IN THIS ISSUE

Peace Be to Their Ashes: The 11th Kansas Cavalry and the Battle of Red Buttes
By Steven C. Haack 6

Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory
By Mark T. Calhoun 22
Americans during the Civil War era saw great significance for the republic in the future of its Western territories. The question of whether to allow the expansion of slavery there was a key issue in the 1860 presidential election. When that contest was won by Abraham Lincoln, who wanted those sparsely populated lands opened exclusively to free, independent farmers and settlers, Southerners sought to create a separate nation with conflicting territorial goals. The Civil War that ensued mobilized the entire country, including its Western settlers, and one loyal territorial unit sparked a second front late in the war by provoking a bitter conflict with Plains Indian tribes. In the first article of this issue, Steven Haack examines how a volunteer regiment from the nearby state of Kansas was engulfed by this Western conflict in what is now the state of Wyoming. He also describes how the members of the unit and the nation as a whole have subsequently struggled with the memory of their losses.

Mark Calhoun’s article evaluates the military thought of two influential officers and military theorists, the Swiss Antoine-Henri Jomini and the Prussian Carl von Clausewitz, both of whom gained their primary experience of warfare during the tumultuous Napoleonic era. Despite their involvement in the same series of conflicts, albeit largely on opposite sides, these two authors developed very different approaches to understanding the nature of war. Calhoun examines the intellectual bases of these contrasting approaches and finds Clausewitz’s views consistent with modern concepts of nonlinear systems. His analysis is designed to assist with the comprehension of these sometimes daunting writers.

Finally, I wish to use this forum to thank my youthful colleague Bryan Hockensmith, who served Army History for several years as book review editor and circulation manager and on one occasion as guest managing editor. Sadly, he is now engaged in other work for the Center, leaving those of us who remain with this bulletin enriched by his ideas and contributions and challenged by his novel absence. 

Charles Hendricks
Managing Editor
I am truly humbled and honored to be the new chief of military history and director of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. I would especially like to thank Col. Pete Crean for his tremendous work as acting chief. Being an “acting” leader is always a test, and Pete met every challenge and accomplished every mission with sound leadership and adept management. Along with the Army’s chief historian, Richard Stewart, Pete remains a vital part of the Center’s command team.

As the preface to another informative issue of Army History, this, my first chief’s corner, will outline some of the key objectives I envision for the Army’s history program over the next few years. We will formalize these goals in the next few months in a revision of the Center’s strategic plan.

We all know that before we can develop a vision of the future we must place both the present and the future into the context of the past. This is extremely important to me since one of my first goals is to return the Center to the basics. The Center of Military History must hold fast to its core missions and execute them with excellence. So let us review briefly what the Center and the Army Historical Program have contributed and where they stand now before we look ahead into what a complex future holds.

One of the Center’s traditional missions has been recording the official history of our Army in both peace and war. This function traces its origin at least to the late nineteenth century when, at the direction of Congress, a series of Army officers oversaw the compilation of the monumental documentary history of the Civil War, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. After World War I, a more formal organization, the Historical Section of the Army War College, assumed responsibility for documenting the Army’s history and actions in that conflict.

The institution that became the Center of Military History dates from the latter part of World War II, when the War Department Historical Division was created and began gathering a large team of combat historians, translators, editors, and cartographers to record the service’s official history of that conflict. The division first issued more than a dozen brief combat monographs begun in the field by uniformed historians that highlighted lessons learned during the war’s operations. Then in 1947 it began to publish another monumental series of volumes, this time in narrative format, on the Army’s World War II mobilization, operations, and specialized services—the well-known Green Book series.

Since then, the Center has detailed the Army’s role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and it is now tackling the Cold War and the Army’s current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. These works, supplemented by hundreds of monographs and other publications on a rich mix of historical topics, have made the Center one of the major publishers of military history in the world.

Alongside its publication work is the Center’s other core mission, providing historical support to the Army Staff and officials at every level in the Department of Defense. This has involved contributing essential background information for decision making, staff actions, command information programs, and public statements by Army officials.

Over the decades, the Center has expanded its role in the vital areas of collecting operational documents, managing and operating the Army’s museum system, and directing the Army’s combat artist program. In pursuing these tasks, it has employed increasingly complex automated historical and collection-oriented data-retrieval systems. In addition, the Center and the Army’s field historical offices have worked with Army schools to ensure that the study of history is a significant part of the training of officers and noncommissioned officers, and this remains a vibrant program.

Today, Army historians labor worldwide to prepare Army histories, deployed historians collect information to facilitate the study of ongoing operations, Army curators safeguard our historical treasures, and the Center’s deployed combat artist is on patrol to better understand and portray visually what our soldiers see and feel in combat. The sun truly never sets on our history program.

While we quietly accomplish these small miracles, I am often asked by senior Army leaders, “What is the value

Continued on page 44
Features

5 News Notes
39 Book Reviews
46 Chief Historian’s Footnote

Articles

6 Peace Be to Their Ashes: The 11th Kansas Cavalry and the Battle of Red Buttes
By Steven C. Haack

22 Clausewitz and Jomini: Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory
By Mark T. Calhoun
2011 Conference of Army Historians

The U.S. Army Center of Military History will hold its biennial conference of Army historians on 26–28 July 2011 at the Crowne Plaza National Airport Hotel located at 1480 Crystal Drive, Arlington, Virginia. The hotel is within comfortable walking distance of the Crystal City Metro station. The theme of the conference is “Armies in Persistent Conflict.” Conference organizers expect presentations to address a wide range of topics related to the Indian Wars, Vietnam War, Cold War, and the contemporary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as recurrent concerns in protracted engagements, including obtaining manpower, structuring the force, and maintaining stability with constabulary-type forces.

Information about the conference and a link to the registration form is posted at http://www.history.army.mil/CAH. The registration form contains a link to the Web site of the conference hotel and the hotel’s phone number, either of which may be used to arrange room reservations at special conference rates. The block of rooms set aside for conference registrants will remain available at those special rates until 26 June or until the rooms are fully booked, whichever comes first.

Freedom by the Sword

The U.S. Army Center of Military History has published a detailed account of the recruitment, organization, and service of the more than 180,000 African Americans who enrolled in the United States Army during the Civil War. Entitled Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867, this 553-page book by recently retired Center historian William A. Dobak examines the contributions of the black soldiers who almost 150 years ago fought to defend the Union and to apply in each section of the South the policy of emancipation decreed by President Abraham Lincoln.

Known collectively as the United States Colored Troops and organized in segregated regiments led by white officers, some of these African American soldiers guarded military posts along major rivers west of the Appalachian Mountains; others fought Confederate raiders to protect Union supply trains; and still others took part in major combat operations like the battle of Nashville and the sieges of Petersburg and Mobile. Black troops also played significant roles along the Atlantic coast. After the defeat of the Confederacy, many of the black regiments garrisoned the area once controlled by that regime to enforce the Reconstruction policies of President Andrew Johnson’s administration.

Because of the book’s broad focus on every theater of the war and its concentration on what black soldiers actually contributed to Union victory, this volume stands alone among histories of the U.S. Colored Troops. Dobak previously coauthored with Thomas A. Phillips The Black Regulars, 1866–1898 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), a book that relates the role of the African Americans who served in the Army in the decades after the Civil War.


New Commemoration Web Page

The Center of Military History has launched a new Web page on Civil War research and memory on the occasion of the sesquicentennial anniversary of that conflict. This is the first in a planned series of postings designed to mark anniversaries of the U.S. Army’s wartime operations. Each of the pages will include a brief overview of the commemorated event, a timeline listing significant component actions and providing a brief synopsis of each, and information about any related published works that the Center has produced or relevant archival material that it maintains. Much of the published and archival material will be available for download. A section of each posting

Continued on page 38
Steven C. Haack, who lives in Lincoln, Nebraska, has worked in the used and rare book trade for about twenty-five years and has assisted in an antique business for the past fifteen years. Trained in physics and mathematics at the University of Nebraska, he has published research on a variety of subjects including ancient astronomy, Egyptology, paleontology, and the history of the American West. During the last few years, he has supported efforts to locate and preserve the final resting place of the members of the 11th Kansas Cavalry killed near modern Casper, Wyoming.

Veterans John Buchanan, left, and John Crumb stand at the spot they identified as the burial site of the soldiers killed at the Battle of Red Buttes, September 1927.
Early travel along the Oregon Trail required little in the way of military security. Disease and accidents caused many more deaths than did hostile action on the part of Native Americans. As the impact of the trails on the land increased, however, this state of affairs changed. The summer of 1864 saw a sharp increase in hostilities with a number of deadly attacks along the trail in Nebraska. As vast as the Great Plains were, it appeared unlikely that whites and Native Americans could share the territory in peace. In June, the territorial governor of Colorado, John Evans, issued a proclamation requiring that bands wanting peace report to specific forts. There, they would be given provisions and assigned “places of safety.” The plan appeared to hold some promise as a number of Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands reported to Fort Lyon in the autumn and were sent to Sand Creek, forty miles northeast of the fort, to await the initiation of formal negotiations. However, on the morning of 29 November 1864, several companies of soldiers under Col. John Chivington attacked the camp without provocation. In the ensuing massacre, fifty-three Indian men and a hundred ten Indian women and children died, as did any hope of peace on the plains. Within weeks, thousands of Plains Indians were heading north, gathering strength as they went, and attacking settlements, Army posts, and ranches. The Overland Trail was closed to all but heavily escorted traffic. Despite the manpower demanded by the Civil War, the government found it necessary to assign more soldiers to service in the west. As the war abated in Missouri and Kansas, several Kansas regiments were reassigned to protect the routes across the prairies.

The 11th Kansas was formed in August and September 1862 as an infantry regiment. The unit fought alongside Indian and other Kansas regiments at Cane Hill and Prairie Grove in northwestern Arkansas in November and December 1862, contributing to those Union victories. It then moved back to Missouri, where its strength was depleted by disease over a particularly cold, wet winter. As a reward for its service, the unit was given horses and converted to a cavalry regiment in the summer of 1863. It spent the following year on patrol along the Kansas-Missouri state line, an area threatened by guerrilla forces supporting the Confederacy. In October 1864, the regiment engaged with other Union units in several battles with Confederate Maj. Gen. Sterling Price’s large force of mounted raiders, culminating in the Battle of Westport near Kansas City. This encounter marked the end of Price’s westward incursion and forced him to turn south. As Price retreated, the 11th protected Kansas border towns and joined in the pursuit of the enemy through southwestern Missouri and northwestern Arkansas, before halting at the Arkansas River below Fort Gibson, Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). The regiment returned to Kansas in December 1864.

With the Confederate threat to their state having largely evaporated and eight months remaining in their three-year enlistments, the men of the 11th Kansas Volunteer Cavalry Regiment were then ordered west to protect the trails and telegraph lines along the North Platte River. Leaving Fort Riley, Kansas, on 20 February 1865, they slogged through miserable weather to Fort Kearny in Nebraska Territory, then west to Julesburg, Colorado Territory, and northwest to Fort Laramie, Dakota Territory (now in Wyoming). Most of them did not stop until they reached Platte Bridge Station, an important river-crossing point located in what is now the west side of Casper, Wyoming, although the regiment left two companies at Deer Creek Station, thirty miles downstream. Two other companies were soon sent west to Sweetwater Station on the lower Sweetwater River, a tributary of the North Platte. The regimental headquarters was set up a few miles south of Platte Bridge Station. Named Camp Dodge, it stood guard over the road from the base of a mountain just to the south that carried the timber to be used for the construction of a stockade and a number of buildings on the right bank of the river at Platte Bridge.
Before the men could settle in, they were sent on an expedition. The hostilities of the past few months had convinced the Army that the passive tactic of escorting traffic and protecting structures should be supplemented with more aggressive action. This philosophy would be employed a number of times in 1865, but it was never very productive. Learning that an encampment of Cheyenne had been spotted near the Wind River Range in what is now western Wyoming, the commander of the 11th Kansas Cavalry, Col. Thomas Moonlight, rounded up five hundred soldiers. They set out on a search-and-destroy mission under the guidance of mountain guide Jim Bridger. Nothing went right. The horses, already weak from the long trek from Kansas, started to fail within a few days, and about half of them had to be walked back to the post. The closest the expedition came to the Indians was a trail that Bridger deemed to be a month old. Most of the water found was alkaline, and, with no spring growth as yet, the horses were forced to subsist on dry sage and continued to deteriorate. On the return trip, Bridger lost his bearings and led them up a blind canyon. The men finally straggled into Sweetwater Station, some fifty miles to the west of Platte Bridge, on 14 May. The expedition had been an utter failure.

