print today on the history of the law of war.

Editor’s Note: Fred Borch has reported that both Geoffrey Corn and Gary Solis are friends and that he is mentioned as such in the acknowledgments of The Law of Armed Conflict.

Fred L. Borch III retired after twenty-five years active duty as an Army lawyer and is now the regimental historian and archivist for the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He is the author of Judge Advocates in Combat: Army Lawyers in Military Operations from Vietnam to Haiti (Washington, D.C., 2001).

No Quarter: The Battle of the Crater, 1864

By Richard Slotkin
Random House, 2009
Pp. xvii, 411. $28

Review by William A. Dobak


Before dawn on 30 July 1864, the Union besiegers at Petersburg detonated four tons of gunpowder under the Confederate trenches, hoping to charge through the breach, seize the high ground beyond, and by nightfall capture the city which was a rail center vital to the support of Robert E. Lee’s army. The scheme was devised, the digging done, and the charge laid by a regiment of Pennsylvania coal miners in Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps of the Army of the Potomac. According to plan, the assault itself was to be the first offensive operation of Burnside’s 4th Division, made up entirely of U.S. Colored Troops regiments—untried black enlisted men whose white officers were nearly all veterans of fighting during the early years of the war.

From the start of the operation, little went right. The chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac impeded the project, belittling the Pennsylvanians’ plan and denying them adequate supplies to perform the work. The day before the scheduled attack, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, persuaded his superior, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, to withdraw the 4th Division from the front line and to substitute for it one of three white divisions from the IX Corps. As Grant testified a few months later, “Meade said that if we put the colored troops in front . . . and it should prove a failure, it would then be said . . . that we were shoving those people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front” (p. 144). Meade was being disingenuous: like many other Union officers he had a poor opinion of the U.S. Colored Troops and, indeed, of black people in general.

So a white division was substituted at the last minute to lead the assault. The other two white divisions of the IX Corps followed it into the breach, and, finally, as failure was becoming apparent but confusion made withdrawing impossible, the black regiments of the 4th Division joined in. Some of the attackers lost their way, while others huddled in the crater that the explosion had created. Few Union troops got beyond the Confederate trenches, and even they soon retreated. By early afternoon, Lee’s army had restored its defensive line. The day’s fighting cost the Army of the Potomac some four thousand killed, wounded, and missing out of twenty thousand engaged.

Two investigations followed: a War Department court of inquiry that Grant himself requested and, several months later, a visit to Virginia by the congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Grant, Meade, and Burnside testified, as did the division and brigade commanders. Some regimental officers, including a few from the black regiments, were called. A surgeon told investigators that he had seen more than one general lingering near his aid station and drinking “stimulants” during the battle (p. 264). In the end, admonishments were few and punishments nonexistent: Burnside left the Army of the Potomac on a leave of absence, finally resigning at the end of the war. All four of the IX Corps divisional commanders kept their jobs, and the Army of the Potomac settled down to another seven months of trench warfare that ended only when Lee’s army abandoned Petersburg and Richmond and retreated west toward Appomattox during the first week of April 1865.

One feature of the engagement that has attracted much attention was the assault by U.S. Colored Troops in division strength, something that rarely occurred. The Union defeat meant that scores of wounded and surrendering black soldiers were killed by the Confederates, who regarded them as being little more than rebellious slaves. Less than three months earlier, news of a massacre of Colored Troops at Fort Pillow, Tennessee, had horrified the North. Black soldiers and their officers had long expected Confederates to show them no mercy, and adopted “Remember Fort Pillow!” and “No
quarter!” as their battle cries. Although hundreds of black soldiers were taken prisoner in different parts of the South during the course of the war—most worked on Confederate fortifications, while a few were returned to their former masters—massacres of black troops also occurred wherever they and Confederates met for the first time. There is evidence that later in the siege of Petersburg they became used to each other and adopted the live-and-let-live attitude that sometimes develops during prolonged trench warfare; however, the idea of “massacre” continues to dominate historical treatments of the U.S. Colored Troops.

The author tells the story of the battle deftly. His description of the IX Corps as weak and as consisting of new, untried, and worn-down regiments fleshed out with recent conscripts is accurate and perceptive. If the idea of the mine explosion had not originated in one of its regiments, the corps would never have been assigned to carry out the project. Slotkin also describes well the state of the Confederate defenders and the combination of dread and hatred with which they faced armed black men.

