In This Issue

Rommel’s Lost Battalions
By Douglas E. Nash

U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight

In Pursuit of the Great White Whale:
Lewis Sorley’s Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
By Andrew J. Birtle

The Professional Bulletin of Army History
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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General, United States Army
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The U.S. Army Center of Military History publishes Army History (ISSN 1546-5330) quarterly for the professional development of Army historians and as Army educational and training literature. The bulletin is available at no cost to interested Army officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian employees, as well as to individuals and offices that directly support Army historical work or Army educational and training programs.

Correspondence, including requests to be added to the distribution of free copies or to submit articles, should be addressed to Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Ave., Fort Lesley J. McNair, DC 20319-5060, or sent by e-mail to us.army.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

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Cover Image: Erwin Rommel, shown here as a colonel general, in North Africa, 16 June 1942/Bundesarchiv

Table of Contents Image, Bottom, right: A group of German soldiers with rifles and machine guns march west of Tunis, c. 1943/Bundesarchiv

Back Cover Image: Bizerte, Tunisia by Fletcher Martin, 1943/National Museum of the U.S. Army, Army Art Collection

The Summer 2012 issue presents an article by Douglas E. Nash, deputy director of the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School at Marine Corps Base Quantico, on the German’s use of replacement troop battalions as provisional infantry battalions during the Axis’ defense of Tunisia during late 1942 and early 1943. These Africa Replacement Battalions, later renamed Tunis Field Battalions, were originally intended as an administrative convenience in order to deploy them to North Africa. Once in theater, these battalions would be used to flesh out existing units already in the field and subsequently disbanded. However, the precarious position in which the Axis found itself in Northwest Africa forced these battalions to be used wholesale as defensive stopgaps.

Andrew J. Birtle, chief of the Military Operations Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, provides us with a review essay of author Lewis Sorley’s newest book, Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam. This critical examination highlights major flaws in the book’s argument that General Westmoreland lost the war singlehandedly. Birtle shows the author’s presentation of facts to be selective and anything but objective.

This issue’s U.S. Army Artifact Spotlight highlights General Anthony Wayne’s Society of the Cincinnati “Eagle” medal, which was presented to him in 1787, and is currently part of the National Collection of the United States Army.

We also feature timely comments from the chief of military history on the Center’s progress concerning its work with Arlington National Cemetery and a call from the chief historian for a Historian’s Code.

I continue to invite our readers to send me articles and commentaries concerning the history of the U.S. Army and land warfare.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
Another quarter has passed and as usual the Army historical community has continued to be at the forefront in so many facets of our Army. I am especially proud of the efforts and considerable progress that our multidisciplinary team has made on the Career Program 61 initiatives. As we continue to refine the details of our new career program, the prospects of advancement for our history professionals, a menu of position assignments, and ever more exciting opportunities for personal and professional growth seem to avail themselves. This is an interesting time to be a member of our professional community; please stay engaged and become part of the process. We will all be better for it.

In past columns, I have discussed staying relevant to your command while keeping your eye on the principal history mission, in other words, giving your boss what he or she wants while working your own “history agenda.”

Allow me to share a story of such a recent success. I am certain that most of you are familiar with the challenges that the Army has encountered at the Arlington National Cemetery (ANC). Thankfully, most of the problems at the ANC were of a management or administrative nature and not related to the history field. The Center of Military History (CMH) first became involved with the ANC when the secretary of the Army consulted us on procedures for the collection of mementos left by loved ones in Section 60 of the ANC. Section 60 is an emotionally charged part of the cemetery where Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF) burials are primarily located. For several years, visitors to OIF/OEF graves at ANC routinely left mementos beyond the usual floral arrangements. These mementos included military ephemera (photographs, uniform items, and challenge coins), religious tributes (crucifixes, rosary beads, dream catchers, prayer rocks, and chakras), and toys (teddy bears, toy soldiers, and action figures).

Beginning in February 2008, the ANC historian had informally collected and selectively stored some of the materials found near the Section 60 graves. However, there was no attempt to link these materials to the graves nor were these items cataloged. In fact, most of the items were being disposed of in accordance with the cemetery’s standing floral policy, which forbade such displays. ANC did not have a policy in place to deal with these mementos because tributes of this nature had not occurred before.

In September 2009, the secretary of the Army directed CMH to develop and administer a pilot collection program for Section 60 materials. The objectives of the new program targeted some of the gaps that existed in the more informal collection program, including photographing objects at the gravesite on a weekly basis, thus establishing provenance; collecting and documenting the materials in a database indexed by grave number, which could be used by ANC in their communication with families; and finally, housing and storing the objects until disposition guidance was codified.

The CMH pilot program commenced on 22 September 2009, and today, the Center’s curatorial staff members have collected over 4,000 objects. Although most of these objects are not considered significant enough to merit retention in the Army’s permanent historical collections, the pilot program firmly established our history community, and the Army’s, commitment to preserving the stories of service members who sacrificed their lives in support of our nation. By any measure, the pilot collection program was a complete success, garnering considerable media attention, including segments on NBC Nightly News and Nightline, and addressing the concerns of a wide spectrum of ANC stakeholders.

As with any success, the program highlighted the capabilities of history, causing ANC leaders to seek additional support from the Center. We rapidly expanded our activities into two discrete mission areas at the ANC: first, continue with the original Section 60 collection mission; second, and a more critical historical support mission, is to embrace the missions of a standard field history office.

Under its current table of distribution and allowances, the history office at ANC had one historian assigned. The command used this position predominantly as an...
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Article

Rommel’s Lost Battalions
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Center Issues Comprehensive World War II DVD

The U.S. Army Center of Military History has recently published a new DVD titled The United States Army and World War II: The Collected Works. This single DVD-ROM disc consolidates all of the volumes in the Center’s United States Army in World War II series (also known as Green Books) that were originally spread over five multidisc sets. It also includes the Center’s other World War II–related publications, some of which were not previously available in an electronic format. This single disc contains 156 major volumes, monographs, and pamphlets in searchable Adobe PDF format. This DVD-ROM has been issued as EM 0312.

Army publication account holders may obtain copies of this DVD-ROM from the Directorate of Logistics—Washington, Media Distribution Division, ATTN: JDHQSVPAS, 1655 Woodson Road, St. Louis, MO 63114-6128. Account holders may also place their orders at http://www.apd.army.mil. The general public may order the disc from the U.S. Government Printing Office via its Web site at http://bookstore.gpo.gov.

New Publication from the Combat Studies Institute Press

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press has announced the publication of Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan, edited by Donald P. Wright. This monograph, commissioned by General David H. Petraeus, is a collection of eight platoon-level operations ranging from firefights to civic actions. General Petraeus, who provides the book’s foreword, expresses the hope that “these accounts would be of immediate utility to sergeants and lieutenants at the center of future operations.” This volume is the first in a planned multivolume series. This publication is available for download in PDF format from CSI’s Web site at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/csipubs.asp.

Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Issues New Publications

The Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has released two new publications. The first, McNamara, Clifford, and the Burdens of Vietnam, 1965–1969, by Edward J. Drea, is the sixth volume in the Secretaries of Defense Historical series and covers the incumbency of Robert S. McNamara, as well as the tenure of Clark M. Clifford. The bulk of the narrative in this work focuses on McNamara’s key role in the United States’ involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1968.

The second book, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945–1960, by Elliott V. Converse III, examines the evolution of the U.S. military, emerging victorious at the end of the World War II and being tasked with maintaining the delicate and tense balance of the Cold War. This volume, part of the OSD Historical Office’s History of Acquisition in the Department of Defense series, deals primarily with the arsenal modernization and rearment efforts of the period.


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Douglas E. Nash graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1980, after enlisting as a cavalry scout in 1974. He was awarded a master's of military arts and sciences in military history from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth in 1995 and a master's of strategic studies from the Army War College in 2004. He retired from the Army as a colonel in 2006 after twenty-eight years of service as an armor and civil affairs officer in a variety of conventional, airborne, and special operations assignments. He is the deputy director of the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School at Marine Corps Base Quantico. He is the author of Hell's Gate: The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket, January to February 1944 (Stamford, Conn., 2002) and Victory Was Beyond Their Grasp: With the 272nd Volks-Grenadier Division from the Hürtgen Forest to the Heart of the Reich (Bedford, Pa., 2008).

Above: A German infantryman in North Africa in late 1941
Right: German infantrymen wearing raincoats march with loaded donkeys, Sidi Nsir, Tunisia, 1943
Introduction

The battle for North Africa, which raged from 1940 to 1943, is best remembered today by many as a war that was fought entirely by mechanized armies arrayed against one another in the open Saharan desert. However false, the popular image that seized the imaginations of thousands of people who lived during the war, and the one that still endures to this day, was that this was a war of maneuver, with the tanks of the German Afrikakorps, aided by the luckless Italians, pitted against the stubborn but valiant “Desert Rats” of the British Eighth Army, who fought back and forth across the desert wastelands of Libya and Egypt. While that timeworn image may have held true between February 1941 and October 1942, a second campaign began in November 1942 that had little in common with the first. This war was fought in the cactus-covered valleys and rugged mountains of Tunisia, where infantry forces bore the brunt of the burden with armor more often than not playing a supporting role.

This campaign witnessed the debut of the American forces under Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower fighting alongside a mix of seasoned and inexperienced British forces under Lt. Gen. Harold Alexander, and with recently allied French forces thrown in for good measure. Instead of General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrikakorps, Allied forces in Tunisia fought initially against Col. Gen. Jürgen von Arnim’s Fifth Panzer Army, composed of German and Italian units unversed in desert warfare. It was a positional war far more than a war of maneuver, but it was also a war of expedients and improvisations.

One of the more noteworthy improvisations of the Tunisian phase of the campaign for North Africa was the German’s use of ad hoc combat formations composed of replacement battalions. Though these battalions contributed immensely toward prolonging the
German defense in Tunisia, they have received scant credit for their contributions, except as little-noticed footnotes to history. During the course of the Tunisian Campaign, American ground combat forces, including the II U.S. Corps’ 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions, became very familiar with these battalions, having fought against them in numerous engagements, but the official U.S. Army history of the campaign, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West*, pays them meager attention.¹ This article represents the first effort in English to describe how these “lost battalions,” twenty-four of which arrived by the end of February 1943, were organized and employed and the role they played during the initial German defense in Tunisia.

**Organizing German Army Replacement Battalions**

The genesis of these battalions can be traced to the summer of 1942, when, in order to regulate the movement of badly needed replacement troops for Rommel’s *Panzer-Armee Afrika*, the German Replacement Army (*Ersatzheer*) was directed to exercise more direct control of *Marsch-Bataillone* (March, or Replacement Draft Battalions) destined for North Africa.² A total of seventy-one of these *Africa Replacement Battalions* was envisioned, but less than half eventually arrived in the North African theater of operations. The rest of them were diverted en route to other destinations in the Mediterranean, such as Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, and Crete, where they were used to reinforce understrength divisions (such as the 22d Luft-Lande, or Air-Landing Division), re-create the divisions that were soon to be deployed in North Africa, and build new divisions from scratch.³

Those replacement battalions destined for North Africa, officially titled *Afrika Marsch-Bataillone*, or *Africa Replacement Battalions*, differed very little from replacement battalions destined for other theaters, such as the Eastern Front. These *Africa Replacement Battalions* generally possessed the same number of personnel as any other replacement battalion (between 800 and 1,000 men); were equipped with small arms (rifles, pistols, and machine guns); and varied in composition, having generally between three and five companies, as well as a small headquarters company with a field kitchen.⁴ In contrast to the unit replacement system adopted by the Germans, the U.S. Army preferred a system consisting of individual replacements, that, while more efficient than the German method, ruled out the use of groups of replacements being employed as ad hoc combat formations in an emergency.

These temporary battalions as a rule lacked vehicles, heavy weapons, and the rest of the equipment a combat battalion was normally authorized because they were never intended to be anything other than an administrative convenience to facilitate the task of transporting replacements from the zone of the interior to a given combat zone. The ranks of these battalions were filled with men from all branches of the German Army, including infantry, panzer crewmen, communications specialists, mechanics, truck drivers, and so forth, based on projections of historical loss rates from the North African theater of operations. Upon arrival, these men were to be parceled out to the various units in the field to fill vacancies as needed, per the normal practice for the distribution of personnel for any other replacement battalion on the European continent.
Every attempt was made to assign the replacements to their regionally based field unit.

To facilitate the orderly movement of these large bodies of men, many of whom scarcely knew one another, Africa Replacement Battalions were placed under the nominal control of officers and noncommissioned officers, who were usually replacements themselves, many being recent graduates of various training courses or returning convalescents. The relative lack of cohesion in these battalions was not seen as a problem because they were not intended to serve as combat units except in extreme circumstances, and replacements were merely grouped into companies and battalions for ease of transport. Once a replacement battalion arrived at its destination and its men parcelled out, it was normally disbanded and the whole process was repeated for the next group of replacements.

What set these Africa Replacement Battalions apart from the others, of course, was that they were being sent to North Africa, which in those days was still considered a romantic and exotic locale. To prepare the men for their assignment, they were medically screened by their home station depot battalion to determine their fitness for tropical service. They were then issued tropical clothing and equipment, given inoculations against the diseases endemic to the area, and were briefed on the customs and health hazards of the region if time permitted. As with any other replacement battalion, these Africa Replacement Battalions were composed of a mixture of new recruits, veterans recovering from wounds, men transferred from disbanded units, volunteers, and those compelled to volunteer in lieu of punishment for minor offenses.

**Axis Response to Operation Torch**

Evidence indicates that Africa Replacement Battalions A1 through A13 made it safely to North Africa, where they joined Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa before the beginning of Lt. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery’s El Alamein Offensive on 24 October. Two other units, Battalions A14 and A15, were diverted to Crete. However, once the defeated Panzer Army Africa began withdrawing from the El Alamein position on 4 November, Rommel asked the Wehrmachtführungsstab des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Operational Staff of the German High Command) to temporarily suspend the shipment of these battalions. He reasoned that
the arrival of thousands of replacement troops at that critical stage in the battle would only serve to exert additional strain on a logistical system already in the process of collapse. In any case, neither fuel nor vehicles would be available for moving troops should they arrive in Libya, leaving them little choice but to join in the retreat or surrender to the pursuing British Eighth Army.6

To complicate matters for the Axis, on 8 November 1942, the Anglo-Americans carried out a series of amphibious operations in Vichy-held Algeria and Morocco (code-named TORCH) that threatened to envelop the retreating Axis forces from the west. The Allied goals were to bring the French into the war on the side of the Allies, conduct a rapid march upon Tunis, link up with Montgomery’s forces approaching from the east, and sever the Axis logistical lifeline to Italy. With their supplies cut off, German and Italian troops trapped in Libya would have no choice but to surrender. Whoever got to Tunis first, therefore, would determine the outcome of the campaign. Unfortunately for the Axis, Rommel’s prolonged and stubbornly fought withdrawal from El Alamein required all of Panzer Army Africa’s available forces, leaving none to occupy Tunisia, a French province still under the control of the nominally neutral Vichy government.