Back at Platte Bridge Station, new construction was under way. The Army expected 1865 to be a violent season along the Oregon Trail. The string of posts on the road between Fort Laramie and South Pass had thus far been lightly guarded, with outposts generally consisting of a few ramshackle buildings to house telegraph operations and perhaps a sutler store. Improvements designed to accommodate about one hundred soldiers were now ordered at each. Platte Bridge Station had been just a couple of adobe huts at the south end of the bridge, but construction in May and June would add barracks, storehouses, and a kitchen, as well as a stockade to protect the horses. Operations at the bridge slowed, however, in mid-June, when Brig. Gen. Patrick E. Connor, commander of the Army’s District of the Plains, ordered five companies of the 11th Kansas Cavalry south to Fort Halleck, Dakota Terri-

On the return trip, Bridger lost his bearings and led them up a blind canyon.
tory, to patrol the Overland Trail. Only the regiment’s Company I and Band remained at Platte Bridge, and Camp Dodge was abandoned.5

John Friend of the 11th Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, one of a score of men of that unit at Platte Bridge, described the situation there after the departure of the five companies. “The garrison at Platte Bridge at that time was a one-company post built in the form of a square. The outside walls were fourteen feet high. The material used was pine logs about a foot in diameter. The outside walls projecting four feet above the roof. This projection or breastwork as the boys called it, was provided with loop holes for musketry. All doors and windows faced inside on the courtyard, the entrance to which was defended by two heavy gates. These were the only outside openings. The corral was on the east side of the buildings and adjoining. It was built of pine logs about a foot in diameter, securely pinned together, set on end three feet in the ground, projecting up ten feet. To gain entrance to the quarters it was necessary to pass through the corral, the entrance to which was secured by a heavy gate.”6

The bridge itself was quite an impressive structure that had been constructed in 1859 with $30,000 of private money and had benefited from the investment of almost an equal amount in maintenance over the next half-dozen years. It was a thousand feet long and rested on twenty-eight caissons that were filled with rock to secure them to the river bottom. It was employed as a toll bridge and typically charged $5 per wagon, but the price was reduced when low water levels made fords in the area passable.7

Life at the post was certainly spartan, with the men constantly struggling with a shortage of supplies and failing horses. However, the wilderness around them was not without its charms. Upon exploring the mountain south of Platte Bridge Station that formed the northern terminus of the Laramie Range, Pvt. James Kirkpatrick of Company B wrote, “The mountains are covered with rich forests of pine, cedar and fir and broken up by deep ravines and gulches, overhanging precipices and steep cliffs. Streams of bright clear cold water chase their way down these gulches forming little lakes in the chasms and rushing down steep precipices forming pretty cascades or cataracts. One of the water falls, about four miles from camp, is about fifty feet descent and is a most beautiful scene. Oh, how I have wished for Mrs. K with me in my rambles among the mountains, a visit to one of those little lakes surrounded by shady pine and fir, or to the cascade and seated under the huge cliff, watch the cold clear water rushing down the rocky steep, then climb the sides of the huge mountain to the top where we find beautiful grassy parks among the pines.”8

For the most part, though, there was little idyllic in the soldier’s daily life. In addition to poor rations and the many discomforts of living in the high desert, friction existed between the men and their commands. On 16 June, twenty-one members of Company I refused duty, and discipline was restored only after the arrests of the leaders. Tempers wore thin again on 17 July when about ninety men were sent off with a howitzer in pursuit of a band of Indians whose location had been reported on 25 June. Of course, nothing but an old trail was found. Sgt. Isaac B. “Jake” Pennock of Company I minced no words in his appraisal of the situation: “Fifty-five of our company, 24 from K, and some infantry at the station, start at one o’clock to Horse Creek with 8 Ohio Eleventh, and one howitzer, to surprise an Indian camp that was seen there about the 25th of June, and which I was satisfied left for the north, Powder or Wind Rivers, about the 4th of July, from personal knowledge. But now, 15 days after, ‘old fogie’ commanders send a party to surprise a camp that the rank and file know to have cleared out of the country for at least twelve or fifteen days, from having seen their trail at the time they were leaving, and also their rear men as they were going off.”9

In addition to their duties of patrolling and repairing the telegraph line, the soldiers were also charged with rendering any aid needed by passing emigrants. The threat posed by Native Americans hostile to travel through their homeland led authorities to hold traffic until the number of wagons was sufficient to enable the group to provide for its own protection. In some cases, these numbers were quite impressive. On 23 June, three hundred wagons pulled out of Fort Laramie headed for the gold fields of California, and a few days later a hundred eighty passed through on their way to Utah Territory. On 12 July, seventy-five wagons crossed the bridge headed north to Montana.10

While the trains were large enough to furnish their own security, the soldiers were often on hand to hear complaints of theft and pursue the miscreants.

The spring and early summer of 1865 were punctuated by a number of ambushes and engagements in which several soldiers were killed. Many raids targeted the Army’s mules and cattle. On 2 June, while patrolling the telegraph line to the west of the station, a detail of 11th Kansas Cavalry soldiers was surprised by a large contingent of warriors. In the ensuing skirmish, Pvt. Jesse Playford took an arrow to the neck. Pvt. William Henry Lord, a fellow member of Company I who had himself been wounded in the shoulder at the Battle of Westport, extracted the arrow for him, and the two men survived this as well as later ordeals. They were ultimately buried within a few feet of each other in the cemetery of Burlingame, Kansas.11

Clouds Gather to the North

Many of the warriors who headed northwest from the plains of Kansas and Colorado Territory in the wake of Sand Creek joined their brethren in winter camps along the Powder River. So massive was the resulting encampment that it was forced to move repeatedly in the spring of 1865 as its members quickly exhausted the resources in each location they chose. Throughout the spring, small groups of warriors peeled off the main group and headed south to harass travelers and gather firearms and livestock. As troublesome as this activity was to the soldiers on the North Platte River, the chiefs were in council planning a more impressive offensive.12
The United States military was certainly aware that trouble was brewing to the north, but it lacked knowledge of the enemy’s location and specific intentions. Lt. Col. William O. Collins of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, who was then commanding the Western Sub-District of the Military District of Nebraska, had confronted an estimated two thousand warriors at Rush Creek in the Nebraska panhandle in early February. He was prescient in his prediction that they were headed north to join forces with those in the Powder River region and even predicted that Platte Bridge Station would be particularly vulnerable. The military had also managed to recover Nancy Morton from captivity in early March. She had been taken the previous August at Plum Creek in Nebraska. On her return to the East, her party stopped at Fort Kearny. Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell, who commanded the District of Nebraska, reported to his superior, Maj. Gen. Grenville M. Dodge, commander of the Department of the Missouri, that “Mrs. Morton, lately bought from the Indians on Powder River, says the Indians are high up on the North Fork of Powder River, where they intend to leave their families for the summer for the purpose of making war on the Platte. She says the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brulé and Ogalalla [sic] Sioux, and Minneconjous are banded together and determined to make war to the knife.”

Dodge ordered General Connor to prepare for a major offensive into the territory north of the North Platte River. Dodge wanted the expedition to be in the field before the Indians’ ponies recovered from the high-plains winter and did everything he could to supply Connor with the men and material needed. Despite his best efforts, the project was beset by a myriad of troubles ranging from a shortage of road-worthy horses and mules to near mutinous troops eager to return home. The expedition would not enter hostile territory until August.

The spring and early summer saw intense activity in the river basins of northern Wyoming, and historians are fortunate to have a thorough account of this period written from the Native American viewpoint. George Bent, son of the famous trader on the upper Arkansas River William Bent and his Southern Cheyenne wife Owl Woman, was with the Indians in the Powder River region. He participated in the raiding that spring and in the major offensive of the summer. From 1904 until his death in 1918, he wrote approximately four hundred letters about his experiences to ethnologist and historian George E. Hyde. About thirty of these letters covered the events of 1865.

Bent had been wounded at Sand Creek and, after a few weeks of convalescence at his father’s ranch, had...
joined the mass of Indians headed north across the plains. He joined in Indian attacks at Julesburg and nearby Mud Springs in January and February 1865 and was among the warriors who traveled south to raid along the North Platte River in May and June. During one of these sorties, he and a companion performed a short reconnaissance of Platte Bridge Station from the hills across the river to the north. He wrote, “Next day, Young Wolf Chief and myself went up to the bridge to see what we could see. We had field glasses and could [see] over to their camp. The soldiers had stockade here at south end of the bridge and tents all around this stockade. In case of hard fighting soldiers could run to this stockade and fight behind it.”

Returning to the main camp, then located on Lodgepole Creek, Bent found that other raiding parties were coming in as well. “We were not the first ones that got in with mules. Our war party of Cheyennes had got in with plunder, big war party of Red Cloud Sioux had also got in with lot of horses and mules from Platte River east of Fort Laramie. Young Man Afraid of His Horses, war chief of the Siouxs came in with lot of plunder from Platte River with large party of Siouxs.” Old Man Afraid of His Horses and Red Cloud’s cousin American Horse also joined the native warriors planning vengeance upon the whites to the south.

As the various raiding parties returned to the Lodgepole Creek camp, they were told to remain there and prepare for a major military offensive that was to take place in late July. The council of chiefs had decided that the best place to attack was the bridge, where the wagons crossed the North Platte River and entered the Indians’ last remaining stronghold. Some of those wagons traveled west after crossing, but others ventured straight north on the Bozeman Trail. The bridge was to be destroyed, and, after the destruction of the post at its south end, the war party would move down the North Platte, taking each station in turn until they got to Fort Laramie. It was an ambitious plan.

Bent’s letters relate the intense activity surrounding the preparation.

The operation was of a scale unprecedented in the history of hostilities on the high plains. Bent writes of the arrangements: “All the ‘charms’ that are worn in battle must be fixed up, putting new feathers on war bonnets, shields, lances, scalp shirts and all the medicine charms. Those that got ready first rode out to the opening of the circle of the village ½ mile and waited until everybody got there. Each band formed in line. . . . Foolish Dogs took lead of all the bands. Dog Soldiers came last and behind everybody. Siouxs and Arapahoes took part also. These bands rode around inside of the circle of the village. The line must have been 2 miles long. Everybody was singing war songs.” The next morning, the war party, stretching for several miles, left camp. The Foolish Dogs warrior society was charged with policing the enormous party, urging stragglers ahead, and keeping eager young warriors from running out in front. The trek took three days.

The same day that the war party left Crazy Woman Creek, a party of about sixty soldiers left Platte Bridge Station, crossing the bridge and heading west. Forty members of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, a unit that had spent its entire Civil War service in the western territories, were moving to Sweetwater Station, about fifty miles to the west. Two dozen members of the 11th Kansas Cavalry led by Commissary Sgt. Amos J. Custard were escorting them to deliver five wagon loads of supplies. The Kansas men had made this trek several times during their service at the bridge. It was a two-day affair with a night spent near Willow Springs, roughly midway between the two stations.

Arriving at Sweetwater on 24 July, the Kansas men unloaded the supplies, and the next morning they started back for the bridge with three of the wagons. They set up camp at Willow Springs that evening unaware that it had been a very eventful day at Platte Bridge Station.

The Native American war party had arrived in the vicinity of the bridge that morning and set up camp behind the hills some six miles north of the sta-
tion. Wasting little time, they sent a small party of warriors down a creek bed that struck the North Platte a half mile east of the bridge. The soldiers called this Dry Creek, but its name was later changed to Casper Creek. Emerging from the creek bed, the Indians attacked the post’s horse herd, which had been taken over the bridge to graze on the bottomland just east of the bridgehead. The purpose of this action was not to take horses or attack the soldiers but to lure the cavalry into an ambush in the hills to the north.

The soldiers, in fact, saddled up, and about two dozen of them went in pursuit of the raiding party. However, they soon perceived the true nature of the operation and returned across the bridge. The numbers of Native Americans involved was typical of the raids the soldiers had dealt with over the past few months, and they were not, at this point, particularly alarmed. The Indians continued to demonstrate throughout the day, to no avail.

Late in the afternoon, the chiefs sent word to the warriors to return to camp. A number of them, unwilling to call off operations, decided to cross the river east of the bridge and attack the station’s beef herd. A mail wagon coming from Fort Laramie passed by at this time and its escort raised the alarm upon its arrival at the station. Thirty men saddled up and headed over to the herd. In the ensuing skirmish, they killed and scalped a Cheyenne chief, High Backed Wolf. Upon the soldiers’ return, Maj. Martin Anderson of the 11th Kansas Cavalry, now the commander at Platte Bridge Station, took an inventory of his men and ammunition. Each of the eighty able-bodied soldiers present had about twenty rounds of ammunition. The Indians had cut the telegraph wire to the east, making communication with Fort Laramie impossible. Still unaware of the magnitude of the forces in the hills to the north, Anderson was nonetheless concerned about the situation and ordered a group of men to start packing rifle rounds.

At 0200 on 26 July, ten soldiers on horseback came clattering over the bridge. Under the command of 1st Lt. Henry C. Bretney of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, they had arrived from Sweetwater Station en route to Fort Laramie on a payroll run. Bretney awakened Major Anderson. When Bretney had received the orders from Platte Bridge to proceed to Fort Laramie, he had apparently been apprised of the hostilities of the previous day. As his party passed through Willow Springs, they had attempted to persuade Sergeant Custard to have his contingent break camp and join Bretney’s group, hoping to reach Platte Bridge Station under cover of darkness. Custard refused, claiming the mules were tired and saying they would proceed as planned the next morning. Bretney recommended to Major Anderson that a detail be sent west to locate the Kansas men and escort them back to the bridge. Anderson saw no reason to launch such an effort in the middle of the night and told Bretney he would send an escort out the next morning.

One of the clearest descriptions of the events of 26 July 1865 would be recorded in 1882 by 1st Lt. William Y. Drew of Company I, 11th Kansas Cavalry. His description of the battle was serialized in five issues of a Kansas newspaper. His account is straightforward and concise, and it was written while he was still relatively young.

Drew does not indicate that he was particularly distressed by what he saw when he looked across the river on the morning of 26 July. “The next morning, as soon as we could distinguish objects, we scanned the surrounding country to see if we could find any of our last evening’s opponents. We did not make out any on our side of the river, but on the north side there were some moving about and others squatted on the hills. Altogether there seemed to be about ninety in sight, just about the number we had been fighting the day before.” However, to Pvt. John Friend, who had been among the men traveling from Sweetwater Station with Bretney, the sense of impending action was clear: “About sunrise we were awakened by Captain Bretney calling ’Come boys, get up
and hurry and get your breakfast. The hills are alive with Indians and Lieut. Collins is going to meet the train. It required no second calling for us to turn out and climb to the top of the quarters where we could get a view of the surrounding hills which were sure enough alive with Indians. The top of every ridge was black with the heads of the ‘noble red man.’ We spent but little time in viewing the situation, as we well knew from the numbers in sight there would be plenty of hard and sharp work before the day was over. A hurried repast was eaten, guns cleaned, cartridge boxes filled and every preparation made for action.”

Two dozen members of the 11th Kansas Cavalry, including five officers, were ordered to prepare to take part in the mission of finding and escorting the Custard party. With the end of their service imminent, awaiting only the arrival of the 6th Michigan Cavalry, then at Fort Laramie, the officers of the 11th Kansas at the post thought this a poor time for a dangerous mission, and all five of them claimed sickness. Thus it fell to 1st Lt. Caspar W. Collins of the 11th Ohio Cavalry, son of Lt. Col. William O. Collins, to lead the Kansas men across the bridge and up the road. He was not even assigned to Platte Bridge Station but had simply arrived there with the mail stage the previous evening en route from Fort Laramie to Sweetwater Station. He did not have a horse but was able to borrow one from the leader of the Kansas regiment’s band.

As the escort started across the bridge, men stationed on the rooftops of the post saw Indians in the ravines to the west of the station and in the creek bed to the east. Upon learning this, Major Anderson ordered more men to follow across the bridge on foot and hold the bridgehead in case the party was forced to return.

Turning west once across the bridge, Collins led the detail up the road. About a half mile from the bridge, he took the escort off the road to the right, mounting a rise that afforded a better view of the surrounding country. That he would venture up the road at all puzzled Bent, who observed the events from the hills to the north. “I always thought he must have seen some heads of Indians.”