For documentation, though, the author relies too heavily on published material, both secondary works and veterans’ memoirs written long after the event. If he had spent a few days at the National Archives and other repositories, he would be more reluctant to declare that the 4th Division received “careful training” (p. 324), or any at all, before going into the fight. There is no mention of such training in the surviving records of the 4th Division or its regiments. Moreover, although its commanding general asked on 17 July that his men be relieved from fatigue in order to “rest and clean their arms, &c., before taking part in the proposed assault,” another officer’s diary and a sergeant’s letter to the Christian Recorder, the African Methodist Episcopal weekly, indicate that the men of the division were still hard at work on 26 July, only four days before the attack.¹

Despite this reservation about Slotkin’s sources, No Quarter is a well-written and generally accurate account of one of the Civil War’s most dramatic episodes.


Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan

By Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
Pp. ix, 382. $29.95

Review by Keith Walters

Historians have produced scores of studies on every conceivable aspect of the end of World War II in the Pacific with little consensus on U.S. motivations for the use of atomic weapons or the events that compelled Japanese surrender. The most widely acclaimed investigations of that era, including the works of eminent historians such as Robert Butow, Gar Alperovitz, and Barton Bernstein, address the topic mainly from either a Japanese or an American perspective. In essence, many historians have oversimplified the end of the Pacific war, assuming a direct cause-effect relationship between the American use of atomic bombs and the Japanese struggle to end the war on terms acceptable to hawks in Tokyo. In Racing the Enemy, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa sheds new light on the diplomacy of the final year of the Pacific war. What makes this study unique, however, is Hasegawa’s careful scrutiny of Soviet political maneuvering, which adds an essential, yet often-overlooked, perspective to the examination of the U.S. planning process and the internal politics of the Japanese Imperial government.

The author is armed with far greater evidence than any scholar who previously addressed this topic. His fluency in English, Russian, and Japanese enabled him to scour primary sources from the archives of the United States, the former Soviet Union, and Japan. The resulting product is an international history in its truest sense with no single prevailing perspective; rather, the reader is able to gather the strategic and political realities facing the three states throughout the well-crafted and meticulously argued work.

Hasegawa organizes his study around three “subplots.” First, he addresses the complex relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, or more accurately, between Harry S. Truman and Joseph Stalin. The relationship that the author describes highlights two crucial questions: were Truman and Stalin cooperating to defeat Japan, or were they competing for the postwar spoils of Asia; and, if so, how early did this competition begin? Next, he scrutinizes the political maneuvering of Japanese and Soviet diplomats, as the former sought to secure their continental front while the latter maneuvered for an optimal bargaining position from which to consolidate control over East Asia. Last, he explores the internal political struggle between the war and peace factions of the Japanese government that threatened to prolong the war indefinitely, despite continued raids by U.S. bombers and the specter of Soviet intervention in Manchuria.
Ultimately, Hasegawa’s argument pivots around the Soviet Union. How wary were the Japanese of Soviet military intervention in any form? What role was the United States willing to grant the Soviet Union in postwar Asia? How did the United States use diplomacy and the atomic bomb to thwart Soviet aspirations? And how did Stalin mask his true intentions from both the Japanese and the Americans? It is against the backdrop of these questions that Hasegawa makes his most significant contribution to the examination of the ending of World War II. After scouring the archives of the former Soviet Union with the late scholar Boris Slavinsky, the author presents Stalin as a key figure in the closing weeks of the Pacific war. The author contends that Stalin was the pivotal focal point of both Japanese and American strategies in 1945. The hopes of the Imperial government in Tokyo for a negotiated peace rested upon Stalin’s intentions, which the author reveals to be jaded, yet skillfully focused on optimizing Soviet gains after the ultimate defeat of Japan. The United States, meanwhile, looked to limit Soviet gains in east Asia as the Truman administration sought to induce a Japanese surrender before Stalin could consolidate control over the vast resources of Manchuria and, more ominously, of Sakhalin and Hokkaido Islands.

Beyond placing greater stress on the role of Stalin in the final months of the war, Hasegawa revisits many of the conventional arguments that characterized a half-century of scholarship on the end of the Pacific war. However, he offers a different perspective on the Potsdam Proclamation, a nuanced argument centered on the close timing of events in the latter half of July 1945, and one with added significance, given his outright emphasis on the central role played by Stalin. The author argues that the proclamation was originally intended as a dire threat to Tokyo to secure a Japanese surrender prior to the invasion of Kyushu. The successful Trinity test, however, solved two problems; it allowed Truman to utilize the demands of Potsdam as justification for using the atomic bomb while providing a powerful alternative to Soviet entry. The ultimatum, in Hasegawa’s construct, is more forceful as a tool of atomic diplomacy focused on limiting Soviet gains than in compelling a Japanese surrender.

