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U.S. Army Art Spotlight

The Professional Bulletin of Army History
In this Fall 2012 issue of Army History we feature two interesting articles on very disparate topics. The first, by U.S. Army Center of Military History historian John Maass, examines the deployment of troops under Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson to New Orleans in 1809. The acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase may have doubled the size of the country but it put almost unbearable strain on a fledgling U.S. Army. Guarding the borders and outposts of a young nation was difficult enough for a small peacetime force. Now however, the Army was tasked with protecting a rapidly expanding homeland in the face of Spanish and British incursions and threats. The port of New Orleans was a significant transportation and economic hub, and with the specter of a possible war with Great Britain looming the city’s protection became of vital importance. What should have been a fairly simple mission turned into the deadliest peacetime disaster in the Army’s history and became the subject of the first congressional inquiry.

Next we present an article by Jean Bou, a historian at the Australian War Memorial and a visiting fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. The author details the birth, and the growing pains, of an independent Australian military force following Federation and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. As our own U.S. Army enters a period of transformation, reorganization, and restructuring it is imperative that our military leaders, when preparing to make important decisions, look to history, and not only to our own history, for valuable lessons.

This issue also features an Army Art Spotlight, comments from the chief of military history and chief historian, and book reviews covering a wide range of topics.

As always, I invite our readers to send me their articles and commentaries as well as their critiques or comments on this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
I t matters not whether you believe in global warming or discount it as a theory postulated by a bunch of “Tree-Hugging Hippies.” What does matter is that the country and the world have seen a recent pattern of extreme weather conditions. The causes are debatable, but the results are unquestionable— it looks like the world weather pattern is changing. Average temperatures in the United States have risen 4.5 degrees over the past year, an unprecedented change, leading to dramatic weather conditions and associated natural disasters across the country.

At some point we are all touched by devastating natural disasters—hurricanes, tornadoes, or even the derecho that stunned the East Coast in July. In large-scale disasters like these, local, state, and national or international emergency management authorities usually take over, but we as a community of history professionals have significant roles, too.

We learned many important lessons during the July megastorm well worthy of our future consideration, but none proved more critical than the loss of communication and leadership situational awareness. We quickly learned that when primary communications are lost, along with the loss of power, computers, and cell phones, leadership rapidly loses awareness. Reliable back-up communication means, which are always critical, become even more vital, but the shift back to them is challenging.

The derecho event illustrated that we have become too reliant on computer-based communications systems and twenty-first century technologies. As an example, in the Washington, D.C., area, many organizations relied on an automated emergency alert notification system to update the workforce on report times and post closures or delays.

However, with computer and phone lines down, and many personnel without electrical power, leaders were not sure who had received the messages or if the messages had even gone out. Some organizations were quick to leverage other means of communications including radio/TV broadcasts, newspaper, social media, and Web sites, but many of these were also rendered useless by power outages. Think about it, it is hard to check a Web site, Facebook, or Twitter if you don’t have power and using your iPhone or iPad becomes particularly problematic when cell towers are not functioning.

Even when the message did get through, information was often inconsistent due to a loss of leadership situational awareness— didn’t someone once talk about the “fog of war”?

Fort McNair was quick to report that the post was open with little damage, while Fort Belvoir, which was hit harder by the storm, transmitted inconsistent information resulting in workforce confusion. Radio notices and Facebook postings further confused the issue by providing conflicting guidance on whether or not to report.

Communication challenges were only one of a myriad of issues, but this particular challenge points out a serious vulnerability gap in our normal operations. Imagine if the storm had been compounded by a terrorist act! We can only close this gap through preparation—it’s too late when the megastorm or the terrorists or even the zombies strike! We have to be ready far in advance. Conducting preparatory exercises before emergencies occur with all personnel will go a long way to mitigate the effects of the disaster. We must anticipate challenges by training for them, participating in tabletop exercises, rehearsals, and disaster exercises targeted to identify gaps, gather lessons learned, and improve our emergency

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The Center of Military History has released two new publications. *The Civil War Begins: Opening Clashes, 1861*, is the first in a series (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War) of campaign brochures commemorating our national sacrifices during the American Civil War. Author Jennifer M. Murray examines the successes and challenges of both the Union and the Confederate forces during the early days of the Civil War. Notable battles discussed include Fort Sumter, South Carolina; Bull Run, Virginia; Wilson’s Creek, Missouri; Cape Hatteras, North Carolina; and Port Royal, South Carolina. This 64-page brochure includes six maps, three tables, and numerous illustrations. It has been issued in paperback as CMH Pub 75-2. It is also available for sale to the general public from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00552-2.

The second publication, *The Army in the Pacific: A Century of Engagement*, by James C. McNaughton, offers an overview of the Army’s history in this rapidly changing region. It describes how the Army’s involvement began with an expedition to seize Manila from Spain in 1898, which led to a protracted campaign against Philippine insurgents. When Japan attacked in 1941, the Army fought back as part of a joint and multinational team in some of the most far-reaching campaigns in history, after which the Army became responsible for post-conflict operations in Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and the Philippines. During the Cold War, the Army fought hot wars in Korea and Vietnam. After the Vietnam War, the Army provided regional stability, a shield against aggression, and engagement with allies and partners as the region experienced unprecedented growth. This broad historical perspective reveals some enduring lessons: the vast distances and diversity of terrain and weather, the necessity for joint and multinational operations, and the need for a versatile, adaptive, and agile force. The Center has issued this paperback booklet as CMH Pub 70-120-1. This publication has not yet been assigned a stock number by the Government Printing Office but it will be available to purchase in the near future.

**Upcoming Conferences**

The National World War II Museum’s International Conference on World War II will be held 6–8 December 2012 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The theme of this conference will be “Stemming the Nazi Tide: The End of the Beginning 1942–43.” The conference schedule includes presentations by notable historians such as Robert Citino, Allan Millett, Gerhard Weinberg, Rick Atkinson, and Conrad Crane. Registration and hotel information can be found on the conference Web site, http://ww2conference.com.

The Eightieth Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History will take place 14–16 March 2013 in New Orleans, Louisiana. The conference is hosted by the Center for the Study of War & Society at the University of Southern Mississippi, with the National World War II Museum and Southeastern Louisiana University cohosting. The conference theme is “War, Society, and Remembrance.” The call for papers is currently open with a deadline for proposals scheduled for 1 October 2012. More information, including hotel and registration guidance, is available on the Society’s annual meeting Web site, http://www.smh-hq.org/2013/2013annualmeeting.html.

**Society for Military History Distinguished Book Awards for 2013**

The Society for Military History is currently accepting nominations for its annual Distinguished Book Awards. Books published during the three previous calendar years may be nominated. Books will be considered for one or more of the following prize categories:

- American Military History
- Non-American Military History
- Reference Works
- Biography and war memoirs

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. John R. Maass is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He earned a B.A. in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history at the Ohio State University. He is currently working on a publication covering the history of the U.S. Army from 1783 to 1811, to be published this year.

James Wilkinson, portrait by Charles Willson Peale, 1797
The Army’s Disaster at Terre aux Boeufs, 1809

By John R. Maass

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the United States Army was a small force faced with large responsibilities. U.S. troops were frontier constabularies in the western territories, garrisoned newly built forts and batteries on the Atlantic Coast, and interdicted smugglers along the Canadian border and the Champlain Valley. In addition to these missions, soldiers also guarded U.S. territory in Louisiana, recently acquired from French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte. Tensions with Great Britain, Spain, and France over a host of commercial and territorial disputes led Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison to begin preparing for war with these European powers. Part of the military preparations included increasing the size of the U.S. Army in 1808, and keeping a force of over two thousand troops at New Orleans to forestall a potential British or Spanish attempt to capture the city. In the spring of 1809, over fifteen hundred newly recruited soldiers led by inexperienced officers arrived in Louisiana and quickly found themselves in a “frightful” debacle, in which hundreds sickened and died of disease in unhealthy camps, a situation worsened by insufficient supplies, inedible provisions, and poor leadership among the Army’s officers and officials. Tragically, even more soldiers perished during the troops’ relocation hundreds of miles up the Mississippi River to a position thought to be more salubrious. The disaster led to public outcry, a congressional investigation, and a court-martial of the Army’s top officer on the eve of the War of 1812, charged with “the great mortality in the corps under [his] immediate command.”

In 1803, the United States purchased the territory of Louisiana from France, over eight hundred thousand square miles west of the Mississippi River, and doubled the size of the country. Spain had recently ceded the region to France, and was displeased that the area—especially the city of New Orleans—was to be taken over by the United States, whose land-hungry citizens posed a threat to the northern provinces of Mexico and to Spanish West Florida. The U.S. Army took formal possession of Louisiana on 20 December 1803, by establishing garrisons at New Orleans and several smaller posts on the southern waters of the Mississippi River.

Due to the uncertain loyalties of the populace in New Orleans and concerns about Spanish belligerence in the southwest, U.S. Army regulars were essential to Louisiana’s defense. A significant threat to U.S. interests early in President Jefferson’s administration was the continued Spanish presence in the Floridas and west of the Mississippi River, unsettlingly close to New Orleans. With the Louisiana Purchase, American control of that city alleviated western farmers’ and traders’ long held complaints of Spanish and French interference in their trade and shipping down the Mississippi, but Spain’s North American possessions continued to trouble the president, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, and Brig. Gen. James Wilkinson, the Army’s highest ranking officer. As recently as October 1802, the Spanish had closed the port of New Orleans to American goods coming down the Mississippi, a trade worth $2 million per year to the aforementioned farmers and traders. The Spanish also denied the U.S. government’s request to supply Fort Stoddert in the Mississippi Territory by passing through Louisiana and West Florida free of duties. Accordingly, the Jefferson administration hurried to move troops to occupy the newly acquired territory, particularly New Orleans, in order to prevent a potential
Spanish reoccupation and claim to the region it formerly possessed. Over the next several months, U.S. Army detachments occupied additional military frontier posts as well, and by late 1804, almost seven hundred soldiers garrisoned nine outposts or forts in the new lands.

The border between Louisiana and Spanish possessions to the west was not firmly established at the time U.S. troops marched into New Orleans; this created a source of tension and potential conflict in the region during Jefferson’s two terms as president. Although Jefferson and Dearborn regarded a hostile Spanish advance as a serious threat to American territory, in reality the Spanish had few troops to garrison their posts and defend the border with the United States. By the early fall of 1806, the Spanish diffused the disputed border situation by withdrawing troops west to Nacogdoches, in Texas. Leaders of both belligerents then established a neutral buffer zone fifty miles wide between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo to the east, which Spain claimed was the actual border between Texas and Louisiana. Once the forces had pulled back to the two rivers, no further military flare ups occurred in the region, although the Jefferson administration and Congress kept a watchful eye on the Spanish positions at Baton Rouge, Mobile, Pensacola, and along the Sabine.

In addition to the Spanish threat, the United States feared hostilities with the British as Jefferson’s presidency drew to a close, particularly a seaborne attack on New Orleans. Britain and Napoleonic France had been engaged for over a decade in warfare on the
European continent and the high seas, and also sought to cripple each other economically with commercial and maritime decrees and restrictions. Although the United States claimed neutrality in the Napoleonic wars, American shipping suffered from confiscation of goods, impressment of its sailors, and reduced commerce—primarily at the hands of the British Royal Navy. Jefferson and his Secretary of State, James Madison, tried to avoid open conflict with either of the belligerents. Rather, they employed economic coercion as a tool of foreign relations, beginning with an embargo in 1807, and other trade restrictions in Madison’s first term as chief executive in 1809. American leaders feared that if U.S. troops invaded Canada, British forces at Halifax, Nova Scotia, would be deployed to New Orleans, “and hold it as an equivalent for whatever they might lose.” Moreover, six thousand British soldiers in the West Indies posed an additional threat to Louisiana. With this in mind, and at Jefferson’s urging, Congress increased the size of the U.S. Army in 1808, and by the end of the year 5,712 men were in the ranks.

As tensions between the British and Americans escalated, Jefferson took further steps to secure the Louisiana territory. To guard against the possibility of a British attempt to attack New Orleans, on 2 December 1808 he ordered General Wilkinson to assemble “as large a proportion of our regular troops, at New Orleans and its vicinity, as circumstance will permit.” Wilkinson was to concentrate at New Orleans approximately two thousand men in thirty-seven companies from the 3d, 5th, 6th, and 7th Regiments of infantry, along with the light dragoons, riflemen, and light artillery units raised in the states south of New Jersey. These soldiers were almost all new recruits, led by inexperienced company officers. The troops stationed on the East Coast were to sail to New Orleans, from Savannah, Charleston, Norfolk, and other eastern ports. Troops raised in the western states were to descend the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to the same destination. The troops’ equipment, ammunition, and medical stores would follow separately. Wilkinson received orders to report to New Orleans to take command of the men “as early as practicable,” and to defend the city “against any invading force.” Former Continental Army officer Col. Alexander Parker of the 5th Regiment assumed temporary command of the gathering units on his arrival at New Orleans on 26 March 1809, several weeks ahead of Wilkinson.

General Wilkinson was a controversial figure at the time of his appointment, and remains so today. Aside from the fact that he was the highest ranking officer in the U.S. Army, he was also a Revolutionary War veteran, and a man of questionable loyalties. Born in Maryland in 1757, he studied medicine briefly in Philadelphia, and served in a Pennsylvania rifle battalion at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. Commissioned a captain in the Continental Army in 1775, he saw action during the siege of Boston, and on Benedict Arnold’s Canadian campaign of 1775–1776. Wilkinson soon thereafter became an aide to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, and fought at the battles of Trenton (1776) and Princeton (1777). Although he was a brevet brigadier general in the Continental Army from November 1777 to March 1778, and secretary to Congress’ Board of War, General Wilkinson was a controversial figure at the time of his appointment, and remains so today.
George Washington compelled him to resign both offices due to his involvement in what became known as "the Conway cabal," a murky plot to remove Washington as the Army’s commander in chief. Wilkinson then served as clothier general of the Army from July 1779 until early 1781, but had to resign this position due to improper accountings in his books. Although he became a Pennsylvania militia officer in 1782, his active wartime service was over.

Perhaps to make a fresh start after his checkered Continental Army career, Wilkinson moved to Kentucky and became a businessman with extensive trade contacts among Spanish merchants and officials in New Orleans. The former clothier general could not stay away from military pursuits for long, and in August 1791, he commanded an expedition of five hundred mounted Kentucky volunteers against hostile Native Americans in the wilderness north of the Ohio River. Soon he rejoined federal service by accepting a lieutenant colonelcy and the command of the U.S. Army’s 2d Infantry Regiment. Promoted to brigadier general, he served under Maj. Gen. Anthony Wayne in the Army’s 1794 frontier campaign that culminated in the victory at the battle of Fallen Timbers, in northwestern Ohio. Wilkinson and Wayne clashed from the moment they began to serve on the frontier, fueled by the former’s relentless torrent of accusations and denunciations against his commander. Wayne’s sudden death of complications from gout ended Wilkinson’s insubordination, and made Wilkinson the senior officer of the U.S. Army in December 1796.