About a mile up the road, the group passed between Indians hiding in the ravines just north of the river and groups of warriors concealed behind the hill north of the road. The attack was like nothing the soldiers had ever witnessed. Swarming in from both sides, an estimated two thousand warriors descended upon the party. Wheeling his men around, Collins ordered a retreat, and the detail, strung out as each man fought for his own life, headed back for the bridge. As this scene erupted, hundreds of warriors poured out of the creek bed to the east and ran for the bridge. Had it not been for the last-minute order to send more men over to hold the bridgehead, the Collins party would have been cut off from the bridge and annihilated. As it was, the soldiers there fell into a skirmish line and poured fire into the approaching mass, turning it back. The crush of warriors around Collins’ party was so great that the attackers were reluctant to shoot, for fear of striking their comrades. Rather, they attempted to bodily pull the men out of their saddles or strike them with lances and clubs.

Jake Pennock was among the Kansas soldiers who rode out with Collins that morning. His diary entry for the day begins, “Terrible day for our command, and no knowing how it will end.” Describing the attack, he wrote, “It appeared as though they sprung up out of the ground. . . . Death was approaching on every side in its most horrible form—that of the tomahawk and scalping knife of the Indians. We turned and charged into the thickest of them, drawing our pistols and doing the best we could. It was a terrible ordeal to go through. It was really running the gauntlet for dear life.” Astonishingly, all but five members of Collins’ party managed to return to the bridge. Collins, however, was among those killed. A soldier had lost his mount and cried out for help. Collins had turned around to rescue him when an arrow found him.

**The attack was like nothing the soldiers had ever witnessed.**
The men at the post now saw what they were up against. Their past experience had been with raiding parties of a few dozen warriors. When going out on patrol, the soldiers generally felt safe if their group numbered twenty or more. Rarely would a party of that size be attacked, as the Indians preferred to target small groups or isolated individuals. The force arrayed before them on 26 July was an order of magnitude larger than any party they had dealt with before. They set to work throwing up breastworks and securing the periphery of the post as best they could. Low on ammunition and without telegraphic communication, their situation was dire. A call then went up that the wagon train was crossing the saddle gap five miles to the west, where the trail mounted a rise between two hills.35

Custard’s contingent had left Wil- low Springs that morning. A few miles before it reached the saddle gap, the group met some Ohio soldiers who had dug breastworks across the neck of a small peninsula on the river and taken refuge there, aware that a large war party was in the area. The Ohioans informed Custard of the dangers ahead and invited his group to join forces with them. Unimpressed by their concerns, Custard told them that his men had just whipped the rebels and that it would take more than a bunch of Indians to intimidate them.36 He forged on along the road and up the steep western side of the saddle gap. It was customary to rest the mules at this point, but the sight which lay before them made them take immediate action. Cpl. James Shrader, a member of the party, would later write, “As we raised to the top of the hill the whole country appeared to be covered with Indians in front and to our left. Custard and I soon saw it was fight or surrender, and the latter was never thought of with Indians.”37

Taking the wagons off the road to their right, they made a mad dash over the broken ground, attempting to get to the river where they could set up a defensive position with the river to their backs. They got to within about a quarter mile of the river when the first wave of warriors struck. Unable to reach a small rise to which Shrader tried to direct them, the wagoneers swung about and set up a hasty, desperate defense. Shrader and four others were out in front of the wagons and were cut off from them. They ran down a ravine to the river and plunged into the water. One man was killed as they emerged on the south bank, and another, 23-year-old Pvt. Edwin Summers, soon panicked and urged his horse south toward the mountain. Shrader last saw him alive being chased by five warriors. While still near the bank of the river, one of the soldiers shot and killed Left Hand, brother of the famous Northern Cheyenne warrior Roman Nose, another participant in the battle.

The three remaining Kansans abandoned their horses and worked their way past ravines and sparse stands of vegetation toward the fort. They spent
some time recovering in a cave in the riverbank, not knowing if the station itself had been taken. When they finally ventured out, men at the post spotted them and sent out an escort to bring them in.38

The Indians had the wagon train surrounded soon after it stopped. The soldiers managed to hold their attackers off for a few hours, but the end was inevitable. No help would be coming from Platte Bridge Station. Though a number of men approached Major Anderson urging him to allow them to go out in a force of forty or fifty to relieve the train, he considered such an act foolhardy.39 Any force large enough to survive the onslaught would have left the station virtually unprotected. He denied permission to launch any rescue attempt, and the men could only watch from the rooftops of the station until smoke rising from the burning wagons told them that the fight was over. All of the twenty soldiers at the train were killed. This fight would become known as the Battle of Red Buttes, despite the fact that the geologic feature of that name lay some six miles to the west. While the Indians were occupied at the wagon train, Major Anderson sent a detail to the east to find and repair the break in the telegraph line, but it came under attack and made a disorganized retreat, losing a man in the process.40

The Indians, satisfied by the destruction of the wagons, did not renew their hostilities at the bridge and simply returned to their camp six miles to the north. The night passed at the station with little sleep. Major Anderson paid two Snake Indians who lived on the post to make their way east to Deer Creek Station and request relief. They made it through, and a heavily armed party of sixty men of Company K, 11th Kansas Cavalry, immediately set out on a forced march. They arrived about noon on 27 July. By then, however, the Indians were gone. Despite their overwhelming numbers, they appear to have sustained unacceptable losses. Drew writes that reports came in later indicating that sixty warriors had been killed and over a hundred wounded.41

Of course, the soldiers did not know if the enemy had withdrawn from the region. They had no dependable source of information on the war party’s location or intentions. The overwhelming force had appeared without warning the morning Lieutenant Collins rode out, and there was no reason to believe it could not happen again. Were the Indians just replenishing themselves for a few days to strike once again? On 31 July, Sergeant Pennock wrote, “Saw two Indians below camp a couple miles. The herd was brought in immediately. Succor must come soon; this suspense is terrible.” The next day he wrote, “Our ammunition is very short; but a few rounds.” It was a relief that afternoon when word came that the telegraph line was again working. “The joyful tick, tick, tick put a glad smile on every face.”42

Despite the soldiers’ concern, the grand operation had, in fact, been called off. The Indians had fielded overwhelming numbers of warriors to no avail. The scale of the effort was far beyond their traditional practice, and the more complex chain of command, involving a number of different warrior societies and chiefs, had led to chaos on the field of battle. Organizing a large contingent of warriors to act in concert was quite difficult, as they traditionally acted autonomously, with each warrior seeking to demonstrate his prowess to his peers. The Native Americans may also have been unprepared logistically for a long-term operation. The thousands of horses they brought would have quickly exhausted the meager ground cover of the area, and the men themselves would not have been sustained by what little game they could have found.

Also, the river was running quite high and only a few warriors ventured across. Bent implies that the plan had been to cross the river in large numbers and attack the post from its lightly defended south side.43 As it was, they ended up having to attack the more easily defended bridgehead.

On the morning of 27 July, the Indians stood on the hills across the river in a final show of force and then, with seeming reluctance, broke into small groups and headed off in different directions.44 Most of them rode back north to the main encampment, but others went up or down the North Platte River, making war on a scale with which they were more familiar.

The bodies of Lieutenant Collins and the men killed with him were recovered and buried at the post cemetery across the river from Platte Bridge Station. Collins was soon disinterred and sent home to Ohio. The rest of
the soldiers at the post cemetery were removed in 1899 and reinterred at Fort D. A. Russell, now Warren Air Force Base, at Cheyenne, Wyoming. 45

A burial detail finally ventured out on 29 July to the site of the wagon train battle. The men dug a trench and laid to rest their comrades’ bodies, which had been mutilated and then exposed to the hot sun for three days. Several accounts of this grim task exist, detailing the horrible sight that met the group and the dignity with which the men went about burying their comrades. All the bodies had been scalped, but the scalps themselves were discarded about the site, an act interpreted by Drew as indicating that the victory came at too high a price for the Indians to exult. Drew concludes his article with a short tribute to the dead soldiers, next to whom he had served for almost three years. He ends with the simple words, “Peace be to their ashes.” While the burial party worked at the mass grave, Corporal Shrader was south of the river. He managed to locate the body of Edwin Summers and buried him where he fell, picking out a shallow grave in the hard, rocky soil. 46

On 2 August 1865, the 6th Michigan Cavalry arrived at Platte Bridge Station, and the next day the men of the 11th Kansas Cavalry began their long trek home. They were discharged in September. 47

The completion of the transcontinental railroad changed the pattern of westward migration, rendering the posts along the North Platte River of little use. Maj. Gen. John Pope, who had become the commander of the Department of the Missouri, changed the name of Platte Bridge Station in November 1865 to Fort Caspar in honor of Caspar Collins. The post was decommissioned in 1867 and promptly burned by the Indians. The region remained thinly populated until a rail spur came to the area in 1882 and the streets of Casper, Wyoming Territory, were platted. (A clerical error left the town with a different spelling than the fort.) Located in an arid region that endured harsh winters, the town grew slowly, sustained by the cattle and sheep operations in the area. This state of affairs changed when, in the second decade of the twentieth century, a number of companies began to seriously exploit the region’s oil reserves, which had been known to exist in the form of natural oil seeps since the old trail days. Midwest Refining was one of the oil concerns headquartered in Casper. In 1919, that company brought Robert Spurrer Ellison to serve on its legal staff there. A native of Indiana who had spent several years representing the legal interests of railroads in Colorado, Ellison would eventually become the company’s vice president. Active in the civic life of Casper, he was a man of broad interests and a collector of art and books who would eventually amass one of the country’s finest private libraries of Western Americana. 48

In June 1924, Ellison contacted the prominent octogenarian photographer and late-budding artist William Henry Jackson to ask about an early Jackson portfolio he had recently acquired. Jackson responded immediately and observed that he had memories of crossing the Platte Bridge in 1866. Thus began a long and fruitful correspondence between the two men. Jackson had passed over the same section of the Oregon Trail
again in 1870 and recalled that “both years I noted particularly the fearful steepness of the jump-off from the top of the hill and the necessity of rough-locking all the wheels of our wagons in making the descent.”

In the course of the next few years, Ellison and Jackson’s friendship grew, and Jackson visited Casper in 1927. Ellison suggested to Jackson that he create paintings of Platte Bridge, as he remembered it, and the battles of July 1865 as well, going so far as to supply him with photographs of the terrain around both of the battle sites to ensure the geographical accuracy of Jackson’s renderings.

Around the same time, Ellison tracked down some surviving veterans who had served at Platte Bridge Station. Although now advanced in age, a number of them responded with recollections of the adventures of their youth. Among them was James Shrader, one of the three members of the wagon train who escaped the attack and survived the battle. After his discharge from the Army, Shrader had returned to his home in Oskaloo-sa, Kansas. He was now in his eighties, a widower living with a daughter and her husband after retirement from a life of farming. After exchanging many letters with Ellison, Shrader traveled with his daughter and son-in-law by automobile to Casper to meet the Wyoming attorney. On 14 July 1926, almost sixty-one years after the battle, Shrader and Ellison headed a small party to explore the vicinity of the attack. Traveling to the west of Casper, they picked up the old trail and headed back east, attempting to replicate the course of the wagon train. The erosion of both land and memory complicated the venture, and Shrader was unable to locate the battlefield with any certainty.

That night, the two men planned their activities for the next day, and Shrader expressed an interest in exploring the land south of the river. His reasoning was that, if he could locate the place he buried Edwin Summers, he ought to be able to backtrack to the spot they crossed the river. The next morning found them working their way among the ravines on the south side of the North Platte River, alternately driving and walking. At one point, they asked a couple of local men if they were aware of any graves found in the area, and one of them indicated that his father had located human skeletal material when they were clearing rocks from a field. He took them to the site, and Shrader was certain that it was where he had buried Summers. Walking north to the riverbank, Shrader saw a ravine striking the river on the opposite bank and identified it as the ravine down which the men had escaped as the Indians attacked the wagon train. Returning to the car, the men drove around to the north side of the river and located the ravine.

Members of the Interior Department survey of the Rocky Mountain region led by geologist and paleontologist Ferdinand V. Hayden, seated in center at rear of table, gather for the noon meal at Red Buttes, Wyoming Territory, on 24 August 1870. The image’s photographer, William Henry Jackson, stands at far right, and noted landscape artist Sanford R. Gifford sits at far left.
Shrader at last had his bearings. This was, indeed, the right ravine, and the battlefield lay at its head. Researchers have long been aware of Ellison’s written record of Shrader’s visit, but my discovery in the archives of Brigham Young University in 2007 of photographs taken during the reconnaissance has helped to pinpoint the locations described in that account. The following year, two more veterans came out to Casper by train from the Soldiers Home in Leavenworth County, Kansas. John Crumb, who had also exchanged correspondence with Ellison, was accompanied by John Buchanan, who served in the burial detail that performed its grim task at the site of the wagon train fight. Both men had been privates in Company I, 11th Kansas Cavalry, and by early 1865 Crumb was a corporal. Their 1927 visit to Casper coincided with one by William Henry Jackson, and he accompanied the party as it explored west of Casper. Ellison’s account of their explorations is unclear, and tracing their route is difficult. However, we are again assisted by the photographic record in the Ellison Collection at Brigham Young University. The men believed that they located the grave. Although the background offers but a meager selection of landmarks, a montage of the horizon can be assembled from the various photographs taken that afternoon, yielding a good lead as to its location.

Over the next few years, Ellison entertained thoughts of having the veterans return for more exploration, possibly having the three of them there together to compare memories and define the battlefield with more certainty. However, time soon took its toll. Shrader died in 1929 and Crumb in 1932. Ellison, however, maintained an active interest in the battlefield and the lost burial site. In 1928, he wrote to Jackson that an old wagon part had been located a few hundred feet south-east of the place Crumb and Buchanan had picked as the gravesite. In 2008, I observed the recovery of a few wagon parts surrounded by charcoal about two hundred feet southeast of the point that a close inspection of the
1927 photographs indicates was the spot the veterans indentified as the burial site.  

Because these graves were never permanently marked, they are apparently not protected. Unfortunately, the site is now threatened by rapidly encroaching development. One would think that the twenty U.S. soldiers buried there in so humble a manner after so great a sacrifice would deserve better. “Peace be to their ashes.”

Notes


6. Ibid., p. 212; “Account of the Platte Bridge Fight Written by John C. Friend,” folder 18, box 2, William Oliver Collins and Family Papers, WH 73, Western History Collection, Denver Public Library.


10. Ibid., entries for 23 June, 28 June, 12 July 1865.


12. Ltr, George Bent to George Hyde, 12 Oct 1905, George Bent Papers, Western Americana Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (hereinafter cited as George Bent Papers).