On the day of the Allied landings in North Africa, there were no German troops in Tunisia except a liaison staff charged with monitoring the terms of the armistice. French intentions were opaque, to say the least. Diplomatic efforts to determine how they would react to an Axis move on Tunisia proved fruitless, due to the deliberate evasiveness of the French military governor, General Georges Barré. The Germans and Italians rightly feared that any French effort to assert their neutrality would compel the Germans to seize ports and airfields by force. This placed a daunting challenge before the Axis because they had few combat-ready infantry or armored divisions that could be immediately dispatched to Tunisia. The divisions that were available on the European mainland were readied for a surprise occupation of Vichy France, such as the 10th Panzer Division, while others, such as the 320th Infantry Division, were being shipped to the Eastern Front to reinforce the stalled drive on Stalingrad.7

This turn of events left Adolf Hitler no choice but to use any means necessary to avert a potential catastrophe. The loss of all Axis forces in North Africa, as bad as that would have been, was dwarfed by what he felt was an even greater threat to Germany’s southern flank in the Mediterranean should Tunisia fall. The speed of the Allied drive across Morocco and Algeria, minimally delayed by Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica’s feeble interdiction efforts, left little time for Hitler to delay in any case. At the most, he had only a few days, if not hours, to act. His decision on the evening of 8 November to establish a Tunisian bridgehead would therefore require his commanders to resort to a series of expedients in order to gain some operational breathing space until new forces could be gathered and shipped across the Mediterranean from bases in Italy and France. Hitler and his military advisers realized that this could take weeks or even months to carry out, depending on the availability of aircraft and shipping.
In the meantime, Hitler ordered that diplomatic steps be taken with General Barré in order to deceive the French as to his ultimate intention, which was to occupy the province with Axis forces to thwart the Allies’ plans. Placing ground troops in Tunisia would also protect the rear area of Panzer Army Africa as it retreated slowly along the Libyan coastal highway. Hitler was aware that occupying Tunisia would violate the terms of the Franco-German Armistice signed in July 1940 and force the French to take sides in the conflict. He would mitigate the impact of the change in the strategic equilibrium by occupying the remaining areas of France not already under German control. This would cut off the French troops in North Africa from guidance, reinforcements, and supplies, should they decide to go over to the Allies.

Until then, he still had to observe diplomatic niceties; and with no German forces available for immediate employment, Hitler could ill-afford to alert the French to his intention to occupy the remainder of their country, a contingency plan code-named Operation Anton. Thus, Hitler had no choice but to hew to the proper protocols of the armistice, at least on the surface; the French held Tunisia with over 20,000 men and would vastly outnumber anything the Germans could initially scrape together. But where would he get the forces to gain a bridgehead in Tunisia in the meantime?

**Kesselring Organizes the Tunisian Bridgehead**

While traveling in his private train on the night of 8 November to Munich, where he was scheduled to give a speech at the Bürgerbräukeller the following morning to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler turned to the one man who could salvage the situation—General Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the Oberbefehlshaber Süd (Commander in Chief, South), responsible for all German operations in the Axis’ Mediterranean theater of operations.

Hitler, via the short-wave radio set aboard his train, contacted Kesselring at his headquarters in Rome and asked him what troops he could immediately deploy to Tunisia. “The 5th Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Regiment and my personal security company,” replied Kesselring. “Good,” said Hitler, “throw everything into it that you have available.” Renowned as an optimistic and forceful leader, Kesselring immediately got to work, having been given a free hand against Tunisia by Hitler, who authorized him to use any forces in his geographic area of responsibility to accomplish this task.

With his peculiar blend of energy and ruthlessness, Kesselring ordered his staff to scour the Mediterranean for any force it could lay its hands on, including those mentioned above, and ordered the air- and sealift to Tunisia to begin no later than 9 November 1942. Naturally, this directive pertained to the Africa Replacement Battalions as well, many of which were en route or had already arrived at forward staging areas in southern Europe, conveniently within Kesselring’s domain. Once on the ground, these hastily assembled forces would be used to secure the ports and airfields and build a defensive perimeter around them until regular infantry and panzer divisions could be brought over the Mediterranean. Once the bridgehead had been established, these same forces would then have to delay the Allies long enough for Rommel to bring his forces out of Libya into the relative safety of positions along the Tunisian-Libyan border.

The scratch force assembled to carry out the first phase of this operation, code-named Braun, consisted of an additional regiment of Fallschirmjäger from France (named Regiment Barenthin, after its commander) and Flak (antiaircraft).
troops from southern Italy, as well as Fallschirmjäger Regiment 5 and Kesselring’s aforementioned headquarters security company, fewer than 10,000 men in all. They would land at the airfield in Bizerte and two fields in Tunis, seize them from their French garrisons by guile or by force if necessary, and prepare the reception for those that would soon follow. These elite troops, comprising the first wave, were to be joined within the next forty-eight hours by several Africa Replacement Battalions. Over twenty of these battalions were quickly designated to be “at the disposal” of Kesselring, evidence of just how desperate the Germans were for men to secure their Tunisian bridgehead. Kesselring could also expect reinforcements from Italy’s Superga Division to arrive within a week. This unit, a light infantry division trained originally to conduct amphibious assaults, was to be Benito Mussolini’s initial contribution to the occupation of Tunis.

First Employment of Africa Replacement Battalions in a Tactical Role

Upon reaching their staging areas in southern Italy in late October 1942 Africa Replacement Battalions A16, A18, A20, A21, and A23 were renamed by 16 November as Tunis Feld-Bataillone (Tunis Field Battalions) T1, T2, T3, T4, and T5, respectively. Envisioned at first to serve only as static forces for the defense of Tunis, they were given a T designation to differentiate them from the other replacement battalions that would arrive shortly thereafter. All five were now designated as regular field formations and would be assigned missions commensurate with their new status. In fact, shortly before departing Italy, they had been hurriedly reorganized along the lines of a standard Panzergrenadier (armored infantry) battalion, comprising three infantry companies, a heavy weapons company, and a headquarters company with signal platoon. The other Africa Replacement Battalions that followed were not treated so preferentially, retaining their original temporary structure until they were later disbanded or absorbed by other formations.

According to the commander of Field Battalion T2, 1st Lt. Dietrich Krueger-Haye, his battalion was issued greatly augmented firepower in the form of 124 light machine guns, twelve heavy machine guns, six 5-cm. antitank guns, a 7.5-cm. antitank gun, and six 8-cm. mortars. His battalion’s combat engineer platoon also drew its full allotment of pioneer tools, mines, and explosives. Krueger-Haye, a recent graduate of the artillery battery commander’s course in Eberswalde, had taken the command of his battalion on 28 October 1942. He had been initially instructed to lead it to staging areas in Greece where it would then be shipped to Libya. Following a weeklong train journey through the Balkans, the battalion was diverted to Rome where Krueger-Haye and his 1,000 men arrived on 13 November. However, he was given little time to reorganize his unit for its new mission and barely managed to draw the authorized number of weapons and equipment before the battalion departed for Tunisia on 16 November. No vehicles were forthcoming; like the other Tunis Field Battalions, his men would have to scrounge what they could from the French and Italians after arriving in Tunisia, including commandeering civilian cars, trucks, and even donkey carts.

None of the mixed bag of German and Italian troops who flew into Tunisia from 9 to 16 November 1942 knew exactly how the French forces holding the airfields would react. Though German diplomats had been involved in drawn-out discussions
with General Barré, who also served as the commander of all-French military forces in Tunisia, no one was certain whether his troops would cooperate or arrest the first Axis troops to land. Understandably, the initial wave of troops was concerned that they would be outgunned and outnumbered by a hostile French force immediately upon arrival. Luckily, the air landing at the two airfields in Tunis went off more or less according to plan, with the French authorities carrying out only token gestures designed to uphold their sense of honor, leaving the Axis to proceed undisturbed.

Rather than limit the movement of their troops into Tunis, the Axis also decided to send units to outlying ports and airfields such as Bizerte and Sfax. When the Germans appeared in Bizerte on 11 November, they were members of an *Africa Replacement Battalion* that was one of the first units on the ground. The 1st Company of *Tunis Field Battalion T1* was supposed to fly from Ljubljana in Slovenia via Athens to join Rommel’s army in Libya. While en route, it was hastily diverted to Rome, where the company, commanded by Lt. Werner Wolff, was directed to seize the airfield in Bizerte.

Wolff informed the commander in Tunis, Col. Martin Harlinghausen, via public telephone that the airfield was in German hands and that it was now safe to bring in more troops. With the addition of a German parachute battalion and two Italian units, Bizerte was declared secure by 12 November.13

**Building the New Tunisian Defensive Position**

The first four *Tunis Field Battalions*, T1, T3, T4, and T5, had arrived by 13 November and soon took up positions where they would serve as the Tunis and Bizerte garrisons. The fifth to arrive, *Field Battalion T2*, was ordered to secure the port cities of Sousse and Sfax in southeastern Tunisia, and, using the French rail system, reconnoiter westward towards the town of Gabes. Once the battalion had arrived in Gabes, it was to hold the town until German and Italian forces of Rommel’s...
army arrived. This was perhaps one of the most critical assignments given one of these battalions. Had Field Battalion T2 not secured Gabes when it did, the town may well have fallen into the hands of approaching Allied forces, who had already reached Gafsa, located some ninety miles west of Gabes, by 17 November.

Shortly after the battalion’s requisitioned French passenger train passed through the railway station at Sfax on the evening of 19 November, the Kampfgruppe (battle group) from Field Battalion T2, led by Krueger-Haye himself, was shot up by a platoon of Free French light tanks as the train headed towards Gabes. After a brief but deadly firefight, the German-manned train managed to drive the tanks away with a 5-cm. antitank gun mounted on a flatcar but only after losing more than two dozen men killed and wounded. This brief fight bought the Germans enough time to hold on until an Italian infantry battalion, the vanguard of Rommel’s force, arrived from the south the next morning. With its locomotive slowed to a speed of fifteen miles an hour because of a damaged boiler (caused by the light tank’s 3.7-cm. tank cannon), the Kampfgruppe was able to limp back to Sfax to fight another day.14

The German paratroopers and the men of the Tunis Field Battalions knew they would soon be reinforced by the 10th Panzer, the 334th Infantry, and the Hermann Göring Panzer Divisions as well as several Italian divisions. However, the movement of these divisions across the Mediterranean had been slowed by the limited amount of available shipping and Allied air attacks against German and Italian convoys sailing from Sicily and the Italian mainland. This development forced the Axis to move units by sea to Tunisia piecemeal until they could achieve temporary air superiority over the shipping lanes between Sicily and Tunisia, guaranteeing that most of their cargoes made it through with their men, tanks, and equipment. In fact, major elements of the 10th Panzer Division and a Tiger tank battalion (Schwere Panzer Battalion 501) had arrived in Tunisia by the end of November.

However, the bulk of these units would not be able to deploy to North Africa with their full complement of men and equipment for several weeks and even months, in some cases.15 While these seaborne units began arriving piecemeal beginning on 11 November, command and control of most of the first wave of Axis troops to secure Bizerte, including the paratroopers of Regiment Barenthin and newly arrived Field Battalion T3, was exercised by a provisional headquarters named Stab (Staff) Lederer on 11 November 1942 after its commander, Col. Hans Lederer of the Luftwaffe. Another similar provisional headquarters, Stab Harlinghausen, was formed to secure the Tunis bridgehead, using elements of Lt. Col. Walter Koch’s Fallschirmjäger Regiment 5 and Tunis Field Battalion T1, which had been ordered to Tunis after helping to seize the airfield in Bizerte.

Africa Replacement Battalions Incorporated into Divisional Structures
The Tunis Field Battalions did not remain near the ports of Tunis and
Bizerte for long. Rather than wait for the rest of the 10th Panzer Division, the Germans formed an ad hoc division using parachute units and Tunis Field Battalions. Stab Lederer (renamed Division von Broich on 18 November after its new commander, Col. Friedrich von Broich), including two Tunis Field Battalions, was given the mission of securing and expanding the lodgment area while simultaneously pushing out screening forces as far to the west as possible. Thus, von Broich initiated a series of sparring matches with the advancing Allies along the western approaches to Tunis and Bizerte, as each side attempted to seize key terrain and to determine each other’s relative strengths. This development had come about because the Allies, not content solely with the consolidation of their control over Algeria and Morocco, had continued their advance towards the Algerian-Tunisian border, forcing the Germans and their Italian allies to establish blocking positions along the major avenues of advance into Tunisia.

As more German and Italian troops flowed into Tunisia throughout November 1942, Division von Broich was soon augmented by the addition of 4th Battalion, Africa Artillery Regiment 2, as well as by the Italian 10th Bersaglieri Regiment, giving the division the nominal strength of seven infantry battalions and a total strength of 7,629 men by 1 December. Von Broich’s division was initially placed under the control of Lt. Gen. Walter Nehring’s ad hoc XC Corps on 19 November, which had been given responsibility of commanding all Axis forces in Tunisia until an army headquarters could be formed.

With the arrival of the three aforementioned regular German divisions progressing more slowly than anticipated, Kesselring decided to take the rest of the Africa Replacement Battalions and send them to help reinforce Nehring in Tunisia, where the latter’s troops were already engaged in combat with oncoming British, American, and French forces. More men were needed if the Germans and Italians were to have any hope of gaining enough troops to build up their new Tunisian bridgehead and keeping the ports and airfields beyond the range of Allied artillery. A great deal of ground now had to be held, and the manpower to do it was in short supply. As it turned out, Kesselring’s decision was the best practical solution to Nehring’s most pressing problem since these Africa Replacement Battalions, equipped with only light arms and no transport, could not be incorporated into Rommel’s forces until he had completed his retreat into Tunisia, a move that was not finished until 28 January 1943 when the rear guard of Panzer Army Africa finally crossed into Tunisia near Mareth.
Division von Broich (renamed Division von Manteuffel on 11 February when von Broich took command of 10th Panzer Division and was replaced by Col. Hasso von Manteuffel) began pushing south westward into the interior of Tunisia to widen the defensive perimeter around Tunis and prevent the Allies from threatening Rommel's retreat. Instead of moving to the west with the other Tunis Field and Africa Replacement Battalions assigned to Division von Broich, Field Battalion T2 was transferred from Gabes to the Faid Pass, located at the far southern end of the Eastern Dorsals, where it was attached to 21st Panzer Division. To the north, Field Battalion T5 remained in the Bizerte area, where it provided local security against any possible Allied sea or airborne landing attempt to seize the port.

