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Historians have often pointed to the Continental Army’s experiences during its winter at Valley Forge in 1777 and 1778 and the actions taken by the U.S. Army to defeat insurgent forces on the island of Samar in 1901 and 1902 as epitomizing the character of the winning armies of the Revolutionary War and the Philippine War, respectively. Stoic endurance and a focus on military training and discipline have been the uplifting themes of the Valley Forge encampment. In contrast, the indiscriminate violence and punishment that U.S. Army and Marine forces under Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith are alleged to have unleashed on Samar have long stained the memory of the United States’ pacification of the Philippine Islands.

This issue of Army History presents a study by Ricardo Herrera of an ambitious joint Continental foraging expedition launched during the late winter of 1778 in the environs of British-held Philadelphia. During the undertaking, George Washington and two of his subordinate commanders, Nathanael Greene and Anthony Wayne, demonstrate an ability to direct very daring and spirited operations undaunted by the large nearby British forces that attempted to stymie them. Herrera concludes that Washington’s army was far more active and formidable before Steuben made his impact upon it than has been widely recognized.

Thomas Bruno contributes a reexamination of General Smith’s leadership of United States counterinsurgency efforts on Samar in the aftermath of the killing by local insurgents at Balangiga, Samar, of forty-eight U.S. soldiers, a majority of the garrison there, in September 1901. Bruno finds that this shocking event led both Smith and his military superiors to utter extraordinarily harsh language about their intentions. He concludes, however, that Smith’s approach to subduing the insurgency on Samar was, overall, considerably more restrained than has been recognized, while at the same time it proved exceptionally effective.

The type of detailed new examinations of military operations provided by these authors can contribute significantly to an understanding of our nation’s military past.

Charles Hendricks
Managing Editor
This is an exciting time to be part of the Army’s historical community. Amid significant changes in the Army’s leadership, developments in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, a series of upcoming commemorative events, the publication of several major Center of Military History books, and various changes in the Army’s museum system, opportunities abound for historians to collect, preserve, and interpret the Army’s story.

The Center is among the Army organizations with a new chief. I am pleased to announce the selection of Robert J. Dalessandro as the director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, effective 13 February 2011. The new director is no stranger to those familiar with the Army Historical Program. A retired Army colonel and published historian, he brings unique qualifications to the position. While in uniform, he served at the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Center of Military History, and for five years he led the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, overseeing its remarkable growth. As editor of the Army Officer’s Guide, he contributed to the development of the leadership skills of junior officers throughout the Army. His books on the American Expeditionary Forces in France have established him as an expert on U.S. involvement in World War I. Having observed over the last nine months the skills he demonstrated in his position of assistant chief of military history, I look ahead with great confidence and anticipation to his future leadership of the Army Historical Program.

I mentioned that the Center has recently published several major works. In January, I attended the formal launch of one of them, Dale Andrade’s new book, Surfing South of Baghdad. The event, held at Fort Stewart, Georgia, was jointly sponsored by the 3d Infantry Division and the Center of Military History, and it was well received by the over two hundred fifty soldiers, veterans, and community members who attended. As I watched the “dog face soldiers” viewing the museum display provided by the 3d Infantry Division Museum and observed their keen interest in Andrade’s presentation and in the discussion that followed, I was struck by how the event represented a crossroads of U.S. Army history and heritage. Andrade’s work certainly provides a great historical record of the division’s actions in Iraq during the well-known troop surge of 2007 and 2008, and it will be a useful tool for students and planners of similar operations for years to come. The book also serves an important purpose, however, in advancing the heritage of the famous division by incorporating its recent accomplishments. Young soldiers entering the 3d Infantry Division today may not know of their unit’s actions along the Marne River in July 1918, but, through the tireless work of generations of historians and museum specialists capturing and interpreting the unit’s story and commanders recognizing its value ever since, the soldiers have inherited a great legacy that builds unit cohesion and serves as a combat multiplier on today’s battlefield. Andrade’s book continues that legacy.

The articles in this issue of Army History also address subjects important to both the Army’s history and its heritage. Ricardo Herrera’s essay shows how popular lore may overshadow fact to create a distorted image. As Herrera reminds us, the common view of the Continental Army at Valley Forge is of self-sacrificing patriots who “marched along frozen, snow-choked roads, leaving their bloody footprints to mark their route in the cruel Pennsylvania winter.” Herrera rightly observes that General Washington commanded a field army that undertook extended missions to sustain itself and to counter British efforts to do the same. As an Army logistician, I am pleased by Herrera’s focus on a subject that is frequently overlooked by military historians. The complexities involved in logistical operations are often difficult to describe and rarely capture popular interest. The Continental Army in the winter of 1778, much like the U.S. Army in Afghanistan in the winter of 2011, provides a fine example of how logistical and combat operations intertwine. Neither aspect of warfare can be depicted well without understanding the other. The reconnaissance and foraging operations of Washington’s army, although executed on a large scale, have been too

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CSI Releases War Termination Conference Volume

The Combat Studies Institute Press has issued War Termination: The Proceedings of the War Termination Conference, United States Military Academy, West Point, edited by Col. Matthew Moten. As General Martin E. Dempsey, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, explains in his keynote speech, which the book reproduces, the June 2010 conference and the subsequently compiled volume were inspired by the book America’s First Battles, 1776–1965, edited by Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft. Dempsey comments that the earlier volume, which the University Press of Kansas published in 1986, had a significant impact on Army preparedness. Editor Moten, who is the deputy head of the Department of History at the U.S. Military Academy, observes in his foreword that “war termination is a curiously neglected topic” and sees the current volume as “an important first step” in promoting thought on “one of the most important issues facing military and political leaders.”

The new publication contains brief essays on each of the wars addressed in America’s First Battles, except it substitutes the Philippine War for the Spanish-American War. It also includes essays on the Second Seminole War, Sioux War, Cold War, and Gulf War. The essays are, with one exception, followed by printed interviews that Colonel Moten conducted with the contributors, which enable the essayists to comment more broadly on their respective conflicts. The contributors are or have been academics, primarily in civilian settings, with expertise in the actions they address. Only one of them, Ira D. Gruber, wrote essays contained in both volumes. Roger Spiller provides an overview of American thought and experience on ending war.

Digital copies of War Termination may be downloaded from http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp. Military personnel and federal employees may request printed copies by following the instructions posted at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/Request.asp.

New CMH Publications Available for Purchase

Two books whose publication was announced in the Winter 2011 issue of Army History may now be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Dale Andrade’s Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007–2008, issued in paperback in the Center of Military History’s Global War on Terrorism series, is available for $22. The Government Printing Office is selling The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, 1983, by Edgar F. Raines Jr. in paperback for $62 and in hardcover for $86. That book is part of the Center’s Contingency Operations Series. The price of the paperback version of the newly issued Engineers at War by Adrian G. Traas, the latest entry in the United States Army in Vietnam series, is $35. The price of the hardcover edition should be announced very soon.

Little Rock Study Published

The Center for Arkansas Studies at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock has published Operation Arkansas by Robert W. Coakley. The author, who for three decades was a historian at the Office of the Chief of Military History, was detailed to the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations in 1957 and 1958 to write this study. It examines the employment in those years of Regular Army and federalized National Guard troops to maintain order at Little Rock’s Central High School during its integration by nine African American students. Coakley revised the manuscript modestly prior to giving it final form in 1967, and it has subsequently been available to researchers at the Army Center of Military History’s library as OCMH Monograph 158M. Paul Scheips relies on this account in the chapters on Little Rock in The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disturbances, 1945–1992 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2005). Scheips observes in his book that Coakley’s study “is the most important existing military account of Operation Arkansas” and that it drew on the Pentagon’s “operational documentation, some of which no longer exists” (p. 28). John Carland, who was a historian at the Center of Military History for more than a decade and a half, provides a foreword to Coakley’s 211-page published report.

In Memoriam: Mattie E. Treadwell (1913–2010)

Mattie Evelyn Treadwell, who wrote The Women’s Army Corps in the Center’s series on the United States Army in World War II, died on 30 August 2010. The daughter of a pharmacist in Uvalde, Texas, she attended the University of Texas, where she received bachelor’s and master’s degrees and was elected to membership in Phi Beta Kappa. She taught in Texas and worked in Washington, D.C., for the U.S. Civil Service Commission before joining the first officer-candidate class of the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps

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Ricardo A. Herrera is a historian on the Staff Ride Team at the Combat Studies Institute (CSI), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He holds a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of California, Los Angeles, and a doctorate in history from Marquette University. Before joining CSI, he was director of honors at Mount Union College in Ohio and chair of the Department of History and Geography at Texas Lutheran University. He has published several articles and chapters in military history. Commissioned in 1983, he served as an Armor officer on active duty, in the Army Reserve, and with the California National Guard.
General George Washington was understandably concerned about the continued provisioning of his army at Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, in the middle of the winter of 1778. Writing to Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene on 12 February 1778, the American commander observed that "whereas by recent intelligence I have reason to expect that they ["the Enemy"] intend making another grand Forage into this Country, it is of the utmost Consequence that the Horses Cattle Sheep and Provender within Fifteen or Twenty miles west of the River Delaware between the Schuylkil and the Brandywine be immediately removed, to prevent the Enemy from receiving any benefit therefrom, as well as to supply the present Emergencies of the American Army." Washington did "therefore Authorise impower & Command . . . [Greene] forthwith to take Carry off & secure all such Horses as are suitable for Cavalry or for Draft and all Cattle & Sheep fit for Slaughter together with every kind of Forage that may be found in possession of any of the Inhabitants within the Aforesaid Limits." That which could not be carried off, Greene was to "immediately Cause to be destroyed, giving Direction, to the Officer or Officers to whom this Duty is assign’d, to take an account of the Quantity together with the Owners Names.”

In issuing these orders, Washington set in motion one of the Continental Army’s largest, riskiest, and most complex operations executed while at Valley Forge, the Grand Forage of 1778. The expedition involved some fifteen hundred to two thousand soldiers of the Continental Army and thus constituted a substantial portion of the roughly sixty-five hundred able-bodied, armed, and uniformed Continental Army troops at Valley Forge. It also included elements of the Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey militias and contingents of the Continental and Pennsylvania Navies. The forage spanned southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, northern Delaware, and northeastern Maryland. It lasted nearly six weeks and engaged an estimated twenty-three hundred British soldiers (about one-sixth of the able-bodied British force in Philadelphia), as well as several vessels and crews of the Royal Navy. Yet, the Grand Forage remains largely unexamined and unknown.

Compared to the campaigns and battles that bookended it, the Grand Forage was small indeed. In terms of raw numbers, the four thousand or so Continentals, Britons, Pennsylvanians, Delawareans, and New Jersey men who took part quite simply paled in comparison to the larger number of soldiers who fought at Brandywine, Germantown, or Monmouth. Yet, while the forage was not equal in scale to the Philadelphia campaign or the Battle of Monmouth, a closer study of that effort reveals in fine detail some of the operational, logistical, and civil-military complexities, constraints, and opportunities faced by commanders in the War of Independence. Moreover, it demonstrates the growing tactical and operational maturity of the Continental Army. Washington's forces executed actions that today might be deemed joint (involving companion services like the Army and Navy), compound (involving missions undertaken in conjunction by regular and irregular forces), and full-spectrum operations (combining “offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support
Map: The Environs of Philadelphia in 1778

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operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force”). Those actions stand in a startling contrast to the image of the encampment that most Americans hold.3

Herein lies the second reason for the Grand Forage’s obscurity: the power of myth as popular history. For most Americans, including military officers, the Valley Forge cantonment is little more than a national morality play highlighting the virtuous self-sacrifice and patriotism of George Washington and his ragged band of Continentals. Sketched in broad outlines, they marched along frozen, snow-choked roads, leaving their bloody footprints to mark their route in the cruel Pennsylvania winter. While these patriots, ignored by Congress, their parent states, and local farmers, starved and froze, they endured in the service of the “glorious cause”—independence. By way of contrast, General Sir William Howe and the British Army enjoyed the winter and the pleasures of Loyalist society, snug and warm in occupied Philadelphia, the erstwhile American capital. American officers’ knowledge typically goes beyond this. They note the appearance of Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, formerly a Prussian officer, who would, with vulgar charm, lead the effort to transform the Continental Army from a group of individualistic and undisciplined republican-warriors into citizen-soldiers, part of a well-drilled machine able to stand up to British bayonets.

In each of these cases, the Continental Army emerges as a static force, a “Greek chorus” trumpeting stoic martial values and patriotism. While there are kernels of truth to these images, they reduce the Continental Army to passive witness and caricature, rather than viewing it as a field army engaged in active operations. These views ignore the Continentals’ nearly constant combat and reconnaissance patrols and the foraging the Army undertook to supply itself and to deny those supplies to the British. In the scope, planning, and execution of the Grand Forage, Washington revealed his burgeoning acumen as a planner and commander and his continued willingness to accept risk. Equally important, the Grand Forage revealed the maturity of Washington’s staff and the Army’s leadership. The operation was too distant and too dispersed for the Army to exercise direct control; thus he relied on the experience and judgment of his generals, dozens of field- and company-grade officers, and the Army’s logistical staff. Washington exercised centralized command but placed his confidence in decentralized execution. Meanwhile, his opponent, General Howe, demonstrated a singular lack of interest in the largest and riskiest operation undertaken by the Continental Army in the winter of 1778.4

Feeding the Continentals

By February 1778, the Army’s Commissary and Quartermaster’s Departments had collapsed. The month’s bad weather and the atrocious road network compounded the dismal logistical picture. On 5 February, the Schuylkill River, which divided the principal encampment of Washington’s Main Army on the right bank from its local magazine on the left, was impassable because of flooding. Supplies could be had, but a host of factors like the declining purchasing power of Continental currency, the disorganization and lack of firm leadership in the Commissary and Quartermaster’s Departments, and, of course, the British Army militated against the Continentals. The “situation of the Camp is such that in all human probability the Army must soon dissolve,” wrote Brig. Gen. James Varnum of Rhode Island on 12 February. Valley Forge historian Wayne Bodle agrees that the army was fast approaching collapse and probably could not have lasted through March 1778 without obtaining additional sources of food and fuel.5

The problem was not that Pennsylvania was barren; it was not. There were supplies to be had to the west and south of Valley Forge, but transporting them to the army was difficult. The roads were poor and even under clement conditions the journey was difficult for heavily laden wagons. Col. Ephraim Blaine, deputy commissary general of purchases for the Middle Department, noted the “neglect in the Quarter Master Department [for] not keeping up a continual supply of Waggons from the Magazines with provisions.” Increased military traffic, to the extent this was possible, merely churned the roadbeds, which, in the freeze, thaw, and rain cycle made an arduous journey hellish. Furthermore, wagoners often siphoned off brine from barrels of pickled fish or meat in order to lighten their loads, thus spoiling the food. Many simply jettisoned barrels along the roadside. The frequent snow, rain, and cold weather made foraging for food very difficult. The proposition that hunting...
could supply the army while maintaining its position is, at best, ludicrous. Complicating supply problems for the Continental Army, farmers were reluctant to sell their goods to purchasing agents, speculating that prices for agricultural products would continue to rise. They avoided the public market established by Washington, and, upon the approach of foragers or purchasing agents, husbandmen hid their horses and wagons.6

Dreadful roads to the west, inclement weather, inadequate transport, near-worthless currency, and reluctant farmers made maintaining the cantonment a difficult proposition. Compounding the Continentals’ difficulty were the British Army’s competing need for food and forage and the raids and patrols it executed to supply itself. To the southeast of Valley Forge, the British Army wintered in Philadelphia. If considerably more comfortable than were the Continentals in their huts at Valley Forge, the British found that provisioning Philadelphia was no easy task. As Redcoats patrolled the countryside around the city, commissary agents under the escort of large detachments did their best to supply the army from local farms; thus on 26 January 1778, Howe’s Hessian aide de camp, Capt. Friedrich von Muenchhausen, matter-of-factly recorded the dispatch of “three regiments . . . this morning to cover our foragers and wagons, all of which returned unmolested.” They “brought almost 200 tons of hay” into Philadelphia. Often enough, however, lone farmers and millers brought their goods to the British.7

Howe’s foragers favored the lands east of the Schuylkill, where Loyalism was more pronounced, the enemy’s presence was lightest, and the risk of being caught on the wrong side of a rising river was obviated. Col. Walter Stewart, whose 13th Pennsylvania Regiment of the Continental Army foraged through northeast Philadelphia County and Bucks County, estimated that enough flour and other provisions to feed from eight thousand to ten thousand men “goes daily to Philadelphia, Carried in by Single Persons, Waggons, Horses &ca.” But while a large quantity of Bucks County’s bounty entered British lines, something that astounded Washington, British agents discovered that providing for their army and navy was no easy task. Payment in specie and escorts to city markets might encour-

A mid-nineteenth-century artist’s depiction of General Washington and his associates visiting suffering Continental Army troops at Valley Forge

Library of Congress
age many farmers, but fresh provisions were still difficult to obtain. Farmers’ subsistence needs and political loyalties were as varied as their numbers. Moreover, the region was anything but pacified. British foragers had swept through Valley Forge and the surrounding area before the Continentals occupied it in December 1777. Following the armies’ settling into winter quarters, life between the lines became increasingly dangerous for soldiers and civilians alike as the two forces competed for popular affections, political power, and subsistence in a region that easily contained a hundred thousand civilians, who also needed to eat. Marauding bands of furloughed Continentals, deserters from the armies, bandits, and Continental and British patrols looked for easy pickings of all sorts. Sometimes Continental pickets summarily executed farmers bringing produce and livestock to Philadelphia. Maj. John Graves Simcoe, commanding the Loyalist Queen’s Rangers, wrote that “to prevent this intercourse [with the British Army], the enemy added, to the severe exertions of their civil powers, their militia” to enforce the will of the Continental Congress, although its strength was by “no means sufficient for . . . stoping the Intercourse between the Country and City.”

The inability of Howe’s agents to subsist the army locally forced British commissaries to ship large quantities of food from New Jersey and Delaware, but the “greatest reliance, especially for livestock, was placed on large detachments of soldiers who roamed both sides of the Delaware.” Fuel could be had in the local area, but forage for horses and cattle had to be “supplemented by hay shipments from other areas, particularly Rhode Island.” As for the Continental Army, its situation was so desperate that Washington ordered magazines that were to supply the army for the upcoming spring campaign emptied and brought to Valley Forge. The garrisons protecting the magazines were forced to fend for themselves.

The army’s dire straits did not translate into inaction or lethargy. Instead the Continentals prepared to undertake a large foraging expedition of its own, comparable to one the British were reported to be planning for sometime in mid- to late February, at a location unknown to Washington. Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne, a native of Chester County, in which Valley Forge was situated, and a former elected official from the area, took an active role in planning the Continental Army mission, and he was prepared to lead it. But on 12 February, Washington selected the more senior General Greene to command the Continental Army’s forage. That evening, as the diary of Col. Israel Angell records, orders went out “for a detachment from the army to parade by ten O’Clock in the morning to Consist of one Major General [Greene], one Brigadier Genl. [Wayne,] three Colo. four Lt. Cols. four Majors 16 Capts. 32 Subls 32 Serjts 32 Corporals 56 Drums and fifs and 1200 privats, to be furnished with hard Bread for Six days, but where they are a going is not yet known.”

The Grand Forage Commences

While contemporary estimates of the size of the force that Washington placed under Greene’s command range from twelve hundred to two thousand soldiers, the roughly fourteen hun-

Nathanael Greene, by Charles Willson Peale, c. 1783
preceding year, was better suited for home defense than as a proper adjunct to the army. Washington pleaded with the president of Pennsylvania, Thomas Wharton Jr., to call out and strengthen the militia in order to secure the countryside north and east of the Schuylkill. Wharton and the county lieutenants faced the insurmountable task of mustering enough militiamen to do their duty. More often than not, however, Pennsylvania’s forces were “reduced to almost a cypher.”

The morning of 13 February was “pleasant but soon clouded up and grew raw cold and unpleasant.” At 1000, in obedience to Washington’s orders, officers, soldiers, and musicians formed up into their ad hoc division. Not long after, a “Detachment of fifteen hundred Men & four Field Pieces . . . marched towards Darby; what their destination is we know not.” In not atypical Continental fashion, the foraging column represented a mix of the army. Unit integrity, prized by modern armies, was cast aside out of necessity and in accordance with the Continental practice of forming improvised units. General officers from Rhode Island and Pennsylvania commanded field- and company-grade officers and enlisted men from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia regiments.

Greene recognized the army’s difficult situation but was doubtful about the forage’s ability to accomplish much. Doubt notwithstanding, the Rhode Islander concluded that “His Excellency thinks we had better make the experiment nevertheless.” Greene then ordered Wayne to “consult and fix upon the plan for execution” with Col. Clement Biddle, commissary general of forages, who was to oversee the expedition’s issue of warrants to farmers and others for their seized or destroyed property as well as direct the subordinate commissaries and quartermasters accompanying the forage. Greene dived into the task with his customary drive and energy. Because of the proximity of the target area to Valley Forge and the resultant wariness of its farmers, the Continental soldiers had little chance of finding enough wagons and teams to haul away whatever they might glean from the region’s farms. Thus, one of Greene’s first actions was to dispatch Biddle and a group of soldiers to Lancaster, some forty-five miles west of Valley Forge, with instructions to impress and bring forward wagons and teams. In the meantime, Greene led his division to Springfield Meeting House, about twelve miles southward, which coincided well with an earlier recommendation from Wayne to station a thousand to twelve hundred soldiers as an advanced post at Darby.