16. George Bent’s friendship with General E. Hyde lasted until Bent’s death in 1918. From the approximately 340 letters Bent wrote to him, Hyde wrote Bent’s story. Unfortunately, he failed at that point to find an interested publisher and finally sold a substantial portion of the manuscript to the Denver Public Library in 1930 for a few hundred dollars. There it languished until in 1966 when Hyde informed Savoe Lottinville, director of the University of Oklahoma Press, of its existence. Hyde also sent Lottinville a more complete, if less legible, draft, which had lain in his Omaha attic all that time. Lottinville collated these materials and published the result in 1968 under the title Life of George Bent Written from His Letters (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), providing an account of the book’s gestation on pp. xv–xix.

17. Ltr, Bent to Hyde, 11 May 1906, George Bent Papers.


19. Bent writes that “criers went around saying no more war parties would be allowed to start out again. Time was drawing for big war party to start. Foolish Dog soldiers were selected to act as police to see that no war parties started out. Small war parties were even not allowed to start out.” Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The story of the wagon train trip to Sweetwater and back is told in many sources, including Ltr, Henry C. Bretney, son of Lieutenant Bretney, to Alfred J. Mokler, a Casper historian, 27 Jan 1936, folder 1, box 1, Robert S. Ellison, Walter M. Camp Papers, WH-1702, Western History Collection, Denver Public Library.


24. Ibid.

25. Statement of Crazy Head, 10 Sep 1908, George Grinnell Notebook 348 (1908), MS 5, George Bird Grinnell Collection, Braun Research Library, Southwest Museum of the American Indian, Los Angeles, Calif.


27. Ltr, Bretney to Mokler, 27 Jan 1936.

29. “Account of the Platte Bridge Fight Written by John C. Friend.” Friend gave his account after the war, and he undoubtedly referred to Bretny as a captain because Bretny had achieved that rank in September 1865. See McDermott, Circle of Fire, p. 173.


31. Ibid.

32. Ltr, Bent to Hyde, 11 May 1906.


34. Ibid.; Pennock, “Diary of Jake Pennock,” entry for 26 July 1865, quote; George Bent’s hand-drawn map of the battle, sent to George Hyde on 22 May 1906, in folder 11, box 1, Bent-Hyde Papers, Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder. For a detailed discussion of this and another map of the battle, see Haack, “This Must Have Been a Grand Sight,” pp. 8–11, 20.


42. Pennock, “Diary of Jake Pennock,” entries for 31 July and 1 August 1865.

43. George Bent commented, “The river was very high. The Indians intended to rush across the river but could not do so on account of the river being up.” See Ltr, Bent to Hyde, 12 Oct 1905, George Bent Papers.

44. A news account stated, “At daybreak, hundreds of the enemy were seen standing on the north side of the river, but appear more quiet and passionless. The number in view increased, until the forces of yesterday appeared to be all purposely shown to us in a grand parade. Thus they stood until about 11 A.M. when slowly and reluctantly they moved off in small squads, till all were gone.” See Gene Wilson, “Indian Fights and Atrocities,” Daily Times (Leavenworth, Kansas), 30 Aug 1865.


50. Ellison, “Locating the Red Buttes Indian Fight Site.”

51. Ibid.

52. Robert Spurrier Ellison Photo Collection, MSS P-115, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Harold B. Lee Library, Brigham Young University.


55. Ellison wrote, “I am sure it will interest you to know that while riding on my usual Sunday morning horseback trip yesterday, our friend Colvin who lives on the Trevett ranch gave me the axel sleeve of an old style wagon he recently found a few hundred feet southeast of the place picked by Crumb when we were looking for the Red Buttes site last September.” See Ltr, Ellison to Jackson, 23 Jul 1928, folder 21, box 2, Robert S. Ellison, Walter M. Camp Papers, Western History Collection, Denver Public Library.

56. A representative of the Army’s Human Resources Command explained, “because the graves were never permanently marked (a common practice) I don’t believe the graves are protected.” See E-mail, Lt Col Thomas Cross, U.S. Army Human Resources Command, to author, 25 Jun 2010, author’s files.
Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory

By Mark T. Calhoun
Military thought reflects the influence of contemporary intellectual trends. One can, therefore, achieve a deeper understanding of a military theorist’s ideas by studying them within the broader context that influenced their development. Our comprehension of the influential ideas about military matters offered in the early nineteenth century by Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz is particularly enhanced by an examination of the intellectual milieu in which they evolved. While Jomini’s Art of War traces its lineage to the French Enlightenment, Clausewitz’s On War reveals the influence of a German intellectual movement that built upon but signiﬁcantly departed from the core ideas of Enlightenment thinkers. As a result, these two military theorists, despite sharing similar backgrounds as career military professionals during the Napoleonic era, arrived at highly dissimilar viewpoints on the nature and characteristics of military conﬂict.

This topic holds particular relevance within the professional military education system, in which instructors often describe Clausewitz and Jomini as two sides of the same coin. In the typical approach, students learn that each man derived his ideas from the experience of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, developing different but complementary military theory. This narrative depicts Clausewitz’s ideas as relevant today mainly at the intersection of policy and strategy, while Jomini’s—still extant in the form of most modern military’s doctrinal “principles of war”—hold enduring truths relating to operational art and tactics. However, this standard interpretation fails to address a more basic question that one must answer before fully understanding either theorist’s ideas—whether these men’s concepts qualify as military theory, or represent something else entirely.

One must approach a comparison of Jomini and Clausewitz with caution. Contrary to the manner in which many depict them today, these theorists’ ideas contain such signiﬁcant differences that they resist evaluation according to a common framework. Nevertheless, modern students of military theory may beneﬁt from a deliberate comparison of the purpose, structure, and key assertions of these authors’ most important works, Jomini’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s On War. Such a comparison illustrates the fallacy of presenting their writings as two examples of military theory that differ only in terms of scope or relevance. The following analysis demonstrates that these works instead represent very different forms of military thought, based on fundamentally opposed intellectual foundations.

**Background**

Clausewitz and Jomini each developed their ideas while serving as ofﬁcers in the armies of the Napoleonic Wars, but their military careers progressed along highly dissimilar paths. Clausewitz enlisted in the Prussian Army as a twelve-year-old ofﬁcer cadet in 1792 and saw his ﬁrst combat one year later while serving with the First Coalition against France. His military service was lengthy and continuous, spanning from 1792 until his death in 1831. Clausewitz did not begin to study and write military theory, however, until his enrollment in 1801 at the Berlin Institute in the Military Sciences. He therefore built his theoretical efforts on a foundation of ten years’ prior active service in the army of his homeland.

Jomini began his military career in 1798 at the age of nineteen, when he used personal connections to gain employment as secretary to the minister of war of the newly established Helvetic Republic. Jomini left this post in 1801 and spent the next three years working in the Paris ﬁnancial markets. While in Paris, Jomini read the works of the leading eighteenth-century military thinkers and in 1802 began writing a didactic essay on the fundamental principles of war. However, upon reading Heinrich von Bülow’s Geist des neueren Kriegs-systems (Spirit of the Modern System of War), which had appeared in a French translation in 1801, Jomini’s dissatisfaction with his own ﬁrst manuscript led him to throw it into the ﬁre. Starting over, he published in 1804 and 1805 the ﬁrst two volumes of a series intended to support his didactic theorizing by comparing the campaigns of Frederick the Great to those of the French Revolution. These historical works enabled Jomini to cultivate a reputation as a military thinker and in 1805 to secure a post on the staff of Marshal Michel Ney, one of Napoleon’s senior lieutenants. Thus began Jomini’s lengthy career as a staff ofﬁcer, ﬁrst in the French and later in the Russian Army.
Two implications arise from the differences in the early stages of Clausewitz and Jomini’s careers as soldiers and theorists. The first of these is the impact on their motivation for writing military theory. Although Clausewitz focused his early writings on the need for governmental and military reform after Prussia’s defeat in 1806, he demonstrated from the beginning a more fundamental interest in the phenomenon of war itself. After the fall of Napoleon, Clausewitz shifted his primary research interest from Prussian military organization to the development of a general theory of war. This project consumed much of his time and intellectual effort between 1818 and 1830 while administering the General War College in Berlin. There he wrote the work that his widow Marie would posthumously publish as *On War*.4

By contrast, Jomini’s initial efforts as a military theorist preceded his active service. He secured and maintained his postings as a staff officer on the strength of his intellectual reputation. In contrast to Clausewitz’s desire to discern the fundamental nature of war, Jomini’s primary motivation appears to have been “a frantic scramble to succeed by making an impression on some key man.”5 Put simply, Jomini’s success as a military professional relied on the widespread acceptance of his ideas. For more than fifty years, Jomini focused on arguing for and later defending their validity. This resulted in the publication of a dizzying number and assortment of books, including reprints, updates, and, in some cases, the same book merely published under a different title or volume number.6

During the years he spent postulating his military views, Jomini also developed a distinct intellectual inflexibility and an intolerance of criticism. As a result, the central characteristics of Jomini’s ideas remained consistent from the publication of his first two volumes in 1804 through the completion in 1838 of his capstone work, the *Art of War*, which he continued to defend until his death in 1869. While many of Jomini’s works examined recent military history, his first and last writings in particular focused on his theory of war. As John Alger puts it, “Jomini’s writings present a startling symmetry, for he ended very nearly at the place where he began.” Jomini even arranged to promote the immutability of his principles after his death, having his biographer Ferdinand Lecomte publish an edited version of Jomini’s *Art of War* in 1894. Near the end of his life, Jomini had asked Lecomte to write a supplement to Jomini’s treatise to support his view that new technologies would not alter the principles of war he had offered many years before. The intransigence with which Jomini defended his claims contrasts with decades of evidence demonstrating their variance with reality.

The second implication of the two men’s different backgrounds is that of divergent perspectives. Jomini’s early study of contemporary military theory, uninformed by any practical experience in war, led to his understanding of warfare as a fundamentally simple phenomenon that, like any other science, conformed to universal principles. Jomini claimed to have identified those principles and found an audience in early nineteenth-century Europe hungry for just this kind of formulaic approach to military theory.6 Witnessing the ever-increasing scale and devastation of war, readers drew comfort in Jomini’s simple explanations and assurances. By contrast, Clausewitz’s early experience of combat and his struggle to identify the various causes of his beloved Prussia’s demise resulted in his view of war as a complex and unpredictable phenomenon. Over the following three decades, Clausewitz grew even more convinced that the only universal truths about war lay in its staggering complexity. Any principles of war one might discern served only to identify broad generalities, none of which consistently held true in the fog and friction of actual combat. It is difficult to imagine how the motivations and perspectives of two military thinkers could have differed more fundamentally than did those of Jomini and Clausewitz. While their different motivations stemmed largely from their unique personal circumstances, one must analyze the intellectual climate within which each man worked to understand how they developed such divergent outlooks on war.

**Intellectual Traditions**

Jomini and Clausewitz formed their perspectives on warfare within the context of distinctly different intellectual traditions. Jomini’s thinking epitomizes the Enlightenment, an eighteenth-century movement of philosophers and scientists united in the belief that man could, through proper application of the faculty of reason, fully understand the universe and its diverse phenomena. Influenced by the dramatic achievements of contemporary scientists and mathematicians, practitioners of many diverse disciplines sought to apply scientific methods to explain and predict the behavior of the natural world. Enlightenment-inspired military theorists and historians Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–1780), Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert (1743–1790), Henry Humphrey Evans Lloyd (1718–1783), each of whom served in the French Army, and Adam Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–1807), a Prussian officer, believed that the study of history could reveal universal principles of warfare in much the same way that mathematical analysis revealed the secrets of physics. The most provocative of these theorists, perhaps, was Bülow, who built upon the ideas of his predecessors while simultaneously seeking to discredit them by providing a mathematically precise tactical system. He argued that his theories could offer the key to victory by enabling scientific prediction of the outcome before armies engaged in battle. These theorists provided useful analysis of tactical issues such as the relative strengths of line and column formation and the optimal locations of bases of supply relative to movement routes. However, while their claims of scientific methodology served as their strongest attraction to contemporary Enlightenment thinkers, these assertions did not appear convincing during the international conflicts spawned by the French Revolution, when their theories failed to anticipate or explain the dramatic changes in warfare that unfolded.7

Unlike most of his Enlightenment-influenced predecessors, Jomini developed his theories after the upheavals
A martial portrait of King Frederick the Great of Prussia by Antoine Pesne, before 1758
spawned by the French Revolution, sparing him the difficulty of adapting a previous body of work to the radically changed nature of warfare. He also avoided continuing the trend of developing increasingly complex geometric systems of warfare. Nevertheless, Jomini built his theoretical approach on the foundations established by Enlightenment thought, leading to a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach. In the spirit of his age, Jomini aimed to identify the universal principles central to the art of war and claimed to have discerned them in his study of the campaigns of King Frederick the Great of Prussia, who reigned from 1740 to 1772. Jomini focused on Frederick’s practice of striking a fraction of the enemy’s army with all of his forces.

Frederick’s practice of striking a fraction of the enemy’s army with all of his forces is a fundamental principle that Jomini aimed to identify and universalize. Jomini built his theoretical approach on the foundations established by Enlightenment thought, leading to a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach. In the spirit of his age, Jomini aimed to identify the universal principles central to the art of war and claimed to have discerned them in his study of the campaigns of King Frederick the Great of Prussia, who reigned from 1740 to 1772. Jomini focused on Frederick’s practice of striking a fraction of the enemy’s army with all of his forces.

Focusing on the inherent complexity of nature and argued that it could not be explained by a Newtonian scientific model. Romantics like Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling saw nature’s phenomena as endlessly diverse and man’s relationship to nature as constantly changing. A historical approach to understanding human reality evolved, in which all comprehension was seen as the subjective result of the dynamics of one’s particular time and place. These and other trends in German science and philosophy led to a conviction among leading German intellectuals that reality does not conform to universal laws or principles. Building on these challenges to Enlightenment thought, “A German cultural self-awareness emerged in reaction against French intellectual imperialism, and developed, in response to Napoleonic political imperialism, in a clear political direction with a strong emphasis on the primacy of the state.”

Clausewitz began to think about the phenomenon of war and the future welfare of his native Prussia in the midst of this intellectual transformation. He thus saw the world in a wholly different light than the Enlightenment-inspired thinkers who had dominated military theory up to that time. Clausewitz’s formal military education began in 1801 when, at the age of twenty-one, he gained admittance to the military institute in Berlin. There, his intellectual development commenced in earnest. Clausewitz benefited in particular from the influence of the school’s director, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who encouraged his interest in military theory while instilling in him the conviction that theory must stand up to the test of reality. Scharnhorst was a pragmatic thinker who stressed the interrelationship of military campaigns with the social and political circumstances surrounding them.