Within a few years, with an established commercial and military network in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys, Wilkinson became involved in treasonous intrigues with the Spanish government, by which he was paid for information and influence. The general was also initially involved in former Vice President Aaron Burr’s 1805–1806 plot to form a western empire of Mexican territory and frontier American states. Although conclusive proof of Wilkinson’s duplicity was not discovered in Spanish archives until the middle of the nineteenth century, he had long been suspected of shady, disreputable dealings with the Spanish by Jefferson, Madison, and many fellow Army officers. Nevertheless, in the summer of 1808 Wilkinson had just been cleared by a military court of inquiry investigating his dealings with Spanish authorities in the Southwest, and seemed to have a knack for eluding discovery and censure. Despite his shadowy background, the War Department tapped Wilkinson to command the troops concentrating at New Orleans.17

Leaving his post at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Wilkinson did not depart the East Coast until 24 January 1809—six weeks after being ordered to go to New Orleans. Apparently engaged in private affairs during this time, he eventually sailed from Baltimore, and made stops in Norfolk, Charleston, and Havana, Cuba. On the Spanish island, Wilkinson acted as an unofficial representative of President Jefferson, to meet with the Marques de Someruelos, Cuba’s captain-general. He tried to assure the Spanish that the growing concentration of U.S. troops at New Orleans was no threat to Spanish posts in West Florida. Wilkinson also brought with him fifty barrels of flour and other supplies to sell on the island for his personal gain, a clear violation of the Jefferson administration’s Embargo Act, as he must have known.18 Unable to achieve any diplomatic success at Havana, he finally reached New Orleans on 19 April, where the army of recruits had already assembled.19

Wilkinson and Wayne clashed from the moment they began to serve on the frontier...
On his arrival Wilkinson found a troubling situation at New Orleans. Most of the troops had arrived in the city between 10 March and 20 April. Nearly all of the officers were recent appointees who were untrained and ill-prepared to handle their troops, and were also new to the routines of army life. Many of the men were sick and poorly housed, and the enticement of New Orleans’ numerous taverns, gambling dens, and brothels was inimical to discipline and good order. A report of 16 April shows that of the 1,733 soldiers present in the city, 553 were sick—one third of the troops. It was a “frightful disorder,” the general observed. The troops were “undisciplined recruits,” who were “sunk in indolence and dissipation.” The general found the officers and men “green from the bosom of civil life,” and noted that many of the new officers “shrank from their duties” and “abandoned the recruits they led” at Louisiana, under the pretext of “ill health, resignations, or important family concerns.” He singled out Capt. Winfield Scott in particular as a subaltern who left his command and thereby “deserted his immediate countrymen,” whom Wilkinson also neglected to pay before Scott returned home to Virginia.

The commanding general was not the only officer alarmed at the state of the army. Capt. George Peter saw that the troops in and around the city became ill due to their “intemperance, to the badness of their provisions, and to the want of discipline and subordination.” The army’s second in command, Col. Alexander Parker, recalled that the provisions “were generally bad, of the meanest kind, and unfit for use.” Constant rain added to the woes of the troops, and turned their camps and parade grounds into acres of mud. Diarrhea struck officers and men in increasing numbers as more troops arrived in the city. Many of the men sickened after drinking unfiltered water from the Mississippi River, their only source. A lieutenant in the 7th Regiment later testified that his company was generally healthy upon arrival in New Orleans, but many soon sickened, and by the time the troops moved out of New Orleans, disease had carried off six or seven of his men. Only two surgeons and two surgeons mates were present to treat the sick, but with “medicines and hospital stores scarcely sufficient for a private practitioner.” The army lacked medicines, tents, mosquito netting, haversacks, and numerous other items necessary for a field force, including wagons to transport the provisions and equipment. Wilkinson knew from long experience that for the health of the troops and the maintenance of an effective command, he had to remove the army from this unhealthy and unwholesome location. He later claimed to have written to Secretary of War William Eustis even before he reached New Orleans that the troops there would have to be moved to a “proper position,” away from the city, but this 13 April letter may not have reached Washington, D.C. In any event, the general never received a reply.

To alleviate the Army’s woes in New Orleans, Wilkinson planned to reposition the men as soon as feasible by dividing his force. Those troops previously stationed in New Orleans he ordered to Natchitoches, the Mobile River, and Fort St. Philip (in the Mississippi River delta), while leaving just two companies in New Orleans. He also kept nine companies at Fort Adams, on the east bank of the Mississippi River just north of the international boundary with West Florida, where the men were already quartered “in comfortable huts.” The hundreds
of newly arrived recruits would be moved to healthier ground, though close enough to the city to defend it per orders.29

After several days of reconnoitering along the Mississippi River, Wilkinson chose to relocate his command to Terre aux Boeufs ("Land of Oxen" in French), several miles downstream from New Orleans, on the east side of the Mississippi at a bend in the river known as the English Turn.30 This location was recommended by the territorial governor, William C. C. Claiborne, who accompanied the general on his reconnaissance.31 Here there was a small enclosed battery for nine guns made of masonry, almost completed, with a magazine and barracks for one company of troops.32

Wilkinson described the spot he chose as “perfectly dry,” despite being several feet below the water level of the Mississippi, banked by an earthen levee. The land was still too close to New Orleans to leave the general completely at ease about the city’s allure, which “divert our green officers, from due attention to their profession,” and debauched the soldiers.33 Nevertheless, the advantages were, as Wilkinson saw them, dry land, access to clean water, a local food market, and a strategic position from which the army could defend the city. He hoped the relocation would be beneficial not only to the soldiers’ health, but would “inculcate a proper sense of discipline . . . and extract order out of anarchy.”34 Wilkinson later justified his choice of the new site by claiming that many local citizens recommended it as “remarkable for its salubrity, as it is for its aptitude for the defense of New Orleans.”35

Wilkinson was not alone among the army’s leadership in his endorsement of the Terre aux Boeufs site. Several of his subordinates held that the location was adequate, if not ideal, for stationing the army. Lt. Col. William D. Beall described the spot “as eligible for a camp as any in the vicinity of the city,”36 while Dr. Alexander Macauley concluded that the area was “more healthy than the city of New Orleans” and “as good as any I had ever seen in that country.”37 Colonel Parker concurred, although he noted that Wilkinson consulted none of his officers as to the choice of
the camp. Why Wilkinson chose the site was a matter of some debate and contention after the camp proved to be disastrously inhospitable. Some of Wilkinson’s critics—then and now—have surmised that the general sought to be near to his personal business interests in the city, and also to maintain contact with Spanish authorities, with whom he was still communicating surreptitiously. His detractors accused him of choosing the ground at Terre aux Boeufs to benefit the property’s owner, whose land would be cleared and drained at no cost by the soldiers as they established their camps. Others have observed that Wilkinson had recently begun courting a woman thirty years his junior, Celestine Trudeau, daughter of Louisiana’s surveyor general, who lived in the city. Wilkinson may have been reluctant to relocate his position far from the city, away from Miss Trudeau and her other suitors. Still, the general seems to have kept his orders to defend New Orleans as a priority in choosing a position for his forces, along with a desire to move the men out of New Orleans.

In order to prepare an encampment for the army, Maj. Zebulon Pike brought nine companies of soldiers to the site in early June. Although some of the fields were covered in clover, much of the ground was brush covered and had to be cleared by soldiers in fatigue details. In rear of the site was a dense swamp, while cypress trees, willows, and palmettos still covered much of the area on which Wilkinson’s command had to clear by the time the rest of the army arrived during the second week of June. The army also dug extensive ditches and culverts to drain the land. Several officers concluded that the location required too much preparatory work to make it a suitable position. “The duty and labor required to put the place in order was too great to be endured in so hot a climate,” wrote Maj. Electus Backus, and indeed Pike’s men had not finished their work by the time the rest of Wilkinson’s troops, except those too sick to depart the city, arrived to set up camp on 10 and 11 June.

Shortly after the main army reached the new camp, Wilkinson received a letter from Secretary Eustis dated 30 April 1809. In this letter, Eustis clarified Wilkinson’s earlier instructions in order to assure him that he could change the position of his army according to his own judgment, if need be. Eustis also wrote that in light of the alarming number of sick soldiers at New Orleans shown on the last return he had received, removal to a healthier position was “suggested by every consideration of prudence and experience.” The secretary advised Wilkinson that the general should order a relocation immediately, if he had not done so already. The “old troops” were to be left in New Orleans, and “it will be desirable” that the newly recruited soldiers be transported north to higher ground at Fort Adams, Natchez, or both, these places “being more favorable to their health.” If Eustis meant this letter to be a preemptory directive to Wilkinson to move the army up the Mississippi, the general did not interpret it that way. He had already moved his force to Terre aux Boeufs by the time the 30 April letter reached him, and Eustis’ phrase “it will be desirable” seemed something less than a direct order to the army’s commander. Moreover, the general was still acting under his original orders of December 1808 to protect the city of New Orleans, which could not be done effectively by moving over half of his forces hundreds of miles up the river. Although at least some of Wilkinson’s subordinates favored Eustis’ recommendation to move the army’s position to the Natchez area and advised him to do so, the general rejected the suggestion, fearing to leave New Orleans “uncovered,” and vulnerable to attack.

The secretary’s 30 April letter should have reached the general by the end of May, given the mail system of the day, and the great distance from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans. Wilkinson claimed to have received it in mid-June, after the army had already relocated to Terre aux Boeufs, and thus too late for him to comply with Eustis’ suggestion to move the troops to the Natchez area. Although later investigations found no conclusive proof that Eustis’ letter reached the general earlier than Wilkinson reported, Wilkinson’s dubious reputation led to doubts about the veracity of this claim among administration officials and congressmen looking to blame the soldier’s mortality on the general. Some modern historians have concluded that Wilkinson simply decided to ignore Eustis’ letter.

Wilkinson responded to Eustis on 18 June and advised him that moving the troops upriver could best be made by water as the Spanish refused to allow the Americans to move through their West Florida territory on land. The general advised Eustis that the health of the troops would suffer greatly by doing so, especially with so many already sick. He also pointed out that the expense of relocating to Natchez would be excessive. Wilkinson advised the secretary that moving to Terre aux Boeufs did not adversely affect the soldiers’ health, as the change in location started to reduce the army’s sick rolls. To support this claim, Wilkinson reported that the numbers of his soldiers listed as sick had decreased, after a peak of 600 at New Orleans in May, to 442 in late June at the new site, and the fatalities dropped as well, even with the
addition of 69 new soldiers. Given these numbers, the general had no intention of moving his troops again, unless necessity demanded it.

The new camp was for the most part dry when the troops arrived, although much of the ground was low, and part of it near the surrounding cypress swamps was soggy. Fair weather did not last, however. In late June incessant rains converted the fields into a morass, and brought with them fevers and diseases associated with low ground, inadequate shelter, and wet conditions. The landowner later testified that the rain-swollen Mississippi rose in June to a level “greater than [it] had been for a number of years.” The rising waters of the river overflowed the sections of the levee, “which rendered the ground of our encampment wet and muddy,” and made it “ineligible . . . for an encampment,” in the words of an officer at the scene.

Many of the men initially had to sleep directly on the ground due to a lack of straw, and had only their blankets and palmetto leaves to protect them from the wet earth for several weeks. Later the soldiers slept in tents with floors made of wooden planking taken from the boats which had transported part of the army by river from Kentucky. The troops also set up sheds and small arbors of palm branches to shield the sentry posts from “the piercing rays of the sun,” and for shade at the mess areas as well, but this was not completed until August. Once the late June rains came and turned the camp into a quagmire, the tents offered little protection for the men. Fatigue parties dug ditches and trenches around the camp and near the tents in a vain effort to divert water from the site, a strenuous project that continued for weeks. At the rear of the camp, rain flooded the sentry posts so that the pickets stood in water “over their shoes” while on duty. Heat and humidity also took a toll on the sentries and work parties, some of whom died while on duty, no doubt weakened by poor diet and illness.

In addition to the inhospitable weather at Terre aux Boeufs, problems supplying the men with all manner of food, uniforms, and equipment added to the soldiers’ misery. Many of the men had worn-out clothing, and getting new uniforms issued was difficult at the Terre aux Boeufs location. One dragoon officer described the men as “naked” at the camps, where heavy fatigue duties and muddy conditions wore out the uniforms. Confusion occurred in clothing distribution when the army later moved upriver in September, and some of the uniforms arrived not sewn and without buttons. Major Backus recalled that the uniforms were not stitched “but just basted together.” According to one report, much of the new clothing sent to the army did not arrive until late August, just before the troops left the Terre aux Boeufs encampment, and was not distributed to the men until after they reached the town of Washington in the Mississippi Territory in early November.

Complaints about the army’s food supplies were widespread. “The clamors of the troops,” wrote Wilkinson, were “loud and just,” due to the lack of food and other daily essentials. The general blamed the contractor’s agent in New Orleans for failing to supply quality flour, as he was “a young man without knowledge or experience.” At one point the supply system deteriorated to the extent that Wilkinson had to purchase one hundred barrels of flour in New Orleans “on account of the contractor” to furnish the men with edible provisions. Officers noted that the camp’s flour was typically “sour, moldy, in lumps, and sometimes full of bugs and worms.” Some barrels contained meal of a sulfur color, and other shipments could only be used to “clean pantaloons” of the soldiers. At times the men would simply bury it. One particularly colorful account of the flour sent to the camp reported that dampened flour would become “so firmly agglutinated together, that when the barrel was separated from its contents, the cemented mass retained the shape given to it by the cask, and stood firmly erect like a block of wood.” In such condition the men had to use axes to cut up the hardened flour and pound it into meal. Although some officers reported that the beef and pork was generally of good quality, and that the quality of provisions improved once the army moved from the city to Terre aux Boeufs, most observers concluded that the army’s rations were typically substandard.

Meat sent to the troops was “frequently refused” due to its rotten condition, and rancid pork was not uncommon. Most of the pork they received was “not proper for the use of the soldiers,” who threw it away. Major Backus observed that much of the salted pork issued to the men “was so bad that the soldiers would not eat it; it was rusty and moldy . . . and unfit for use.” The 5th Regiment’s quartermaster, 

Wool uniforms, like this 1810 staff officer’s coat, wore out quickly under the harsh conditions and heavy duty at the Terre aux Boeufs encampment.
Lt. Le Roy Opie, recalled that the bread and flour at the camp was “generally bad; the pork sometimes good, sometimes bad; the beef better than is generally got in warm climates.” At Terre aux Boeufs he recalled that “some of the provisions . . . were bad, but generally comparatively good.” Opie recalled that rejected deliveries of provisions were accepted back by the contractors without complaint. Wilkinson himself later testified that he made frequent inspections of the flour and other provisions, and found it to be serviceable for the men, although he regretted to the feelings of a medical man, to be in attendance on the sick soldier, and see him die for the want of proper food and medicines.”65

Not only did the troops receive inadequate provisions and supplies, the process used to procure them was also deficient. Wilkinson frequently complained about the system of military agents, the procurement and distribution officials who were not directly responsible to him, but to Federal authorities. These agents were “held solely responsible to the military department, without even an indication of the subordination to military rule.”66 Recent congressional legislation had eliminated the Army’s Quartermaster Department in favor of a system of procurement using contract agents, based in Philadelphia. The 1802 reorganization act divided the nation into three military departments, with one contracting agent and several assistants assigned to each department, responsible for supplying the troops within their area of responsibility. Since all of the agents and assistants received their appointments from the president, responsibility and accountability to Army commanders were often lacking within the departments, which created inefficiency and shortages.67

Wilkinson complained that in his department, these men were “without rank, commission, or a single ray of military information, or experience.”68 He added that “the officers who are appointed to meet every expense, act under specific instructions, from the war department, and are often authorized, to control the general’s arrangements.”69 This system was “putting the baby to beat the nurse,” Wilkinson wrote. He complained to Secretary Eustis that the army’s paymaster received guidance directly from Washington, D.C., as did the army’s military agent for the Southern Department, Abraham D. Abrahams.70 The agent received a warning from Eustis to reject purchase requests from Army officers—including Wilkinson—for over $50, unless absolutely necessary. Eustis acknowledged to Wilkinson that Congress had recently enacted a law that “prescribes severe limitations in expenditure,” and he warned the general of the government’s “disposition to scrutinize every item.”71

While Wilkinson bemoaned the procurement arrangements, many of his own critics accused him of withholding the troops’ pay while at Terre aux Boeufs and during the movement to Natchez in September. At least a few officers believed that the men had gone months without their pay, which prevented them from purchasing local vegetables and fowl to improve their own health. Rumors spread that Wilkinson refused to allow the troops to receive their pay before the movement to Natchez for fear the men would desert afterward. While some officers complained of significant arrears in pay for their soldiers, others reported no pay problems, either at Terre aux Boeufs or after the troops had relocated to the Mississippi Territory. Wilkinson later pointed out that preparations to move the army in September precluded paying the men at that time, and claimed that they had just been paid up through the end of June. He also noted that the general was not responsible for paying the men—the army’s district paymaster assumed that role, and was not dependent on Wilkinson to execute his duties, nor did the general order him

“It is a distressing sight, and truly unpleasant to the feelings of a medical man, to be in attendance on the sick soldier, and see him die for the want of proper food and medicines....”
not to do so. The paymaster at New Orleans in 1809, Lt. Simeon Knight, had sufficient funds to pay the troops through December of that year.72

