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U.S. Army Art Spotlight

The Professional Bulletin of Army History
The Summer 2013 issue of Army History presents two articles dealing with the conflicts currently being commemorated by our nation. The first article, by Matthew T. Pearcy, a historian with the Office of History of Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, presents a continuation of the story he began with his article that appeared in the Summer 2010 (no. 76) issue. The author’s in-depth examination of the role played by Andrew A. Humphreys at the battles of Antietam and Fredericksburg is continued in this new article with the focus shifting to Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Pearcy’s detailed picture of Humphreys allows readers a glimpse into the life of one of the Union Army’s more competent generals and highlights the fact that not all fighting took place on the battlefield.

Next we feature a piece by Ricardo A. Herrera, an associate professor of military history at the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Herrera, in the spirit of Russell Weigley, reminds readers that the War of 1812 was a transformative time for both the Army and the young nation. This Early National period saw a citizenry grappling with its national identity—a struggle between perceived civic and military duty and republican political ideology—and a mistrust of standing armies. As we celebrate the bicentennial of the War of 1812 it is prudent to examine how the Army’s roles, responsibilities, and relationships to the citizens it defends have changed in the last 200 years.

The Army Art Spotlight in this issue carries a somber tone. One of the last surviving combat artists from World War II, Edward Reep, passed away this past February. An accomplished artist, Reep captured on canvas war’s violence, as well as its absurd humor, in a way few artists could.

In the Chief’s Corner, the chief of military history highlights the Center of Military History’s many ongoing commemorative efforts. Besides participating in and supporting a number of events across the country, the Center is also making steady progress with the publication of a number of brochures intended to commemorate the anniversaries of the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and the Vietnam War. The chief historian, in his Footnote, continues the conversation concerning Career Program 61 and discusses a number of discipline-specific “historian competencies.”

Army History continues to strive for excellence in the field of military history scholarship, and I, as always, invite readers to send us their submissions and comments.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
Remembrance is significant in every culture. Anniversaries of special or momentous events are signposts on the road of life. Think of the reaction from friends or loved ones if you have ever overlooked a birthday, wedding anniversary, or other important celebration.

In our business, commemorating notable events allows us not only to remember the historic moments that shaped our nation and the acts of citizens and soldiers who played a role in those important occasions, but commemorations also serve as a vehicle for honoring past achievements and teaching history to a broader audience not normally within our reach.

Recognizing this essential fact, coupled with the weight of several upcoming national commemorations, particularly the bicentennial of the War of 1812, the sesquicentennial of the American Civil War, the centennial of World War I, and the fifty-year commemoration of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) established a Commemorative Team within the Center’s Histories Division several years ago.

The historians assigned to our Commemorative Team have already proved their metal. They assisted the Army Legislative Liaison in solidifying the Army’s role in commemoration of the War of 1812, crafting legislative language for the Joint Bicentennial Resolution introduced by Sen. Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.). As members of the National Capital War of 1812 Collaborative Bicentennial Planning Group, these historians had Fort McNair included as the site of the U.S. Arsenal at Greenleaf Point for a self-guided War of 1812 points-of-interest tour of the District of Columbia. They reviewed the legislative language for the appointment of the World War I Centennial Commission and worked to de-conflict the ongoing difference of opinion on the location of the official memorial. Center historians have routinely represented the Army at international, interagency, and state and local committee meetings of the respective celebration commissions.

Today, the team provides routine assistance to sister services, government and private agencies, and nonprofit organizations by supplying valuable information so these historic events can be correctly interpreted from an Army perspective.

The Commemorative Team is also responsible for answering public and official inquiries. In addition, they provide information to multiple media outlets, both commercial and those inside the Department of Defense, such as Soldiers magazine and The Pentagon Channel.

The team’s primary mission remains the publication of a series of commemorative brochures that are designed to tell the Army’s story by examining each of the Army’s various campaigns. These brochures are intended primarily as a professional development and training vehicle for junior officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers, but they also serve to educate the American public on the history of the Army and the significant contributions its soldiers have made to the development of the United States.

Our team is spearheading this extensive commemorative effort with planned titles including:

**Campaigns of the War of 1812**
- *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811*
- *The Campaign of 1812*
- *The Canadian Theater, 1813*
- *Canadian Theater, 1814*
- *Chesapeake Campaign, 1813–1814*
- *Creek Campaign, 1813–1814*
- *Gulf Coast Theater, 1814–1815*

**Campaigns of the Civil War**
- *The Regular Army in the Antebellum Period, 1848–1860*
- *The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1862–1864*
- *Civil War on the Atlantic Coast, 1862–1865*

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New Publications from the Center of Military History

As part of its activities commemorating the Civil War Sesquicentennial, the Center of Military History (CMH) is publishing a series of brochures, The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War. The first of these, The Civil War Begins: Opening Clashes, 1861, was published last year. By early summer 2013 CMH will have published three more brochures covering the Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg campaigns. These booklets will be available to the general public for purchase from the Government Printing Office. Department of Defense personnel may requisition copies through their normal publication acquisition channels. The brochures will also be available as a free download in Adobe® PDF format on the CMH Web site.

Combat Studies Institute Releases New iBook

In March 2013, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) released its first multimedia, interactive historical study titled Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan, Enhanced Edition, which is now available in the Apple iBooks format. By taking advantage of the latest technology, CSI’s iBook offers an interactive version of this work originally published in paperback in 2012. Features such as 3D digital terrain views, video from combat actions, interactive digital models of weapon systems and vehicles, and interactive maps and charts transform these accounts into immersive experiences for the reader.

Christmas of 1862 saw the battered Army of the Potomac, demoralized after its costly defeat at Fredericksburg, settling back to its "old camping place" at Falmouth, Virginia, and bracing for a hard winter. For his part, Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys had cause for optimism. The 30-year veteran of the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers had led his green division of Pennsylvania volunteers in a valiant and widely admired assault on Confederate positions along Marye's Heights. "It has cost me a great labor," he admitted to his wife Rebecca, "but I take it that it has established my reputation in arms as the same earnestness did before in science & art & administration." Humphreys had, by all accounts, performed magnificently at Fredericksburg, and its aftermath brought accolades from all quarters. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside, commander of the Army of the Potomac, heaped praise on his division commander for "conspicuous . . . gallantry throughout the action," and Regis de Trobriand, a colorful French aristocrat and colonel of the 55th New York, went further still, calling Humphreys "probably the best officer in the Army of Potomac that day." Two weeks after the battle, Harper's Weekly ran an illustrated account of the assault on Marye's Heights. The piece was titled "Gallant charge of Humphrey's division at the battle of Fredericksburg." Back at camp amid a spike in desertions, Humphreys turned his attention to rebuilding his division and securing a much sought-after promotion to major general. Burnside was restless to redeem himself and made one final attempt at Confederate General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia, still in force across the river at Fredericksburg. This was to be a flanking attack and called for a march up the Rappahannock River for Banks Ford, ten miles upstream. Originally planned for the morning of 18 January 1863, the movement began two days late and then in the afternoon. The delay proved costly as the army advanced only a few miles from Falmouth when a sheet of wind-driven rain, thundering out of darkened skies, swept through the ranks. Humphreys' 3d Division, V Corps, bivouacked along the roadside, but most of the men were without shelter and quickly drenched. The relentless storm continued into the next day, and the army started out only to find the Virginia roads so mired that passage was impossible. Men waded through mud, water, and pouring rain; wagons and artillery carriages sank to their axles; and horses had to be cut loose, or in some cases, shot, as they struggled to exhaustion in the mud. The next day, 22 January, Burnside called off the whole affair, and the hard-luck Army of the...
Potomac slogged back to Falmouth. Humphreys lamented, “If we had only marched a day earlier, and could have attacked the enemy’s entrenchments in that storm, we should have carried them. It would have been a glorious fight.”5 Burnside’s grip on command did not long survive the “Mud March,” with President Abraham Lincoln turning next to Maj. Gen. Joseph “Fighting Joe” Hooker, a 48-year-old Massachusetts native with a reputation for aggressive fighting and loose morals. Humphreys, still a brigadier general, remained at Falmouth with his division of mostly short-timers as the clock ran out on their enlistments. It would be spring before the army moved again, but for Humphreys the quiet months at Falmouth were anxious and unsettled. With 1,337 men on sick leave by mid-February, his division counted no more than 3,398 men—about the size of a single brigade.6 He put through a request to his new V Corps commander, friend and fellow engineer, Maj. Gen. George Meade, for additional troops to bring it to 10,000, “the proper strength of a division of infantry,” but conceded that his was a special case, as “six of eight regiments composing my division are nine months men whose term of service will expire the first week of May.”7 Meade did not act on the request, and the fate of the 3d Division remained uncertain late into April.

Humphreys’ professional standing, too, was unresolved. Though highly regarded in the Regular Army, he was a mere captain on the eve of the Civil War, and the rapid wartime promotions that came so easily to others mostly eluded him. He had built his reputation as a scientist and engineer and, after two decades in Washington, was regarded as something of a “desk soldier,” a perception only reinforced by his history of frail health and his want of recent combat experience.8 Baseless but persistent rumors that Humphreys was “lukewarm in his loyalty” were buttressed when his only surviving brother, Joshua, threw in his lot with the rebel navy.9 Certainly his very public friendship with Jefferson Davis, now president of the Confederacy, did not help at all. Humphreys also held all the wrong views—Democratic, conservative, and antiemancipation. These were majority positions among the West Point set but out of favor in the wartime capital. All of this condemned Humphreys to watch from behind while less worthy men advanced over him. It was a full year into the war before he secured his brigadiership but even that left him junior to dozens of officers he had outranked in the old Army. It was a bitter pill for the proud Pennsylvanian.

In the days immediately after Fredericksburg, Burnside threw his still considerable weight behind an effort to promote Humphreys and pressed Lincoln on the issue, successfully it seemed initially but nothing came of it. Humphreys first learned of trouble on 17 January when an investigation revealed that “my name is not on the list of those officers sent to the Senate for promotion, and that there is no trace whatever in the War Department of any such intention towards me.” He fumed in frustration, writing to his wife that “President L. had not done as he had promised General Burnside.” She offered to speak to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, but Humphreys initially balked—“I would not have you or anyone say one word to the Secretary of War or anyone else. If I cannot command the position I know that I am entitled to by my acts, I will not have it by impetrating or intercession . . . so let it pass.”10
After a week of reflection, he changed his mind and took leave of his division to attend to the matter personally in Washington. A brief visit to the White House on Wednesday, 28 January, did him no good, and he returned to Falmouth with the “depression consequent upon the chilling reception I met at the President’s and at the War Department.” That an old nemesis, General in Chief of the U.S. Army, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, nursed a grudge was no surprise to Humphreys, but he was disheartened to learn that Lincoln had “no recollection of my recommendation for promotion, nor of his assurance it should be made, and knows nothing of my service at Fredericksburg.”

Lincoln, neck-deep in a war gone badly, had simply forgotten. Shortly after his brief meeting with Humphreys, the president scratched out a note to Burnside:

Gen. Humphreys is now with me saying that you told him that you had strongly urged upon me, his, Gen. H’s promotion, and that I in response had used such strong language, that you were sure his name would be sent to the Senate. I remember nothing of your speaking to me, or I to you, about Gen. H. Still this is far from conclusive that nothing was said. I will now thank you to drop me a note, saying what you think is right and just about Gen. Humphreys.

Burnside wrote his response to Lincoln on Valentine’s Day: “Humphreys is the general that behaved so gallantly at Fredericksburg, and when I spoke to you of him you said he ought to be rewarded by promotion to rank of major-general, and I hope it will be done.” The note would doubtless have had the desired effect but for the hostile machinations of others.

In mid-January, simmering tensions between Humphreys and one of his leading regiments, the 129th Pennsylvania, spilled over into several courts-martial. Two of its best volunteer officers, Col. Jacob G. Frick and Lt. Col. William H. Armstrong, had refused—in violation of direct orders by Humphreys—to require the purchase of winter dress coats that they saw as an unnecessary and extravagant expense for their men, most of whom had only several months remaining in their enlistments. Humphreys dug in his heels, testified against both officers, and saw them incarcerated for a time before they were cashiered from the Army for what became known as the “frock coat mutiny.” Neither of the men went quietly, and their howls of protests reached the capital with some effect. Frick’s brother-in-law, Eli Slifer, was the Pennsylvania secretary of state in Gov. Andrew Curtin’s administration, and the colonel’s dismissal “roused a whole nest of state politicians.” The clever Armstrong struck back with his pen, later publishing a pseudonymous and highly unflattering account of his experiences in the division. The novella was directed at Humphreys and titled Red-Tape and Pigeon-Hole Generals (1864).

In short order, a second schism opened between Humphreys and his senior brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Erastus Tyler. A capable drill officer and disciplinarian, the native Ohioan had felled a future U.S. president for his colonelcy and was a formidable figure in his own right. He was also an avowed teetotaler (which made him an outsider at division headquarters) and a braggart. In the immediate aftermath of the December battle, he wrote a self-aggrandizing account of his actions that left Humphreys out of the tale altogether. Then, circumventing his chain of command, Tyler sent copies
to his hometown press and to Governor Curtin in Harrisburg. Humphreys soon learned of it and threw into a rage. “This fellow [Tyler],” Humphreys wrote to a friend, “who passes himself off as a hero to those who have never seen him under fire, fills newspapers with false accounts of his deeds. . . . He is double-faced, stealthy, mean, unscrupulous, and I believe much of a coward.” Humphreys preferred formal charges against Tyler who was summarily court-martialed and rebuked before returning to command; but Humphreys could take little satisfaction in it. At some point in late February, he learned of a rumor circulating in Washington that “the President had sent my name to the Senate for promotion, but had withdrawn it when he learnt of Colonel Frick’s case.” Humphreys was loathe to believe it but moved quickly to rally powerful friends to his side.¹⁸

He began in Congress, turning first to the senior senator from his home state of Pennsylvania, Edgar Cowan, a moderate Republican on good terms with Governor Curtin. In a sprawling ten-page letter, Humphreys justified his actions against Armstrong and Frick, both Pennsylvanians, and drew up a new and damning case against Tyler, who “dilly-dallied” at Fredericksburg doing everything he could to “delay and delay until it was too dark for his brigade to go into the fight.”¹⁹ Humphreys also shared information recently gleaned from trial testimony that Frick and Armstrong were acting on Tyler’s advice when they refused the frock coats, so the three had been in cahoots.²⁰ Humphreys reached out as well to Solomon Foot, a powerful Republican from Vermont and president pro tempore of the Senate.²¹ Throughout much of 1860, the two had served alongside Jefferson Davis and several others in a congressional investigation of the five-year curriculum at the U.S. Military Academy. Foot promised his support.²² Humphreys turned next to the War Department and Burnside, presently on a thirty-day furlough awaiting reappointment. The two exchanged letters, but, by mid-March, the former commander took an apologetic tone. “I did all in my power, personally and otherwise, to have you promoted, but there was something or somebody in the way.”²³ On the identity of that person, Burnside demurred, leaving Humphreys to speculate. By that point it was a long list of suspects.²⁴

The early part of the year was not entirely absent of good news. On 3 March 1863, Lincoln signed two bills of immediate concern to Humphreys. The first established the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and named Humphreys among its fifty incorporators. His close friend, the renowned scientist and supervisor of the U.S. Coast Survey, Alexander Dallas Bache, had long called for the creation of “an institution of science” to guide public action; and the demands of the Civil War saw both the Army and Navy overwhelmed by proposals for new technologies and weapons. The NAS would be staffed by the finest scientific minds of the country and would serve in an advisory capacity to the government through Congress and various federal agencies and departments. Given wartime exigencies, military scientists and engineers were well represented among the original fifty, and Humphreys ranked among the most esteemed of these. His remarkable record of scientific achievement went back at least two decades and included a long stint as “assistant in charge” at the Coast Survey while Bache transformed that agency into the preeminent patron of antebellum science in the United States; authorship of an exhaustive survey of the lower Mississippi River and, with Henry Abbot, a landmark Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River (Washington, D.C., 1861), among the most significant contributions to hydraulic engineering in the nineteenth century; and a long stretch directing the Pacific Railroad Surveys (1853–1860), an unprecedented assemblage of more than one hundred soldiers, scientists, and technicians marshaled for the purpose of identifying the most practical and economical route for the nation’s first transcontinental railroad.²⁵ As the North American Review noted in 1862, Humphreys was “associated with, literally, almost every
important scientific work undertaken by our government during the last quarter of a century.”26 He was the only topographical engineer named to the National Academy of Sciences, and his appointment marked the end of an era.

The second bill signed by Lincoln legislated the Corps of Topographical Engineers into oblivion.27 Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and the driving force behind the creation of the NAS, sponsored the bill to abolish the topographical corps and transfer its functions to the Corps of Engineers. The two corps had coexisted for twenty-five years with each enjoying its own distinct function and purview. The topographical engineers, otherwise known as “topogs,” did mapping and the design and construction of federal civil works while the Corps of Engineers did mainly coastal fortification and some lighthouse work; but the war muddied those distinctions. Given the immense scale of the conflict, there were far too few engineers to go around, and most were assigned without any regard to their position in the Regular Army. Engineers from both corps were engaged in the construction of bridges, blockhouses, entrenchments, and fieldworks and batteries for the reduction of Confederate coastal forts and other permanent works.28 The low rank structure long in place also contributed to a major exodus early in the war as the most talented and ambitious officers abandoned the engineers for opportunities in the civilian world or for substantial promotions into the volunteer ranks. Of the original forty-five topogs serving in 1861, fewer than thirty-one remained by February 1863.29 Of that lesser number, at least nine took leave to command troops, including, most prominently, Humphreys, Meade, William H. Emory, Amiel W. Whipple, John G. Parke, Orlando F. Poe, Gouverneur K. Warren, and John C. Fremont. The new legislation, in addition to streamlining the engineers into a single organization, increased the aggregate strength of the corps and elevated its rank structure to better reflect its value to the Army. News of the merger came as no surprise to Humphreys. Though proud of his long association with the topogs (his career spanned its entire existence from 1838 to 1863), he supported the merger when most engineers did not.30 It was cold ambition that drove him. Humphreys already had his eye on a postwar command of the newly combined engineer corps. The merger elevated that position from colonel to brigadier general in the Regular Army.31

None of this could remove the dark cloud hanging over Humphreys and his division. Possessed of a keen intellect and extraordinary soldiering skills, he was stubborn as an ox and, once crossed, a relentless adversary. He also had blind spots and, despite mounting evidence, refused to see that fallout from the several courts-martial was chiefly responsible for holding up his promotion. His search for an alternative explanation led to yet another clash with the unpopular General Halleck, the top commander in the Army. The two men had traded barbs six months earlier on the eve of the Antietam Campaign. As Humphreys was scrambling to organize and equip his green regiments for the march from Washington, Halleck—increasingly anxious at the delay—dashed off a note threatening Humphreys with arrest for “disobedience of orders” unless he “immediately leaves to take command of his division in the field.”32 Humphreys had not forgotten the incident and, on 28 March 1863, wrote Secretary Stanton asking for a court of inquiry. “I make this request because after having been strongly recommended for promotion for services in the field by Major-General Burnside, my promotion has not taken place.” The note crossed Halleck’s desk as it snaked its way up through the War Department, and the general in chief of the U.S. Army added a handwritten notation, “As General Halleck did not oppose General Humphrey’s promotion, but on the contrary supported General Burnside’s recommendation for such promotion, the whole motive of General Humphreys’ complaint falls to the ground.”33

Humphreys next turned on Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the for-
mer commander of the Army of the Potomac who had been sacked in late 1862 following a record of failure and missed opportunities. Both men were Philadelphians and West Point graduates, and they had worked closely together in the Office of Pacific Railroad Explorations and Surveys in the early 1850s. When war came, Humphreys joined McClellan’s staff as chief topographer of the Army of the Potomac and served him loyally for the better part of a year before assuming division command. The two men remained cordial, even friendly. Then, in early April 1863 as Humphreys read the Daily Morning Chronicle (Washington, D.C.), he came across McClellan’s newly published report on the Battle of Antietam. There on 17 September 1862, at Sharpsburg along Antietam Creek in Maryland, McClellan had checked the invading Army of Northern Virginia but failed to follow up with decisive action the next day. In his report, he fell back on his customary and fatal excuse that he was awaiting reinforcements, but then added in detail, “Humphreys’s division of new troops, fatigued with forced marches, were [sic] arriving throughout the day [September 18] and were not available until near its close.” This struck a nerve with Humphreys, who had pushed his green division in a painful overnight march of more than twenty-three miles to place it on the field that morning. He addressed McClellan directly: “Nothing but the spirit of heroism would have carried men who had recently entered service and who were unused to fatigue and hardship through that march. . . . Your report would mark the mouth of the Massaponax, about five miles below Fredericksburg. He kept the army active and engaged in preparing the ground for a spring offensive—large details of 1,000 to 1,500 men were tasked daily to repair and corduroy roads and make temporary bridges. Finally, he instituted a system of division and corps badges to be worn conspicuously on the caps of all soldiers. These became a source of regimental pride and esprit de corps. The cumulative effects of these actions were revitalizing. With its strength at nearly 134,000 men and 404 artillery pieces, the Army of the Potomac stood poised to march against a Confederate force less than half that size.35

Humphreys had his 3d Division in fighting trim as well, though there were continued distractions. Armstrong and Frick, their disabilities removed by the state of Pennsylvania in late March so that they could rejoin the Army, arrived at Falmouth on 10 April and were warmly received by their regiment. Both men would fall into line when the time came for it, but tensions remained. Less than a week after his return, Frick retaliated against Humphreys with a grab bag of formal charges that never went to trial.36 General Tyler, commander of the 1st Brigade (91st, 126th, 129th, and 134th Pennsylvania Regiments), returned about the same time from an extended sick leave in Washington spent mostly currying favor with politicians and stirring up trouble for Humphreys.37 Col. Peter H. Allabach, a burly Mexican War veteran and a congenial fellow, retained command of the 2d Brigade (123d, 131st, 133d, and 155th Regiments) and enjoyed continued close relations with division headquarters.