If Hasegawa dedicates much of his study to the bilateral diplomatic struggle between Washington and Moscow, he is equally diligent in presenting the best analysis of the flurry of political maneuvering in Tokyo in the waning days of the war since Robert Butow’s benchmark study, Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford, Calif., 1954). As the author articulates the significance of the kokutai, the “symbolic expression of both the political and spiritual essence of the emperor system” (p. 4) to Japanese society, he implies the absolute importance of the terminology of the Potsdam Proclamation. The centrality of the kokutai to Japanese identity and the unclear requirements of “unconditional surrender” posed the gravest obstacle to Japanese acceptance of Allied surrender terms. Here Hasegawa corrects a significant amount of previous literature that emphasized “clarification” of the term unconditional surrender. While “clarification” connotes restating the same demands in different ways, “modification” explicitly addresses changes to those specifications. Hasegawa accurately notes that Truman “modified” the definition, providing a window of opportunity for the Tokyo peace faction to advance its case to the emperor and the war faction to surrender while preserving the kokutai (pp. 70–71). The author concludes that Soviet entry, rather than the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, compelled Japanese surrender (p. 298). He argues that the Japanese would have continued to fight until further use of atomic bombs, an invasion of the home islands, or continued conventional bombing and blockade precluded prolongation of the war. It is a true post-revisionist conclusion in the context of World War II studies, but it also raises important questions that are ripe for analysis by historians of the Cold War.

Although he clearly identifies the utter shock with which Japanese leaders received news of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, shattering the peace faction’s hopes of a negotiated settlement, Hasegawa does not succeed in portray-
The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier’s Education

By Craig M. Mullaney
Penguin Press, 2009
Pp. vii, 386. $28.95

Review by Gary M. Bowman

The Unforgiving Minute is Craig Mullaney’s memoir of his experiences as a young man. The title is taken from Kipling’s poem If, which counsels

If you fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything
that’s in it,
And—which is more—you will be
a Man, my son!

Mullaney seems to have filled each minute of his life. He grew up in a working-class family in Rhode Island. He was a state champion wrestler, graduated second in the West Point class of 2000, was a Rhodes scholar, was an infantry platoon leader in Afghanistan, and, at thirty-one, was appointed principal director for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and central Asia at the Department of Defense.

The book recounts Mullaney’s experiences at West Point, Ranger School, Oxford, and in the Army, but the heart of the book is a chronicle of his war experiences in Afghanistan. Most reviewers have placed it in the genre of recent memoirs written by junior officers, and it is one of the best in that category. However, The Unforgiving Minute has literary merit that transcends the war story around which the book is constructed. The volume is characterized by both a bourgeois can-do tone and an introspection that distinguishes it from other similar books that come to mind: Winston Churchill’s My Early Life (New York, 1930) and James McDonough’s Platoon Leader (Novato, Calif., 1985).

The portion of the book on life at West Point is interesting, but the recent West Point experience, generally, is better described in David Lipsky’s Absolutely American (Boston, 2003) and Bill Murphy Jr.’s In a Time of War (New York, 2003). However, there are unique aspects to Mullaney’s experience due to the heavy influence of teachers who are among the leading Army intellectuals, such as Paul Yingling and, especially, John Nagl, Mullaney’s mentor. The author’s industriousness and competitiveness as a student are also remarkable; his motivation to be at the top of the class would have probably driven him to success at any college, but his chronicling of how he succeeded at West Point is noteworthy.

Mullaney’s description of his time at Oxford is beautifully written. For example, he details an early-morning outing with the Lincoln College crew:

My head snapped back to the center line of the boat as we pushed off from shore and glided down the Thames. Here in Oxford they called it the Isis, conferring upon it an almost mythological reverence. It was at its most beautiful in the moment before dawn, as the wooly mist absorbed the first light and hovered above the glassy belt of obsidian winding its way along the banks (p. 135).

However, this reviewer was left wondering what Mullaney studied in his two years at Oxford. He relates his first meeting with his academic supervisor, in which he stated that he intended to “examine American involvement in a secessionist insurgency there in the 1960s” (p. 137). The adviser suggested an academic program of “[r]ead and think. . . [s]imultaneously if possible” (p. 137). One of the most interesting parts of the book is Mullaney’s reading list, which is attached as an appendix. The author also fell in love, traveled all over the world, and party in peculiar Oxford ways, and attended lectures on “everything from nineteenth-century European diplomacy to twenty-first-century bioethics” (p. 138).