Scharnhorst’s pragmatism and relativist approach greatly influenced Clausewitz’s thinking, but Clausewitz remained convinced of the feasibility of developing a general theory of war. However, unlike Enlightenment-inspired thinkers, he rejected the notion that there was a single theory that could reduce war to a mere mathematical exercise or provide immutable principles that would guarantee victory. Rather, it would illuminate war’s universal characteristics while allowing for the unique patterns of events that characterized each particular war. In his efforts to understand the phenomenon of war, Clausewitz built upon his foundation in the emerging German intellectual trends through intensive study of history, mathematics, and philosophy. This convinced him of the requirement to test military theory against practical reality and to account for the influence of both the physical and psychological factors prevalent in war.

Jomini and Clausewitz thus developed fundamentally opposed world views, shaped by the differing perspectives and intellectual traditions that influenced their thinking. Jomini held true to Enlightenment tradition when creating his system of universal principles. Clausewitz, by contrast, saw any attempt to reduce the complex phenomenon of war to a simple system of universal principles as an exercise in futility, although he did believe in the value of generalization at some level. While their theorizing may appear similar on the surface, comparison of the purpose and form of their treatises and the key ideas they contained demonstrates the substantial differences that resulted from their conflicting world views.

**Comparing Clausewitz’s *On War* and Jomini’s *Art of War***

**Purpose**

After providing a survey of war, diplomacy, and policy in the first two chapters of the *Art of War*, Jomini moves to the central purpose of this work, stating “It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war,—a principle which must be followed in all good combinations.” Jomini then immediately provides a list of four maxims that make up this overarching principle. One thus finds when reading Jomini that even seemingly simple principles consist of a set of subordinate tenets, each of which Jomini further subdivides and qualifies in subsequent sections of the treatise. This is true even when Jomini himself refers to his “one great principle.” The four maxims that embrace Jomini’s “one great principle” are the following:

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the
hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.16

Jomini concedes that the simplicity of this principle will invite criticism, but he assures his readers that he will describe fully its key elements in the succeeding chapters, and pronounces that a student who, after reading the Art of War, cannot understand how to determine the decisive points “may well despair of ever comprehending strategy.”17

This central principle, divided into four parts, therefore contains the essential elements of Jominian thought, although Jomini does revisit and expand upon each separate part in later sections of the work. Further, this principle demonstrates that in 1838 Jomini still saw war as a phenomenon subject to the application of a simple overarching principle, a formula for victory made up of several supporting principles, elements, and maxims. The Art of War is his textbook, and it will reveal the secret of victory to his students—if only they are able to understand and apply his system of principles.

Clausewitz argues that a system of principles and rules fails to account for “the endless complexities involved” in war and therefore results in theoretical constructs that bear little resemblance to the actual practice of war.18 Clausewitz sets out to correct this error in On War by taking a new approach to military theory. He begins by identifying the difficulties involved in developing a theory of war, to determine if, given the failure of other theorists’ attempts, this is even possible. As U.S. Army War College professor Antulio Echevarria points out, Clausewitz determined that several key challenges limit the feasibility of formulating a theory of war.19

The first challenge results from the influence of psychological forces such as hostility, danger, and the intellectual qualities of the commander. These forces interact in unpredictable ways, leading to “the disproportionate part assigned to the play of probability and chance” that frustrates any attempt to calculate their overall effect on the outcome. A second challenge lies in war’s inherently interactive nature. Here Clausewitz points out that no independent variables exist in war—no action occurs in isolation because each action will result in a positive reaction. Due to this complex process of interaction, a theory of general principles cannot account for all the possible responses ensuing from the unique judgments and talents each combatant applies to the conflict, as “the very nature of interaction is bound to make it unpredictable.” Clausewitz sees a third challenge in the unreliability of information in war, a result of the many unobservable actions taken by the various participants. As Clausewitz puts it, most of the action in war takes place “in a kind of twilight”; no principle can account for the resulting uncertainty. Since one can never be certain of the reliability of information, “once again for lack of objective knowledge one has to trust to talent or to luck.”20

Clausewitz concludes that these three challenges make a theory in the form of a positive doctrine or model impossible to construct and that they demonstrate that “talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with practice.” Rather than giving up on his quest for a general theory of war, however, Clausewitz overcomes these problems by fundamentally redefining military theory. Rather than a manual for action, it is a framework of inquiry, a means to study and grow familiar with the recurring patterns of military actions.
Based on this insight, Clausewitz's purpose is to develop a theory that will serve as a guide to the student of war that will "light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls."21

Thus, Clausewitz's intent in writing his theory differs significantly from that of Jomini. Jomini sought to simplify war through a system of principles that would reveal the key to victory in all cases. By contrast, Clausewitz perceived that war's inherent complexity drives its participants to act outside any system of rules. He therefore strove to provide a framework within which to study and embrace the phenomenon of war itself. In Clausewitz's view, his theory would be successful "if it helps the commander acquire those insights that, once absorbed into his way of thinking, will smooth and protect his progress, and will never force him to abandon his convictions for the sake of any objective fact."22 In short, Clausewitz and Jomini each expressed their intended aim in developing their military theory, revealing fundamental differences in what they sought to achieve.

**Form**

The form of *On War* and the *Art of War* reflects the differing purposes for which Clausewitz and Jomini developed their ideas. Describing strategy as "the art of making war upon the map," Jomini focuses his discussion as "the art of making war upon the map," Jomini focuses his discussion of strategy primarily on the application of military principles to the actual conduct of war. This represents the primary difference between Jomini and his Enlightenment predecessors, who focused almost entirely on tactics. Jomini developed his theoretical publications by transforming lessons selectively drawn from historical examples into the many subordinate principles and maxims that supported his overarching principle.23

The *Art of War* embodies the culmination of a confusing multitude of reprints, rewrites, and works published with identical content under various titles and at different times. Jomini's body of work also contains many updated and expanded editions of previous works, volumes published out of order, or collections originally intended to consist of a predetermined set of volumes but later modified to suit the whims of his contemporary readership. This convoluted publishing history makes an examination of the evolution of Jomini's ideas very difficult to achieve simply by reading his printed works, particularly since so few exist in English. Two facts remain clear, however. Jomini’s primary motivation throughout his career continued to be publishing and selling books to a popular audience, and the *Art of War* contains new content in the introductory chapters that did not exist in the many books Jomini wrote before the posthumous publication of Clausewitz's *On War*.24

Despite Jomini’s confusing publishing history, the "fundamental principle of war" that was central to the *Art of War* can be consistently found in the works that Jomini published since early in his career.25 Jomini apparently found it necessary to respond in 1838 to ideas he encountered in *On War*, which had appeared five years before, leading him to include the introductory chapters on military diplomacy and policy in his *Art of War*. These chapters, however, do not offer particularly original insights, nor does their inclusion appear to affect fundamentally the content of the rest of the work. Rather, they serve merely as a prelude to the immutable principles that remained the centerpiece of his ideas throughout his writing career and that make up the majority of the treatise.

The form of *On War* is both fundamentally different from that of the *Art of War* and harder to discern, making its interpretation challenging. In particular, Clausewitz’s key ideas often lose their meaning when they are divorced from his theory’s unifying structure—a problem routinely evidenced in commentators’ selective quoting from *On War*.

For example, many of Clausewitz’s interpreters focus on his description of the relationship between politics and strategy, which he expresses in the phrase "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."26 Modern readers regularly misinterpret and overemphasize this phrase by representing it as an argument for the subordination of military activity to civilian control. However, Clausewitz’s description of war as an extension of policy is actually a method of classification, intended to place war within a clearly defined category of human activity that one can then study in accordance with the overall philosophical construct of the work. His system of classification derives from Kantian logic, which Clausewitz studied under Johann Kiesewetter, a clear-thinking and skilled lecturer in mathematics and logic, and a significant influence on the young Prussian during his years at the military institute in Berlin.27

Kiesewetter emphasizes the importance of both form and substance in theory, explaining that correct form would enable a disciplined approach through appropriate arrangement of observations and concepts. Thus, rather than studying war in a purely logical manner as a distinct scientific phenomenon, Clausewitz seeks to illuminate its interdependent social nature by classifying it as a member of the category of human activity understood as policy.28

Similarly confusing to many readers is Clausewitz’s use of dialectical reasoning in describing his theoretical ideas. This is most evident in Book One, in which he establishes a model of absolute war to which, in theory, any conflict should escalate due to the contestants’ ever-increasing efforts to win. Clausewitz then proceeds to deconstruct the concept of absolute war by holding it up to the test of reality, demonstrating that many factors limit the contestants’ ability or willingness to apply the ever-increasing means necessary to achieve their ends. Therefore, war in the real world is always limited to some degree by prevailing circumstances, including lack of popular support or material resources. In Clausewitz’s time, intellectuals in many fields used dialectical reasoning, which involved the contrasting of opposites, in their discourse. Clausewitz’s use of this form of reasoning enables him to establish in *On War* a framework upon which to build a detailed and practical analysis of ends and means in real war by contrasting them to the theoretical
concept of absolute war, a logical construct familiar to his contemporaries. Contrary to some interpretations, Clausewitz does not directly pattern his use of dialectical reasoning after Hegel, who contrasted an idea with its contradiction, thesis against antithesis, to raise the idea to the level of synthesis or perfection. Rather, Clausewitz’s dialectic is of the more general type, intended not to achieve synthesis but rather to contrast extremes, showing that practical reality exists somewhere in between, depending on the nature of the specific situation.\(^2\)

Another issue of form that creates challenges for readers of Clausewitz is the degree to which one should consider *On War* a final reflection of his theory. Two notes that he left behind, one of them undated, generated much of the debate and confusion that has surrounded this topic. In the undated note, Clausewitz described his realization that he could no longer ignore his conviction that the ideal war of pure theory conflicted with the practical conduct of war he had both experienced in his life and gleaned through historical study. To resolve this conflict, Clausewitz began a major revision of the entire work, declaring in the undated note: “The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished.” The editors of the 1976 translation of *On War* concluded Clausewitz “presumably” prepared this undated note in 1830, with the implication that a revision of *On War* of the scope Clausewitz described could not have progressed much by the time of his death only one year later.\(^3\)

Compared to the relative stability of Jomini’s work, which he refined but did not significantly change over several decades, critics often interpret Clausewitz’s theory as unfinished and therefore of questionable value. Some more recent scholars, however, dispute this interpretation. One of them, Azar Gat, argues that Clausewitz wrote the undated note in 1827 and spent several years working on the planned revision before his death.\(^4\) Others, most recently John Shy, insist that the evidence indicates that Clausewitz wrote the undated note in 1830 and died without undertaking the revisions to *On War* he had intended, as Clausewitz scholars Michael Howard and Peter Paret had argued.\(^5\) Antulio Echevarria provides perhaps the most cogent resolution of this ongoing debate, arguing that the point is moot since Clausewitz’s own description of his planned revision in the other, dated note of 1827 suggests his later ideas would merely clarify and simplify, rather than nullify, his earlier concepts. Therefore, although *On War* may in its form appear to be an “unfinished” work, modern readers should view it as a full expression of Clausewitz’s genius.\(^6\)

---

*The Battle of Marengo, 14 June 1800*, by Louis Lejeune, 1801, depicts a critical victory by Napoleon’s forces over Austrian troops in northern Italy, a triumph that solidified his power in France.
Two key implications derive from this comparison of the form of *On War* and the *Art of War*. First, the relative simplicity of Jomini’s presentation makes his ideas more accessible and easier to interpret than Clausewitz’s theory, which, although conforming to a construct that was standard among the philosophical works of his time, is difficult for modern readers to understand. Second, Jomini’s *Art of War* serves as a field guide of practical advice for the conduct of warfare through the application of universal principles, while Clausewitz’s *On War* represents a broader attempt to understand the immutable nature of war while recognizing each individual war’s variability due to the subjective characteristics of its particular time and place. Jomini’s work is a guidebook intended to accompany the general to war, while Clausewitz wished his readers to internalize his theory, using it as the intellectual foundation on which to integrate their training and experience to create an intuitive awareness of the factors at play in combat. These dissimilarities in both the form and purpose of *On War* and the *Art of War* reveal themselves in each work’s theoretical content.

**Ideas**

The concepts Jomini propounds in the *Art of War* differ from his predecessors’ theories in that, unlike their focus on tactical matters, Jomini focuses his system of universal principles at the level of strategy. Thus, he concentrates on the handling of large units on campaign rather than tactical units in battle. Nevertheless, his intellectual foundation in the Enlightenment led him to apply a similarly scientific approach, as seen in the concepts for which he is best known: lines of operation and decisive points. Jomini does not invent “lines of operation”—Lloyd introduces the phrase and Bülow focuses on it—but Jomini criticizes their overly mechanical application of the concept as a description of lines of communication and supply. By contrast, Jomini applies lines of operation in the sense of offensive maneuver, retreat, and communication with friendly units. Nevertheless, he develops the idea with the same geometric precision and assurances of universal applicability, defining strategy as simply “the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or the zone of operations.” Jomini declares that the general’s identification of decisive points “is not a difficult matter when he is aided by the hints I have given on the subject.” Expanding on this theme, Jomini introduces the idea of interior and exterior lines, advocating use of the former when benefiting from a central position and an overall closer proximity of friendly units than that of the enemy’s, while arguing for the latter when relative weakness or barriers to movement make maneuver upon an enemy flank the wiser course. Jomini provides a sketch of French operations at the end of 1793 to illustrate these universal principles for the
reader. By contrast, Clausewitz avoids such prescriptive methods and derides the concept of interior and exterior lines as a "lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation."34

Clausewitz’s concept most closely related to Jomini’s lines of operation is the center of gravity, which Clausewitz describes as the “focal point of force and movement, upon which the larger whole depends.”35 In its pure form the concept is quite linear, depicting destruction of the enemy’s center of gravity—usually the main body of the enemy army—as the key to victory. However, when moved from the realm of theory to the real world of practice, the center of gravity becomes much more complex. The location and nature of the center of gravity, as well as the possible existence of more than one such center, depend on the coherence and interaction of the forces involved. There may be one center of gravity or many, and the center of gravity may be a city, an alliance, or public opinion, rather than the enemy’s army. True to form, Clausewitz is again using dialectical reasoning to describe a complex idea, one quite simple in its pure form but exceedingly intricate in reality. Clausewitz explains, “We want to reiterate emphatically that here, as elsewhere, our definitions are aimed only at the centers of certain concepts; we neither wish nor can give them sharp outlines. The nature of the matter should make this obvious enough.”36

The interrelationship of policy and war serves as a matter of form in On War, where it functions as the basis for the theory’s ends-means analysis within a dialectical framework that contrasts absolute war with war in reality. However, Clausewitz illustrates and elaborates upon this idea in his description of the “wondrous trinity.”37 Jomini describes diplomacy’s relationship to war merely to show how this will influence the war’s character and the military objectives it should

*The Battle of Smolensk, 17 August 1812*, by Jean Charles Langlois, 1839, illustrates a costly victory by Napoleon midway on the road from Poland to Moscow, in which he captured an important city but failed to destroy the Russian armies that opposed him.
achieve. By contrast, Clausewitz emphasizes that war does not suspend diplomacy between its contestants. Rather, while the political aim is always at the forefront, an interrelationship exists between the political process and the conduct of war; one can modify the ends based on the impact of victories or defeats, or due to changes in the materiel means available or the political will to continue the struggle. Due to this interrelationship, “war is more than a true chameleon.” Not only will its outward appearance adapt to circumstances, its inner nature and “dominant tendencies”—violence, chance, and policy—will vary in relationship to each other as well. Therefore, a valid theory cannot fix values to any one of these tendencies; rather, it must maintain “a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.” Thus, in terms of its classification as a form of human activity, war is a subset of policy; however, in practice war’s inner nature can change because of the complex interaction of violence, chance, and policy—the “wondrous trinity.”