Humphreys’ personal staff had not changed substantially since Antietam. Two were holdovers from the Peninsula Campaign—his 23-year-old eldest son, Henry “Harry” Humphreys and Capt. Carswell McClellan, an engineer graduate of Williams College and, notably, first cousin of General McClellan. Of middling height, dark hair, and haunting eyes, Captain McClellan served Humphreys with pluck and fidelity and, like his commander, saw a younger brother join the rebellion.38 Harry was eager and smart, an inch or two taller than his father and fiercely loyal. He attended high school at the elite Phillips Academy at Andover, a traditional feeder school for Yale College but looked instead to West Point. With his father’s help, Harry secured an at-large appointment in 1857 that would place him in the lackluster class of 1861 alongside George Armstrong Custer; but for reasons unknown, he
accepted the appointment but did not attend, enrolling instead at the Yale Scientific School (later the Sheffield Scientific School) for instruction in science and engineering. The Civil War interrupted his education, and he joined his father at Yorktown as a civilian assistant in the Topographical Engineers Department. Humphreys wanted a commission for his son and successfully lobbied Governor Curtin, who in the days after Antietam appointed Harry a first lieutenant in the 112th Pennsylvania Volunteers. The young Humphreys immediately left the regiment to serve with his father, rarely leaving his side. Additional aides-de-camp were Lt. Henry C. Christiand of Michigan and Capt. William H. Chester, a popular 46-year-old from New York City. Also noteworthy was the Division Assistant Inspector General and “special aide-de-camp,” Capt. Adolfo Fernández Cavada, the youngest of three brothers born in Cuba to a father of Spanish descent and an American mother from Philadelphia. He was also a diarist. The months of preparation and training came together in a last bit of pageantry, a grand review for President Lincoln on Wednesday, 8 April 1863. It was a warm, clear day in Falmouth as the soldiers took to the field in their best uniforms. The regimental banners flapped in a steady breeze as the musket barrels and brass buttons gleamed in the sun. The president, dressed in civilian clothes and a stovepipe hat, rode a large bay with an Army saddle and ornamental blanket. Alongside him was his youngest son, Thomas “Tad” Lincoln, dressed in military garb and astride a splendid horse of his own. It was just four days past his tenth birthday. Humphreys wrote an account to his wife:

The sight was far more imposing than the grand review of McClellan’s in October 1862, the troops now looking like soldiers and moving soldierly. There were not so many bands of music, but one was made to do duty for many. The corps, divisions, and brigade flags came just after the general [and]... they give a much more martial aspect to the command.

The grand review was also a show of force—the two armies were in plain sight of each other and separated only by the waters of the Rappahannock. They would have at each other soon enough

**Left to right**: Lieutenant Christiand, Lieutenant Humphreys, General Humphreys, Captain McClellan, Captain Cavada
at Chancellorsville, a dusty crossroads ten miles west of Fredericksburg. As Hooker firmed up plans for the spring offensive, he struggled decidedly with the timing of it. Further delay promised warmer, drier weather in that region of Virginia, but there was good cause to push ahead as well. The Army of the Potomac faced potentially disruptive manpower problems as the terms of enlistment for 37,000 men, nearly a quarter of its infantry ranks, began to expire. This number included two-year men who enlisted in spring 1861 and nine-month men who signed up during the invasion crisis of late summer 1862. Few divisions in the Army were as heavily impacted as Humphreys’ 3d Division in which six of eight regiments were to muster out in the first week of May. Striking a balance between the prospects for improved weather and the ultimate loss of nearly sixty infantry regiments, Hooker decided to move in late April 1863. His plan called for a double envelopment, attacking Lee simultaneously from his front at Fredericksburg and his rear at Chancellorsville while an advance of cavalry cut off Lee’s supply line to the south. It was an audacious plan that would allow the Union Army to deploy its superior numbers to best effect.

Humphreys received his marching orders in the early hours of 27 April but they were not what he had hoped. The three divisions of the V Corps would advance to Chancellorsville along with the bulk of the Federal forces, but Meade had specifically ordered that the rear guard “be selected from regiments whose terms of service are soonest to expire.” His motives were clear. Few placed much trust in short-timers who were allegedly characterized by a reluctance to fight in their final weeks of enlistment. Even so, the 3d Division, consisting of about thirty-seven hundred men in total, stepped briskly into the limited role assigned to it. The 2d Division of regulars under Maj. Gen. George Sykes marched at 1000 followed an hour later by the 1st Division under Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin. Humphreys and his division set out at 1200. Each of the soldiers carried eight days’ rations—hard bread, coffee, sugar, and salt—and sixty rounds of cartridges. Marching under a flag bearing the blue Maltese Cross, they made for Kelly’s Ford traveling along Warrenton Pike.

The long wagon train of men, beef cattle, pack mules, rations, ammunition, and baggage stopped at Hartwood Church that night and the next day drew up on the summit of a ridge overlooking the Rappahannock River. Kelly’s Ford was a natural bottleneck with a single canvas-covered pontoon bridge, and the 1st and 2d Divisions of the V Corps were delayed in crossing until late on the morning of 29 April. They then turned south and made for Ely’s Ford on the Rapidan River. The 3d Division stayed behind to cover passage of the remaining trains. Throughout that day, Humphreys supervised the crossing of the XII, XI, and, finally, the V Corps including a single train of at least one hundred seventy wagons and ambulances. The 3d Division was the last to cross, taking up the pontoon bridge behind it, and Humphreys set off in a steady rain to rejoin the rest of the command. Deteriorating roads made the march “very slow,” and, according to accounts, it was “so dark that nothing could be seen.” Colonel Armstrong recalled “the streams forded during the night of sleepless toil, the enjoined silence, broken only by the sloppy shuffle of shoes half filled with water, and the creaking wagons, the provoking halts that would temp the eyes to a slumber that would be broken immediately by the resumption of the forward movement.” After several hours of it in “pitch dark,” the guide “lost his way” and “discovered that he was not on the road he had traversed twice the day before.” Humphreys halted the command “as there was nothing else to be done but lie down in the rain on the roadside and wait until there was light enough to see.” The men, according to Captain Cavada, “tried to get some sleep but the cold & rain made that impossible.”

That night and into the next morning Humphreys received several urgent communications. The first came from Meade advising him “of the importance of having the pontoon train at Ely’s Ford at the earliest possible moment.” The second largely repeated the first but originated from Army headquarters. Capt. Cyrus B. Comstock, U.S. Engineers, hand delivered that one at 0100. At dawn, “as soon as there was light enough to see,” Humphreys brought up the pontoon train, and the column fell in behind it on the march to Ely’s Ford. Just under way, he received new instructions from Meade to leave the remaining trains under the guard of a...
single regiment and move the rest of his command “as quickly as possible” to Chancellorsville. The V Corps commander anticipated a fight and wanted Humphreys on hand. The division, “very much jaded by the want of sleep and the wet of the previous night,” picked up its pace and drew up on the ford in the early afternoon, but Sykes and Griffin had already departed. The Rapidan River, swollen by heavy rain, ran too strong for pontoons, so Humphreys and his men had to wade into chilled waters running breast deep. They stripped down, fixed their cartridge boxes to their musket barrels, and bundled a set of dry clothes on their heads. After gathering on the far side of the river, the men—cold, wet, and exhausted—moved only as far as Hunting Creek where they bivouacked three miles from Chancellorsville. They had marched eighteen miles that day.

Humphreys roused his division in the predawn hours of 1 May 1863. It promised to be a momentous day. The men struck tents, packed, and set out at daybreak. They reached Chancellorsville at 0700, “having been delayed one hour,” as Humphreys reported in a direct jab at Tyler, “by the tardiness of the First Brigade.” The 3d Division located the V Corps near the junction of three narrow country roads that passed through Chancellorsville en route to Fredericksburg. The largest and most direct of these was Orange Turnpike which ran due east into the city; the second was River Road which ran in a northeasterly direction before turning back along the Rappahannock to Fredericksburg; and the last was Plank Road which dipped in a southeasterly direction before converging again on the turnpike about six miles up. The area was otherwise thickly wooded with scrub oak, stunted pine, and a dense undergrowth of hazel and briar. The locals called it “The Wilderness.” As the 3d Division settled into a clearing behind the Chancellor house, Humphreys and his staff briefly occupied its lower rooms while the female residents, “the ladies of the house of Secesh [secessionist] sympathies, kept themselves closely in the upper story.” Their curiosity tempted them “to occasional peeps from half-opened shutters at the blue coats below.” It would have been a daunting site. By midmorning, Hooker had concentrated 70,000 Union troops in the vicinity including the V, II, III, XI, and XII Corps. Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick and his VI Corps, as well as the I Corps under Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, remained at Falmouth with 40,000 men in an initial holding action. The Army of the Potomac had executed the deployment flawlessly. Lee was outnumbered and outmaneuvered. Lee was outnumbered and outmaneuvered.

After reconnoitering enemy positions in the early part of the morning, Hooker put the bulk of his force in motion toward Fredericksburg about 1100. The V Corps led the way. Meade sent Griffin up River Road toward Bank’s Ford with Humphreys immediately behind in reserve. Sykes took his regulars east on the turnpike, and the XII Corps under Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum followed Plank Road. The XI Corps under Maj. Gen. Oliver Howard held the Union right while the III and II Corps began a slow movement east in support of the advance. The two armies first clashed on the turnpike about a mile east of the Chancellor house when Sykes and his division traded shots with the vanguard of Lt. Gen. Thomas E. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Confederate corps. A sharp engagement ensued, and the sounds of battle—“the roar of cannon, the explosion of shells, the rattle of musketry . . . mingled with the shrill cheers . . . of the Rebels”—carried to the north and accompanied Humphreys and his men as they marched to the Rappahannock. There were occasional shots fired up ahead as the lead division moved on enemy pickets and pushed through a hastily deserted Confederate camp littered with “tents left standing” and abandoned caissons and ammunition. For another hour or two the column wound its way unmolested along the narrow road when Griffin, with Humphreys close behind, approached a wooded summit overlooking Bank’s Ford. Distant several miles, the din of battle faded out altogether, “with no sound to break in upon us save the screaming of the whip-poor-wills.”

The men had scarcely reached their destination when Humphreys received an order to “retire in haste” and return his division to Chancellorsville. Hooker had lost his nerve and was falling back on the defensive. Humphreys saw that the return was “promptly done,” and his division found its place again in the vicinity of the Chancellor house.

Meade then sent Humphreys, his best topographer, to make preparations for anchoring the army’s left flank on the Rappahannock. After a “hurried examination,” he selected a line beginning at Ely’s Ford Road and bending to the right along Mineral Spring Road to the river and moved promptly to place his division on its extreme left. The 2d Division halted on its return from Bank’s Ford and formed to Humphreys’ right. “The sound of the axe . . . broke the stillness of the night along the lines” as Humphreys and
his men strengthened their position with rifle pits and log breastworks faced with abatis.\textsuperscript{55} They worked through the night and by 1200 the following day were, as Armstrong remembered, “enjoying our coffee in a cleared space, behind a ridge of logs and limbs that fronted our entire division, and which we would have been content to hold against any attacking force.” Humphreys also deployed twenty-six pieces of artillery, “rendering it impossible for the enemy to debouch from the woods on the high, open plain.” As a final precaution he borrowed a regiment of sharpshooters, the 7th New Jersey, and deployed them to rugged ground on the extreme left extending to the narrow bottomland of the river. Humphreys had secured the left flank, but in late afternoon the Union right met with disaster. Howard had failed to fortify his position, and Jackson, concealed by the dense woods, orchestrated a daylight march around the Federal lines and
attacked its hanging flank from the rear. The XI Corps was overrun in the worst rout of the war.  

Secure in its earthworks, the 3d Division could only listen and wait as the calamity played itself out in the distance. Colonel Armstrong described what he heard as Jackson and 26,000 Confederates swept down the turnpike and threatened to throw the entire Union Army into confusion:

At first sounding sullenly away to the right, then gradually nearing, until at nightfall musket and artillery appeared to volley spitefully almost upon our Division limits. It was apparent that our lines had been broken, and apprehending the worst we anxiously stood at arms and awaited the onward. Nearer and nearer the howling devils came; louder and louder grew the sounds of conflict. The fiercest of fights was raging evidently in the very center of the ground chosen as our stronghold.  

As night fell on a chaotic field, Jackson ran out of steam and Hooker roused himself from a curious lethargy to re-form and stabilize his lines. Meade moved Sykes that evening into a new position—now facing Jackson rather than Lee—about a half mile to the west along Ely’s Ford Road. The rest of the V Corps would follow at daybreak but not before situating into its formidable earthworks a host of stragglers and disorganized regiments from the shattered XI Corps. After pointing out the details of the position,
Humphreys marched his men to the rear of General Griffin’s line which fell back along U.S. Ford Road. Joining the V Corps to its right and anchoring that new flank was General Reynolds and his I Corps, fresh up from Falmouth.

Sunday morning still held promise for a Union victory. Despite the ruin of the previous day, Hooker had 80,000 men in fortified positions while the Confederates—now without Jackson who had been accidentally shot by his own pickets the previous night—stood badly outnumbered and divided on the field. Separating the two rebel wings along the turnpike was the Union III Corps under Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles. A political general from New York City and a hardheaded, aggressive commander, he held the high ground at Hazel Grove, a substantial clearing south of the turnpike with a wide-ranging field of fire. The location was the key to the whole Union position, but Hooker failed to see it. Despite protests from Sickles and others, he ordered the plateau abandoned. Confederate artillerist and West Point engineer, Col. Edward Porter Alexander, quickly occupied it, hauled in thirty cannons, pointed them to the north, and began firing shells into Federal positions all along the front. The III Corps, situated nearest the guns, caught much of it. One shell struck the Chancellor house where Hooker had established his headquarters, and a falling pillar knocked him senseless. He retired from the field but refused to yield command. The Federals, now effectively leaderless, were slowly driven back toward the crossroads as the two wings of the Confederate army closed in on the central part of the Union position at Chancellorsville.

Humphreys, again in reserve but this time with the rest of the V Corps, was disgruntled at the "unsatisfactory disposition of my command to support whenever support was required—unsatisfactory because it almost certainly took from me the opportunity of fighting my division as a whole." Indeed, both brigades were detached for much of the morning, and each saw independent action at various points along the horseshoe-shaped front. The first out was Colonel Allabach’s brigade which moved to a frontline position immediately to the left of Griffin’s division. That sector saw little activity, but Humphreys later accompanied two of its regiments south to the turnpike on
a “most risky” mission to “hold the enemy in check” while the III and II Corps fell back from their increasingly untenable positions south of the crossroads. As Humphreys moved his men into position, “almost to the enemy,” the Confederates opened canister and shell on them. The men had just been ordered to lie flat “or they would have been mowed down.” As soon as the two corps took up their new positions, these regiments retired slowly through the woods and rejoined their brigade.

Meanwhile General Tyler’s brigade, with orders from Meade, pushed to the southwest to shore up the exposed right flank of the II Corps then hotly engaged with elements of Jackson’s corps (now under the command of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart). Tyler and his men, upon approach, came under heavy fire as they became “objects of especial interest to the Rebel sharpshooters.” In another minute, “flashes of flame and puffs of smoke that appeared to rise among the dead foliage of the wood—so closely did their Butternut clothing resemble leaves—revealed a strong, well-formed, but prostrate Rebel line.” The opposing forces traded volleys for nearly two hours before the Federals ran out of ammunition and withdrew. Humphreys then, as directed, massed his restored command in a reserve position behind Sykes’ division, though “this supporting,” he reiterated, “is not to my liking.”

Meade watched the battle all morning from his line to the north and saw one last opportunity to turn the fight. As Stuart’s forces advanced to the east, his columns passed directly under the Union V Corps, still largely unbloodied and anxious to engage.
Conditions were right for a potentially devastating flank attack—the V Corps, together with the I Corps, could throw twenty thousand men into it; and the rebels appeared completely unaware.66 Meade rode rapidly to army headquarters and made his case. Hooker, who was prostrate in his tent but conscious, refused without explanation and then censured the V Corps commander “for sending in a brigade [Tyler’s] of Humphreys’s, which,” Meade later conceded, “I did in spite of orders to the contrary.”67 Within the hour, two wings of the Confederate army converged on Chancellorsville and approached the mansion, now a smoking ruin, as the men in blue beat a hasty retreat to positions just beyond the fork of Ely’s Ford and U.S. Ford roads. The day held one final humiliation for the Federals as the VI Corps, bogged down after some small success at Fredericksburg the previous day, was “hemmed in” just west of the ford roads resembling rivers of mud, they slept away their sorrows under wet blankets in the comfortable huts of their old campground at Falmouth.70 Humphreys had little time to reflect on the Chancellorsville debacle. His division was “beginning to dissolve” and, as he admitted to his wife, he still did “not know what assignment will be made of me.”71 On the first full day back at camp, he issued a formal statement to his men expressing “the satisfaction and pride I have felt at their conduct, from the time I assumed command...up to the present eventful period...I shall part with them with deep regret.”72 That latter sentiment was widely if not universally held.73 The first of the regiments to go was Col. John B. Clark’s 123d Pennsylvania—“one of the very best.” It left Falmouth on 8 May under the escort of one of two three-year regiments in the division. “Sorrow and sadness prevailed,” remembered an officer of the 155th Regiment, “when they were ordered to fall into line with their bands to escort the nine-months’ regiments from Camp Humphreys to Stoneman’s Station, there to entrain via Washington for Pittsburgh.”74 The others followed suit over the next week.75

The last to go, fittingly, was the 129th (home to the troublesome officers Frick and Armstrong) but not before one final row. On 10 May, Capt. David Eckar of that regiment filed formal charges against the division adjutant general, Captain McClellan, for “drunkenness upon duty” and a slew of other alleged violations dating back to January.76 Whatever the merits of the case, the intent was clear. It was a parting shot at the division commander and his personal staff. Humphreys put pen to paper as he so often did when vexed and drafted a five-page letter to Meade. It began with a heated defense of his adjutant against the “false and malicious” accusations levied by Eckar but “no doubt...prepared with the instigation of Genl. Tyler and Col. Frick.” The focus then turned exclusively to Tyler and his several months of mischief making. Two incidents stood out—his ongoing plot “to undermine my authority and influence in his brigade” and another involving extortion and blackmail.77 At some point while Tyler was still facing
charges, he sent two friends, one of whom was a former Republican congressman from western Pennsylvania, to meet Humphreys and “prevail on me to withdraw my charges against General Tyler, first by the offer of aid to my promotion, and next by a threat to do all they could to prevent my promotion.” So it had been Tyler all along. Humphreys declined the “bargain” and instead pushed to have his brigade commander “relieved of duty” from the division, as he shortly was. “Just before sunset,” on 17 May “came the order giving the coup de grace to my division. It will expire today.”

Tyler would return to Washington, ending his time with the Army of the Potomac and, happily, any further association with Humphreys; the remaining three-year regiments—the 155th and the 91st Pennsylvania—would join Sykes and his regulars; and Humphreys would take charge of a veteran division.

After breakfast on 18 May, Humphreys went to army headquarters to receive orders for his new command. As he told to his wife, “it shall be Hooker’s old division, one of the very best in the whole army and consisting, I understand, of nearly 10,000 men.”

Though not so large as that, it was a plum assignment, and Humphreys understood that “General Hooker himself had done this—certainly complementary.”