The section entitled “Soldier” recounts Mullaney’s tour as platoon leader of 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, in eastern Afghanistan. In “Veteran,” he recalls how other people responded to him as a combat veteran.

Mullaney discusses the reactions many veterans have experienced when they return to the states, particularly from Afghanistan. When a friend took him out to dinner, the friend told the waitress that Mullaney had just returned from Afghanistan, and the waitress said, “Well, at least you weren’t in Iraq. Afghanistan mustn’t have been too dangerous these days” (p. 348). At a cocktail party at Yale Law School, where Mullaney was visiting another friend, a student declared, “Believe me, I support the troops. I just don’t support the war” (p. 349). The author isolates the oft-repeated phrase, “I support the troops,” by asking what it means? How exactly do the people who make that comment support the troops, except by paying no attention to the war to which the troops give years and sometimes their very lives? He correctly identifies how this separation from our country and the war occurs: when he returned from Afghanistan, he “scoured the back pages of the newspaper to find anything about Afghanistan. Descriptions of the fighting were vague and incomplete: even the journalists had abandoned that front” (p. 348).

The reverse is now true. Journalists now cover Afghanistan and ignore Iraq, though Iraq again descends into violence. However, Mullaney does not develop his experience to its logical and ironic conclusion, which is that the current wars are mere spectacle. The wars are just another story in the succession of other happenings presented to the American public through mass media. The relationship of war to most citizens is not really any different in kind than celebrity gossip or sports; people experience no changes in their lives because of the wars. The irony is that Mullaney’s book, by telling his personal tale without
addressing the meaning of his experiences, only adds another story to the genre of entertainment about the war. It seems to this reviewer that his narrative demands exegesis, an explanation of how his experiences have meaning for the reader and for all Americans and how they were not just unusual events happening to Craig Mullaney.

This is especially true in Mullaney’s account of the death, and the responses to the death, of Pfc. Evan O’Neill. O’Neill’s death in an ambush on Losano Ridge is the dramatic climax of the story. The author writes that his platoon’s contact with the enemy on the ridge was “the minute that all of my training had prepared me for. As rounds whipsawed past me and spit up gravel, I had to decide whether to follow [Company Commander Ryan] Worthan down the hill into the ambush or to stand my ground and coordinate the Humvees’ heavy machine-gun fire. By doctrine I needed to be wherever I was now in a position to impact that end. By doctrine I needed to be wherever I was now in a position to impact that end. But where was that” (p. 285)? In that unforgiving minute, O’Neill was killed.

Ironically, aspects of Mullaney’s personal experiences in Afghanistan were singular and not typical of the general experience of soldiers serving there. Although the author accurately points out that the media did not adequately cover Afghanistan, his platoon and O’Neill’s death were promptly reported in an article in Time entitled “Battle in ‘the Evilest Place’ ” by embedded reporter Tim McGirk. Pfc. Evan O’Neill, in whose sacrifice Mullaney finds the meaning of his education, died a particularly Kipling-esque death. The private’s father wrote that his son was proud to be a paratrooper, like his father who had served in Vietnam, and that he would have been “happy to have earned the same pair of Purple Heart and Bronze Star medals” as his dad (p. 323). At his funeral, “a line stretched for nearly half a mile outside the funeral home” (p. 323). Most soldiers still do not receive such noble treatment.

Unfortunately, Mullaney’s book does not itself address the root reason for the public’s alienation from the war in Afghanistan; the author describes what he did, but he does not adequately explain why he was there. He does not address the larger context of his platoon’s mission in Afghanistan. At the unit’s first location, he states that its mission was to “protect the Gardez Provincial Reconstruction Team,” which “managed the reconstruction contracts for the entire province,” and to “show presence” within the city of Gardez to “intimidate the ‘bad guys’ ” (p. 224). The platoon later moved to Shikin, in Paktika Province on the Pakistani border, and conducted patrols. He does not explain that the platoon leader’s patrols were part of a larger effort to interdict the rat lines that al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters used to infiltrate into central Afghanistan, from which the Taliban intended to threaten Afghan population centers, particularly the southern city of Kandahar.