Finally, Clausewitz’s concepts of friction and genius further demonstrate the divergence of his perspective from that of Jomini’s. Clausewitz built on nineteenth-century German interest in the study of man as an active, imaginative participant in the interrelated whole of nature, emphasizing the physical and psychological effects of the experience of combat on the men involved in it. He describes these effects as friction, “the only concept that more or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on paper.” This observation stands in stark contrast to Jomini’s assertion that strategy is “the art of making war upon the map.” Clausewitz identifies danger, exertion, uncertainty, intelligence, and chance as the components of general friction, and characterizes friction as a constant factor in war—one with which an effective general must have direct experience if he is to have any chance of overcoming it.

Clausewitz’s emphasis on these human factors is one of the key distinguishing features of his theory from that of Jomini, and it helps explain many of the underlying differences between them. While Jomini does not completely neglect the importance of genius or the human element in war, the fundamental difference between his view and Clausewitz’s was that of primacy. Unlike Clausewitz, who
argues for the primacy of fog, friction, and chance, occasionally overcome by rare military genius but otherwise only surmounted through experience and training, in Jomini’s view primacy always rests in the immutability of his principles. As quoted above, Jomini considers the measure of genius to be the skill with which a commander could employ in combat the fundamental principles of war he is elucidating. Jo- mini grants that adhering to his central principle of identifying the decisive point is difficult, so he provides in the Art of War discussions that would supply “all necessary explanations for its application upon the field.”

By contrast, Clausewitz argues no system of principles could overcome the effect of friction. While peacetime maneuvers or the direct experience of combat could familiarize soldiers with the frictions and fog of war, only exceptional gifts of intellect and temperament could enable the general to offset the effects of this friction and achieve “any degree of virtuosity.”

Courage might enable the general to triumph over the danger and exertion of combat, but only the combination of courage with heightened powers of intellect could elevate him to the level of military genius. Theory alone does not create genius; on the contrary, genius rises above theory. Thus, Clausewitz asserts, “what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case.” One should note that Clausewitz does not present genius as the only means to overcome war’s challenges—this is the purpose of education, training, and experience. Rather, he is arguing that genius enables insight and innovation that will consistently frustrate any adversary relying on a fixed system of principles.

Although Jomini is clearly uncomfortable with the idea that genius could trump the primacy of the principles of war he had formulated, he admits that because one could not foresee or avoid the whims of chance, factors that therefore stood outside the bounds of theory, the application of his principles might not guarantee victory. Yet, while granting that unforeseen events can influence the conduct of operations, Jomini concludes that those generals who possess a good strategic coup d’oeil—the ability to quickly assess the situation and skillfully adjust a plan in execution—are better equipped to deal with uncertainty. However, unlike Clausewitz, who recognizes that genius enables a degree of capability that rises above the level of theory, Jomini quickly reduces the concept of coup d’oeil to nothing more than the ability to apply his principles correctly: “There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:—in every position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate by the right, by the left, or by the front.”

This approach contrasts sharply with the views of Clausewitz, who sees theory as merely a framework.
Implications

While most scholars consider both Jomini and Clausewitz to be military theorists, we should question to what degree the Art of War and On War demonstrate the intellectual rigor generally expected of theory. To this end, let us first consider the dictionary definition of the term “Theory”:

1. The analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another;
2. Abstract thought: speculation;
3. The general or abstract principles of a body of fact, a science, or an art;
4a. A belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of action;
4b. An ideal or hypothetical set of facts, principles, or circumstances—often used in the phrase “in theory”;
5. A plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena;
6a. A hypothesis assumed for the sake of argument or investigation;
6b. An unproved assumption: conjecture; or
6c. A body of theorems presenting a concise systematic view of a subject. 46

Based on this wide range of meanings, both Jomini and Clausewitz clearly produced works that qualify as theory, as have many military commentators and reformers who have followed in their footsteps. In light, however, of each author’s stated purpose, let us hold Jomini and Clausewitz to standards as demanding as those they set for themselves. One modern standard for evaluating theories describes three essential traits they should possess: abstractness, or an independence of specific time and place; intersubjectivity, or an applicability to more than one specific subject; and empirical relevance, or validity in practical application. 47 By all three measures, On War surpasses the Art of War as theory.

A military theoretician faces a significant challenge in achieving a level of abstractness sufficient to ensure that his theory is not merely a description of warfare in his own experiential frame of reference. In this respect, both Clausewitz and Jomini are clearly products of the Napoleonic era, heavily influenced by its dramatic military events. Nevertheless, each developed a distinct theoretical approach. While Jomini derives from his review of history a system of detailed universal principles, Clausewitz first identifies theoretical truths or laws and then applies rigorous historical tests to determine their validity. Jomini’s inductive method, limited by the relatively narrow range of military history from which he derives his principles, fails to produce an abstract theory, despite his best efforts to portray his product as such. In contrast, by beginning with a broad description of the phenomenon of war as a struggle between opponents attempting to impose their will on one another, Clausewitz could seek truths throughout human history that could illuminate its practice. History therefore does not provide the source of his ideas, but instead serves as a means to test them. Clausewitz excludes from his theory any principles he deems too specific or contextual, and even when retained, their validity is always contingent on their interaction with the universal characteristics of war—friction, and the interplay of violence, chance, and policy, the “wondrous trinity.”

Similarly, a theory should possess intersubjectivity—a broad applicability within its discipline. In terms of military theory, this quality applies to the various types of war. Some of Clausewitz’s critics point out his neglect of maritime warfare or his brief discussion of popular insurrections, or “wars of the people.” Nevertheless, he carefully constructs his theory within the framework of an ends-means analysis, accommodating both total war as practiced by Napoleon and the much more frequent limited war, which results from political constraints on the means available to achieve the desired ends. This construct allows for the full range of escalatory options. In contrast, Jomini’s work, also land-centered, merely describes the various types of war as a prelude to presenting a set of principles very specifically geared to the conduct of a conventional war aimed at achieving decisive victory by defeating the enemy’s army.

Finally, a theory should demonstrate empirical relevance by holding true when tested against reality, or in the case of military theory, against warfare in practice. By this measure, Jomini’s work, at least initially, clearly fared worse than that of Clausewitz, as evidenced by Jomini’s increasingly strained attempts to uphold his theory’s validity after Napoleon skillfully employed Jomini’s principles in the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 but still failed to achieve victory. Jomini’s dogged adherence to the validity of his principles and maxims and his refusal to consider the effects of the friction described by Clausewitz virtually guarantees that his theory would not hold up against the test of reality. Ironically, although the empirical evidence of the First World War should have landed a death blow to any remaining believers in Jomini’s validity, his stature actually rose after the war. This result was largely due to the efforts of B. H. Liddell Hart, who managed to unfairly identify Clausewitz as the theoretical source of the “suicidal obsession with the Great Battle,” while reenergizing Jomini’s lines of operation by popularizing his derivative “strategy of the indirect approach” as the means to break the gridlock of the modern battlefield. 48

Despite the fact that the two, only Clausewitz’s theory demonstrates the three characteristics described above, Jomini’s theory has ironically fared better over time. While modified forms of Jomini’s principles of war are found in the doctrine of most modern armies and the relative merits of exterior versus interior lines are still debated at the U.S. Army’s staff college, modern scholarship on Clausewitz has failed to arrive at consensus on even the most basic issues of his meaning or modern applicability. This phenomenon has a deceptively simple
cause that traces back to the intellectual traditions within which the two authors developed their ideas. As described above, Jomini embodies the Enlightenment conviction that all natural phenomena conform to universal laws that science can identify and subject to mathematically precise calculation. According to this view, theory can enable prediction by providing the means to characterize clear cause-and-effect relationships, and phenomena can be broken into component parts and studied in isolation from each other. Defined more broadly as linear reductionism, this scientific world view dominates Western education and scientific inquiry to this day—a fact that is not surprising given the achievements of the reductionist scientific approach in such diverse disciplines as physics, mathematics, and chemistry. Nevertheless, a growing number of modern scientists have in the past few decades become aware of the fact that despite the empirical usefulness of linear reductionism, the vast majority of natural phenomena are nonlinear, dynamic processes that are highly sensitive to initial conditions and therefore demonstrate complex and unpredictable behavior.50 Social systems in particular display complex behavior and therefore do not submit to reductionist methods of predictive analysis. Unfortunately, nonlinear science, described in its various forms as complexity, chaos, chaoplexity, or complex process theory, must compete with the allure of linear science’s simplicity and its ability to furnish adequate solutions to the most common problems confronting scientists.51 Even today, modern Western education relies primarily on reductionist, Newtonian thinking, making the mental adjustment to a nonlinear world view particularly challenging. This alone largely explains the continued appeal of Jomini’s relatively simple Art of War with its rules, maxims, and principles; and the persistent debate over the meaning and relevance of Clausewitz’s On War.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of Clausewitz’s theory stem from the fact that he grasped the realities of nonlinearity a century and a half before its time. His awareness of the interconnectedness and complex feedback processes inherent in the human activity of war resulted in his intuitive recognition of combat as a distinctly nonlinear phenomenon. Clausewitz achieved this insight despite the fact that the mathematicians of his day had yet to develop a mathematical method for dealing with such systems. Only the advent of modern computer science and advanced techniques of probability analysis would provide the tools to deal with complex, nonlinear systems, and even today, those tools remain somewhat blunt instruments. Clausewitz realized that the practice of war eludes precise calculation or prediction; rather, one can only understand war through probabilistic analysis that accounts for the effects of friction and the interdependence of the infinite and varied components of the whole. This profound awareness of the nature of complex human processes is as remarkable in its anticipation of future scientific progress as it is frustrating to those who desire a simple, predictive, linear theory that promises to supply the key to victory.

**Conclusion**

The foregoing comparison demonstrates that Clausewitz’s work qualifies as a valid, intellectually rigorous theory of war, while Jomini’s merely serves as a subjective guidebook of doctrine and principles that is better suited to the study of Napoleonic warfare than to the varied phenomena of war as a whole. This insight should enable the contemporary reader to understand the form, purpose, and main ideas of each author’s work within the framework of his own time and place, while illustrating the challenge posed by the continued application of linear, reductionist thinking to the study of a human activity that unquestionably resides within the realm of nonlinear, dynamic phenomena.

Modern-day military developments demonstrate the effects of reductionism’s influence not only in the longevity of Jominian principles, but also in the ongoing quest for prediction and certainty in combat systems and doctrinal development—a search for a holy grail that Clausewitz clearly recognized as futile. One can only hope that further advances in the study of nonlinearity will increase awareness of the interconnected complexity of the patterns of human activity—such as the ties between policy and war. Only an enhanced understanding of the meaning and prevalence of nonlinearity will enable military theorists to grasp the true nature of Clausewitz’s genius by understanding his theory for what it is, rather than attempting to shoehorn it into the prescriptive category of reductionist, linear military thinking represented by Jomini and his many Enlightenment-inspired counterparts.

**Notes**


8. Ibid., pp. iii–iv.


14. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 81–85; Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pp. 46–50.

15. Jomini, Art of War, p. 70.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., p. 71.


19. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p. 30. In short, as Echevarria points out, Clausewitz identified several aspects of war unaddressed by Enlightenment–inspired theorists that make war a phenomenon defined in today’s terminology as “nonlinear.” Clausewitz sought to develop a theory that would account for these nonlinear aspects of war, an insight addressed in more detail below.


22. Clausewitz, On War, p. 147.

23. Gat, History of Military Thought, pp. 114–15. Jomini endured criticism throughout his career for his selective and inaccurate use of historical examples to support his ideas.


25. Alger uncovers the reason for the consistency of these principles in his bibliographic study, revealing that Marshal Louis-Alexandre Berthier, Napoleon’s chief of staff, severely criticized Jomini for failing to include a conclusion in the first two volumes of a planned five-volume military history that he wrote while working on Napoleon’s staff. Under this pressure, Jomini wrote a separate Résumé des principes généraux de l’art de la guerre (1807) containing his general principles. These principles then appeared in the conclusion of virtually every subsequent work Jomini wrote. In addition to satisfying Berthier, this forced Jomini to maintain consistency with a hastily developed set of principles throughout the rest of his career. See ibid., pp. iv, 6–7.


27. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, p. 41; Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 69.


29. Ibid., p. 38; Clausewitz, On War, p. 517.

30. The two notes are printed in Clausewitz, On War, pp. 69–70, 70–71, quotes, p. 70.


33. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pp. 5–7.

34. Jomini, Art of War, pp. 322, first quote, 324, 328, second quote, 330–33; Clausewitz, On War, pp. 135–36, third quote, p. 136.

35. This translation is Echevarria’s, which renders the original German more literally than does the Howard and Paret translation. See Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pp. 177–90, quote, p. 177.


37. Howard and Paret rendered the original German (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) as “remarkable trinity” in the 1976 version of their translation of On War and, upon further reflection, as “paradoxical trinity” in the revised 1984 edition of the translation. See Clausewitz, On War, p. 89, both editions. Echevarria provided the more literal and strictly accurate translation, “wondrous trinity.” See Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pp. 69–74, 81, quote, p. 69.

38. Jomini, Art of War, p. 13; Clausewitz, On War, p. 89, quotes.


40. Ibid., pp. 110, 119–22, first quote, p. 119.


42. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 100, quote, 122.