Formed in March 1862, the hard-hitting 2d Division of the III Corps had won a reputation for courage and gallantry at Yorktown, Fredericksburg, and, finally, Chancellorsville where Hooker threw the veteran unit—“the darling of his own creation”—into the breach against “Stonewall” Jackson’s troops. By then, division command had devolved on Maj. Gen. Hiram Berry, a Democratic state politician from Maine who had earned his stars on the field. He was one of two division commanders—both belonging to the III Corps—killed by sharpshooters at Chancellorsville. The other was Humphreys’ friend and colleague, General Whipple, a U.S. Military Academy graduate, a fellow topog, and yet another engineer veteran of the Pacific Railroad Surveys.

All told, Sickles lost 22 percent of his corps in the campaign, and Berry’s division saw nearly twelve hundred men killed and wounded, more than any other Federal division. Those losses, together with the resignation of one Pennsylvania and four New York regiments, substantially reduced its strength and forced a consolidation in the III Corps from three to two divisions—the 1st Division remained under Maj. Gen. David Birney, son of the famed abolitionist, and the 2d Division under Humphreys who would be the only West Point–trained general officer in the corps. Meade, back at V Corps headquarters, was “sorry to lose Humphreys. He is a most valuable officer, besides being an associate of the most agreeable kind.”

Humphreys spent the next few weeks acclimating to new surroundings. He located his new camp at Stafford Heights (above Falmouth) on the morning of 24 May and got situated into his residence—a house “with many comforts that I am not accustomed to” instead of a tent, though he had mixed feelings about it. “An occasional sleeping in a house may do,” as he explained to his wife, “but in the field I prefer my tent.” The “greatest attraction of the present position is the well of good water of which one may drink freely without apprehension or suffering from it.” He spent part of the day reviewing division reports and then “rode informally through the encampments, some of which are very prettily situated. It was very oppressive [hot]; scarcely a breath of air stirring and the visit occupied several hours.”

Late that afternoon, he “dined with Genl. Sickles to meet the other officers of the command and had a pleasant dinner.” But the adjustment continued to be a difficult one for Humphreys. “There is something depressing in changing all your associations and finding yourself under the necessity of forming new.” Though he retained his personal staff, he missed the other officers of his old division and corps—“not only efficient officers but warm, devoted friends.”

Humphreys initiated a review of his new division in the first week of June. He began with the 1st Brigade under Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Carr, a mustached New Yorker and former tobacco merchant who briefly commanded the division after Berry fell at Chancellorsville. A dry wind blew “clouds of dust over the plain,” hampering Humphreys’ efforts, but “I made this inspection myself to see what kind of men I had, and was very well satisfied with them.” They were “fine, manly looking fellows that I know I can depend on. In marching, condition of arms, and soldierly appearance or bearing in the ranks, they did not sur-
pass my good nine months men. But some of the regiments had a somewhat harder look—for they have been two years acquiring it.” He next inspected the 2d Brigade under Col. William R. Brewster, an inexperienced commander with an unflattering military record. He had recently inherited the famed “Excelsior Brigade” composed entirely of New York regiments recruited by Sickles in 1861. Last was the 3d Brigade under the temporary command of Col. George C. Burling. A New Jersey native and coal merchant with a reputation for bravery, Burling was wounded early in the fighting at Chancellorsville and still recovering. Humphreys conducted these reviews on a new horse, “Becky,” a gray (named after his wife, Rebecca) “who was not afraid of the soldiers or the music, but the flapping of the flags (the wind was very strong) alarmed her very much, and I couldn’t get her to ride close to the lines.” She looked “magnificently in her alarm—and, indeed, throughout. . . . She will soon become accustomed to flags and drums and men and with a little teaching will deport herself in a most perfect manner.”

On the morning of 5 June the division awoke to “artillery firing below the Phillips House on the River” and “rumors of a move of some kind.” Lee was pulling back from his positions along the Rappahannock and drawing together two of his three corps—those of Lt. Generals James Longstreet and Richard Ewell—at Culpeper while Lt. Gen. A. P. Hill’s Confederate III Corps remained at Fredericksburg. Hooker, with no plans to move his army, sent Union cavalry to investigate. On the morning of 9 June, Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton and eight thousand Yankee troopers splashed across the river at Beverly’s Ford in a daring raid that caught General Stuart’s forces napping. The ensuing battle at Brandy Station was the largest cavalry battle of the war. After a day of mounted charges and fighting at close range with sabers and pistols, Pleasonton broke off the engagement and returned to Falmouth with useful intelligence on the strength of the Confederate concentration around Culpeper Courthouse. The presence of strong infantry forces removed all doubt; Lee was preparing to march north. Hooker would follow with roughly one hundred thousand men while trying to ascertain enemy intentions and keep his army between Lee and Washington City.

The Union III Corps would be the first out, and Humphreys was exhilarated. “How dreary and gloomy it was to see me at my new headquarters near Falmouth in the Third Corps,” he explained to a friend, “until the orders to march came—and that always brings bright anticipation.” After more than five months in winter quarters, his division “broke up camp” at Falmouth on 11 June and started out after Birney’s division. The day was “hot and sultry” and the roads “very dusty” as Humphreys and his men
made their way along the now familiar Warrenton Road and bivouacked once again at Hartwood Church. They spent three days on the Rappahannock in the vicinity of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad Bridge making “such defensive arrangements as would render it impracticable for the enemy to cross in my front.” His men threw up rifle pits and batteries at two crossings, Wheatley’s and Beverly’s fords, and destroyed the railroad bridge. Sickles was notably absent. Suffering from persistent enteritis (inflamed bowels), he had gone home to New York City to convalesce in the arms of his infamous young wife. He would rejoin the corps just days before Gettysburg.87 Birney served as acting commander until then.

By 14 June it was clear to Hooker that Lee had got the jump on him. Ewell marched forty-five miles in two days and appeared near Winchester, a scant few miles from the new state border with West Virginia. As Ewell continued his dash up the Shenandoah Valley to the Potomac River, he threatened to flank the Federal Army or cut it off from Washington. This imbued Hooker with a sense of urgency, and he ordered his whole army forward to Manassas Junction, about twenty miles southwest of Washington, moving under cover of the Bull Run Mountains while pushing his cavalry out front to locate the main Confederate body.88 Humphreys and his men filed out of camp that evening, “as soon as it was sufficiently dark to conceal the movement,” marched all night, rested for a few hours in the morning, and then set out again at 1200. It was, according to Humphreys, “painful in the extreme, for, owing to the long continued drought, streams usually of considerable magnitude were dried up; the dust lay some inches thick on the roadway, and the fields were equally uncomfortable. The suffering from heat, dust, thirst, fatigue, and exhaustion was very great.” It was nearly 2400 when they reached their destination and, as Captain Cavada wrote, “fell to the ground in their bivouac more dead than alive.”89 Men staggered into camp throughout the night, and the ambulances in the rear were crowded with soldiers suffering from heat exhaustion and sunstroke.90 The division rested a day before marching for Centreville and then, two days later, Gum Springs. It bivouacked there for nearly a week while Hooker reconciled conflicting reports on Lee’s whereabouts and planned his next moves.

Hooker turned to the cavalry and to his own spies for clarity, and they pieced together a disturbing picture. Lee had crossed the Potomac River in force, pushed north, and scattered his men to subsist on the fat Pennsylvania countryside. Hooker had little choice but to follow, and he ordered his army into Maryland. After an all-day march on 25 June, Humphreys and his men crossed the river at Edward’s Ferry on a pontoon bridge spanning more than a quarter mile and then under a heavy rain hiked alongside a canal on a narrow towpath to Monocacy Aqueduct. The march continued late into the night, as Cavada wrote, “partly in the utter darkness . . . and with a cold driving rain in our faces.”91 Another officer recalled that “men were continually falling from utter exhaustion . . . a few slipped into the canal.”92 While many in the division remembered it as an especially painful march, it brought the war-weary division back to Northern soil. There, according to Cavada, the “look of distrust and hesitancy gives place to the hearty and cheerful expression—and it does one good to hear an honest outspoken, ‘God bless you, boys,’ from simple minded country folks.”93 The whole Army of the Potomac with all its artillery, cavalry, and supply trains, had crossed the Potomac River into Maryland by Sunday, 27 June. Sickles returned to the III Corps the next day, just in time to see Hooker displaced. Secretary Stanton and the administration had lost faith in him, and a bureaucratic snaggle over the garrison at Harpers Ferry became the pretext for his dismissal. The commanding general job went to Meade.94

Humphreys left his division to Colonel Brewster and started off on horseback with his son Harry and Captain McClellan. They found Meade in his new army headquarters tent and quickly divined his purpose. He wanted Humphreys to serve as chief of staff, a senior advisory position with a rank of major general but no promise of glory. Sorely tempted, he spent several hours at headquarters discussing the matter but then politely “declined or deferred it.” He was loathe to give up combat duty for a desk job, particularly with his home state overrun, and he wanted to command his division in the coming fight. Also, Humphreys aspired to corps command, “less than that I cannot stand,” and was hesitant to take even a promotion that did not bring him closer to it. Meade was left with little recourse and, while he would later regret it, stuck with the able incumbent, Maj. Gen. Daniel Butterfield.94 The two worked closely that first day to concentrate the army about Frederick and then throw it forward to Taneytown and Emmitsburg where Meade could control the main roads from Baltimore and Washington and, with the railroad at Westminster immediately to its rear, provide a secure supply line to his army. Humphreys returned to his division as it entered Frederick. The city’s residents “thronged the streets to see us march by” and greeted the men as “heroes of the war.” The column then filed out of town on the main road north to Taneytown reaching Walkersville that evening and encamping nearby. Before dawn on 29 June the division was “under arms and in motion,”
reaching Ladiesburg at midday—“a village counting three full grown houses and fewer full grown ladies.” The men had fresh bread and fresh milk by the roadside before pushing on. They reached Taneytown early in the afternoon and, according to Captain Cavada, “marched through its principle street amid hearty cheers and waving of handkerchiefs, and groups of young girls greeted us with choruses of patriotic songs.” One party sang the ever popular, “When this cruel war is over” and did so “very charmingly.”95 The Division bivouacked north of town.

Reports of enemy activities in the direction of York, Pennsylvania, forced Meade to modify his plans on the afternoon of 30 June and he ordered the III Corps to Emmitsburg where Sickles would report to Reynolds and fall under his authority. Humphreys led his men back into Taneytown, “turned to the right on main road to Emmetsburg [sic],” and advanced three or four miles before halting for the night.96 The column reached its destination late the following morning, 1 July, and, according to Cavada, found the “1st & 11th Corps moving through in great haste on the Gettysburg Road.”97 Meade held the III Corps back but, throughout midday, had Humphreys undertake a “careful investigation of the ground in front of Emmitsburg,” all in “the event of our fighting the battle there.”98 He and Cavada were still engaged in that important work when a dispatch arrived urging the “greatest haste” in pushing the division on to Gettysburg. The I Corps had encountered a large Confederate force there and was “fighting against great odds and . . . in danger. Genl. Reynolds is killed.”99

By the time Humphreys returned to his men, two of his three brigades, those under Carr and Brewster, were already under way. Sickles had put them on a circuitous path—“a country wagon road making many turns right and left”—running two to three miles west of the main Emmitsburg Road which carried Sickles and Birney along with the 1st Division directly into Gettysburg later that afternoon. Colonel Burling and a single battery were left in position to guard the South Mountain approaches. Humphreys rode up the dirt road “through the mass of men struggling forward” and, after about a mile, overtook the head of his division then under the guidance of Lt. Col. Julius Hayden, a staff officer in the III Corps, and Dr. Andrew Annan, a prominent citizen, and Union man, from Emmitsburg.100 The column pressed ahead until it approached a fork in the road just beyond Marsh Run. Humphreys, already warned via dispatch “to look out for his left in coming up,” had misgivings. The road to the left would carry him by way of the Black Horse Tavern and Fairfield Pike into Gettysburg from the west. A right would put him on Millerstown Road and carry him to the main highway leading north into the city.101 Given the uncertainty of enemy positions, that latter route seemed safer to Humphreys, but Hayden, “more noted for forth and foam than for common sence [sic]” insisted that they take the left.102 Humphreys deferred to Hayden despite nagging concerns that they may be “coming upon the enemy,” and, as the sun dropped below the horizon, the division pushed forward across Marsh Run. The sharp sounds of horses, artillery, and ambulances fording the rocky streambed carried into the night, but, with the crossing complete, Humphreys “issued orders along the line to prevent all noise—then dismounted and . . . went cautiously up the road to the Black Horse Tavern, which was only a few hundred feet.” With him went McClellan, Harry, the two guides, and a young orderly, Pvt. James F. Dimond. No advanced guard accompanied them. The party of six discovered on its approach a rebel picket and quickly “understood the exact condition of things.” They had stumbled into the Confederate rear at Gettysburg. As Cavada told it, “we were almost within the Rebel lines and . . . over thirty pieces of artillery crowned the very hill we were about to ascend and completely commanded the point we then stood on.” As silently as possible and with the moon riding high in the night sky, the two brigades did a hasty “about face” and retraced their steps. Humphreys and his staff had not been gone ten minutes when twenty or thirty Confederates rode up to the tavern and passed the night there. He later conceded that “it was one more of my many good fortunes, almost a thousand. You will call it Special Providence.”103

The division—according to Cavada “not a little relieved at our fortunate escape from our perilous position”—followed the left bank of Marsh Run in a southeasterly direction to the Sachs Covered Bridge that carried it back across the stream.104 It then resumed the “proper road,” crossed Willoughby's Creek, and marched past Pitzer School House. Upon reaching the crest of Warfield Ridge, the division “encountered another wolf.” Spread out before it were “the extensive smouldering [sic] fires of some [author’s italics] troops.” Humphreys called for an experienced officer and sent him forward with a company of infantry to reconnoiter. “After an absence of some time,” he returned with good news. These
were Union fires. For that they had confirmation from Col. Orson H. Hart, assistant adjutant general of the III Corps, who had been sent “to find out what had become of the division.” Apparently, there had been “much uneasiness expressed” at headquarters “because of its non-arrival.” Humphreys led his men forward to Emmitsburg Road, turned left past the outposts and the Peach Orchard and found, just beyond, the camp fires of Birney’s division. The incompetence of the guide had added many miles and several hours to the march, and it was well after 2400. The exhausted troops bivouacked “without delay,” Cavada, “overcome with fatigue and sleepiness,” threw himself “under the nearest tree amid the wet grass, and in spite of rain and mud was soon lost to everything.”

Humphreys awoke before dawn to a hushed camp, his personal staff spread out under the canopies of two large trees and “enwrapped in their overcoats . . . all buried in slumber.” The white division flag “drooped heavily from its staff,” and the only sound was the “pattering rain drops on the grass.” The division had bivouacked just to the east of Emmitsburg Road near the crest of high ground running from Cemetery Ridge in a southerly direction to a “conical shaped hill” called Little Round Top. Birney’s pickets were out all night with tired eyes, and, as the first order of business, Humphreys sent Cavada to round up replacements. Within minutes “the clear notes of a single bugle broke upon the ear and before its echo had lost itself among the hills a dozen had taken up the call.” The army began to stir. Burling arrived at midmorning, tardy by several hours. As the 3d Brigade massed to the rear of the division, Humphreys had his men pull down “all fences in front of the division . . . and extending up to the Emmitsburg
Pike.” There were no trees except those of the Peach Orchard “which were small.” The skirmishing up ahead was at times “very brisk,” and the occasional spent ball would “sail lazily over our heads or drop among us without causing injury.”

About 1200 Humphreys had orders to form his division in line of battle, one brigade behind the other and separated by 200 yards. It was Carr, Brewster, and then Burling. To their left was Birney’s division which stretched to the base of Little Round Top, a craggy, rocky hill with command of the field. To their right was Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps. Drawn up in a “considerable hollow” facing Emmitsburg Road, the III Corps occupied the extreme left of a Union position that extended for nearly two miles in a straight line along Cemetery Ridge before curling back along Culp’s Hill. This position offered the obvious tactical benefit of high ground and interior lines, but Sickles chafed at his leg of it, the only point along the Federal line where the advantage of high ground was lost. He remembered Chancellorsville and the order to abandon the plateau at Hazel Grove for which he had paid a steep price. After conferring at length with Birney—and excluding Humphreys entirely—Sickles made his fateful decision. He would act unilaterally, seize the higher ground to his front before the enemy could do so, and tell no one—not even the II Corps to his immediate right. He began with Birney and his three brigades. The 2d Brigade under Brig. Gen. John Henry Hobart Ward abandoned its position at the base of Little Round Top, leaving it uncovered, and marched forward 500 yards to a rocky area known as Devil’s Den. The 3d under Brig. Gen. Regis De Trobriand filed into the Wheatfield but with fewer than fourteen hundred men could not begin to cover the wide front. The 1st under Brig. Gen. Charles Graham set out across open field for Emmitsburg Road. Cavada watched this last movement with special interest. His brother, Lt. Col. Federico Cavada, commanded its 114th Regiment, “conspicuous by their Zouaves uniform,” as it “took the lead and reached the road under a heavy fire from the enemy’s batteries and sharpshooters.” By early afternoon, Birney and his men were detached from the army and spread thinly along a remote and dangerous salient (later known as “Sickles’ salient”). As Ward received the first attack, Sickles ordered Humphreys to turn over one of his brigades to Birney and to “make it subject to his order for support.” Humphreys, disgusted at the request but powerless to refuse, tasked Cavada with “selecting a position,” and
the captain led Burling and his brigade to a “rocky wood of large growth . . . with a crumbling stone wall about 3 ft high serving as cover.” He then returned to his division, “now reduced to two small brigades” and numbering only about thirty-six hundred men. Humphreys later called back one of the strongest regiments, the 5th New Jersey, for picket duty, but the rest of the brigade was shortly taken from him and divvied up, “no two regiments being together,” to plug holes along Birney’s weak and overextended line. The afternoon was half spent when Meade learned that the III Corps was not in its assigned position. He quickly gathered up his staff and rode for the left flank. As he passed Humphreys’ division, the men “jumped to their feet and cheered lustily,” but Meade was in no mood for it. He could already see the enormous gap in his line. Pushing ahead, he found Sickles at the Peach Orchard and demanded an explanation but did not wait to hear it. “You cannot hold this position,” Meade warned, “but the enemy will not let you get away without a fight.” On cue several Confederate batteries opened upon them. The fight had begun. Meade promised the V Corps support and rode off to secure it. Sickles then directed his 2d Division forward to Emmitsburg Road, “a half a mile in front of the rest of the army.” Humphreys knew “it was all wrong” but dutifully gave the order. General Carr advanced in line of battle and Colonel Brewster in battalions in mass. The sun shone brightly on their waving colors as they marched into open field. It was a grand sight, Cavada recalled, “one to make the blood warm and tingle through its channels.” The soldiers of the II Corps watched the display with a mixture of pride and bafflement. Seated on his horse and observing from a position on Cemetery Ridge, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon, a West Point graduate and division commander in that corps, “could not conceive what it meant, as we had heard no orders for an advance and did not understand the meaning of making this break in our line.” The movement was still under
way when the shells came screaming and bursting among the advancing ranks of blue. Longstreet had concealed himself with 13,000 men in a dense wood beyond the Peach Orchard, his position roughly parallel to that of the Union left, and his gifted artillerist, Colonel Alexander, had massed fifty-four guns along Warfield Ridge bearing directly on the Peach Orchard. These were mounting a deadly crossfire when Humphreys, still en route to Emmitsburg Road, received new orders.

Brig. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, a brilliant young protégé of Humphreys and now chief engineer of the Army, had made a stunning discovery. Little Round Top, abandoned hours earlier by Sickles, was yet unmanned. Standing near its summit and peering through his binoculars into the distance, Warren spied a long rebel line running far to the south and advancing in his direction, and he took only a moment to recognize the emergency. Lee was moving against the Union left, and Little Round Top was the key to the whole position. Warren scrambled to find defenders and sent word to Meade who thought first of Humphreys. The army commander dispatched his personal aide, Maj. Benjamin C. Ludlow, riding out to the Pennsylvanian with instructions "to move at once towards Little Round Top and occupy the ground there which was vacant." As Humphreys later recalled, "I immediately gave the order by my aides for the division to move by the left flank, a movement that was made at once and with the simultaneousness of a single regiment." The order given, he "turned to . . . Ludlow . . . and requested him to ride at full speed to Gen. Meade and inform him that the execution of this order, which I was complying with, would leave vacant the position my division was ordered to occupy [along Emmitsburg Road]." The major was gone but a few minutes when Humphreys rode off in the same direction "to expedite matters." Ludlow met him on the rapid return and, according to Humphreys, "informed me that Gen. Meade had recalled his order"
and that “the 5th Corps were moving to Little Round Top.” Humphreys then ordered an about-face, and the division “re-trod the ground by the right flank that they had the moment before gone over by left flank” and resumed its march to Emmitsburg Road. The maneuver had occupied less than five minutes and was done with “the precision of a careful exercise, the enemy’s artillery giving effect to the picturesqueness.”