After establishing his headquarters, Greene set his men to collecting all the cattle, horses, wagons, and other necessary items in the area. He intended to fall back six miles on 15 February “to take post at one Edwards,” which was to serve as a collection point for the foraging parties. Greene urged Biddle to “exert yourself in collecting forage otherwise the business will go on slow.” Underscoring his seriousness, he enjoined Biddle to supervise the officers and men closely and promised he would “punish the least neglect with the greatest severity.” Greene concluded, “You must forage the country naked, and,” he added with a touch of sardonic humor, “to prevent their complaints of the want of forage we must take all their cattle, sheep and horses fit for the use of the Army.”

If Greene had hoped to maintain some degree of operational security, he would be disappointed, although he was initially unaware of the problem. Von Muenchhausen recorded with remarkable precision on 12 February that Washington “today detached General Wayne with 1,500
men and four cannon down the river about three miles beyond Darby to gather available cattle, provisions, etc.” American progress was assisted by a “sudden heavy rain” on 11 February, which forced the British to “dismantle the upper bridge across the Schuylkill.” This was a pontoon bridge located directly west of the center of Philadelphia that linked “a redoubt on the other side” with the garrison holding the city. Without the bridge, the British were unable to dispute the American forage. Under the circumstances, the redoubt was a temptation that could not be resisted.16

The redoubt’s isolation prompted Lt. Col. Robert Ballard of the 1st Virginia Regiment to propose an attack against it. Ballard and his command were “out on the foraging business yesterday [14 February] down about Darby” when he learned of the bridge’s removal. Sensing an opportunity to temporarily smash a British toehold across the Schuylkill, he selected about two hundred men “to attempt the Guard, [and] upon his earnest entreaty” Greene acceded. As Ballard’s party advanced upon the redoubt around 0300, a “Light horseman” spied it about five hundred yards distant and galloped off to raise the alarm. Ballard “push’d on as hard as possible” but discovered the garrison secure in a stone house. A party of Ansbachers from the regiments von Eyb and von Voit held it. Before Ballard’s attack got to within one hundred yards, the Ansbachers opened “a very heavy fire . . . which was very warmly return’d on our part till we got within 50 yds.”17

Unable to close with the enemy, Ballard ordered his men to fall back. During the course of the fight, Maj. Samuel Cabell of the 14th Virginia Regiment led a group toward the river and “fell in with a small party” of the enemy. Cabell believed “he kill’d several of them,” but in the darkness of the morning it was difficult to tell. The fight for the redoubt lasted about thirty minutes. Capt. Johann Ewald, a Hessian jäger, reported that Ballard lost ten killed and left behind seven wounded, including a French officer. Ballard, however, notified Greene that “there was not a man of his men kild, [although] five were slightly wounded.” He also added that his men “kild one Hessian and mortally wounded another; two of his men on their march deserted.” The Ansbachers reported suffering one killed and three wounded. Ballard’s setback notwithstanding, the forage continued.18

Greene maintained a steady correspondence with Washington, constantly updating him with the progress of his division, sometimes twice daily. Scarcity and Pennsylvanians’ skill at hiding their goods prompted Greene to request from Washington assistance from an additional deputy quartermaster general “to conduct the business of that department.” The foraging parties were not meeting with much success; Greene noted that their “collection was inconsiderable, [as] the Country is very much drain’d.” Nonetheless, they managed to find some cattle, sheep, and horses, all of which were sent to the encampment. Biddle reported to Greene much the same state of affairs in Lancaster. He “com plains bitterly of the disaffection of the people,” wrote Greene to Washington. There was “but a poor prospect of getting Waggons.” Nonetheless, Greene was not dissuaded. He steeled himself against the people’s distress: “The Inhabitants cry out and beset me from all quarters, but like Pharaoh I harden my heart.” In pharaohnic fashion, when Greene’s Continentals seized two men transporting provisions to the Brit-
ish, he ordered “an hundred [lashes] each by way of Example.” Greene was “determine[d] to forage the Country very bare. Nothing shall be left unattempted.”

Chester County’s farmers’ skill at hiding cattle aside, the chief problem was the paucity of wagons and teams. Livestock could be driven forward, but hay, flour, grain, and goods required transportation. Temptingly, what the land did have in abundance was “Hay... the plenteful test article that there is in the Country.” Greene estimated that “sixty or seventy tons may be had in this neighborhood,” which would go far toward feeding the few winter-thin cattle, sheep, and horses seized for the army. Greene proposed expanding the geographic scope of the forage to include the back side of Brandywine Creek to the west, Reading to his northwest, and, “as soon as the Bridge [over the Schuylkill] is passable,” Bucks County to the northeast. Determined to deny the British the hay his own foragers could not collect, Greene expanded upon Washington’s instructions to destroy provender on the islands in the lower Delaware River and instead followed Wayne’s advice to “destroy all the forage upon the Jersey shore.” Greene selected Col. Richard Butler of the 9th Pennsylvania Regiment to command the detachment. He was to “cross the River from Chester,” Washington concurred.

The following day, Greene altered his proposal for the Bucks County incursion. Mindful of his force’s security, he believed that an attempt to seize wagons in Bucks County would “explain our intentions too early for the safety of the party.” Thus, he proposed issuing a press warrant to Johnston Smith, a purchasing agent in the Quartermaster’s Department. Greene wanted Smith to hold his warrant in abeyance, and instead first “apply to the Executive Council for an hundred Waggons to be got ready in three Days.” Should the state government in Lancaster prove unable or unwilling to exert itself, only then was Smith to “collect the Waggons with his press Warrant.” The escorts for the newly acquired wagons were to load them with forage from “some of the best Hay Towns between Camp and Lancaster,” deposit the hay at the encampment, and proceed to Bucks County “with so much secrecy and dispatch, that it will be difficult for the Enemy to defeat it.”

Two other considerations may also have informed Greene’s logic. First, he believed the farmers around Lancaster were more skillful at hiding their wagons than Colonel Biddle was at discovering them. Thus, who better at ferreting out wagons than local officials? The second may have been Greene’s sensitivity to state and Continental authority and the Army’s role in supporting them. Part of the Army’s mission was buttressing the shaky authority of the state government to help keep it in the war. By appealing to Pennsylvania’s government to provide the wagons, the Continental Army publicly deferred to civil power, which reinforced the state’s authority while it demonstrated to the people of southern Pennsylvania the state’s power and its ability to persevere. Whatever the reasoning, however, Washington agreed with Greene’s plans as “our present wants will justify any measures you can take.”

**Greene’s Return to Valley Forge**

Much as Greene had expected, the pickings had been slim. About 17 February, he forwarded “near fifty Head of Cattle” to camp, and it was not too soon. Over the past several days the army had not had “Above half allowance” of its meat ration and the “soldiers are scarcell restrained from mutinity by the eloquence and management of our officers.” Camp was littered with the carcasses of horses, while those still alive exhibited a “deplorable leanness [for]... want of forage.” Greene wished that he could have sent more, but the “Inhabitants have taken the alarm and conceal their stock in such a manner that it is very difficult finding any.” They had done as much with their horses and harnesses, thus “Our poor fellows are obligd to search all the woods and swamps after them and often without success.” However, to provide a disincentive for their efforts to hide animals and goods, Greene ordered that no receipts be given to those whose concealed stock was discovered. Naturally, the owners were to be notified of the uncompensated seizures; it was only right that they should know of their support of the Army.

Any hope that the local “Whigs” would give information “respecting the Tories” and their cached goods was lost “for fear when we are gone they will be carried prisoners in Philadelphia.” Still, detachments fanned out in an ever-widening circuit. Lt. Col. Josiah Harmar of the 6th Pennsylvania Regiment followed through on Greene’s plan to forage west of the Brandywine’s forks “a little above the rout of the enemy,” while Col. Oliver Spencer, a New Jersey officer who commanded Spencer’s Additional Continental Regiment, made a large circuit north and west toward Goshen Meeting House, about ten miles southwest of Valley Forge.

Even with a much smaller force, Greene was determined to continue foraging until all of the wagons were loaded with hay. As for “Grain there is but little to be got.” Elements of his force had already burned a “very considerable” quantity of forage on the Delaware River islands and “We got a number of very good Horses from off” them in the bargain. Greene also learned that the British were readying for a “grand forage some where.” His sources believed that it would take place “on this side [of the Schuylkill], but I imagin they will alter their plan now if they design it before” Continental foragers had scourcd Chester County. Greene had “no doubt of Bucks County being their object.” Throughout the forage, the dearth of transportation had dogged Continental efforts, and now Greene was ready to return to camp. “The time for which I came out expires tonight,” he wrote on 18 February, “but as the foraging business has been greatly obstructed for want of Waggons it will be necessary for me to continue a few days longer.” Before acting, Greene first wished “to know your Excellencies pleasure respecting the matter.” Coincidentally, the unintended delay
met with Washington’s desire that Greene continue the forage “if you have any prospect of making it worth the while.”

By the evening of 19 February, Greene was prepared to present to Washington forty loaded wagons, but nothing more. It was not that the countryside was devoid of hay, rather that the army did not have the number of wagons and teams it needed to support its operations. With more of them, Greene believed that he would have made an even greater impact, but instead his efforts “rendered us but little assistance from the lines.” As for cattle, that was another matter. Colonel Spencer reported from Goshen that “there was but few Cattle to be got there.” Harmar, operating around the forks of the Brandywine, had not yet reported, but Greene, having “heard of Cattle going to camp from that quarter,” attributed them to Harmar. Greene’s foragers had “pretty well gleaned” Chester County. He then ordered his troops, save a two-company rearguard, to return to camp. Greene followed around 21 February, no doubt frustrated by the army’s lack of transportation and the unwillingness of so many to aid so few. His disappointment notwithstanding, Greene believed that the “little collections” made by his command and “some others” had “prevented the Army from disbanding.” Despite the few supplies collected, Greene had been fortunate. Except for increased raiding, forages, and daily patrols, the British Army had not stirred. Washington’s foragers had had unchallenged access to southeastern Pennsylvania. This state of affairs changed, however, once Anthony Wayne’s detachment entered New Jersey.

A Provincial Offensive?

Much as nature abhors a vacuum, so too did would-be provincials. Responding to the opportunity presented by the collapse of the Continentals’ eastern screen line and the departure of Greene and Wayne from Chester County, some Pennsylvanians loyal to the British government and “a great many deserters” entered British lines, and many of them would join or form Loyalist corps. Always a careful observer, Capt. Johann Ewald noted that “These people receive no pay, ride their own horses, and live from pillage.” Loyalists like Capts. Richard Hovenden, Evan Thomas, Jacob James, and Thomas Sandford had formed Loyalist troop units in Philadelphia, and following Greene’s departure from Valley Forge in February 1778 they led their companies into the counties north of Philadelphia and east of the Schuylkill to attack Continental supply lines, often under or supported by regulars. Their attacks grew in scope once the foraging division divided, and its parts went their separate ways. One of their most notable attacks took place in late February, when Hovenden and his troop of Philadelphia Light Dragoons captured a drove of one hundred and thirty New England cattle, which had been under light escort.

Wayne Bodle contends that Hovenden’s “possession of the oxen was an ominous sign of the scope of the provincial offensive.” Furthermore, he argues that successes like this, coupled with the lack of resistance, emboldened the Loyalists, who expanded their scope of operations into more daring raids against the local Whig leadership and other sources of supply. Increased raiding, however much consternation or fear that it raised, did not constitute an offensive. Indeed, as the ever-observant Ewald noted, “we jägers felt like we were dead and forgotten.” These Hessian regulars, who, with their British counterparts were the backbone of the army and of
any major operation, made their displeasure known to Howe. The general assured the jägers that he was resting them for future use, “expressed his complete satisfaction concerning our sensibilities, and wished that the same esprit de corps existed in the entire army.” Thus, it seems reasonable to view the provincial forces’ actions as an uptick in the British Army’s operational tempo, an intensification of ongoing efforts in a disputed area of operations. While these raids were worrisome, threatening the Continental Army’s lines of communications with New England and terrorizing local Whigs did not represent an offensive. These bold actions pointed to some especially active provincial and regular corps seizing the local initiative with the commanding general’s blessing. Their increased tempo points to British commanders’ realization of Continental weakness, yet Howe did nothing more than expand raiding. Even with his knowledge of the collapse of the Continental Army’s eastern screen line, Howe held his main force in Philadelphia—until Anthony Wayne crossed the Delaware.28

“General Wayne will cross over into the Jerseys”29

On the evening of 15 February, Greene had informed Washington that Col. Richard Butler would cross the Delaware from Chester into New Jersey. Shortly thereafter, however, Greene amended his plans and decided to send General Wayne and two hundred and fifty to three hundred soldiers “into the Jerseys from Wilmington to execute the design of destroying the Hay and driving in all the stock from the shores.” Detaching Wayne represented a significant expansion over the original Butler plan, which probably would not have involved much more than a hundred and fifty to two hundred soldiers. Greene believed his present force had gleaned what it could in southeastern Pennsylvania. By maintaining a concentration of forces rather than dispersing, he merely increased the pressure on a limited forage and provision base.30

Greene also shelved his earlier plan to enter Loyal-leaning Bucks County. He likely reckoned that the effort his forces would expend would not equal the gain or be worth the chance taken. Entering Bucks risked the destruction of that element because of the county’s proximity to Philadelphia and the ease with which British foragers and patrols made their way into it. Were Greene to penetrate Bucks County, he would reduce the number of soldiers available to enter New Jersey and weaken Continental foragers everywhere. Should the Schuylkill rise, a likely event, the foragers risked being cut off by the British. With purchasing agents at work to the west of Valley Forge, foraging parties to the south and southwest, and the ongoing need for forage and provisions, New Jersey was the logical choice. It had yet to be exploited by Continental forces; doing so might benefit the army as it deprived the enemy.31

Greene did not believe that expanding the forage would “afford an immediate relief,” but it would be worth the effort if Wayne were able to burn Jersey hay, drive in some cattle, and deny them to the enemy. The Rhode Islander’s command had departed camp only five days earlier, but already its numbers were much reduced. Wayne’s detachment
probably constituted over half of the force under Greene. “Great numbers” of the sick and those who “got foot sore amarching” had already been sent back, and as for Wayne’s forthcoming leg of the forage, Greene reminded Washington that “by this detachment my party will be much diminished.” Expressing what was likely a common wish, Greene prayed that “God grant we may never be brought into such a wretched condition again.” Under the circumstances, dispatching Wayne made eminent sense. It promised some degree of success with a reasonable degree of risk.32

Despite Howe’s diffident behavior, there was a possibility that Wayne’s detachment might prove too tempting a target for the British commander to ignore. Indeed, as historian Troyer Steele Anderson pointed out, “only a very serious mistake by Washington” could inspire Howe to risk an attack against Washington’s army. In December 1777, Howe had declined attacking the fortified Continentals at Whitemarsh, just north of Germantown, and he refused to do so while they were at Valley Forge. Explaining his decisions, Howe pled the “entrenched situation of the enemy,” his paucity of forces, and the Loyalists’ questionable strength and commitment to the British cause as limitations on his scope of action. These considerations notwithstanding, Wayne’s detachment, if not as grand a prize as the Main Army, presented an opportunity to strike while husbanding Britain’s increasingly precious manpower.33

But more than manpower constrained Howe. On 21 October 1777, a little more than a fortnight after his victory at Germantown, Howe offered his resignation. Following his eventual return to England, Howe blamed Lord George Germain, secretary of state for the American colonies, for failing to support him. Howe complained of not having been adequately reinforced, of having had his recommendations for officers’ promotions denied, and, most tellingly, of having lost the ministry’s confidence. However, historian Piers Mackesy made plain that Howe’s requests for reinforcements were extravagant and that Howe treated the ministry’s refusals to accede to them as personal affronts. In the matter of rebuffed recommendations for promotions, the ministry denied just two of them. As for lost confidence, Mackesy attributed it to Howe’s sensitivity to Germain’s requests for more frequent and fuller communications and his urging Howe and his brother, V. Adm. Richard, Viscount Howe, commander of British naval forces in America, to disrupt rebel trade through coastal raids, a tighter blockade, and less lenity with pardons and shipping. Thus, it is perfectly plausible that Howe was preoccupied with quitting the American theater while the Grand Forage was taking place. Anderson believed that Howe recognized the scale, scope, and complexity of subduing the rebellion and that as early as December 1776 or January 1777 he was very discouraged about British military prospects. Whatever the case, Howe’s attitude, his leadership, and the command climate he fostered clearly affected the army’s discipline and subordinate officers’ attentiveness to duty. Nonetheless, Howe’s continued indolence was not a forgone conclusion.34

Should Howe decide to act against Wayne, the Royal Navy’s command of the Delaware River gave his forces unmatched operational mobility and reach. The Delaware River Squadron, under Capt. Andrew Snape Hamond, boasted over ten vessels, including a fifty-gun fourth-rate, two fifth-rate, and a pair of lighter sixth-rate frigates and others. Over fifteen hundred sailors, many of whom however suffered from “Fever and Flux,” crewed Hamond’s squadron, which mounted over two hundred and twenty guns. Despite the Royal Navy’s overwhelming strength, what remained of the Continental and Pennsylvania Navies’ leadership was determined to dispute Hamond’s control of the river. Unable to contest Hamond directly, Continental and Pennsylvania naval commanders chose to put the Briton off-balance by striking at weak targets and forcing Hamond to disperse and dissipate his strength. This proved most fortunate for Wayne.35

On 29 January 1778, the Marine Committee of the Continental Congress had ordered Capt. John Barry to “employ the Pinnace and Barges” of the frigates Effingham and Washington, and another barge, “in annoying the enemies Vessels.” The orders authorized Barry to “collect such a number of men . . . necessary to officer and man” the boats as he saw fit. Orders in hand, Barry ventured to Bordentown, New Jersey, to take charge of his new command. Arriving on 1 February, he found two serviceable barges, a third in need of repair, and the pinnace in a like condition. Barry recruited Lt. Luke Matthewman, his first officer on the Lexington, as second in command, and Midshipman Matthew Clarkson, probably to command one of the boats. It is likely that Lt. James Coakley, a Continental marine from Barry’s scuttled Effingham, also joined. As for the crews, Barry was only able to recruit twenty-five sailors; however, it took twenty to man each
barge. Fortunately, Commodore John Hazelwood of the Pennsylvania Navy granted his request for the additional fifteen sailors.36

After fitting out the boats, Barry set off on the night of 10 February. Hugging the Jersey shore, Barry and his sailors, “in two barges, passed Philadelphia through the ice.” Around the same time that Barry made his way past the city, another contingent was traveling overland with its boats. According to Barry biographer William Bell Clark, Capt. Joseph Wade and crews of the Pennsylvania Navy hauled five or six armed boats overland to a point below Philadelphia. Like Barry, Wade’s mission was to “annoy the enemy below” Philadelphia. Once afloat, Wade may have joined forces with Barry in the Christina River, near Wilmington.37

On 17 February, Wayne and his detachment departed for Wilmington, the place from which he hoped to cross into New Jersey. On the eighteenth, they halted at Newman’s Creek, just north of Wilmington. Wayne learned that Barry was anchored nearby with four boats. After the two conferred, Barry agreed to ferry Wayne’s Continentals across the river on 19 February. Luckily, it was free of ice, and there were no British cruisers in the vicinity. The crossing, however, did not go undetected. Hugh Cowperthwaite, a Salem, New Jersey, Loyalist, made his way to Philadelphia and reported to General Howe that “Wayne was loose in Salem County” in order to “rob the country of cattle, forage, clothing, and leather goods.”38

As had southeastern Pennsylvania, southwestern New Jersey had suffered from the effects of the war. Regulars and militiamen frequented the countryside in search of livestock and other goods, while Whigs and Loyalists vandalized one another’s property. This part of the state, particularly Gloucester County, boasted large concentrations of Loyal Americans and Quakers who, following the British occupation of Philadelphia, “lost no time in opening a brisk trade with the city.” “Everywhere,” wrote Pastor Nicholas Collin of Swedesboro, “distrust, fear hatred and abominable selfishness” reigned.39

Upon landing, Wayne established contact with Brig. Gen. Joseph Ellis of the New Jersey militia and requested that he collect all the cattle and horses at Gloucester, Cooper’s Ferry (present-day Camden), and Haddonfield. Ellis was “happy in just receiving your Orders” and promised to be “particularly careful in attending to” them. Mustered no more than three hundred men, Ellis set his militiamen to work with a purpose. Over the next several days, they and the Continentals did their best to collect horses, cattle, forage, and foodstuffs. In Salem County, Wayne’s forces collected cattle from Elsinboro up to Mannington, north of Alloway Creek. Like many of the farmers in southeastern Pennsylvania, a goodly number of south Jersey farmers hid their cattle in the woods, or in tall swamp grass. Despite the presence of Wayne’s force, many Whigs were wary of openly supporting Wayne for fear of what would happen once the Continentals departed, and British regulars and Loyalists returned. Although some saw it as their “Duty & Inclination . . . to give every possible assistance to the Common Cause of America,” they demurred out of concern that it “would involve . . . [them] in so many unhappy consequences were . . . [they] to be personally active.”40

Ellis’ militiamen quickly collected “Such Cattle &c. as are fit for present use and the several Horses for the more immediate service of the Cavalry in the Neighbourhood of Gloucester-Coo- per’s ferries & my present Quarters” in Haddonfield. Upon gathering the livestock, they were “taken & drove to some secure place as soon as the small Detachment . . . can possibly collect them.” Wayne also tasked the New Jersey brigadier with keeping a watchful eye on the “Motions of the Enemy.” Ellis promised “that you shall receive the earliest Intelligence of their Rout.”41

By 25 February, the Continentals and New Jersey militiamen had amassed one hundred and fifty head of cattle. Wayne, who had by then shifted his headquarters northward to Haddonfield, wrote to Washington that he believed that there was more livestock between Cooper’s and Dunk’s Ferries (present-day Beverly), which he expected to drive in within four days to bring the total number of stock to two hundred and fifty head of cattle and thirty horses for Capt. Henry Lee’s dragoons. The owners, he noted, received certificates.42

Early on, Wayne had anticipated a British reaction to his presence in New Jersey. His distance from the Main Army, the size of his command, its physical isolation because of the river, the slow rate of march imposed by the cattle and forage, and Howe’s need to respond in order to reinforce British authority and preserve New Jersey’s provender for British forces made him too tempting a target for Howe to ignore. Unable to match a sizable British force in combat, Wayne decided on an alternate scheme. On 23 February, Wayne ordered Captain Barry to “pass up the River, with your Boats, and Burn
all of the Hay along the shore from Billings Port to Salem. He was to take “an Acct. of the Persons Names to whom it belongs together with the Quantity” destroyed. As a start, Wayne had it on good intelligence that at “one John Kellys place at the mouth of Raccoon Creek, there is near One Hundred Tons—and up Mantua Creek, there is [also] a Considerable Quantity.” Supplementing Barry’s crews, Wayne ordered 2d Lt. Simeon Jennings of the 2d Rhode Island Regiment to “proceed with the Detachment under your Command being nineteen in number . . . on board Captn. Barreys Boats.” Jennings’ detachment was drawn from his regiment and the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 8th Connecticut Regiments from Varnum’s and Brig. Gen. Jedidiah Huntington’s brigades. Barry’s raids were to serve a dual purpose: to divert British attention from the expedition while denying the dual purpose: to divert British attention and avoid them. Wayne’s intent was to “push the Cattle for Trent town” while he and his detachment joined with the militia, estimated to be no more than three hundred strong, “to prevent the Enemy from Maroding too far.”