43. Ibid., p. 136.

44. Richard M. Swain, “‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’: Jomini, Clausewitz, and History,” Naval War College Review 43 (Autumn 1990): 106. This is classic Enlightenment reductionism—Jomini simply factored out the variables he deemed too difficult, and therefore too unimportant, to include in his theory.

45. Jomini, Art of War, p. 337, emphasis in the original.


Continued from page 5

will be devoted to related artwork, photos, and additional resources. A series of tabs will allow users to view all of the available information. The Civil War commemoration page is posted at http://www.history.army.mil.

New CMH Publication Available for Purchase


Combat Photographer Killed

Chris Hondros, a Getty staff photographer whose images of U.S. Army operations in Iraq appeared in Army History, was killed in Misurata, Libya, on 20 April 2011. He died several hours after being severely wounded while observing Libyan insurgents battle government forces in that city. Six of Hondros’ photos, all licensed by Getty Images, appeared in the Fall 2009 issue of Army History, illustrating an article by James R. Crider on Operation Close Encounters in the Dora neighborhood of south Baghdad.

New CMH Publication

FREEDOM BY THE SWORD

The U.S. Colored Troops 1862–1867

See page 5 for more information.
The War of 1812 in Person: Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers and Militiamen

Edited by John C. Fredriksen
McFarland and Company, 2010
Pp. v, 324. $45

Review by Gregory J. W. Urwin

The bicentennial of the War of 1812 presents Americans with the opportunity to become reacquainted with a struggle that had a profound influence on their nation’s political, economic, and military development. Because of the long string of humiliating defeats that attended the U.S. Army’s repeated efforts to conquer Canada, those Americans who remember the war tend to dwell on Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson’s unlikely triumph at New Orleans and some symbolic victories won by the U.S. Navy on the high seas and the Great Lakes.

Distilling the War of 1812 into a few comforting episodes has prevented a proper appreciation of the conflict’s lessons. The inability of President James Madison’s administration to manage the war showed Americans that the sort of small, frugal national government favored by Thomas Jefferson and his followers lacked the competence to protect America’s borders and foreign trade. The War of 1812 also exposed U.S. dependence on European suppliers for manufactured goods, a rickety financial system, and a primitive transportation system as grave threats to national security. Although the Jeffersonians remained in power following the war, they jettisoned outmoded elements of their agrarian ideology to embrace a national bank, a protective tariff, and an ambitious program of internal improvements.

The War of 1812 also proved to be a transformative experience for the U.S. Army. Jeffersonian budget cuts turned the fine regular force that emerged during George Washington’s presidency into a skeletal frontier constabulary officered by political appointees. An eleventh-hour expansion begun six months before the United States declared war on Great Britain did little to improve the situation. When hostilities broke out in June 1812, the U.S. Army marched into battle as a collection of amateurs led by befuddled old men. Such a combination made disaster inevitable, but defeat also had a purging effect that produced a stronger institution. The Army rebuilt itself from the ground up. A new generation of aggressive young officers came to the fore, and they trained a disciplined force able to meet its redcoated foes on equal terms. Jacob Brown, Winfield Scott, and the other officers who would guide the Regular Army through the succeeding decades realized that an officer’s epaulets should be awarded to men on the basis of courage and ability, not political ties. A reformed United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, would institutionalize those standards and facilitate the emergence of a truly professional officer corps.

Greater familiarity with the Americans who fought the War of 1812 is essential for military historians and professional soldiers to fully comprehend the development of the U.S. Army. An ideal place to start that journey is John C. Fredriksen’s collection of eyewitness accounts, The War of 1812 in Person. This volume provides the testimony of fifteen American veterans—regulars, volunteers, and militiamen. Eleven of these narratives were penned by regular officers, and they serve as excellent tools for gauging the values of the officer corps forged by that conflict.

No scholar has made a closer study of the available sources on the American military in the War of 1812 than Fredriksen, and that shows in the introductions and annotations that accompany each of these fifteen narratives. The fact that the publisher chose to place the latter in endnotes rather than footnotes was a mistake, but the information and insights that the notes contain make accessing them well worth the bother.

In addition to supplying inside views of the war’s battles and campaigns, these narratives reveal interesting aspects of the lives of U.S. soldiers. We learn of infantrymen concealing whisky in their musket barrels, the élan and skirmishing skills of the regular rifle regiments, and the interest that the new breed of American officer took in the welfare of the rank and file. There are also portraits of the U.S. Army’s high- to mid-level commanders, some of them complimentary and others not. Capt. Rufus McIntire of the 3d Regiment of Artillery, who fought on the Niagara front, referred to young Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott as “the life and soul of that army” (p. 134). In contrast, Col. William Clay Cumming, 8th Infan-
try, complained of serving under “so many knaves and fools” in the army that operated along Lake Champlain (p. 156).

Some reviewers may complain that Fredriksen limited his scope exclusively to American land forces and did not include any naval accounts. The need to shed more light on the soldier of 1812–1815, however, justifies the editor’s preference for keeping this an all-Army affair. A more valid criticism would be to question the publisher’s decision to release this book in paperback only. A reference work of this sort—especially one that is bound to receive extensive use over the next few years—warrants a more durable binding.

These quibbles aside, it must be said that Fredriksen has performed a noteworthy service by resurrecting a lost generation of American soldiers in The War of 1812 in Person. Their voices deserve to be heard again because they have much to teach us. Along with Fredriksen’s 2009 release of The United States Army in the War of 1812: Concise Biographies of Commanders and Operations Histories of Regiments, with Bibliographies of Published and Primary Sources, students and scholars should be grateful for such a firm foundation from which to launch new studies of the War of 1812’s military facets.

**Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin** is a professor of history at Temple University in Philadelphia and a trustee of the Society for Military History. He has written extensively on the Civil War and World War II and is now at work on a social history of British Lt. Gen. Charles, Earl Cornwallis’ 1781 Virginia campaign.
States) also dispatched troops to the Siberian port of Vladivostok in 1918. Japanese troops were not withdrawn from Siberia until late 1922.

In 1931, the Japanese occupied Manchuria, which later became the puppet state of Manchukuo. During the first half of the 1930s, the Japanese Army’s plotting in Manchuria and North China “destabilized those regions and helped to isolate Japan internationally” (p. 181). Military involvement in domestic terrorist incidents, political assassinations, and attempted coups “undercut Japan’s political process and enabled the army to gain dominant political influence” (p. 181). The army emerged as the nation’s premier power broker, but it neglected the development of a sound national defense strategy and made no joint operations plans with the navy.

Full-scale warfare broke out in China in 1937, and this ended the Japanese Army’s modernization and rearmament plans. By the end of that year, Japan had six hundred thousand men committed to operations in China, and they were exhausted, in part because of inadequate logistical support. There were also troops in Manchuria and Korea. Japan began its war with the West—the Greater East Asia War—by attacking the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in December 1941. Japan soon found maintaining its massive defensive perimeter impossible, an area that extended from Midway Island in the east to Burma in the west and from the Aleutian Islands in the north to New Guinea in the south. Logistical support was poor in all these locales, especially Burma, and one Japanese historian wrote that most Japanese military deaths resulted from starvation rather than hostile action. In other words, as Drea notes, “the army’s incompetence killed more Japanese soldiers than did the Allies” (p. 238). By mid-1945, as the army prepared to dig in and defend the Japanese homeland from Allied invasion, the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought a speedy conclusion to the war. By the end of the year, all military forces in Japan had been disbanded. In summing up the war, the author concludes that along with the navy, the Japanese Army had “consistently produced a military strategy that the nation could not afford” (p. 257).

*Japan’s Imperial Army* is a most impressive work. The author is fluent in Japanese, so he relies heavily on Japanese-language books and periodicals that other Western historians have been unable to access. Readers seeking a single reference on the history of the Japanese Army would be well advised to purchase this volume.

---

**Roger D. Cunningham** graduated from West Point in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of *The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901* (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.

---

**The Army Medical Department, 1917–1941**

By Mary C. Gillett

U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2009

Pp. xx, 644. $54

Review by J. W. Overton

This book follows Mary C. Gillett’s three previous volumes on the U.S. Army Medical Department, the first volume beginning with the Continental Army in 1775 and the latest covering up to the start of U.S. preparations for World War II. With nearly forty years of experience researching and writing in this field and with ample access to official Army and other government records, she is as qualified an author as one could find on this oft-neglected area of military and U.S. history.

Although the book spans twenty-four years, the vast majority of the material concerns World War I. The naiveté shown by so many who believed that America could form a million-man army overnight before the United States entered that war is superimposed on the more realistic view of those who knew that a great army would need a tremendous amount of staff work and support and that the greatest killer of American soldiers had always been disease. Medical logistics were, then as now, a concern—getting bandages and medicine to war zones—and even domestic training camps required congressional funds, private manufacturers, and trained administrators and professionals, all of which proved at best uncooperative and at worst acting in complete opposition to one another.

For the Army Medical Department, World War I brought disease to hastily constructed training camps at home and abroad, transformed aviation medicine into its own specialty, and exposed soldiers to new battlefield dangers such as chemical weapons. The drawdown from war spurred humanitarian operations to help decimated former belligerents and the return home of the first massive numbers of physically and mentally wounded warriors the United States had experienced in two generations.

The strains caused by the rapid mobilization of so many soldiers offer lessons for today’s “Army out of balance” on issues related to the medical screening process, on the shortage of training time, and on what would now be called resiliency challenges, all of which were experienced in 1917 and 1918. Many troops returning home to the United States carried with them lice, venereal disease, typhoid, and tuberculosis. Aside from the thousands with obvious physical disabilities, the millions of quickly mobilized troops also had their share of mental illness, much of it caused by the war and some from preexisting conditions not identified in the rushed indoctrination processes. So great were the numbers of mentally ill servicemen that Army psychiatrists met neuropsychiatric patients as they disembarked in the United States from
troop and hospital ships. Those whose symptoms were diagnosed as severe were sent to "general hospitals and treated for four months . . . apparently treated as humanely as possible" (p. 445). More "interesting" patients were those who had gone through the war and returned home well but then broke down at camps or after demobilization, suffering from what we now know as posttraumatic stress disorder.

After the armistice was signed, the Army Medical Department put its efforts into returning the wounded veterans to "useful citizenship" (p. 447). The department made broad changes and showed real innovation in hiring physiotherapists, orthopedists, and social workers, who used techniques like massage, hydrotherapy, and electrotherapy, which even now is sometimes considered outside traditional norms.

Gillett writes in her bibliography that "the historian attempting to research the history of the Army Medical Department for the period 1917–1941 may feel swamped by the plethora of material . . . for World War I and discouraged by the paucity of records for the years that followed the war’s end” (p. 575). This dearth is evidenced in the amount of the book devoted to the interwar years, only the last 112 out of 573 pages.

The 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic, which possibly originated in U.S. military training camps, is afforded less space than its influence warrants, particularly in light of the recent H1N1 pandemic. Pages 163–72 give a detailed account of the impact it had on the Army, of the preventative measures taken against its spread (many of the prophylactics are the same prescribed to fight H1N1 nearly a century later), and of the mad rush to discern the disease’s real cause. But its overall significance to the Army, effectively shutting down training in time of war and afflicting one out of every five soldiers, merits more attention.

The book concludes just before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Despite lessons learned about readiness, personnel, and logistical needs in the buildup to World War I, the Army Medical Department was in many ways shorthanded and constrained in 1941 as it had been in 1917. And again, as in 1917, venereal disease was the department’s greatest concern in the peacetime buildup to war. Organizational methods and doctrine learned in the chaos of the Great War would, however, serve the department when it went to war once more, as Gillett states, it was "better prepared and better armed for its mission—‘the conservation of manpower’—than it had ever been in the history of the nation” (p. 573).

This volume continues the exhaustive scholarship of Gillett’s previous work on Army medicine. It is the definitive work on this subject and is of particular value to any scholar of World War I or medical history.

J. W. Overton is the internal relations manager for Navy Region Northwest and an adjunct instructor for the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. He was previously the command historian for the Army’s Western Regional Medical Command and served four years in the Coast Guard. He has a bachelor’s degree in history from Northern Arizona University and a master’s degree in national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

Review by Peter J. Schifferle

Occasionally, one finds a book that is both an important contribution to the history of the Army as an institution and a joy to read—*America’s Army* is one of those pleasant finds. Filling a significant gap in our understanding of the policies, effects, and circumstances surrounding the creation of the all-volunteer force after the Vietnam War, Professor Bailey has given us a marvelous book that should be in every professional military officer’s library. She attempts, with a high degree of success, to tell much more than simply the story of the Army. She develops a narrative of what being an American means, what citizenship signifies, what defines equality and liberty, and what the appropriate roles for the military are by looking at what type of person the Army wished to attract in the four decades after Vietnam—a tall order but one she fulfills in a master’s touch. She offers sophisticated and complex answers to these questions.

Divided into seven chapters, this book resolves many other issues as well. The author believes the Army repaired itself after the Vietnam conflict by coping with the changing nature of American society. The first postwar step was to fix the Army, using the move away from conscription as a transformative reform of the broken Vietnam-era Army. Attracting young men and women for service to the nation was widely seen as a cathartic or purgative remedy for Vietnam. The Army intentionally targeted youths by appealing to four themes: motivation, dignity, individuality, and fulfillment, with some initial success. According to Bailey, however, the big story was the second-order effect of re-creating an Army based on these values.

The challenge of recruiting for an all-volunteer Army included organizing modern promotional campaigns. The notion of senior generals critiquing an advertising slogan meant to interest eighteen year olds is not just an image from the recent “Army of One” campaign. It dates back to at least the early 1970s slogan “Today’s Army Wants to Join You!” Distrustful of Madison Avenue and wary of a fickle Congress, which frequently and simultaneously imposed unrealistic restraints and objectives, the Army’s senior leaders persevered in finding the right balance between appealing to youth and retaining critical Army
values. By the end of the 1970s, the Army had managed to preserve its reformed, post-Vietnam character as a source of opportunity, respect, and commitment while attracting sufficient recruits. Now the American people saw the Army as a new chance for young people; the racial and gender composition of the Army began to expand beyond the confines of just white men, as African Americans and women responded to the advertisements as well.

The author weaves a complex tale of race relations, educational attainment, standardized mental testing, normalizing of test results, operating space-age military equipment, and strenuous efforts by powerful individuals to open doors for employment in the Army. Torn between providing opportunities to undereducated blacks (and rural whites) and recruiting soldiers able to manage the “space-age” equipment of the 1970s, the Army fell victim to congressional politics, civilian leaders, academic experts, and the perils of marketing. By late 1979, under the shadow of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Army struggled to meet its goals of values, quality, quantity, and equality. When President Jimmy Carter called for a reinstatement of Selective Service registration in response to Afghanistan, many thought it was also an admission that the volunteer force had failed.