As Humphreys settled into his new position just short of the road and aligned with Graham on the left, Longstreet and two of his three division commanders, Maj. Gens. John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws, unleashed a sweeping en echelon attack against the Union flank. Humphreys recalled that “they began chiefly at Birney on my left.” Hood led the fray, sweeping forward under rough terrain and closing on Devil’s Den and Little Round Top where he encountered stiff resistance in a standing fight of unusual ferocity. McLaws made demonstrations along Emmitsburg Road “but did not,” Humphreys wrote, “drive in my pickets.” Rebel guns continued to enfilade his lines, and he ordered his men to the ground as he positioned his own batteries. At about that time, Humphreys sent Captain McClellan to find Sickles and “report to him our conditions and position and ask if he had any further orders.” The captain found the III Corps commander on horseback in the company of Colonel Hayden “some distance in the rear of the line of battle.” Shells were “dropping thick and fast,” and the commander had little to say but warned of “a battery the enemy was putting in position in your front.” McClellan replied that they “had already been introduced to it” and rode off. Moments later, a solid shot struck Sickles squarely in his right knee and shattered his leg. He was carried from the field and his leg later amputated above the knee. Birney assumed command just as his own positions began to falter. Hood was pressing his attack all along the vulnerable salient and making inroads. Graham put in a “most urgent request” for another regiment, and Humphreys and McClellan discussed it for a time before complying. As the last of his reserve regiments peeled away, Humphreys had word that “the enemy was driving in my pickets, and was about advancing in two lines to the attack.” He turned his immediate attention to his active batteries, “stepping between the guns and giving his directions,” as Cavada recalled, “wholly intent upon the work & heedless of the murderous missiles that were felling the very gunners around him.” As McLaw and his men drew within sight, they sent up “a diabolical cheer and yells” and came on “like devil’s incarnate.”

Humphreys called his men to their feet, and a “here they come” echoed...
along the thin blue line. They received the attack in open field. Already, portions of Birney’s command were removing to the rear, broken and disordered, and Humphreys found himself practically alone along Emmitsburg Road and utterly exposed, his left flank “in air” and his right a half-mile in front of the II Corps—almost, as McClellan later wrote “beyond hope of assistance from the rest of the army.” The fighting was fierce, and dozens on both sides fell in the first minutes. Humphreys, still mounted, struggled to hold the line; but his men were now drawing “the enemy’s whole attention,” and he was badly outnumbered. On the left Birney was “calling to some of the regiments to fall back.” A couple left Birney was “calling to some of the regiments to fall back.” A couple left Birney was “calling to some of the regiments to fall back.”

Humphreys was to throw back his left, front, and right, while Humphreys was maintaining “pretty good order under a heavy close fire of artillery and infantry” when his horse (not Becky) suddenly “pitched headlong into the ground.” The general pulled himself up, dusted off, and, no doubt cursing, detached his holsters from the saddle, and resumed his efforts on foot. Minutes later, Private Dimond surrendered his horse to the general and disappeared into the battle. He was never seen again. With a herculean effort, Humphreys succeeded in forming a new line, but, just as feared, there was “nobody to form the new line with but myself—as Birney’s troops cleared out.”

The situation was manifestly grim when Birney, acting through a staff officer, ordered Humphreys to retire all the way to Cemetery Ridge, still a considerable distance to the rear. A fresh Confederate division under Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson had joined McLaws in the fight, and, as three large Confederate brigades closed in on Humphreys from left, front, and right, he initiated a slow and deliberate withdrawal. To steady the ranks, he placed a provost guard of seventy men with fixed bayonets behind the retreating line. The ensuing movement occupied thirty minutes, during which, as Humphreys recalled, “Twenty times did I bring my men to halt and face about [to fire].” He maintained a “cool and calm demeanor” throughout, and, according to Cavada, placed himself “at the most exposed positions in the extreme front, giving personal attention to all the movements of the Division.” Few officers in either army could have managed it as well. The tattered remnants of his division arrived at Cemetery Ridge just as the battle crested. They formed around their tossing regimental flags, still defiant, and aligned to “the left of General Hancock’s troops, whose artillery opened upon the enemy, about 100 yards distant.” At dusk the Federal infantry surged forward and, as Humphreys recalled, “the enemy broke and was driven from the field, rapidly followed by Hancock’s troops and the remnants of my two brigades.” The ground they reclaimed was “liberally strewn with dead and wounded for a half mile.” His division had suffered 2,088 casualties out of less than 5,000 engaged, the third highest casualty total in the Federal Army. Humphreys was again uninjured—yet another case of “special providence”—but his personal staff had paid a bloody price for the engagement. All were dismounted or had their horses shot out from under them. Captain Chester was severely wounded; Private Dimond was missing; and his son Harry was shot through the arm. As a heavy darkness covered the battlefield, Humphreys formed his division “on the left of Hancock’s (Second) corps, along the Round Top ridge, where it remained during the night.” He sent out ambulance parties to bring in the wounded. It was ghastly work.

The men roused before daybreak and received fresh rations and ammunition in preparation of “another struggle this day.” The morning was “cold and damp,” and the smoke from their fires spread out along the ground. Cavada recalled that, at first light, “a shot from a battery opposite to us, barely grazed our heads as we stood on the crest of a hill.” A bombardment followed, and the “position soon became very hot.” The rank and file were ordered to “keep low.” Putting on brave faces, Humphreys and his staff ignored their own directive,
or tried to. The men laughed when one of the party made “a very sudden ‘bow’ & then positively denied that he had budged at all.” Humphreys had a close scrape of his own as “a shell burst so near the General’s head that he could have reached the missile with his hand as it passed.” Shortly after, the division fell back “about half a mile to give the men a chance to rest and gather the stragglers.” Humphreys took the opportunity to send Cavada to the hospital along Rock Creek, about a mile off, ostensibly to check on the wounded but also to seek out news on his missing brother. For the captain, it was a “dreadful sight . . . , even my familiarity with such scenes was not proof against the agonizing picture here presented.” He found Chester, pulled from the field the previous night. The two talked for some time, and the injured officer “appeared cheerful and full of hope though his wound (through his stomach) was one considered fatal.” After a spell Cavada turned away confident that his friend had “fought his last battle.” Chester died shortly after. Cavada resumed his search, visiting with several other officers, “some severely & many slightly wounded.” The news on his brother was contrary and confusing—“some thought he had escaped, others had seen him wounded and prisoner, others had seen him struck down by a cannon ball.” Amid so many “contradictory statements,” Cavada could only hope for the best. He concluded his “painful survey of the place” and returned to the division.148

Humphreys and his division moved twice that morning—initially in reserve “to the right of the First and the left of the Second Corps” and then further to the left, “massed in rear and support of the Fifth Corps . . . near where the Marsh Run road passes by the Round Top.”149 The division held that position, just below the ridge and blind to the action, at about 1300 when Confederate cannonading became, as Cavada remembered, “very rapid on our right.” Lee meant to soften up Federal defenses and silence its artillery in preparation for a final assault on the Union center. An hour into the barrage, as the day grew uncomfortably warm and clouds of smoke obscured the field, Longstreet sent forth his entire force of 12,500 men in what
became known as “Pickett’s Charge” (named after one of the three division commanders, Maj. Gen. George Pickett). Union artillery opened “with great fury” on the gray lines as they advanced from Seminary Ridge across three-quarters of a mile of open ground. Cavada “had never heard such artillery firing—it was as rapid as ordinary musketry—the hills fairly groaned, the ground trembled, and the air seemed filled with shrieking shells and whining shot.” 150 It was likely the largest (and loudest) bombardment of the war, and the doomed charge bent under it.

As the remnants of Pickett’s Charge dashed itself to pieces against the Union lines, broke and receded, a supporting attack, too late to do any good, approached the Union left. An aide rode up hastily with an order for Humphreys “to move ‘double quick’ to the right and form in charging columns behind our batteries.” His men were promptly on their feet and pressing out of the woods at a full run along the ridge. Their flags drew enemy fire and, as Cavada recalled, “for some time a shower of shot, shell and canister followed us cutting down many of our men in their tracks.” 151 As they reached their destination—once again “to the left of the Second Corps”—Humphreys ordered two of the regiments forward to the rifle pits. They were “spoil­ing for a fight” and, “supposing that they were ordered to charge the whole mass,” would have carried over the ridge into the enemy “but for the united efforts of all the officers to restrain them.” 152 As the men settled into their forward positions, a “swarm of graybacks” poured down the opposite hillside, “bayonets gliss­tening like moonlight on the rippled surface of a vast lake.” Division batteries, “silent until now, opened a perfect hurricane of shot upon the advancing columns of Rebels.” A thick smoke covered the field and, for a moment, “nothing could be distinguished.” As it cleared, Cavada saw “the traces of humanity . . . shattered into fragments and disorder.” The Federals let out a tremendous cheer as the rebel columns “broke and fled.” A Vermont brigade of Green Mountain boys abandoned their rifle pits in pursuit and sent a scattered volley into the retiring mass. Dozens of Confederates surrendered, “waving their hats and throwing down their muskets in token of submission.” The assault was over, but enemy artillery continued to fire into the lines. One shot closed on Humphreys and his staff, all once again mounted, “tear­ing an infantryman’s leg into shreds, scattering our horses on all sides, [and] wounding Capt. McClellan in the foot.” The infantryman had been “standing before the general’s horse at the time,” and the “torn flesh and blood” from his limb “bespattered” their clothes and “adhered to the sides.
of our horses.” At dusk, the division fell back to its position in the rear of the V Corps and, when all fighting was done for the day, “engaged in bringing in the wounded, burying the dead, and collecting arms.”

The Army of Northern Virginia had been defeated at Gettysburg but was still a dangerous fighting force. That night Lee fell back to strong lines on Seminary Ridge and entrenched hoping for a Union attack to retrieve his fortunes. Meade sensed the risk and passed the early hours of Independence Day in a defensive posture—feeding and re-equipping his army and addressing the immediate needs of its more than twenty-three thousand battlefield casualties. Humphreys used the lull in activity to pen a letter to his wife and report on the battle: “I am untouched and Harry has only a flesh wound in the arm—a ball having gone through it. . . . Yet the fire that I went through was better in artillery and as destructive as at Fredericksburg—for a time positively terrific.” Humphreys “had lost very heavily” and especially blamed Sickles and “this ruinous belief (it doesn’t deserve a name of system) of putting troops in position and then draining off its reserves and second line to help others, who if similarly disposed would need no such help.”

Humphreys, it was clear, felt ill used by III Corps leadership, and he carried deep resentments into the coming weeks and months. After dark on 4 July, Lee began his withdrawal from Pennsylvania. A “severe storm” lent cover to his activities. Two days later Meade ordered a pursuit, and Humphreys and his division joined the march south in the early hours of 7 July.

Later that day, as Humphreys recalled, “Meade overtook my division and asked me to ride with him a short distance, when again he urged me to take the position of chief of staff. Humphreys still had no intention of doing so” but afterward sent word by a staff officer that he would accept “if I could get no better command than I had.” None were apparently forthcoming, and that sealed it. Meade acted at once. At 2400 on 8 July, just as Humphreys was lying down after an “excessive fatiguing day,” he received a message asking him to come to Meade’s headquarters at once, “that I was a Major General, and Chief of Staff.” It was 0200 before he reached the camp. He had “no sleep that night; and,” writing on 16 July, “an excessively fatiguing time since, working incessantly.” In many ways, Humphreys was perfectly suited to the new job—he was exceptionally hardworking, had a keen eye for detail, and had accumulated in the years before the war more high-level administrative experience than anyone in the Army—but he was nevertheless unenthusiastic about the position. Within weeks, he grumbled to a friend
that “it suits me in nothing, my habits, my wishes, my tastes. It is even more distasteful to me than I can well express and I feel therefore depressed at no longer commanding.... I hate to be second to anyone.” Humphreys never entirely warmed to the position but held it for a full sixteen months, playing a prominent role in the tragic encounters at the Wilderness and Cold Harbor as well as the early siege of Petersburg. When he stepped down to assume command of the celebrated II Corps in November 1864, he was widely regarded as the best chief of staff the Army of the Potomac ever had. Humphreys later earned accolades at Sailor’s Creek and contributed in no small part to Lee’s final surrender at Appomattox Courthouse. At war’s end, Charles Dana, assistant secretary of war, called Humphreys “the great soldier of the Army of the Potomac.”

The generalship Humphreys displayed at both Fredericksburg and Gettysburg evinced a military talent that placed him in the front rank of division commanders in the Federal Army. Yet, the myriad idiosyncrasies that made him a great battlefield commander occasionally stymied his efforts to win the authority and respect of his men off the field. His failures in this regard were most evident in his bitter relations with the volunteer officers of the 129th Pennsylvania Regiment, including especially Frick (later a Medal of Honor recipient) and Armstrong—both of whom fell victim to what one of their contemporaries called Humphreys’ “great idea of military duty.” Humphreys valued order, obedience, and, above all, military discipline. Months earlier in a letter to an academic friend, he drew this out with an abundance of candor—“But discipline I hold for higher value than anything else and will maintain it if I have to crush out the whole of my command to preserve it.” In this dogged pursuit, he sacrificed the esteem of his men; scuttled a promotion to major general in the aftermath of Fredericksburg; and delayed opportunities for a corps command he so desperately coveted, though he did learn some valuable lessons in his command of Pennsylvania volunteers. These he applied with remarkable success to increasingly responsible commands through the remainder of the war.

In 1866 General Ulysses S. Grant selected Humphreys as the new chief of the Corps of Engineers, a position he held for thirteen years. During his long tenure he managed a dramatic postwar expansion of internal improvements and oversaw important surveys and explorations of the American West as well as a complete overhaul of the nation’s coastal fortifications. He also established the Army’s first engineering school at Willets Point, New York, and served on a number of important boards and commissions, including the Washington Monument Commission, the Lighthouse Board, and the commission to examine canal routes across the isthmus connecting North and South America. He retired at the age of sixty-eight and is the second longest serving chief of engineers, behind only Brig. Gen. Joseph G. Totten. Humphreys’ last years were devoted to penning two important and highly reputable histories of the Virginia campaigns. He died in Washington, D.C., on 27 December 1883.

Notes

1. Ltr, Andrew A. Humphreys (AAH) to Rebecca Humphreys (wife), 18 Dec 1862, Andrew A. Humphreys Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as AAHP, HSP), 33/26; Matthew T. Peary, “‘No Heroism Can Avail’: Andrew A. Humphreys and His Pennsylvania Division at Antietam and Fredericksburg,” Army History 76 (Summer 2010): 6–26.

2. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 17 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/32.

3. Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s official report, see The War of Rebellion: A Compilation of Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (hereafter cited as OR), vol. 33 (Washington, D.C.: 1890–1901), p. 95; also see, Ltr, Burnside to Humphreys, 21 Jan 1863, AAHP, HSP, 14/60; for comments by Regis de Trobiand, see John Watts DePeyster, “Andrew Atkinson Humphreys,” Magazine of American History 16 (October 1886): 352. For similar comments, see, Francis W. Palfrey, The Antietam and Fredericksburg (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1882), p. 170, “Some of the very best fighting that was done at Fredericksburg was done by the Third Division of the V Corps. The division was commanded by General Humphreys, who was probably the best officer in the Army of the Potomac that day.”


6. Consolidated abstract of officers and men absent on leave, furlough, or on account of sickness, from 3d Division, V Corps, 14 Feb 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/57.


10. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 17 Jan 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/27; Brooks D. Simpson, “General Mc-


12. Two days earlier, on 26 January, Lincoln had replaced Burnside with Hooker.


16. Ltr, AAH to Professor Hansen, 22 Feb 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/22. Chief among these was U.S. Representative (Pa.) Edward McPherson of Pittsburgh who sent a sharp letter to the War Department. In his first term, Governor Curtin suffered a severe breakdown from the stresses of war. Secretary of State Eli Slicher handled governmental affairs during the increasingly frequent periods when Curtin was incapacitated.

17. Ibid. Frick returned almost immediately to the Army and many years later received a Medal of Honor for valor at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ltr, AAH to Hansen, 22 Feb 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/22. Humphreys wrote that both Cowan and Foot “offered to go to the War Dept. and the White House to urge upon the President the promotion I won at Fredericksburg.”

23. Ltr, Burnside to AAH, 17 Mar 1863, AAHP, HSP, 14/68.

24. Humphreys later raises the issue with Hooker. Ltr, AAH to Hooker, 7 Mar 1863, AAHP, HSP, 36/61.


29. Ibid., pp. 317–32. Three died, four retired, and eight resigned from the U.S. Army (of whom, seven went over to the Confederacy).

30. “Not one officer of the old Topogs (Abbot excluded) has spoken in commendation of the present legislation. . . . Neither Parke, Michler, Simpson, nor Macon are satisfied.” Ltr, Maj Israel G. Woodruff to AAH, 20 Mar 1863, AAHP, HSP, 13/87.

31. Several years later in 1866, Humphreys became the first “Chief of Engineers” of the combined corps.


34. Ltr, AAH to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, 3 Apr 1863, AAHP, HSP, 14/41; Ltr, Col Peter H. Allabach to AAH, 4 Apr 1863, AAHP, HSP, 14/45; Ltr, AAH to Maj Gen George B. McClellan, 13 Apr 1863, AAHP, HSP, 14/114.


37. Ltr, AAH to Hansen, 22 Feb 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/22.


40. His older brother, Frederico, had recently assumed command of the 114th Pennsylvania Zouaves, also in the III Corps. The Historical Society of Pennsylvania has a print copy of the Captain Adolph F. Cavada Diary, 1861–63, Collection AM .6956 (hereafter referred to as Cavada Diary).


42. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 10 Apr 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/30.


45. Steven E. Woodworth, *The Loyal, True, and Brave: America’s Civil War Soldiers* (Wilmingtom, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), p. 70; Major General John Sedgwick of the VI Corps best summarized the feeling among Union commanders, “No troops with but a few days to leave are going to risk much in a fight.”


47. OR, ser. 1, vol. 25, pt. 1, pp. 545–46; Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 8 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/31.

48. Cavada Diary, 29 Apr 1863.

49. Cavada Diary, 30 Apr 1863.


53. Ibid., p. 239.


56. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 8 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/31; “Determining that the Union left and center were well protected and invulnerable, Lee acted on intelligence . . . that the Union Right was ‘in the air’ and vulnerable to a flanking movement.” Robert C. Plumb, Your Brother in Arms: A Union Soldier’s Odyssey (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011), p. 82.


61. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 8 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/31.

62. Ibid.

63. Powell, The Fifth Corps, p. 478; The detached regiments were the 155th and the 131st.

64. Under the Maltese Cross, p. 37.

65. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 8 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/31.


68. Sears, Chancellorsville, p. 423.


70. Ibid.; Cavada Diary, 6 May 1863; Powell, The Fifth Corps, p. 472.

71. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 8 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/31.


73. Ibid. Armstrong speculated that “such regret was not in the least reciprocated by his command.”

74. Under the Maltese Cross, p. 145.

75. Ltr, Col Frederick T. Locke to AAH, 20 Apr 1863, AAHP, HSP, 15/61.

76. See undated “Charges and Specifications preferred against Carswell McClellan,” AAHP, HSP, 12/32.

77. Ltr, AAH to Meade, 12 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/31.

78. Ibid. The former congressman was Dr. John Winfield Wallace.

79. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 17 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/32.

80. Ibid.

81. Sears, Chancellorsville, p. 441.


83. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 25 May 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/34.

84. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 3 Jun 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/35; Cavada Diary, 1–3 Jun 1863.

85. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 3 Jun 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/35.


87. OR, ser. 1, vol. 27, pt. 1, pp. 529–30; Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; Cavada Diary, 11 Jun 1863; Young, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 111; Keneally, American Scoundrel, pp. 273–74.


89. OR, ser. 1, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 530; Young, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 113; Capt. Henry N. Blake of the 11th Massachusetts in Humphreys’ division wrote that “Caligula and other monsters of antiquity never displayed a more diabolical spirit than certain generals in the corps . . . there is not more than one in ten officers of high rank that understands the proper mode of moving a division.”

90. Young, Battle of Gettysburg, p. 113.

91. Cavada Diary, 25 Jun 1863.

92. Blake, Three Years, p. 198.

93. Cavada Diary, 29 Jun 1863; see similar remarks by Blake, Three Years, p. 199.


95. Cavada Diary, 28–29 Jun 1863; “When this cruel war is over” was also known as “Weeping Sad and Lonely.” Written by Charles Carroll Sawyer, it was among the most popular sentimental songs of the war.