Poorest quality provisions, inclement weather, muddy camps, and bad water inevitably led to the hundreds of soldiers on the army’s sick rolls, and deaths among the troops. While the number of men too ill for duty began to decline initially once the troops left New Orleans, by late June conditions in camp began to take their toll. Most of the ill soldiers suffered from dysentery, “bilious fever,” scurvy, and malaria.73 Many of these men died of dysentery alone, although some had this affliction in combination with others. Death from dysentery was in some instances “sudden and instantaneous.”74 It became apparent by early July that there were too few Army doctors at the encampment, so that Wilkinson had to employ private physicians from New Orleans to assist in treating the sick. “I was very attentive to the sick, and did as much as could have been expected of a general officer,” Wilkinson recalled, and several of the army’s doctors later noted his concern for the ill soldiers. Wilkinson also housed many sick officers within his own headquarters, while some of the most severely ill troops were placed in the hospitals in New Orleans. The ship containing medical supplies for the army arrived from Philadelphia in late August, but by that point many of the soldiers were severely ill and did not benefit from medicines.75

Due to the lack of medicine and surgeons at camp, some of the men died without having received any medical attention at all.76 The regimental surgeon of the 5th Infantry complained of the “imperfect state of the medical staff” and the “want of a hospital, hospital stores, and medicines” at Terre aux Boeufs.77 Another officer wrote that the sick suffered in their tents and were “exposed to the constant and incessant torrents of rain, to the scorching heat of the sun, and during the night to the attacks of numberless mosquitoes. They manifested the pains and sufferings they experienced by shrieks and groans, which, during the silence of the night, were distinctly to be heard from one end of the line to the other.” This officer concluded that the insects at camp produced more misery than any other cause.78 Although Wilkinson ordered mosquito nets distributed among the regiments, these appear to have done little good.79

Not all witnesses at the camp reported the same situation. One of the army’s surgeons stated that he did not have difficulties procuring medicine while at the encampment, or buying it at New Orleans.80 Secretary Eustis, alarmed by the reports of fatalities at the encampment, noted that “a stock of medical and hospital stores, for two thousand men, for three months” arrived at New Orleans on 5 April 1809, and that from March 1809 to January 1810, the Army’s military agent at New Orleans purchased for the use of the Army $11,800 of medical supplies. Given this information, “the causes for the alleged deficiencies are inexplicable by this Department,” wrote Eustis in April 1810 to Thomas Newton of Virginia, the chairman of the congressional committee investigating the mortality of the troops in Louisiana.81 Eustis, of course, had only secondhand knowledge of the conditions at Terre aux Boeufs, and was contradicted by many at the encampment, such as surgeon William Upshaw, who reported bleakly in July that the soldiers “came here sick, have grown worse, and are now on the brink of the grave.”82

Returns show that from the time the army arrived at Terre aux Boeufs to the end of June, a period of just over two weeks, the number of men reported daily as sick fell from 562 to 442. During this period, eleven soldiers died, and three deserted. In July, once the rains had begun and the camp became swampy, deaths increased to thirty-seven, and in August fifty-eight men died there. In September, before the army departed Terre aux Boeufs, twenty-one men died in fourteen days. This made for a total of 127 deaths from disease among the troops in the army’s camp from mid-June to mid-September, significantly higher than the 47 deaths the army had suffered while at New Orleans from 1 February to 9 June 1809.83 Whether or not the army’s medical staff had sufficient medical stores to use in Louisiana, the poor health of the army was indisputable. One army surgeon described the scene of the camp as deplorable. “The progress of disease at Terre aux Boeufs,” he observed, “both in numbers and alarming symptoms, evidently bore proportion to the advance of the summer heat; thereby forcing conviction . . . that the climate, and not the local situation of the camp, was the cause of sickness among the troops.”84 Others disagreed as to the cause of the widespread sickness. Colonel Beall of the 5th Regiment opined that the low ground along the river “contributed...
surgery as well, also noted that poor provisions “unfit for use” and the scarcity of vegetables contributed to the high rate of sickness among the new recruits. An 1818 study of the troops’ situation at Terre aux Boeufs by Army surgeon Jabez W. Heustis concluded that the camp’s location, poor weather, and the burdensome fatigue duties required of the men were contributing factors to the widespread illness there. Heustis also noted that “what added still more to the influence of these causes was . . . that the troops consisted of new levies from different states, unaccustomed to the climate.”

The troops eventually built “a tolerable large hospital” out of lumber from the boats and the surrounding woods, and the army rented a nearby house for use of the ill soldiers. Some of the worst cases went to New Orleans hospitals, but the number of men on the sick rolls grew so large that the hospital in camp could not accommodate them, so that many had to remain in their tents with little medical attention. One company commander of the 3d Regiment reported that he typically had only five men fit for duty at a time while at Terre aux Boeufs, the rest being too ill to perform any service.

The inexperience of the new officers among the regiments and the raw recruits within the ranks also contributed to the army’s poor health. Many of the troops used water from the camp’s drainage ditches to drink and to wash, and kept their camps unclean. Wilkinson urged the troops to stop throwing refuse in front of their tents, and repeatedly admonished his officers for failing to police the camp and observe common sanitary practices. “A filthy camp will become a sickly one,” he lectured the army in his general orders. The army’s officer responsible for policing the camp described it in July as abounding in “filth and nastiness of almost every kind.” The troops used the trees in camp as latrines, as well as the camp kitchens. Drainage ditches and culverts became refuse dumps, filled with “stinking meat . . . vegetables, old clothes, and every species of filth.” He found it common to “see four or five

Drainage ditches and culverts became refuse dumps, filled with “stinking meat . . . vegetables, old clothes, and every species of filth.”

house for use of the ill soldiers. Some of the worst cases went to New Orleans hospitals, but the number of men on the sick rolls grew so large that the hospital in camp could not accommodate them, so that many had to remain in their tents with little medical attention. One company commander of the 3d Regiment reported that he typically had only five men fit for duty at a time while at Terre aux Boeufs, the rest being too ill to perform any service.

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As Wilkinson’s dismissal of the officers’ petition demonstrated, he refused to concede that the location of the camp was anything but healthy. Rather, he blamed “the want of medicine and medical skill,” the poor provisions supplied to the army, and “the change of climate, and habits of life, and to the ignorance and neglects of officers and men, in regard to the interior police of military corps, on which cookery and cleanliness depend.” Although some of his officers were of the same opinion, the low ground and wet, muddy conditions in the camp—once the late June rains swamped the area—certainly added to the conditions in which the

general review of the army, “symptoms of mutiny were manifested” among the men and a few of the officers as well, some of whom had put stock in a false rumor that Congress soon planned to discharge them. Major Backus concluded that the men were disgruntled at the conditions in camp, the prevalent illness among the soldiers, and “the unremitted fatigues and hardships they were compelled to endure.” In July, many officers signed a petition to General Wilkinson “to remove the army” from Terre aux Boeufs. Capt. John Darrington presented this document to the Army commander, to which an “astonished” Wilkinson responded that he “would not remove the troops until he received orders to do so.” Darrington did not leave the petition with the general, who “made a few harsh expressions” on learning of his intentions. The captain returned to his fellow officers on parade with the recognition that “all prospect of a removal ceased.”

Not all officers signed the document, and at least one of them thought that the “discontent among the troops was owing to a petition signed by many of the officers, and their unguarded conversations.” Wilkinson was offended enough at the officers’ appeal that he issued general orders on 9 July to state publicly his justification for choosing the Terre aux Boeufs site. “Here, then, the camp, after due deliberation, has been pitched; and here it will continue until a change may be directed by the executive, or made necessary by some internal or external incident,” the general concluded defensively.

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men suffered. Despite the general’s refusal to consider relocation, he soon had no choice.96

On 20 July, Wilkinson received a letter from Eustis dated 22 June 1809, in which the secretary of war ordered Wilkinson to move the army to a healthier location, upriver at Natchez and Fort Adams. Wilkinson was surprised at the directive, and later described his incredulity at receiving orders to move the army from Eustis, who already knew the army had moved to Terre aux Boeufs.97 Eustis told the general that he was “unable to perceive, any advantages in the position, which you have selected for an encampment . . . which give it a preference, over the high grounds in the rear of Fort Adams, or its vicinity.” After also admonishing Wilkinson for the army’s high expenses, the secretary directed him to move the troops upriver, leaving only a sufficient force to garrison New Orleans and Fort St. Phillip, a post eighty miles downstream on the Mississippi. Eustis advised Wilkinson that the army would receive transportation assistance from the U.S. Navy to move up the river, and the parsimonious secretary also warned Wilkinson that “next to preserving the lives and health, of the officers and men, a rigid regard to expenditures [should] be observed.”98

Wilkinson was stunned by the pre-emptory order to move almost his entire command when so many of his soldiers were ill. He replied to Eustis on 23 July, pledging to begin preparations to leave Terre aux Boeufs as soon as practicable. Wilkinson also reminded Eustis of the sickness in camp, and warned him of the Navy’s lack of available boats to move his men. “The heat of the sun, in dog days, must endanger our health,” the general wrote.99 Wilkinson was not alone in his concern for the troops if the army made a move to Natchez. One officer later stated that on hearing that the army would be sent upriver in the heat of the summer, he “had no doubt that the well would sicken and the sick would die.”100 While the general opposed moving the troops to Natchez, as did his medical staff, the troops had a different reaction. Once news of the plan to relocate to the Mississippi Territory reached the men in late August, “nothing could have exceeded the joy expressed by the soldiers on this occasion,” as their “drooping spirits” were at least for a time raised.101

Although Eustis had ordered the Navy to assist Wilkinson in moving the army northward by river, the Navy supplied only four gunboats for men.102 As for the rest of the soldiers, 632 were fit to march on land with arms, accoutrements, and knapsacks; 350 were able to march without them; and 382 men were “convalescents who can take care of themselves, but cannot march.” An additional 178 men were too ill to march and required personal assistance.103 In the end, all 1,542 soldiers at the Terre aux Boeufs camp went by boat or marched along the riverbank.104

Wilkinson’s troops began the move northward in the middle of September—about two months after receiving the War Department’s orders to do so. They stopped briefly across from New Orleans before proceeding toward Natchez on 23 September.105 Some of the boats proved to be leaky, and had to be repaired before the troops could proceed.106 Wilkinson fell ill and remained at the city for several weeks, but some of the ailing soldiers who should have been left at New Orleans had to continue with the army “from a want of room in the hospital.”107 The flotilla proceeded upstream under the command of Major Backus, the only healthy field grade officer with the men.108 In his Memoirs, Wilkinson wrote that the army’s boats were covered with canvas, the men had adequate food, medicines, and supplies for the journey, and had recently been paid. Nevertheless, the army’s commander also concluded that the voyage north to Natchez was a miserable ordeal for all on board the boats, “a scene of disease and death,” an opinion shared by many of the army’s officers.111 Colonel Beall wrote that “the sufferings were such as would excite pity in the most callous heart.” The condition of the men deteriorated as they moved north, so that “the surgeons declared it useless to administer medicines in the unsettled state of the troops.”112 A junior officer of the 5th Regiment wrote that “men were known to die without the smallest medical assistance.” Initially the number of deaths among the soldiers remained typical, but as the boats proceeded against the current, more of the men succumbed to their illnesses. Many debilitated soldiers remained uncovered while on the boats,
and medicine was largely unavailable. “The decks were crowded with sick,” a witness recalled, “nearly as thick as they could lie; it would have been very difficult to have crowded in another man... there being no means to keep fires on board the boats, cooking could be done in the evenings only, when stopped for the night and made fires on shore, consequently the sick were deprived during the day, of their tea, and such other comforts as could not be regularly and properly supplied.” At night, Captain Darrington reported, the soldiers buried the dead on shore, and in the mornings, those who had died during the night were likewise interred, wrapped in their thin blankets and covered with “two or three feet of earth.” He estimated that one third of the men in three companies on his boat died on the way to Natchez.113 A fellow officer, Capt. James Gibson, reported that of the seventy-six men in his company, six had perished at the Terre aux Boeufs camp, while sixteen died en route to Natchez.114

On 3 October the army reached Pointe Coupee, on the west bank of the Mississippi upriver from Baton Rouge, where a makeshift hospital promised some relief for those too ill to continue the voyage. With no money in the army’s coffers, the regimental officers collected one hundred dollars from their personal funds to provide some medical relief, set up a hospital, and purchase fresh vegetables for the suffering soldiers who were left there, but many eventually succumbed to their illnesses.115 Some of the transport boats stopped farther north at Fort Adams in mid-October, where they left 120 soldiers too ill to continue the journey. Within two weeks, seventeen of these men had died, and all but twenty “were very sick.” An artillery officer at Fort Adams reported that “eight or ten [soldiers] were in an open room in which they could have no fire, some of them no blanket, and almost naked; and all, with one or two exceptions, extremely dirty.” At the end of November 14 more ill soldiers arrived at Fort Adams, and of the total of 134 men deposited there, by the following March, 68 had died.116

The men began to arrive at Natchez in the Mississippi Territory on 31 October, but no hospital had been arranged there in advance. Sick soldiers were crowded together in their tents, often laying directly on the ground from lack of straw or planking. “In this situation numbers died daily,” one officer reported.117 A return of 31 October 1809 shows that of 1,107 men present (excluding field and staff officers), 621 were listed as sick—56 percent—at the army’s new cantonment near Washington in the Mississippi Territory, six miles east of Natchez.118 Although the high ground was “a place healthy, elegant, and convenient to springs of fine water,” the deaths among the troops was still high for the first several weeks after they arrived at the new camp. As one report of 1810 concluded, “many of the soldiers had been so much exhausted by preceding sufferings, that no situation, however salubrious, nor medicines, however powerful, were of sufficient efficacy to rescue them from their impending fate.” One junior officer reported that at Washington, the fatigue duty was “constant,” and that “every man that could do any thing [was]... ordered on it.” Fortunately, the people of Washington “received the army with much affection,” and treated the soldiers with “attention and friendship.” Many of the locals sent vegetables and milk to the camp hospitals for the benefit of the sick. By December the number of deaths began to decrease, and by the end of February 1810, the condition of the troops had improved considerably, although many of the soldiers were still sick and quality provisions were at times troublesome to procure.119 Two months later, there were 1,184 effective troops at the Washington camp.120

Having opposed the army’s removal from Terre aux Boeufs, Wilkinson also argued that had the men remained there, improving weather and supply systems would have seen an alleviation of the soldiers’ distress. He pointed out that most of the suffering and death occurred on the voyage to Natchez, not at Terre aux Boeufs. In fact, during the relocation to the Mississippi Territory from mid-September to the end of October, 638 men were sick and 240 died, not counting those troops who expired at Pointe Coupee and Fort Adams. From 1 November 1809 to 31 January 1810, 326 men died at the army’s Washington cantonment, a total of over 634 disease-induced deaths since they left Terre aux Boeufs in September.121 In addition, fifty soldiers deserted during the northward journey, probably from those
troops well enough to march on land. Although it is impossible to know how many soldiers would have died at Terre aux Boeufs during the same time period, the losses incurred by the army during the move to Natchez and afterward is staggering compared to the losses suffered beforehand at Terre aux Boeufs, where 127 had died in three months. Wilkinson’s position that the army would have suffered less had it remained near New Orleans certainly had some merit.

Wilkinson, who had fallen ill at New Orleans at the time the army left Terre aux Boeufs, did not rejoin his troops until November. President Madison relieved him from command in Mississippi. Madison replaced him with recently promoted Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, a former Revolutionary War cavalryman and U.S. Congress- man from South Carolina, who arrived in Natchez on 13 December. Before the troops had even reached Natchez and into the following year, the Madison administration and Congress placed Wilkinson under scrutiny for the illness and deaths that plagued the troops in Louisiana. The general “has lost completely the confidence of nine tenths of all persons with whom I am acquainted,” wrote Virginia congressman John Wayles Eppes in the nation’s capital in January 1810, “he hangs like a dead weight upon the administration.”