Barry’s sailors and makeshift marines had, meanwhile, set fire to the haystacks they encountered as they moved down the New Jersey shore, igniting one bale after another, all the way to Salem Creek. On 26 February, Barry notified Washington from Port Penn, Delaware, that “According to the orders of General Wayne I have Destroyed the Forage from Mantua Creek to . . . [Salem]; the Quantity Destroyed is about four Hundred Tons & should have Proceeded farther had not a Number of the Enemies Boats appeared in Sight & Lining the Jersey Shore Deprived Us of the Opportunity of Proceeding Farther on the Same purpose.”

**HOWE TAKES “A SLAP AT GENERAL WAYNE”**

Wayne’s dispatch across the Delaware had roused Howe from his stupor, if only momentarily and in the most dilatory fashion. On the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, he launched a two-pronged movement into New Jersey. “We imagine,” wrote Lt. Col. Francis Downman of the Royal Artillery, that “the intention is to make a junction with the light infantry and most likely by this manoeuvre they may surround Mr. Wane and his cattle” from above and below. The intent, according to another officer, was “to surprise” him. The crew of Hamond’s Roebuck (44 guns) had busied itself from about 1500 on 24 February “fitting out the Pembroke (Tender) & [two] half Galley’s with arms Provisions” and other supplies preparatory to making the assault. Capt. John Linzee of the frigate Pearl (32 guns) commanded the naval contingent, which included his tender, the sloop Zebra (14 guns), two galleys, and “a Great No. of flatt Boats, Carrying the 2 Battns. of [the] Light Infantry” brigade. Late on the night of 24 February, over twenty flatboats and escorts set out for Billingsport, carrying the infantry under the command of Lt. Col. Robert Abercromby. They anchored there around 0600 and disembarked the “light bobs.” The infantrymen were to “march on Salam” to “have a slap at General Wayne, if possible.” Captain Hamond ordered the flatboats to follow the brigade downriver in order to provide it with greater mobility and operational reach. So just after noon, the flotilla again sailed, “Rowd and Towd with flatt boats down the River,” before anchoring off Wilmington, Delaware.

Hamond’s sailors ferried a second brigade around 2200 on 25 February, when a second contingent of flatboats and escorts carried Lt. Col. Thomas Sterling’s two-battalion 42d Regiment of Foot, Major Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers, and “4 three po[unde]rs” to New Jersey. The ad hoc brigade mustered around a thousand soldiers. Sterling landed above Cooper’s Ferry around midnight and before long seized the ferry’s wharves to land the artillery, being momentarily delayed “on accot. of a few shot fir’d . . . by a guard of militia.” The Highlanders’ advance scattered it. Sterling organized a field officer’s guard of about a hundred and fifty men to escort supply wagons forward and then set off with the bulk of his force for Haddonfield. Given the proximity of Cooper’s Ferry to Philadelphia, Hamond’s squadron could easily support Sterling.

Ellis’ scouts apparently doubled Abercromby’s strength, as indicated by Wayne’s report on 26 February.
that about two thousand infantrymen had "landed at Balensport," where Abercromby divided his brigade to cover Wayne’s most likely routes of march. In line with Wayne’s exaggerated understanding of British strength, the American commander stated that Abercromby had sent fifteen hundred soldiers southward to Blessington (present-day Sharptown), where they “encamped... within Seven Miles of Selem,” and another five hundred northward along King’s Highway. Unhappily, but not unexpectedly, the British had a decidedly easier time “Collecting the Cattle &Ca.” than did Wayne. Wayne reported that the “Inhabitants in that Quarter” gave the “Enemy exact Intelligence of our Numbers and Rout—in Consequence of which that body were thrown over [the river] below” Wayne’s position to block his line of retreat to the south. Scouts to the north soon reported that two thousand British soldiers had landed at Cooper’s Ferry “with four Pieces of Artillery and a Considerable body of Light Horse.”

While Barry’s flotilla had “amused” and possibly attracted the enemy, Wayne had on 24 February marched northeast toward Haddonfield via the King’s Highway, passing through Blessington and on to Swedesboro, where he spent the night at the Rev. Nicholas Collin’s house. Just after Wayne bedded down, sentries fired alarm guns warning of a British approach, but it turned out to be a false alarm. Collin thought his guest “a well-bred gentleman [who]... showed me great respect,” and also noted the shabby appearance of Wayne’s force, “the greater part [of which] were miserably clothed, some without boots, others without socks.” Wayne departed the next morning and none too soon, for, “on the morning at 11 o’clock, a regiment of English infantry came to attack him, but he had already then escaped. These troops had come in running march the last [Swedish] half mile, and the militia in Swedesborough had hardly time to escape.” Abercromby missed Wayne, but he captured “four or five Waggons belonging to the Commy. which were on a back Rout from Selem loaded with Spirits Brandy &Ca.” as well as “a small guard of Seven men left to Conduct them.”

Wayne and his band of three hundred pushed northward to Haddonfield. Their stay there, like that at Swedesboro, was short. The night that he landed, Sterling set out to attack or block Wayne. After leaving behind a “Field officers Guard to come up with the Waggons,” the Scot marched for Haddonfield, but, yet again, Wayne eluded capture. Although Wayne fretted that “from the Supines and Disaffection of every part of this State which I have passed through (on my Present tour)—I don’t expect a Single man of the Militia to turn out more than those already under Col Ellis, which don’t amount to three Hundred,” Ellis’ New Jersey men performed creditably. One of their number, Lt. Aaron Chew of the 2d Battalion, Gloucester County Regiment, was patrolling the riverfront when he took note of Sterling’s column. Chew galloped through a snowstorm to Haddonfield, arrived at 0200 on 26 February, and warned Wayne of its approach. Wayne next ordered a drummer to beat to arms and then sent out scouts with Chew to confirm the report.

While waiting for his scouts to return, Wayne sent ahead to “Trent Town” forty barrels of gunpowder, a hundred and fifty head of cattle, and assorted other supplies with an escort of about a hundred and forty soldiers under Lt. Col. Isaac Sherman of the 2d Connecticut Regiment. Sherman’s detachment reduced Wayne’s already small force to just above half its original complement. Because of the size of the herd, the need to maintain the cattle’s weight, and the number of wagons carrying forage and other foodstuffs, Sherman’s rate of march was limited to about eight miles per day. The remainder of the detachment evaded its pursuers as it decamped in the darkness of the early morning and marched another fifteen miles or so northeast to Mount Holly. Wayne’s mission, the small size of his command, and memories of the unhappy fate of his rearward element that had been overwhelmed at Paoli, Pennsylvania, on the night of 20–21 September 1777 likely hastened his departure.

Sterling may have missed Wayne, but he made the most of his stay in Haddonfield, the limit of his penetration, some six miles inland from Cooper’s Ferry. Roughly forty families, mostly Quaker, “who seem heartily tired of this Contest,” lived in the village. Capt.-Lt. John Peebles of the 42d noted that the villagers “seem’d well pleased at our coming.” The day after arriving, details searched for wagons and forage and then transported back to the ferry the seized or purchased goods, including “some live stock whh we buy here pretty reasonable.”

During the excursions “some skulking militia” captured two soldiers from Sterling’s regiment, while Simcoe’s rangers brought in two or three hogsheads of rum they seized “at a house a few miles off,” no doubt welcome in the cold, wet weather. Within a day of landing, the character of Howe’s incursion into New Jersey had changed; the search for forage and sustenance had trumped the hunt for Wayne.

British and Hessian journals, diaries, and letters emphasized that Wayne was the focus of both brigades. Many of them commented that foraging was a secondary priority. Abercromby’s and Sterling’s behavior, however, raises doubts about the clarity of their orders, their priorities, and especially Howe’s command climate. Indeed, Howe’s subordinates appeared more concerned with driving the rebels from contested sources of supply than with seizing an opportunity to strike at them while they were vulnerable and heavily outnumbered. The relative ease of foraging evidently outweighed larger strategic considerations. Lack of effort and forethought, immediacy, and sloth ruled; the same strategic and operational diffidence that marked British operations in Pennsylvania carried on unabated in New Jersey.

Wayne, however, was unaware of the British Army’s climate of command. As far as he knew, two experienced and aggressive enemies were hunting for him. With Abercromby and Sterling to the south and southwest, Wayne’s numbers reduced to just over half, and Sherman’s rate of march...
Wayne feared that the British were about to check him. Facing what he believed to be an enemy force that outnumbered him dramatically, Wayne’s options were limited. Although his remaining force was considerably more mobile than before the departure of Sherman’s detachment, Wayne still had to try to block or delay any British attempts against the cattle and supplies under escort. Unable to cross from Salem County as originally planned, he elected to bypass the British positions by marching northward. Wayne intended to sweep northeast and then northwest in a wide arc in order to cross the river safely above Philadelphia. Even severely circumscribed, Wayne recognized that he would “not be able to Prevent . . . [the British] from passing thro’ the Country at pleasure—their Numbers being Eight to one—but in Order to Circumscribe them as much as Possible,” he took the “Liberty to Call on [Brig.] Genl [Casimir] Polaskie for such part of His Horse as can Conveniently be spared and [are] fittest for duty.” On 27 February, Wayne requested General Pulaski, who was at Trenton with a troop of the 1st Continental Light Dragoons, to join him “this Evening.” Because the “Regiments are dispersed at a great distance” for forage, billeting, and security, Pulaski had “but few of the Cavalry . . . at present.” Only eighteen were armed and fit for duty; the “remaining part are sick & without arms.” Although Pulaski wrote to Wayne that he would “always be ready to oblige you in every respect,” his correspondence with Washington that same day revealed his sensitivity to rank and presumptions regarding the seniority of cavalry officers to all others. Worried that an infantry brigadier general, whom he considered junior to him in branch of service (“General Brigadie plus Jeune que les autres”), but not date of rank, would presume to give him orders, Pulaski asked Washington to provide clarification. Washington did so promptly: seniority based on date of rank was the only “preeminence in our Service.” In order to make sure that Pulaski fully understood, Washington added that “the Officer whose Commission is of prior date commands all those of the same grade indiscriminately wheth-er of horse or foot.”

But even before Washington clarified the matter of rank, Pulaski took personal command of the eighteen light dragoons and set out to join Wayne. By the twenty-eighth, the Pole was at Burlington with fifty horsemen, including five officers he had “collected together in the Country.” At the same time, Ellis and two hundred and fifty militiamen were at Evesham Meeting House (present-day Mount Laurel), roughly equidistant between Haddonfield and Mount Holly. Meanwhile Sterling held at Haddonfield, from which he sent forth foraging parties to the south and west between Cooper River and Big Timber Creek. Simcoe’s rangers seized several boats and one hundred and fifty barrels of tar. The tar, useful for caulking ships’ and boats’ seams, was loaded in boats and sent off to Captain Hamond. Loyalist refugees manned the boats, which conserved Simcoe’s troop strength. The rangers also seized “some cattle” and destroyed “some tobacco” on the road to Egg Harbor. Simcoe “returned in the evening with some few militia as prisoners.” They had mistaken the rangers for “Wayne’s rear guard.”

On the morning of 28 February, boats from the armed ship Delaware (24 guns) carried Lt. Col. Enoch Markham and a “Field offrs. Detach-ment” of about a hundred and fifty soldiers from the 46th Regiment of Foot to Cooper’s Ferry “to collect forage in its vicinity.” That same morning, around 1000, Abercromby’s brigade reembarked at Salem and headed upriver, possibly “intended to intercept General Wayne, & his collected supplies.” Thus, on the last day of February, Sterling was within striking range of Wayne, and Abercromby was sailing upriver (so far as Washington understood it) to join with Sterling or block Wayne’s line of march north. Although Wayne was severely out-numbered and his options seemed de-cidedly limited, he acted wholly in character—on 1 March he turned back to confront Sterling’s foragers and thereby seized the initiative. Heretofore, Wayne had successfully evaded the British, but he now saw an opportunity to “drive in
or cut off some of these parties.” From Mount Holly, Wayne made a “forced March” toward Haddonfield, “altho my Numbers were few.” Around 2100, he arrived at Capt. Joseph Matlack’s house, four miles southeast of Haddonfield, where he was reinforced by Pulaski and his fifty light horsemen. Ellis and his New Jersey militia remained at Evesham Meeting House, at the juncture of the Egg Harbor and Mount Holly roads. As Wayne approached Haddonfield, Pulaski’s impetuous behavior forced him to act earlier than planned. If that surprised Wayne, it ought not have. Earlier, Pulaski had revealed to Wayne that his “intention is to attack the enemy by Night.” He believed that “as strong as they may be we can loose nothing but gain proper by them.”

About 2200, Pulaski attempted to surprise the Queen’s “Rangers Picket across the Creek at Keys Mill,” a half mile southeast of Haddonfield, “but [it] Miscaried.” In large part, it failed to surprise the British because they had been forewarned by a local man with “credentials.” Simcoe wrote that he thought that when Sterling received the intelligence he should have advanced and ambushed Wayne as he approached. He expected that, once Sterling and Howe had received the report, Markham would advance to Haddonfield, and he supposed it possible that Howe might order “a strong corps embarked, and passed up the Delaware, above Wayne.” Thus, as he wrote his memoirs well after the event, Simcoe was disappointed in his superiors’ timidity. Sterling understood that Wayne’s force “had been so considerably augmented, [and] that it would be imprudent to remain at Haddonfield.” The informer may have been a plant put forward by Wayne, or a Loyalist who had been fed false information, for, according to Wayne, his strength had been “Exaggerated to thousands.” Wayne reported that Sterling believed American troops were “moving in three Columns—for his Right, left and Center,” and because of this “the North Brittain thought it prudent to Retreat.” Consequently, Sterling formed his brigade and departed for Cooper’s Ferry at 2300, where it arrived around 0200 on 2 March. He left behind most of the supplies and livestock his brigade had seized.

Because his troops were fatigued from the constant marching and countermarching, Wayne waited until late the next morning before acting. He first sent a patrol to Salem to discover Abercromby’s location and intentions. Learning that there was “nothing to Apprehend from that Quarter,” the light infantry having departed, “I went with Genl Pulaski to examine the position of the Enemy” before Cooper’s Ferry. Having traveled the night before in “uncommonly severe” weather with a “cold sleet . . . the whole way,” Sterling’s brigade had spent the “coldest night that they ever felt, [moreover] without fire,” alongside the river. Likely exhausted from the move and the cold, Sterling was at “Coopers ferry in full force” waiting to be taken off by the navy. Hamond’s boats, however, were unable to extricate the brigade because the weather had worsened to “Fresh gales and [was] squally with Frost and Snow.” Nonetheless, Sterling’s brigade, now supplemented by Markham’s guard, and covered by the navy’s heavy guns, meant he was “too well posted [for Wayne] to do anything.” Wayne exercised a needed degree of tactical patience and forethought as he elected to pause and wait for an opportune moment to strike at Sterling, although, as always, Pulaski was “Impatient & Anxious to Charge.”

In need of forage, Sterling sent out a few wagns and an escort of “fifty of the 42d and Rangers, under the command of Captain [James] Kerr” of the rangers along the road to Haddonfield. He also sent out a mounted patrol of “ten [ranger] Huzzars . . . towards Haddonfield,” which encountered Wayne’s advance guard, fifty Continentals under Capt. John Doyle of the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment, about noon. The officer commanding the British patrol, Lt. Alexander Wickham, sent word to Kerr and to Sterling, who was now in the process of embarking his brigade. Loudly calling out a series of commands, Wickham deceived Doyle into believing he had a large force with him. It gave Kerr enough time to fall back and for Sterling to form a line of battle with the 42d on the right, the 46th in the center, and the Queen’s Rangers on the left, while still under cover of the navy’s guns.

Doyle reported to Wayne that British reinforcements, “having Crossed from Phila. . . . were Marching up Coopers Creek and were pushing for our Rear,” headed for Ellis’ militia. He knew, however, that the “Other part of the Detatchment under Colonel Butler [was] to follow as fast as possible.” The remainder of Wayne’s command was about three miles to the rear. Doyle hastened forward to develop the situa-
tion and came upon Sterling’s covering force, a picket line “whose numbers were about three times as many as our’s when joined to the Horse.” However, it appeared that the pickets’ flanks were “Approachable” and that the ground fronting their center was “favourable for the Cavalry.” After consulting with Pulaski, Wayne “Determined to Attack them—in Order to gain time for the main body to come up—as well as to amuse and prevent the Reinforcement of the Enemy from proceeding further up the Creek.”

Sterling’s picket line held its position in anticipation of an American advance, but when it did not materialize the embarkation continued apace. Horses were put aboard boats, and, “as the enemy did not advance, Colonel Markham’s detachment followed them.” When the boats were “scarce half way over the Delaware,” Wayne sent Doyle forward, and “soon Obliged the Covering party to Retreat.” As Doyle approached, “pushing them hard,” Sterling responded “in force to support” the covering party with the 42d Foot closing in line. He next ordered Simcoe to have the “Queen’s Rangers . . . advance, which it did, in column, by companies,” securing its left on Cooper’s Creek, near Spicer’s Ferry Bridge. Wayne was quite pleased at drawing the British forward “from under Cover of their Shipping.” He had Doyle maintain a “Constant and galling fire” as he fell back “by slow Degrees” in order to fall back on “Butler’s Detachment.”

Sterling pressed forward with the rangers’ light infantry company in the advance. Three three-pounder “grasshoppers,” drawn by sailors “with their accustomed alacrity,” followed. The battalion of ranger infantry continued on the left with the post of honor on yards from him, when a ranger called out to Pulaski, “You are a brave fellow, but you must go away.” Pulaski failed to hear, heed, or understand the warning; Simcoe then ordered Capt. John McGill to fire on him “on which he retired into the woods.” Pulaski, as Wayne put it, “behaved with his Usual Bravery having his Own with four Other Horse Wounded.”

Easily outnumbered by Sterling’s and Simcoe’s battalions, Doyle’s little band gave way as the British advanced, until they “halted on the advantageous ground” about a mile from Cooper’s Ferry. When Simcoe then noted about a hundred militiamen near the Cooper’s Creek Bridge on his left, he dispatched the grenadier company and opened up with his three-pounders “at the entreaties of the sailors.” It was “at this Instant,” according to Wayne, when “Hessian Grenadrs attempted to force over Cooper’s Bridge . . . but they soon gave up the Attempt.” Ellis’ New Jersey militia was busy destroying the bridge and posed no threat to the British left, thus “they were no longer interrupted.”

The “fireing from the Enemies Shiping, field pieces, and Muskettry now became General.” Doyle’s “Little Corps of Infantry” acted well, and “bravely Sustained” the enemy fire, “but we could not Draw Mr Sterling far.” It was nearly 1800, and Butler had not yet arrived; the skirmish ended as “the firing totally ceased” and Wayne withdrew a safe distance. The threat removed, Sterling continued embarking his forces. They returned to their quarters by about 2000. With more than a bit of self-satisfaction and embellishment, Wayne declared that “thus ended the Jersey Expedition which was Conducted with great Caution”—by two North Britains at the head of full three thousand Troops and Eight field pieces—but they have saved themselves, and we have saved the Country for this time at least.” The action, which lasted about four or five hours, was inconclusive. Sterling’s Scots suffered three wounded, while Simcoe’s rangers had three of four wounded and one killed. Wayne, on the other hand, lost three light dragoons wounded, four or five horses killed, and three lamed. All of the casualties were from Pulaski’s command. Reporting to Washington, Pulaski claimed to have captured seven sailors, among whom was a ship captain (“parmis Le quels il se trouvs un Capitain d’un Vaisso”). There is, however, no mention in the Philadelphia squadron’s records of any officers or sailors captured.