Between 15 November and the middle of December 1942, the five Tunis Field Battalions provided vital additional manpower to the bridgehead in Tunisia during the initial stages of the buildup of the German lodgment area. By 17 December 1942, of the twenty-eight infantry battalions available to Axis commanders in Tunisia, one-third of the fifteen German battalions (the balance were Italian) were composed of troops from Tunis Field or Africa Replacement Battalions. It is safe to say that without them, Nehring’s XC Corps (succeeded three weeks later on 8 December by the newly established Fifth Panzer Army under Col. Gen. Jürgen von Arnim) would have been hard pressed to hold the 160-mile-long Tunis bridgehead at all; there simply would not have been enough troops to occupy the ground, much less defend it. This infusion of manpower at a critical period enabled the Germans to have the tactical depth to consolidate their strength and prepare for the next phase in the campaign.

By 31 December 1942, the Fifth Panzer Army totaled 47,000 German and 18,000 Italian troops with 330 armored vehicles and 360 guns. The bridgehead remained secured until 13 January 1943 when the vanguard of Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa linked up with it near Gabes, uniting both armies into what was soon to be officially designated as Army Group Africa. Even though the Tunisian front had achieved some measure of stability by this date, Africa Replacement Battalions continued to pour in. By 6 February, Allied intelligence reported that they represented seventeen of the thirty-eight German infantry battalions, nearly half of the total and a third of all the infantry, including the Italians, available to von Arnim.

Africa Replacement Battalions in the Frontline

The impact of this infusion of manpower can be seen by examining where the Africa Replacement and Tunis Field Battalions were assigned once they arrived in the front lines. Note that for some of these battalions, they were moved so frequently around the Tunisian battlefield that today, in some cases, it is difficult to track their assignment histories without consulting individual battalion records, many of which were lost or destroyed following the German surrender.

For example, within XC Corps (then Fifth Panzer Army), Field Battalions T1, T3, and T4 were initially assigned to Division von Broich/ Manteuffel. After defending Bizerte, Field Battalion T5 was attached to Grenadier Regiment 756 of the 334th Infantry Division, instead of that regiment’s second battalion. Once that battalion arrived from France, Field Battalion T5 was then sent to reinforce Kampfgruppe Schmid of.
Africa Replacement Battalion A33 was at first assigned to Kampfgruppe Schmid but was then absorbed by Panzergrenadier Regiment 69 of 10th Panzer Division and disbanded. Africa Replacement Battalion A34 was assigned to Kampfgruppe Fullriede of the 961st Light Africa Grenadier Regiment (part of Afrika Division 999), where it fought with distinction at the Battle of Fonduk Gap on 27 March 1943.

Not all of these Africa Replacement and Tunis Field Battalions were sent to the Fifth Panzer Army. Panzer Army Africa eventually got its share, including Krueger-Haye’s Africa Replacement Battalion 18/Field Battalion T2, which was attached to Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer, part of Panzergrenadier Regiment 104 of the 21st Panzer Division. Africa Replacement Battalion A29 was assigned to Defense Sector Ousseltia and then fought with the 21st Panzer Division at Mezzouma.

As many as half of all Africa Replacement Battalions were parceled out among Italian units such as the Imperiali or Superga Divisions. Between six and fourteen Africa Replacement Battalions, at one time or another, were arrayed along the nearly 100-mile-long Italian defensive line that stretched from Pont du Fahs to Faid, a sector that included the Hermann Göring Division. Africa Replacement Battalion A24 was first assigned to Panzer Grenadier Regiment 69 of 10th Panzer Division, then to Kampfgruppe Schmid as well. Africa Replacement Battalion A25 was assigned to the Italian Superga Division, then as a reinforcement to Grenadier Regiment 756 of the 334th Infantry Division, followed shortly thereafter by its attachment to Kampfgruppe Schmid to help hold Defensive Sector Kairouan. Africa Replacement Battalion A30 was assigned to Division von Manteuffel as division reserve in January 1943.
the tactically important southern passes of the Eastern Dorsal mountain range.

Some of the Africa Replacement and Tunis Field Battalions that contributed to the success of the Italian’s defensive effort in the south included Africa Replacement Battalion A22, which was attached to the Italian Superga Division and fought at Ousseltia and Kairouan; Africa Replacement Battalion A26, which was also attached to the Superga Division and fought at El Hammam; Africa Replacement Battalion A27, which was attached to the Italian Defensive Sector near Kairouan; and Africa Replacement Battalion A28, which was attached to the Italian Defensive Sectors Ousseltia and Kairouan. Tunis Field Battalion T5 also served with the Superga during the last phase of the Tunisian Campaign.

**U.S. II Corps Experience Against Africa Replacement Battalions**

Africa Replacement Battalions encountered the Allies, troops of the U.S. II Corps, relatively early during the Tunisian Campaign. One of the earliest incidents occurred on 2 December 1942, when 3d Battalion, 26th Infantry, of the 1st Infantry Division, commanded by Lt. Col. John W. Bowen, conducted a reconnaissance in force from Sbeitla eastward towards Sfax. The key to this high-speed avenue of approach leading to the coast was the narrow pass in the mountains east of the village of Faid; whoever held it controlled the road. Should Bowen’s task force reach Sfax, he could potentially have prevented or delayed the linkup between Fifth Panzer Army and Rommel’s army, a move that would have proved disastrous for the Axis’ plans to unite both forces and conduct a deliberate defense of Tunisia.

The pass, however, was blocked by a 150-man Kampfgruppe composed of 2d Company, Africa Replacement Battalion 18 (for example, Tunis Field Battalion T2), reinforced by a small Italian contingent, which had positioned five antitank guns in an all-round defense. The commander of the Axis force, 1st Lt. Friedrich Gladow, put up a spirited defense throughout the day, bringing Bowen’s much larger task force to a halt and forcing it to ground in the rock-strewn valley below.

Nevertheless, by midnight Gladow’s force was surrounded and running low on ammunition and water. A request for help had gone out that afternoon, and the battalion commander, Lieutenant Krueger-Haye, was en route early the next morning from Sfax with a relief force of 120 additional men, 2 tanks, and a section of Italian armored cars. They arrived too late, for in the meantime,
the 3d Battalion had launched a deliberate attack with air support, and the pass was in American hands by 1130 on 3 December, with a prisoner haul of 125 men, including 47 Italians. American losses totaled two killed and six wounded. Faid Pass was then handed over to Free French forces under U.S. II Corps command, who held it successfully until 30 January 1943. Despite the failure of Africa Replacement Battalion 18 to hold the pass, it was able to set up a much stronger position a few miles to the east, and thus Axis forces prevented Allied troops from reaching Sfax until April.

The U.S. II Corps and its Free French allies frequently encountered Tunis Field and Africa Replacement Battalions after the initial battle at Faid Pass, though in nearly every case the Germans held prepared defensive positions and were usually able to stand their ground. However, on several occasions, these makeshift organizations showed that they could conduct offensive operations as well if conditions were suitable. The best example of their employment against American forces was the German attack that retook Faid Pass on 30 January 1943, which established the necessary conditions for the successful Axis operation at Sidi Bou Zid two weeks later.

At the end of January 1943, there were three openings in the southern Eastern Dorsal mountain range (Faid Pass, Sidi Khalif, and Ain Rebaou) held by some 1,000 Free French from General Marie Joseph Edmond Welvert’s Constantine Division that kept the Axis forces bottled inside the southern flank of their Tunisian beachhead. At the time, the French were under the tactical control of Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall’s II Corps, whose own forces were arrayed to the south between Thala and Gafsa. Before the Axis could launch their ambitious twin offensive operations, code-named Frühlingswind and Morgenluft (Spring Wind and Morning Air), which were designed to cut off and destroy II Corps in the area between Faid and Kasserine, all three mountain passes had to be retaken.

As chance would have it, the mission of retaking Faid Pass fell to Africa Replacement Battalion 18/Tunis Field Battalion T2, which was ordered to encircle the Free French and seize the pass during the evening of 29–30 January as part of a larger operation conducted by Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer of the 21st Panzer Division. Attacking from the south during early morning darkness, the battalion’s spearhead company blundered into the French forward positions near Hill 644, awoke the defenders, and was soon pinned down in a hail
of grenades and machine gun fire. The replacement battalion’s lack of experience in conducting offensive operations soon became apparent when the lead company panicked and fled the scene, leaving the wounded company commander an unwilling guest of the French. After losing fifty men, Krueger-Haye, the battalion commander, pulled his men back and tried again five hours later. This second attempt finally managed to cut off and encircle the defenders after the artillery of 21st Panzer Division was brought to bear, though not after the German timetable for the overall attack was severely disrupted.25

Though the assault on Faid Pass was not conducted with the Wehrmacht’s usual competence or offensive spirit, Africa Replacement Battalion 18 had at least succeeded in its mission and now held its objective. The counterattack launched 31 January by Combat Command A of the 1st Armored Division was driven off with heavy losses by 21st Panzer Division. Its failure sealed the fate of the French, whose 134 survivors surrendered to Krueger-Haye’s battalion the following day.26 Krueger-Haye was relieved of command 4 February for disobeying orders, but his battalion, under a new commander, played an active role in the coming offensive, which culminated in the American defeat at Kasserine Pass on 18 February. Africa Replacement Battalion 18 was disbanded by the end of the month and its survivors incorporated into Panzergrenadier Regiment 104 of the 21st Panzer Division.

Following the Axis’ tactical successes at Sidi bou Zid and Kasserine Pass (where several Africa Replacement Battalions played prominent roles) between 14 and 22 February 1943, the pause in operations was used to implement a series of unit reorganizations that lasted until the end of the month. Intended to reorganize German forces in Tunisia, 26 February 1943

Following the Axis’ tactical successes at Sidi bou Zid and Kasserine Pass (where several Africa Replacement Battalions played prominent roles) between 14 and 22 February 1943, the pause in operations was used to implement a series of unit reorganizations that lasted until the end of the month. Intended to restore unit tables of organization and to bring the older formations of the original Afrikakorps back to their authorized strength, Tunis Field and Africa Replacement Battalions were finally used to round out gaps in the organizational structure of existing Afrikakorps formations, their former numerical designations being discarded immediately thereafter. Such was the case with Africa Replacement Battalion A40, which was simply re-designated as 2d Battalion, Panzergrenadier Regiment “Afrika,” and incorporated as an organic element of the veteran 164th Light Africa Division. Africa Replacement Battalion A35 suffered a different fate when it was attached to 90th Light Africa Division to furnish replacements and then disbanded altogether.27
Though these developments corresponded with their original stated purpose, the continued disruption of the normal personnel replacement system, coupled with the always-threatened logistical lifeline to continental Europe, meant that using *Africa Replacement Battalions* as a stop-gap measure would continue to the end of the campaign. According to one source, “Not even the normal process of replacement by allocating troops from replacement battalions to fill up depleted units could be carried out. Instead, it became a practice to fill out regiments by assigning to them *Tunis Field* and *Africa Replacement Battalions*.” Deploying these battalions as combat troops did have its advantages though; not only did they have a relatively light logistical footprint (always a consideration when supplying an army by constrained air- and sealift), but their use allowed the German High Command to send regular formations to where they were needed even more urgently, such as the Eastern Front and the ongoing relief of Stalingrad, which until the surrounded *Sixth Army’s* surrender on 2 February 1943 occupied Hitler’s attention more than anything else.

**Shortcomings of *Africa Replacement and Tunis Field Battalions in Combat***

Lack of training, to one degree or another, remained an issue with all of the replacement units sent to Tunisia, as evidenced by an official readiness report filed by the commander of *Tunis Field Battalion T3*, Capt. Michael Bürgermeister, at the end of January 1943. Even though the unit’s morale was good, he wrote, “The level of training of the rank and file of the battalion is insufficient, as [it] has had no chance at all since its establishment to conduct any kind of comprehensive weapons practice.” This was no exaggeration, since many of his men were not even in the combat arms and up to the point when they arrived in Tunisia had served in noncombat positions. Such training had to be conducted in the harsh classroom of the battlefield.

Due to their improvisational nature, with few exceptions, neither the *Tunis Field* nor the *Africa Replacement Battalions* ever received the same quantity of weapons and other organizational equipment as the other regular infantry or *Panzergrenadier* battalions did. In addition, they were constantly having their ranks thinned by the transfer of specialists and men with other skills in great demand to the veteran formations, leaving these units so reduced in strength that they were often combined with other replacement battalions or disbanded altogether. For example, on 2 February 1943, *Africa Replacement Battalion A30* was ordered to give up 47 artillerymen to the 21st *Panzer Division*, 51 antiaircraft artillerymen to Regiment Buhse, 126 men to *Tunis Field Battalion T4*, and 100 additional men to *Tunis Field Battalion T3*, out of an original strength of about 1,000 men. In exchange, however, it was formally *etatisiert* (officially converted to a standard table of organization) as *Panzergrenadier Battalion A30*, one of the few to undergo this transformation.30 Though the *Tunis Field Battalions* were indeed creatures of improvisation and lacked for many things,
such as motor vehicles, the Africa Replacement Battalions seemed to have been even less favored. On account of their temporary nature, most were not formally reorganized as combat units at all and remained, until the end, in their original replacement battalion structure, which made them poorly suited for tactical operations and contributed to their lack of unit cohesion. These improvised combat units were equipped at first with small arms and machine guns but were gradually provided a greater establishment of heavy weapons.

Most of the Africa Replacement Battalions were considered by German North African Campaign veterans as being little more than Alarmeinheiten (emergency units). They were seen as a Verlorene Haufen (forlorn hope) of “orphans” who were passed frequently from one higher headquarters to another, being verheizt (pointlessly sacrificed) for limited gains. Without a German division headquarters to call their own, whose commander would naturally look after their welfare had they been organic to a division, many of the Africa Replacement Battalions were poorly fed, received inadequate medical care, and were often deprived of mail due to a lack of means to deliver it to them. Those battalions attached to Italian formations suffered even more from the lack of basic necessities, since these organizations were even worse off logistically than the Germans. As if this were not enough of an obstacle, there was still the language barrier to consider.

**The Views of One Commander**

Lt. Gen. Wolfgang Fischer, commander of the 10th Panzer Division until his death on 1 February 1943, had a low estimate of the usefulness of these units when he first encountered them in combat. In a report dated 2 December 1942, a week after he had arrived with his division’s advanced detachment, he stated that the German forces’ prospects for success in Tunisia were dimmed by the low quality of these Africa Replacement Battalions, reporting that their use in the infantry role was seriously deficient in important respects. Furthermore, he stated that among these units not the slightest interest existed, no aggressive spirit, no readiness for action, so that I was forced to lead some companies, platoons, even squads. I consider it my duty...
to point out this critical condition as it is impossible to fight successfully with such troops. It is also true that their command is inadequate. I have warned one captain who failed several times to execute his mission that in case of a repetition I would have him relieved. I had another officer relieved on the spot and demanded that he be court-martialed because he and his men lurked under cover for hours.31

Fischer also stated in a report that same day that rather than send any more of these provisional units to Tunisia, which in his opinion were of limited tactical use, it would be far better to dedicate available shipping space to bring the rest of his division as well as the other established units awaiting transport in France and Italy. His request was declined and the shipment of Africa Replacement Battalions to the Tunisian theater of operations continued unabated.