96. Cavada Diary, 30 Jun 1863.

97. Cavada Diary, 1 Jul 1863.


99. Cavada Diary, 1 Jul 1863.

100. Ibid.

101. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19.


103. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; Ltr, AAH to DePeyster, 11 Jul 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/59; Cavada Diary, 1 Jul 1863; OR, ser. 1, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 531; Henry Humphreys, A Biography, pp. 189–92.

104. Cavada Diary, 1 Jul 1863; Also called Sauck’s or Sauk’s Covered Bridge.


106. Humphreys blamed Sickles for the whole affair: “You see how things were managed in the Third Corps!” Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; James A. Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010), pp. 98–99; “The Third Corps . . . was late in starting, late in moving, lost its way and got far out into the hostile lines, and got back only by Humphrey’s [sic] skill and readiness, and long before they were on the field, Reynolds’ dead body was on its way to a place of safety.” Maj Joseph G. Rosengarten, “General Reynold’s Last Battle,” in The Annals of War: Written by Leading Participants North and South (Philadelphia, Pa.: Times Publishing Company, 1879), p. 64; for additional criticism of the movement of the III Corps, see Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, pp. 335–36.

107. Cavada Diary, 1 Jul 1863.

108. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863.


110. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863.


112. Pfanz, Gettysburg, p. 91; Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg, p. 130.

113. Hessler, Sickles at Gettysburg, p. 133.

114. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863.


116. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863; Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 4 Jul 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/36.


118. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863.

119. Pfanz, Gettysburg, p. 144.

120. Bruce Catton, The Army of the Potomac: Glory Road (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday), p. 289.
121. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; Pfanz, *Gettysburg*, p. 145.


124. Ltr, AAH to DePeyster, 11 Jul 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/59.

125. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19.


127. Ltr, Capt Carswell McClellan to AAH, 21 Sep 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/81–82.

128. OR, ser. 1, vol. 25, pt. 1, p. 531; Ltr, Carswell McClellan to AAH, 21 Sep 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/81–82.

129. Cavada Diary, 2 Jul 1863.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.; Ltr, Carswell McClellan to AAH, 21 Sep 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/81–82.


133. Ltr, Carswell McClellan to AAH, 21 Sep 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/81–82.

134. Cavada Diary, 3 Jul 1863.

135. Ltr, Carswell McClellan to AAH, 21 Sep 1869, AAHP, HSP, 22/81–82.


137. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19.


139. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 4 Jul 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/36. In the letter to his wife, Humphreys indicates that “I lost another horse, but not my grey,” which he had named “Rebecca” after his wife.

140. Ltr, AAH to Campbell, 6 Aug 1863, AAHP, HSP, 17/19; in a letter to his wife, Humphreys explained that “The troops on my left retired, leaving me to catch it.” Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 4 Jul 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/36.


143. Coddington, *The Gettysburg Campaign*, p. 413. One of Wilcox’s veterans remembered, “They did not run, but retreated slowly and in good order, and returning our fire, but leaving the ground literally covered with their dead.”


145. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 4 Jul 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/36.


148. Cavada Diary, 3 Jul 1863.


150. Cavada Diary, 3 Jul 1863.

151. Ibid.


153. Cavada Diary, 3 Jul 1863.


156. Ltr, AAH to Rebecca, 4 Jul 1863, AAHP, HSP, 33/36.


158. Henry Humphreys, *A Biography*, pp. 200–201; DePeyster, a close friend to Humphreys after the war, sheds additional light on Humphreys’ decision to accept the chief of staff position. DePeyster asserts that “nothing would induce him [Humphreys] to remain in a position subordinate to any who were likely to succeed him [Sickles], Birney particularly.” Also, “Meade gave Humphreys to understand that even if the corps were to continue as they were, small and compact…, he, Humphreys, would not get one of them under any circumstances.” DePeyster, *Andrew Atkinson Humphreys of Pennsylvania* (Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Intelligencer Print, 1886), p. 15.


161. Lyman, *Grant & Meade*, p. 73.

162. Ltr, AAH to Professor Hansen, 22 Feb 1863, AAHP, HSP, 12/22.

Edward Reep, one of the Army’s last surviving World War II combat artists, passed away on 27 February 2013, at the age of ninety-four. A prolific war artist, Reep is known for seeking out the action and often painted at the front. Recalling his experience, Reep wrote,

Many times I painted and sketched while a battle raged. I was shelled, mortared, and strafed—the last a terrifying experience. At Monte Cassino the earth trembled (and so did my hand) as I attempted to paint the historic bombing of the magnificent abbey. At Anzio I innocently waited for the monstrous German cannon Anzio Annie to lob its shells into the harbor so that I could study and record the gigantic geysers of water shooting skyward. (At this point it didn’t occur to me that one of them might do me in). I joined reconnaissance patrols to seek out the enemy. More willing than knowledgeable, I almost destroyed myself on two occasions through my own stupidity.

Shortly after graduating from art school, and five months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Reep enlisted in the Army. He was first assigned to Fort Ord, California, where he and his art school classmate Gordon Mellor were tasked to paint a mural depicting early Spanish exploration of South America and the United States. Before the mural was complete, Reep was accepted into Engineer Officer Candidate School, leaving Mellor to complete the mural on his own. In spring of 1943, Reep received a telegram informing him that the War Art Advisory Committee was considering him for an overseas artist assignment, which he eagerly accepted. He traveled first to North Africa, where he soon learned that the funding for the art program had been cut. The disappointed artist was reassigned to the Psychological Warfare Branch in Algiers, where he designed propaganda leaflets to be dropped over enemy countries.

In December 1943, Reep was ordered to report to General Eisenhower’s headquarters, where he was informed that the art program was being re-established without the civilian artists and that the five soldier
artists currently in the program would be accompanying five Army divisions into Italy. As the only officer of the five, Reep was put in charge of the group and assigned each artist to a division. Reep was eager to get to the front and did so at the first opportunity, following in the footsteps of experienced soldier-artist Rudolph von Ripper, who had a reputation for seeking out dangerous missions and spent most of his time at the front, only rarely reporting back to the artists’ studio.

As the earth shook during the bombing of the historic Monte Cassino Abbey, Reep was recording the event in a frenzied and spontaneous watercolor painting. It was at the Anzio beachhead, however, where he first experienced what he later described as “my indoctrination into sustained peril.” In his 1987 book *A Combat Artist in World War II*, Reep wrote, “I surely didn’t have to travel very far for my subject matter. I was living in it—or part of it—and there wasn’t any place to go anyway. We were packed into the beachhead like sardines, and the front lines were within walking distance . . . but to my knowledge I drew enemy fire only once.” Completed at Anzio, his watercolor of a soldier bathing is one of his most well-known works. Reep noted that it was a surreal experience to see a smiling soldier sitting in a bathtub in the Anzio beachhead and described the bather’s resourceful idea to heat the bathtub as “nutty.”

In his book and later in an interview for the documentary *They Drew Fire: Combat Artists of World War II*, Reep tells the story of saving a wounded man at Anzio. While waiting to depart with a reconnaissance company one day, sudden artillery fire exploded throughout the beachhead. Reep saw a man wounded in the leg and ran to assist him, ignoring his captain’s screamed order to take cover. An aid man arrived just after Reep, and together they delivered the wounded man to safety. During a dramatic moment when the wounded man closed his eyes and his skin turned cold, Reep yelled to the driver that he was dead. The wounded man opened his eyes and replied, “Like hell I am.” In 2011, at the age of ninety-three, Reep was contacted by the son of the man that he saved, who had seen the documentary and tracked him down to thank him.

Reep and his fellow artists traveled with the Army to Rome, where he was impressed with the city’s artistic treasures, and later ventured north to the banks of the Arno River. Along the German defensive works known as the Gothic Line, Reep worked in pen and ink. It was so cold that winter that watercolor would have frozen as it was applied to paper, ruining the painting. He preferred to work in watercolors, a medium that allowed for the spontaneity that he valued in his work. Reep received two battlefield promotions during the war and a Bronze Star Medal for efforts beyond his assigned duties. He left Italy in September 1945 and was briefly assigned to the Pentagon prior to
his discharge. In 1946, Reep was awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship and revisited the subject of war, producing paintings that he considered protests against war in general.

In 1970, while employed as artist and instructor at East Carolina University, Reep briefly returned to his position as a war artist as a participant in the Army’s Volunteer Civilian Artist Program. He was offered a choice of a temporary assignment covering American soldiers fighting in Vietnam or the tenth anniversary of the Berlin Wall. Reep chose the Berlin Wall assignment, citing that he had seen enough combat during World War II. Older and more confident in his artistic skills and personal beliefs, Reep painted what he considered to be the most significant antirwar statements of his career, including a vibrant and powerful oil painting that he titled *Idiot’s Garden—The Berlin Wall*. Comprised of sharp edges, harsh angles, primary colors, and devoid of life, this painting represents the more critical view of a mature artist—a vast departure from the more organic style and strictly documentary perspective of Reep’s earlier work.

His World War II art and Berlin Wall paintings are part of the U.S. Army Art Collection, which is preserved at the Army’s Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Sarah Forgey is the curator of the U.S. Army Art Collection.

**NOTES**

1. This 28-cm. railway gun, nicknamed “Anzio Annie,” is on display at Fort Lee, Virginia, and is a part of the Army’s Historical Collection, as is Reep’s finished painting of the shelling of Anzio harbor.
3. Ibid, p. 77.
Continued from page 3

Virginia Campaigns, March–August 1862
Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862–1863
Civil War in the West, 1862
Civil War in the West, 1863
Overland Campaign, May–June 1864
Atlanta and Savannah Campaigns, 1864
Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864
Campaigns in Mississippi and Tennessee, 1864
Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns, 1864–1865
The Civil War Ends, February–May 1865

Campaigns of World War I
Mexican Border Campaign, 1916
Joining a Global War, 1917
From Defense to Offense, May–June 1918
The Marne, July–August 1918
Supporting Allied Offensives, August–November 1918
St. Mihiel, September 1918
Meuse-Argonne, September–November 1918
Occupation and Demobilization, 1918–1920

Campaigns of the Vietnam War
Buying Time, March 1965–September 1966
Taking the Offensive, October 1966–September 1967
Turning Point, October 1967–October 1968
Redefining the War, November 1968–March 1970
Cross-Border Attacks, April 1970–February 1971
Last Battles, March 1971–April 1975


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Our team of historians provides a dynamic public outreach opportunity and contributes to the Army’s strategic communications effort. It makes available its military history expertise and advises local planners on obtaining Army participation at commemorative events. Team members assist military organizations in planning and conducting staff ride activities on historic battlefields and act as a liaison with government organizations, such as the National Park Service and local stakeholders. A recent example saw our historians contributing to the development of an interpretive map of the August 1814 Battle of Bladensburg, produced by the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, for the historic site’s new visitors’ center.

The Commemorative Team historians are frequently invited to offer programs and present papers to a variety of audiences, from academic symposia to the meetings of history interest groups, as well as educational and community organizations. In each of these venues our historians have provided considerable contributions to the scholarship and understanding of the commemorated events.

Efforts to commemorate these events do not end there! Working in conjunction with the American Battle Monuments Commission, the Center will make the Summary of Operations in the World War divisional series available electronically, including all operational maps. This landmark series was last printed during World War II. Center museum professionals are working with the American Battle Monuments Commission on design updates to the exhibits at several of the World War I cemeteries in France, including the cemetery at the Meuse-Argonne. These enhancements will set the context for visitors before viewing the powerful image of row upon row of crosses.

Finally, the Center remains fully engaged with each of the national commissions charged with oversight of these important commemorations. In particular, we have worked extensively with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Commemoration Office, sharing our products both from the history and museum efforts.

Even in these times of budget challenges, be assured that the members of the Center of Military History Commemorative Team are dedicated to making the American public aware of the Army’s contributions to our nation’s history and telling the story of our Army and its heroic soldiers.

Keep Army History Alive!
In 1962, historian Russell F. Weigley wrote of the challenges faced by American military and political leaders in reconciling the United States Army’s existence and mission with the country’s evolving political order, priorities, and an electorate that was suspicious and often overtly hostile to the Regular Army. In Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall, Weigley was one of the first historians to give serious, scholarly consideration to U.S. senior military and political officials’ attempts at shaping an acceptable and effective standing force, one whose being was not a threat to republican government and democratic society, but instead one whose mission and raison d’être were attuned to the changing nature of American politics, policy, and priorities. If not as well known as Weigley’s American Way of War, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, or The Age of Battles, Towards an American Army is worth recalling on the fiftieth anniversary of its publication and on the bicentennial of the War of 1812.1

Weigley wrote of the political and ideological tension wrought by maintaining a standing army in the United States as the political nation adhered to the ideal of the citizen-soldier. If Weigley was not the first to consider the friction, he was one of the first to examine in a scholarly manner the Army as an institution and how its leaders wrestled with the Army’s place in a democratic and republican nation. He asked how the Army’s political and military leadership shaped the organization’s structure in order to confront the Army’s evolving mission, although not always successfully, as its commanders and political masters tried to reconcile its continuance with American political culture and to harmonize its strategic focus with the
changing nature and circumstances of the United States.\textsuperscript{2}

\textit{Towards an American Army} was published on the cusp of the emerging new-social history, which drove military historians to examine common soldiers’ experiences, but also to take into consideration military history as seen through the lenses of cultural and intellectual history. Since this work’s publication, historians have spilled buckets of ink addressing the country’s armed forces and their relationships with American society and politics. The period bracketed by the War of Independence and the Civil War (1775–1865) has been especially fruitful for students of the American military experience. Scholars have also surveyed what soldiers witnessed and thought about their relationship with the republic and have scrutinized soldiers’ motivations. Students of the Army in this transformative period, and of what historian Marcus Cunliffe termed the “martial spirit in America,” have analyzed the Army’s operational and institutional accounts and U.S. soldiers’ backgrounds, circumstances, experiences, and worlds.\textsuperscript{3} Notwithstanding the work of such eminent historians as Francis Paul Prucha, Richard H. Kohn, Lawrence Delbert Cress, J. C. A. Stagg, Donald R. Hickey, Edward M. Coffman, C. Edward Skeen, and Harry S. Laver, to name but a few, only Cunliffe has approached soldiers’ beliefs as part of a greater cultural or intellectual continuum, a subset of the broader American culture that stretched from the War of Independence through the American Civil War.\textsuperscript{4}

Hence it is altogether appropriate to reconsider the thrust of Weigley’s work, albeit in a different light and to shift the focus from reasons of state, policy, and institutional purpose to the perspectives of the officers and the rank and file, the regulars, volunteers, and militiamen of the republic, and to consider their place in the evolution of the U.S. Army during this transformative period. It is appropriate to ask the officer corps and soldiery how they reconciled their service with American political and cultural norms and what role that set of beliefs played. For U.S. soldiers in the War of 1812, military service was not only the means by which they shaped, defined, and understood their identity as American soldiers and citizens, but it also helped them understand the role of the Army in the political order. Their beliefs were a source of cultural and intellectual continuity and stability even as the Army’s mission and nature changed.

The Army of the War of 1812 straddled a dividing line between two different armies: one the inheritors of the Continental Army’s rigid eighteenth-century tactics and Anglophile mind-set; one officered and manned on an impermanent footing, its officer corps giving little indication of professionalism or of corporate identity. The army that emerged in the course of the war and developed more fully in the 1820s was distinctive for its stable footing, its adoption of flexible French Revolutionary tactical systems, and its officer corps’ professional identity, albeit one rooted in the larger American culture.\textsuperscript{5}

French-inspired drill, its significance notwithstanding, should not be confused with the emergence of military doctrine, a late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century phenomenon in the U.S. Army. Drill, unlike doctrine, emphasizes routine and a relatively narrow range of prescriptive actions, rather than broad conceptual frameworks that stress initiative, creativity, and the freedom to modify elements as necessary. While French drill allowed for greater discretion by the commander, it was, nonetheless, intended to present officers with a variety of predetermined tactical options, much like modern crew and battle drills, and should not be conflated with doctrine.

Therefore, as the prewar, Anglophile army faded and the new, French-influenced army emerged, officers’ and men’s beliefs served as vital links of intellectual and cultural continuity as the Army metamorphosed. An unstable, backward-looking, and defensive-minded force developed into an army preparing for war with a European foe, even as it shepherded western expansion and internal improvements as the army of “broadax and bayonet.”\textsuperscript{6}

Soldiers’ records ranging from personal letters to orderly books, journals, and diaries point to four broad, often overlapping threads of cultural consistency in these years of change: virtue; legitimacy; self-governance; and glory, honor, and fame. This complex of ideas informed and reinforced the connection between service and citizenship. The ideas expressed by soldiers often carried multiple meanings,
as if opposing points on a shared spectrum. The distinctions between each concept were sometimes blurred or overlapping; nonetheless they formed a coherent whole. The order, conceptualization, and categorization of these ideas, while not expressed as such by the soldiers, have been imposed in order to organize and clarify their thoughts and facilitate understanding. The records consulted were appeals and references to transcendent values commonly accepted by soldiers, but only rarely and explicitly developed by them. As historian Earl J. Hess has suggested, the belief system of Union soldiers during the Civil War was so pervasive and accepted that few soldiers needed to enunciate fully all of its principles; the same can be said for soldiers in the War of 1812. To a great degree the commonness of these ideas belied the need for soldiers to expand on them for their audiences.7

The records and categorizations were admittedly rationalizations and expressions of idealized standards of conduct. They were rationalizations because they helped order the intellectual lives of U.S. soldiers, not because they were excuses or alibis. The rationalizations were each soldier’s effort at making sense of his military service, its connection to American republicanism, and at helping others understand the nature of military service. They were idealizations because these attitudes represented widely held beliefs and were guides for conduct toward which soldiers aspired, though often fell short. Nonetheless, soldiers’ inability or failure to live up to these aspirations did not make them any less real or less important. Soldiers’ acknowledgment and striving toward these commonalities argues for the ideals’ real existence in soldiers’ minds. Therefore, taken together, these records document a pervasive multigenerational culture of soldiering, an ideology, or as historian Jack Lane asserted, the means by which soldiers responded and made sense of war and their participation in it.8

Virtue

Much as the broader American society had incorporated the concept of virtue into its vision of itself well before the outbreak of war, so too had the soldiers of the republic. According to Whiggish and republican philosophers, military service was the provenance of the virtuous militiaman. Arms, property, the franchise, social order, and political independence could not be separated without endangering the life of the republic. Armed citizens who fought for and served the interests of society would not, in all likelihood, subvert the social and political system of which they were a part. Recognizing that republics were fragile and could survive only if the people exercised constant vigilance and personal responsibility, American society broadly subscribed to the belief that the cheerful and willing shouldering of arms constituted part of a citizen’s responsibility to society and to himself. The unwillingness of
citizens to share in the burdens of self-defense and in the preservation of order was an indication of moral rot and social decay. Quite naturally, therefore, American soldiers placed great stock in the public and private demonstrations of virtue as proofs of their purity of heart and of their sincerity as republicans.

Well before British regulars and Massachusetts militiamen exchanged shots at Lexington and Concord in 1775, “Americans were convinced,” wrote Robert E. Shalhope, “that what made republics great (or what ultimately destroyed them) was not force of arms but the character and spirit of the people.” Therefore, the notion of res publica (public thing or spirit of the people) was not the “life of Republics.” Virtue was devalued in the character of the people; their public virtue announced itself through the citizenry’s personal and civic “frugality, temperance, and simplicity.” Citizens’ willing practice of these traits—“private virtue”—was the “life of Republics.” Virtue was demanding. It embodied a community-oriented and ascetic spirit that was crucial because if “the public welfare was the exclusive end of good government,” it “demanded a constant sacrifice of individual interests to the greater needs of the whole.” Thus, what better way for the citizen to embody virtue than his other guise as soldier?

Petitions for the formation of militia companies and in the covenants articulating their purpose vividly illustrated virtue’s communitarian spirit. In 1812, ninety-two “Friends of the Union,” residents of New Gloucester, Massachusetts, in the Maine district, declared that “Every Government hath a right, especially in times actual or impending Invasion, to command the PERSONAL SERVICES of ALL its Members.” According to these Mainers, the threat of invasion allowed the community’s interests and needs to supersede the enjoyment of individual rights. In such times, New Gloucester’s militiamen declared that “no member of the Body Politic can justly withdraw himself, or decline to render, with promptitude and zeal, his utmost services in behalf of the Government, to the support of which, as a good and faithful Citizen, he is SOLEMNLY PLEDGED.” New Gloucester’s Friends of the Union were “deeply impressed with the truth of these great fundamental Principles,” and pledged their “unity and vigor in sentiment and action” as the armed servants of their town and the republic. That same year Connecticut men in the “town of Fairfield and Village of Blackrock” announced principles familiar to the New Gloucester militia when they formed a “Company of Musquetry (Volunteers),” and deemed it “the duty of every person in society to put himself in a state of defence against the enemy during the war.”