Following the engagement at Cooper’s Creek Bridge, Wayne remained at Haddonfield until 6 March “to refresh the Troops and procure Shoes to enable them to March” for camp,
his “Troops being almost barefoot.” After resting and presumably obtaining shoes, the return march proceeded. Wayne “Detached Lieut. Morton of the Virginia Troops to Camp with 22 head of Cattle (one of them for your Excellencies particular use being the fattest beast in New Jersey[)].” As valuable as Wayne’s activities were in New Jersey, Washington wanted him to return to camp to meet with some “Gentlemen of Congress” over the pending consolidation of Pennsylvania’s Continental Line into ten regiments.66

By 14 March, Wayne was in Bordentown, New Jersey, after having destroyed or sent away from the river with local Whigs the forage he could not take. From there Wayne crossed over to Bristol, Pennsylvania, and as he returned to camp he continued disposing of “the forage within the reach of the Enemy in the Counties of Philada and edge of Bucks,” as well as driving “off the Horses Cattle & Ca fit for our service.” On 15 March, Wayne was about sixteen miles northeast of Philadelphia in Bensalem. He promised Washington that “you will be waited upon by your Excellencies Most Obt Huml. Sert” on Monday, 16 March. By 24 March, Wayne was back on rotation as the duty brigadier general. That same morning, “All Officers that was in Command with General Wayne in the Jersies” met with him at his quarters that “at 10 O’Clock to Render and Account of the Horses they had in Charge.”67

**Conclusion**

The foraging and petite guerre progressed even as Wayne returned to camp un molested. Awakened to the possibilities in New Jersey, General Howe on 12 March dispatched another ad hoc brigade to the state, this time under Lt. Col. Charles Mawhood. Mawhood commanded his own 17th Regiment of Foot as well as the 27th Regiment of Foot under Lt. Col. Edward Mitchell. Colonel Markham, his 46th Foot, and the Queen’s Rangers under Major Simcoe paid a return visit to New Jersey with the new expedition. Lt. Col. John Morris’ Loyalist 2d Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers, and Maj. John Van Dyke’s West Jersey Volunteers completed the roster. Easily sweeping aside the New Jersey militia, Mawhood had virtually unimpeded access to southern New Jersey until his departure on 29 March. The destruction and disorder Mawhood’s forces spawned forced Washington to dispatch the 2d New Jersey Regiment under Col. Israel Shreve to restore order to the area. As in so many other instances with the overstretched Continental Army, it was a case of too little, too late. The violence and disorder continued unabated until well past June 1778, when the armies met in battle once again at Monmouth.68

While Wayne’s men trudged northward through New Jersey, Captain Barry widened his operations to include harassing British shipping on the Delaware. On 7 March, his flotilla intercepted an army escort, the armed schooner Alert (8 guns), and her charges, the supply ships Kitty and Mermaid. Barry and his men boarded and seized all three. Putting in on the Delaware shore, he set his crews to unloading the supply vessels, but a Royal Navy patrol surprised him. Barry was able to save most of the captured goods before igniting the three vessels. If not decisive, the riverine actions boosted Continental morale and further burdened the Royal Navy’s Philadelphia squadron.69

All told, Washington’s Grand Forage had succeeded, even if it did not fully meet his expectations. Foragers scoured the countryside but were daunted by farmers’ skill at hiding livestock; hampered by a lack of wagons, harnesses, and teams; and preempted or challenged by the British Army. They drove several hundred head of winter-thin cattle and several dozen horses to camp and carted back unquantified amounts of preserved provisions and fodder, enough to sustain the army for a short while, but not enough to cushion it against winter’s vagaries or to restock the army’s empty magazines.

If the foraging fell short in gathering the promised bounty of the region and exposed a worrisome flank, it also turned British attention away from Valley Forge and refocused it eastward to New Jersey. Howe dispatched two brigades to “have a slap at General Wayne” as American foragers gleaned what they could from the state’s southern counties. However, as the expedition denied the enemy much-needed supplies, it also unleashed a new round of violence in New Jersey and forced Washington to divert scarce Continentals to restore order in the troubled state.

The forces that contested this stretch of the Delaware River valley were emblematic of their commanders’ personalities and their armies’ institutional cultures. In February and March 1778, the Continental Army was a tested, determined, generally competent, if sometimes insufficient, force. Despite deaths, desertions, and expirations of enlistments, the Army had held together to challenge the British Army for control of the Delaware valley and to bolster the writ and reach of Continental and state governments. While on detached duty, the commanders maintained a constant flow of communications with Washington, their subordinates, and one another. Wayne demonstrated an aptitude for working with the militia and getting the most out of an often ill-armed and poorly trained body of citizen-soldiers. Moreover, he proved to be anything but mad. Wayne showed himself a forceful, yet diplomatic, commander, able to work with the Continental Navy and the prickly Pulaski. In the actions before Haddonfield and Cooper’s Ferry, Wayne demonstrated his willingness to take risks while exercising a degree of tactical patience and maturity not exhibited by Pulaski.

While Continentals rarely bested British regulars at the tactical level, they frequently matched and sometimes outperformed them at the operational level. When Washington sent out his foragers, General Howe had several options available. At the outset, he could have crossed the Schuykill and challenged Greene, but with a mere dozen or so miles separating Greene from the fortifications at Valley Forge a hasty retreat would not have proven difficult. Alternatively, Howe could have attacked
the thinly-screened eastern approach to Valley Forge. With so many of the Continental Army’s effectives absent, Howe’s chances against the army in its encampment would have improved mightily. Nevertheless, attacking an entrenched enemy, weakened or not, who had shown great skill in defending his works in the past was a decidedly unappealing choice. Howe might also have elected to ignore Washington’s exposed forces and continue with routine occupation duties. As it happened, he did not.70

The only reasonable choice left to Howe was striking at Wayne in New Jersey. The Delaware River and the Royal Navy could effectively cut Wayne’s lines of retreat as Howe operated along interior lines with Philadelphia as his central position. The navy gave Howe unmatched operational mobility as well as overwhelming firepower and the ability to project force easily along the river. The forces of either Abercromby or Sterling were more than a match for Wayne’s Continentals and Ellis’ militia. Because of the livestock and other impedimenta gathered by Wayne’s force, the British also had an advantage in tactical mobility. As it happened, however, the performances of Abercromby and Sterling mirrored that of Howe. One British officer’s tart commentary on Abercromby’s accomplishment easily encapsulates the British Army’s performance throughout the affair: it “returned without doing anything.”71 British commanders’ sometimes questionable vigor and muddled focus raises serious doubts about the clarity of their orders, the emphasis of their mission, and their priorities. Halfhearted pursuits, a preoccupation with foraging, and gross tactical timidity characterized their slaps at Wayne. Howe was focused on resigning his command and returning to England. Meanwhile, his commanders seem to have concentrated on returning to Philadelphia.

If the armies and their commanders’ actions stood in stark contrast to one another, those of the navies were more alike than not. After receiving his orders from Wayne, Barry proved a zealous partner in the game of deception through destruction. His crews burned several tons of hay, which deprived Howe’s livestock of much-needed forage, and may have also distracted British attention for a while. As Wayne made his way northward through New Jersey, Barry continued showing his “spirit of enterprise” as he harassed British shipping with his handful of boats.72 His opponent, Captain Hamond, ably supported British Army operations by transporting the two brigades across the Delaware and back while maintaining open lines of communications along the river. Hamond’s squadron, because of its composition, was better suited for close blockade than for riverine operations. Nonetheless, Hamond, too, showed a spirit of enterprise by fitting out galleys and other light-draft vessels in an effort to patrol as much of the river as possible. His success in preventing Barry from ferrying Wayne back to the Pennsylvania shore south of Philadelphia as originally planned is testimony to his activity.

In the end, the Grand Forage helped the Continental Army maintain its position for a few weeks longer. As spring approached, more supplies and more recruits entered the camp. Von Steuben’s School of Instruction regularized the Army’s drill and helped establish a framework of duties and expectations for soldiers and their officers. But well before the Army felt the impact of von Steuben’s reforms, Washington’s Continentals, supported by local militiamen and assets of the Continental and Pennsylvania Navies, demonstrated a new and impressive maturity that extended down to field- and company-grade officers’ ranks. The force that marched out of
Valley Forge in February 1778 and the army that left there in June of that year were qualitatively superior to the one that had slogged into camp in December 1777. In the intervening months, the army surely suffered and wanted, but it did not do so passively. The Main Army was, above all, an active, operational field army capable of functioning well at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and in both the military and political spheres. While small in scale, the Grand Forage testified to the Army’s maturation, the full spectrum of its operational ability, and the skills of its commanders.

NOTES

This article is a revised version of papers presented in September 2009 at the thirty-fifth International Congress of Military History held in Oporto, Portugal, and in May 2010 at the seventy-seventh annual meeting of the Society for Military History held in Lexington, Virginia.


24 Jan 1778, Lacey to Wharton, 2 Feb 1778, William Coats to Wharton, 2 Feb 1778, and Lacey to Wharton, 15 Feb 1778, all in Pennsylvania Archives, 6:202–03, 226, 265; Ltrs, Washington to Lacey, 8 Feb 1778, Lacey to Washington, 11 Feb 1778, and Washington to Lacey, 13 Feb 1778, in PGW, RWS, 13:477–78, 510–11, 521, respectively.


15. Ltr, Greene to Biddle, 14 Feb 1778, in Papers of General Greene, 2:283.

16. Muenchhausen, At General Howe’s Side, p. 47. The bridge was at the Middle Ferry crossing site, where Market Street today crosses the Schuylkill River. Continental Army security left much to be desired, as evidenced by how John Charles Philip von Krafft, a former Prussian Army officer who was in Valley Forge in early February 1778 seeking a commission in the Continental Army, recorded with incredible detail the force’s composition and its senior leadership (“General Green and General Ween”), and then made his way surreptitiously to Philadelphia, where he joined a Hessian regiment. See “Journal of von Krafft,” pp. 18–30.


18. Ltr, Ballard to Greene, 15 Feb 1778, first and second quotes; Ltr, Greene to Washington, 17 Feb 1778, third and fourth quotes, in Papers of Nathanael Greene, 2:289; Ewald, Diary of the American War, p. 120.


21. Ltr, Greene to Washington, 16 Feb 1778, in Papers of General Greene, 2:286–87. In retrospect, Greene’s concern for security is ironic in light of how well the enemy was informed about the Continental Army’s strength and actions.

22. Ltrs, Greene to Washington, 16 Feb 1778; Washington to Greene, 16 Feb 1778, quote.


31. Ltr, Greene to Washington, 16 Feb 1778, in Papers of General Greene, 2:287; Ltr, Blaine to Stewart, 18 Feb 1778; Robertson, Diaries and Sketches, p. 163; Jackson, With the British Army in Philadelphia, pp. 169, 170.


40. Ltrs, Wayne to Washington, 25 Feb 1778, 26 Feb 1778, in *NDAR*, 11:427–28, 438–39, respectively; Ltr, Greene to Washington, 20 Feb 1778; Ltrs, Ellis to Wayne, 21 Feb 1778, and Thomas Sayre to Wayne, 21 Feb 1778, both in Wayne Papers, HSP.

41. Ltr, Ellis to Wayne, 21 Feb 1778.


43. Ltrs, Wayne to Barry, 23 Feb 1778, first three quotes; Wayne to Jennings, 23 Feb 1778, fourth quote, both in *NDAR*, 11:412.

44. Ltr, Wayne to Washington, 25 Feb 1778.


46. Wayne believed that the deception prevented his interception. See Ltr, Wayne to Livingston, 25 Feb 1778; Francis Downman, *The Services of Lieut.-Colonel Francis Downman, R.A., in France, North America, and the West Indies, between the Years 1758 and 1784*, ed. Francis Arthur Whinyates (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1889), p. 56; Robertson, *Diaries and Sketches*, p. 163; Hamond, *Master’s Journal of H.M.S. Roe buck*, 24 Feb 1778, fourth and fifth quotes; Cdr James Watt, *Journal of H.M.S. Delaware*, 26 Feb 1778, and Lt Thomas Spry, Master’s Journal of H.M. Galley *Cornwallis*, 25 Feb 1778, ninth quote, last three in *NDAR*, 11:421, 439, 428–30, respectively; Barbara J. Mitnick, ed., *New Jersey in the American Revolution* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005), p. 8; Sickler, *History of Salem County*, pp. 42–43; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe’s Side*, pp. 48, eighth quote, 72. Abercromby’s brigade was one of the elite formations within Howe’s army. Composed of the light companies drawn from each of the light companies within the army’s fittest and most intelligent soldiers. In the regular establishment, each British battalion was authorized eight line companies and two flank companies, one of light infantry and another of grenadiers. The Light Infantry Brigade’s establishment, like that of the similarly organized Grenadier Brigade, followed a long-established tradition in the British Army of creating with these companies ad hoc battalions and brigades in field armies.


52. Gruber, *John Peebles’ War*, pp. 166–67; Downman, *Services*, p. 56; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe’s Side*, p. 48; Robertson, *Diaries and Sketches*, p. 144. Several of these diarists, however, including Howe’s Hessian aide de camp, Captain von Muenchhausen, stated that striking at Wayne was most important.


57. Ltr, Pulaski to Wayne, 28 Feb 1778; Ltr, Wayne to Washington, 5 Mar 1778, in PGW, RWS, 14:72–74, first three quotes, pp. 72–73; Stewart, Foraging for Valley Forge, p. 7.

58. Captain Lieutenant Peebles noted that the “Coll. got some intelligence of a great Body of the Enemy coming towards us & some shots being fired at the Rangers Picket across the Creek at Keys Mill the Compsys. order’d under arms, & soon after desir’d to go into the Barns & be ready to turn out at a moments warng.” See Gruber, John Peebles’ War, p. 167. The Light Infantry Brigade landed at the north end of Philadelphia about 1400 on 1 March. See Spry, Master’s Journal of H.M. Galley Cornwallis, 1 Mar 1778, in N DAR, 11:483.


60. Simcoe, Military Journal, p. 43; Biogra-phy of James Kerr in Don Gara, Biographical Sketches of the Infantry Officers of the Queen’s American Rangers, posted at http://home. golden.net/~marg/bansite/odds/qr_infantry. html; Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army during the War of the Revolution, April 1775, to December, 1783 (Washington, D.C.: Rare Book Shop, 1914), p. 203; Gruber, John Peebles’ War, p. 167.

61. Ltr, Wayne to Washington, 5 Mar 1778.


64. Ltrs, Wayne to Washington, 5 Mar 1778, third and fourth quotes; Pulaski to Washing-ton, 3 Mar 1778; Simcoe, Military Journal, pp. 44–46. Distinctive in their short green jackets, white breeches, and tall, black, cylindrical, lambskin caps emblazoned with small, white metal gorgets, the rangers’ grenadiers looked nothing like Hessian grenadiers in blue with tall, metal-fronted, conical caps. Wayne, who had faced both rangers and Hessians, was clearly mistaken in his identification.


66. Ltr, Wayne to Washington, 5 Mar 1778, first quote, endnote 9, quoting draft, second quote; Ltrs, Washington to Wayne, 12 Mar 1778, Wayne to Washington, 14 Mar 1778, third quote, and 14 Mar 1778 at 1400 hours, and Washington to Wayne, 15 Mar 1778, fourth quote, last four in PGW, RWS, 14:166, 180–82, 190. Lieutenant Morton was likely either James Morton of the 4th Virginia Regi-ment or Hezekiah of the 12th Virginia Regi-ment. See Heitman, Officers of the Continental Army, p. 438.


71. Downman, Services, p. 56.

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General Smith at Tacloban, Leyte
From 1899 to 1902, the United States Army waged a successful counterinsurgency campaign against Philippine forces seeking independence. For more than half of that period, the Army’s leaders endeavored to employ a policy of “benevolent assimilation” to attract the Philippine populace. Due to intense insurgent resistance in some areas, however, they were ultimately obliged to adopt policies that relied on varying levels of attraction and chastisement. In the fall of 1901, the killing of a majority of the Army garrison at Balangiga, Samar, led the U.S. military to undertake aggressive campaigns to end the insurgency in the two remaining rebel strongholds in the Philippines—Batangas Province on Luzon and the island of Samar. In retaliation for the “Balangiga massacre,” both offensives were vigorous punitive expeditions that employed the harshest measures that allowed under the War Department’s General Orders (GO) 100 of 1863. The operations on Samar drew the more intense scrutiny due to controversial statements made by the commander there, Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Smith.

**AN ATTEMPT AT BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION**

At the outset of its conquest of the Philippines, the United States anticipated occupying the archipelago and defeating the forces for independence led by Emilio Aguinaldo through the use of conventional military tactics. In February 1899, U.S. forces under Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, aided by R. Adm. George Dewey’s warships, drove Aguinaldo’s forces from their trenches surrounding Manila. Otis then launched spring offensives north and east of Manila and successfully drove back his Filipino opponents. He renewed his operations in the autumn and by November 1899 conventional column tactics in the Luzon plains had shattered Aguinaldo’s army. Its fragmented bands were forced to dissolve into the surrounding jungles and mountain ranges. As the U.S. Army was soon to discover, however, the poorly supplied and trained insurgents were much better suited to guerrilla warfare.

The Army’s initial victories led its senior leaders, especially General Otis, to underestimate the scale of the remaining resistance. Aguinaldo managed to reorganize his forces into small, independent guerrilla bands hidden among the local population, allowing the combination of irregular combat with sabotage and subterfuge in the “pacified” areas. Semiautonomous regional commanders led the resistance, using guerrilla tactics that employed surprise, ambushes, and raids. Full- and part-time Filipino militias supported clandestine political, logistical, and leadership structures. Their goal was not to achieve victory over U.S. forces but rather to harass...
them until American political and military will was exhausted. Almost immediately, the Army began to pursue a policy of benevolent assimilation. The United States focused on civil improvements to win the support of the population. Reforms targeted transportation, education, infrastructure, and public health in an effort to raise the Filipinos’ standard of living.

The U.S. Army’s strategy was to wage a pacification campaign that relied on attraction. This political-military program, aimed at “winning the confidence, respect, and admiration” of the populace, drew on approaches the Army had previously employed with Indians on the American frontier. It tried to inculcate American ideals in the Filipino population. The Army supported this policy by enforcing troop discipline, penalizing looting, and paying for military requisitions. In the civil realm, the Army embarked on a series of societal programs aimed at winning the confidence and support of the local populace. The Army oversaw the construction of schools, roads, and civil infrastructure, and by August 1900 over a thousand schools had been constructed in the Philippines. Education was viewed as an “adjunct to military policy,” not merely a civil policy. The Army also attempted to organize municipal governments composed of the local citizenry. Senior commanders in Manila even showed a high degree of leniency toward low-level partisans and their supporters, often reducing or overturning the sentences of military commissions and tribunals.

The insurgents, meanwhile, sought to undermine the progress of the pacification campaign. They were aided by the populace’s fear of guerrilla retribution for supporting the Americans. Unlucky American sympathizers were mutilated or assassinated, and some were buried alive. Shadow insurgent governments maintained control of the villages and organized support for the guerrillas in the form of taxes, supplies, recruits, and intelligence. To the common villager, fear of guerrilla retribution was stronger than the attraction of U.S. civil improvements. Ironically, American leniency toward guerrilla activists often proved to be counterproductive. Many officers soon realized the need to augment “soft” policies with harsh measures to ensure effective security for the local populace. One American officer observed that Capt. Henry T. Allen had considerable success on Leyte due to his “policy of treating the good man very well indeed and the bad man very harshly.” The Army’s headquarters in Manila soon adopted this approach.