In addition, President Carter called for registration of women, setting off a political firestorm, with the Army caught in the middle. According to Bailey, this controversy reflected a larger crisis over the role of women in the military and in society as a whole. In a now-familiar cast of characters, the Army’s civilian and military leadership, Congress, the White House, the media, academe, and the public all scrambled for a voice on this topic. Akin to matters of mental quality and racial equality, women’s rights, roles, and responsibilities entangled the Army in a front-burner American political issue. The Army managed to weather this storm, becoming a proactive and progressive organization for women’s rights, within statutory limits. With the elimination of the Women’s Army Corps in October 1978, the old guard had finally lost to a new form of female soldier integration—no longer separate and unequal but now fully part of most Army occupational specialties.

The question then became what should be the true nature of soldiering, at least as reflected in the recruitment of new soldiers. Although throughout the book, the author does an admirable job of researching and explaining the manning of the Army, she does not really address many of the other ways in which an Army is “made.” The leadership, training, education, equipping, and doctrine development essential to a professional and competent force are left to other historians. Fortunately, we can access Paul F. Gorman’s Secret of Future Victories (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1992), Shimon Naveh’s In Pursuit of Military Excellence (New York, 1997), and Al Santoli’s Leading the Way (New York, 1993), among others, for a more complete story. America’s Army is a fascinating and insightful book but should have been more accurately subtitled “Manning the All-Volunteer Force.”

Bailey does address, with her customary skill, the subject of whether the Army exists to “fight and win the nation’s wars,” or for social experimentation and uplift. Her response to this inquiry is refined and intricate. The Army serves both purposes, always reflecting the issues relevant to the larger American society, while retaining the skills, talents, and values necessary for combat operations. The last large topic the author tackles in this book is whether the United States can adequately fight a war, or two, with an all-volunteer, professional force. Given the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, she asks a series of questions that will reveal an answer in the future, but she does not presume there is one yet. Additionally, one of the most artful parts of this book is the powerful use of recruiting posters and advertisements as visual evidence of the changing attitudes toward service and citizenship. A casual reader would be well served to start here, in the more than a dozen graphics reproduced from both posters and electronic media, where Bailey tells much of the story of both the Army and the nation (illustrations between pp. 142 and 143).

America’s Army is one of the finest, most compelling, and most insightful histories of the Army as an institution. Well crafted, written in flowing prose, based on extensive and painstaking research, and composed of numerous critical interviews of participants and careful assessment, Professor Bailey has penned a book that deserves a prominent place in the military, cultural, and social history of the United States. It is one of the rare finds in military history—a detailed study of a restricted topic that reveals much about the very nature of America and does so with grace, elegance, and a high level of priceless energy.

Dr. Peter J. Schifferle is a retired Army officer who served in a variety of command and staff positions in both cavalry and armor units throughout the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and the Republic of Korea, and he is a veteran of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. He holds master’s degrees from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, in German history, and the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies in theater operations. He received his Ph.D. in American history from the University of Kansas in 2002. He is the author of America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Lawrence, Kans., 2010). After retiring from active duty in 2000, he was appointed the director, Advanced Operational Art Studies Fellowship, at the School of Advanced Military Studies.
of the Army Historical Program?” and “Why should leaders expend resources in this constrained environment on history?” In these times of multiple wars, competing priorities, and severe budget constraints, it is often seductive to debate the merit of investment in history. As a response to those questions, I declare that our efforts to understand history are indeed most significant in difficult times such as these.

As challenges increase, history becomes an ever more important thread of continuity to bind our soldiers and our nation to those men and women who have struggled before us. Far beyond providing today’s soldiers a knowledge of the Army’s past or fostering unit pride and esprit de corps—although it does each of these—history teaches us that we serve a cause far greater than ourselves. History links us to the men and women who have defended this nation throughout its existence. We take their legacies to heart and draw from them strength to overcome the obstacles and adversities that confront us.

Our forebears inspire us through their sweat, their blood, their accomplishments, and their commitment. The legacy of their actions is the priceless value of history, one that we should proudly cherish and fervently guard. Simply stated, our past strengthens our resolve to act and informs our decisions. Using our past as our guide, we can confidently chart a vision for the future. Let me outline how I intend to proceed.

My immediate priorities for the Center are to vigorously engage the Army’s senior leaders, to expand the Center’s influence across the Army Staff, to improve our theater collection efforts, and to refine our historical information management systems. The plan my team has developed to accomplish these goals focuses on reestablishing our footprint in the Pentagon. Many may not be aware that the Center had a suite of offices in “the Building” until some years ago. Once our historians’ expertise was no longer immediately available to the Army Staff, we saw a precipitous decline in requests for the Center’s support and a concomitant reduction in our level of access to Army leaders. For the Center to be successful, its historians have to be where the action is. We will arrange just that by putting them back in the Pentagon in force.

We must also work to strengthen the Army’s theater collection activities. Our contribution to the training of the Army’s military history detachments, the development of their collection priorities, and their careful assignment to theaters of operation will be essential to this endeavor. If these efforts bear fruit, we will ensure that materials will be available for scholars to study in the future, enabling them to write well-informed histories of our current conflicts.

Incorporating these immediate priorities, our strategic plan will focus on five main areas: continued enhancement of operational history documents collection, refinement of the Army Museum Program, improvement of historical support to Army leaders, wider dispersion of historical information, and better communication of the Army’s history and heritage to our soldiers and the nation through a broader variety of historical products.

Each focus area will trigger an array of changes, including the reexamination and rewriting of standing policy and regulation. These tasks will include reviewing public outreach projects and military history detachment doctrine and training, partnering with the Records Management and Declassification Agency on its National Archives records initiatives, preparing to return the supervision of the National Museum of the United States Army to the Center upon the museum’s opening, designing and launching a federated Center Web site for the entire Army Historical Program, expanding our audience through social networking sites, advancing electronic publishing initiatives, and developing adroit strategic communications.

The Center’s long-range goals include an increased awareness of, and coordination with, the activities of the historical offices of Army field commands. Such cooperation will, we anticipate, assist these offices to obtain the resources they require and support their efforts to highlight their value to their commanders and the Army’s senior leaders. The U.S. Army has a vigorous and flourishing history and heritage program. The Center must actively defend the Army’s various history programs from any detractors, and this can be accomplished only through closer coordination and synergy. The Center must be cognizant of what all Army historical organizations are doing so that we can convey their many accomplishments to the Army’s leaders as successes for our program writ large.

Our museum program must continue to build efficiencies by centralizing the staffs and collections of selected Army museums so as to support the Army’s branch schools in a cost-effective manner, while ensuring the success of the national museum project. We can no longer afford to collect outside our defined charter areas. Adept collections management will be the chief means to this end, and this will be guided by a completely rewritten Army Regulation 870–20.

Public outreach is an important facet of our program. Harnessing the ubiquitous dispersion of the World Wide Web and social media platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube, can provide some of the most effective and economical means to broadcast our message widely. The Center has taken advantage of the incredible benefits of the Web for more than a decade and has seen tremendous growth in the numbers of those who view its site, making it today second in usage only to the Army’s main public Web site (www.army.mil). We hope to parlay this achievement into even greater visibility for our programs.

Finally, as a publishing house, the Center will complete a comprehensive analysis of its publication and distribution mediums. We are beginning to employ twenty-first-century
technologies to make our products available to users who want the flexibility of e-publishing formats. Already many of our printed materials are also available on our Web site in Adobe PDF format, as are historical photographs and images of Army artwork. We are also exploring efficient ways to produce podcasts of historical lectures and videos of staff rides and to make our text publications available for easy viewing on personal devices such as the iPad, Kindle, Nook, and Sony Reader. To view some of our initiatives, visit our Web site, http://www.history.army.mil/index.html, and our Facebook page, http://www.facebook.com/pages/US-Army-Center-of-Military-History/313989217852.

Additionally, we must do all we can to facilitate and defend the development of the National Army Museum at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and to ensure the preservation of the Army’s central repository and archive at the Army Heritage and Education Center at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Both projects are key to the preservation and propagation of the Army’s history.

As I mentioned earlier, details of all these initiatives, along with our map forward, will be outlined point-by-point in our strategic plan. Many of you will be key players in the development of that plan.

Be assured that the Center is pressing ahead with the important work of our profession. The Center of Military History will stand as the guardian of the Army’s history and traditions while upholding high standards, battling for needed resources, and defending and enhancing all of the Army’s historical programs.

I now stand with a long line of men and women who have been committed to the advancement of history in our Army. We owe this dedication to every soldier and every Army civilian who has preceded us. Together, as the keepers of the Army’s memory, we will maintain a vibrant, relevant, and relentlessly persuasive program targeted at sharing the Army’s heritage and history with our nation and its latest generation of brave soldiers.

Keep Army History Alive!
At the most recent meeting of the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee (DAHAC), Lt. Gen. Jack Sterling, the Deputy Commanding General and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, posed a question to the assembled historians and heads of Army historical programs. Under pressure to reduce in-residence classroom hours for all Army training and education, he wanted to know what role distance learning (DL) could or should play in helping to reduce the number of hours devoted to on-site instruction in history. Roughly defined, the teaching objectives for those hours would include supplying insights into unit heritage and the history of the Army. More broadly, however, this education, especially at the higher levels of Army schooling, should impart a deeper perspective on warfare and engage the student’s mind in new pathways of critical thinking and analysis. In short, Army schools use history as one of their most effective tools to teach students how to approach problems and to provide the basis for a wider and more effective use of their critical faculties. This is particularly important in officer education, from pre-commissioning studies at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) or through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), to branch basic and advanced courses, and then at the Army’s Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Senior Service Colleges (SSC).

For years, the importance of historical studies to soldier and officer education has been recognized within the Army, and command historians and teachers at all levels have sought to maximize the number of hours of historical instruction in the various schools’ curricula. That classroom time has generally been spent providing an overview of the history of the U.S. Army and of warfare in general (at USMA and in ROTC programs), reviewing a branch’s history (in the officer basic course), or engaging in a staff ride to a nearby battlefield (during the advanced course). Despite the instructors’ interest, the Army has reduced the relatively few hours of contact time devoted to the study of history to a bare minimum, and school historians have had to defend those hours on a regular basis against the ever-present cost-cutters and “bean-counters” who continue to try to reduce them further or eliminate them altogether. The situation for historical instruction is somewhat brighter at CGSC and the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), although there too changes in the officers’ course have, over the years, diminished contact hours to some degree. But their programs, and even the much more limited historical-case-study–oriented portion of the Army War College curriculum, remain generally strong. Yet, with the inevitable budget cuts that will soon follow the drawdown in Iraq and the projected beginning of the withdrawal from Afghanistan, we must expect renewed pressure to reduce that instruction as well, both to save money and to “spare” the operational force from having to spend too much time in schools. (Another Chief Historian’s Footnote topic entirely.)

The real challenge for those responsible for both the quality and quantity of historical education at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College is that both of these august institutions must do far more than simply pass on a few historical examples or facts to their students or give them an overview of the history of warfare. These institutions exist to imbue majors and colonels with higher-level reasoning skills and an ability to engage in critical thinking and in sophisticated analysis of cultures and events so that they can think “in time.” This type of education (much more than just training) leads to more effective approaches to problem-solving and thus better decision making, operationally and strategically, as those officers move higher in Army and joint hierarchies. The issue, then, is what role can distance learning perform in reducing historical contact hours with students at these institutions without in any way undercutting the desired goal of improving reasoning skills and analytical ability? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be, not much.

Despite the many promises made by its supporters, distance learning simply cannot compete with the direct intellectual exchange that is so essential for instilling in a student the important skills of critical analysis. There is still no substitute for the tried-and-true seminar approach for achieving a detailed and thoughtful analysis of historical case...
studies, based on complex readings that illuminate the issues involved and a comparison with other events and concepts from the past and present. Such a discussion should be led by a thoroughly trained, professional historian (with a Ph.D. and not just a Master’s degree) with a deep knowledge of the subject and of historical method. In that seminar, a number of attentive students (We can hope, can’t we?) would critique other students, supporting their own theories or even attacking the premises presented by the professor. In so doing, the students would participate in a truly productive exercise in engaged, synergistic learning. That cannot be accomplished with a series of distance-learning “modules,” however sophisticated they may be.

Having said that, distance learning does have a role to play in education, albeit a relatively modest one. It can lay out certain facts and provide some background case studies. The use of distance learning seems best suited for the distribution of readings and supporting information to help establish a “base” of knowledge prior to class or seminar meetings. Simply handing out materials or assignments is, of course, no guarantee that students will actually read them or think about them before a class or other in-resident school setting. Such assignments are only effective if there is some type of follow-up mechanism, such as a test. The example of the now-defunct Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) is perhaps instructive here. When the Army used correspondence courses in CAS3 to establish a baseline of knowledge before students came to Fort Leavenworth (an early form of DL), these courses only proved useful when the student was faced with a graded exam on their contents before arrival at the resident phase. That helped ensure, at least to some degree, a common starting point for all students. As a result, the course could be limited to only eight weeks in residence rather than the ten or twelve weeks that would have been required without a tested distance-learning phase.

Historians are sometimes labeled as technologically challenged or even as resistant to new technology and ideas. (Some historians are even viewed as outright Luddites, yet few have actually destroyed a water-powered stocking frame as required for full rights to that label.) And there are those who will attempt to explain our caution about distance learning as mere old-fashioned opposition to new ideas. But we, as historians, must state clearly what we believe. Distance learning can contribute to Army training in a variety of lower-level skills and serve a number of needs. However, for the higher-level critical-thinking skills and abilities with which we aspire to endow our most promising officers—the future leaders of the Army—no alternative method will accomplish the mission of teaching these vital competencies as well as a fully trained historian leading a seminar of students engaged in face-to-face interaction. Too much is at stake for us to reduce or eliminate for our future leaders and strategists such “golden” instructional time by pursuing the chimera of inappropriate distance learning in an illusory attempt to save money, instructional hours, or teaching slots. True education in critical thinking can only be achieved in the classroom, using personal, interactive, Socratic methods of dialogue, challenge, testing, and response.

If you have examples of good and bad uses of distance learning or ideas on where and when such methods could be appropriate or inappropriate for use in historical training, please contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.
I WANT YOU
FOR THE 2011
CONFERENCE OF ARMY HISTORIANS

“Armies in Persistent Conflict”
26 - 28 July 2011

http://www.history.army.mil/CAH/