This reviewer found an aspect of Mullaney’s story troubling. The subtitle of the volume is “A Soldier’s Education.” He spent four years at West Point, two years at Oxford, approximately one year in Army schools, and at least a year teaching at the Naval Academy. He served one tour as a platoon leader and approximately nine months in the Old Guard. He left the Army in 2008. He does not explain why he left the Army. A soldier’s education takes a lifetime, and Mullaney’s experience as a platoon leader was only a beginning; it is unfortunate that the Army could not benefit more from the author’s schooling and experience and that Mullaney did not continue his soldier’s education.

Another curious aspect of the book is its ambivalence to the essence of war and the soldier’s profession. The turning point of his story is the death of Evan O’Neill and Mullaney’s guilt and introspection after O’Neill’s death. Every soldier’s death is singular and painful, but the unique character of the soldier’s calling is that he is willing to kill and to be killed. Mullaney’s pathos over O’Neill’s death suggests that the relative rarity of combat deaths today increases the value of each casualty more than it did in prior wars, perhaps causing us, as a nation, to be unwilling to make the blood sacrifice necessary to prevail in war. I would have been interested to know whether the author thinks the meaning of O’Neill’s sacrifice would be affected by the way in which the war ends, especially since he is now in a position to impact that end.

Nevertheless, The Unforgiving Minute is a superb book. It is entertaining and thought-provoking. Mullaney’s humility and introspection are apparent throughout the book. He is obviously a natural diarist, and the candid chronicle of his personal journey, including his account of his relationship with his father and brother, make the book more than a mere war diary.

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Review by Roderick M. Cox

As Victor Davis Hanson has stated, “The best place to begin studying war is with the soldiers’ stories themselves.” In Warriors and Scholars: A Modern War Reader, Professors Peter B. Lane and Ronald E. Marcello have put together a collection of easy-to-read...
essays of both firsthand accounts—soldiers’ stories—and scholarly papers about U.S. military actions that are entertaining and informative. The papers, presented at the University of North Texas’ annual military history seminars ranging in date from 1987 to 2003, will certainly satisfy a wide range of military history readers, particularly those who are new to the study. The editor’s notes are extensive and supply an excellent supplement to further explain, and often fill in needed background for, the various authors’ presentations. The information provided in these notes also furnishes an excellent bibliography for readers interested in exploring a particular subject area.

The book is presented in chronological sections: World War II (Europe and Pacific), The Early Cold War, The Korean War, The Vietnam War, The Late Cold War, and Terrorism. The sections’ authors, who participated in the campaigns discussed, give their firsthand experiences and share their observations and commentary on the conflicts as they saw them. This collection of soldiers’ stories consists of descriptions of World War II from the view of a bomber pilot flying over Europe who survived twenty-five missions; a Marine corporal in the ground campaigns on Iwo Jima, Saipan, and the Mariana Islands; and a B–29 navigator who survived thirty-five missions in the Pacific theater, which included incendiary bombings of Japanese cities. The Cold War period is addressed from two senior officers’ perspectives, one an operator and one an attaché, and affords an interesting outlook on the time, examining the challenges of a military strategy based on deterrence and dealing with the Soviet Union. The Korean War is studied by two men who are both warriors and scholars; one presents a very good overview at the operational level and the other offers a stark view at the ground level with a junior soldier’s thoughts on life in the Army of the era. The Vietnam War is engagingly discussed from the viewpoint of a seasoned Air Force combat pilot who spent over five years as a prisoner of war in Hanoi and asks the question, “how is it that smart people sometimes do dumb things?” (p. 191).

Coupled with these accounts are works written by scholars that provide not only a well researched history of the events but also include analysis and conclusions that are very informative and educational. David Glantz advances an excellent synopsis of the Soviet Union’s efforts in World War II. In a short essay, he expertly frames the immensity of the struggles and sacrifices the Soviets made in their “Great Patriotic War.” His presentation of little known, or as he puts it, “totally overlooked, forgotten, neglected, or frankly, covered up,” facts concerning the Soviet war effort is first rate (p. 5). Robert Divine authors a thoughtful piece on President Harry S. Truman’s choice to use the atomic bomb. Divine puts the decision into the context of the time and refutes the argument that dropping the atomic bomb was unnecessary or immoral. George Herring submits a good overview of President Lyndon B. Johnson and the paradox of the man that resulted in the disastrous handling of the Vietnam War. He brings to light several good considerations about limited war while also detailing how Johnson’s personal penchant made him exactly the wrong man to be commander in chief at that time and for that war.