The U.S. Army’s difficulties were rooted in its leaders’ initial underestimation of the depth of the Philippine insurgency. In the first months of the conflict, U.S. commanders incorrectly assumed that the opposition was limited to a few key leaders who imposed their will on the masses. Although leadership was a significant factor, the independence movement held a strong cultural and nationalistic appeal across all economic levels of the Filipino population. Initial U.S. strategy anticipated that toppling the principal leaders would cause the quick collapse of public support. The intensity of resistance startled the U.S. Army and political administration. The Filipino lower class was largely dependent on, and therefore loyal to, the wealthy class from whom the insurgent leadership was drawn. Ac-

U.S. COMMANDERS incorrectly assumed that the OPPOSITION was limited
cordingly, U.S. civil programs and promises of reform initially had little effect on the typical villager.\(^9\)

In reaction to the lack of decisive outcomes following the initial months of battlefield victories, Army officers increasingly supported harsher measures. This attitude eventually permeated the highest levels of the chain of command (and the political administration) and resulted in the formulation of a policy of chastisement. The measures contemplated under this policy—fines, communal punishment, destruction of private property, imprisonment, population relocation, exile, and execution—were the same ones authorized to counter Confederate guerrilla activity in the Civil War by the “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field” published in the War Department’s General Orders 100 of 24 April 1863.\(^10\)

General Orders 100 directed a reciprocal relationship between the military and the civilian population of an occupied territory. Respect and moderation were appropriate to achieve the eventual restoration of peace. To that end, the orders specifically forbade looting, torture, and needless destruction, as well as any disproportionate reprisals against the population. However, GO 100 also recognized that harsh measures would be necessary to counter guerrilla threats and, to use a modern term, acts of terrorism. Importantly, General Orders 100 gave commanders the option to punish civilian supporters of guerrilla forces. The order specified that irregular forces would only be granted the protection of legitimate combatants if they wore uniforms and formed an organized part of a larger, traditional army. Guerrillas who assumed “the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers,” were to be treated as criminals rather than soldiers. Thus, GO 100 contained a “practical blend of moderation and stringency that would characterize the Army’s approach to military government, counterguerrilla, and pacification operations for the next one hundred years.”\(^11\)

Initially, senior U.S. civilian and military leaders were hesitant to sanction harsh measures in the Philippines, hoping to avoid allegations of the use of excessive force from American opposition parties and anticolonialists. However, junior Army commanders realized that the Filipinos who supported the insurgency viewed lenient U.S. policies as signs of weakness. American officers also soon realized that fear was a greater motivator than kindness. By the fall of 1900, military officers, on their own initiative, were launching “unofficial” punitive campaigns to counter guerrilla actions. These measures were aimed at withholding aid to partisan-controlled areas through the destruction of crops and the punishment of hostile populations. In order to reduce the guerrillas’ logistical base and their popular support, Army commanders began fining entire villages, destroying private property, and punishing hostile citizens to curtail support to the insurgent organizations.\(^12\)

After his reelection in November 1900, President William McKinley freed the military to adopt an official policy of chastisement in the Philippines. On 20 December 1900, Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, who in May had succeeded Otis as commander of the U.S. forces in the Philippines, issued orders allowing the sternest measures authorized in General Orders 100. The burning of villages, exiling of insurgent leaders, and confiscation of property were now officially sanctioned.\(^13\) The new policy aimed at the surrender of the guerrilla leadership. The insurrection’s leaders were drawn largely from the land-owning, upper class of the Philippines. As such, the leaders were more vulnerable to American policies that now threatened them with imprisonment and loss of property. This psychological offensive, coupled with aggressive operational and tactical-level field operations, proved extremely effective. The combination of physical and moral campaigns cowed the rebellion’s leadership, starved the guerrillas in the field, and served as a lesson to the inhabitants of
the surrounding regions. More importantly, their devastating effect on rebel soldiers eventually allowed the U.S. Army to gain the confidence of the local population by providing them credible security from guerrilla brutality.  

To distinguish clearly between friend and foe, the U.S. Army began to relocate the population to areas under American control. This was reminiscent of the Indian reservation policy on the Great Plains. Theoretically, concentration policies allowed aggressive actions to be executed in all external areas without excessive concern for collateral damage since anyone outside of the “colony” or “zone” was considered hostile by default.  

Maj. Frederick A. Smith relied heavily on reconcentration while fighting insurgents on the island of Marinduque between February and April 1901. Smith relocated the island’s entire dispersed population—50,000 Filipinos—into the six major American-occupied towns on the island. Later, he credited concentration with separating friend from enemy and depriving the rebels of their external recruits, intelligence, and supplies. Concentration camps also theoretically allowed the Army to gain the confidence of the people by protecting them from guerrilla retaliation. At the same time, Major Smith employed a policy of devastation throughout the countryside, destroying the islands’ most valuable commodities—cattle, crops, and hemp—in an effort to “starve out” the guerrillas. Lastly, he conducted frequent patrols to separate the guerrillas from their supplies, keeping them under constant pressure. As with the U.S. Army’s earlier experience in the American Indian Wars, “the triple press of concentration, devastation, and harassment” led to eventual victory. In fact, the actions on Marinduque would serve as a guide for the later campaign on Samar.

In the summer of 1901, Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes, who commanded the Department of the Visayas, began implementing on Samar an aggressive policy of food and property destruction. This effort was supported by active patrolling aimed at flushing the insurgents out of their mountainous base camps. He also established “colonies,” or protected zones, to segregate the general population from the guerrilla forces. Thus, even before General Smith’s arrival, the roots of a population concentration policy had been established on Samar. Though politically
controversial, concentration tactics would ultimately prove extremely effective in ending the insurgency. The use of severe policies toward potentially disloyal Filipinos proved highly successful when combined with aggressive military offensives in the winter and spring of 1901. The operations were augmented by the support of intelligence networks, judicial institutions, and civil policies that facilitated the penetration of the insurgents’ political support networks and the destruction of their supply bases. These campaigns caused the surrender of all but two major guerrilla groups—General Miguel Malvar’s forces in Batangas and insurgents led by General Vicente Lukban on Samar. Lukban, a Manila-trained physician, had been born in southern Luzon and had fought for independence against Spain before moving to Samar to continue the struggle against the Americans. He found determined fighters on that island to assist in the contest. In September 1901, the gruesome massacre of a garrison of U.S. Army troops at Balangiga, Samar, acted as a catalyst for the U.S. Army to bring Samar under control. The surprise attack, undertaken by townspeople augmented by insurgents from surrounding areas, resulted in the brutal deaths of 48 members of the 74-man garrison, including all of the officers. Subsequent investigations would reveal that local officials, who were supposedly loyal to the United States, had secretly coordinated the attack. Compounding these actions, the attackers mutilated the bodies of many of the dead soldiers “with a ferocity unusual for even guerrilla warfare,” giving special attention to the officers. The event shocked the Army and the American public. In striking similarity with the “hard war” concepts of Sherman and Sheridan in the American Civil War, the subsequent offensive on Samar was a purposefully brutal campaign. It was designed to make the Filipino populace, to use Sherman’s words, “feel the hard hand of war.”

Standing on a Volcano

Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee had succeeded MacArthur as commander of the Division of the Philippines in July 1901, after leading U.S. forces in China during the Boxer Rebellion. Chaffee
believed that the leniency of well-meaning Army officers had created the unfortunate conditions that led to the Balangiga massacre. Other events soon reinforced Chaffee’s opinion. Within weeks of the Balangiga attack, four hundred insurgents armed with bolos—the long, slightly curved knives common in the Philippines—assaulted another Army detachment on the Gandara River in Samar, killing ten soldiers and wounding six. Additionally, a small garrison at the town of Weyler was besieged for nearly two days, and several other minor stations on Samar received small-scale attacks.  

Not surprisingly, General Chaffee is reported to have metaphorically equated the Army’s tenuous hold on the archipelago with standing on a volcano. On many mornings, the general would alarmingly ask his staff, “Has it blown up yet? . . . The volcano, damn it! The volcano we’re standing on!”

Chaffee’s guidance to commanders reflected his apprehensions. He directed that soldiers be “stern and inflexible” in order to impart to the Filipino population a “wholesome fear” of the Army and that his officers punish every hostile act “quickly and severely.” Chaffee was clearly anxious. He estimated that another hundred soldiers would probably be lost attempting to retrieve the firearms captured during the Balangiga massacre. Musing shortly after Balangiga on the outcome his approach would produce, Chaffee commented that the two battalions of infantry he was sending to the area “will start a few cemeteries for hombres in Southern Samar.” He explained, “in my opinion it is very necessary to maintain here the influence of the Army on the mind of the people—that they fear it.” In fact, some scholars have surmised that Chaffee’s “direly vengeful” frame of mind may have impacted General Smith’s later actions.  

Judging from his feelings at the time, one could deduce that Chaffee may have selected General Smith to command in Samar because of, rather than in spite of, his bellicose attitudes. General Smith’s attitude toward waging “hard war” was well known. In fact, Smith had told reporters earlier that fighting Filipino insurgents was “worse than fighting Indians.” The headline of one article on this interview announced “Colonel Smith of 12th Orders All Insurgents Shot at Hand.” Smith had even bragged to reporters about his harsh methods. Prior to his campaign in Samar, he posed in front of “cattle pens,” crude cells created from railroad ties used to imprison captured insurgents for months at a time. During his Samar expedition, Smith submitted an article to a Manila newspaper in which he suggested that the Balangiga massacre was the result of “officers who loved the ‘Little Brown Brother.’”

While serving as a district commander in northern Luzon prior to his assignment in Samar, Smith had cautioned his officers to remember that “many [Filipinos] who apparently are friendly to the Americans[.]” rule are guilty of the blackest treachery and all officers are warned not to allow their suspicions to be lulled to sleep by friendly association and social intercourse with the native inhabitants.”  

General Smith regularly complained about the excessive leniency of American officers. For example, following the arrest of several Filipinos suspected of attacking a group of U.S. soldiers with bolos, Smith lamented, “I only wish that I could have been there to have summarily dealt with them, but it is difficult to get Officers to take prompt measures under G.O. 100 . . . A few killings under G.O. 100 will aid very much in making the enemy stop these assassinations.”

General Smith, moreover, had a notorious history of squabbles and intemperate talk. Prior to his service in the Philippines, he had been the subject of several civilian legal cases and two military courts martial for accusations of fiscal misconduct and blatant disrespect to a senior officer. Even his 1867 efficiency report had described him as “garrulous.” However, he also had a reputation as a fierce and aggressive commander on the battlefield, routinely demonstrating bravery in combat.

General Chaffee’s sense of urgency and his strong confidence in Smith’s abilities may have further bolstered the new brigade commander’s aggressive nature. Chaffee ordered Smith’s direct superior, General Hughes, to undertake immediate operations to “disarm these people and to keep them disarmed, and any means to that end is advisable.” In fairness to Chaffee, he tempered his guidance by writing, “While I do not urge inhumane treatment of any person in these islands, it is necessary that we be stern and inflexible.” However, Chaffee’s mercurial temperament could lead him to provide inconsistent guidance. For example, following Balangiga, Chaffee told a reporter, “if you should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put away don’t grow too sentimental over it.”

In reaction to Balangiga, General Chaffee rushed General Smith’s 6th Separate Brigade to Samar, while stating his favorable impression of Smith’s
abilities: “General Smith, as I am told, is an energetic officer, and I hope he will prove so in command of that brigade.” Chaffee undoubtedly wanted Smith to conduct an active campaign aimed at providing Lukban’s forces no respite. In his report to Washington he stated his overall guidance to Smith, “I shall let Smith prosecute affairs vigorously in Samar and hope to bring Lukban to . . . submit within a couple of months.”

Upon Smith’s arrival in Samar, he received guidance from the commander of the Department of the Visayas that was no less clear than his initial direction from Chaffee. General Hughes revealed his disdain for the insurgents when he explained that Smith was being given additional troops to “destroy any hopes created in what the savages might designate in their minds from their success at Balangiga.” Further, he warned that “simple burning out appears to do no good, the[y] want to be stayed with and either killed or domesticated.”

The Philippine Commission, the civilian authority that governed the pacified areas of the islands, seemed to sense the gathering storm. In a report issued in October 1901, it stated, “It would be a sad injustice if the Samar disaster shall induce on one side a rigour in the treatment of all Filipinos and on their part a consequent revulsion in those feelings of friendship toward Americans which have been growing stronger each day with the spread and development of civil government.” Further irritating Chaffee, Philippine Governor William Howard Taft’s 1901 report went so far as to state, “The people are friendly to the civil government” and desire “protection by the civil government.”

After taking command of the 6th Separate Brigade, General Smith’s first priority was to conduct a survey of his assigned territory to acquaint himself with the challenges that he would be facing. Accordingly, Smith made an inspection tour of the stations in his new area. He soon realized that, beyond Samar’s harsh terrain and climate, he would have to overcome many serious obstacles quickly. He was determined to rectify his garrison’s shortage of troops, compounded by what he perceived as lax discipline. Smith described the conditions he encountered during this initial inspection tour:

I found the troops scattered over an immense territory, and with only the coast towns garrisoned and by barely sufficient number of soldiers. . . . Little or nothing had been done owing to a feeling of security and confidence which had been engendered by officers who loved the “Little Brown Brother” . . . and a general do-as-you-please was the order of the day.”

General Smith quickly and aggressively went about solving the largest challenges: remedying his lack of troops and cutting the insurgents’ supply chain. The attacks at Balangiga and the Gandara River convinced him that concentrating troops into larger formations was required since the “small detachments were not safe at isolated points.” Accordingly, Smith requested additional troops from the division commander and gladly accepted a Navy offer to supply him with a battalion of marines led by Marine Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller. General Smith also requested, and received, increased Navy gunboat support to blockade the coast of Samar and thereby disrupt the smuggling of food and supplies from the nearby island of Leyte.

Chaffee, at least initially, agreed with General Smith’s tactical assessments. He later reported, “Prior to October,
1901, the number of troops in Samar were too few to campaign for a peace. The most that could be done under the circumstances was for the soldiers to remain idle in the numerous occupied stations and talk; many stations were inadequately garrisoned.

Chaffee reported to the War Department in late October 1901 that “General Hughes has unsafely spread his force there, several places being held by 15 or 20 men.” In Hughes’ defense, dispersed army forces were employed in an effort to provide security to the Filipino populace by (theoretically) controlling the terrain and isolating the people from the guerrillas. To maintain pressure on troubled areas and respond with prompt offensive action, a series of small garrisons had been established in each substantial coastal community. Tellingly, the number of Army posts in the Philippines had increased from several dozen in 1899 to 639 by 1901. Often, Army garrisons consisted of company-size detachments stationed in major towns throughout the districts, with smaller detachments assigned to less populated villages.

Dispersion, however, became a two-edged sword. Though small garrisons allowed wider coverage throughout the countryside, the individual posts were often undermanned and vulnerable to attack. For example, Army officers stationed on Marinduque in 1900 noted that garrisons with less than a hundred men were not strong enough to defend themselves while pursuing offensive operations. The Balangiga massacre underscored the potential weakness of small garrisons. Accordingly, General Chaffee gave Smith substantial reinforcements, hoping to spur more active operations into the interior of the island. Chaffee assigned to Smith’s 6th Separate Brigade twelve battalions of regular infantry and seven companies of Filipino scouts—approximately four thousand men. Previously, Samar’s garrison had rarely exceeded a thousand troops.

One of General Smith’s first field orders was wisely aimed at attacking the insurgents’ ties with the underground supply chain—consisting mainly of food stores and hemp, which transited among the small villages of Samar and extended to the neighboring island of Leyte. On 21 October 1901, the newly appointed commander ordered that all vessels be conspicuously painted red and their owners issued identification passes delineating their point of origin, destination, and content. By strictly limiting and controlling the passes, General Smith was determined to reduce the flow of illegal supplies and funds to Lukban’s insurgent forces.

In conjunction with his active land operations, Smith also arranged intensified naval patrols of the San Juanico Strait between Samar and Leyte and coordinated increased gunboat support to the Army’s coastal and riverine operations.

General Smith also focused his efforts on the Filipino population, especially the social elite. He released a proclamation on 1 November 1901 accusing the residents of Samar, especially its more influential and wealthy citizens, of secretly supporting the insurgency. He proactively commenced a weapons purchase program and demanded that the na-
atives establish their friendly intent by 10 November through concrete acts, such as giving information about the location of guns or the whereabouts of insurrectos. This policy espoused several principles central to successful counterinsurgency campaigns. It attempted to make individuals responsible for their own actions, thereby driving a wedge between the insurgents and the peaceful natives. It also laid the seeds for future security programs aimed at rejecting protestations of neutrality as a rationale for not supporting U.S. forces.

Unfortunately, Smith’s flashes of tactical brilliance were offset by his characteristic disdain for political interference and his verbal eruptions. Accordingly, some aspects of his campaign got off to a rocky start due to his overaggressive policies. For example, after banning trade across the San Juanico Strait on 27 October, Smith issued ten days later an order broadly restricting and controlling trade at Leyte’s ports. His objective was to more effectively cut off supplies to the insurgents on Samar. In fact, the policy of preventing trade across the San Juanico Strait proved to be an extremely effective military tactic. Combined with the destruction of crops during the war, the lack of external food supplies resulted in people being forced to eat edible roots in order to survive. Smith realized that starving natives would be unlikely to donate foodstuffs to the insurgency voluntarily.

Smith explained at the end of October that “the people of Leyte are actively cooperating with and assisting the insurgents in Samar by sending food supplies, men, arms, and money across the Straits of San Juanico, and by operating a system of signals to warn all parties of the approach of our gunboats.” He added that “Leyte remains an asylum to which” the Samar insurgents “may repair to rest and recruit.” Smith was apparently dissatisfied with the cooperation he was obtaining from the new civil governor of Leyte, J. H. Grant. These concerns led Smith to request that Leyte be transferred to his jurisdiction under martial law.

Smith’s efforts to regulate commerce on Leyte drew a rebuke, however, from Luke Wright, the acting civil governor of the Philippines. In response, Chaffee instructed Smith to try to convince Grant to support his policies rather than seek to displace him. So Smith first modified his controls and on 7 December lifted all restrictions on Leyte’s ports.

In Smith’s defense, the military rationale for his politically precarious actions was sound. Even General Hughes, who clashed with Smith over various tactical issues, admitted that closing all ports in Leyte would offer a “very decided military advantage.” However, Hughes was savvy enough to demur on the implementation of this idea as he deemed it likely to be overruled in Washington. Accordingly, Chaffee’s rebuke to Smith was relatively mild. He directed Smith to consult with the civilian leadership to work out an agreement and to insist that the civil government enforce the existing trade restrictions. Chaffee’s reply illustrates that he most likely agreed with Smith’s overall military objective but was restrained by political considerations.

**Samar: "The Howling Wilderness"**

General Smith’s lack of restraint in his verbal instructions would cause him even greater difficulty. In late October or in November 1901, Smith issued Major Waller verbal orders that would soon become infamous: “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill and burn the better you will please me. . . . The interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.” Smith added that he “wanted all persons killed who were capable of bearing arms and in actual hostilities against the United States.”

When Major Waller asked about the age of those to whom he should apply this guidance, Smith replied that males over ten years old should be considered as being capable of bearing arms. Major Waller and General Smith were later court-martialed for their actions on Samar. Waller would testify that rather than taking the order literally, his interpretation of Smith’s intemperate guidance was “that the General wanted all insurrectos killed . . . people who were bearing arms against Americans. . . . I understood that we were not to take prisoners if they were armed.” In fact, Waller testified that he cautioned his officers that...
“we were not sent here to make war on women and children and old men.”

Though he may not have expected his orders to be taken literally, Smith’s intemperate language undoubtedly had an effect on his subordinates’ actions. For example, when Major Waller led his 315-man battalion into Samar in November 1901 on a punitive campaign to eradicate guerrilla forces, food and trade to the island were severed and patrols scoured the countryside in an effort to starve the revolutionaries into submission. Waller reported that in an eleven-day period his patrols killed 39 people, destroyed 255 dwellings, and butchered or destroyed draft animals and crops. The patrols employed the harshest measures allowable by General Orders 100, and in some documented cases its leaders exceeded those guidelines. After one patrol lost eleven marines whom Waller had been unable to extract from the jungle into which he had led them, Waller had an equal number of Filipino porters executed summarily. Chaffee believed that the porters had served honorably and Waller was ordered to appear before a court-martial.

Smith also warned his officers that all Filipino town officials were either part of the insurgency or sympathetic to it. Smith considered the Filipino peasant as merely an ignorant tool of the wealthy class, easily manipulated by its master. Therefore, the wealthy nationalist sympathizer represented the most dangerous threat to the counterinsurgency effort and would be the focus of the Army’s attention. Smith’s circular permitted the arrest and confinement of suspected sympathizers as prisoners of war solely on the basis of suspicion, even in the absence of sufficient evidence to convict in a military court. This relaxation of legal protections was designed to prevent contributions and other support from reaching the insurgents.

Smith concluded his circular with his most prescient observations. To reduce the influence of the insurgency over the local population by the use of threats of violence and terrorism, Smith pronounced, Natives living in the pueblos will be informed that they can secure protection from forced contributions whenever they really desire such protection. . . . It is quite common for natives of all classes to claim that they are afraid of the insurgents; that if they assist the Americans or give any information to them they will be killed. . . . Officers will furnish protection against all real dangers directed against those natives who seek protection within their commands.

Accordingly, Smith continued a tactic already established by General Hughes. A concentration camp system was reinvigorated to separate the general population from the insurgent threat. This colony, or zone, system gave U.S. soldiers the ability to target nearly any native outside the camps on the presumption that he was an insurgent or an insurgent sympathizer. It also provided security and protection to the portion of the native population that earnestly desired American support.

The combination of the aforementioned policies—the reduction of illicit trade, the intolerance of neutrality, and the provision of security through population concentration—placed Filipino natives in the unenviable position of having to choose sides openly between the insurgency or the Americans. Presented with the option of accepting the protection offered by American concentration camps, natives could no longer claim that they were supporting the insurgents involuntarily.
General Smith’s declarations of policy were accompanied by active tactical operations. Smith directed his forces to sweep the interior of the island to directly engage the guerrilla bands. Employing the recently arrived reinforcements, he eventually had sixty commands “driving in from the coast and river landings, dispersing the insurgent bands and destroying their caches of food and arsenals in the interior.” Smith described the methods he used to reinvigorate the counterinsurgency effort:

Increased activity was required of all the stations and a vigorous policy produced good results. Food supplies were cut off from getting to the interior of the island; smuggling prevented, and all traffic in hemp was suspended in both Leyte and Samar. Bands of insurgents were annihilated and their cuartels and stores of rice destroyed until the cry went up from the merchants of Leyte who had been aiding Lukban’s forces.

Chaffee supported, in fact urged, vigorous operations from the start. His initial perceptions of Smith’s military offensives seemed favorable. In early November 1901, Chaffee reported that “Smith is now actively operating in Samar and has three or four columns moving in the Northern end of that island from the East, North, and West Coast.” Despite later claims that Chaffee had cooled to Smith shortly after he commenced his campaign, in December the division commander was still supportive of the military actions on Samar.