Despite Fischer’s negative evaluation, the five Tunis Field Battalions, combined with the nineteen documented Africa Replacement Battalions (totaling about 20,000 to 25,000 men by the end of the campaign), proved to be welcome reinforcements to the Tunisian bridgehead during the initial stages of the buildup of the German lodgment area between 15 November and 25 December 1942 when the Allies finally went over to a defensive posture. Without this vital infusion of manpower, Nehring’s XC Corps, later the Fifth Panzer Army, would not have had the soldiers needed to man the defensive perimeter ringing the Tunisian bridgehead. With the addition of these units, however well or poorly they were trained and equipped, the bridgehead was more or less secured and the danger of an Allied envelopment had passed by Christmas.

### Conclusion

Eventually, most of the Tunis Field and Africa Replacement Battalions were disbanded, renamed, or amalgamated into other units before the Allies finally succeeded in bringing Axis forces to bay in May 1943. Of the rest, the German Army High Command decided to keep only eight Africa Replacement Battalions (A22, A25, A26, A27, A28, A30, A31, and A33) as well as three of the five Tunis Field Battalions (T1, T3, and T4) on the order...
of battle. They were to be converted to a regular establishment, leaving their eventual status to be decided at a later date. Tunis Field Battalions T3 and T4, along with Africa Replacement Battalion A30, were incorporated into Panzer Grenadier Regiment 160 of Division von Manteuffel but kept their temporary designations. The campaign in North Africa ended before their permanent redesignations as the regiment’s 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions could be formalized.

All of the remaining Tunis Field and Africa Replacement Battalions marched into captivity alongside the veterans of the Afrikakorps and Fifth Panzer Army. Though these hastily scraped-together reserves might not have seemed capable of standing up to their much better organized, trained, and equipped Allied opponents in Tunisia, most of Rommel’s twenty-four lost battalions gave a good account of themselves. Along with other deploying elements of Fifth Panzer Army, they provided the necessary manpower that contributed to the German’s success in preventing the Allies from seizing Bizerte and Tunis in November 1942, forcing the war in North Africa to drag on for six more bloody months.

Notes

4. War Department Technical Manual TM-E 30-451, Handbook on German Military Forces, 15 March 1945, p. 1-66. Africa Replacement Battalions were designated with a capital A followed by a numeric designation related to the order in which they were raised.
5. Each training and replacement unit in the zone of the interior in Germany was affiliated with a combat unit raised from the same region, though this did not always occur in practice. For example, replacements bound for Panzergrenadier Regiment 104 of the 21st Panzer Division normally originated from Panzergrenadier Ersatz Battalion 104 in Landau; those bound for Panzergrenadier Regiment 155 of the 90th Light Africa Division came from Panzergrenadier Ersatz Battalion 50 in Küstrin.
10. The historical record does not provide a complete list of all the Africa Replacement Battalions and Tunis Field Battalions sent to Tunisia between 12 November 1942 and 31 March 1943, but through the process of analyzing the Kriegstagebücher (war diaries) of the various German units concerned and Allied intelligence reports, the author has determined that, all told, twenty-four of these units arrived and were incorporated into Rommel’s forces by the end of March 1943.
20. Kriegstagebuch, PzAOK 5, Panzer-Armee, Anlage 1a Nr. 223/43, Taktische Kräftegliederung (Tactical Force Dispositions), 6 February 1943; Allied Force Headquarters, G–2 Estimate No. 4 of Axis Battle Order, Strength and Dispositions in Tunisia, 14 February 1943.
21. Indeed, after 26 February 1943, Panzer Armee Afrika, renamed the Deutsch-Italienische Panzermarme, was allocated 80 percent of all replacement personnel thereafter (see Oberkommando des Heeresleitung (OKH) Order Number 1016/43, 26 February 1943).
25. After Action Report, 1c Meldung über die Kampfhandlung vom 30.1. bis 1.2.1943; Headquarters, 21st Panzer Division, 4 February 1943.
26. The defending Free French forces consisted of two companies from the 3d Zouave Regiment, one company of the 2d Algerian Rifle Regiment, 1 platoon of the 19th Engineer Regiment, and a section of guns from the 67th Artillery Regiment (see 21st Panzer Division report, above).
27. Appendix 1 to OKH Order No. 1016/43, 26 February 1943, pp. 1–2.
29. Kriegstagebuch Anglageheft, Division von Broich, 1 February 1943.
30. Headquarters, Division von Manteuffel, Division Order 99/43, 2 February 1943.
32. OKH Order No. 1016/43, 26 February 1943.
The Society of the Cincinnati was founded in May 1783 by General George Washington and officers of the Continental Army for the purpose of preserving the rights and liberties won through the Revolution. The society is the oldest of American hereditary societies and is still active, currently composed of the descendants of Revolutionary War officers. There is also a French branch of the society that was founded by officers of the French Army who had served in the American Revolution. The society takes its name from the Roman hero Cincinnatus, the famed citizen-soldier who refused positions of power after leading on the battlefield.

Since the founding of the society, its members wore a distinctive medal or insignia badge known as the Eagle to distinguish themselves as members. Several contemporary paintings of notable officers who served during the Revolution prominently depict the badge.

This particular example of the society badge was presented to General Anthony Wayne in 1787 and is a part of the National Collection of the United States Army. Designed by Maj. Pierre Charles L’Enfant and first produced in 1783, the badge is of gold and enamel and mounted on a silk ribbon. The design was not standardized until 1902 and several variations by different makers exist. In 2008, a version of the Eagle that had belonged to George Washington sold at auction for $5,305,000.

Wayne was born 1 January 1745 in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania, and was appointed by Congress as colonel of the 4th Pennsylvania Battalion in 1776. He served with distinction in Canada (1776), and at the battles of Brandywine (1777), Germantown (1777), Monmouth (1778), Stony Point (1779), and Yorktown (1781). He retired from active service as a brevet major general in 1783. President Washington selected Wayne to command and rehabilitate the United States Army in 1791. He was the senior officer of the Army from 1792 until his death in 1796. Under his leadership and training, the Army decisively defeated the northwestern Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers (1794).
Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley, is a Vietnam-centered biography of one of America’s most important post–World War II officers, General William C. Westmoreland. After presenting an overview of General Westmoreland’s life and career before President Lyndon B. Johnson made him deputy commander, and then commander, of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), in 1964, the book focuses on examining Westmoreland’s tour in Vietnam (1964–1968). It concludes by describing the general’s post-Vietnam career and life in retirement, much of which continued to be dominated by issues related to the war.

The author’s thesis runs something like this: Westmoreland was a dedicated, hard-working, egotistical, and ambitious conventional soldier of limited talent whom the Army promoted above his abilities with tragic consequences. Once he assumed command of MACV, he did nothing right. He ignored counterinsurgency precepts that were beyond his comprehension and embraced instead a hopeless strategy (the strategy of attrition); he implemented tactics (search and destroy) that undermined the greater goal of pacification, a subject he never understood; he misrepresented the situation in Vietnam to his superiors and the American people; he ignored America’s South Vietnamese allies and starved them of attention and materiel; he missed the signs of a major enemy offensive, and, when that offensive struck during the Tet holiday in January 1968, he compounded his error by asking President Johnson for more troops, thereby further undermining national confidence in the war. The government rewarded his miserable performance by kicking him upstairs to become Chief of Staff of the Army where he proved irrelevant. Stung by the criticism that attended his leadership in Vietnam, Westmoreland was condemned to spend the rest of his days in a lonely struggle to salvage his reputation by obfuscating the truth.

This is not a novel interpretation. Many people have widely criticized the U.S. Army, and General Westmoreland in particular, for the things that draw the author’s disapproval. Sorley has a specific interest in attacking Westmoreland as he has argued in an earlier work—A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam—that Westmoreland’s successor as MACV commander, General Creighton W. Abrams, essentially won the war by correcting Westmoreland’s mistakes.1 The story contains elements of truth. Westmoreland was neither a towering intellect nor a brilliant strategist, and there were differences between the way Westmoreland and Abrams prosecuted the war. But was Westmoreland the hapless antihero of Sorley’s morality play? Was he singularly responsible for the outcome of a complex, twenty-year politico-military event in which many individuals and institutions had a hand? The author pulls out all the stops to persuade the reader that this is the case—so much so that he resorts to questionable methods, producing in the end a fatally flawed book. The following paragraphs of this review outline some of the shortcomings of this work.

As is the case with many of Sorley’s writings, this volume depends heavily on interviews, reminiscences, and anecdotes, many related long after the events described. This approach is useful as long as it is rooted deeply in the archival record. Otherwise, personal bias, faulty memory, error based on incomplete knowledge, and misperception can produce a flawed image of the past. Regrettably, the author’s use of pri-
mary documentation to ground the story in facts is selective and superficial. Although he used documents drawn from the U.S. Army Center of Military History, the Army History and Education Center, and the Westmoreland Papers at the University of South Carolina, only one footnote in the entire book is based on a document drawn from the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. This institution houses the voluminous records of MACV and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Army. Anyone writing a comprehensive analysis of what Westmoreland did and why must make extensive use of this collection if he or she is to produce a full, factually grounded history. The author’s decision not to use these resources raises questions as to the completeness of the story.

The inadequate use of primary documents is compounded by poor citation technique. Many quotations have no citations, making it impossible to substantiate the related material. Without the ability to verify the quotations and the context in which they were made, the quotes in and of themselves have no meaning. The author is also sometimes careless, as a random check found several footnotes that did not contain the promised information. Some of the blame for these omissions falls on the publisher and its editors, but ultimately the responsibility is Sorley’s. Such shortcomings may appear inconsequential to the nonspecialist, but good history, like good science, is rooted in verifiable facts.

Had such matters of the historian’s trade as sources and citations been this book’s only problem, one could minimize their significance, but they are a symptom of greater troubles. One of the greatest is the book’s penchant for not presenting the reader all of the available information so as to place events and decisions in context. One of the first examples of omission occurs when the author praises a “valiant attempt” to block Westmoreland’s assignment to Vietnam by then-Col. Amos A. Jordan Jr., a story the 87-year-old retiree related to the author in a phone conversation in 2009. The tale may be true, but up to this point the book has not given the reader a convincing reason to question Westmoreland’s selection. Sorley offers no explanation for the decision other than Westmoreland’s relationship with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), General Maxwell D. Taylor. It might have been interesting for the author to have explained why the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, said Westmoreland was “first rate.” Or why National Security staffer Michael V. Forrestal thought that Westmoreland was perhaps the answer to the nation’s need to have in Saigon “the ablest, most modern minded three-star general we can find.” Or why the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, William H. Sullivan, welcomed Westmoreland’s ascension as MACV commander because “with the takeover of the military command by General Westmoreland, we can shift from trying to kill every Viet Cong to protecting the Vietnamese population.” The author is likewise silent on Westmoreland’s views about counterinsurgency and Vietnam prior to the general’s deployment. He does not explore Westmoreland’s role in introducing counterinsurgency into the curriculum at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point when he was superintendent there between 1960 and 1963. The reader will not learn, as writer Ann Marlowe has related, that in 1962 Westmoreland helped David Galula, the U.S. Army’s patron saint of counterinsurgency, get a research position at Harvard, nor, that Galula attended a counterinsurgency symposium hosted by Westmoreland at West Point in 1963.6

These omissions seem odd given their relevance to the story, but they soon become commonplace. Once the book gets to Westmoreland’s service in South Vietnam, it reads less like an objective history and more like a political attack ad. Whether the author is writing about matters of strategy and tactics, troop requests, the Tet offensive, or arming the South Vietnamese with M16s, he lavishes criticism on the MACV commander without fully explaining the situation. As one example, the book criticizes the search and destroy tactic, but fails to say that this was only one tactic and that Westmoreland also espoused others, including small-unit and pacification support operations; that there were sometimes good reasons for conducting search and destroy operations; and that every commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam before and after Westmoreland employed it. Likewise, Sorley legitimately criticizes the twelve-month tour policy, yet never bothers to explain why Westmoreland and his superiors chose this system. In its recent wars, the U.S. government has learned from its Vietnam experience and rotated by units, rather than individuals, with salutary effects. Still, as in Vietnam, troops generally do not serve more than twelve months at a time in-theater, a policy that works to the detriment of counterinsurgency programs now as it did then. There are pros and cons to rotating personnel, just as there are in most complex decisions. But for the author, there is no room for nuance. There are no shades of gray, only stark contrasts of black and white—and Westmoreland is found on the dark side of every issue. By sacrificing completeness, balance, and objectivity, the book denies the reader a fuller understanding of the Vietnam War and of Westmoreland’s role in it. The result is a caricature of the MACV commander rather than a fair portrait.

Compounding the selective use of documentation and the omission of necessary context and perspective is the author’s habit of mischaracterization. As in his earlier works, Sorley distorts the Army’s Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam (PROVN) report.7 He rep-
resents it as a stunning indictment of General Westmoreland, when it was not, and neglects to mention that Westmoreland agreed with much of its content. Similarly, the author misrepresents a 1966 JCS memorandum on the course of the war. He depicts this document as a pointed critique of Westmoreland’s approach to the conflict when it was nothing of the kind. The memorandum targets the strategic policies of President Johnson’s administration, not Westmoreland’s methods, which the report does not even discuss. The 1966 JCS report’s preferred course of action was for the United States to dramatically increase air and naval action against North Vietnam, to launch major incursions into Cambodia and Laos, and to greatly expand the war in the South by placing the United States on a full war footing and by rapidly deploying large additional forces so as to “continue to seek out and destroy the enemy” on an expanded basis. It is hard to understand how the author interpreted these recommendations as a critique of Westmoreland—indeed Westmoreland probably would have welcomed the suggested program.8

Another example of skewed presentation concerns Westmoreland’s alleged neglect of the South Vietnamese Army. The author offers a quote from part of the U.S. Army’s official history of the Vietnam War to the effect that Westmoreland never altered the division of responsibilities he initially set for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.9 The statement is accurate, but it is only tangentially related to the question of whether Westmoreland supported improving South Vietnamese forces. Unlike the impression given by the author, the official history provides evidence of improvements that occurred during the Westmoreland era, of Westmoreland’s efforts to make more changes, and to the factors that impeded progress, some of which were beyond the MACV commander’s control. Conversely, Sorley is silent over the fact that in 1967 Westmoreland assigned his talented deputy, General Abrams, with the task of improving the South Vietnamese military. If the South Vietnamese did not improve as Sorley alleges, does not Abrams bear some of the blame? It is a fair question, but not one that fits into the author’s argument.