After turning over the troops to Hampton in the Mississippi Territory, Wilkinson left Natchez in February, descended the river to marry Miss Trudeau in New Orleans, and then traveled to Washington, D.C., to defend his reputation and answer the accusations against him related to the sufferings of the troops, as well as his dealings with Spanish officials and his role in the Burr Conspiracy. What becomes clear from the correspondence between Eustis and Wilkinson, and later between the secretary and the congressional committee investigating the Louisiana calamity, is that Eustis sought to blame Wilkinson for the debacle. When Wilkinson wrote that “this inquiry was instituted, to justify the secretary of war, and condemn me,” he was no doubt close to the truth. Existing papers from 1809 to 1811 show that Eustis tried to demonstrate through documents he provided to investigators that there was an adequate supply of medicine in Louisiana; that uniforms were sent to the troops from Philadelphia and arrived prior to the army’s journey to Natchez; and that the troops could have been paid at New Orleans or beforehand, were not in arrears, and that funds were available to do so. Eustis also tried to show Congress that if the general found the supplies lacking or of poor quality, he had been authorized by the supply contract to reject spoiled goods, replace the contractor’s agent, and purchase satisfactory provisions on the contractor’s account. The secretary also made plain that he did not choose the Terre aux Boeufs location, and pointed to his two letters—30 April and 22 June—calling for the new camp to be at Natchez or Fort Adams as proof that Wilkinson had not only chosen an unhealthy site, but he also disobeyed orders by doing so. Finally, Eustis argued that the Terre aux Boeufs site led to the disease and that the deaths on the boats going to Natchez were from the poor condition of the troops before they even started the upriver relocation. Wilkinson’s new encampment, he wrote, sowed “the seeds of death” among the troops, which “germinated on the voyage up the Mississippi.”

In his own defense, Wilkinson argued that his objective was to defend
New Orleans from attack, based on orders he received from the War Department, then under Dearborn, in December 1808. In order to do so, Wilkinson concluded that keeping the army and his command near the city at Terre aux Boeufs was the best way to comply with his orders and avoid incurring expenses. The general also pointed out the suggestion—and later, the orders—he received from Eustis to move the army to the Mississippi Territory violated a commonly held maxim of command that a commander in the field was the proper authority to decide an army’s movements, operations, and positions. Wilkinson also reminded Eustis that the secretary was over one thousand miles away, and knew little about the conditions, limitations, and practicalities the commander of the army had to confront and overcome in Louisiana.127

Wilkinson also showed how parsimonious the War Department was, even by quoting Eustis’ own letters, in which he admonished Army officers and agents in Louisiana to limit their expenses. By doing so Wilkinson sought to imply that the War Department must be blamed for the soldiers’ illnesses and deaths due to a lack of uniforms, medicine, provisions, and other supplies. As to the move to Terre aux Boeufs, the general not only claimed that he had not received Eustis’ 30 April letter until after the removal of the army downstream, he also marshaled a dozen letters and depositions of prominent locals to show that Terre aux Boeufs was usually a healthy, dry, and strategic position. Wilkinson also produced documents from the U.S. Navy through which he demonstrated that the sea service provided only four transport vessels for the army’s use, not the two dozen promised by Eustis. “Blame does not lie at my door,” Wilkinson later wrote, “but that of the secretary of war, for failing to furnish, in due season, the transport promised in the order” of 22 June. Even before the army had reached Natchez, Wilkinson began to hear rumors and reports that his critics were shocked at the high number of deaths among the army’s regiments in the New Orleans area and blamed him. His early attempts to deflect blame to the War Department can best be seen in his letter to Eustis of 22 July 1809, in which he replied to the secretary’s unqualified order to move northward. Shifting responsibility to Eustis for the orders to relocate, Wilkinson wrote that “the peremptory tenor of your order for the removal of the troops has relieved me from an oppressive responsibility.” He concluded the missive by noting “that, was my discretion permitted, I should stay here and hazard the consequences; but, as there would be hazard, I am glad of your order to move, not only as it lessens my responsibility, but because

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp near November</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Camp near December</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Orleans Camp near December</td>
<td>January 1810</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total loss</td>
<td>934</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Taken from the original returns and reports, and from the returns of the Inspector of the army.

### Table

![Table showing losses incurred by Wilkinson's force from February 1809 to January 1810](https://example.com/table.png)
the change of place may prove salu-
tary to our men.” This craven attempt
to avoid liability for the deleterious
effects a move to Natchez and Fort
Adams would create must have been
obvious to Eustis and to the congres-
sional committee as well.128

The general reached the capital on
17 April 1810, and soon requested a
court-martial, but Madison and Eu-
stis quickly rejected the application.
“The cruelty and injustice and bit-
terness and ingratitude with which I
have been treated,” Wilkinson com-
plained to a friend, “is a reproach to
our whole country and a disgrace
to the government.”129 Congress,
however, did investigate “the great
mortality in that detachment of the
Army ordered for the defence of New
Orleans” in a manner prejudicial to
Wilkinson, in that he was not al-
lowed to testify personally before
the investigators, offer documents
in his defense, nor question witnesses
against him. The general suspected
that Eustis was in part behind the
investigation, in order to deflect
blame from the War Department for
the army’s disaster along the Missis-
pippi. “This inquiry,” Wilkinson later
wrote, “was instituted, to justify the
secretary of war, and condemn me.”

The court-martial was held at Fred-
erick, Maryland, beginning on 4 Sep-
tember 1811, before a panel of eleven
Army officers. The charges against
him related to the “Burr Conspiracy,”
his rumored Spanish intrigues, and
the deaths among the soldiery on the
Mississippi.131 Wilkinson’s defense
of his conduct in New Orleans and Terre
aux Boeufs was based on a strategy of
transferring blame to others, especially
Secretary Eustis and his predeces-
sor, Secretary Dearborn, as well as
local civilians and contractors who
failed to properly support the troops.
Wilkinson painted the two secretar-
ies as being miserly with funds and
supplies for his command, and with
failing to alleviate the troops’ suffer-
ing.132 Wilkinson also faced charges
he disobeyed Eustis’ order to move
upriver to Natchez and Washington.
His best defense seems to have been
his demonstration that the majority of
soldiers’ deaths from illness occurred
during the removal of the army from
the Terre aux Boeufs camp to the
Mississippi Territory, which he had
opposed, and his orders to protect
New Orleans.133

The jury of officers deliberated until
Christmas Day, at which point they sent
their verdict and all court documents
to the president for his review. Madison
spent part of six weeks reviewing the testimony and court transcripts, as well as the verdict: not guilty of all charges. In February 1812, the president announced Wilkinson's acquittal. "His sword is accordingly ordered to be restored," Madison declared, no doubt grudgingly.\footnote{134} The general received orders in April to take command once again at New Orleans, as the United States moved closer to a conflict with its perpetual adversary, Great Britain. He arrived in the Crescent City in July, several weeks after Madison persuaded the U.S. Congress to declare war. Wilkinson evidently still had powerful supporters at the outbreak of the War of 1812, for he received a major-general's commission in the U.S. Army just months after his acquittal. He was no longer, however, America's senior officer, an honor given to former War Department chief Henry Dearborn six months before war was declared. Assigned to the Northern theater in 1813, Wilkinson performed poorly and was relieved of his command. With his fortunes still attached to the Old South-west, he died in Mexico City in 1825, while pursuing a Texas land grant.\footnote{135}

Author's Note

The author would like to thank Dr. Erin Greenwald of the Historic New Orleans Collection for her assistance in the preparation of this article and providing modern photographs of the Army's encampment site at Terre aux Boeufs.

Notes


20. Ltr, Sec William Eustis to the House of Representatives, 30 Jan 1810, Military Affairs, 1:249.


The first of many paintings by Tom Lea to appear in Life magazine throughout World War II, Sgt. Bruce Bieber was published as a full-page illustration in the “Defense Issue” on 7 July 1941. When war seemed inevitable, Life commissioned seven prominent artists to paint subjects related to what the magazine described as “the mighty stir and drama of the nation’s defense effort.” Lea’s portrait of 1st Sgt. Bruce Bieber of the 9th Infantry’s antitank company inspired a biographical article on Bieber, which appeared in the same issue.

Working under a very tight deadline, Lea traveled to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and selected subjects for four portraits, including this one. For Lea, Bieber represented the prewar Army, the career soldier, and the importance of the noncommissioned officer in the development of young recruits. Lea described Bieber as “everything an honest-to-God old time Army Sergeant should be. He is everything that he looks.” Lea portrays Bieber standing proudly while supervising new recruits. His well-worn uniform and athletic physique show an experienced leader who takes pride in his discipline.

Bieber, who was forty-seven when Lea painted this portrait, had enlisted in 1917, but did not see overseas service during World War I. After a short attempt to transition back to civilian life after the war, he reenlisted and never looked back. By the time Lea painted his portrait, Bieber had served in the Army for twenty-four years. Life describes Bieber as worrying constantly about his soldiers’ comfort, welfare, and their ability to transition to Army life. In September 1942, Bieber received a direct-commission to captain, and he performed extensive administrative duties throughout World War II. Ultimately, Bieber is remembered as the ideal first sergeant portrayed in the 1941 portrait.

In 1960, Time Life Inc. donated this painting, along with the entire collection of art produced by Life artist-correspondents during World War II, to the Army. It is now part of the Army Art Collection, which is preserved at the Army’s Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Sarah Forgey is the curator of the U.S. Army Art Collection.

Notes

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In September 1909 a group of Australian Army officers filled a room at the United Service Institution of New South Wales to hear Maj. W. F. Everett, a permanent officer then appointed the brigade-major of the 2d Light Horse Brigade, deliver a lecture entitled, “The future use of cavalry, and our light horse.” Having recently attended the 1909 autumn maneuvers of both the British and French armies, as well as visiting the battlefields of the Russo-Japanese War, Everett had returned to argue in his lecture that the regiments and brigades of the Australian Light Horse, being neither proper full cavalry nor the more limited mounted infantry, needed to be organized and trained “on definite lines.” 1 There was nothing extraordinary about Everett’s lecture, nor the discussion that resulted from it. They were but a contemporary example of the professional discussions about military developments that then occurred at officer gatherings and in service journals, much as they still do today. At this lecture, however, the officers, in discussing what form Australia’s mounted troops should take, were not simply debating matters of organization or armament, but trying to grapple with some fundamental matters about the military system of which they were part. These matters stemmed in large part from an ambitious desire to create a modern, efficient, and effective military force from an organization where almost all officers and soldiers were part-time and the resources of all kinds were far from plentiful. One of the officers present at Everett’s lecture, Col. George Lee, by then a senior permanent officer and respected veteran of the Boer War, noted:

It is absolutely impossible to train our mounted troops up to the standard of Imperial cavalry. . . . We can put into the field first-class irregular light horse. . . . I have no hesitation in saying that with the material we have in Australia an exceedingly useful force can be made available.2

In broad terms this is what Australia had supplied to fight in the Boer War of 1899–1902, which, if sometimes imperfect, had been adequate—but what about the next war? As Major Everett pointed out in his lecture, “we will not have the Boers to fight again, and much higher training will be required against European troops.”3 And so it would prove to be.

The Commonwealth Military Forces, as Australia’s Army was then known, was created between the Boer War and the First World War, and then, just a few years before the Great War, almost completely recreated. In both cases the schemes implemented reflected the fundamental ambition to create something effective and efficient, but each time the efforts would be severely troubled by the problems that beset them.

The Commonwealth Military Forces came into being just a few months after Federation when, on 1 March 1901, the now state governments passed the control of the various colonial forces they had maintained to the new federal government and the Department of Defence, established in Melbourne. In most of the colonies, efforts to maintain some form of local defense force had begun with a degree of seriousness in the 1850s, but generally speaking it had only been since the mid-1880s that the larger colonies had become prosperous and developed enough to maintain them on an ongoing basis, a resolve that had been severely tested during the economic depression of the 1890s. The forces that the Commonwealth inherited were all recognizable as examples of British-pattern nineteenth...
century citizen-based part-time forces; however, they were widely varying in their administrative and organizational forms, level of training, size and, it was soon discovered, quality. As part-time paid troops or completely part-time unpaid volunteers, their members also tended to be proud of their status as citizen soldiers and the units they belonged to had also often developed their own distinctive cultures and ethos. The result was that they could be vocal in their own defense. The fact that many officers were also pillars of their local, and sometimes colonial, societies meant that they could also create political waves if they were so inclined.

To meld this disparate conglomeration into a federal force the Commonwealth Government, after several refusals, secured the services of the British Army officer, Maj. Gen. Sir Edward Hutton. An experienced officer with a record of active service in various colonial campaigns in Africa, Hutton was a vocal proponent of mounted infantry and perhaps an even more vocal advocate of imperial defense cooperation. He was no stranger to Australia and had been the commandant of the New South Wales military forces between 1893 and 1895. In that appointment Hutton had undertaken a great deal of useful reform and revealed a vigorous energy when trying to improve the colonial forces under his control. He had, however, also clashed with his civilian masters and shown himself to be undiplomatically outspoken, often tactless, and dismissive and scornful of those with differing views. These were traits that came to the fore again in 1899–1900 when he got into serious trouble with the Canadian government while commanding their militia and was quickly removed to a face-saving field command in South Africa where he led a mounted infantry brigade made up mostly of Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders.

Hutton arrived for his second stint in Australia in early 1902 and quickly outlined his plans for Australia’s new army. In broad strategic terms he reiterated the long-held view that though the Royal Navy was the ultimate guarantor of Australian safety, there was the possibility that this might be temporarily unavailable and a unified defense force needed to be available as a backup. In this regard Hutton’s basic ideas were not revolutionary and this strategic assessment had been a staple of colonial defense thinking for some decades. Similarly the idea of creating a unified mobile military force to meet such an eventuality, in addition to the maintenance of coastal fortresses, had been part of local military thinking since another British officer, Maj. Gen. Sir J. Bevan Edwards, had proposed it to the colonial governments in 1889. It was an idea that the various colonial commandants of the 1890s, including Hutton in New South Wales, had pursued, but that had never gained the political and popular support necessary for it to be realized.

With the opportunity to finally effect something like what Edwards had proposed, Hutton quickly outlined his plan to the government. There was no desire from anyone to upend the pre-Federation reliance on part-time military service, and under Hutton’s scheme the number of permanent soldiers would be limited to that required to man the more technically demanding corps associated with the forts, mainly the coastal garrison artillery and the associated submarine miners. There would also be a small permanent administrative and instructional cadre that would tend to the requirements of keeping the forces running smoothly and teach the other members of the forces their duty. More numerous were to be the two kinds of part-time troops. First the unpaid volunteer, predominantly infantry, units that Hutton had inherited would be accommodated by attaching them to the coastal fortresses for local protection, and together with the gunners and other troops in the forts they would constitute the Garrison Force. More numerous and significant in developmental terms was to be the Field Force, which was to be predominantly made up of part-time paid troops with a stiffening from the permanent cadre in time of war. With a wartime establishment of 26,000 men this element was intended to be the highly mobile, well-trained, and prepared to move to threatened areas as required.
Showing his imperial thinking Hutton also intended that troops of the Field Force could be embarked and sent to defend Australia’s “interests,” however that may have been defined, should it be necessary. This last idea was not in line with the government’s thinking, however, and after making it clear to the British government at the Imperial Conference of 1902 that no Australian troops would be earmarked for imperial use, it oversaw the passage of a defense act that ensured that its troops could serve outside Australia only if they specifically volunteered.

Because of the requirement for mobility, the Field Force was to have a very high proportion of mounted troops with six of the nine brigades arranged to be made up of light horse, which under Hutton’s scheme were a type of abbreviated cavalry known at the time as mounted rifles. The other three brigades were to be infantry, but in keeping with Hutton’s thinking they were to be organized and prepared to take up the role of mounted infantry if required. These brigades were to be balanced, self-sufficient formations that included artillery, engineers, and service branches, and the intention was that a component of virtually any size could be drawn from it for independent operations. The emphasis on mobile forces and the establishment of formations that were in many ways ready-made “columns,” not dissimilar to those that had recently been ranging across the veld of South Africa, was no accident. Hutton believed that if a war had to be fought against an invader on Australian soil then it was likely that the campaign would closely resemble that which the British had just fought against the Boers. It was not the only precedent, however; the idea that fast moving, firearm-equipped mounted troops supported by artillery could have a dramatic effect on the course of a campaign was an idea that had excited theorists of mounted warfare, including Hutton, since Union troops had marched deep into the Confederacy in the final years of the American Civil War.