In January 1902, Chaffee made a visit to Samar “to make a personal inquiry into affairs” and to determine the future prospects of success. Although he bluntly stated that the situation on Samar was “not encouraging,” he was not overly critical of Smith’s actions when he discussed them in a report sent to the War Department at the end of the month. Rather than discrediting the efforts of the brigade commander, Chaffee elaborated on the harsh climate and weather, recently made even more challenging by extremely heavy rainfall. Chaffee reported, “Notwithstanding all this, the officers and troops which I saw were cheerful and in fairly good health and look forward to the time their efforts will be crowned by success.” He also declared that, although only a few of Lukban’s insurgent force had been captured, a “considerable number of the people of Samar have come to the coast towns” and Lukban’s remaining forces had been “broken into small bands.” Actually, Lukban had been reduced to doing nothing more than issuing proclamations and urging his leaders not to surrender.

In contrast to the claims of later critics, General Smith also demonstrated a keen ability to modify the intensity of his campaign based on changing tactical conditions. Regardless of Smith’s reputation as a ruthless and excessively forceful commander, a circular he issued on 18 November 1901 specifically sought to ensure that accommodating natives were cared for: “Emphasis is laid upon the point that the brigade commander desires not only to permit proper food supplies to reach all friendly natives, but he particularly desires that these supplies do so reach them.”

In mid-February 1902, when the strength of the insurgency on Samar was waning, General Smith informed his officers that he had now divided the natives into those participating in or materially supporting the insurgency and those who were not. To the latter class, Smith promised a restoration of many privileges in an effort to achieve “a softening of the rigors of war toward the noncombatants.” Later that month, he urged even more lenient measures, stating,

We have in the past compelled them to respect our prowess in arms; we must in the future compel them to respect our generosity of heart toward a vanquished foe and our purity of purpose in waging war upon their misguided leaders and their followers.

Henceforth, then, it must be the labor of our officers and men to assist the loyal natives in repairing
the ravages of war. No opportunity should be lost to instruct them that the Americans have come among them, not to take from them any of the good things in life, but rather to give them more and in greater measure than they have ever enjoyed before.67

Though some of Smith’s tactics would be harshly criticized, he successfully influenced the local population. In late March 1902, shortly before Smith’s relief, Chaffee reported a plan to garrison the east coast of Samar to enable the natives of the region to return to their villages, which had been burned years prior by the insurgents. It was estimated that between forty thousand and fifty thousand natives were homeless as a result of these actions. Chaffee noted that the commander of the garrison at Oras on the east coast had recently established a town of fifteen thousand people near his station, boasting that it was “very orderly laid out and the buildings well constructed from the native material in the vicinity.”68

The combination of these policies soon took effect. General Smith was able to commence indirect negotiations with Lukban for surrender terms, but these did not immediately produce results. After the U.S. Army garrison at Laguan received information about Lukban’s approximate location in early February 1902, however, a patrol led by 26-year-old 1st Lt. Alphonse Strebler sought the insurgent commander and on 18 February captured him at a remote interior settlement. General Lukban’s condition illustrated the brutal effectiveness of Smith’s counterinsurgency campaign. Smith’s vigorous patrols had forced Lukban and his staff to change locations daily in order to avoid detection.69 When he was taken, the rebel general was “sick, malnourished, and disgusted with the war.” At the time of General Smith’s relief in early April 1902, Lukban was already urging his successor, General Claro Guevarra, to surrender.70 Guevarra yielded to Smith’s replacement, Brig. Gen. Frederick D. Grant, on 27 April.71

Some historians have charged Smith’s forces with haphazardly burning villages and destroying homes, crops, and draft animals. In several documented cases, this unrestrained violence led to abuse and wanton aggression toward the local population. Additionally, General Smith has been accused of making little effort to restrict contact between civilians and the guerrilla forces. Critics assert that in addition to allowing guerrillas access to supplies and intelligence, Smith permitted the insurgents to continue to influence the increasingly dissatisfied populace. Accordingly, detractors contend that American relations with the local citizenry were irreparably damaged, despite Smith’s moves to relax his more severe measures. Historian John M. Gates maintains that the guerrillas on Samar sustained their resistance until April 1902 due in large part to the hatred and motivation inspired by Smith’s harsh policies. Gates suggests that if General Smith had employed a more balanced approach of benevolence, tempered with chastisement, the insurgency might have ended with the surrender of Lukban.72

Although brutal and repressive, Smith’s campaign must be credited with successfully crushing one of the most thoroughly ingrained insurgencies in the archipelago’s most rugged terrain. This was accomplished in just under seven months, an impressive feat when one considers that since 1945 the average duration of an insurgency has been roughly fourteen years.73

General Smith’s reputation, however, was undermined by the legal processes designed to ensure that the protections that GO 100 of 1863 offered to innocent civilians were enforced. In March 1902, Major Waller was tried and acquitted for summarily executing eleven Filipino prisoners following his ill-fated trek through the mountains of Samar. During his defense, Waller implicated General Smith in the incident by bringing his intemperate verbal orders to light. The Army was then forced to court-martial Smith based on the damning testimony given in Waller’s trial.74
Amazingly, however, Smith was not tried for issuing illegal orders or for inciting war crimes. Instead, he was charged with “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline” for the excessive nature of his orders. A military court headed by Maj. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, who had commanded the Department of North Philippines, that convened in Manila in April 1902 found General Smith guilty of instructing Waller to “kill and burn” as much as possible and not take any prisoners. Commenting on this verdict three months later, Secretary of War Elihu Root described the language Smith was convicted of using as containing “intemperate, inconsiderate, and violent expressions, which, if accepted literally, would grossly violate the humane rules governing American armies in the field.” But the court exercised leniency and sentenced Smith merely to be “admonished by the reviewing authority.” It justified this outcome by concluding that Smith “did not mean everything that his unexplained language implied; that his subordinates did not gather such a meaning; and that the orders were never executed in such sense.” Root commented, “Fortunately they [Smith’s instructions] were not taken literally and were not followed. No women or children or helpless persons or noncombatants or prisoners were put to death in pursuance of them.”

Advising President Roosevelt on the case, Secretary Root claimed that, although General Smith had committed many verbal transgressions, his written and printed orders, and the actual conduct of military operations in Samar, were justified by the history and conditions of the warfare with the cruel and treacherous savages who inhabited the island, and their entire disregard of the laws of war, were wholly within the limitations of General Orders, No. 100, of 1863, and were sustained by precedents of the highest authority.76

Fearing a public outcry, however, the Roosevelt administration decided to take further action against the 62-year-old General Smith. Accordingly, Secretary Root recommended that Smith be retired from active service, arguing “his usefulness as an example, guide, and controlling influence for the junior officers of the Army is at an end.” President Roosevelt agreed. Observing that “the shooting of the native bearers by orders of Major Waller was an act which sullied the American name” and that the war had witnessed “instances of the use of torture and improper heartlessness,” Roosevelt concluded that it was “impossible to tell exactly how much influence language like that used by General Smith may have had in preparing the minds of those under him for the commission of the deeds which we regret.” He therefore ordered Smith’s retirement.77

Despite the president’s action, most Army officers supported Smith’s methods and decided that he was a scapegoat of the politics associated with the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of an empire in the Philippines in its aftermath. Newspaper articles reported that Smith had the “hearty approval of his fellow-officers,” and that they believed that “the effect upon the discipline and morale of the army is . . . anything but wholesome.”78 In fact, one officer asserted that “some of the best fighting men in the army say that as a soldier in battle General Smith is superb.”79 Upon Smith’s return to the United States, one of his staff officers observed that, if the American people knew “what a thieving, treacherous, worthless bunch of scoundrels those Filipinos are, they would think differently. . . . I do not believe that there are half a dozen men in the U.S. Army that don’t think that Smith is all right.”80

Editorial pieces and reader comments that appeared in the military professional journals of the time also strongly demonstrated that Army officers endorsed Smith’s actions. Not one of the opinions published in the Army and Navy Journal in 1902 was critical of Smith.81 An opinion piece that appeared in that journal in 1911 seemed to sum up the officer corps’ sentiments concerning both General Smith and the overall policy of concentration:
It is recognized by all those thoroughly conversant with the situation which existed at the time in Samar that General Smith’s campaign was justified, that the only way to save the lives of hundreds of good American soldiers was to wage a destructive war in the enemy’s country and render it as desolate as Sheridan made the Shenandoah Valley. The peaceful natives, men, women and children, had ample time to report within the lines of reconcentration, and the natives who remained outside these lines and carried weapons were justly regarded as enemies, and were treated as such.82

Similarly, the Department of the Navy lavished official praise on Major Waller and his battalion of marines. (In fact, prior to the announcement of court-martial proceedings, even General Smith had highly commended the Marine battalion and its commander, going so far as to recommend that he be awarded another brevet). R. Adm. Frederick Rodgers, who commanded the Navy’s Asiatic Squadron, stated that the Marine battalion had “performed its duty in a most efficient manner.”83 Later, Major Waller would defend his actions on Samar to reporters, arguing,

You can’t stop the revolution in the Philippines unless you take the severest of measures. You would hate to see your wounded and dead mutilated. I cannot describe the fearful condition in which we found some of the bodies of men under my command who were murdered by the insurrectos. I received both verbal and written orders from Gen. Jacob Smith to kill all insurrectos who were caught armed or refused to surrender. It was the only thing that could be done, and I never questioned Gen. Smith’s orders . . . I left Samar a howling wilderness. They tried to make it that for us, but we made it a howling wilderness for them.84

Upon the battalion’s return to the United States, Waller and his men were given a hero’s welcome at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.85 In fact, Waller’s expedition would later become legendary in the Marine Corps, exemplifying extreme sacrifice and determination in the face of overwhelming adversity. For years afterward, whenever a marine who had seen action on Samar entered the mess, other Marine officers would reverently rise to their feet and announce, “Stand, gentlemen, he served on Samar!”86

Unfortunately, the Army as an institution largely failed to incorporate the positive lessons of the war into its doctrine. Even as Army officers generally recognized the success of General Smith’s counterinsurgency campaign in Samar, few contributed professional reflections on the campaigns, and the textbooks employed in Army instruction were not substantially altered. Most officers thought that prewar tactics, with only minor modifications, sufficiently covered guerrilla combat. Moreover, most continued to view partisan warfare as an auxiliary form of military science, believing that the decisive form of combat would remain conventional warfare. As a result, the United States would largely have to rely on the short-term memory of its soldiers to fight the partisan wars of the future.87

Notes

This essay is based on an award-winning strategy research paper on the campaigns in Samar and Batangas Provinces that the author prepared at the U.S. Army War College in 2010. That paper, entitled “Ending an Insurgency Violently: The Samar and Batangas Punitive Campaigns,” is posted at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA522005&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

1. War Department GO 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 April 1863, specified the range of responses legally available to commanders for counterinsurgency operations.


17. Linn, Philippine War, pp. 306–09, quote, p. 309. The aggressive counterinsurgency tactics General Hughes employed on the island of Panay prior to this period were well known. One officer would later state that General Hughes was “a hero” for burning “a path 60 miles wide from one end of Panay to the other.” See Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899–1903 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 257.
23. Ltr, Chaffee to Corbin, 25 Oct 1901, folder 3, box 1, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC.
25. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 94–95, quotes, p. 95.
26. Ibid., p. 238; newspaper clipping in Philippines scrapbook, box 1, Walter L. Cutter Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), Carlisle, Pa. The newspaper clipping was most likely from the Manila Critic, an English-language paper popular among soldiers stationed in the Philippines.
27. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p. 238; Jacob H. Smith, “Campaign in Samar and Leyte from 10th of October to 31st of December, 1901,” Manila Critic, 1 Feb 1902, copy in folder 2, Philippines Miscellaneous, box 8, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC.
29. Ibid., p. 212.
32. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, p. 196.
33. Ltr, Chaffee to Hughes, 30 Sep 1901.
34. Ltr, Chaffee to Corbin, 5 Nov 1901, folder 3, box 1, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC.
35. Ltr, Hughes to Smith, 5 Oct 1901, box 49, entry 2483, RG 395, NADC.
38. Telgs, Smith to Hughes, entry 3451, Field Telegrams Received and Sent at Catalogan by General Smith, October 1901, RG 395, NADC; Smith, “Campaign in Samar and Leyte.”
45. First District, Department of the Visayas, FO 1, 21 Oct 1901, in ARWD, 1902, 9:206.
47. Proclamation, HQ, 6th Separate Brigade, 1 Nov 1901, Philippine insurgent records compiled by Capt J. R. M. Taylor, roll 70, National Archives Microfilm M254, NADC.
62. Smith, "Campaign in Samar and Leyte."
63. Ltr, Chaffee to Corbin, 18 Nov 1901, folder 3, box 1, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC.
64. Ltr, Chaffee to Corbin, 31 Jan 1902, folder 4, box 1, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC; Linn, "Struggle for Samar," p. 173.
65. Sixth Separate Brigade Cir 3, 18 Nov 1901, in ARWD, 1902, 9:207.
68. Ltr, Chaffee to Corbin, 30 Mar 1902, folder 4, box 1, Henry C. Corbin Papers, LC.
71. ARWD, 1902, 9: 189; Daza y Salazar, "Some Documents of the Philippine War," pp. 184–86. Frederick D. Grant was a son of the late president Ulysses S. Grant.
73. Archer, Philippines' Fight for Freedom, p. 129. On the duration of insurgencies in the last sixty-five years, see the published excerpts of an interview of RAND analyst Seth G. Jones by Newsweek journalist Taylor Lee in "The War Is Still Wide Open: A RAND Analyst Assesses the Situation in Afghanistan," Newsweek, 17 Jul 2009, posted at http://www.newsweek.com/2009/07/16/the-war-is-still-wide-open. html. Smith’s campaign began in October 1901 and a final surrender occurred in April 1902, a period of seven months. The initial invasion and occupation of Samar occurred in January 1900, however, so the entire campaign was concluded in twenty-eight months.
75. Adjutant General's Office, Headquarters of the Army, GO 80, 16 Jul 1902, pp. 1–2; Root's words are contained in Ltr, Root to President Theodore Roosevelt, 12 Jul 1902, in ibid., p. 2.
76. Ibid., p. 3.
77. Ibid., pp. 3–4.
Rise and Fight Again: The Life of Nathanael Greene

By Spencer C. Tucker
ISI Books, 2009
Pp. xv, 237. $25

Review by Bradford A. Wineman

Written as part of the Lives of the Founders series, Spencer Tucker’s Rise and Fight Again examines the life and career of one of the most underappreciated heroes of the American Revolution, General Nathanael Greene. Although Greene has received growing attention from the U.S. military community recently as a luminary of small war operations, his greater contributions to the Patriot cause attain proper recognition in this valuable biography.

Greene’s illustrious career as a military hero sprang from a most obscure upbringing. Raised in a pacifist Quaker household, his father encouraged him to shun education and learning in order to focus on a life dedicated to the family businesses in his native Rhode Island. Greene had no formal military education or training as a young man and probably should not have been considered for service given a noticeable limp from which he had suffered since childhood. But he matured into adulthood as the tensions against Britain rose in his native New England and eventually committed to the Patriot cause. In spite of his Quaker upbringing and thriving business career, he joined a Rhode Island militia company and eventually the Continental Army. Once the Army’s newly appointed leader, General George Washington, organized his new forces outside of Boston in the summer of 1775, Greene at the age of thirty-two became Washington’s youngest general. Although limited in his martial experience, Greene quickly developed the qualities as a commander that would carry him to success throughout the upcoming war. He immediately learned the importance of training, order, and discipline, particularly in dealing with raw troops. But unlike other strict commanders, Greene showed compassion for his men and continually looked to their welfare. In the heat of battle, he showed remarkable bravery, always pressing for aggressive action but never reckless with the lives of his soldiers.

After arriving in Boston, Greene served with distinction in every major campaign with Washington, from the siege of Boston to Monmouth Court House. Through his distinguished conduct in these battles, he earned the unshakable trust of the commander in chief, who made the young Greene his appointed successor. Greene balanced his achievement as a battlefield leader with a robust sense of duty, particularly when Washington reassigned him from field command to serve as quartermaster general, a staff position. Although he lamented being withdrawn from the front lines, Greene executed his new assignment with remarkable effectiveness. He was a tireless administrator, using a combination of personal connections and creativity in order to keep the starving Army fed and clothed through its most trying times. Many historians argue that Greene’s services as quartermaster contributed as much to the triumph of the American war effort as any of his actions on the battlefield. Much attention in this biography is given to Greene’s undertakings in civil-military relations, not only dealing with the public and businessmen in acquiring provisions, but also his countless, and often unsuccessful, visits to the Continental Congress to plead for the resources to keep the Army alive.

Greene, however, truly solidified his reputation for extraordinary leadership during the Southern campaign of 1780–1781. Rebuilding the broken southern Patriot forces in less than a year, he engaged a British force that was often four times his army’s size, wearing down the enemy through a brilliantly executed Fabian strategy. In this campaign, he distinguished himself as a brilliant strategist, boldly dividing his forces and compelling his opponent, Lt. Gen. Charles, Earl Cornwallis, to give him chase throughout the backcountry of the rural Carolinas. The pursuing British extended their already thinning supply lines and endured constant harassment from colonial irregular forces. When Greene did give battle, he only engaged on ground of his choosing and cleverly used his militia to draw the enemy into the fire of his more steadfast Continental troops. Although he never defeated Cornwallis’ army in a conventional fight, he bled the already exhausted enemy forces so badly that their victories over the Americans were only Pyrrhic in nature. After tactically defeating Greene’s forces at Guilford Court House in March 1781,
the frustrated Cornwallis forfeited the Carolina campaign and retreated to Wilmington to open a new effort in Virginia, eventually leading to his surrender at Yorktown.

The venerable Greene, however, was not without his negative qualities. As a commander in the Northern theater, he met with only mixed success, making poor tactical decisions at Fort Washington and Germantown, which contributed to terrible American defeats. Despite his selfless dedication to the Patriot cause, the general worried greatly about his own reputation and often looked for opportunities to achieve personal recognition for his talents and exploits. His career is ripe with episodes of his complaining about not receiving the credit he believed he was due. He demonstrated a continual need for validation of his worth, either in obtaining choice assignments or public accolades for his accomplishments, which occasionally reflected an almost certain emotional insecurity. When he encountered failure, either as an administrator or commander, he was also quick to identify fault in his subordinates. Few can argue against Greene’s accomplishments, but he exhausted a great deal of energy to ensure he was rewarded for each one.

Although a concise biography, this volume demonstrates remarkable research, drawing primarily from Nathanael Greene’s personal papers and the writings of his contemporaries. Tucker’s carefully balanced analysis of the general’s military as well as personal life, exploring his commitment to both a family and business man, offers a well-rounded picture of the man as well as the soldier. The shortcomings of this book, consequently, are few. At times, the author apologetically addresses Greene’s transparent opportunism, ego, and penchant for self promotion. The text also lacks adequate maps of the Northern campaigns to match those provided for the Southern theater.

Overall, Tucker makes a convincing case for Nathanael Greene as the Continental Army’s ablest commander after George Washington. This volume is well-researched, cogently written, and a welcome addition to students of both the American Revolution and the art of command.

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**Review by Paul E. Teed**

More Than a Contest Between Armies: Essays on the Civil War Era includes twelve essays that were originally delivered as the Frank L. Klement Lectures at Marquette University between 1992 and 2005. In keeping with the scholarly legacy of Frank L. Klement, a pioneering historian of political dissent and civil liberties in the Union, the central focus of the book is on nonmilitary aspects of the Civil War. Topics include prostitution in the Confederacy, news reports of the Battle of Fredericksburg, and various approaches to the making of America’s collective memory of the war in the years after the surrender at Appomattox Court House. Students of the Civil War era will recognize most, if not all, of the historians in the collection. Some, such as David Blight, Edward Ayers, Mark Neely, and Gary Gallagher, have emerged as leaders in a new generation of Civil War scholars. Overall, the quality of these essays is very high, and the book serves as a good starting point for those who seek a broad introduction to the newest interpretations of Civil War society and culture.

The one major weakness of More Than a Contest Between Armies is the lack of a thematic introduction. The editors provide brief introductions to each essay, but these do not furnish the larger overview that collections of this kind often include. This is unfortunate because the essays themselves provide opportunities for larger conclusions about the war’s impact on American life. Most of the authors, for example, address the important relationship between the war and questions of modernization in the Union and Confederacy. Catherine Clinton’s essay on prostitution shows that Union military authorities in occupied Memphis were anxious about the impact of venereal disease on troop morale and effectiveness. As a result, they instituted a highly bureaucratic system of inspection and licensing of prostitutes that was partially modeled on similar systems developed in London and Paris. George Rable’s essay on the news reports of the Battle of Fredericksburg points out that with the advent of telegraphic news services and modern news distribution networks, reports of battlefield disasters could no longer be concealed from the public or fully controlled by the government. As a result, the Abraham Lincoln administration was forced to rely on the Republican press to “spin” the news of the battle in ways that minimized the political and diplomatic damage caused by the disaster along the Rappahannock. Edward Ayres’ essay on the Civil War in Augusta County, Virginia, and Franklin County, Pennsylvania, argues that modernization, especially its optimism about economic development, social progress, and technological...
change, was embraced on both sides of the Mason-Dixon Line. Ayres suggests that even as slavery and political loyalty divided these two communities, the simple dichotomy between a “modern” North and a “traditional” South does not hold up under the close scrutiny of new research.