The deeper one gets in the book the more it becomes apparent that the author’s thesis, that Westmoreland botched the war and that Abrams turned everything around after he became MACV commander, is driving the selection and presentation of facts. One example of this involves a lecture that the eminent historian and ghostwriter of Westmoreland’s memoir, Charles B. MacDonald, gave at the Army War College in 1976. In the lecture Mac-

Donald compared and contrasted the leadership styles of Westmoreland and Abrams.10 Sorley mined the lecture for every unflattering comment about Westmoreland, but he neglected to relay information contrary to his case, to include the following statement by MacDonald:

When General Abrams succeeded General Westmoreland in Vietnam, reporters were quick to say that Abrams sharply altered the tactics and strategy of the war. I’ve heard the same from soldiers, including at least one general officer, but that simply was not the case. And Abrams himself, I am told, was embarrassed by that speculation.11

Westmoreland enjoys a moment with the soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division during one of his frequent visits to the field.
MacDonald went on to explain how virtually all the changes instituted by Abrams were relatively minor and were “evolutionary rather than revolutionary,” reflecting changes in the nature of the war itself rather than of a fundamental transformation in the conception of how it should be fought. The author also misleads the reader by linking unrelated information. In one instance, he juxtaposes a statement by Ambassador Henry C. Lodge to the effect that socioeconomic developments were critical to shaping the outcome of the war with an unfootnoted and unexplained quotation from Westmoreland to the effect that Lodge had little military knowledge. The implication is that Westmoreland disagreed with Lodge on the role of socioeconomic affairs. In fact, Westmoreland shared Lodge’s appreciation of the role political and socioeconomic concerns played in combating an insurgency, regardless of what he might have thought about the ambassador’s military credentials.

The above mischaracterization is just one example of how the author builds his larger argument to deny that Westmoreland had any interest in pacification. The documentary evidence is contrary. Indeed, as MacDonald told the students at the Army War College in a passage that Sorley ignored, “I think the most unjust criticism of General Westmoreland’s conduct of the war was the oft-repeated allegation that Westmoreland never understood that the war was political rather than military. That’s absurd.” Absurd it is, yet that notion is central to Sorley’s thesis. Nowhere in the book will one find a discussion of Westmoreland’s thoughts and actions in the realm of pacification, civic action, nation building, or even counterinsurgency. The book mentions neither the major Hop Tac pacification program that Westmoreland initiated in 1964 nor the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program started under his watch in 1967, which he fully supported. CORDS was just one of many initiatives begun during Westmoreland’s tenure that would mature after he departed Vietnam—a fact the author erroneously denies.

While the book ignores evidence contrary to the author’s point of view, it does not hesitate to draw conclusions without any form of substantiation. The author claims Westmoreland found advice from Brig. Gen. William P. Yarborough “uncongenial,” yet he offers no evidence that this was so. On the same page, Sorley writes that Westmoreland accepted bad advice from General Douglas MacArthur, again without evidence. Later, the author doubts Westmoreland’s assertions on the desirability of introducing ground troops but offers no source to prove his point. Assertions without proof are not evidence.

“Is it possible,” reads a rhetorical question on the book’s dust jacket, “that the riddle of America’s military failure in Vietnam has a one-word, one-man answer?” For this reviewer, Sorley’s answer to this question strains credulity, particularly because of his effort to stack the deck. Ultimately, the book’s fixation with blaming Westmoreland for every misstep during the war devolves into absurdity. No subject is too small to draw opprobrium. Thus, not only did Westmoreland botch the war by his poor generalship, but he also had the affront...
to take time out to exercise three times a week. If that was not bad enough, he was a lousy tennis player to boot. When the general suffers a fractured wrist in a tennis match, the author quips that this was the closest Westmoreland came to bodily harm during the war. Cheap shots like this are not only unnecessary but untrue. Westmoreland put far more on the line than his wrist during his frequent trips to the field, such as the time his helicopter was hit by enemy fire as it departed the besieged base of Khe Sanh in 1968. That Sorley failed to report this event, while relaying the anecdote about Westmoreland’s tennis game, speaks volumes about the author’s mindset in writing this book.

Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam is a tragedy, but not the tragedy the author intended. Blinded by an Ahab-like obsession to destroy Westmoreland’s reputation as a general, Sorley has merely managed to call into question his own reputation as a scholar. Rather than reading this book, those interested in obtaining an accurate and balanced examination of Westmoreland’s decisions and the context in which they occurred should reach instead for Samuel Zaffiri’s fine 1994 biography, Westmoreland or Graham A. Cosmas’ two-volume history, MACV: The Joint Command.17

NOTES

3. Memo, McGeorge Bundy for the President, 9 Jan 64, Historians files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH).
4. Memo, Michael V. Forrestal for McGeorge Bundy, 4 Feb 64, sub: South Vietnam, Historians files, CMH.
5. Memo for Record, Summary Record of the Meeting on Southeast Asia, Cabinet Room, June 10, 1964, 5:30 PM—Southeast Asia, Historians files, CMH.
8. Sorley, Westmoreland, p. 145; Report by the J–3 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Courses of Action for Southeast Asia, 13 Jan 67, p. 5 (quotation), unmarked box, Westmoreland Papers, U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
15. Sorley, Westmoreland, p. 68.
16. Ibid., p. 78.
Although the late Samuel P. Huntington published his seminal *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957) over fifty years ago, it remains a touchstone for any discussion of military professionalism. Huntington defined the terms for a debate that continues to this day. Painting with a broad brush, he claimed that military professionalism did not exist until the Prussians invented it in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars. Huntington also argued that military professionalism did not really blossom in the United States until after the Civil War, and it had to wait even longer to win acceptance in Great Britain.

Huntington’s generalizations have attracted their share of critics. William B. Skelton, for one, successfully demonstrated in his book, *An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784–1861* (Lawrence, Kans., 1992), that the roots of American military professionalism ran deep into the antebellum period. Now two decades later, Ira D. Gruber, a distinguished historian of the British Army in the American War of Independence, has produced a brilliant study that argues the process of professionalization took hold in that force during the eighteenth century.

*Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution* is about books—books that shaped the army that failed to preserve the First British Empire. The product of decades of research, this is a complex and richly textured study that uncovers the collective mindset of the British officers who fought from Lexington to Yorktown. Interestingly, Gruber’s research received considerable support from the Society of the Cincinnati, which is composed of descendants of the Continental Army officers who triumphed over King George III’s forces. The society permitted Gruber full access to its exceptional collection of early modern books on war, and it also cosponsored the publication of his book.

Gruber adopted an ingenious approach to reconstructing the reading habits of the eighteenth-century British officer corps. Since most infantry and cavalry officers learned their trade on the job without the benefit of command and staff schools or war colleges, Gruber could draw on no set curricula to guide his research. He created a sample of forty-two British officers of long and varied service who soldiered between the wars of Louis XIV and the French Revolution. Gruber admits that these officers tended to be more affluent, better educated, and better connected than the norm. Yet if this sample cannot be considered representative, it definitely contained the sort of individuals who shaped the opinions of their fellow officers and transformed British military culture.

With painstaking precision, Gruber discovered that these officers owned, cited, noted, or recommended 650 books on war, while neglecting 243 other available titles. They preferred works on military and naval history, engineering, the art of war, and the writings of ancient Greek and Roman authorities. These officers exhibited less interest in works on drill, discipline, and military medicine.

Gruber identifies the War of the Austrian Succession as a major turning point in the evolution of the British officer corps. French victories shook British officers’ smug satisfaction with their army and tactics dating back to the Duke of Marlborough. In addition to reforming their combat methods, these officers also began to read more extensively on the art of war, particularly continental titles from France and Holland.

Gruber explains how British Army officers grew increasingly serious and committed to their profession. Ambitious junior officers appreciated the value of learning French and reading continental books. The Hanoverian kings, George II and George III, and the former’s son, William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, progressively raised standards within the officer corps. They expected all officers to be courageous, skilled in combined arms, and prepared for varied service at home and abroad.

French treatises heavily influenced the British officers who attempted to suppress the American bid for independence. The French authorities that these officers most admired—such as Maurice, comte de Saxe, and Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban—advocated what Gruber called a “prudential” or cautious approach to conducting both offensive and defensive campaigns, stressing careful preparations and gath-
erRING ample intelligence. They did not always consider battle an ideal tool for attaining success.

The British government initially responded to the outbreak of the American Revolution with a massive show of force aimed at achieving a quick victory. This strategy conflicted with the cautious predilections of Sir William Howe, John Burgoyne, and Sir Henry Clinton, who opted to act more methodically. Howe and Clinton achieved nothing decisive, and Burgoyne’s army would be captured at Saratoga. Yet even aggressive commanders floundered in North America. Thomas Gage claimed a bloody victory at Bunker Hill that seriously weakened his command, and Lord Charles Cornwallis did much the same at Guilford Court House. Furthermore, Cornwallis’ impulsive- ness ultimately resulted in disaster at Yorktown. George Washington also adopted the prudential way of war advocated by Marshal Saxe, and his adherence to the strategic and tactical defensive eventually wore down his overextended British foes.

It is impossible to do justice to this monumental work in a short review. Gruber has produced both an important monograph and a valuable reference with detailed appendixes that disclose when the books British officers preferred came into vogue and when they fell from favor. Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution is essential reading for students of the British Army, the American War of Independence, and military professionalism.

Well before the war, the Chesapeake Bay and nearby waters had been the scene of unfortunate and ugly encounters between the Royal Navy, American merchantmen, and the United States Navy. Britain sought sailors for its fleet through impressment and to deny France war materials by searching ships and seizing contraband goods as the United States attempted protecting its rights at sea and preserving its commerce with wartime European countries. The worst of these engagements, the Chesapeake-Leopard affair of 1807 and President–Little Belt incident of 1811 highlighted the tensions between Great Britain and the United States and helped drive the two countries closer to war. Concerns at sea intersected with Western expansion, Indian wars (and suspicions of British complicity) in the Old Northwest and Old Southwest, and calls for war by congressional “war hawks.” When the United States declared war in June 1812, the U.S.-Canadian frontier became the locus of the larger land campaigns. Invasion, counterattack, and eventual stalemate marked the northern theater. To relieve pressure against Canada and take the war to the center of American political power, Britain concentrated its efforts in the Chesapeake Bay in 1814, where its unmatched sea power gave British forces superior operational reach and mobility.

Against this backdrop, Ralph E. Eshelman, Scott S. Sheads, and Donald R. Hickey have carefully researched and written a superb scholarly reference to over eight hundred selected sites in the Chesapeake. The authors note that for the truly dedicated researcher, a full copy of the listing resides in the Fort McHenry National Monument and Historic Shrine’s research library in Baltimore, Maryland. Of the 805 sites listed, 623, over 70 percent, are located in Maryland; another 124 in Virginia, 53 in Washington, D.C., and another 5 in the outlying states of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and North Carolina. The sites are as varied

**Dr. Gregory J. W. Urwin** is a professor of history at Temple University in Philadelphia and a trustee of the Society for Military History. He received the first Earhart Foundation Fellowship on American History from the University of Michigan, William L. Clements Library. He also received the Tyree-Lamb Fellowship from the Society of the Cincinnati to research a social history of the 1781 Virginia campaign of British Lt. Gen. Charles, Second Earl Cornwallis.
The War of 1812 in the Chesapeake is organized with an introduction and five chapters with maps and illustrations; appendixes, including “Sites Whose Location Could Not Be Established”; notes; a bibliographical essay; and indexes. At the outset, the authors remark on the obscurity of the war today and also its small size compared to the War of Independence and the Civil War, although for many Americans of the age it was “an essential struggle to vindicate the new nation’s independence” (p. 1). Eshelman, Sheads, and Hickey take care to point out that the war was more than an “Anglo-American conflict waged mainly on the Canadian-American border,” and note its theaters and actors (p. 1). The authors then move on and give a concise overview of the war, its causes, conduct, termination, and consequences. Importantly, the authors suggest that the war can be seen as the last of the great colonial wars for dominance in North America, but they also place it in its larger context, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, 1793–1815, that engulfed Europe.

Following the larger view of the war, Eshelman, Sheads, and Hickey’s second chapter “Warfare in the Chesapeake” features helpful chronological, topical, and state-level synopses of events, characters, locales, the contributions of privateers, and the war’s legacy in the Chesapeake. The real meat and potatoes, however, is in Chapters 3 to 5, which are devoted to sites in Maryland, Virginia, and “The District of Columbia and Other Sites Related to the Chesapeake.” Each site listing is followed by a description highlighting its significance, condition, and location. Throughout, the authors have supplemented the text with illustrations, modern maps displaying locations and major roads, and period maps. Unfortunately, the maps do not always include scales that would enable readers to determine mileage or distance, an important, if minor detraction. The appendixes following the main body prove to be a wealth of useful information, noting sites that the authors were unable to locate, war-related gravesites, a chronology of the war in the Chesapeake, and a survey of the various actions in the region. Readers in search of further resources on the war in the Chesapeake will find the bibliographic essay valuable.

The authors are to be congratulated for this fine work, as is Johns Hopkins University Press for publishing such a handsome volume. It is a signal contribution for scholars and others interested in the war.

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Aside from John Brown or William Quantrill, there is no figure more associated with the Kansas-Missouri border wars than James H. Lane. For over 150 years, historians and popular culture have portrayed Lane as an unscrupulous demagogue and a near satanic scourge of Civil War-era Missourians. The evidence has always appeared overwhelming. His political life was marked by howling oratory, the murder of a neighbor, and near constant allegations of corruption. Even more damning were the burned-out farms and dead Missourians who seemed to mark the trail wherever Lane led a column of Kansas Jayhawkers. But the telling of history always seems to bring revisionists, and Lane now has his. Bryce Benedict, an Army veteran and attorney, tries in Jayhawkers to give a more nuanced and balanced historical portrait of Lane and his military operations in 1861 and 1862. It is a valiant effort, but Benedict does not present enough evidence to alter Lane’s negative image in history.

Although Benedict focuses narrowly on Lane’s military activity at the outset of the war, he does provide a brief biographical treatment. In it, Benedict touches on the salient features of Lane’s life before the start of the Civil War. Born and raised in Indiana, Lane practiced law until the
outbreak of the Mexican War when he formed a company of volunteers from Dearborn County. Shortly thereafter, he was elected colonel and regimental commander of the Third Indiana Volunteers. Lane then served with distinction under Zachary Taylor at the Battle of Buena Vista. A war hero, Lane returned to Indiana where he was elected to the United States Congress as a Democrat. Lane remained in Congress long enough to vote for the principle of popular sovereignty as embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. For reasons unknown, Lane left Indiana in 1855 and headed for Kansas where he promptly abandoned popular sovereignty and the Democratic Party. Over the next four years, Lane became synonymous with an aggressive Free State Party, which dedicated itself to purging slavery from the territory by any means. During this period, Lane supplemented his political activity with the command of paramilitary elements of the Free State movement.