Hutton’s Field Force was an ambitious goal that would require a good deal of reform and improvement from the disparate forces inherited from the colonies. In the first instance it would require a dramatic expansion and reorganization. Only in New South Wales had there been an attempt to create a military organization above that of the regimental level before Federation (under Hutton’s direction in the 1890s), and aside from the larger eastern colonies such a step would have been futile given the number of troops at their disposal. With nine brigades to be created, including some that included units drawn from across state boundaries, existing units would have to be split and expanded, and some country infantry units would be required to convert to light horse. Men who could command these new entities at all levels would also have to be found, a problem that was made all the more critical because of two factors. The first was that Hutton’s vision of the Field Force required the pushing of responsibilities downward...
through the ranks and a great deal was expected from regimental level officers to act independently on campaign if required. The second was that in order for defense costs to be kept down the Field Force was to be established on a cadre basis; that is, that though each unit was to have close to its full complement of officers and noncommissioned officers, peacetime soldier numbers were to be kept to a minimum, meaning that on mobilization much would be expected of regimental leadership and the more experienced rankers to bring the new recruits up to the required standard.

Not surprisingly, training was a significant matter and the men of the infantry and light horse would be expected to attend sixteen days of training per year; artillery and engineers would do more. Essential to the program was the annual completion of the assigned musketry course and an inspection by the state commandant. For city infantrymen this meant an annual camp, usually of four days, plus a series of night and weekend activities. For men in the country, particularly the horse owners of the light horse, the training was concentrated into a regimental or brigade level continuous camp of eight days, supplemented with a smaller program of local unit-run parades. Officers had not only to make this basic commitment, but be prepared to study in their own time, attend the new “Schools of Instruction” that Hutton instituted, pass examinations for promotion or confirmation in rank, be prepared to conduct administration on their own time, and if possible they were to take part in staff rides (tactical exercises without troops) run by state commandants.

Given that before Federation soldier training had been usually limited to the traditional four-day Easter camp and a mixture of local evening or weekend parades, and that officer training programs do not seem to have even existed in any meaningful way, this training requirement was a substantial new commitment that caused considerable disquiet.

Hutton’s ambitious plans ran into trouble almost from the start, and the problems he faced quickly seemed to outweigh the opportunities presented. The most pressing matter, not surprisingly, was one of money. The new federal government had limited taxation powers and there were strong parliamentary calls for military expenditure to be kept down. Hutton’s first funding requests, based on an assumption that his budget would equal the combined colonial defense budgets, had totaled more than £480,000 over four years, estimating that if this were kept up the field and garrison forces would be fully equipped by 1908. This proved overly optimistic, however, and on submitting these and other spending proposals to the department Hutton was informed that his budget for the first year was not to exceed £50,000, which quickly stymied many of the changes afoot. The effects were obvious at the unit level and the light horse would have to continue using
their completely unsuitable civilian pattern saddles, the field artillery would not get replacements for their obsolete guns, machine guns could not be bought, the infantry would have to continue with the old pattern equipment they brought from the colonial stores, and there was no hope of creating the logistical train required to support the Field Force if it had to be mobilized. Moreover it meant that attempting to expand the establishments to meet Hutton’s targets could not be contemplated. Dismayed, and typically for him, enraged that civilian politicians could be so difficult and obstructionist, Hutton could do little but amend his budgets and point out that no guarantees of military efficiency could be offered to the government any time soon.

The problems extended well beyond those associated with money, however. The requirement to convert rural volunteer infantry into part-time paid light horse, for example, ran into difficulties when the affected men pointed out that buying horses was beyond their means. In one instance the men of the Kerang Company of the Victorian Rangers found this such an impost that they enlisted the local newspaper and member of parliament to their cause and then, having gained the ear of the minister for defense, managed to fend off Hutton’s changes to their unit. Other units complained about reorganizations, the trampling of what they saw as their identities and traditions, and their being broken up to facilitate expansions. Senior regimental officers, including the commanding officer of the Victorian Mounted Rifles, who were judged incompetent by Hutton, were replaced; they responded by venting their grievances in the newspaper, which led to more difficulties for Hutton and the government.

More fundamentally it was obvious that the quality of many units allotted to the Field Force was far from high. With the experiences in South Africa still fresh, training activities during the Hutton years often sought to draw on them. In Victoria, for example, both the 1903 and 1904 annual camps were conducted in areas chosen because of their physical similarity to the veld and which could be used to demonstrate characteristics of the fighting there. But these and other camps quickly demonstrated that despite the smattering of Boer War veterans present, the overall quality of the troops and their training was low and that they possessed only, as Hutton put it, an “elementary knowledge” of their duties. Hutton had a poor opinion of the Victorian forces he had inherited and believed that only New South Wales and Queensland, which had maintained the highest proportions of part-time paid troops, had maintained reasonably effective organizational and instructional standards before Federation. In the other states he felt the limitations of pre-Federation budgets and poor instruction had severely limited the development of their forces. On his first visit to South Australia, for example, he had been so alarmed at the lack of instructors available that he immediately arranged for the dispatch of more from other states that could better afford the loss.

Despite the effort to inject rigor, learning, and professionalism into the militia and volunteer forces, the likelihood of success was always going to be diminished by the inherent problems of the defense scheme’s structure and resources. Sixteen training days per year including, at most, an eight-day annual camp was a good deal better than the more relaxed pre-Federation arrangements, but was still not a sufficient period of time to create competent soldiers, let alone effective units or brigades. There was some hope that the leavening of South Africa veterans would help, but this was a small and diminishing pool whose talents were often open to question given the patchy performance of many of the Australian contingents in that war. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that finding enough men to fill even the limited peacetime establishments was a challenge. The strength of forces that Hutton had inherited from the colonies had been artificially high thanks to a spurt of martial enthusiasm that had accompanied the Boer War, in much the same way that war scares and Britain’s imperial conflicts had spurred colonists into military uniforms for brief periods throughout the nineteenth century. As the memory of the war started to fade, however, so did the taste for soldiering. When this combined with the ordinary difficulties of part-time service such as giving up precious time, facing the burdens of buying equipment, repetitive or dull training, maintaining a horse, putting up with officers of dubious quality, or having to continually travel to parade, it soon meant that units’ strengths were often...
well below even the establishments. In many places it proved impossible to raise new detachments and sub-units in compensation for when the hoped-for wave of local volunteers failed to materialize. On top of this was a continuing need to keep defense spending tightly in rein, and for some years after Federation many units were not authorized to recruit up to even their limited peace establishments.

Hutton may have been able to correct these problems, but his time as General Officer Commanding came to an end in late 1904, not surprisingly in acrimony with the government over plans, among other things, to replace him with a committee rather than another opinionated and perhaps difficult senior officer. Hutton had not been successful in his effort to create an efficient and capable field force, but this did not mean he was a failure either. He had carried out the essential and difficult process of amalgamating the various colonial forces (the difficulty of which should not be underestimated) and, for all its failings, created a military force that aimed to address the country’s defense needs with the limited resources at its disposal. With Hutton’s departure the government and his replacement, the Military Board of Administration, undertook many of their own. In broad terms though, his Field and Garrison Forces continued on as they then existed until new, even more ambitious schemes were developed toward the end of the decade.

In 1905 Australia’s defense outlook changed considerably with the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War. The possibility of a competent Asian military and naval power was one that had exercised Australian minds for a generation and the development caused much vexation. This, combined with a growing realization that the military forces created after Federation were unlikely to overcome the problems that beset them to become effective, led to increased thought being given to some form of universal military service obligation. In 1906 a committee formed at the behest of the second Deakin ministry, headed by the Inspector General, Maj. Gen. J. Hoad, reported that despite the assurances about Japan and the power of the Royal Navy coming from London, Australia had to have a more capable military force. Several political and military threads were woven together over the next few years and the result was a shift towards the creation of a broadly based citizen force founded on the idea of compulsory military service for all able-bodied males, inspired in part by the Swiss model. Though the push began as early as 1906, it was 1910 before the government of Andrew Fisher passed the final legislation that would bring the Hutton-era army to an end and replace it with what was virtually a completely different force.

Drawing on work done by Australian officers, notably Col. J. G. Legge, Field Marshal Herbert Kitchener visited Australia in 1910 at the government’s request and in his report on the military forces offered a template for the army of what is generally known as the Universal Training era. The scheme adopted called for all males to commence their military service at age twelve in the junior cadets and, after passing through the senior cadets later in their teens, continue until they were twenty-six years old when they would complete their service in what became known as the Citizen Force. Unpaid volunteer troops, which had always been the most problematic and under-trained element of the colonial and federal forces, were to be done away with, and all militiamen were to be paid (though for privates at half the rate than under the old system). The expansion that the scheme was to bring about would make what had been attempted under Hutton seem puny, and the goal for the Universal Training era was a peacetime strength of about 80,000 personnel, expanding to 135,000 on war breaking out. Kitchener proposed that there be twenty-one brigades of infantry,
which made for eighty-four battalions, twenty-eight regiments of light horse, and fifty-six field or howitzer batteries—objectives that were all increased very shortly. To facilitate the plan, the country was divided into unit and brigade areas from where the men that would fill the ranks would be drawn. The expansion was not to be immediate and it was planned that the scheme would take eight years to reach its intended peacetime establishments. Moreover, there were notable exceptions to the idea of universal service. No man who lived more than five miles from a training center would be obligated to endure the difficulties of travel to serve, and because of the need to provide a horse, the light horse regiments would continue to rely predominantly on volunteer service.

Still, this was an extremely ambitious plan that called for a massive change and expansion of the forces.

At a tactical and operational level the army was changing too, and had been gradually since Hutton’s departure. In 1906 the Australian military had started a process of more closely following the example and model of the British Army. This was reflected in several ways, not the least of which was the gradual acceptance at the 1907, 1909, and 1911 Imperial Conferences of the idea that the British and Dominion Armies be aligned as closely as possible in their organization, training, and doctrine. It was a process that had led in part to the creation of the Imperial General Staff to help such coordination. There were other changes too, and the primacy of the mounted soldier that Hutton had established in his Field Force, and which had been encapsulated in his own locally produced mounted service manual, had not survived much beyond his tenure. The infantry, apparently dismayed with the idea of mounted drill, seem to have devolved themselves of the mounted infantry role the moment Hutton sailed for Britain. A reorganization of the Field Force brigades in 1906 had also changed the proportions of infantry and light horse available in each state, effectively calling into doubt the idea of a “move anywhere” mobile federal force and suggested that the defense of each state would depend on units raised there. The introduction of the Kitchener scheme completely removed the last vestiges of the Hutton horse-mounted columns and relegated the mounted branch to a more conventional supporting role, leaving the model of the Boer War and nineteenth century cavalry theorizing behind.

The new scheme commenced for the senior cadets in 1911 and for the Citizen Force in 1912. Not surprisingly, however, the demands of establishing the Universal Training plan were manifold and difficult to overcome. There were too few permanent officers and noncommissioned officers to administer and train the men being brought into the ranks, a situation made worse by the requirements of controlling a massive increase in the cadets. The long-standing problems of militia officer quality were perhaps exacerbated by the scheme as the good ones were diluted into a larger force.
where they were called on to do more. The light horse faced a fundamental manning crisis brought on by the pay cut of the new scheme that did not come close to compensating for the costs of horse ownership. Moreover, as the new inspector general, the imperial officer Maj. Gen. G. M. Kirkpatrick, toured the country in 1912 and 1913 he found that the forces were, by and large, as poorly trained and inefficient as they had been since Federation.46

When in 1914 General Sir Ian Hamilton visited to inspect the Australian forces his report did not necessarily make happy reading. Though it is often cherry-picked for the encouraging and supportive comments he made, less is usually made of the grave deficiencies he highlighted in manning, logistical underpinnings, training, unit cohesion, and tactical competence. Referring to the mounted branch he worried that any attempt at maneuver by anything larger than a squadron-sized body would quickly degenerate into "disarray and confusion."47 In 1917 the military board, made wise by the realities of fighting a terrible war, looked back at the militia of 1914 and realistically concluded that “at the outbreak of war it would not have been possible to take a Militia Regiment as it stood and put it in the field at once against an efficient enemy, without disaster.”48 Clearly if the force was going to be required, a substantial period of mobilization and training would be necessary to get it ready.

Regardless, the ambition had not disappeared. The Universal Training scheme had made no specific proposals for the establishment of divisions, but there was provision for divisional mounted troops and a close correlation between the number of battalions and brigades required, and what would be required if divisions were to be formed.49 Establishments prepared in 1912 had hinted at such a step for the infantry, but nothing was then done about it.50 The idea clearly stayed around though and on 1 July 1914, just a few weeks before the outbreak of war, the military board met and recommended that a divisional organization be adopted. At that meeting a memorandum prepared by the Director of Military Operations, Maj. C. B. B. White, and submitted by the Chief of the General Staff, Brig. J. M. Gordon, stated that as the division was the "approved military organization for the Empire . . . its adoption is therefore recommended."51 Though it recognized the problems that would come with creating higher formations in a part-time citizen army in which even brigades were perhaps still more theoretical than real, the scheme went on to propose the establishment of a “Field Army” of three light horse brigades and two infantry divisions to be drawn from the 2d and 3d Military Districts (essentially New South Wales and Victoria). District Field Forces, which in the 1st and 4th Military Districts (Queensland and South Australia) included understrength infantry divisions, were also to be established in the smaller states. It was recommended that the commanders and their divisional staffs be appointed from the ranks of the Australian permanent forces by reorganizing the existing militia district headquarters (which had replaced the older state-based commands of the immediate post-Federation era). In conclusion the submission recommended that this structure be adopted as the basis for planning until 1920.52 The plan was apparently cut off by the events of August 1914, but did not disappear entirely and throughout the war the military authorities issued revised national establishments that set out the organization of a force made up of two light horse divisions and six infantry divisions.53

Whether this scheme for a divisional army could have been attained, and the problems that Hamilton identified overcome, is impossible to know, as the outbreak of war dramatically altered the situation and the chance to correct the deficiencies of what still was a very new system was taken away by the demands of the moment. The Defence Act’s ban on sending troops outside Australia without their specifically volunteering precluded a war role for the militia and a specially created expeditionary force, the Australian Imperial Force, would instead serve in Europe and around the Mediterranean. In a sense the prewar Citizen Force gave this new force everything it had to give, from its best and most able officers, and much of its manpower, to its materiel, and eventually its financial lifeline. In other ways it also gave it very little. Though many officers of the Great War started their military careers in the citizen forces, and though the militia experience gave the military an administrative and organizational framework to work with in 1914 and 1915, it is difficult to conclude that what eventually became the very effective Australian Imperial Force that existed by 1917 and 1918 in both France and Palestine owed much of its competence to the prewar militia.

The militia did not disappear with the war. Although the goal was to continue with what had been started, gutted of its best soldiers and officers, and increasingly lacking resources as the war went on, the militia in 1918 was nothing like what had been hoped for. Before Federation the Australian colonial forces were enthusiastic and often popular, but small in an age of mass armies, largely parochial in their outlook, established with minimal official support, and, with some possible exceptions, not very competent. In the dozen or so years that passed after
This article was first published in 1911: Preliminary Moves: The 2011 Chief of Army History Conference, Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, eds., Sydney, Big Sky Publishing, 2011, pp. 169–183. It is reprinted here with the permission of the Australian Army History Unit. Its text and notes have been modified, with the approval of the author, to conform to the style of this publication.

NOTES

1. Major W. F. Everett, “The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse,” Journal and Proceedings of the United Service Institution of New South Wales, XXI, Lecture LXXXVIII, 1909, pp. 91–103, at p. 91. The light horse were organized as an abbreviated form of cavalry known at the time as mounted rifles. Mounted infantry, as understood at the time, was merely infantry made more or less permanently mobile by the addition of horses or some other riding animal. For more see Jean Bou, Light Horse, A History of Australia’s Mounted Arm (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 69–71.

2. Comments made by Col G Lee; Everett, “The Future Use of Cavalry, and our Light Horse,” p. 102.


9. Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA. The war establishment of the Field Force was 26,019 men, with 15,334 of these in the three infantry brigades and 10,485 in the six light horse brigades.


11. Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA; Hutton, Defence Scheme for the Commonwealth of Australia, Jul 1914, B168, 1904/185, NAA.

12. Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.