Virtue celebrated and demanded self-abnegation and the willful and manly submission to duty. It was a harsh and unforgiving element of republican culture. In 1814, while campaigning against Creek Indians in Alabama, Brigade Major William McCauley of the North Carolina militia feared for the safety of soldiers’ wives and “Darling Infants unprotected in a savage world.” He noted that “high military sprints falls below par” within the brigade. Others, McCauley wrote, wished they were “going to school or teaching” instead of waging war. However, if the desire to return home was strong, the call to duty was all the more powerful. Failing to complete military service honorably brought personal and familial shame. A man who deserted his comrades and neighbors could not be trusted, for he had violated accepted social and military strictures. He was self-serving and was thus devoid of virtue. Capt. James Callaway, commanding a company of Missouri mounted rangers, was “almost ready to resign” his militia “commission, but a moments reflection with respect to the situation of my country together with this consideration that their is a number of men that has joined the service that would not if any other person commanded makes me quit such thoughts.” Putting aside his desire to return home, Callaway expressed hopes for a “Glorious” campaign in the summer of 1814 and the assurance that “the American Cause will ultimately prevail.”

Not all Americans supported the war, nor indeed did all soldiers. Dissatisfied men, particularly within the militia and volunteers, aired their views through letters home, to newspapers (often anonymously or pseudonymously), or to sympathetic peers, mentors, and politicians. These soldiers did not see any inherent contradiction by their participation in the fractious arena of politics even while acting as the conscientious servants of the government or their communities. Members of a democratic republic could not keep silent on matters of personal and national importance, nor could they be kept isolated from the larger currents of political activity. In the autumn of 1814, war weariness led to open talk of secession in New England. A long general disaffection in Federalist New England with the Republican national government grew and eventually culminated in the Hartford Convention that winter. Succeeding as only a damp squib could, the convention was the last hurrah of the Federalist Party, which thereafter dwindled into insignificance. Nonetheless, in the midst of New England’s political tumult, Col. William Edwards, an artilleryist in the Massachusetts militia, reminded his men that “whatever may have been the original cause of the War in which the Gen[era]l Gov[ernme]nt tho[ugh]t it proper to engage,” it was “enough for us to know that our State is invaded by an enemy who can make no distinction between those who were the authors of the War and those inhabitants who have uniformly opposed it.” No matter the region’s opposition to the war, Colonel Edwards made plain that virtuous duty was the higher calling.

Virtue, like beauty, is very much in the eye of the beholder. Following the end of the war, Maj. Gen. Jacob Jennings Brown counseled cadets at the United States Military Academy to remember that “every good citizen will consider himself called upon to defend his Government and to vindicate the rights and the honour of his country, from whatsoever quarter assailed.” Perhaps Brown recalled the shameful, legalistic, yet thoroughly American conduct when militiamen and volunteers from several states refused to march into Canada. Ohio led the way
rearward when one hundred militia-men refused to march into Canada in July 1812. In October of that year, New York militiamen, once “ardent warriors, who had insisted upon being led into action . . . now discovered Constitutional scruples about leaving the territory of the United States” and like their Buckeye brethren, refused to cross into British territory. One month later, New York’s brave volunteers excelled and gave an encore performance ably seconded by Vermonterns. Soldiers of the Excelsior State were nothing if not consistent. The third try being the charm, a full brigade’s worth of New Yorkers refused yet again in October 1813 to cross into Britain’s domain. “As children of the Republic,” Brown had intoned, “you will remember, this is your precious duty.” What other course would there be for a virtuous soldier?¹⁷

LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy, the second element in U.S. soldiers’ belief system, was both conservative and forward looking. The preservation and defense of the political and social order upheld the legitimate disposition of republican society, and in doing so soldiers were the agents of conservatism. Nearly every soldier considered himself a defender of the republic or of the Constitution, thereby elevating his purpose from simple defense into a principled act. Defending the republic meant preserving its past as that past existed within living institutions like government and culture. Importantly, it meant following the example set by the Revolutionary generation, which, as Charles Royster noted, had “explicitly deprived citizens and soldiers” of any “opportunity for moral abdication by asserting that the founding and survival of the nation were a public responsibility.”¹⁸ Citizens serving in uniform were, therefore, the conservators of liberty and the republic. In peace, they reinforced the republican order by quelling social disorder and through public displays of ceremony. In war, their victory in battle “accomplish[ed] society’s purposes by protecting republican self-government.” Soldiers of the post-Revolutionary generations took inspiration from their eighteenth-century forebears to serve when “liberty seemed threatened.”¹⁹

Legitimacy in its progressive guise looked forward to creating a new political reality. Soldiers had directly participated in the creation of the republic through revolution in the eighteenth century and were now proof of the republic as a legitimate member of the community of nations. The Army and the militia, in effect, served as badges of status and as a proof of the United States as a legitimate political entity. These forces demonstrated the nation’s ability to protect itself, a direct link to conservatism, and of the republic’s ability to enforce its will. Celebrated as a bulwark of legitimacy and liberty, the militia held a special place in popular culture and political mythology. Lauded and fondly remembered for its real and supposed contributions in the American War
of Independence, the militia served local interests but was, however, often poorly trained and led. Adherence to compulsory militia duty, a carryover from the colonial military tradition, had steadily declined in the closing years of the eighteenth century and had continued falling away throughout the nineteenth century. Unequal military burdens among the citizenry and receding threats from Indians and European powers contributed to the demise of the popularly constituted militia in many states. But even as the obligatory system “waned, volunteering waxed.” Exclusive volunteer companies arose in the early republic and continued through the middle of the nineteenth century and beyond. State governments enrolled enthusiastic volunteers as legally constituted elements of the militia. Older style units were largely replaced by volunteer militia companies, which helped fill necessary militia enrollments. Moreover, militias answered a public need for entertainment and spectacle. Displays of the “martial spirit, combined with a love of colorful uniforms, military ceremonial, and martial music” were a form of public theater as well as a reassuring demonstration of public order and devotion to republicanism.

Militia parades and musters played an important role in propagating and reinforcing the militarized elements of republican culture. The symbolism of the uniformed militia was mighty indeed. It represented the virtuous citizenry in all of its armed might and uniformed splendor. As a real and symbolic representation of law, order, and republicanism, a militia company, in the words of John F. Kutolowski and Kathleen S. Kutolowski, “did not have to fight to prove its legitimacy, indeed a show of force, a marshalling of citizens in arms, seemed at times effective in maintaining order in nineteenth-century America.” Armed and uniformed citizens embodied a vision as “both defenders and products of the republican way of life.”

Oratory figured as highly as theater in the Early Republic. Astute commanders understood the power of speechifying that drew upon the past, and they used it with great effect to motivate their soldiers in the performance of their duties. This was particularly so with militiamen and volunteers. Governor William Henry Harrison of the Indiana territory, one-time ensign of infantry and future major general, thought “occasional military orations” to western militiamen would “teach them the necessity of subordination and obedience . . . by placing before them the illustrious examples of military virtue with which the history of Greece and Rome abound.” If the ancient world was too distant for some, the Revolutionary generation and the Spirit of ’76 more than sufficed. They were, after all, the “descendants of those progenitors, who were the disciples of Washington . . . our departed sire to his country,” proclaimed the Constitution of the Soul of Soldier some years after the war.

During the war’s course, however, Col. James Mills steadied his Ohio militiamen in 1813 by reminding them that they were merely facing a “band composed of Mercenaries of reluctant Canadians goaded to the field by the Bayonet and wretched naked Savages.” Colonel Mills told his Buckeyes that they clearly possessed the same qualities as those of the previous generation. It was obvious to Colonel Mills that this “Army” under his command was “composed of the same Materials” and character “which fought under the Immortal [Anthony] Wayne.”

Lt. Christopher Van Deventer of the 2d Artillery, a close observer of military affairs, however, thought otherwise about this bulwark of the republic. Writing in 1810, Van Deventer saw danger in relying on the militia as a “system of defense.” If the citizenry seriously devoted its time to military affairs it would neglect “internal improvements,” destroy the “domestic oeconomy” and open the nation to “external attack.” He feared that “such reliances have always been . . . the forerunner of slavery.” Van Deventer instead argued for a strong Regular Army to free citizens for more industrious pursuits and to prevent the militarization of society. For a regular officer Van Deventer’s view was rare, although it resonated, if discordantly, with American fears of standing armies. In this case, however, it was fear of a militarized society that concerned the lieutenant.

That the regulars, militiamen, and volunteers represented the young republic, its repute, and their own self-worth was axiomatic. General orders issued on the eve of the bungled November 1813 invasion of Canada reminded men that the “pride and glory of this army [is] to conquer, not to destroy.” The Army’s “magnanimity, its forbearance, and its sacred regard of private property” would confirm the nation’s legitimacy to observers. Indeed, the people had entrusted [their] character [and] honor” to the Army’s keeping. Reality though, proved the undoing of such brave words. Ohio’s soldiery fell short of the mark. The militia’s failure was not out of the ordinary, nor, however, was the continued subscription to high-flown ideals no matter how glaring the citizen-soldiers’ poor performance. The decision to fight or flee, as Robert Middlekauff has argued, was a highly personal choice that brought no permanent shame, although soldiers were sensitive to criticism or slights, real and perceived.
to the appointment of foreign-born officers. Indeed, few events rankled American sensitivities in this era more than the appointment of Simon Bernard as assistant engineer of the Army with the rank of brigadier general. Lt. George Blaney of the Corps of Engineers found the appointment “beyond comprehension.” Blaney was “willing to believe” Congress had “intended to insult the Corps” because it had not opted for “one of our own countrymen.” America’s ability to train and commission officers through its own institutions symbolized more than independence; it remarked on the ability of the United States to raise and perpetuate native leaders and institutions and on the country’s claim to rank as a legitimate member of the world’s nations. Lieutenant Blaney was clearly piqued when he asked rhetorically, “Are we to be dependent on France or any other European Nation for officers? If so we had better have a Frenchman for the next President. Why not appoint an Assistant President with as much propriety? And why not give Marshall [Emanuel, Marquis de] Grouchy and the whole host of Frenchmen who are overrunning the country like the Locust appointments in our Army?” Maj. Gen. Andrew Jackson felt that introducing foreigners into U.S. military service ought to be forbidden by “sound policy . . . particularly in our Engineer Corps.” Jackson thought if “America cannot produce sufficient talents for its own defence, we had better resign all pretensions to self-government.”

Nativity thus constituted a basic element in the makeup of the U.S. citizen-soldier. How could any man who had not been born and raised in the United States develop true affection for the country, its people, or their institutions? How, had he not been born in the United States, could he be an American? Writing in 1813, Lieutenant Van Deventer could not “refrain from the expression of regret for the eagerness and avidity with which foreigners, vomited upon our Shores, have been welcomed by the impolitic lenity of our Laws.” Admitting “Vagrant foreigners as American Citizens” was “the beginning of the approaching catastrophe, by which proud Americans will be disgraced by the most ignominious of deaths in battle.” Van Deventer believed the “American, who from affection and duty to his country, willingly yields his life to its Services and glory, must face the deepest mortification and pain, mingled with abject ‘indignation, that it should be taken from him, to atone for the blood of profligate and unprincipled deserters, or abandoned traitors” in the service of the United States. A decade later, Capt. Edward Fenno of New Orleans’ Louisiana Guards, the “only good American corps in this famous city,” had a litany of foreign-inspired woe to relate to his family. A committee of the state legislature had summoned Fenno because he had refused to serve under the command of a French major. Although Fenno deemed the major a “very well meaning good heart felt man,” and believed him to be a “very excellent grocer,” the captain believed “nature never intended him for a soldier.”

Following the end of the war the United States experienced a nationalist upswing, opposition and rancor over the war notwithstanding. Coincident with the rise in American nationalism was soldiers’ pronounced and newfound devotion to the United States Constitution, less than a generation old. Even as U.S. soldiers cited the Lockean-inspired “enjoyment of life, liberty, and property” as motivating factors, to them they added the Constitution of the United States as the “birth right of every American Citizen,” in the words of Massachusetts’ Marblehead Light Infantry in 1814. Together, these made up an “invaluable inheritance which” they had “received unimpaired” from their “Patriotic Ancestors.” That same year, patriotic intensity inspired the ever-voluble Lieutenant Van Deventer to state that “I will never become a citizen of another Government[]” My heart, by education principle and reason is unalterably bound in affection to the United States of America.” Van Deventer’s ambition was to develop the professional military “knowledge which will make my efforts useful to the perpetuation of Republican Institutions.” The young artillerist hoped that Providence would aid him in his endeavors, so that he might focus his energies to the “defense of our glorious constitution.”

Self-Governance

While popular attachment to the Constitution was a new phenomenon, it was part of an older and much larger piece of American political culture and republican ideology, which emphasized the right and responsibility of the citizen to rule himself and his society.

The right to exercise nearly unlimited self-governance in virtually all aspects of life was a fundamental component of American political culture. The citizenry’s belief in this guaranteed that the nation’s soldiers would to different degrees exercise their self-governing rights. Soldiers expressed their self-governing tendencies through behavior such as in expressions of personal independence, through militia constitutions, negotiations over military discipline, and by other methods.

Whether implicitly understood or explicitly stated, American soldiers acted out of the conviction in their ability and right to govern and
direct their lives in some meaningful manner. So pervasive was this certainty that it could not help but influence the nature of military service and the imposition, acceptance, and exercise of military discipline. Understood in this fashion, American military discipline was not so much the unyielding application of incontrovertible regulations by superior officers as it was the result of the military hierarchy’s tacit recognition and acceptance of soldiers’ insistence on practicing some form of self-governance.

For a number of communities, volunteer companies, many of which were incorporated into the states’ militias, were the craze. Within many communities the “militia ethos was almost as viable in the nineteenth century as in the republic’s dawning days.” Acting as highly selective social clubs, volunteer companies screened candidates and voted whether to admit or to reject prospective members. Detailed constitutions specifying members’ duties, uniforms, and election procedures for officers and noncommissioned officers were the norm.

Because of their self-governing and voluntary nature, militiamen and volunteers believed themselves more patriotic and worthy of trust with the republic’s liberty than were the regulars. To many volunteers, a regular was a base hireling who was unable or unwilling to exercise any degree of self-governance. Slavish obedience to military hierarchy and officers with aristocratic pretensions threatened the existence of a republican United States. Surely, such men could not be entrusted with the future of the nation. Many of these citizen-soldiers believed that their performance of admittedly idealized military obligations was proof of their good citizenship. Suspicions about trust and worthiness, however, were not the province of the militia and volunteers alone. Regulars also had their concerns, but theirs were about the part-time soldiers.

Regulars viewed their counterparts in the militia and volunteer forces with concern and contempt. To some professionals, these men seemed too preoccupied with their individual rights to become good soldiers. Indeed, the unwillingness of militiamen and volunteers to accept fully the self-abnegation demanded by military discipline caused some regulars to doubt their patriotism. As the Army matured and developed, its communal culture subsumed many of its soldiers’ more pronounced individualistic tendencies. Self-sacrifice and the needs of the community became the touchstones of republican virtue and self-worth. Nonetheless, U.S. soldiers believed themselves to be citizens first and foremost. Their service helped define their relationship to the republic.

One of the most distinctive traits of U.S. soldiers was their highly developed degree of individualism. Individual autonomy, a basic form of self-governance, was readily apparent in the behavior of many soldiers. A number of them, particularly volunteers and militiamen, acted out their personal liberty by their irregular and unsteady performance on the battlefield and by their general indiscipline. Battle was dangerous. When electing to fight or to run, the soldier exercised personal liberty, the freedom to govern his life as he saw fit. This conduct was more in line with the individualistic warrior ethos than with that of a disciplined team of soldiers. The selection of whether to fight or flee was, in the words of Middlekauff,
one of the “classic problems free men face: choosing between rival claims of public responsibility and private wishes, or in eighteenth-century terms choosing between virtue—devotion to public trust—and personal liberty.” It would seem then that some militiamen and volunteers could decide to fight or flee without much mental reservation since both choices fell within the construct of self-governance. Middlekauff’s explanation provides insight into the less-than-heroic conduct of the Ohio, New York, and Vermont militias. The United States was indeed fortunate that its regulars were less scrupulous about exercising the fullness of their individualism and self-governance and that they instead accepted the Army’s discipline.

Individualism is the obverse of military discipline; it galled many men. It smacked of subservience, and, in the opinion of many, it threatened individual and national independence. Men who voluntarily abdicated individual independence were suspected by the public of harboring disloyal anti-republican sentiments. Writing in 1815, Ens. John Claude of the 13th Infantry, formerly a sergeant of the same regiment, disliked military life and daily hoped for an “honorable discharge and restoration to the beloved title of private Citizen.” Claude thought the “post of a Subaltern” was one of the “most unpleasant in the World” and compared it to being a “slave driver.” He believed that to a “mind truly Republican, a commission in the Army is repugnant.” Military hierarchy and discipline threatened individualism and the ability to think and act independently. Men’s sense of their personal rights and liberties was corrupted by “The habit of implicit obedience,” wrote Claude. Military discipline created a “soldier accustomed to blows,” who soon “forgets that he ever was a free-man—Out of such materials” men created “Monarchy or Despotism.”

According to Ensign Claude, the “higher grades smack of Aristocracy, and the lower ones, if they mean to command are despotic—The general and so in succession thro’ the field commissions, dismisses from the service for neglect of duty.” At company level the “Captains and so in succession down enforce authority with the men by stripes” laid against men’s backs. “I seriously believe,” wrote Claude, “that a war (with discipline in our ranks) of ten years would so completely change the character of Countrymen, [and] that a monarchy would be almost the unavoidable result.”

Assertions like these were easily made, particularly when a central requirement of professional soldiers was the nearly complete surrender of one’s individual rights. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and the daily routine of drill and other military functions seemingly reduced the regular’s life to a harsh, mind-numbing, or dehumanizing routine. This picture, however, was too neat. It ignored two of the central features of life in the U.S. Army in this period: its voluntary, short-term enlistments and the relative freedom of action afforded to soldiers when off duty. Military life demanded more subordination and self-discipline than present in civilian jobs but entailed the risk of one’s life, unlike most civilian callings. However, the routines and difficulties associated with agricultural, craft, factory, and maritime work were every bit as mind-numbing as drill and sometimes risked men’s lives and limbs. Every form of manual labor demanded some degree of self-abnegation by those who performed it. Soldiers surrendered many, but not all, of their individual rights, and they did so voluntarily and for only a short period of time. Naturally, however, only the Army demanded the possible loss of life or limb in the line of duty.

If following orders was a burden for some American soldiers, leading these supreme individualists was an equal challenge. Maj. Gen. James Wilkinson ordered his officers in 1813 to cease corresponding with the secretary of war, except in “cases of personal grievances, and then through the office of the Adjutant General.” Wilkinson had to remind the officers that their “discordant opinions” caused him innumerable problems because of their tendency to “distract the public mind, break public confidence, and degrade the military character.” The rights of a soldier, Wilkinson reminded them, are “few and those should be heedfully guarded.” Soldiers were citizens, but “we must be careful not to confound republican freedom with military subordination, things as irreconcilable as opposite elements—the one being founded on equality the other resting on obedience.”

Commanders often asked their men to exercise discretion so as not to bring discredit on themselves, the Army, or their state. Men of the Old Line State who had marched to help suppress the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, were ordered to “remember you are Marylanders, remember the honours gained by your fellow citizens . . . let no neglect of duty by us tarnish the military reputation of our state. We are now going into the deluded part of our country,” western Pennsylvania, and should “let our conduct be what I have observed on the march, that of good citizens.” Orders from senior
officers of the Massachusetts militia to the Bay State’s militiamen in 1814 called their attention to the disrepute which had been “brought upon the Militia in the minds of some of the most worthy citizens by the boisterous revelry and Excess which has heretofore too often disgraced the Muster Field.” Cautions over conduct were not confined to any region. They were truly national.

While campaigning against the Creek nation in 1813, General Jackson called on his soldiers as fellow citizens whose actions “must not disgrace the cause we are concerned in nor sully that reputation which we shall carry along with us.” Victory in the Battle of Tallassee, Alabama, on 3 November “furnished another proof to the world that there is no soldier so valiant as the volunteer who takes up arms to defend the government of his choice.” The regularity of the appeals of commanders to their soldiers’ ability to exercise self-discipline tacitly recognized their individualism and often worked successfully. Frequently, however, soldiers chose to go their own way, ignoring the strictures of military discipline and causing countless problems for commanders and civilians alike.