Lane’s desire, and ability, to play both politics and war continued in the aftermath of the election of Abraham Lincoln and the secession of the Southern states. Lane was elected a U.S. senator, but he did not hesitate to ingratiate himself with Lincoln by providing a company of “Frontier Guards” to protect the president after the war commenced in April 1861. The result of this grandstanding, along with his other lobbying efforts, netted Lane a special dispensation to raise volunteer troops in Kansas as well as an appointment to brigadier general. Both acts carried no small amount of controversy as state governors usually raised volunteer troops and the U.S. Constitution forbade Lane from serving simultaneously as senator and general. Lane handled the controversy cunningly by never formally accepting his commission, which did not stop him from either raising the troops or commanding them in active operations. Possessing the president’s favor, Lane would be allowed to operate largely above the law despite the protests of many political opponents, including the governor of Kansas. To Benedict, “Lane had found a niche not occupied by anyone else” (p. 61).

By August 1861, Senator James Lane had a brigade of infantry consisting of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Regiments, Volunteer Infantry. The 6th Regiment, Volunteer Cavalry, also operated at Lane’s behest, although it was never formally attached to his brigade. Lane’s regiments were filled with many a veteran of the earlier border wars with Missouri. Included in the lot were two regimental commanders, Charles R. “Doc” Jennison and James Montgomery, who were already notorious for their vicious raids into Missouri. Lane and these men joined together, ostensibly, to protect Kansas in the late summer of 1861. At that time, most Kansans along the border feared invasion as a pro-Confederate army commanded by Sterling Price had defeated Union forces in southwest Missouri. Price followed his victory with a march to the north and the Missouri River, where he pivoted to the east and then defeated another Union army at Lexington. During Price’s long march north, Lane positioned his brigade at various spots along the border, always waiting for Price to strike into Kansas. When Price chose to ignore Kansas, Lane realized an opportunity to conduct a large-scale raid into Missouri. It was this raid that eventually resulted in the most well-known action of Lane’s extra-legal command of his brigade—the sacking and destruction of Osceola, Missouri.

Bryce Benedict’s description and analysis of the incident reveals both the strength and weakness of this book. In a fine bit of historical sleuthing, Benedict argues convincingly that many historians have inflated the amount of destruction wrought by Lane as his men pillaged and leveled the town. Using census data, Benedict shows that the town had no more than 267 white occupants, which was about 2,700 short of what most historians have claimed Lane left homeless. Benedict also casts some doubt on both the degree of drunkenness among the Kansans and the charge that Lane carted a piano out of the town as part of his own personal booty. While these points are interesting and necessary to make, they do not add up to a significant revision of Lane’s role in the affair and what still amounted to the deliberate destruction and plundering of a town.

The remainder of the book is uneven, although it does contain fine moments of historical detection. Such is the case when Benedict exposes a number of errors in H. E. Palmer’s memoirs, which have long stood as an essential primary source on Lane’s brigade. Similarly, Benedict does well to cast doubt on the idea that Lane ever uttered the infamous quote of wanting to clear Missouri of “everything disloyal, from a Shanghai rooster to a Durham cow” (p. 240). However, the book suffers from a number of flaws. First, Benedict fails to discuss Lane’s use of “total war” within a broader historiographical debate. Very noticeable is the absence of any reference to Mark Grimsley’s seminal Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861–1865 (New York, 1995). Second, Benedict makes use of only one map. The lack of maps is debilitating to a book of operational history containing a series of complicated troop movements. Finally, Benedict sometimes lards his narrative with extraneous material. This is especially the case in Chapter 9 when Benedict spends almost four pages discussing Indian affairs in southern Kansas that had no direct bearing on Lane’s operations. No less distracting, the author digresses even further with an abrupt description of some courts-martial within the brigade. The author does not offer an analysis or any attempt to link the courts-martial to a wider context of Lane’s brigade or matters of discipline during the war. It seems simply that the author discovered this information and felt obliged to include it somewhere within his narrative.

All of these problems are unfortunate as James Lane deserves a critical reexamination. Nevertheless, and despite a number of virtues, Jayhawkers is a disappointing book.

Dr. Kyle S. Sinisi is a professor of history at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina.
As the sesquicentennial of the Civil War is upon us, Americans find themselves besieged with a flurry of new publications dealing with that conflict, just as they did fifty years ago. A large number of these new works are aimed at promoting state tourism, and the Georgia Civil War Commission has made an early start by publishing its attractive guide to Civil War sites, Crossroads of Conflict. The book is written by Barry L. Brown, a tourism specialist for the Georgia Department of Economic Development, and Gordon R. Elwell, a former command historian for the Georgia National Guard and the current historian for the Georgia State Defense Force.

This guide is an updated version of a 1994 publication, and it has more than doubled the number of sites discussed to three hundred fifty. It is organized according to the nine tourism regions that have been designated by the state of Georgia. There is nothing wrong with this approach, but some regions are packed with war-related attractions, while other regions have almost nothing to offer Civil War buffs. In the latter category is the Magnolia Midlands region, located between Savannah and Macon, which has only two sites. At the other extreme is the Atlanta Metro region, which is home to almost one-quarter of Georgia’s Civil War attractions. These include the excellent Atlanta Cyclorama and the Atlanta History Center, with its impressive DuBose Gallery featuring more than fifteen hundred superbly displayed Union and Confederate artifacts.

One especially interesting anecdote discussed in the guide is the story of the “Roswell Women.” In the summer of 1864, when Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s troops arrived in Roswell, a town just north of Atlanta, they discovered the Ivy Woolen Mill, where about four hundred female employees were manufacturing cloth for the Confederacy. Sherman’s men burned the mill buildings, and they shipped the women, along with their children and a few men, by railroad to Louisville, Kentucky, and some of them were transported even farther, across the Ohio River into Indiana. The federal authorities hoped that these women “could no longer supply the Confederacy with their skilled labor at such a distance” (p. 67). Many of the women never returned to Georgia, and their sad story was largely forgotten until the 1980s. A monument honoring their sacrifice was finally erected near the Roswell town square in 2000.

As might be expected, this reader perceived a slight Confederate bias at a few points in the text. This bias revealed itself in the discussion of Camp Sumter, the infamous prison camp that the Confederacy constructed at Andersonville, in southern Georgia. In 1864–1865, about thirteen thousand Union prisoners of war died due to the camp’s appalling living conditions, and after the war the camp commandant, Capt. Henry Wirz, was tried, convicted, and hanged for war crimes in Washington, D.C. The guide does note the horrible environment that existed at Camp Sumter, but it seems to excuse the squalor by carefully pointing out that “the U.S. government [also] ran a prison system with systematic ill-treatment of Confederate captives in retaliation for conditions in the South” (p. 127). The guide attributes Captain Wirz’s trial to the fact that “[t]he Federal government needed a scapegoat” for Andersonville (p. 127). Today, tourists may visit Andersonville National Historic Site, with its impressive National Prisoners of War Museum and adjoining national cemetery, and wonder how such a beautiful site could have witnessed so many horrors. In the adjacent village of Andersonville, visitors can view the Wirz monument that was erected by the Georgia Division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy in 1909. The guide does not mention that the village annually pays homage to Captain Wirz as a sort of hero-martyr on the anniversary of his public execution, but it does accurately note that “[l]ike the record of the man it pays tribute to, the monument remains controversial” (p. 127).

A useful addition to this guide is an appendix that lists global positioning system (GPS) coordinates for all the sites discussed. This appendix enables map-challenged tourists to be able to find the sites by using the GPS devices in their vehicles.

Avid military historians who intend to conduct terrain walks at Chickamauga or on the battlefields associated with General Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign or his later March to the Sea will need a more in-depth guide than Crossroads of Conflict. For those who seek a less-detailed, well-illustrated, and fairly priced guide encompassing all of Georgia’s war-related sites, such as buildings and monuments, this publication is highly recommended.

Notes

1. For more details on these women, see the “Deportation of the Roswell Mill Women” entry on the New Georgia Encyclopedia Web site. [http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-1086]

2. For a revisionist study disproving the claim that the United States established policies to retaliate against Confederate prisoners of war, see Andersonvilles of the North: The Myths and Realities of Northern Treatment of Civil War Confederate Prisoners, by James M.
Review by Mark L. Bradley

Since the appearance in 1995 of Stephen V. Ash’s groundbreaking study, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861–1865*, several monographs have examined the subject from a more local perspective to delineate the nuances that a broader study can only suggest. Judkin Browning trains his lens on Craven and Carteret Counties in eastern North Carolina, which fell to Union forces in March 1862. Browning, an assistant professor of history at Appalachian State University, describes his study as “a story of whites and blacks, men and women, soldiers and civilians, rebels and Unionists, all trying to carve out a social and cultural space for themselves during a tense time” (p. 7).

Giving a brief history of the two counties and a description of conditions on the eve of war, Browning contrasts the secessionist fervor of Craven County’s residents with the Unionist sentiment of Carteret County’s inhabitants: in February 1861, Craven approved a secession convention by over five hundred votes, whereas Carteret cast only twenty-one votes in its favor. The author then devotes an entire chapter to the first year of the war. On 14 April 1861, after receiving news of the fall of Fort Sumter, a large number of Beaufort men led by hotel proprietor Josiah Solomon Pender captured Fort Macon, the nearest symbol of federal authority. This display of martial spirit served notice to neighboring Craven County that Beaufort was also committed to war and secession. Yet Browning notes that in Carteret, “primarily unattached youth flocked to the banners. . . . Their fathers generally stayed out of the war.” In Craven, however, “established citizens matched the zeal of youth. . . . Their commitment was deeper; they fought to preserve their homes and households” (p. 37).

Browning next covers the fall of New Bern and Beaufort and the beginning of military occupation. On 14 March 1862, Union forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside captured New Bern, and they occupied Beaufort eleven days later. Some local men demonstrated their loyalty to the Union by taking the loyalty oath or by resuming their peacetime pursuits, while others went to work for or enlisted as soldiers in the federal army.

In an effort to conciliate the region’s loyalist element, President Abraham Lincoln appointed Craven County native Edward Stanly as military governor of North Carolina. But Stanly soon clashed with Burnside over the Union Army’s policy of paying black employees cash wages, and of allowing blacks to attend a school run by a northern missionary. Browning notes that Stanly “had opposed secession, not the institution of slavery.” The governor warned the Lincoln administration that unless he could assure North Carolinians that “this is a war of restoration and not of abolition, no peace can be restored here for many years to come” (p. 80). Stanly’s warning was prophetic.

Union soldiers soon found that despite their efforts at conciliation, some of New Bern’s citizenry remained openly hostile. While the Union high command tolerated the insults of the town’s “secesh ladies,” more lethal assaults met with severe reprisal. When a federal soldier was severely wounded while on patrol, the commanding general at New Bern ordered the soldier’s regiment to destroy the house from which the shot was fired as well as four neighboring houses.

Browning devotes a chapter to the experience of blacks under federal occupation. During the war, black refugees in eastern North Carolina flocked to Union-held areas by the thousands. In 1860, the black population of New Bern was 3,000; within five years, it had grown to about 11,000. Browning describes the freedpeople as “savvy pragmatists who used the Union army and agents of northern benevolent societies to attain the four pillars of their empowerment: escape, employment, enlistment, and education.” There was a fifth pillar that blacks deemed essential to their independence: land ownership. Freedpeople worked hard to earn enough money to buy their own plots of land, and some of them prospered. Black barbers, grocers, carpenters, masons, and other tradesmen earned several times what Union enlisted men made. Blacks also served as soldiers and sailors in the U.S. armed forces, deeming this their “greatest opportunity to earn that equal chance with their fellow whites” (p. 96). Browning states that blacks were “remarkably successful in achieving their empowerment goals during the wartime occupation” (p. 83), but he adds that their efforts to build on that success after the war met with disappointment.

Browning next deals with the northern benevolent societies and
the teachers they sent to eastern North Carolina to educate the freed people. Although grateful for the teachers’ efforts, blacks sometimes “challenged their northern benefactors” over what would be preached and taught in their churches and schools (p. 106). The benevolent societies also squabbled among themselves, each domination asserting that its spiritual message was the only “proper” one.

In discussing the affects of occupation duty on the troops, Browning states that “the majority of Union soldiers in the region were volunteers who sought to preserve the republic their founding fathers had created” (p. 124). Many also were dedicated abolitionists, yet this did not prevent some of them from sharing similar racist views with white Southerners. In short, Browning writes, such men “could not abide the actual physical beings who personified the institution of slavery” (p. 123). Most federal soldiers despised occupation duty in eastern North Carolina and believed that they could better serve the cause elsewhere. For all their complaining, Browning observes, most soldiers remained committed to the goal of Union victory.

For their part, local whites ultimately rejected Union occupation. After a brief honeymoon period, they became disillusioned with the increasing severity of the occupation and with the radical turn of the federal government’s racial policies. When Governor Stanly resigned in January 1863 in protest over Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, the president did not appoint a replacement, indicating that he regarded his experiment in conciliation as a failure.

In conclusion, Browning argues that while local whites were merely “conditional Confederates” in 1861, they became confirmed Confederates during the very occupation that was supposed to cultivate and encourage loyalty to the Union” (p. 180). Their allegiance to an idealized Confederacy became only stronger after the war. Unionist merchants in eastern North Carolina who had prospered under Union occupation soon found that their pro-Confederate neighbors boycotted their establishments, driving many of them out of business. The larger implications of Browning’s superb community study are timeless: “even the noblest intentions of an occupying force . . . can create hostility and resentment on the ground, especially if the external force does not understand or approve of the dominant local cultural mores” (p. 182). Shifting Loyalties is a welcome addition to the literature on the occupied South during the Civil War.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, received his Ph.D. in history from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His most recent book, Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Lexington, Ky., 2009), is based on his doctoral dissertation. He is currently writing the Army’s official history of logistical support in Vietnam between 1962 and 1973.

**Dr. Mark L. Bradley**

**Racing the Sunrise: Reinforcing America’s Pacific Outposts, 1941–1942**

By Glen Williford

Naval Institute Press, 2010

Pp. xviii, 415. $37.95

**Review by Benjamin R. Mannix**

In his ambitious study, Racing the Sunrise, Glen M. Williford has generated an incredible narrative that concerns the American effort in 1941 and 1942 to secure lines of communication with Australia and reinforce important strategic bases in the Pacific. The author’s central thesis maintains that even though the Philippine Islands inevitably collapsed under Japanese invasion, American political military policy towards the reinforcement of the Philippines and points of strategic interest provided the necessary infrastructure for the massive deployment of forces in 1942. Specifically, the steps taken by the Roosevelt administration and the U.S. military in the early 1940s allowed for an immediately available conduit of manpower and, more importantly, a well-developed sea and air transportation network when war broke out in late 1941. The latter permitted the United States to transition quickly to the offensive in the Pacific theater. Unlike the contributions of other authors who have focused their historical analyses on the failure to provide American commanders with adequate weapons and troop strength in order to prevent the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, Williford focuses on the strategic importance of the initial American military buildup before 1942.