13. Maj Gen Edward Hutton, The Defence and Defensive Power of Australia (Melbourne: Angus & Robertson, 1902), pp. 15–19; Bou, Light Horse, pp. 30–31, 61–62. For more on mounted troop theory during this period see Gervase Phillips, “‘Who Shall Say That The Days of Cavalry are Over’: The Revival of the Mounted Arm in Europe, 1853–1914,” War in History 18, no. 5 (2011): 5–32, at 29–30; and Stephen Badsy, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry 1880–1918 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008). The contemporary literature is large, but for an example that seems to have been influential with Hutton see George T. Denison, Modern Cavalry: Its Organisation, Armament and Employment in War (London: Thomas Bosworth, 1868). The American experience was not the only inspiration, but it was a prominent one.


16. Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.

17. Australian Regulations and Orders of the Military Forces of the Commonwealth, provisional edition, 1904, part 8, section 37, NAA, A2657, vol 1, NAA; Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.

18. Hutton, Min Upon the Defence of Australia, B168, 1902/2688, NAA.

19. Before Federation, officer training, such as it existed, seems to have occurred only within the regimental environment, perhaps with supplementation through personal study and attending lectures at colonial service forums such as the United Service Institutes where they were established.


21. Ltr, Secretary of Defence to Hutton, 1 Jun 1903; Ltr, Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 8 Jul 1903 both in AWM3, 03/624, Australian War Memorial.

22. Hutton wanted to spend over £10,000 on saddlery for the light horse and other branches, but had to settle for spending £90 to produce a small number of sample saddles. Secretary
of Defence to Hutton, 1 Jun 1903, and Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 8 Jul 1903, both in AWM3, 03/624; Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division . . . and remarks Thereon by Maj Gen Sir Edward Hutton, B168,1902/618, NAA; Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 33.


24. Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 2 Jun 1903, AWM3, 03/624.

25. The infantrymen of the Victorian Rangers were most vocal in their opposition to becoming light horse, but they were not the only unit to do so. The Melbourne Cavalry and New South Wales Lancers both also made complaints about the changes being forced on them regarding organization and armament. Bou, Light Horse, pp. 74–80; see also Craig Stockings, The Making and Breaking of the Post-Federation Australian Army (Canberra: Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2007), p. 19.

26. Lt Col William Braithwaite was commander of one VMR battalion and the senior regimental officer. Hutton, with the concurrence of the state commandant, brought in a NSW permanent officer to command an ad hoc brigade created from the two VMR battalions for a camp in 1903. See Bou, Light Horse, pp. 79–80 and Wilcox, “Australia’s Citizen Army,” pp. 189–92.

27. Narrative of Instructional Operations by a Cavalry Division, B168,1902/618, NAA; Wilcox, “Australia’s Citizen Army,” p. 163.

28. Ibid.

29. Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 Nov 1902, MP84/1, 1930/1/12, NAA.


31. Hutton to Secretary of Defence, 22 Nov 1902, MP84/1, 1930/1/12, NAA.


33. All the colonies and states had expanded their forces during the Boer War, in particular their mounted branches given the example of what was happening in South Africa. Bou, Light Horse, pp. 63–66.

34. For more on the travails of citizen unit service during the late colonial and early Federation period, see Bou, Light Horse, pp. 87–98, 115–30; Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes.

35. For example of the troubles the 17th Light Horse Regiment had in South Australia see Inspector-General’s Rpt on his visit to 1 Squadron, 17th Light Horse Regiment on 17 Mar 1906, B168, 1906/5262, NAA.

36. Lt Col W. T. Bridges, AQMG, to Queensland Commandant, 3 Jul 1903, AWM3, 03/677, pt 1; Bridges, AQMG, to Secretary of Defence, 14 Sep 1904, AWM3, 03/600.


38. For more detail on the threat from Japan and its effects on the development of Australian defense policy in this period, see Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, pp. 55–61; Palazzo, The Australian Army, pp. 39–56; Grey, A Military History of Australia, pp. 71–76.


41. Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 59; Palazzo, The Australian Army, p. 51.


44. Bou, Light Horse, p. 99.

45. Ibid., p. 103.

46. Ibid., pp. 103–07.


49. The following information regarding the plans for the establishment of divisions was first outlined, Jean Bou, “An Aspirational Army,” Sabretache 49, no. 1 (2008): 25–30; see also Bou, Light Horse, pp. 110–11.

50. War Establishments of the Australian Military Forces, 1912, A1194, 22.14/6970, NAA.


52. Ibid.

The Mongol Art of War: Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Military System

By Timothy May
Westholme, 2007
Pp. xiii, 216. $29.95

Review by Grant T. Weller

Timothy May, a professor at North Georgia College and State University, has written what may be the definitive work on the Mongols at war. While it will not replace standard histories of the Mongol Empire, such as David Morgan’s The Mongols, 2nd ed. (Malden, Mass., 2007), it is a topical work of immense value to academics with an interest in Inner Eurasian history, military historians, and military professionals.

May begins with a vignette from the Mongol conquest of Bukhara in 1220. After setting the stage, he gives a short history of the Mongol Empire, which serves as a refresher for those already familiar with the Mongols, or as a quick introduction for those who have not yet made their acquaintance. From here, May breaks down the Mongol military system topically, addressing: recruitment and organization; training and equipment; logistics, supply, and medical care; espionage, tactics, and strategy; leadership; and opponents.

Having considered these aspects, May shows their application by addressing key Mongol campaigns, battles, and sieges, including episodes from the Khwarazmian War, which serve to close out the story, started in Bukhara. Illustrative details abound, and May’s interpretations are sound. The topical approach leads to some repetition of examples if reading the book straight through; however, each chapter can stand alone, if required.

The final chapter considers the strengths and weaknesses of the Mongols, as well as their overall legacy for the art of war. May concludes that their greatest strengths were their mobility and discipline, and their greatest weakness the quality of the individual Mongol soldier. The latter will surprise many, but May makes a good case that the average Mongol warrior had trouble facing elite forces such as Mamluks or samurai. He goes on to trace Mongol influence on modern military theorists, the blitzkrieg, and modern armored warfare.

May demonstrates an absolute command of the relevant secondary literature, but more importantly has considered, and made excellent use of, the primary sources. Given the extent of the Mongol Empire, sources on the Mongols appeared originally in Chinese, Japanese, Russian, French, Latin, Persian, Arabic, and Mongol. Few historians have mastered them all, but May has made use of nearly all, at least in translation. May also engages the reader when the sources are unclear, or contradictory, rather than offering an omniscient interpretation.

The book is supplemented with five useful maps, two sets of battle diagrams, and some well-chosen black and white illustrations. The glossary is critical, given that most readers will lack familiarity with Mongol terms. The bibliography, divided into primary and secondary sources, is extensive.

The Mongol Art of War is highly recommended for academics and military professionals. Those academics with an interest in Inner Eurasia will get a crash course in the military aspects of Mongol greatness, and a better understanding of why they expanded as far as they did, as quickly as they did, but no further. Military historians who have not previously focused on Inner Eurasia will come to see the Mongols as something other than opponents of the cultures with which they are more familiar. And, despite May’s emphasis on the Mongols’ influence on tank warfare, military professionals will gain the most by understanding the military legacy of regions of the world to which many will have deployed, or will be deploying.

Dr. Grant T. Weller is an Air Force lieutenant colonel and is chief of the Air Force Watch in the Pentagon. He is a former associate professor of history at the United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is coeditor of Harnessing the Heavens: National Defense Through Space (Chicago, Ill., 2008).

Dr. Grant T. Weller
Review by Clifton Lopez

Founding father John Adams once foretold that the essence of American Revolution histories would be that Benjamin Franklin’s electrical rod would “smote the Earth,” thus producing General George Washington, and from that moment forward the two would conduct all “Policy, Negotiations, Legislatures, and War” (p. xvii). Accordingly, authors have produced centuries of works on this subject, but none of the comprehensive descriptions are as surprisingly crisp as Robert J. Allison’s version. The American Revolution: A Concise History, which sets out to capture this classic event in the spirit of Oxford University Press’ concise history series, begins with the French and Indian War and ends with the 1800 U.S. presidential election, and convincingly accomplishes its purpose in under one hundred pages.

However, to compress such a monumental and intricate event is never an easy feat, and, as in this case, certainly comes at a price. To save space, Allison annoyingly omits any and all maps, provides no endnotes or footnotes, and includes no bibliography (while he does provide a well-thought-out suggested reading list). Even though his space-saving techniques do not help with identifying starting points for future investigation (as might be expected from a concise account), the book’s biggest shortcoming is that its purpose is challenged by technology. Within .27 seconds, any Internet search engine will link the investigator with an innumerable amount of collaborative knowledge management sites that share all the information contained within Allison’s account. Additionally, these Internet searches provide more depth on the subject, and should have been used to prevent Allison’s obvious historical error that credited Francis Marion with a win at the Battle at Cowpens. Although these opportunities were missed, Allison, as professor and chair of Suffolk University’s Department of History, and an experienced author of the revolutionary era, has the credentials and impartiality of a good historian, and, more importantly, a lucid writing style that allows him to easily surmount these obvious deficiencies.

Allison’s organization of the book is excellent. It is ninety-nine total pages and is organized into five chapters utilizing John Adams’ words, “Policy, Negotiations, Legislatures, and War” as the conceptual framework. Chapter 1 wrestles with identifying the causes of the revolution, and begins circa 1750 and ends with the Gaspee Affair. The second chapter uses all major events from the Tea Act to the introduction of German troops into the conflict to discuss how the revolution escalated from mere grievances to open rebellion. Chapter 3 explores the reasons why the colonists called for independence and focuses predominantly on the year 1776. In Chapter 4, Allison evaluates how the war was fought and won, and in the final chapter, he reflects on the postwar conundrums, and how those challenges made the United States different. By focusing each chapter on a single question, Allison is able to answer each in a disinterested, but informing way. For instance, Allison’s summarized central notion of Chapter 1 is that the cause of the Revolution was resultant from irreconcilable differences between postwar British empire-cleaning policies and liberty-minded colonial ideologues. This central notion, as simple as it may seem, in fact, weaves two disparate theories that emerged in the twentieth century: the economic causes cited by Charles Beard at the beginning of the century and the ideological causes advanced by Bernard Bailyn in the middle of the century. Allison’s evenhandedness is carried throughout each chapter in an effort to answer its principal question, and goes a long way to provide the reader with evidence from all theoretical perspectives.

The author endeavors to make this sometimes blurry event clearer. For example, to answer how events escalated to revolution, Allison certainly supports his assertion that “loyalty and good will are not fostered by military force,” when he uses the following clear-eyed sequence (p. 29). The Tea Act instigated the Boston Tea Party, which triggered the Intolerable Acts, which prompted the Continental Congress session, which forced General Thomas Gage to direct the ill-fated defusing effort at Lexington and Concord. With this persistent use of cause-consequence sequencing, Allison makes the book that much more cohesive and understandable, especially when he covers the years of war.

Only outdone by his excellent organization is Allison’s experience with this subject, which is qualitatively displayed throughout this book. His keen understanding of the American Revolution properly informed his choice to shape his book around the predominant persona of the time, and then facilitated his perfect selection of the best characters. By focusing on the infamous Charles Townsend; the British Generals Gage, William Howe, and Henry Clinton; the revered Franklin; the stoic General Washington; founding father Thomas Jefferson; and the ambitious Marquis de Lafayette, Allison is able to retain the richness of the events and ideologies of that time. Further though, his use of lesser-known personalities, like William Duddingston, an impetuous British lieutenant; Isaac Barre, a sympathetic British politician; and James Otis, a Massachusetts assemblyman and pamphleteer, brings some desperately needed depth to the book.
Worth mentioning, because it adds to the accessibility of Allison’s account, is his writing style. In particular, Allison’s determined use of the characters’ own words intensifies the connection between the reader and the time period, and creates an effortlessly consumable account (though we take Allison’s word that these are the actual character’s words because there are no footnotes). An example of this use is best displayed when Allison identifies that the new U.S. government is most exceptional, and uses Thomas Jefferson’s spine-tingling words to recognize this new government is, “the world’s best hope,” due to its reliance on an informed and concerned citizenry (pp. 88–89).

The American Revolution: A Concise History is the textbook introduction to this event and should be considered a prize for Oxford’s concise histories collection. Allison is an effective writer, and has produced a summary that captures most prevailing historical accounts in good form. However, for the reader finding this review in Army History, chances are that this book will provide little value to your professional library. Though this account is a fantastic executive summary, it provides no analysis of tactics or strategies, and provides very little in the way of professional development for soldiers. That said, this is the perfect book for anyone taking the hour and twenty-minute, internet-less flight from—let us say—Yorktown, Virginia’s airport in Newport News/Williamsburg to Philadelphia’s International Airport.

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Of Duty Well and Faithfully Done: A History of the Regular Army in the Civil War

By Clayton R. Newell and Charles R. Shadrer
University of Nebraska Press, 2011
Pp. xvii, 383. $75

Review by Steven C. Haack

On the eve of the Civil War, the Regular Army consisted of only 16,000 officers and men strewn over a vast area and relegated to controlling Native Americans and securing the borders. After April 1861, while the Volunteer Army exploded to include almost one million members, the Regular Army expanded modestly to a maximum of 26,000 men. The Civil War challenged every aspect of the government’s administrative capability. The movement of large forces by road, river, and rail stretched logistical capacities to their limits. New weapons and tactics forced changes in medical evacuation and treatment, and obligated the Army to deal with the management of large numbers of refugees. That so few could effectively provide for so many in the areas of subsistence, ordnance, and engineering is an impressive feat of organization, and one which this book excellently details.

Of Duty Well and Faithfully Done provides a short but tightly written account of the prewar Regular Army and then goes on to describe the structure, mission, and operations of each department and how it evolved to meet the enormous challenges imposed by the Civil War. The structure and evolution of the War Department’s staff bureaus (Subsistence, Ordnance, Quartermaster, Medical, Adjutant General, Paymaster General, and Judge Advocate General) are covered in detail, showing how they adapted to the challenges placed before them. In addition to ramping up for the war, the staff bureaus simultaneously suffered high attrition rates as about a quarter of the Regular officers left to join the Confederacy. A high percentage of the officers were Southern and it is fortunate that the majority of them actually remained with the Union Army.

In addition to providing administrative staff, the Regular Army had nineteen regiments of soldiers: ten infantry, five mounted, and four artillery. It has long been a subject of debate that these units were held intact rather than being disbursed among the growing legions of Volunteers. Without knowing at the time how long the rebellion would last, such an act was deemed a perilous dilution of a well-trained fighting force that may be needed to serve as a cohesive defensive unit. The Regular Army units saw their fair share of combat and acquitted themselves well. They were often assigned to spearhead attacks or hold important positions. Despite this, their better training and discipline helped them sustain a lower rate of combat death when compared to white Volunteers and black troops. The book takes the reader through the history of each regiment from its prewar location and mission through the particular battles in which it engaged. Here, the authors also cover the Signal Corps and Corps of Engineers, known as the “fighting bureaus.” Both of these saw tremendous expansion during the war. In 1860, the Army had one signal officer. Like the Corps of Engineers, the Signal Corps grew rapidly to meet the demands for its services imposed by the need to move large numbers of troops over short periods of time. The Signal Corps ended the war with 105 officers.

The Regular Army changed not only to meet the demands of the war, but adapted once again to a new mission at the war’s end. With the end of hostilities, the Volunteers were eager to return to their homes while the Regular Army shouldered the burdens of reconstruction in the South and protecting citizens involved in the westward expansion. It is here that the decision to keep the Army intact proved fortuitous. The regular regiments were quickly dispatched to their new assignments.
The organization of Of Duty Well and Faithfully Done is excellent with impressive amounts of information and statistics distilled in over forty tables and charts. The volume and organization of information will make it a valuable reference for researchers as well as the general reader interested in quickly locating such details as the number of horse blankets provided during the war (732,526) or the amount of roasted coffee sent to the troops (35,569,758 pounds costing $10,826,609.22). The index features only names, but the tight organization of the book renders the task of finding specific information clear and easy. The book is a significant and useful work that should have a place in the library of every Civil War researcher.

Steven C. Haack is an independent researcher living in Lincoln, Nebraska. His publications include an article on the experiences of the 11th Kansas Cavalry in the west published in the Summer 2011 issue of Army History.