Militia constitutions of the Early National period continued to stress the ideological motives for service, although their drafters more clearly delineated the members’ expectations of one another and rules and motives governing their conduct. When the militiamen of New Gloucester, Massachusetts (District of Maine), formed an Association of the Friends of the Union, and declared that “Every Government hath a right, especially in times actual or impending Invasion, to command the PERSONAL SERVICES of ALL its Members,” they placed government in a central role and emphasized the positive power of the law. In contrast, covenants and constitutions had formerly been concerned solely with the individual citizen and his responsibility to limit government’s accretion and use of power. But this association seems to have reversed the equation when it declared: “No member of the Body Politic can justly withdraw himself, or decline to render, with promptitude and zeal, his utmost services in behalf of the Government.”

New Gloucester’s covenant recognized the responsibility of the self-governing citizenry to defend its individual and communal interests as a collective whole. Government was the organized representative power of the political community and was, therefore, the “institutionalized” sum and substance of personal “liberty.” By stressing the power of government to call on the services of the citizen-soldiers and the citizenry’s responsibility to heed that call, New Gloucester’s defenders acknowledged “institutionalized liberty” and their interest and responsibility in...
defending their rights and in exercising their responsible self-governance.\textsuperscript{46}

Soldiering relied in no small degree upon the willingness of the soldier to accept and shape its terms and conduct himself accordingly. Service was not a total surrender of the right of self-governance but was, instead, a voluntary, negotiated, and temporary abjuration of that right. By willingly placing himself under the demands, limitations, and expectations of military discipline, the American soldier signaled his responsibility as a citizen through his willingness to forgo the full exercise of his rights. For the American citizen as soldier, self-governance and military service were not mutually exclusive. They converged and reinforced one another, and in this way made plain the interdependence of republican citizenship and military service.

**Glory, Honor, and Fame**

All of the elements underpinning U.S. soldiers’ understanding of service and citizenship joined together in the adherence to and pursuit of glory, honor, and fame. Concern for these abstractions of proper behavior and for their very real rewards and recognition was not peculiarly American. Many, if not most, soldiers in the Western tradition held in high regard proper deportment, manhood, bravery, reputations, and the commensurate accolades derived from gallantry in battle. Exemplary service and performance, and, especially, bravery in combat were among the keys to success in a military life. But for U.S. soldiers, very few of whom were long-service professionals, glory, honor, and fame went beyond the boundaries of the military world. These highly militarized values spoke not merely to a valorous soldierly mien, but to the soldier’s core, to his character and standing as a man, as a soldier, and as an American citizen. Glory, honor, and fame functioned as the guides and goals of reputable conduct.

Glory, honor, and fame took on added importance because of the rather austere nature of American republicanism, the political nation having consciously rejected hereditary, monarchical, and aristocratic privileges, transmissible titles, and their affiliated distinctions and trappings. Most conspicuously, the regulars and militia had rejected formal military decorations, unlike the abundance available in the late-twentieth– and early-twenty-first–centuries U.S. Army. Embracing plainness and simplicity in address and uniforms spoke to the symbolic but very real need of Americans for national identity and distinctiveness.\textsuperscript{47}

The absence of an official system of publicly recognized distinctions did not, however, mean that U.S. soldiers did not desire earning popular or soldierly acclaim. Indeed, the dearth of titles and decorations made soldiers even more anxious to earn public approbation. Without titles of distinction, medals, or other tangible forms of recognition, glory, honor, and fame were the rarefied social coin of the republic. By earning honor, fame, or glory, men were raised in the public’s esteem and as a result acquired particularly distinctive badges of social status. Men who had earned this form of public recognition were evidence of the nation’s natural aristocracy coming to the fore and indicated a growing trend toward meritocracy. Soldiers accrued glory, honor, and fame through acts of bravery and virtue and were at the core of a soldier’s identity and reputation; they reflected on his manhood and virtue. In this way, glory, honor, and fame were at one and the same time the guides, results, and public images of virtuous republican military service.\textsuperscript{48}

Serving the public interest through military service held out the opportunity for individual distinction while acting for the good of society. In this way, selfishness united with the needs of the public good. The best way to ensure the immortality of name and repute was to pursue and accumulate honor, fame, and glory. The quest for a reputation based upon honor, fame, and glory was, according to Douglass Adair, a “spur and a goad” that impelled some men toward military service. By chasing after these distinctions, soldiers transformed their “egotism and self-aggrandizing im-
pulses into public service." Because of the mutually reinforcing nature of citizenship and soldiering in the American republic, glory, honor, and fame spoke not simply to the soldier, but to the citizenship of the soldier. Colonel Mills reminded his Ohio militiamen that in their 1813 campaign for the "preservation of the lives of helpless thousands," the "honor of the American Country in arms" was at stake. No motivation beyond an "opportunity to share the glory of defeating the enemy" was necessary to inspire the men from Ohio. On the western frontier the following year, Captain Callaway of Missouri’s St. Charles County Mounted Rangers did not think that a "man embarking in his Country’s Cause" was necessarily honorable. It was, instead, his duty when his country was "invaded by a cruel and savage foe" like Britain’s Indian allies. Surely, Callaway’s sentiments about invading savages were not ironic. If Callaway died while performing his duty his death would, nonetheless, be an "honourable" act, one he “trust[ed] no man may have it in his power to add a cowardly one.” Following the repulse of British forces at the Battle of Baltimore in 1814, Maj. George Armistead, commander of Fort McHenry, reflected upon the recognition he had received for his spirited and successful defense of the post. Armistead reported to his wife Louisa that along with a brevet promotion to lieutenant colonel, he had received a "very handsome compliment" from President James Madison. “So you see my Dear Wife,” Armistead wrote, “all is well, at least your husband has got a name and standing that nothing but divine providence could have given him.” President Madison’s congratulations and proffered promotion were public recognition for Armistead’s divinely ordained success against the heretofore victorious British. The overtly combative and competitive nature of honor suited many U.S. soldiers, but it also created problems. In an army with little social and economic distinction, officers were often less sure of their standing and as a consequence were inclined to read insult into minor or unintentional transgressions and quick to respond. Capt. George W. Melvin of the 1st Light Artillery reacted vigorously to an alleged slur against his personal honor in February 1814. Melvin informed his fellow regular, Maj. Asa B. Sizer of the 29th Infantry that he had heard that Sizer had "circulated a report injurious to my reputation (i.e.) that I carried women of loose character out of town to a dinner and returned with them to Albany, [New York] and while in their company was guilty of disorderly conduct." Melvin was clearly incensed, and he called on the major for an "immediate answer that I may govern myself accordingly." Sizer may well have been a gossip who delighted in impugning the character and honor of fellow officers because Lts. John McCarty of the 23d Infantry and David Foot of the 9th Infantry also wrote to Major Sizer that same February regarding reports which were “Degenerative to our character” and charged him to answer their inquiry. Officers were not alone in their concern over matters of personal honor. Writing to Lt. Christopher Quarles Tompkins, Cpl. S. Johnson of the 3d Artillery believed he had been imprisoned unjustly and requested a transfer to Tompkins’
command and a new court-martial to clear his name. Pleading that “I set no higher value on my life than a soldier should,” Johnson forthrightly stated “my honour is as dear to me an enlisted soldier as if I held a commission, and although my life in the strict sense of the word belongs to my country and at the disposal of any superiors, yet my honour remains my own.”

Despite the many entreaties to honor, there were always deviants and those supreme individualists who did not submit to military order on behalf of honor, or for any other reason. Whether through acts of omission, commission, or by happenstance, the U.S. Army had its fair share of such soldiers. According to Col. Andrew Hynes of the Tennessee Militia in 1814, it was in the “power of a few men, by their refractory conduct, to bring disgrace on the whole army.”

Sensitive to misconduct and to its ramifications, commanders went to great lengths to prevent and punish indiscipline. As he prepared to invade Canada in 1813, General Wilkinson stressed to his men that the Army’s “character, its honor, and that of the American people are entrusted, deeply entrusted” to the care of the soldiers, and that any deviation would stain America’s repute. Wilkinson added an additional caveat to ensure compliance by men who might not be inclined to uphold national honor. Severe punishment, including death, for “rape and plunder,” or for marauding was promised to all offenders. Wilkinson’s admonitions over honor are not without more than a little irony. Strange stuff indeed: an appeal to honor from a traitor to his country, Spanish Agent 13.

Even in the aftermath of a successful battle, soldiers’ behavior was capable of devolving. Charges and countercharges by Louisiana and Kentucky volunteers against one another quickly followed the 1815 Battle of New Orleans. Men from the contending states charged one another with the “unmanly defence of their line” against British assaults. General Jackson’s chief engineer, Maj. Howell O. Tatum, offered his own assessment of the row in his journal. Tatum was of the “opinion that neither of the contending parties acted with that manly bravery and fortitude their country expected of them, or that their own reputation required.”

Ultimately, war was a chance to win fame and immortality of name. After a period of recruiting duty, Capt. Benjamin Smead of the 11th Infantry was “glad for the opportunity to return” to his regiment and active duty. Smead’s regiment had fought successfully at the 1814 battles of Chippawa and Lundy’s Lane and was sharing vicariously in the glories of the victories. He hoped for the chance to “share exploits with” those “worthy” soldiers of his regiment so that he might earn the “never fading wreaths with which their brow are already entwined.” Not long after the war, Quartermaster General Thomas Sidney Jesup, an ambitious and capable regular officer, “abandoned forever the idea of a political life and of a residence in the West” in 1820 and “resolved to continue in the Army.” Jesup, a 32-year-old brigadier general and self-confessed “votary at the shrine of ambition,” was coldly honest about the passions that drove him. He could with “truth disclose” to his friend Col. Joseph Gardner Swift, formerly of the engineers, that he was not “animated” by the “petty aspirations of the office which govern grovelling souls,” or by a “thirst for power merely for its pomp, which is satisfied with a glittering exterior.” Jesup knew that he possessed that “pride of character which covets applause for the good produced which aspires only to the promoting of the welfare of society and of the country.”

In the end, these soldiers and others like them hoped to make names for themselves and to set a standard by which succeeding generations of U.S. soldiers would be judged and would judge themselves. They fully intended being the standard by which such conduct was measured. Pvt. William Atherton of Kentucky thought it “proper that the rising generation should know what their fathers suffered, and how they acted in the hour of danger; that they sustained the double character of ‘Americans and Kentuckians,’” an aspiration well-attuned to U.S. soldiers’ sensibilities.

**Conclusion**

Considered within the larger chronological sweep of the Early Republic (1789–1815), the three short years of the war marked a watershed in the course of U.S. history. Until the war, Americans had directed their attentions across the Atlantic toward the former mother country as either an object of economic, political, and cultural desire, or of animosity. France’s nearly uninterrupted wars with Great Britain from 1792 to 1815 merely exacerbated the dichotomy. True the United States had expanded westward, but it had given minimal attention to internal improvements and even less to manufacturing. Prewar blockades and embargoes had stimulated to some degree domestic manufactures, but still the country’s attentions were focused on British and Continental European markets and affairs. Peace with Great Britain, but also revolution and instability in Latin America from 1810 to 1821, altered and even expanded U.S. commercial and political attentions. However, not until the twentieth century’s great
cataclysms—the two world wars and then the Cold War threat of nuclear exchange—did the United States devote so much attention across the Atlantic. Therefore, with the conclusion of the War of 1812, a war within a war, Americans turned toward aggressively exploiting western resources, subjugating and expelling Indian nations on an unprecedented scale, and linking the country through improved transportation and communications networks. Through the nineteenth century the pattern continued; disunion and civil war merely slowed it. As the nation’s focus and drive shifted, so too did that of the militia and the Army.

Despite the militia’s often unsteady performance, the amateur military tradition remained strong. Training, officering, and organizing remained state and local functions. It was, as Weigley put it, a “policy without offering the means to realize it.” Significantly, the militia also underwent its own change. Compulsory drills fell by the wayside for any number of reasons. Many Americans opposed mandatory membership as an attack on individual freedom, and, not without some irony, saw the “militia as an aristocratic organization.” Mandatory musters and fines for noncompliance adversely affected the common man and his ability to organize freely and use his time according to his own dictates. By the 1820s and 1830s, the militia had assumed a two-class structure—the unorganized and organized. The states quietly let slip away or ignored altogether laws requiring musters and instead adopted the volunteer companies, privately organized and corporately run. Like the nation and militia, the Army too had undergone a marked, albeit limited transformation. It had entered the war as an amateurish, ad hoc organization commanded by a superannuated officer corps wedded to eighteenth-century norms and tactics. Institutionally, the Army had emerged as a far more capable force led by younger, more vigorous officers with a developing professional identity and devotion to studying military art and science; while at war the Army had adopted French tactical methods with varying degrees of success. At the level of policy, however, senior military and political leaders still struggled with shaping the Army’s role beyond continental defense. For the most part, their prescriptions had been ambiguous or equivocal. While the Army trained to fight a conventional, European-style foe, it more often than not performed constabulary duties, and what today might be termed nation building, than fighting conventional wars. Drawing upon elements in the larger culture, the continuity and stability of soldiers’ beliefs provided surer footing in an uncertain age.

Author’s Note

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Notes


2. Weigley, Towards an American Army, pp. vii, x.


11. Fairfield, Connecticut Volunteers, “Proposed Rules for a Company of Musquetry (Volunteers),” War of 1812 Collection, WLCL.


13. Ltr, James Callaway to Flanders and Jaminah Callaway, 9 Aug 1814, James Callaway Papers, Joseph Maher Collection, Library and Research Center, Missouri History Museum, St. Louis (MOHM).


16. Msg, Maj Gen Jacob Jennings Brown to the Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 4 Dec 1815, Jacob Jennings Brown Papers, WLCL.


24. Col James Mills, GO, 29 Apr 1813, sub: Regimental Book for the 1st Reg, 3d Detachment of the Ohio Militia, Containing Orders Received and Issued by Colonel James Mills of Butler County and the State of Ohio, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus (OHS).

25. Christopher Van Deventer, 27 Dec 1810, Christopher Van Deventer Papers, WLCL.


28. Ltr, George Blaney to David Bates Douglass, 21 Jun 1816, David Bates Douglass Papers, WLCL.

Independent Greens, Manuscripts Division, South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, Columbia; Baltimore Light Dragoons, Orderly Book, Special Collections, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore (MDHS); Franklin Artillery Company, Record Book, MDHS; Boston Sea Fencibles, Constitution and Exercise of the Boston Sea Fencibles, Instituted 11 September 1817 (Boston: Munroe & Francis, 1822); Soul of Soldiery, Constitution of the Soul of Soldiery; Natchez Fencibles, Constitution of the Natchez Fencibles: As Adopted on the 21st Day of April, 1824 and Revised on the 11th Day of January 1827 (n.p., n.d.); First Northumberland Troop, Minute Book, USAMHI; First Ward Guard, Minute Book, MDHS.


47. George Washington introduced the Purple Heart to recognize military valor during the War for Independence. It did not reappear until the twentieth century. The Medal of Honor was not awarded until after 1861.


52. Ltr, Callaway to Flanders and Jamiah Callaway, 9 Aug 1814, MOHM.

53. Ltr, George Armistead to Louisa Armistead, 10 Sep 1814, War of 1812 Collection, MDHS.

54. Ltr, George W. Melvin to Asa B. Sizer, 6 Feb 1814; Ltr, John McCarty and David Foot to Asa B. Sizer, 6 Feb 1814, Sizer Family Papers, Louisiana Research Collection, Special Collections, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans (HTML).

55. Ltr, S. Johnson to Christopher Quarles Tompkins, 11 Sep 1845, Tompkins Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.

56. Ltr, Andrew Hynes to Tennessee Volunteers, 14 Nov 1814, Andrew Hynes Papers, HTML.


58. Jnl, Maj Howard Tatum, 8 Jan 1815, War of 1812 Series, HTML.


60. Ltr, Thomas S. Jesup to Joseph Gardner Swift, 4 Sep 1820, Joseph Gardner Swift Papers, USMA.

61. William Atherton, Scenes of the Late War…: Narrative of the Suffering and Defeat of the North-Western Army, Under General Winchester (Frankfort, Ky.: A. G. Hodges, 1842), p. 3.


63. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 38.

64. Ibid., pp. 250, 254.
Review by Andrew T. Wackerfuss

German academics maintain a tradition called the Festschrift, a volume of essays presented to honor a respected scholar whose lifelong work has influenced the profession. American historians, whose academic culture is influenced by German models, participate in this tradition as well, though in recent years such volumes have become scarce due to increasing reluctance from financially strapped publishers. If any current scholar of military history deserves such a written tribute Dennis Showalter certainly stands high on the list. Michael Neiberg, editor of this volume, had little trouble soliciting contributors, which for most Festschriften come from the ranks of the honoree’s doctoral students. Here, the contributors come from a much wider sample of the profession, as is appropriate for Showalter, a scholar known for his generous intellectual support of others despite not having had any doctoral students of his own. Showalter has long been an intellectual anchor of military history conferences, at which he matches perceptive comments with a warm personal touch. This reviewer has fond memories of attending a conference dinner in Washington, D.C., as a young graduate student and being seated across from Showalter. Here was an intellectual (and literal) giant whose generosity and kindness soon dispelled his intimidating presence. Showalter has long been a friend and colleague to faculty and students at the service academies as well, where he has taught, appeared as a guest lecturer, and where several of the contributors to this volume teach. At this stage in Showalter’s illustrious career, his paternal style and mentorship have brought him as much respect as have his own intellectual accomplishments.

The essays in Arms and the Man continue themes present in Showalter’s own work. The essays ground themselves in European military experiences, but always with a consciousness of how these experiences shed light on broader issues of military culture, personalities, and civil-military relations. The collection can be subdivided into three main sections: essays on military culture and historiographical issues, meditations on military figures as illustrating the role of personality and command, and studies of specific European battles that exemplify these issues. Most of the essays focus on the two World Wars, which they use as windows into larger themes.

The collection begins with its most abstract and personal essay, William Astore’s interrogation of the enduring popularity of the German military among recent generations of American servicemen. Astore attempts to balance various strains of this phenomenon, which on one hand originate in what he calls a “youthful infatuation” many military-minded boys (himself included) have with the tactical and technological superiority of the Wehrmacht, based on a “sanitized” version of its history in the Second World War. He also identifies much darker currents in the national histories of societies that have embraced a socially separate “warrior culture” that he sees solidifying in recent decades. While neither of these observations is entirely new, Astore describes them well and combines the intellectual critique with personal experience that expresses his concern in a powerful and engaging way.

Jeremy Black’s “Military Cultures, Military Histories and the Current Emergency” takes a similarly comparative view of the relationship between how societies write about and wage their wars. In this essay, Black investigates various aspects of the “cultural turn” in military history of recent decades, and concludes that paying attention to cultural issues in war making is in fact a dynamic process. In other words, to take recent examples, the belief of some prominent historians in a supposedly superior “western way of war” affects both strategic and tactical decisions, and can lead to military setbacks by underestimating the ease and cost of potential military interventions. Above all, Black argues, we must not bask in a “misleading clarity” that a history of military success indicates a superior war making culture that will inevitably win out in future conflicts.
Throughout the rest of the volume, the majority of chapters focus more closely on single battles or individuals. Robert M. Citino’s “Manstein, the Battle of Kharkov, and the Limits of Command” admirably traces the dilemma its title implies, while Richard L. DiNardo’s contribution on August von Mackensen’s generalship in the First World War shows how its central figure transcended his own nineteenth-century limitations to become among the most successful field commanders of the war. Mary Kathryn Barbier contributes an interesting case study of military intelligence and security law in World War II Britain, during which both legitimate and paranoid concerns over internal security led MI5 and the Home Secretary to receive and employ broad powers. She uses the fate of one man, suspected spy Benjamin Greene, to examine larger issues of interagency cooperation and problems of coordination in democratic societies at war.

Two essays on campaigns in France complete the focus on the World Wars, with Robert A. Doughty’s study of the Marne and Meuse campaigns a particularly skillful contrast of experiences in 1914 and 1940. He demonstrates that the flexibility of the First World War French military, which had enabled a successful stand on the Marne in 1914, had by 1940, ossified into a doctrinaire and constrained battle culture that led to France’s defeat. This essay pairs well with Holger H. Herwig’s chapter on the German invasion of Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, because Herwig also emphasizes the flaws of military cultures that inflexibly adhere to their understanding of how the coming war should be fought. Together, both essays represent an effective condensation of ideas the authors have presented in full-length works on these same topics. Two essays on prior eras, Kelly DeVries’ “The Question of Medieval Military Professionalism” and Robert McJimsey’s posthumous account of the origins of seventeenth-century English naval strategy, demonstrate that these issues transcend the modern age.