The last section of the book is titled “Terrorism” and is arguably the most interesting part of the collection. Norman Itzkowitz shares his thoughts on the psychology of terrorism and terrorists. He puts forth the convincing case that terrorism is anything but a new phenomenon and offers a way of thinking about terrorists from a psychological perspective that could enable us to better combat them. The seven categories he recommends make for interesting reading and certainly merit attention by those who would seek to develop a strategy to combat al-Qaeda and its leadership. Written in 2003, Brian Linn’s essay asserts that the U.S. military is deficient in its ability to fight other than major conventional operations and that the study of the United States’ war effort in the Philippines, 1899–1902, would be of great benefit to those involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as other current conflicts. He makes his argument by presenting parallels between the beliefs and decisions of the William McKinley and the George W. Bush administrations, while also pointing out differences in the international situation and U.S. military forces. He then lists concepts and lessons that policy makers and military leaders can learn through study of these conflicts: the worth of local commanders, the integration of civil and military duties, the importance of garrisoning, and the use of the local populace. Linn concludes by illustrating that little professional military education is spent on such topics as irregular warfare, peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and “the making of peace” (p. 273).

Military readers will gain much from this volume’s lessons in history and leadership. Leadership topics are highlighted in anecdotes from the junior enlisted perspective to the most senior flag-officer level. Various essays discuss personal and organizational leadership at the individual, unit, and even national level and offer much for readers to ponder.

This volume, with its scholarly essays and firsthand accounts, does very well in encouraging the proper use of military history; that is, one should look not for answers from the past but look instead for parallels that prompt one to ask the right questions relative to contemporary issues.
Above the Thunder: Reminiscences of a Field Artillery Pilot in World War II

By Raymond C. Kerns
Kent State University Press, 2009
Pp. xvii, 305. $24.95

Review by Joseph Frechette

At first glance, Raymond C. Kerns’ Above the Thunder: Reminiscences of a Field Artillery Pilot in World War II promises its prospective readers a window into the operational experiences of a field artillery aerial observer in the Pacific theater. The majority of the volume consists of Kerns’ wartime memoirs and does not disappoint on this score, but to judge it merely on this basis would be to underrepresent it dramatically. Nearly one-half of the narrative is, in fact, devoted to the period of two years that elapsed between the entry of the United States into the war and when Kerns flew his first missions in combat. This is not simply an exercise in exposition. The process by which a common soldier possessing only an eighth-grade education was able to advance through the ranks on his own merit and become an officer, in a field requiring substantial technical expertise, is one of the fascinating aspects of this book.

The narrative opens in dramatic fashion from Kerns’ vantage point with his account of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and his ensuing eight months with the 25th Infantry Division as an enlisted man in the 89th Field Artillery Battalion. Not only does Kerns’ prose convey a sense of the confusion and fear brought on by the raid itself, but it also brings home the real apprehension of a Japanese invasion that only faded with time as the American defenders gradually trained and equipped their antiquated forces for the modern war that was upon them.

During this period, Kerns proved himself to be a quick study and adept at the practical calculations necessary for artillery targeting. These abilities qualified him for Officer Candidate School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and thence to flight training. The reader then learns how he and his comrades were trained to properly identify targets while under fire and to handle under less than ideal conditions their small aircraft, the J-3 Piper Cub known by the Army as the L-4. The reader also gets a sense of the necessary discipline enforced upon the students, the incentives they had to break the rules, and the urgency and high standards of their curriculum.

After receiving his commission and completing his training, Kerns took his place as one of two aerial liaison officers assigned to the 33d Infantry Division’s 122d Field Artillery Battalion and returned to the Pacific theater. Enthusiasts and historians alike will find much to appreciate in his account of operations, first on New Guinea at Maffin Bay and later on Luzon during the liberation of the Philippines. It is replete with narrow escapes, both spectacularly successful and disastrous fire missions; battlefield expedients necessitated by the primitive environment; and the frustrations of imperfect communications in war. The narrative contains both light-hearted and somber commentaries on the strained living conditions in the Southwest Pacific theater, all of which are related in Kerns’ lively and engaging prose.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of Kerns’ narrative is the attitude toward the Japanese. Despite the typical use of derogatory slang, the reader cannot fail to be impressed by Kerns’ humanity. One may argue that he was not an infantryman and was somewhat removed from the immediacy of combat or that memoirs written long after the fact may not be wholly accurate, but he appears to have genuinely regretted the violence in which he played a necessary role. Furthermore, his respect for the Japanese as fellow soldiers and human beings is often fully displayed. Above the Thunder may not dispel the notion of the Pacific war as a conflict made particularly gruesome by unregenerate racism, but it presents its readers with at least one example of a U.S. soldier who escaped that particular pathology.