Review by Richard W. Stewart

Allan Millett has written the first of a projected three-volume history of the Korean War which should, if completed, put paid to the notion that this conflict can any longer be styled “The Forgotten War.” Perhaps veterans of the conflict, ever sensitive to living in the shadow of the titanic conflict of World War II, will not be convinced, but the rest of the world will know that there is now ample literature, scholarly and popular, highlighting the importance of the Korean War to U.S. and military history in the Cold War. Millett’s volume is just one of those important works and in many ways can be considered the capstone to the effort to chronicle nearly all aspects of the war: military, diplomatic, and political. It is a masterful book.

Millett brings to the Korean conflict his extensive experience in exploiting a huge range of sources, primary and secondary, and his writing ability that pulls it all together in an engaging narrative. Others have told different parts of the story of the first year in Korea—a year of surprise attack, catastrophic retreat, stunning counterattack, near victory, equally stunning Chinese attacks, retreat, advance, retreat, and final advance to a near stalemate line. Clay Blair focused in great detail on the military aspects of the first year of war and told an exceptional story of soldiers, units, and leaders in action, although he gave short shrift to the final two years of the war (to be covered by Millett in the next two volumes). T. R. Fehrenbach wrote a classic in its own way of the nitty-gritty of the war and the price paid in blood and misery for national unpreparedness. It is somewhat marred, however, by his tendency to use the facts of that unpreparedness as a club to plead his case and thus leaves one questioning his objectivity. And Roy Appleman, in a series of books on the war (the first prepared as an official history of the conflict, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu [Washington, D.C., 1961], for the Center of Military History) writes carefully and in great detail about all the military aspects of the war through the end of the first year. His other works include the harrowing story of Task Force MACLEAN/FAITH, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (College Station, Tex., 1987); the retreat from the Changjin-Chosin Reservoir, Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950 (College Station, Tex., 1990); and Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur (College Station, Tex., 1989). Appleman’s works are still probably the best combat histories of the first year of the war.

Millett takes a different tack than any of the above authors by ensuring that he covers the military operational aspects of the war, while only occasionally getting into the tactical battles. Others have told battle stories better, but Millett blends his operational military history into the wider strategic problems faced by all the powers in the conflict and on the diplomatic and political maneuvers of all sides. He is especially skilled at taking advantage of the latest sources available on the internal workings of Soviet and Chinese decision making. He has delved into the massive amounts of research done by scholars since the end of the Cold War in the Russian archives and used them exceptionally well. This research changed everyone’s picture of how the war started, the goals of the Communist elements, and how the Communists perceived what the United States was doing. These are critical pieces of the puzzle that satisfy all but the most ideological leftist writers (I cannot call them historians due to their lack of balance) that the Soviet hand was deeply involved in the decision for war and the prosecution of that war. Even as we agree that the Sino-Soviet split eventually ended the idea of a worldwide and monolithic Communist conspiracy, we have to agree that Moscow was in the driver’s seat in the person of Joseph Stalin and was behind the Communist expansion and aggression in the immediate postwar world. Millett takes this latest research and carefully weaves it into the narrative along with the U.S. political and diplomatic issues and personalities and the military story to create an excellent and comprehensive picture of the struggle. He takes the reader into the back room with many of the key political leaders and diplomats of the countries involved, to the extent permitted by sources, and recreates the decisions of those policymakers as they weighed all the complex issues in the shadow of a possible World War III. The Korean War was the first major conflict of the Cold War and Millett omits no piece of the puzzle.

Another area in which Millett excels is his balanced presentation of the per-
The performance of South Korean troops in the war, despite the difficulty in sources. Most texts focusing on military history spend little time on the South Koreans other than to take them to task for “collapsing” and allowing Chinese and North Korean troops to outflank nearby American units to their great cost. This did happen, of course, and he tells that part of the story clearly and completely. However, this was not the entire story. The South Korean Army was poorly organized right from the start and suffered from crippling equipment shortages and poor leadership. Created to be a mere constabulary force, the South Korean Army was nearly destroyed in the initial attacks by the more prepared North Koreans. However (here is where Millett gets it right), the South Koreans did bounce back. They suffered more than their share of reverses and ignominious retreats (as did most U.S. units in the war—just look at the hard-luck 2d Infantry Division) but their officers and men stayed in the battle, regrouped, often fought well, sometimes crumbled, but in the end persisted and grew better each month. That part of the story is often overlooked by U.S.-centric military historians and here Millett does it justice.

In short, this is as complete and robust a retelling of the first year of the Korean War as is currently available. Its detail is impressive and in the realms of diplomatic and political maneuverings (especially using the latest Russian and Chinese scholarship) it is superb. I recommend it for all historians of the Cold War or of Korea and look forward with great anticipation to volumes 2 and 3 where Millett can really let himself go.

One of the strengths of Crossing the Rapido is that Schultz places the river crossing in its proper historical context. Starting with the invasion of Salerno, the author successfully tells the tale of woe faced by the Fifth Army and the 36th Texas National Guard Division. While General Clark receives too much blame for the failings of the Italian campaign, Walker was not known to be the most optimistic commander in the war. His diary is especially depressing when discussing the Rapido River. Walker, who at the time of the Rapido River crossing was the oldest division commander in the U.S. Army, was much older than his superior General Clark. Schultz paints Walker as a sympathetic character in the story, with Clark as the villain. While not uncommon in books on this subject, the author could have been more objective when dealing with Walker. General Walker was by no means a poor field commander, but his performance in January 1944 was not perfect either. Another minor gripe is that Schultz constantly refers to Walker as a junior officer. It may cause some readers to feel that the author is freeing Walker from blame for the performance of the 36th Division and the Rapido River crossing. As a general, and commander of a division, Walker is not a junior officer and carries his share of the blame for the failed crossing.

One of the strengths of Crossing the Rapido is that Schultz places the river crossing in its proper historical context. Starting with the invasion of Salerno, the author successfully tells the tale of woe faced by the Fifth Army and the 36th Texas National Guard Division. While General Clark receives too much blame for the failings of the Italian campaign, and Schultz does his best to disparage the much-maligned U.S. commander, the author does at least try to explain...
why the Rapido River was of such importance. The Rapido was the last natural barrier to the Liri Valley. If the Fifth Army could cross the river and break through the German defensive line, Rome would be theirs for the taking.

Crossing the Rapido is not a full account of the Italian campaign. While it discusses events before and after the river crossing, readers looking for a comprehensive account of the campaign should look elsewhere. A more thorough explanation of why the Allies fought in Italy would have helped the reader understand the decisions made by the commanders. The Italian campaign was flawed from the start. The main objective was to force Italy out of the war, which took place before the Salerno landings. The secondary objectives were to gain airfields closer to Germany and force the Germans to fight in Italy while keeping the Axis from reinforcing Western Europe for Operation OVERLORD. However, by the time of the Rapido River crossing, nearly all the objectives were secured and this forced the Allied armies in Italy to fight against a well dug in enemy with limited manpower and supplies. By January 1944, the war in Italy was of secondary importance to the Allies, and the Fifth Army did not have enough manpower to break through the Rapido River.

Crossing the Rapido is a solid study on the Rapido River crossing, and it is especially valuable for readers interested in what the average soldier experienced. Those looking for a scholarly operational study will need to look elsewhere.

For its bitter veterans, Anzio was one of the most horrible and pointless battles of the Second World War. In the winter and early spring of 1944, hundreds of thousands of Allied and German troops fought desperately to control the port city a few miles south of Rome. Hemmed in by terrain, the Allies were too weak to break out of their beachhead; German forces, overstretched everywhere, were too weak to throw the Allies back into the sea. It seemed, in the end, that the battle for Anzio had all been in vain, that the Allies’ Italian campaign did not speed the war’s end, and fighting tooth and nail for Italy only prolonged Germany’s agony. Lloyd Clark, a lecturer at Sandhurst, revisits this tragedy in Anzio: Italy and the Battle for Rome–1944. Like Martin Blumenson, Carlos D’Este, and T. R. Fehrenbach before him, Clark recounts the battle’s strategies and tactics, the personalities of powerful men under tremendous pressure, and the price soldiers paid for poor planning, coordination, and execution. Anzio reads well and Clark adds aging veterans’ tragic memories to our understanding of the battle, but others’ accounts are more valuable.

The battle, a result of divided strategies and operational half-measures, occurred in the interregnum between British and U.S. dominance of the war in western Europe. By the fall of 1943, British policy had led the U.S. soldiers into North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy, where German forces under Field Marshall Albert Kesselring exploited harsh, mountainous terrain to stop the Allied advance cold. For U.S. commanders, with their growing preponderance of men and material in the fight, it was time to shift resources and attention to the decisive front, western Europe, and the cross-channel invasion scheduled for May 1944. Fearing the slipping away of his Mediterranean strategy, Prime Minister Winston Churchill mounted a furious assault on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in December 1943. He pleaded and cajoled his way to a renewed effort in Italy, pressing for troops and the precious LSTs (Landing Ship Tank) needed to land and sustain a force on Italy’s Tyrrhenian coast behind German lines. He wanted to unhang the German defenses through a bold move. As at Gallipoli decades earlier, Churchill was seeking the catalyst for his enemy’s final collapse, the domino that would offer endless opportunities for attack against vulnerable German positions across the breadth of Europe’s soft underbelly.

Only a few troops and LSTs would be needed for the assault, Churchill promised, and these only for the few weeks needed to accomplish the mission. Afterward all would speed to England to support the Normandy operation. The indomitable prime minister got his way and the LSTs and two divisions went to rescue the Italian campaign through an amphibious landing in the dead of winter, on three weeks’ notice. The botched landing at Salerno in September—where Fifth Army’s Lt. Gen. Mark W. Clark briefly considered abandoning the beachhead and ultimately relieved the commander of VI Corps in favor of Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas—taught commanders to land in force and secure the beachhead at all cost. Tactical and operational caution, however, were at odds with Churchill’s strategic conception of the operation and his aim to break the stalemate in Italy with an audacious seaborne attack on the German flank.

**Review by W. Shane Story**

Anzio: Italy and the Battle for Rome–1944

By Lloyd Clark

Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006

Pp. xxiv, 392. $25

Dr. Jon Mikolashek is an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. He previously worked in the Contemporary Studies Branch at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of several articles on World War II and the War on Terrorism, and a forthcoming book titled General Mark Clark: Commander of America’s Fifth Army in World War II and Liberator of Rome (Havertown, Penn., 2012) due out in October.
Lucas, in command of the landing force, feared his two divisions were too small for the mission. As his force hit the beach on 22 January, Lucas was elated to find Anzio undefended, but he did not have a plan to exploit success. The overstretched Germans had no means of defeating the landing, but they executed their own contingency plan when they sped reinforcements to the area to contain the beachhead. Fearing a German counterattack posed the greatest threat to his force, Lucas concentrated his efforts on off-loading the ships, organizing his defenses, and putting the port into action to sustain operations. The forty-eight hours he spent preparing to move inland was all the time the Germans needed to set up hasty defenses in the hills around Anzio before greeting the Allies’ initial forays with minefields, registered artillery, and overlapping fields of fire. Three battalions of Darby’s Rangers, laden with raw recruits rather than experienced veterans, tried to infiltrate German lines but quickly found themselves cut off and surrendered en masse. The Allied attack failed all along the line, but Lucas’s perimeter held against a subsequent German counterattack. From February on, the battle deteriorated to a fixed misery on all sides. The Germans were unable to push the Allies off the beach and the Allies were unable to break out. The Allies’ position became a kill zone for German air strikes and artillery bombardment through winter’s wet, shivering months.

There is no shortage of controversy surrounding the battle. In holding the beachhead and defeating the German counterattack, Lucas felt he accomplished his most important task. General Clark, however, relieved Lucas of command amid mounting criticism that Lucas had botched the entire operation by not launching a vigorous attack on Rome immediately after the landing. Lucas’s defenders argued the landing should never have been made in the first place. Tactical commanders had already shelved the landing as impractical and judged the whole Italian campaign not worth additional effort when Churchill overrode for a greater commitment to Italy. More controversy came with the battle’s end. By the time the weather cleared in the spring, Allied Forces in the south and in the beachhead were strong enough to break through the Germans’ weakened lines. Just as the German Tenth Army was reeling in retreat, General Clark irritated his British allies by abandoning the pursuit to claim the conquest of Rome. With photographers in tow to record his triumph for the papers back home, Clark entered the imperial city on 5 June. Alas, with the Normandy invasion, the war’s strategy and headlines shifted to western Europe, leaving Anzio’s dead and their marginal gains all but forgotten in popular memory. That so many fought for so long over Anzio argues for the battle’s importance, but General George C. Marshall judged it little more than “a sideshow of a sideshow,” which exacerbated the pain of his stepson’s death in the battle. The public’s obsession with commemorations and histories of the Normandy campaign added insult to injury for Anzio’s veterans and left many convinced all the sacrifices had been pointless. One veteran summed up the battle, the centerpiece of the war he knew, as “a tragedy from beginning to end [and] tinged with a fatal futility.”

Lloyd Clark’s ten chapters ably recount this standard narrative of the battle and the associated controversies, but even the veterans’ recollections do not improve on previous works. Clark’s work does, however, highlight Rick Atkinson’s recent study of the same events. The second volume of Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy, The Day of Battle (New York, 2007), captures the Anzio tragedy in the larger context of Allied strategy and the Italian campaign by detailing events at Salerno, the Rapido River, and Monte Cassino, bloody fights that directly impacted Anzio but that get short shrift in Clark’s account. Moreover, the depth and clarity of Atkinson’s strategic analysis provide the layman and the professional alike with a comprehension of Anzio and the larger campaign far surpassing Clark’s. Given the limits of shelf space and reading time, Atkinson gets the easy nod over Clark.

**Note**


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**Journey Out of Darkness: The Real Story of American Heroes in Hitler’s POW Camps—An Oral History**

By Hal LaCroix and Jorg Meyer


Pp. viii, 187. $39.95

Review by Mikhael Weitzel Sr.

A history of World War II prisoners of war (POW), told from their point of view, is an exciting and heart-wrenching work. *Journey Out of Darkness* offers the experiences of nineteen veterans who comprised a POW support group run by the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) in Massachusetts.

*Journey Out of Darkness* is easy-to-read with nineteen short vignettes each an average of seven pages. The writing...
is crisp and simple, easily calling forth images of the 1940s. The text is filled with pictures of the nineteen veterans from their time in the service and recent pictures taken during the production of the book. The photographs, taken by Jorg Meyer, were also part of an exhibit constructed by LaCroix and Meyer, displayed as "Journey Out of Darkness: American Heroes in Hitler’s POW Camps" at the National Heritage Museum in Lexington, Massachusetts from 20 May 2006 through 7 January 2007. Most importantly, this work offers an inside view of the mental and emotional wounds the veterans suffered and their courage to persevere the long path of healing and recovery. Unfortunately, the methodology expected from an oral history is lacking. All of the vignettes are reproduced in summary by the author in third-person perspective. This shift from first person to third person gives the stories the feeling of second-hand information. Normally an oral history, even one reworked from a transcript into a narrative, is in first person, providing the reader with the veteran’s experience. The vignettes themselves are rough. The organization of some portrayals is confusing and in others it is flighty. The stories repeatedly jump from prewar, to POW experiences, to wartime prior to capture, to postliberation experiences with no logical progression.

While the storytelling format is unique, the historic content of Journey Out of Darkness, does not offer new information on the POW experience in World War II. The third person summary vignettes would have benefited from the addition of historic analysis; maps showing relative locations, routes of march, and distances covered; and background information on the various Stalags (prison camps). The personal information provided in the stories is moving. However, each one leaves the reader asking why the author did not gather more detail during the interviews. After reading in the author’s introduction that the veterans were all part of a group therapy program offered by the VA, it appears that the vignettes are based on notes taken while observing the group and not constructed from individual oral history interviews. The lack of depth on the personal experiences combined with the absence of maps and historic analysis are devastating to the historic value of this work.

In all, Journey Out of Darkness is a fast-paced, emotional read. While the stories take on the air of a family member sharing their father’s or grandfather’s experience as a prisoner of war, they are unique and genuine. Additionally, the work provides insight into the emotional healing and recovery that continues decades after liberation. While it is impossible to truly understand the guilt and anguish these veterans have endured, the text offers an avenue toward empathy.

Mikhael Weitzel Sr. is the command historian for the Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. He has previously published a number of books for the Army Sustainability Command at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, including Quarters One: Rock Island Arsenal (2008) and Misunderstandings to Massacre: The Black Hawk War of 1832 (2009).