A second theme around which several of the essays cluster is that of Civil War memory. In recent years, historians have shown that postwar Americans worked toward a usable understanding of the conflict, which could serve the political and cultural needs of the late nineteenth century. Concerned mainly with sectional reconciliation, many white Americans were content to forget the role slavery had played in causing the war and to neglect the contributions of African Americans in achieving Union victory. Gary Gallagher’s essay on the postwar career of former Confederate Lt. Gen. Jubal Early shows just how active ex-Confederates were in shaping this larger national memory. He argues that Early’s vision of the Civil War as a noble “Lost Cause” in which a doomed but gallant Confederacy struggled against a tyrannical and unprincipled foe gained wide currency in the nineteenth century and remains remarkably persistent today” (p. 284). At the same time, David Blight’s essay shows that black abolitionist Frederick Douglass struggled mightily to contest such views. Blight finds that, although Douglass generally accepted the postwar adulation of Abraham Lincoln, his speeches about the martyred president reminded audiences that emancipation was the greatest legacy of the war and that protection of black civil rights was the greatest way to honor Lincoln’s memory. Finally, J. Matthew Galman’s essay probes issues of memory and wartime transformations in the work of two Philadelphia novelists, Anna Dickinson and Silas Mitchell. Perhaps more typical than either Jubal Early or Frederick Douglass, these novelists struggled with a basic ambivalence about the war’s impact on American life.

Although More Than a Contest Between Armies is mainly concerned with home-front issues, readers interested in military history will find at least two essays on themes familiar to them. Leslie Gordon’s fascinating look at the experiences of the 16th Regiment Infantry, Connecticut Volunteers, reopens the contentious debate over the meanings of cowardice in the Civil War armies. From the unit’s baptism in blood on the extreme Union left at Antietam to its imprisonment at Andersonville, this regiment was plagued by bad morale, poor leadership, and accusations of battlefield cowardice. Gordon finds that soldiers’ letters often contained frank acknowledgments of fear and even unwillingness to engage the enemy. She concludes that even in a culture that generally produced brave, effective soldiers, an honest history of the Civil War must include the experiences of those who “from shock, monotony and the sufferings of war, behaved poorly, even disgracefully” (p. 168). However, as John Simon’s essay on Union Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Henry W. Halleck demonstrates, poor performance was not relegated to enlisted men. Simon credits Halleck with a sizable intellect and substantial talent for administrative organization. But he also argues that the general’s obsession with personal advancement led him to undervalue and even undermine Grant early in the war. Both men came from the “old Army,” but they had learned different lessons from it. A brilliant success in the prewar military, Halleck’s extensive training nevertheless made him inflexible rather than innovative. Ironically, it was Grant’s lack of engagement in traditional military technique and ambivalence about military culture that allowed him to adjust more effectively to the new realities of the war. Halleck began the war as Grant’s critic and taskmaster, but by the end Grant had become the “victorious commander” while Halleck’s role had been reduced to that of “military housekeeper” (p. 103).

More Than a Contest Between Armies is a valuable book that offers much to students of the Civil War. The historians whose works appear here are consistently good writers and have demonstrated the ability to write effectively for both academic and popular audiences. The twelve essays in the book supply readers with a variety of windows into the war and their careful attention will be amply repaid.
research combines new Civil War databases with older print sources to uncover and document a much larger participation by women in the war than has previously been accepted. Revising earlier figures upward, Hall now estimates that at least one thousand (and perhaps many more) women engaged in military affairs. Emphasizing that women endured the same hardships, confronted the same dangers, and displayed the same courage on the battlefield as men, the author hopes that female soldiers will receive the respect they deserve.

Hall persuasively asserts that a sizable number of women wanted to participate in the Civil War. Women who served as battlefield nurses often had to overcome family opposition and contemporary notions that women could not and should not serve in that capacity. Women who wanted to join the Army had an even tougher hurdle—they needed to convincingly disguise themselves as men. Although countless women were unable to carry off the ruse, the author finds evidence that a surprising number succeeded. The stories of many women included in Hall’s book, such as Jennie Hodgers and Sarah Emma Edmonds, are well known to scholars and students of the Civil War, but they nonetheless provide dramatic evidence of women’s involvement. Concealed as “Franklin Thompson,” Edmonds served for two years in the 2d Regiment Infantry, Michigan Volunteers, during which she saw combat and acted as a courier and nurse. Hodgers, who served a three-year term of enlistment in the 95th Regiment Infantry, Illinois Volunteers, cloaked as “Albert Cashier,” fought in forty battles and skirmishes, including the Battle of Vicksburg, and continued to live as a man until 1911 when a car accident revealed her gender. Not only do Hodgers and Edmonds stand as markers that women did in fact successfully disguise themselves as men and fight in combat, but Hall also uses them to demonstrate the male support they received once their secret had been made public. Male soldiers, for example, supported Edmonds’ application for a military pension and Hodgers’ fellow soldiers left tributes to her bravery in 1913.

While these two cases are certainly extraordinary, the author argues for a theme of male supportiveness of female soldiers in contrast to an official record that castigated those women soldiers who were discovered or cast them as prostitutes.

As Hall documents the contributions of specific women to the war effort, he also acknowledges serious gaps in the historical record and cautions readers that not all stories should be believed. Published regimental rosters were incomplete and newspaper accounts often contained inaccurate information. Synthesizing the historical research that has separated real stories from the apocryphal, the author demonstrates that online databases have made it possible for scholars to debunk information in standard reference works. Detailing thirteen stories that are no longer considered credible, Hall identifies for readers a host of evidentiary problems that are useful to students learning about historical methodology. In some instances stories were simply made up to sell books, and in other cases the stories seemed plausible until other research was conducted. In one useful example, a Union general wrote in an 1865 diary entry that a soldier named “Charley Anderson” was discovered to be a woman named Charlotte and sent home to Ohio (pp. 155–56). Given the source, many believed this to be a credible example of women’s wartime involvement. Yet further research by DeAnne Blanton and Lauren Cook uncovered a newspaper report of a physical examination conducted by Cleveland authorities. “Charlotte Anderson” was in fact a man who wanted to get out of the Army by claiming to be a woman.

For all its strengths in correcting and extending the historical record, Richard Hall’s book, Women on the Civil War Battlefront, has some weaknesses. Readers interested in moving beyond the brief biographical sketches to the larger meaning of women’s participation will find that individual examples rather than interpretive themes dominate the work. Beyond recognizing that women contributed to the war effort, how should the reader understand or interpret their role? The question of motivation is addressed only briefly. The author underscores patriotism, the desire to be with a loved one, or the need to avenge the death of a family member as the most likely factors. In his introduction, Hall suggests that the “mid-nineteenth-century women’s movement” with its emphasis on equality and independence influenced the actions of female soldiers, but the theme was not addressed in the body of the work (p. 11). Because so little is often known about the women who served in the Civil War, it would have been useful to examine the social and cultural context in which they lived to determine any patterns that informed their service. Overall, the book suffers from a lack of interpretive focus, and the conclusions it does offer are derivative. Hall does not distinguish his approach from other recent works on the subject, including Elizabeth Leonard’s All the Daring of the Soldier: Women of the Civil War Armies (New York, 1999) and DeAnne Blanton’s and Lauren M. Cook’s They Fought Like Demons: Women Soldiers in the American Civil War (Baton Rouge, 2002).

With these caveats in mind, Women on the Civil War Battlefront remains a painstakingly researched work that recognizes the diverse contributions of women to the war effort that have been hidden by the historical record or dismissed by scholars. Richard Hall’s book illuminates an understudied aspect of the Civil War military experience.

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The first of these books, Rommel’s Lieutenants, is a prime example of how an author’s enthusiasm for a subject can cause a book to deviate significantly from its stated purpose and how a lack of organization and editorial oversight can make it incredibly aggravating to read. At first glance, the organization of Rommel’s Lieutenants is logical given the title of the book. After a short preface concentrating on how much French equipment was destroyed by the 7th Panzer Division—the unit that Rommel commanded during the 1940 French campaign—the author devotes an entire chapter to explaining how the German officer education system worked both under the German Empire, because so many of Rommel’s officers were already officers before World War I started, and under the Reichswehr. From there, each major staff officer of the 7th Panzer Division receives a chapter. Unfortunately, it is with the individual chapters where the book begins to fail.

The chapters of Rommel’s Lieutenants are wholly unbalanced, with some officers being allotted as little space as two pages while others receive fifteen or more. This could, perhaps, be chalked up to the amount of influence an officer had in Rommel’s decision making; this, however, is not the case. Throughout the course of Rommel’s Lieutenants, Mitcham routinely devotes an incredible amount of detail to an officer’s career before and after the 1940 French campaign but very little—usually no more than three sentences—to what happened in the summer of 1940. Therefore, the central problem with this book (other than poor editing, see below) is its misleading title and preface. The author’s preface and book title clearly make the case that the book is about Rommel’s 1940 campaign in France but very little—usually no more than three sentences—to what happened in the summer of 1940. Therefore, the central problem with this book (other than poor editing, see below) is its misleading title and preface. The author’s preface and book title clearly make the case that the book is about Rommel’s 1940 campaign in France, not the Eastern Front, North Africa, or the sexual exploits of Josef Goebbels, which receive three pages of consideration. Had Mitcham titled Rommel’s Lieutenants anything differently, say Biographical Sketches of Various German Officers, this review would have been much more positive.

While not unique compared to other chapters of the book, three chapters deserve special note because they cover subjects who held high rank or who played important roles. The first of these is the eight-page chapter devoted to Karl Rothenburg, the commander of the 7th Panzer Division’s sole tank regiment. Although a panzer regiment is an integral part of a panzer division, the author simply states “despite its maintenance problems, Rothenburg’s 25th Panzer Regiment performed brilliantly in the French campaign” (p. 24) and then offers some statistics as to how many vehicles the regiment destroyed or captured. No explanation is given as to what the maintenance problems were (and they are not mentioned elsewhere in the book) or under what circumstances the regiment was able to capture so much French equipment. Furthermore, Mitcham provides no explanation for his statement that Rothenburg was the best officer in Rommel’s division. The remainder of the chapter is a short biography of Rothenburg mixed with a great amount of information on how and why the 2d Light Division was reorganized into the 7th Panzer Division, including several anecdotes of the poor impression Rommel made when he first reported to the division. While both of these topics are important later, they would have been better placed in a narrative chapter at the beginning of the work, especially as each chapter offers one or two tidbits of information on the 7th Panzer Division’s history, few of which were relevant to the person being covered in the chapter. A consolidated chapter (or even, as a minimum, an expanded preface) devoted solely to the narrative history of the 7th, with special attention paid to the French campaign, would have been a great help to the reader. The book offers nothing about what the division did in France other than capture 458 tanks and suffer almost 2,600 casualties. Ironically, the division medical officer receives little attention in the volume.

The other noteworthy chapters are those for Georg Von Bismarck, a 7th Panzer Division rifle regiment commander and full colonel to whom the author devotes thirteen pages, and
Karl August Hanke, Rommel’s chief orderly and a career Nazi politician to whom the author gives the largest chapter, sixteen pages. Despite Bismarck’s role in the panzer division, Mitcham’s only comment regarding his role in the French campaign is that “the two [Rommel and Bismarck], however, definitely did establish a close professional relationship during the French campaign of 1940. Rommel even recommended him for the Knight’s Cross” (p. 92). The remainder of the chapter is a short biography and detailed synopsis of the colonel’s military assignments before World War II followed by a lengthy history of the colonel’s exploits in North Africa under Rommel in 1941 and 1942. Reading this, one cannot help but wonder if the author will plagiarize himself in his volume about Rommel in North Africa or simply ignore Bismarck. Regarding Hanke, most of the chapter is actually devoted to Josef Goebbels. By the end of it, readers will learn more about Kristallnacht, the series of attacks against Jews on the night of 9 November 1938, and Goebbels than they will about the 7th Panzer Division in the entire book. Ironically, however, with four paragraphs devoted to Hanke’s actions as Rommel’s orderly, Mitcham pays more attention to Hanke than any other officer in the 7th Panzer Division during the French campaign.

As stated earlier, this book is an example of extremely poor editing and organization. It should be the responsibility of the editor to ensure that the chapters are adequately balanced and stay on topic, which, despite all evidence to the contrary, was the 7th Panzer Division’s 1940 campaign in France; that the photographs in the book are organized chronologically or at least in a manner that makes sense to the reader, rather than intermixing personal portraits with various photographs from numerous fronts and battles, including the Eastern Front, North Africa, Normandy, and the Soviet conquest of Berlin; and that endnotes are relevant and succinct. This final point may seem trivial, as endnotes are normally used to provide citations and briefly explain relevant items. Instead, the author uses endnotes as a way to squeeze more biographies into the volume—creating lengthy entries detailing the careers of officers who had no relation whatsoever to the 7th Panzer Division and sometimes only a weak professional connection with the officer that the chapter was about. See the notes for Chapter 3 for the most glaring examples.

The second volume, Mitcham’s Rommel’s Desert Commanders, was a welcome relief after Rommel’s Lieutenants. Fortunately, the work is a significant improvement over its predecessor, though it does suffer from some serious weaknesses. The reader need not venture far to discover where one of the most egregious mistakes of the book can be found: the dust jacket. The summary printed on the volume’s inside flap is actually the one for Rommel’s Lieutenants, copied verbatim, without any modification, and concludes with “no historian has ever recognized the talented cast of characters who supported the Desert Fox in 1940. No one has ever attempted to tell their stories. This book remedies that deficiency.” Thus, if prospective buyers are to take the book’s title at face value, they will immediately be confronted with the dilemma of deciding what the book is actually about.

The author understandably begins the book with the same introductory chapter as is found in Rommel’s Lieutenants, which explains how the German Army recruited and trained officers in the pre–World War I and pre–World War II period. Following that, each chapter is devoted to a phase of the war in North Africa, such as the Cyrenaican campaigns, the siege of Tobruk, El Alamein, and so forth. It soon becomes obvious that the amount of turnover in command and leadership positions during the North African Campaign was significantly higher than during the 1940 campaign in France. The reader will eventually become aware that although the term Rommel’s Afrika Korps is popular in historical texts (and is even the title of at least one book) it is factually inaccurate. The Afrika Korps had many commanders and was a component of Panzer Group Afrika (later, Panzer Army Afrika), which is the organization that Rommel actually commanded. However, Mitcham does not make this clear until he is describing a commander of the Afrika Korps and then the reader realizes that Rommel must therefore have held some higher command. Furthermore, the author does not explain which units were under Rommel’s command, how they were organized other than in passing statements on the movements of the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division to North Africa, and how the units were rushed into battle. These problems, combined with Mitcham’s reluctance to include the year when giving the date of an event and his frequent back-tracking (describing an event in the book and then immediately following that with another that occurred several months prior to the first), make Rommel’s Desert Commanders frustrating and confusing at times. Therefore, appendixes showing the names of key leaders, along with their duty positions in North Africa and the relevant dates; the organizational structure of the German and Italian forces in North Africa; and a time line of the North African Campaign would all have been extremely helpful and strengthened the book’s value. Lacking these resources, a reader who is not fully versed in the battle history of the German and Italian forces in North Africa should seriously consider researching the Panzer Army Afrika before reading this volume.

And what becomes of Georg Von Bismarck, whose North African exploits received so much attention in Mitcham’s work on France in 1940? After a brief mention in the cryptic sentence “Bismarck was killed at the head of his division” (p. 88), with no explanation of which division that was, he finally receives a small paragraph in the final chapter “Other Commanders.”

On the positive side, the general layout of this book is a remarkable improvement in all respects compared to Rommel’s Lieutenants. From the selection and quality of the photographs—all of which are relevant to North Africa, with the exception of one random photograph from the Russian front—to the way the chapters are organized and the amount of attention the author devotes to the activities of an officer under Rommel’s command in North Africa,
The Wehrmacht’s role in the Holocaust has become a hotly contested topic over the last several decades. Only recently gaining much traction among American historians, it finally received mainstream European attention with the 1995 opening of the exhibition “The German Army and Genocide” at the Hamburg Institute for Social Research. Long held to be a prime example of the professional army divorced from politics largely free of ideological contamination from the Nazi regime, the Wehrmacht has come under increasingly critical scrutiny from scholars. A considerable amount of revisionist literature now demonstrates the extent to which various echelons of the army were at least sympathetic to elements of the Nazi world view or were complicit with the government’s criminal policies in the occupied territories of Eastern Europe. In War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941, Geoffrey Megargee attempts to synthesize that scholarship with the vast existing treatment of military operations during the Barbarossa campaign to demonstrate that, more than obediently carrying out the regime’s genocidal policies, the Wehrmacht’s planning and conduct of the campaign were crucial components in the evolutionary development of the “Final Solution.” Due to the experiences and failure of Operation Barbarossa, annihilation was seen to be both the possible and only solution to the “Jewish Question.”

Beginning with brief discussions of the First World War’s impact on widespread prejudices in German society at the end of the nineteenth century and on the conduct of the campaign against Poland, Megargee narrates the rapid descent of the Wehrmacht leadership from an early alignment with general Nazi goals to enthusiastic collusion in extermination. More importantly, however, he suggests that responsibility for the barbaric solution to the Jewish question resulted as much from the Wehrmacht’s role in Barbarossa as it did from Hitler’s murderous beliefs. “In order to ensure their victory,” Megargee asserts, “the generals also helped lay the plans for Hitler’s vision of an exterminationist war” (p. 150). Although Nazi ideology explicitly harbored the potential for Jewish genocide, the decision for a final solution was only arrived at in the context of military operations on the Eastern Front during 1941. Heavily influenced by ideological, political, and economic considerations, the military campaign suffered because of longstanding assumptions about the foe held by ranking German officers. These assumptions fatally infected the planning stage of Operation Barbarossa, contributing to unrealistic expectations regarding the speed with which Germany could expect to defeat the Soviet Union and the resources necessary for a successful completion of the campaign, eventually condemning millions of Soviet prisoners and civilians to death. As the Soviets proved more resilient than expected, biases against Slavs and Bolsheviks continued to blind German commanders to the reality of their operational situation. Failure to quickly achieve victory both frustrated and threatened the overextended Wehrmacht, resulting in increasingly brutal reactions. Due to the need for rear area security and the extensive conflation of Jews with partisans, the army freely cooperated with embedded Schutzstaffel (SS).
premeditated genocide. Megargee's
on the army's early involvement with
nothing was the extermination of the
by the Wehrmacht.
As established as the evidence is regarding Wehrmacht participation in atrocities on the Eastern Front, there is still a significant amount of ambiguity that Megargee's synthesis does not help to clarify. Perhaps overly ambitious for so short a book, he attempts to discover the connection between military operations and the final solution but falls victim to the generalizations necessary in a narrative of this length. Analyzing the Wehrmacht's role only from the perspective of the highest generals and trying to integrate complex and contested arguments regarding Wehrmacht complicity in the genocide, the author's unconvinced conclusions make the contradictory historical evidence disappointingly apparent. Accordingly, his own position can at times be elusive. How complicit were the various echelons within the army, for example? Was genocide the intentional result of ideology or the culmination of structural-functional factors? When was the decision reached to exterminate the Jews? Was the Holocaust the result of a uniquely German historical development? Megargee is somewhat less than successful in balancing opposing positions on these complex and crucial questions.
The author certainly lays out a convincing case for the radicalization of the Wehrmacht on the battlefield between the invasion of Poland and the beginning of 1942. He acknowledges that the Wehrmacht's murderous cooperation with SS execution squads was largely a marriage of convenience rather than of ideological compatibility, a reaction to the insecurity of the occupying army because of poor planning and the failure to achieve rapid victory. This narrative, however, is frustratingly obscured by an insistence on the army's early involvement with premeditated genocide. Megargee's desire to "speak of deeply held ideas that shape a nation's destiny" (p. 1) and declaration that "most German officers" were predisposed to seek the destruction of the Jews, skate dangerously close to the discredited argument of Germany's "special path" (Sonderweg) no matter how hard he asserts otherwise. By homogenizing the German officer class, the reader is left with the confusing idea that somehow "the army" was both setting out to annihilate the Jews from the start but was then radicalized into it by circumstances on the Eastern Front.
Indeed, Megargee's very insistence on the deficiencies of German staff work unintentionally shields them from his accusations of deliberate genocidal complicity. While he is convinced of the malign intent behind the Wehrmacht's role in achieving Nazi annihilationist goals partly based on the German armed forces' agreement with plans to exploit the food supplies of the occupied territories, he concedes that due to cultural biases officers believed that the Slav population was historically conditioned to endure poor harvests. Thus the intentionality of the genocide is brought into question by the argument that the decision to live off the land resulted more from poor military planning and racist assumptions than the purposeful adoption of genocidal Nazi ideology.
Also troubling, in light of Megargee's stated goal of demonstrating that events in Russia influenced Hitler's decision for a final solution, is his inconsistent position on whether the choice was made at the height of apparent victory or only later because of frustration at the stalled military campaign. Analyzing the German atrocities perpetrated between August and October, he argues that "as their victories gained them more and more territory, their policies towards their captive enemies and the native population would become even more radical" (p. 73). However, later he suggests a connection between the stalled offensive, increasing threats to the rear area, and genocide as the result of perceived necessity from the failure of the campaign. For instance, a section entitled "The Partisan War and the German Reaction," is immediately followed by "The War Against the Jews Expands," while "Strain on the Flanks" (covering the disappointing culmination of the October 1941 offensive) and "The Soviet Counteroffensive Begins" precede his argument that the "Germans' situation was taking a very different turn, and not for the better. They would react, in part, with new levels of barbarity, as they applied themselves to their long-term goal of solving the "Jewish question" (p. 129). Finally, the author concludes that "the prolongation of the war helped close out deportation as an alternative [to genocide] and encouraged a sense of urgency, a belief that the solution could not wait until after final victory" (p. 153).
Megargee's slender volume will be valuable, nevertheless, to a wide range of students of the period. Operationally, the author is at his best when arguing that the generals were as culpable as Hitler for German defeat in the East and when pulling no punches in condemning the Wehrmacht's conduct of operations. Strategic confusion, willful disregard for orders, and mistakes that plagued the campaign are convincingly illustrated. Although he offers no original research, Megargee brings together complementary aspects of the war that typically have been analyzed separately, combining the narrative of army operations on the Eastern Front with examples of Wehrmacht conduct toward civilians, partisans, and prisoners of war. Doing so illuminates the way that culture affects military operations and suggests how the atrocities of the Eastern Front were influenced by the course of those operations. Military officers, in particular, should note with interest the dynamic between a flawed planning process, insufficient forces available for the given task, and the resulting insecurity of the occupied zones that drew the Wehrmacht into using increasingly harsher methods. Furthermore, because of his extensive use of German-language works (especially those examining the experience of Soviet prisoners of war) that might otherwise be inaccessible to the general reader and the valuable biblio-
Review by Alan M. Anderson

The campaign in Italy during World War II has received short shrift for decades. Even before it began, many Allied commanders considered the campaign a sideshow. During the war, divisions were withdrawn from Italy and transferred to northwest Europe, which was considered the primary front. For years after the end of the war, historians largely ignored Italy and wrote little about the battles and operations there despite the fact that the fighting was hard and frequently occurred under the most miserable conditions. Albert Kesselring is generally recognized today as the Luftwaffe field marshal who commanded the German forces in Italy and led his troops in a tenacious and effective defense of the peninsula. A common impression, reinforced by statements of Allied generals after the war, is that Kesselring was a chivalrous commander who fought cleanly, observing the rules of war.