The book also includes a substantial introduction and appendix by Tom Baker, himself the son of an L-4 pilot and for whom bringing this work to publication appears to have been a labor of love. The introduction gives a brief but useful history of the aerial observer program in World War II, while the appendix discusses the history and characteristics of the Piper Cub. In addition, Baker supplements Kerns’ narrative with a short series of useful endnotes that provide helpful context and that refer the reader to additional sources that further illustrate or clarify various events. One might complain that the abbreviations used in the endnotes are not readily apparent to the non-specialist, but that is a minor quibble when set against the citations’ utility. This reader, at least, simply wished that there had been more notes.

Overall, although the book’s structure is necessarily episodic, the reader gets a good feel not only for Kerns but for his compatriots as well. Above the Thunder is a stimulating and informative work that covers a fair bit of ground that has not been especially well trodden.

Joseph Frechette is an organizational historian in the Force Structure and Unit History Branch of the U.S. Army Center of Military History where he helps maintain the rolls of the Army in addition to compiling the lineage and honors of Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Military Intelligence, Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. Currently he is a doctoral student in ancient history at the University of Maryland at College Park with fields of concentration in imperialism, historiography, and late antiquity. He received his bachelor’s degree in history and classical archaeology and his master’s degree in history from the George Washington University in 1995 and 1998, respectively.
In the Summer 2010 issue of Army History, retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales painted a grim picture of a military that had turned its back on learning, primarily because it was “too busy to learn.” Because the issue is an important one, General Scales deserves a response.

Scales begins with some rather dated (and factually incorrect) history. The British Army of 1914 was tactically more adept in some ways than its German opponents, as it had incorporated the hard-earned lessons of the Boer War (1899–1902) into its tactical doctrine. It did, however, have to overcome its lack of experience in the conduct of operations with large forces and the fact that it entered the war without a real war plan.

I do not want to contest General Scales’ comments about the failings of the military’s personnel system but will focus instead on his observations pertaining to professional military education (PME). In this arena, Scales paints with too broad a brush. Many of the problems he identifies are specific to the Army and are not shared by the services generally. General Scales is understandably concerned that officers attend top-level schools, like war colleges, too late in their career. Does this apply, however, across the services or only to the Army? I cannot speak for the Air Force or the Navy, but generally the Marine students who are selected for top-level schools are lieutenant colonels or colonel-selects.

The solutions proposed by General Scales strike me as impractical. The idea, for example, of demanding that every officer emerge from a graduate institution, which would presumably include intermediate-level military schools such as staff colleges as well as top-level institutions, with demonstrated foreign-language proficiency is based on a misreading of history. It is true that the old German Kriegsakademie did have foreign-language proficiency as one of its requirements for graduation. Kriegsakademie attendees, however, had the choice of what language to take and the vast majority chose French or English. Both were widely taught in the German school system. Thus, officers at the Kriegsakademie could build on over a decade of instruction in a language. That is a very different proposition than teaching a major in his thirties a Category 4 language such as Arabic or Chinese from a baseline of zero.

General Scales’ suggestions for the composition of faculty at PME institutions are also unrealistic. His notion that all faculty at PME institutions should be uniformed military officers is simply unworkable, given the realities of our force structure. Even without that constraint, the turbulence created by losing a large number of faculty every year through the normal assignment process would mean a serious absence of continuity at these schools, which would have a major impact on the curriculum.

General Scales’ comments on the civilian presence in faculties in PME institutions are simply inaccurate, at least in regard to non-Army institutions. At Marine Corps University, for example, civilian faculty members are not contractors; they are government employees who come under the provisions of Title X, U.S. Code. Many have left tenured positions in academia to work at these institutions. Was not one of the goals of the first Skelton Report precisely to bring such academic expertise into the PME system? General Scales’ notion of obtaining faculty from other government agencies sounds good, but the likelihood of convincing people working in Washington, D.C., to move to places like Kansas and Alabama to teach seems to me to be remote, to say the least. For General Scales, the ideal faculty might be composed of active service officers, backed by a smattering of civilians, all of whom would be retired officers. I cannot imagine a better way of creating an intellectually destructive atmosphere of “group think.”

Following General Scales’ logic, if only uniformed officers could teach, would the readings be limited only to those works penned by authors who had served long and successful careers? Sir Julian Corbett certainly ranks as one of the great naval theorists. Would the fact that he never wore a uniform disqualify him from a spot on the reading list for military professionals? The same could be asked about Alfred Thayer Mahan, given his demonstrated incompetence as a sailor.