Soul Soldiers: African Americans and the Vietnam Era

Edited by Samuel W. Black
Sen. John Heinz Pittsburgh Regional History Center and the Historical Society of Western Penn., 2006
Pp. xx, 218. $19.95

Review by John V. Clune

Soul Soldiers is a collection of essays and poems addressing important themes from the African American community during the Vietnam War. Through interviews, poetry, and powerful memoir, it is a meditation on how the war affected families, communities, individuals, and American culture. This collection does not dwell on what everybody seems to “know” about the experience of black soldiers, but takes a more personal approach to how the war changed black communities. It considers the totality of the Vietnam experience: exploring interactions between black and white soldiers, discussing how masculinity and black manhood changed as a result of the war, and explaining how the war empowered black women while changing black families and neighborhoods. Although its methodology is fairly solid, this book is not a textbook history of African Americans in the Vietnam War. Its contributors have attempted those works separately. This volume self-consciously describes the personal experiences, observations, and legacies of the war.

The book’s longest section explores race, masculinity, and femininity within the Army and within black communities during the Vietnam era. Herman Graham III, uses excerpts from his book The Brothers’ Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the Military Experience (Gainesville, Fla., 2003) to build an essay about combat and interracial friendships that grounds the collection. He extensively treats the experience of black and white soldiers “in country.” Historian James E. Westheider continues the exploration of how black identity, the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., and the Black Power movement changed the way black soldiers saw their role fighting for the United States. The authors reveal some of the stories behind the large numbers of African Americans who fought during the Vietnam War, but make it clear how difficult it is to make valid generalizations. Fortunately, this does not seem to be the intent of the book. The absence of a universal black experience makes the personal
explorations of later sections more poignant. The reader is required to deal with the community’s experience of war from its vastly different personal perspectives, including a large number of women.

Two essays by historians Kimberley L. Phillips and Heather Stur wrestle with the way the war changed black women, their economic and cultural influence in their own communities, and their prominent voices of protest in American culture. These essays attempt to fill a void in that historiography. To Phillips, social historians and literary compilations of the period have neglected black women’s contributions (p. 69). Her essay argues that the demographic changes caused by the draft intensely affected black women as well as men. Not only did women gain economic, familial, and social status within their communities, they were uniquely qualified to publicly challenge the impact of induction and the war on black society. Still, despite widely publicized condemnation by famous black women, including Eartha Kitt and Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, black women’s experience of the era was not universal. Stur argues that masculinity as a whole changed as a result of the war. She discusses the sad irony of “Project 100,000,” Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara’s ill-considered response to the 1965 Moynihan Report on black families. To Moynihan, African American poverty sprung from an imbalance of masculinity caused by the “abnormal prominence of women.” Black men, he argued, needed military service to gain education and skills to learn how to be men. Instead of restoring black male masculinity, however, disproportionate induction rates emptied men from black communities and further empowered women (p. 101). Stur argues that as a result black women redefined American ideas about what it meant to be a man, a woman, a soldier, and a civilian.

The book’s second section contains two essays built primarily around oral histories and interviews that reveal how this war changed individuals’ lives. Poet Terrence Hayes describes his journey to understand the assembly of soldiers that make up the male side of his family tree. His story is intensely personal, demonstrating the way the war was woven into the fabric of his family’s identity. It demonstrates the ambivalence of the legacy of military service to the black community. He displays pride in his father and grandfather’s honorable service while revealing fear that the Army might make his brother into “a dumb machine . . . ruined by learning to act without asking” (p. 122). To Hayes, war is a family affair.

For the author, the war was also a community affair. He chronicles how two black Pittsburgh neighborhoods produced more than their share of soldiers and casualties during the war. He also describes the way their military experience energized black soldiers to fight for civil rights and empowered them to work on behalf of Vietnam veterans. Many of them, Black writes, felt as if they were simply moving from one conflict to another. Based primarily on oral histories, Black’s account is a local look at a phenomenon that affected black communities nationwide.

The final section is a collection of poetry and prose from black artists that explores some of the psychological impacts of the war. It reminds the reader that there are infinite numbers of personal responses to that time and place. It examines war, blackness, whiteness, Black Power, fear, the draft, and the exotic locations of Saigon and the Gulf of Tonkin for their impact, illuminating the individuals’ widely different experiences.

The book is most effective when the reader accepts its personal and local messages and does not look for a synthesis of the war’s impact on the black community. For example, two essays discuss the importance of male and female black officers, but the book does not explore if the all-volunteer armed forces that followed Vietnam changed the dynamic of the military as a legitimate avenue of advancement for black men and women. Conversely, how did the military itself change in response to the racial violence that followed King’s assassination? It clearly exposes the irony of the Department of Defense’s policy to improve black families, drafting more men in order to “uplift America’s subterranean poor.” It does not, however, discuss what this meant for black communities later in the 1970s. Certain vignettes of Pittsburgh veterans struggling to claim their VA benefits are poignant, but were they universal? Pittsburgh men boldly founded the Black Vietnam Era Veterans support organization. Does this example of courageous civic participation signify any kind of positive trend in black communities in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of military service? Likely, these questions are answered within the larger monographs by the authors who contributed to this book. This book effectively provides smaller, more personal views to a massive event in the history of black America.

Lt. Col. John V. Clune holds a bachelor’s degree in American history from the U.S. Air Force Academy and a master’s degree in American history from the University of Colorado. He is an assistant professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His article “Foreign Exchange Cadets and the International Impact of an Academy Education” appears in High Flight: The History of the U.S. Air Force Academy (Chicago, 1991). He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in international history at the University of Kansas.
procedures. We must ensure that all employees understand their roles and responsibilities during an event and continually update methods to communicate with them. And, everyone must fully understand command relationships and lines of responsibility and how they fit into the organizational picture. Everyone must play a part during a disaster. Well-trained organizations that remain vigilant can restore operations quickly while ensuring the safety of their workforce.

As historians and curators, we have additional responsibilities. We have a duty to safeguard our collections. Some months ago, Center of Military History (CMH) museum conservator Jane Stewart published a short piece for the CMH Museum Memo. Given her particular expertise, it is appropriate to reprint an excerpt here in this column. Jane’s article below speaks powerfully to the benefits of preparation before a disaster strikes.

What can we do about responding to our collection emergencies? What happens in “smaller disasters,” emergency situations, or water incidents? What if something happened in the building that housed your historical collections? Who would you call? How quickly could you find the phone number? What is your plan?

Preserving collections requires care, knowledge, and diligence. A Collections Disaster Plan is one part of your institution’s Preservation Plan. In my career as a paper conservator, I have seen much damage that could have been avoided if only things were done differently. The missing links for safe recovery of collections after an emergency are preparation, information, and education. For response and recovery to emergencies, part of preparedness is the knowledge that there are safeguards any institution or individual can have in place ahead of time. The key to successful response and recovery of historical collections is preparedness: a plan and a well-trained staff. Training for disaster response and recovery is an in-depth process requiring much effort, but with great pay off during and after the disaster.

As history and museum professionals, we do our best to physically protect our collections. We are aware of the environmental concerns like physical security and controlling our temperature, relative humidity, and light levels, but for all of the precautions we take, all the care we give, and the preservation efforts we promote, our collections are still vulnerable to the unexpected: a leaky roof, a bursting pipe, or a devastating natural disaster.

A Collections Disaster Plan has long been touted as something all historical repositories should have in place. Damage, in even the least severe incident, can be crippling unless one knows the proper actions to take. Preparation for what your geographic area has in store for you is critical to your preparedness on a large scale, but what about that leaky pipe?

Your preparation to react and respond to the situation and the damaged collections after the critical life-safety steps have been taken can make the difference between a slightly warped, but still usable, item and complete loss due to fire or flood, or water damage that progressed to all-consuming mold.

A customized action plan that will clearly dictate roles and responsibilities during an incident in your collection should be part of your installation’s emergency plan. Critical to the salvage of the damaged collections is your initial response and your preparedness to take action even if collection recovery cannot begin for weeks after an incident.

In creating your institution’s Collections Disaster Plan, there are many tools to assist you. There are sample plans and even templates that you can customize for your organization. On a national level, the American Institute for Conservation of Art and Historical Artifacts (AIC) is one such source of support (see the link below). Additionally, local universities, state museums, archives, and libraries often have tools to support their constituents. Emergency response and recovery has been systematically prescribed within the archival world for more than twenty-five years. The formula is available for your institution to customize.

From experience working with these plans, we know that all comprehensive plans contain:

1. A body of the plan describing potential emergency situations, the purpose, functionality, and expected results of the document.
2. A clear, concise table of contents.
3. Easily accessible appendices that will provide specific information about contacts, resources, and procedures to follow.

First steps to creating your organization’s Collections Disaster Plan may include looking at trusted Web sites to see what other institutions have done and what sample Collections Disaster Plans contain.

Prepared institutions know that their Collections Disaster Plan is:

1. Readily accessible. They maintain this customized plan electronically to keep the information current, and keep paper copies in-house and off-site in multiple locations.
2. Up-to-date. Personnel and phone numbers and contact information both within your institution and the community change. Verify that you have the correct phone numbers for the services you need by calling those numbers to check their accuracy.
3. Easy-to-use. All critical information should be at your fingertips and clearly laid out. Try using labeled tabs, color-coded sections, or whatever makes sense for your organization.
4. Customized for your institution.
Internet resources to aid in your further understanding abound. The AIC Web site (http://www.conservation-us.org) provides links to a variety of organizations that can assist in writing a plan and help with response and recovery. The Northern States Conservation Center Web site (http://www.museumclasses.org) offers online courses and publications. Be sure to consult the archives, museums, and libraries in your state’s capital, and coordinate with city and county museums, historical societies, libraries, and colleges and universities. Your local support network will be among the first to respond during an emergency if only to offer advice and extra supplies.

Remember that you are not alone. Perhaps your new (or expanded) awareness of the resources available will empower you to begin your preparation (or further your efforts) to manage response to a potentially dire situation. Call on your colleagues and form consortiums. Begin slowly, but purposefully, and stay on track. Once your plan is in place, pursue further training for staff and designate an annual date to revisit your plan and response abilities. The more familiar you are with your plan, and the more training exercises you conduct, the better your chances of reducing damage during an actual emergency.

An Example Disaster Response and Recovery Course Outline:

1. Introduction to Disaster Planning
2. Disaster Team
3. Risk Assessment and Management
4. Health and Safety
5. Insurance
6. Documentation
7. Prioritizing Collections
8. Writing the Disaster Preparedness Plan
9. Emergency Procedures
10. Disaster Response
12. Emergency Procedures–Salvage
14. Emergency supplies and location of regional resources
15. Appendices: What to put in them
16. Next steps: planning drills and further resources
17. Conclusion

Additional Internet resources:
- Conservation Online, through AIC, http://www.cool.conservation-us.org/bytopic/disasters/: this Web site links to the disaster plans from various institutions and provides links to helpful articles and case studies.
- Northern States Conservation Center, http://www.museumclasses.org/: this Web site provides a list of links to published material, tools and supplies, and training.

These resources provide a good start toward disaster preparedness.

Finally, our chief curator, Chris Semancik, asked me to share a few lessons the curatorial staff learned at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir following the last two severe storms and a water main break:

1. Each employee should have an emergency guidance book at home that provides phone numbers and pre-planned courses of action depending on the emergency situation. For example: what should you do if the governor declares a state of emergency or shelter in place?
2. Emergency power and back-up generators do not cover all systems. Your facility may have equipment that should be on the system and is not. How long can these back-up systems last until key components like fuel and water run out?
3. Water main breaks have the potential to damage an HVAC system if undetected. This can occur at any hour and may have a short response time. Water systems usually have not been factored into the planning for back-up systems.
4. Leave the building each night and on the weekend ready to survive a storm to the best of your ability. Artifacts should be locked in cabinets.
5. Essential personnel or responders need to take an aggressive role in surveying their assigned building daily after an incident and re-establishing contact with headquarters and the post.
6. Drill various disaster scenarios and have battle books available that detail how to shut down or override systems for those not familiar with them.

Natural or man-made disasters often strike with little or no notice and when they do, there will be a great deal of uncertainty and loss of situational awareness. Leaders may not be able to get to the scene to take charge.

The only way we can prepare ourselves, protect our workforce, and preserve the precious legacy held in our collections is through vigorous disaster planning, realistic disaster exercises, and thorough training for every member of our team.

Next time disaster strikes, be the organization that is ready! I am confident we are up to the task, and as the trustees of the Army’s history, we must be leaders in disaster readiness.

Thank you for all you do. I’m proud of your accomplishments!

Keep Army History Alive!
A few months back I introduced our new Career Program (CP) 61 for all full-time, permanent general schedule historians, archivists, and museum professionals. (The CP excludes those in title X positions because they are in the excepted service.) I can now report that the creation of the CP is moving along nicely. A number of key documents are in nearly final draft and should shortly be approved by the CP 61 Board of Directors and the Functional Chief of the CP (the Director of CMH) and then sent to the Army G–1 for final approval. The budget request to sustain the program is in the hands of G–3 Training for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years (FY 14–18). In addition, I have requested a little money for next year (FY 13) to provide for some more developmental assignments for CP 61 personnel and to conduct the first session of our new “on-boarding” course, the New Historians, Archivists, and Museum Professionals Orientation. This will be a required course for all newly hired 0170, 1010, 1015, 1016, 1420, and 1421 series personnel from throughout the Army. They will come to the Center; attend briefings on the Army History Program; visit the Museum Support Center; receive copies of all the regulatory guidance for history, archives, and museums in the Army; learn about CP 61; and meet key members of the Army field history programs and the Center.

Even more critical than the budget (well, just as critical anyway) will be the new Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) plan for our CP. Without an approved ACTEDS, we cannot spend money on courses or professional development opportunities. This plan will lay out the career map and career ladder for our job series, establish the documentary basis of our training courses, list professional development opportunities, and establish a new Career Intern Plan (more in the next Chief Historian’s Footnote on this). The approved ACTEDS plan will be a key document for recruiting, developing, and retaining all career professionals for the entire Army history and museum program. The ACTEDS, and its attendant career maps and ladders, is such a critical document that for the past four months I have worked hard to get a cross section of members of the new CP involved in reviewing, rewriting, and approving it. I have assembled two teams of short-term developmental assignment historians, museum professionals, and archivists from throughout the Army History Program to spend time here at the Center to review and comment on the ACTEDS. I have presented draft copies of the plan to the various command historians at the annual Army Historians Council meeting held at Carlisle Barracks this past June. And I have forwarded copies and responded to questions and concerns from all the historians and museum professionals on the Board of Directors for the CP. In each of its many iterations, the ACTEDS plan was improved. Historians and museum professionals here at the Center have worked and reworked the documents to take those suggestions and refine them further. It has been a true collaborative effort as we have discussed key questions such as: What exactly are our core competencies? What professional degrees should we expect our members to have at different GS levels? What functional training or education do we need in our various job series to perform our profession? Every profession or career benefits from occasional self-examination by those most interested in defining its future. And I know that we will all be better for this dialogue. So, I would like to thank each and every contributor to this process, both those who have already participated and those who will in the future. The Career Program will benefit from your personal commitment.

The outlines of the Career Program are getting clearer every day. The CP will allow us avenues to recruit the best new hires into all job series. The professional standards, recommended professional education levels, core competencies, and functional competencies of historians, archivists, and museum career personnel will all be laid out clearly. The possible career paths for each grade in each series will be outlined fully and
transparently along with alternative paths for those who wish to change careers midstream. The various professional development courses, training opportunities, and symposia will be listed and available for you and your supervisor to examine and put in your individual development plans. Some might even be funded by CP rather than by individual history or museum offices. There will be short-term training opportunities, developmental assignment opportunities, chances for academic degree completion (with a service obligation, of course), rotational assignments, and even chances for short research trips for historians to refresh themselves at the well of primary sources. Not all opportunities will be available to all comers, of course, and money will always be problematic. Many new opportunities will be offered to the members of the CP and all applications will be examined by carefully constituted selection boards to ensure that they go to the best qualified. I believe that we will see that over the years to come the three disparate communities of historians, archivists, and museum professionals will increasingly be brought together to form one community with the highest standards to serve the Army and the nation. That is my commitment to you. Prepare to grasp the competitive opportunities that the Career Program will shortly make available to you. Think 61!

As always, you can contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.