Kerstin von Lingen’s book, Kesselring’s Last Battle: War Crimes Trials and Cold War Politics, 1945–1960, provides valuable scholarship on Kesselring and the Italian Campaign, calls into question the perception most associated with “Smiling Albert,” and, most importantly, examines the relationship between war crimes trials and Cold War politics in the years following the end of World War II. An instructor at the University of Tübingen in Germany, von Lingen destroys the myth that Kesselring and the Wehrmacht fought a “clean” war in Italy. She shows that Kesselring and his defense counsel nurtured this myth as a critical part of their strategy during Kesselring’s war crimes trial and continued this strategy for years after Kesselring was convicted in May 1947. Ultimately, the acceptance of this myth, in the context of the debate on the rearming of West Germany during the early 1950s, led to Kesselring’s release from prison in 1952. Thus, von Lingen’s book is about Vergangenheitspolitik—the politics of memory—and shows how politics triumphed over the realities of war crimes as the Cold War intensified.

Kesselring’s Last Battle is an English translation of von Lingen’s book originally published in Germany in 2004. Well written and based on meticulous research conducted in public and private archives in Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the book contains over a hundred pages of comprehensive notes. It begins with a short description of Kesselring’s military career from before World War I to his rapid rise as one of Hitler’s favorite commanders during World War II. Although he was a Luftwaffe officer, Kesselring was promoted to commander-in-chief South beginning in November 1941, an area of operation that included Italy. Following Italy’s surrender to Germany in September 1943, Kesselring became primarily responsible for the German defense of Italy, a position he held almost continuously until just before the end of the war.

Von Lingen describes how Kesselring’s stubborn defense up the length of Italy was beset by partisan attacks on German troops. One such incident occurred on 23 March 1944, when Communist partisans launched an assault on a German police unit in Rome. Thirty-three policemen died in the attack, with an additional sixty-eight wounded. In retaliation, the Germans executed three hundred and thirty-five Italian civilians and Jews in the Fosse Ardeatine caves near Rome. As partisan activities continued, Kesselring issued two Bandenbefehle in June and July 1944. These “antipartisan orders” escalated the war against the civilian population and encouraged German troops to retaliate ruthlessly when attacked by partisans, with no fear of prosecution by German authorities.

As a prisoner of war, Kesselring spent time in custody in London and also wrote studies of military operations for the U.S. Army’s Historical Division. But the British, who headed the occupation of Italy, charged Kesselring with war crimes relating to the Fosse Ardeatine massacre and for his failure to adequately control his troops to prevent atrocities following the issuance of his antipartisan orders.

Von Lingen establishes that Kesselring was not in Rome or its environs when the reprisals occurred and probably had no knowledge of them beforehand, although he basically admitted to complicity in the Fosse Ardeatine retaliation killings. At the time, he was on an inspection tour in northern Italy. However, Kesselring may have wanted to hide this fact because he was present in the area when fifteen uniformed American commandos, who had been captured on a sabotage mission, were summarily shot. General Anton Dostler, who commanded the unit involved in the executions,
who simply did his duty to defend the Fatherland. As von Lingen states, “the Kesselring case allows us, for the first time, to see how a powerful, closely interconnected war criminals’ lobby added an international dimension to the politics of memory” (p. 299).

Coinciding with Kesselring’s clemency campaign was the growing linkage between the efforts to win Kesselring’s release and the growing recognition among the Western Allies that they needed West Germany as a strong, and ultimately armed, partner against Soviet expansion. When the British released Kesselring in 1952, they did so ostensibly on medical grounds, citing his poor health. But the true aim of the British was to promote acceptance of treaties that returned sovereignty to, and allowed rearmament in, West Germany. Thus, Kesselring’s “last battle” represents the first attempt to present and analyze the facts surrounding a case in which the politics of memory benefited a convicted war criminal” (p. 294).

Ironically, although Kesselring effectively won his “last battle,” the victory led to his own defeat. Following his release, Kesselring was appointed the leader of various veterans’ organizations. In that capacity, he made a number of intemperate statements, calling for the release of all soldiers convicted of war crimes, and engaged in activities with adverse diplomatic consequences for the West German government. Essentially, he became an embarrassment. By the time of his death in 1960, he no longer was the symbol of the “good German soldier” who had done his duty. As von Lingen points out sixty years after his trial, the impression in Germany is that Kesselring was in fact guilty, while the “fallacious assumption” remained in Germany and elsewhere that the war in Italy was a “clean war” fought by “decent” soldiers on either side” (p. 294).

Notes

1. In this regard, von Lingen builds on and furthers the work of others. For example, Omer Bartov showed that the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union did not act differently from the “more Nazified” Schutzstaffel and Sicherheitsdienst. Omer Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich (New York, 1992).

2. For a recent and well-researched description of the consequences of these Bandenbefehle on Italian civilians, see James Holland, Italy’s Sorrow: A Year of War, 1944–1945 (New York, 2008).


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Review by Seth Givens

_Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam_ is a book that has been overdue in the historiography of the American combat soldier’s experience in twentieth-century warfare. Previous scholarship has tended to focus on the soldier and marine in earlier wars or a menagerie of conflicts—Peter Schrijvers _Crash of Ruin_ (New York, 1998) and _The GI War Against Japan_ (New York, 2002), John McManus’ _The Deadly Brotherhood_ (New York, 1998), Peter Kindsvatter’s _American Soldiers_ (Lawrence, Kans., 2003), and Gerald Linderman’s _World Within War_ (New York, 1997) come to mind. Dr. Kyle Longley, professor of history at Arizona State University, approaches the issue by exploring combat at the personal level and superimposes it solely on the Vietnam War. Through the author’s research, he found that Army and Marine infantrymen were often similar in nature, sharing common experiences throughout their tours. Longley argues that while the infantryman’s life could vary widely from the delta of the Mekong River to the mountains of the Central Highlands, “the plethora of sources stress far more commonalities than variations” (p. xx). By concentrating on masculinity, race, and class in 1960s America, Longley constructs a well-rounded view of the Vietnam-era military, providing continuity among the stories. Therefore, the author strives to revise the stereotypical view of the Vietnam veteran that has been handed down and ingrained in popular culture in order to make the story of those who served personal again.

The book is organized chronologically, following a typical serviceman’s career. Beginning with enlistment, the reader is then taken through a systematic analysis of the “grunt’s” life, continuing through training, combat, and the eventual return home. Longley further breaks down the subject into topical sections, anything from discussing “The Cult of True Manhood” (p. 14) to “The Soldier as Protestor” (p. 145). This allows the book to be easily digested and read piecemeal. It is a microcosmic look at what the grunt saw and experienced, and Longley allows the veterans to explain their own stories. The book’s analysis relies heavily on the veteran’s voice, as each paragraph is built around quotes and anecdotes. Rather than focusing on one particular battle that signifies the Vietnam War—the book is, after all, about the veterans and not the battles—the author records soldiers’ and marines’ thoughts, fears, and reactions to specific situations. For example, in Chapters 3 and 4, the author analyzes a particular theme that is an overarching point throughout the book. The soldiers’ world views were restricted to their immediate environment. While deployed, their lives revolved around the immediate “family” of men with whom they served. The only world that existed beyond their squad, platoon, or company was their connection to their loved ones back home. For the common serviceman, more often than not, his motivation in combat was not to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia but to survive his tour and return to “the world.” The book mimics this limited scope and therefore focuses only on the veterans’ thoughts and experiences on a day-to-day basis. Longley concentrates on several other themes, particularly the draft and how it affected the Army and Marine Corps. Both went through considerable growing pains when the need for men meant reliance on draftees. The book attempts to show that these growing pains extended beyond just operational capability and had an adverse effect on the draftees themselves, volunteers, commanders, and the nation as a whole.

Longley does not rely on archival materials for his sources. Instead, he mirrors the methodology that Peter Kindsvatter used for his _American Soldiers_ and utilizes primary documents from the veterans themselves to create a portrait of the combat soldier. The book also references a significant and varied cache of secondary sources, though they play a less-important role than the interviews, oral histories, memoirs, and letters from the era. Some readers may be skeptical of this approach, as it is sometimes called into question as a valid lens through which to view history. However, for reasons relating to the book’s concentration and stated purpose (p. xxii), one cannot fault the author’s methodology. Nevertheless, one can wonder about the way in which the book is organized. While the author’s decision to subdivide each chapter into topical themes makes the work easily digestible, it is also a point of weakness. It is, for example, easy to quibble over why a one-page discussion of overcoming fear in combat is woefully inadequate, while an analysis of drill instructors singling out weak recruits goes on for five pages. Critiques aside, it is important to understand that Longley’s book is by no means a comprehensive treatise on what every person experienced in training and combat, nor is it attempting to pinpoint exact actions at precise moments in time. Rather, by definition, it is a fluid work as it documents what the Vietnam War was like from the perspective of the men who experienced it._

_Grunts_ is most useful for those readers who have never picked up a Vietnam memoir. Longley excels at synthesizing the recurrent themes one finds in service members’ accounts. To this end, his work is a voice for the Vietnam veterans who could never fully piece together and put into words what they endured.
during their basic training; in the jungles, deltas, and highlands of Vietnam; or at the homecoming that awaited them. Grunts is, if nothing else, a book about frustration. Soldiers and marines were often angered by the lack of specialized training, with what they viewed as the ineptitude of command, with the elusiveness of the enemy, with the unforgiving environment, with their Army of the Republic of Vietnam allies, with losing buddies, and with returning home. While the author places a finger to the pulse of this anger, the book is, put simply, also about healing—he spends as many pages discussing the reintegration of veterans into society as he does with the war from 1961–1968. By creating a work that removes the focus from the军人 and marines’ experiences in a war that many people still struggle to fathom.

Seth Givens is a Ph.D. student at Ohio University, where he studies twentieth-century military history. His master’s thesis dealt with American soldiers and souvenir-hunting in the European theater during World War II. His current research focuses on the U.S. military in Berlin from 1945 to 1994.
oration, intentionally limiting supplies to Patton’s force due to concerns about the commander’s “reckless approach to operations” (vol. 2, p. 124). Throughout the two volumes of Chief of Staff, the reader is reminded that behind every commander was a chief of staff, leading the staff officers that turned the commander’s decisions into executable plans and often acting independently to influence the course of events in the absence of (or even contrary to) specific guidance from the commander.

Particularly interesting are the descriptions of the relationships between the various commanders and their chiefs of staff. These range from General Eisenhower’s respect and trust of his long-time chief of staff, General Smith, to Napoleon’s aggressive temperament that led him occasionally to physically assault Marshal Berthier, once slamming Berthier’s head into a stone wall (vol. 1, p. 32). The entries are also balanced, addressing both the strengths and the weaknesses of their subjects. For example, the depiction of General Sir Douglas Haig’s two World War I chiefs of staff contrasts Lt. Gen. Launcelot Kiggell’s generally poor performance with the strengths of his successor, Lt. Gen. Herbert Lawrence, who demonstrated much greater confidence when dealing with senior officers and making decisions in the absence of General Haig (vol. 1, pp. 203–05).

Zabecki has assembled an exceptional collection of essays that reveals the significant achievements of the senior staff officers who so often reside in the shadows of commander-centered military histories. Its main flaw is that it leaves the reader wanting more. For example, the emphasis on chiefs of staff of the “Great Commanders” limits the scope of the project primarily to the strategic level. Perhaps a third volume focusing on army- and corps-level commanders and their chiefs of staff is warranted. Regardless, this is a rich resource for the military historian that contains well-researched biographical sketches of twenty-eight of history’s great chiefs of staff, supplemented by introductory descriptions of the structure and function of military staffs from Napoleon’s time into the late twentieth century. These volumes are highly recommended.

Note

1. This is the unofficial motto of the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. It is generally attributed to Alfred Graf Schlieffen, who admonished his staff officers to “Say little, do much. Be more than you appear.” This, like many great quotes, has a long lineage, originating with Tycho Brahe (“appear as nothing but be all”), and repeated by Goethe, whom Schlieffen read assiduously. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (Providence, R.I., 1993), p. 109.

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often neglected so as to preserve the myth that America’s early patriots at Valley Forge endured quietly and stoically at the encampment without engaging in significant actions. In the fall of 2003, as the insurgency in Iraq grew, historians, students, and strategists searched for historical examples of counterinsurgency to assist in the development of U.S. strategy. The U.S. Army’s attempts to pacify the Philippines at the turn of the last century were often discussed as a good case study. Thomas Bruno’s article on the Samar campaign of 1901 to 1902 effectively highlights the challenges involved in deriving clear lessons from a bitter and imperfect campaign. Bruno nonetheless regrets the failure of participants to recognize the understanding of counterinsurgency warfare they did gain or to codify it into enhanced Army doctrine. The most important, and also the most difficult, mission of today’s military historian is to collect, preserve, and interpret current battlefield records and lessons learned. Once that is done, we can be sure that the modern Army will incorporate these lessons into its evolving doctrine.

I appreciate the opportunity the pages of this magazine have given me to communicate with all of you who study and disseminate the Army’s history, and I look forward to the promising future of the Army Historical Program.
in July 1942. The following February she became one of the first group of women officers admitted to the Army’s Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She held senior administrative and educational positions in the Women’s Army Corps during World War II and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel. She was assigned to the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff, in October 1945 to write the history of the Women’s Army Corps and continued this work as a civilian beginning in November 1947.

Treadwell left the Office of the Chief of Military History in March 1952 to become assistant director of a regional office of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Her former office published The Women’s Army Corps in 1954. A thorough, 841-page account, the volume was reviewed widely and generally positively in the press. Writing in the Sunday New York Times book review section, Ralph Gardner called it “one of the most detailed and carefully planned books” in the World War II series. Time magazine offered readers a lengthy review, which stated that the book told the story of the corps “with bold candor and fine humor.” But an unsigned review in the Jackson, Tennessee, Sun observed how the topic of this book differed from that of other volumes in the series and commented that “if we have run out of our own campaigns, it would be better to turn to those of other countries rather than write books of this nature.” The nation’s leading historical journal, the American Historical Review, received the book favorably, with reviewer Margaret S. Teng referring to Treadwell’s narrative as “a sprightly historical account.”

In 1962, while serving as director of the Office of Civil Defense’s field operations in Texas, Treadwell authored a ninety-six page account of the preparations for, impact of, and response to Hurricane Carla, a Category 5 storm that struck Texas near Corpus Christi in September 1961.

In Memoriam:

GEORGE L. MACGARRIGLE (1930–2010)

George L. MacGarrigle, who was a member of the Center’s Histories Division for twenty-eight years, died on 1 October 2010 after a long illness. He was 79. A native of Pennsylvania, George graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1952 and was commissioned as an infantry officer; he received a master’s degree in history from Pennsylvania State University in the early 1960s. He commanded the 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, in Vietnam from December 1968 to June 1969, operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone north of Saigon, and he served as the division’s inspector general.

In a second career at the Center, first as an Army officer and then as a civilian historian, George mentored the team of writers that went to work on the Army’s official history of its operations in the Vietnam War. In 1998, the Center published his magisterial Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967, the first general combat volume in its United States Army in Vietnam series. George was also a coauthor of Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, which the Center published in 1996. He retired from the Center in 1997.
A n article in the Washington Post on the recent publication by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) of a history on the fight at Wanat in Afghanistan has rekindled the perennial discussion of the difference between history produced by the Center of Military History (The Official History) and that prepared by any other Army organization (an official history). The distinction is subtle enough that even some within the Army’s historical community do not fully understand or appreciate it. The differentiation is, however, of critical importance to the charter of the Center of Military History and its long term survival as the sole purveyor of the official history of the United States Army.

In his December 2010 article, Washington Post journalist Greg Jaffe calls CSI’s study of the battle of Wanat “the Army’s official history of the battle” and further refers to the account as the Army’s “final history of the Wanat battle.” Jaffe ends by stating that the father of the platoon leader who was killed in the battle plans to meet with Army officials to ask them to revise the history further but that “he doesn’t expect the Army to change the record, which is considered final.”

No one has more respect than I do for the historical products of the Combat Studies Institute. I have been a fan of its studies since my days as a student from 1986 to 1987 at the Command and General Staff College and then my subsequent three year stint at the newly formed Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), both of which are at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. However, admirers and historians of CSI alike know that it does not write the official history of the Army. Its service to the Army—to students, commanders, teachers, doctrine writers, and others—resides in its quick analysis of a limited body of historical evidence followed by its production, on an ambitious schedule, of an initial account of a battle or event. You need only to look at CSI’s catalog (posted on line at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI) to discover the wide range of important studies and monographs written by its superb historians over the past thirty-two years. CSI was created to write just this form of contemporary history, but it is not, and was never intended to be, the organization that would write the official history. Nor does the Army consider CSI’s products to be the final word.

The only organization in the Army that writes the official history of the U.S. Army is the Center of Military History at Fort McNair, D.C. Formed during World War II, the Center was tasked to write the official history of the U.S. Army in that war. It was to do so with the understanding, as explained in 1947 by Army Chief of Staff and General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the official history “must, without reservation, tell the complete story of the Army’s participation, fully documented with references to the records used.” And those records were to be made available to the maximum extent possible, “with no reservations as to whether or not the evidence of history places the Army in a favorable light.” Taking those words as a form of guidance, the Center over the years has created its system of preparing thoroughly researched, extensively documented, carefully written, obsessively reviewed, panelled, and rewritten history that makes the Center what it is: the source of the authoritative official history of the U.S. Army. Not only do all of our manuscripts undergo the most conscientious scrutiny from our peers at the Center, they are also reviewed by special panels consisting generally of historians from outside the Center, subject matter experts from academia, and often senior participants in the events described. (These involved participants help to ensure accuracy and provide a sanity check to our products; we do not allow them to “spin” our accounts or “sanitize” our historical judgment.) Our goal is to take all the time necessary to research, review, analyze, and criticize our products so that they are the best we can make them. Quality is more important than speed because our works will be the official history and thus must be as accurate, thorough, and objective as possible.

Having said that, is even the official history written by the Center the final word? The answer must be no. All historians recognize that no historical account, however
carefully researched and written for however many years, can be the final word on any subject, let alone the complex story of an Army’s action during war or peace. Although the Center often takes a generation to prepare its official histories (a luxury that CSI is not permitted), more facts, new perspectives, and alternate interpretations of the evidence can still change any historical judgment. Revisionism is not an enemy of history; it is what makes history better over time. What makes the Center’s products different than any other in the Army is the time we take and the reviews we undertake to try as hard as humanly possible to get it right. This involves gathering a wide range of sources and viewing every angle of the evidence. The official history of the Army deserves no less, but even then it can never be the final word. This does not mean that the Center will attempt to review or rewrite CSI’s history of the battle of Wanat. But as time moves on, passions about the event will decline and fresh documentary evidence about the battle and the wider struggle in Afghanistan may shed further light on that event, place it in context, and thus generate new perspectives. Only then will the Center begin to write the official history of the Army’s actions in Afghanistan. If that occurs in ten years or twenty from now, that will be fine. The official history can, and must, wait.

As always, I am open to your comments at Richard. Stewart2@us.army.mil.

Notes
2. Department of the Army, The Chief of Staff, Memorandum for the Directors of Army General Staff Divisions; The Chiefs of Army Special Staff Divisions, 20 Nov 1947, Subject: Policy Concerning Release of Information from Historical Documents of the Army – With Special Reference to the Events of World War II. Copy in file 008, Presidential Directives, HRC-1, U.S. Army CMH Library, Fort McNair, D.C.
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