*Racing the Sunrise* offers the general historiography of the Second World War a valuable analysis of the early strategic and tactical deployment of American forces in the Pacific. Over the course of twenty-one chapters, Williford follows a largely chronological format. This book first examines the initial political and military policy decisions related to U.S. grand strategy and then seamlessly transitions into discussions on the actual movement of troops, weapons, supplies, submarines and, more importantly, the transports and naval escorts that made reinforcement efforts possible. The author examines Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall’s decision to remain devoted to the relief of shortages in manpower and equipment in the Philippines. Although futile in the face of invasion, Williford asserts that such decisions were of extreme importance at the outset of hostilities in 1942.
Equipped with copious footnotes and a well-organized bibliography, the author goes beyond the analysis of policy and strategy and dissects each major unit's deployment. In his analysis of the actual physical reinforcement effort, Williford not only catalogs the establishment and fortification of several installations, but also examines the mission and manifests of no less than four major task forces, eighteen convoys, and twenty-five individual supply vessels. In one example of the author's effort to support his thesis, he returns to General Marshall's decision to fortify the Philippines and asserts that the resulting September 1941 deployments of the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment and the 194th Tank Battalion to the Philippine Islands were invaluable to the early phases of the war in the Pacific. Although only a part of a much larger force that ultimately faced the Japanese onslaught, the deployment of the 200th and 194th represents one of the first collaborative efforts between the U.S. armed forces and the Maritime Commission to establish and maintain a transportation network in the western Pacific. In terms of the organizational steps taken by the Army and Navy to establish airborne lines of communication with the Pacific territories, Williford provides examples such as aircraft pioneer and Pan American Airways founder Juan Trippe's first journeys across the western Pacific in 1935 to find and establish intermediate landing stops for future endeavors. In what was anything but routine, Pan Am flights throughout the late 1930s traveled from San Francisco to Oahu, Midway, Wake, Guam, and finally Clark Field in the Philippines. These flights ultimately provided the logistical legwork for the Army Air Corps' first transpacific flight by the 14th Bomb Squadron's B–17 Flying Fortresses in September 1941.

At several points in each of the chapters, the author defends his arguments with quality primary resources and oral histories from personnel that served in the Pacific theater. For example, when Williford describes the establishment of the Hawaiian Department's air warning system comprised of three fixed and six mobile radar sites, he quotes the commanding officer in charge as to the importance of the project. The author also consulted War Department records for many technical details. Furthermore, the author’s work is equipped with a helpful number of maps and tables. Although Williford's effort to support his central thesis is as dynamic as it is meticulous, his work is at times repetitive. However, the author’s use of original source material makes Racing the Sunrise a useful introductory text for any Second World War history class and to those in search of a more detailed catalog of American military deployments in the Pacific.

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Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan

By Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
University Press of Kansas, 2009
Pp. xxi, 458. $39.95

In Allies Against the Rising Sun, historian Nicholas Evan Sarantakes concentrates on how politics influenced the inclusion of British Commonwealth forces in the Pacific theater. Questions of consequence to Sarantakes are, Why did the British want to participate in operations near Japan and in the invasion of the Japanese home islands, and why, during the planning of the invasion, were American units, with their superior firepower, replaced by British and Commonwealth forces? In answering these questions, the author concludes that the fates of the territories of the United States and British Commonwealth were interconnected. Indeed, the British recognized that restoring the empire required working alongside the United States to defeat Japan, which in turn contributed greatly to the mutual goal of solidarity in a postwar world.

The challenge of cooperation between the U.S. and the British Commonwealth forces is a prevalent topic within the vast body of literature on the Second World War, and on the Pacific War in particular. Many scholars, like Christopher Thorne and John J. Sbrega in their books Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941–1945 (New York, 1978), and Anglo-American Relations and Colonialism in East Asia, 1941–1945 (New York, 1983), respectively, emphasize the disagreements between the United States and the British Commonwealth. Sarantakes takes a different approach. He sets out to demonstrate that the English-speaking allies understood the need to work together and overcome their “honest differences,” by which he examines the interplay between the U.S. and the British Commonwealth forces during the final months of the war against Imperial Japan (p. 10).

Allies Against the Rising Sun benefits from extensive primary research. Particularly vital are the diplomatic and military archival materials that Sarantakes accessed in the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Can-
ada. From these sources, he is able to re-create the independent voices of the British Commonwealth. Indeed, by providing insight into key politicians and generals, the author stresses the impact of varying personalities in the decision-making process and offers a positive assessment of American and British relations. Although disagreements arose over how best to include British and Commonwealth forces in the fight against Imperial Japan, military and political leaders eventually reached acceptable arrangements because they all recognized that the state of the postwar world relied on their cooperation. While many historians, stressing the complexities and daily disagreements between the alliance partners, have suggested that the relationship between the United States and the Commonwealth was strained, Sarantakes argues that the alliance was in fact strong and stable, thanks to its ability to set aside reasonable differences and achieve political harmony.

By 1943, the United States distrusted Britain’s imperial motives, viewing it more as a junior partner in the alliance. The creation of a British strategy in the Pacific was irrefutably tied to this understanding; while Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff Committee—including Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal—cared about the future of the British Empire and wanted to ensure the existence of British influence in the Pacific region. They also understood that inclusion of the British Commonwealth forces in the overall Pacific strategy required the approval of the President of the United States and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sarantakes argues that the British were divided over how to assist in the destruction of the Japanese Empire. Churchill, ever the defender of the British Empire, saw the reclaiming of Britain’s Asian possessions as the means of restoring prestige and respect, and thus he favored independent operations to recapture lost territories, like Singapore, with British forces. Conversely, the British Chiefs of Staff saw fighting alongside the United States in the Central Pacific as the best way of saving the empire and cementing an alliance with the Americans that would last beyond the Second World War. Sarantakes contends that while both parties were concerned with Britain’s future, the means to that end proved controversial. Ultimately, the British Chiefs of Staff won the debate, with American support, by convincing Churchill of the political benefits of British and Americans forces fighting side by side.

Like Britain, the Commonwealth nations sought participation in the downfall of Japan. With their own hopes of playing significant roles in the postwar world, the Dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had varying interests in the Pacific region. Each faced internal debates over participation in the proposed invasion of Japan; so impassioned were Australia’s arguments that it never did decide on its role in the operation. Sarantakes contends that because these nations were part of the Pacific sphere of influence, they sought long-term postwar roles in the region. In addition, all three wanted the British to remain active in the Pacific.

More than a simple narrative on the Royal Navy’s role off Okinawa, Chapter 10 brings together the forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth. A symbol of the Commonwealth, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser’s British Pacific Fleet (BPF), with crews and ships from across the empire entered the fray off Okinawa on 26 March 1944. The need of the British to show solidarity with the America people and the Commonwealth drove the British to overcome the complex logistical and supply constraints of deploying the BPF. Sarantakes argues that despite the Royal Navy’s lack of experience in long deployments, it proved its worth in surviving kamikaze attacks. Designed to survive intense aerial assaults, the British carriers had steel decks which, unlike wooden decks of their American and Japanese counterparts, made them far less vulnerable to catastrophic fires. The survivability of the British carriers, and the determination of their crews, placed them in high regard among their American allies. Nevertheless, U.S. Admiral Ernest King tried to prevent the BPF from encroaching on operations under his jurisdiction.

In Chapter 14, Sarantakes states that King attempted to force the BPF away from the major combat operations off Okinawa. King’s action risked damaging America’s diplomatic relationship with the British, thus Admirals Fraser, Chester W. Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance kept the Royal Navy involved in operations off Okinawa.

In sum, *Allies Against the Rising Sun* provides a comprehensive and detailed account of the inclusion of British Commonwealth forces in the latter stages of the war in the Pacific. Readers will enjoy the background information Sarantakes provides on leaders and events. Furthermore, scholars will appreciate Sarantakes’ weaving of political and military issues into a cohesive and informative narrative. The author makes a valuable contribution to the historiography of the Second World War and U.S.-British Commonwealth relations.

Robert J. Thompson is a Ph.D. student in the History Department at the University of Southern Mississippi. He is interested in America’s pacification efforts in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
The Korean War has received less scholarly attention than either World War II or the Vietnam War. What little writing that exists has focused on the Army while glossing over the Marine Corps’ critical contributions to the fighting. This cursory treatment is due in part to the fact that the marines fought under the operational control of the Army. These factors have contributed to a majority of Korean War Marine Corps veterans viewing their war as “forgotten.” The book’s editor, Charles R. Smith, states that the purpose of U.S. Marines in the Korean War is “to remedy that perceived oversight by highlighting the contributions and honoring the service of those Marines for today’s Marines and the American people” (p. 4).

The work does indeed illuminate the experiences of the marines in the Korean War and provides a great source of information for historians of the war. Overall, its design is similar to a textbook, eschewing deep analysis in favor of straightforward reporting. Each chapter synthesizes secondary sources and uses relevant primary sources, although to a lesser extent. Oral histories, news reports, memoirs, and official unit logs comprise the bulk of the referenced primary sources. The text includes numerous insets that provide in-depth information on weapons systems, key leader biographies, and tactical situations among others. Each chapter in this collection is a stand-alone work, but there are two major themes that run throughout the text. First, the Marine Corps successfully integrated its aviation assets with its ground maneuver forces throughout the war and did so well ahead of the Army. Second, the marines saved the war effort for the United States more than once because the Marine Corps prepared its men for the rigors of combat better than the Army trained its soldiers.

The Pentagon rushed the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the “Fire Brigade,” to Korea to reinforce the Eighth U.S. Army, which had formed a loose perimeter around Pusan after continual retreats that began in early July 1950. Arriving in Korea on 2 August, the brigade engaged the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) the following day. During the defense of the Pusan perimeter, marine fighter aircraft delivered “airstrikes that were not only immediate but also gave truly close air support” (p. 27). The ground tactical commander used these air strikes to facilitate his offensive maneuver resulting in the marines maintaining closer, more effective contact with the NKPA than Army units. A later example of air-ground integration is the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, where close-air support played a critical role in allowing the Marine Corps and the Army’s X Corps to evacuate from North Korea.

In addition to air-ground tactical coordination, the marines used aircraft in several innovative ways. Equipped with OY–2 light observation planes, the marines were able to transport water and ammunition to ground units, two critical assets during hot summer months that witnessed intense fighting over mountainous terrain. OY–2 pilots also observed artillery fire for forward controllers who could not see targets over the mountain peaks from their ground positions. The Marine Corps also used helicopters in this manner as well as for medical evacuation of the wounded. The Army was woefully behind the Marine Corps in using aircraft to facilitate ground maneuvers, which reduced the effectiveness of Army units. Army commanders, therefore, committed the marines at critical areas of the battlefield throughout the Korean War. The Army would not develop the use of helicopters in a combat role until the Vietnam War. The final two chapters of the work, “Corsairs to Panthers: U.S. Marine Aviation in Korea” and “Whirlybirds: U.S. Marine Helicopters in Korea,” both provide detailed information on the types of aircraft used by the Marine Corps and how each was employed in the various phases of the war.

The Army’s continual reliance on the marines to fight at critical locations on the battlefield is the best evidence of the superior preparation for combat of the Marine Corps. In August 1950, the marines assigned to Task Force Keane not only prevented the NKPA from breaking through American lines, but the marines also counterattacked toward Sachon with great success. The Fire Brigade prevented the NKPA from breaking through at Naktong twice during the same period. The removal of the Fire Brigade from the Pusan perimeter to join the 1st Marine Division for the Inch’on landing caused intense arguments among senior officers. General Walton H. Walker, commanding the Eighth Army, argued that the Fire Brigade was his most effective fighting force.

When the Chinese intervened in November 1950, the Eighth Army, operating on the western side of the Korean peninsula in North Korea, hastily retreated south leaving their dead and vast amounts of equipment behind. By contrast, the 1st Marine Division, operating as part of the U.S. X Corps on the eastern side of the peninsula, engaged the
Chinese in an intense fighting withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir led by General Oliver P. “O.P.” Smith who refused to leave dead marines or any equipment behind. Marines on the ground, supported by air strikes, inflicted an estimated 37,500 casualties on the Chinese. More impressive was that the marines emerged from that bitter part of the war with unit cohesion and pride intact.

From 1951 to 1953, the marines were continually assigned to critical parts of the battlefield. The 1st Marine Division played key roles in the resurgent Eighth Army’s Operations Killer, Ripper, Rugged, and Dauntless following the Chinese Third Phase Offensive. Even after the war had stalemated, the marines faced the brunt of continued Chinese attacks aimed at gaining leverage at the bargaining table. Marines of the 1st Division defeated the final Chinese attack of the war at outpost “Boulder City” despite suffering over 1,600 casualties. Though none of the contributing authors states it explicitly, they all make a strong case for the argument that the United States would not have been able to prevent the complete takeover of South Korea by communist forces without the marines.

There are some shortcomings with the work, including a sizable amount of redundancy between the chapters concerning various issues like the Pentagon’s commitment of the marines to the fighting, senior officer biographical information, the nomenclature, and use of aviation assets. The decidedly positive institutional slant of the authors may also distract readers not affiliated with the Marine Corps. The work would appeal to a broader audience if it expanded on the issues of gender and race, two important themes of this period but treated only tangentially by the contributing authors. Finally, the work would greatly benefit from a conclusion by the editor to summarize the experience of the Marine Corps over the three years of fighting as well as an index to help researchers identify information pertinent to their research. Despite these flaws, U.S. Marines in the Korean War remains a tremendously useful source of information for historians of the Korean War.

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Fragging: Why U.S. Soldiers Assaulted Their Officers in Vietnam

By George Lepre
Texas Tech University Press, 2011
Pp. xiv, 318. $34.95

Reviewed by Fred L. Borch III

This is an important book for military historians, commanders, judge advocates, and anyone with an interest in the Vietnam War. First, it is the only comprehensive study of the crime of “fragging” (attempting to kill one’s superior in the chain of command) during the Vietnam War. Second, it demolishes the myth that the killing or maiming of Army and Marine Corps officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) with fragmentary grenades or other weapons occurred mostly during combat. Finally, this book is important because it disproves the claim by Vietnam antiwar activists, and some academics, that antiwar ideology and political antipathy to America’s presence in Southeast Asia played a direct role in the fragging of officers and NCOs.

As author George Lepre acknowledges at the outset, soldiers have assaulted or killed “unpopular comrades since the earliest days of armed conflict” (p. 1). However, it was during the war in Vietnam that such incidents became sufficiently prevalent that the New York Times and Newsweek informed their readers that fraggings were no longer isolated instances but instead “were averaging about twenty per month” (p. 48).