General Scales’ impression about who is actually responsible for PME is also somewhat mistaken. The document that governs all PME institutions, from service academies to war colleges, is the Officer Professional Military Education Policy, which is produced by the Joint Staff J–7. PME institutions that come under the purview of this policy provide input when it is revised.

To conclude, General Scales has raised some important issues pertaining to Army officer education. He would do well to raise these with General Casey. Some of the solutions he suggests, however, would be worse than the problems they are designed to solve.

Richard L. DiNardo
Quantico, Virginia

Dr. Richard L. DiNardo is professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico, Virginia, where he has taught since 1998. He was a visiting professor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, from 1994 to 1996. He is the author of Germany and the Axis Powers from Coalition to Collapse (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnów Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010), and other books on an array of topics in military history.
Many organizations and professions have some form of professional code or creed that highlights what behaviors are expected of their members. The military has The Code of Conduct, which it developed after the Korean War to inspire soldiers and stiffen their backbones should they be captured: “I am an American”; “I will never surrender of my own free will”; “If I am captured, I will continue to resist,” and so forth. The Rangers developed their own creed and a number of variants starting with their resuscitation as a formal unit in 1974. Following the Rangers’ lead and adopting much of the language of the Ranger Creed, the Army developed a Soldier’s Creed seven years ago: “I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat; I will never quit; I will never leave a fallen comrade,” and so on. Pursuing that line, the Army even wrote a Civilian’s Creed: “I am an Army Civilian—a member of the Army Team; I am dedicated to the Army, its Soldiers, and Civilians; I will always support the mission; I provide stability and continuity during war and peace,” etc. And, of course, many medical doctors still swear to a modernized Hippocratic Oath that sets out in some detail the standards to which they aspire.

There was even, if popular forms of entertainment are to be believed, a Pirate Code (as set down, according to Walt Disney, by the pirates Morgan and Bartholomew) to keep them in line (although this code, if it existed, may have been treated as “guidelines”). Thus, I see no reason why historians, especially Army historians, should not have a code or creed of our own. And taking advantage of my own small pulpit (or soapbox) I propose to set one out for discussion/argument/trashing, etc. So here goes.

**A Historian’s Code**

1. I will footnote (or endnote) all of my sources (none of this MLA or social science parenthetical referencing business).
2. If I do not reference my sources accurately, I will surely perish in the fires of various real or metaphorical infernal regions and I will completely deserve it. I have been warned.
3. I will respect the hard-won historical gains of those historians in whose steps I walk and will share such knowledge as is mine with all other historians (as they doubtless will cheerfully share it with me).
4. I will not be ashamed to say “I do not know” or to change my narrative of historical events when new sources point to my errors.
5. I will never leave a fallen book behind.
6. I will acknowledge that history is created by people and not by impersonal cosmic forces or “isms.” An “ism” by itself never harmed or helped anyone without human agency.
7. I am not a sociologist, political scientist, international relations-ist, or any other such “ist.” I am a historian and deal in facts, not models.
8. I know that I have a special responsibility to the truth and will seek, as fully as I can, to be thorough, objective, careful, and balanced in my judgments, relying on primary source documents whenever possible.
9. Life may be short, but history is forever. I am a servant of forever.
In considering the above list, I want to highlight the part of this code that is arguably the most important for Army historians. I am not referring to the first two elements of the code about footnotes and sources because those are inviolable for all historians, but rather the third element about sharing. In my twenty-three years (and counting) as an Army historian, I have been acquainted with some truly outstanding colleagues who go out of their way to share knowledge, help out with sources, conduct peer reviews of material, and just generally shine as generous historians. And they inspire me to respond in kind whenever asked. On the other hand, I have run into others who seem to think that information sharing is a one-way street. They ask, expect, and take help, but after coworkers have provided it and they are asked for similar assistance, they give only the proverbial Heisman salute (a stiff arm to the face) and carry on with their own “more important” business. In a community where many history offices in schools and commands are only one or, at most, two historians deep, we simply cannot afford to behave that way. When an associate requests help, give it to him or her if at all possible. Go that extra mile because one of these days you too will need assistance. The lesson is to be a colleague and not a . . . well, fill in your own word here. Helpful collegiality should be the norm, not the exception. Let’s all resolve to work harder on that.

So, that is my proposal for a Historian’s Code. If you don’t like it, tell me why. If you want to make up your own, fine. I look forward to your input. As always, I may be reached at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

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