The book begins by explaining in general terms how the draft, a strong antiwar movement, student protests, and strife in American society generally meant that by 1970 the Army and the Marine Corps were unable to attract the best young men to serve in uniform, much less maintain the high discipline standards that had existed in both services just five years previously. Subsequent chapters explain the fragging phenomenon, motivations for it, and institutional steps taken by both the Army and the Marine Corps to stop it—or at least mitigate its effects.

The book shows conclusively—chiefly through an exhaustive examination of military police investigations and courts-martial records—that virtually all fraggings or attempted fraggings occurred not on the battlefield, but in rear areas. But even if fraggings occurred mostly in the rear—away from the dangers of combat—what was the motivation of those enlisted soldiers who tried to kill or maim their leaders? Fragging identifies a variety of factors. First, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s Project 100,000 permitted the induction of young men who previously would have been rejected for
military service because of their failure to meet intelligence standards, and who were less adaptable and more likely to have psychiatric problems. Second, the degradation of a professional junior NCO corps caused a crisis in small-unit leadership, in that these inexperienced leaders were overly permissive, sought popularity with their subordinates, and consequently failed to correct indiscipline. Third, illegal drug use (a 1971 Defense Department-sponsored study showed that 50.9 percent of Army personnel in Vietnam had smoked marijuana) and alcohol abuse (beer was cheap and distilled spirits were readily available) were factors because they impaired judgment and lowered inhibitions, contributing to using violence against fellow servicemen. While those who served in Vietnam still argue over whether the abuse of illegal drugs and excessive alcohol use were a cause or consequence of the overall breakdown in discipline, no serious student of the conflict disagrees that this drug and alcohol problem contributed to the fragging phenomenon.

An additional motivation for fragging was frustration with officers and NCOs who insisted on the vigorous conduct of military operations even though President Richard M. Nixon had announced that American forces were being withdrawn from Southeast Asia; no soldier or marine—especially a draftee—“wanted to be the last man killed on the last day of the war” (p. 94).

Finally, racial strife was a factor in some fraggings involving black soldiers and white commissioned and noncommissioned officers. African American soldiers were increasingly angry with what they saw as unfair and racially discriminatory treatment, especially after the shocking assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, and this anger sometimes led to assaults on superiors. Racial animosity in Vietnam was certainly inflamed by statements from prominent African American activists like Black Panther Eldridge Cleaver. In his newsletter of 4 January 1970 titled “To My Black Brothers in Vietnam,” for example, Cleaver exhorted his readers to “start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrams and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese” (pp. 106–07). While there were no reported attempts to kill Abrams or other officers at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Cleaver’s incendiary language must have caused unease among more than a few white officers in Saigon.

Ultimately, Fragging shows that there were many motivations for the assaults on superior officers and NCOs, and Lepre examines these motivations in a nuanced and logical manner. He does, however, conclude from an analysis of court-martial records that “perceived harassment of subordinates was the primary reason for most grenade assaults” (p. 97) [emphasis added].

The book’s section on “fragging and anti-war activism” (pp. 115–23) is particularly illuminating, because the author proves that there was no direct link between anti–Vietnam War activism and fragging. While conceding that the war was unpopular with many GIs—as it was with many American civilians—and that this antiwar sentiment did shape Vietnam-era enlisted culture (and therefore influenced the fraggers), there is no evidence that assaults on superiors were part of a widespread “GI revolt” or “part of a larger political struggle against immoral U.S. policies at home and abroad” (p. 115). On the contrary, Lepre’s examination of individual cases found only two instances where “antiwar or antigovernment utterances” were referenced (p. 116).

While fragging is rare in today’s professional Army, it is not unheard of: witness the recent court-martial of S. Sgt. Alberto B. Martinez for allegedly killing two officers by placing a claymore mine near the window of their office in Tikrit, Iraq, in 2005. Martinez was acquitted by a military jury at Fort Bragg in 2008. Similarly, Sgt. Joseph Bozicevich was court-martialed for killing two fellow NCOs after they criticized him for a series of battlefield blunders in Iraq in 2008. He was convicted of premeditated murder by a panel at Fort Stewart and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Both the Martinez and Bozicevich cases demonstrate that the phenomenon of fragging is not going to go away. Nevertheless, no matter how well-trained, educated, or disciplined the troops are, there always will be assaults by service members on their officer and NCO leaders.

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operations officer and tour guide, with the typical historian’s activities relegated to an extra duty. With a refocus of the mission, the new ANC superintendent demanded more than the overworked one-person office could provide. In response, the Center developed plans for staffing a full-service office with two historians, one of whom has an archival background, and two curators.

On the history side, these individuals were charged with preparing and presenting definitive historical studies and products relating to the history of ANC; coordinating public outreach to tell the story of ANC to a wide audience; planning and conducting comprehensive and in-depth oral history programs to capture significant events and personalities engaged in the ANC mission; conducting extensive research on ANC and preparing written and photographic content for publications and the ANC Web site; and preparing questions and arranging for oral history interviews and transcriptions on individuals engaged in the ANC mission.

The archival function would focus on collecting, organizing, preserving, and assisting in the presentation of two-dimensional artifacts, paper, and photographs; maintaining and conserving historical files, books, and papers; developing finding aids to assist in the retrieval of historical data from these materials; and planning and coordinating overall conservation, preservation, and cultural resources activities at ANC.

In addition, the history office would assess the need for specialists in supporting disciplines (such as architecture, engineering, and environment) and coordinate their support to the overall ANC mission. As such, under the redesign, the history team would have far more reach, including a strategic communications and cultural resources function, in addition to its typical duties.

The museum activities would include providing advice on three-dimensional artifacts and material culture issues; designing and coordinating the production of museum exhibits and displays; coordinating the preservation, accountability, and conservation of irreplaceable artifacts; designing exhibits, maintaining accountability of the collection, conserving artifacts, and preparing display cases and exhibits related to the ANC mission; and organizing the collection and photography of memorabilia left on ANC gravesites in a systematic way, and preserving them as necessary.

Of course, the curatorial staff would also administer the Section 60 Collection Program—including recovery, documentation, and warehousing of gravesite mementos and objects—and nominate objects worthy of retention in the Army’s permanent collection.

The Center detailed one of our historians, Stephen Carney, and one of our curatorial staff, Roderick Gainer, to ANC to establish the program while the positions worked their way through the authorization process. And so the program was off and running.

Now some months later, what have we accomplished and learned?

First and foremost, we have created a fully functional field history office at the ANC, one of the most sacred and visited historic sites in America, providing ANC leaders a range of services across the full historical support spectrum. Our team has created functional historical files, initiated plans for completely revised visitor center exhibits, cataloged and established the library, and brought historical materials under control.

During the course of our work, the discovery and interpretation of a map of the Freedman’s Village, a community of newly freed slaves that existed at the cemetery from 1863 to 1900, caused us to completely reevaluate the location and scope of this historically important settlement, forever changing our understanding of the village.

In addition, CMH archivists have located and assessed a set of handwritten ledgers listing the names and units of soldiers, both Federal and Confederate, who perished in Washington, D.C., area hospitals and were initially interred at Arlington Cemetery during the Civil War. These documents are priceless, and steps are under way to ensure that they are preserved for future scholars.

Finally, we have shown the Army and the ANC leadership, along with the Arlington Cemetery Advisory Committee, the congressionally mandated ANC oversight committee, that historians are good for much more than giving tours. At the request of the ANC leadership, plans are now progressing for a sesquicentennial history publication of the cemetery that will tell the unique story of this resting place of America’s heroes and serve as the official history of the cemetery.

This story of success reminds us what a determined team of history professionals can accomplish! Our hard work does pay dividends, and when leaders realize that history makes a difference to them, they allocate funding for positions, enable their historians, and become true believers in their history program. As I have frequently mentioned, in this resource-constrained environment, you must make yourself a key part of your organization’s mission. Stay focused, stay engaged, and stay relevant! Keep Army History Alive!
Brigadier General James L. Collins Jr. Book Prize in Military History

The U.S. Commission on Military History (USCMH) announces the inauguration of the Brigadier General James L. Collins Jr. Book Prize in Military History. The prize entails a $1,000 award to the author of any nationality of the best book written in English on U.S. military history published during 2009, 2010, and 2011. The Collins Book Prize Committee, comprised of USCMH members Dr. Edward J. Marolda, Chair, Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, and Dr. Kelly Devries, will select the winner based on the following criteria. Topics in all periods and all aspects of U.S. military history (including naval and air warfare) will be considered, including theory, operations, biography, technology and science, strategy and tactics, social, and diplomatic. Special consideration will be given to those works promising to have the most significant impact on the study of America’s military past. In keeping with the mission of the USCMH, award preference will be given to books that highlight the international aspects of U.S. military history.

Books considered by the Collins Book Prize Committee must be submitted to the USCMH by 30 June 2012. Upon notification from the selection committee, the Collins Book Prize will be presented at the USCMH annual general meeting usually held in November. For further information, contact the Collins Book Prize Committee Chair at Edward.Marolda@navy.mil.

The late Brig. Gen. James L. Collins Jr., former chief of military history (1970–1982) and a founding member of the USCMH, was a pivotal figure in the resurgence and sustained use of history in the United States Army. It is a fitting tribute to have a USCMH book prize named after him because of his long tenure—the longest of any chief of military history—his solid integrity, gracious manners, quick intellect, and love of history and historians.

General Collins had a long and distinguished career before coming to the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Born in 1917 in El Paso, Texas, he graduated from West Point in 1939. He served in World War II in the Field Artillery, landed on Utah Beach in the Normandy invasion, and ended the war as a battalion commander. A skilled linguist, he served as the first director of the Defense Language Institute in 1959. In Vietnam, he served as the special assistant to the commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland. Following his retirement in 1969, he was recalled first to serve as a U.S. representative on a mission to the Soviet Union and then to take the helm as chief of military history. In the latter capacity, he inaugurated the Vietnam War Monograph series and staffed the Center to begin work on the official U.S. Army history of that war. General Collins was key in establishing the USCMH in association with the International Commission of Military History; in 1973 the Center and the Smithsonian Institution jointly sponsored the first American meeting. He again retired from the Army in 1982 but remained active in the historical profession until the end of his life. During his years on active duty, General Collins earned the Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Silver Star, the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device (for valor), and the Purple Heart.

ARMY HISTORY
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The Center of Military History now makes all issues of Army History available to the public on its Web site. Each new publication will appear shortly after the issue is printed. Issues may be viewed or downloaded at no cost in Adobe® PDF format. An index page of the issues may be found at www.history.army.mil/armyhistory.
A few Footnotes back, I talked about a Historian’s Code as a potential guide to our collective behavior. The proposal received a fair number of comments from the field, some of them printable! In fact, most of the comments were quite positive, and I would like to continue the dialogue on the nature of our profession with a short discussion of our values. The Army at large has seven key values that it developed about a decade ago: Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage. These are all very important, but perhaps we can generate some additional values of our own that focus on our role in the Army and what we hold as important as we pursue our profession as members of the Army team.

So, I would like to suggest that we consider the following four values as key to our profession in support of the Army: Preserve, Present, Prove, and Prepare.

**Preserve**

As historians, we are the keepers of the Army memory. We preserve documents, save oral history testimony, keep the Army lineage and honors, and serve as the institutional memory of our 237-year-old Army. It sometimes seems as if we do this in spite of the Army, which often appears oblivious to its own past or the importance of preserving and using that past as a guide to doctrine and decision making. The officers and enlisted soldiers of the Army often give the impression of being too busy to read, think, or reflect on their own institution. This is frustrating to historians, museum curators, and archivists who have a deep appreciation of the importance of the past and its continuing value. However, it makes it all the more important that we do our job to the best of our abilities because we are sometimes the only “small still voices, crying in the wilderness” in support of history and the value of the past. That is why the value of “Preserve” is so important to us and to the Army. The men and women of the Army have to know that when they do turn to the past for guidance, that we have done our job as silent professionals and that the documents and studies are there to help them. We need to continue to preserve the past of our units, commands, and headquarters because they will need it in the future and they rely on us to keep it for them, even if they forget that from time to time. No one else does what we do and it is important that we keep doing it.

**Present**

Preserving the documents and history of the Army is critical, but it is insufficient in itself. Army historians must also prepare a variety of products that interpret and present that past to a wide audience in a number of forms. Army historians should write articles, monographs, and books. They should do interviews for television or the local radio on the history of the Army. They should assist museum curators with selecting and interpreting artifacts that highlight the Army. Army historians should work on lineage and honors certificates, if at the Center, or in distributing those certificates to units if working in field history offices. Army historians need to prepare annual command histories, summaries, pamphlets, and brochures. They should be active in providing historical support to Army commemoration events as a living link with the past. They need to post their historical material on Web sites and present papers at historical conferences. In short, Army historians need to disseminate many types of historical materials and products in a variety of formats to diverse audiences. We are the voice of the Army’s past. If we don’t present a clear, objective, and well-written interpretation of that past, using the English language and not acronym-laden gobbledygook, we fail.

There will be plenty of others out there portraying that past in their own way but without our degree of perspective, care, or sophistication.
One of the key aspects of our profession is that we are committed to a high calling: get at the truth of an issue . . . get it right. We have an obligation to look at all the sources, weigh them carefully, present our case, and then document it with citations: the proof. This process enables other historians to retrace our path, locate our sources, and evaluate the degree to which we did or did not use the sources accurately and judiciously. We not only have to prove our historical points, but we also have to provide the basis of why we believe those points to our audience, whether the general public or other historians, to show that our assertions rest on solid evidence. Without such proof, we would be mere storytellers or public relations flacks, spinning whatever tale we wish without any firm foundation in fact. If we cannot provide the proof, a fact is not a fact but mere conjecture.

Even as we preserve the Army’s past, present the results of our research, and provide our readers with the proof of our historical assertions, we have to be aware that we serve the Army best if we also prepare and develop ourselves professionally on a number of levels. We all need to be aware of the importance of preparing ourselves to grow as professional historians by attending seminars and conferences. We also have to educate ourselves as Army leaders and action officers by taking Civilian Education System (CES) courses so that we can defend our programs, serve as capable stewards of our resources, and continually prove our relevance to our commands. If we don’t do this, our profession within the Army can dwindle and vanish. And finally, we need to be looking into the future, finding other historians and grooming them for additional responsibilities so that when we retire we will leave behind skilled replacements to pick up the torch and carry on. All of these things may seem to take time away from the daily grind of staff actions, writing, archiving, or presenting our works to the public or to other professionals, but they are important for the long-term professional health of each of us and of the Army History Program writ large. We need to be prepared to justify and preserve our positions, develop and refine our skills, and identify and grow other historians to preserve the future of Army history.

Only if we are true to these values will our historical profession grow and continue to serve the Army well. The past is too important to leave to just anyone.

Let me know what you think at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at us.army.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images. Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan J. Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.