One of the last essays of the collection examines the historiographical debate on how the writing and waging of war interact with each other in a discursive process of mutual influence. Eugenia C. Kiesling’s “Total War, Total Nonsense” will generate chuckles from those who have followed this intellectual argument, one in which Showalter has participated. However, Kiesling’s point is serious: that the concept of “total war” as a unique phenomenon of twentieth-century wars of annihilation is wrong and ultimately meaningless as an analytical category. Moreover, use of the concept leads to intellectual and moral contortions in defense of what she calls “a powerful and inchoate fantasy.” Given the fact that total war retains such prominence, this essay is essential reading whether or not one ultimately agrees with Kiesling’s suggestion to completely discard the category.

The volume ends with an entry unusual for the genre: Showalter’s own response to the essays. His perspective is characteristically trenchant and encouraging, and serves as a tidy summary of the contents. As a whole, the collection codifies the type of engagement and exchange that has marked Showalter’s career. Those who read the volume will not only gain information about the explicit subjects covered, but also about the style and tone that Showalter has contributed to historical debates about military culture and experience.

Mari K. Eder’s Leading the Narrative belongs to a narrow genre of literature designed to appeal to former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s vision of military transformation. A U.S. Army Reserve major general, Eder tapped into the defense secretary’s frustrations with communications and the media. “We have all been concerned,” Rumsfeld wrote in early 2005, “about the absence of a fully-coordinated comprehensive U.S. Government strategic communications effort. And we have all been concerned about the resulting strong opposition to U.S. efforts in the world.” The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review validated Rumsfeld’s view that “victory in the long war ultimately depends on strategic communication.” The Defense Department spent years organizing and reorganizing strategic communications offices to satisfy the secretary, and Eder’s solution was to elevate the stature of public affairs officers so that they could ensure the success of the military’s strategic communications.

Leading the Narrative is a compilation of articles Eder published in a variety of military journals. Eder envisions a future in which public affairs officers-cum-strategic communicators, seated at the commander’s right hand, emphasize messaging and inject forethought and insight into the process of making and executing strategy. In this...
way, they help tie “national strategy to U.S. government policy objectives” (pp. 27–28). Eder believes the communications process itself is critical. Strategic communications must be “aggressive and synchronized” (p. 21). The process must mass information “at a critical time and place to accomplish a specific objective. It avoids the destructive effects of mixed messages that result from not massing information” (p. 30). The chapters are repetitive; pages 32 through 35 repeat pages 19 through 22 almost verbatim.

Eder twice tries to turn the handling of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib prison into a story of public affairs success:

“There was a definite possibility that . . . photographs of prisoner abuse photos could have . . . become the ultimate negative symbol of the Iraq War. Since that time, however, there have been hundreds of thousands of diverse images released. With a definite emphasis on outreach, engagement, listening, and involvement, the images of the events at Abu Ghraib have been, if not replaced, then supplanted by the sheer volume of photos of soldiers shown building schools, reaching out to Iraqi leaders, posing with smiling children, and providing medical care, clothing, soccer balls, and the symbolic hand stretched out in friendship [pp. 6–7].

The actions the Army took, Eder writes later, “ultimately served to separate the values of the organization from the acts of individuals, and confidence in the institution itself remained high” (p. 55). A single photo from Abu Ghraib—that of a hooded prisoner hooked to electrical wires, often compared to the Statue of Liberty, and widely distributed via the internet—demonstrates the bankruptcy of Eder’s belief that massing thousands of happy pictures can somehow efface one shameful image. Eder’s repetitive faulting of the media for being biased, unprofessional, ill-informed, and lacking credentials and credibility is, at best, pedestrian (pp. 2–3, 66, 73, 86).

Leading the Narrative’s most glaring omissions concern strategy and the audience. Eder faults “mixed messaging” for being confusing, but does not consider that policy itself can be contradictory or that ends, ways, and means do not always add up to a coherent strategy. She gives short-shrift to the all-important audience, or audiences. If nothing else, effective strategic communications must take account of multiple audiences’ concerns and interests, but learning more about the world or the operational environment does not figure among Eder’s concerns.

Leading the Narrative’s library shelf life should be short. Scandals associated with contractors planting easily discredited stories, policymakers’ skepticism, and a greater appreciation for different audiences’ perceptions have undermined the credibility of “strategic communications” since Eder published her work.1 One Obama-era appointee, Rosa Brooks, explained that the current idea of strategic communications hearkens back to the days when defense policy makers “imagined that disciplined use of the right ‘messaging’ would ‘win the war of ideas.’”2 What is really needed, according to Brooks, is to “learn, engage and listen; try to understand how people outside the United States view U.S. actors; think in advance about how what we do and say will be perceived, and plan activities accordingly.”3 Eder’s work offers little insight into navigating the difficult task of saying what we do and doing what we say, or simply synchronizing our words and deeds.

Notes

5. Ibid.
he chronicles the often acrimonious and sometimes genial relationships throughout the war among these top officers.

Despite the hype on the book’s dust jacket and the publisher’s Web site, Castel’s evaluations of the Union’s top generals is, for the most part, standard fare, although the information is presented in a somewhat informal style that adds life to the characters he describes. Unsurprisingly, Generals George B. McClellan, Joseph Hooker, John Pope, Ambrose E. Burnside, and Halleck come in for their share of criticism for their poor performances on campaign, in battle, or within the Army’s administration. Grant and Sherman emerge in these pages as the North’s military stars, although each is shown to have had their own weaknesses and difficulties with their fellow officers—Grant came to sour on Halleck, Rosecrans, and eventually George G. Meade, whom he regarded as slow and cautious, while Sherman’s dislike of Halleck and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton became legendary. Although Castel gives some of his attention to Lincoln’s political appointees, including Benjamin F. Butler, Franz Siegel, and John A. McClernand, his study may have benefitted from more detailed comparisons of these nonprofessional officers to the regulars on whom he concentrates. This is particularly so with regard to Nathaniel P. Banks, a Massachusetts major general of volunteers who served during the entire war and led several campaigns in both major theaters.

Castel is at his best in providing concise interpretations of his subjects’ strengths and weaknesses, offering balanced portraits. Thus readers learn that General Halleck, once he became the army’s de facto chief of staff in 1862, worked strenuously and efficiently to provide the Union field commanders with the men and materiel needed to fight the war, and to liaise between military officers and the Lincoln administration. Halleck would not, however, “issue to these commanders orders on how to conduct a campaign or wage a battle,” nor would he “take command of an army in the field” (pp. 112–13). The Union’s top officer at Gettysburg, General Meade, is shown as an active commander during the great battle of 1863, and Castel also defends him for not attacking Lee’s defeated Confederate army at Williamsport the week after the battle—despite Lincoln’s frantic calls for Meade to destroy Lee before the latter escaped to Virginia with his army. The stalwart General Thomas receives high marks from Castel as well, for his steadfastness at Chickamauga, his victory at Nashville, and in part for his lack of backstabbing ambition.

Although Castel’s handling of all the major figures in the Union Army is thought-provoking, his treatment of General Rosecrans is perhaps this study’s most valuable contribution, particularly since the author does not relegate the general to secondary status, due to the dearth of previous biographies of the general. Castel contends that Rosecrans should have been allowed to attempt to take Vicksburg after the victories at Iuka and Corinth in the fall of 1862, as he had suggested to Grant, and that the latter’s refusal to allow the proposal was a mistake. “The prospects of the Federals being able to . . . take it once they got there, was far superior in October to what it proved to be in December,” when Grant began his own campaign to reduce the Mississippi citadel (p. 164). The author also reminds readers of Rosecrans’ important place in the Union command structure, in that “Old Rosey” was the Union commander at two of the western theater’s largest battles of the war, one of which was a defensive victory for the North (Stone’s River, 1862), the other a stinging defeat (Chickamauga, 1863).

This study of the Union Army’s commanders will likely stimulate debate among Civil War historians, no doubt to the delight of the authors. Victors in Blue could have been improved by the inclusion of a map of the Atlanta Campaign (1864), the account of which is confusing without one. Castel’s prose is often convoluted and awkward, although quite colorful at times. Readers may wonder why so little attention is paid to the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), and why the author’s portrait of Sheridan is the weakest of the Northern generals, in that his meteoric rise to prominence does not seem fully explained. Nevertheless, this study is a valuable contribution to the history of Civil War generalship.

The transition from war to peace is a difficult process for victors and vanquished alike as old enmities last well beyond the echoes of battle. At the end of the First World War, that transition was as unique as the war itself. Much has been written about the 1919 peace process that resulted in the Treaty of Versailles, but often overlooked is the occupation of the Rhineland by British, French, and American forces. Maj. Gen. Johnson Hagood’s resurrected memoir of the initial occupation provides valuable insights on the views of American soldiers in the immediate aftermath of the war. Covering the period between November 1918 and April 1919, Caissons Go Rolling Along establishes a proper baseline from which to evaluate American opinions of former allies and
enemies during the occupation, while at the same time offering candid views on the war, the Army, and the international climate.

General Hagood is a known entity to scholars of the United States in the First World War. Serving as the chief of staff for the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) logistical organization (eventually known as the Services of Supply), he was at the forefront in building the largest and most complex supply system ever attempted by the U.S. Army up to that point. His memoir of the experience, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston, Mass., 1927), is the best firsthand description of the subject.

Hagood intended Caissons Go Rolling Along to be a follow-up of that account and worked on the volume up through the 1940s. But where the first book focuses on the details of logistics and the pressures of wartime, the new work replaces that intensity with more commentary and introspection. At times reading like a travelogue, it describes Hagood’s command of the 66th Field Artillery Brigade and chronicles the march to Germany, establishing the occupation, and touring some of the war’s battlefields as part of an officer education program started during the period.

Several themes dominate Hagood’s memoir. He focuses on the war’s devastation in France, his views of Germany, and the situation in Europe. Hagood is struck by the destruction and deprivations inflicted on civilians in territory previously occupied by the Germans. He contrasts this with the apparent lack of hardships endured by the German people. This comparison fuels Hagood’s overwhelmingly anti-German attitudes. He not only blames Germany for the war but repeatedly criticizes German culture, society, and people (including children). In fairness, Hagood is also critical of the Allies, often humorously so, but there is a level of prejudice in Hagood’s writing that reminds the reader that he is a product of nineteenth-century society in which this attitude was not viewed as racist or xenophobic. Hagood sees the Germans as recalcitrant in defeat and dedicated to spreading propaganda that mitigates their loss and responsibility for the war, seeding discord among their occupiers, and ingratiating themselves with the Americans. Hagood views the Germans as a defeated enemy who should be forced to suffer for their sins and forced to bear the burden of reconquering Europe. He confesses a belief that unless its defeat is driven home and if it is not kept economically, politically, and militarily weak, then Germany will once again threaten international peace and security. Hagood’s lack of respect for the Germans may be attributed to his having spent the war well behind the front lines, but his harshness is unsurprising considering the war’s brutality and the peace’s tenuous nature.

Also interlaced in the memoir is commentary on the U.S. Army and the American war effort. Hagood is proud of the AEF’s performance, but he confesses that it struggled in the build up phase and never established a truly efficient combat or logistical organization. Additionally he laments the status of the American officer corps. He notes the relative age disparity between American and European officers, the former usually being senior to the latter by several years, which resulted in a general lack of flexibility and energy on the part of American officers in comparison to their European counterparts. Hagood also describes his difficulties getting American officers to adopt the trappings that Hagood thinks befits their status (i.e. good billets, a proper mess, etc.). In this Hagood betrays a certain political conservatism and sympathy for social stratification. While he is steadfastly critical of German militarism, Hagood conveys a more accepting attitude toward the hierarchical structure of European armies and societies. These views are further seen in Hagood’s dismissal of President Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic war aims and criticism toward the administration for not establishing more concrete objectives at the outset. For Hagood, the war was not about democracy but rather national defense against a barbaric enemy who needed to be crushed. In this Hagood is not out of step with many of his fellow officers (including General John J. Pershing) and many sectors of the American public, which make his memoir a good reflection of prominent attitudes of that time both within the Army and beyond.

Lost in the tumult of the Second World War and the Cold War, Hagood’s work has thankfully been saved by Larry Grant, the book’s editor. Grant includes a brief biography of Hagood that provides a solid overview of his life and career. Grant lets Hagood speak for himself but adds valuable explanatory endnotes that make the work more accessible to those not familiar with the war in great detail. What comes through is a brief but solid baseline for evaluating American views at the beginning of the occupation. Other works chronicle how those views morphed over the following years, becoming increasingly hostile toward the French and sympathetic of the Germans, and Hagood’s memoir serves as a good starting point for understanding that process.
cousin who died during the World War II battle of Peleliu while serving as a rifleman with the Army’s 81st Infantry Division “Wildcats.” Blair’s project morphed into a collaborative book with John Peter DeCioccio (who passed away prior to publication) intended to chronicle the Wildcats’ role during the Pacific war effort. The book covers the 81st Division’s experiences in the war, but focuses primarily on the unit’s involvement in Operation Stalemate II, the campaign to seize the Palau islands as a prelude to the invasion of the Philippines. In writing the book, Blair relied heavily on interviews and letters from division veterans, along with the division’s unit reports and histories, as primary source materials. The Japanese perspective is limited because Blair relied solely on American intelligence translations of Japanese documents without using Japanese primary sources or other secondary materials. Unfortunately, Blair relied solely on secondary sources to support his criticism of the Navy and Marine’s conduct of the campaign. Blair keyed in on the antipathy that the 1st Marine Division’s commander, Maj. Gen. William H. Rupertus, had toward Army troops as a factor in turning Peleliu into a bloody slugfest. Rupertus bitterly resisted the introduction of Army troops into Peleliu as reinforcements, even as the combat effectiveness of his division dropped due to alarmingly heavy losses. Furthermore, Blair argues that Rupertus was unwilling to adjust his tactics despite the availability of lessons learned by the Army’s operations on Anguar. In a couple of instances Blair described Rupertus’ interactions and disagreements with the Marine III Corps commander, Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, and Army Maj. Gen. Paul Muller, commander of the 81st Division, but failed to clearly cite his sources—an unusual and disappointing omission.

In describing the strategic context of the campaign, Blair related how the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters tacitly acknowledged their inability to defeat the Americans by assuming a strategic defensive posture following the loss of Saipan. Tactically the Japanese resorted to elaborate defenses manned by soldiers willing to fight to the death in exchange for maximum American casualties. American intelligence failed to detect the enemy shift in tactics, so the lethality of the Peleliu defenses shocked the veteran 1st Marine Division. As Blair relates, General Rupertus’ stubborn insistence on frontal attacks quickly destroyed the combat effectiveness of the Marine infantry regiments. Deeply troubled by Marine losses, Geiger overruled Rupertus’ objections to using Army troops, and ordered the relief of the 1st Marine Division by the Army’s 81st Division.

Prior to the Peleliu landing, Geiger released the Army infantry regiments from corps reserve in order to seize Anguar and Ulithi atolls as shaping operations to the decisive Peleliu landing. Unoccupied Ulithi was quickly turned into a support base, while fortified Anguar proved a rough introduction to combat for the green Army soldiers. The soldiers of the 81st quickly mastered the coordinated use of close air support, indirect fires, engineers, and flame expedients to methodically destroy the Japanese defenses. The coral atolls were impervious to digging in to, so soldiers used bags of beach sand to provide hasty cover while advancing and at the halt. In his account of the Anguar operation, Blair corrects the Navy historical record—which described the atoll as secured by D plus 3—by pointing out that the 81st needed an additional month to eliminate 1,300 Japanese defenders, at a cost of 2,558 Army casualties.

The Wildcats’ hard won experience was put to good use as the Army troops relieved the 1st Marine Division on 14 October 1944. Concurrent with the relief operation, Admiral Chester Nimitz announced the end of the assault phase of the operation, directing the 81st Division to “assume final mop-up and occupation duties on Peleliu and adjacent islands” (p. 166). Blair describes Nimitz’s communiqué as disingenuous because the Wildcats remained engaged in major combat operations until 27 November 1944. Faced with fanatical Japanese resistance, the soldiers continued to adapt and improve their tactics. Particularly noteworthy was the use of fire hoses to pump gasoline deep into Japanese-held caves, and a conveyor system to haul supplies and evacuate wounded from atop rugged coral ridges. In the end, the 81st Division suffered a total of 546 deaths and 2,462 wounded in completing the “final mop-up” of Peleliu.

Disappointingly, Blair neglected to give biographical details for General Mueller, the Army regimental commanders, and especially for the interviewees cited in the book—details that could easily have been provided in an appendix. The maps in the book are a disappointment as well. They do not clearly show the movements of the combat regiments and their relation to key terrain features and objectives. Aside from the minor flaws and omissions, the author did a good job of correcting the historical record of Operation Stalemate II and placing the Army’s accomplishments into proper historical context. Readers with interest in the Pacific campaigns of World War II are strongly advised to read this book.

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Even after seventy years, people still debate why Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin held such influence over their citizens, and why the darker side of their regimes received compliance rather than revolt. Numerous historians have attempted to explain how Soviet citizens resisted the Germans after collectivization, purges, censorship, and all the other sacrifices Stalin demanded in the name of industrialization. Did this resistance equate to support for Stalinism? A simple answer is that when caught between the “rock” of Nazi doctrine and atrocities and the “hard place” of Stalin’s regime, most Soviet citizens chose the devil they knew. However, this choice was hardly universal. Social class, nationality, and gender influenced this decision more than most scholars acknowledge. Two recent works address these and related questions from new perspectives.

The first, Roger R. Reese’s *Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II*, re-evaluates the Red Army’s performance in terms of initial and continuing motivation to fight. Reese investigates individual drive and the roles of military leadership, the Communist Party, and government organizations in mobilizing and sustaining the Red Army’s martial will. Oral histories, memoirs, diaries, reminiscences, and letters illustrate the view from the trenches, while archival military and political reports capture official and unofficial records. From these sources, Reese considers how factors such as propaganda, awards, peer pressure, leadership, nationalism, gender, class, hatred of the enemy, executing deserters and punishing their families, and the threat of penal battalion service affected Soviet troops’ resolve, sometimes reaching surprising conclusions.

Reese begins with a case study of the 1939–1940 Winter War with Finland to introduce his model of distinguishing military proficiency (the ability to fight skillfully) from effectiveness (the will to continue the struggle). According to Reese, Soviet gains from the final peace negotiation with Finland were the product of Red Army persistence, undeserving of the label “fiasco” so often found in military scholarship. He then turns to Operation *Barbarossa* in 1941, asking if the success of German encirclements of Red Army units resulted from German skill or a lack of Soviet will to fight. Reese concludes the *Stavka’s* inability to adapt to blitzkrieg forced Red Army units to choose between resistance, surrender, or flight. Contrary to popular belief, Soviet soldiers were captured when organizational leadership disintegrated, or killed when small, cohesive units fought to the end, but very few surrendered. Soviet soldiers were willing to fight, but suffered tactical defeats due to strategic leadership failures.

Having determined the will to fight existed, Reese differentiates the reasons mobilized volunteers and conscripts fought by social and national background. Support for the Communist Party, peer pressure, and pragmatism led urban youth volunteers and other traditional party loyalists to join locally based opolchenie divisions, thus avoiding the terrors. Conscripted peasants were more likely to serve at the front, where good training and competent leadership kept risk-averse rural farmers fighting. Individual morale, courage, political reliability, and loyalty mattered little by comparison. Frontline fighters also included volunteers who sought to change their circumstances, clear their family’s name, reform the Soviet state, or establish a new Russia without Stalin. Not surprisingly, but contrary to official Soviet historiography, the least likely volunteers were national minorities from the Eastern and Central Asian republics, regardless of class, party, or Komsomol affiliation.

Not all soldiers were always willing to fight, and the state employed coercion in an attempt to compel effectiveness. However, one of Reese’s most surprising conclusions is that the Soviet state and the Red Army’s considerable efforts to “intimidate its officers into competence” and force its soldiers to fight were largely ineffective (p. 167). He finds deserters were un daunted by threats of punishment or execution, arrest of family members, or service in penal battalions. Rather, these measures drove some to flee to the German side. Some troops considered penal battalion service no more dangerous than the front, with a few months’ fighting better than years in the gulag. Even more shocking, Reese convincingly argues that blocking detachments, officers, and even the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) rarely carried out death sentences, and that the troops knew it. Listening to the voices of Red Army soldiers, Reese raises significant doubt about the effectiveness of repressive measures. For all the regime’s efforts, soldiers continued to desert.
Official propaganda defended the regime’s ideology and encouraged citizens to fight. Stalin’s government deliberately encouraged hatred of the German people and endorsed patriotic Russian pride. Fear of losing popular support also led the state to quietly allow citizens to believe policies such as collectivization might change if the defenders of the motherland were successful. However, efforts to reach national minorities were particularly difficult as the propaganda arm lacked native language speakers. While Reese effectively categorizes Soviet propaganda, his disappointing conclusion that it is impossible to determine the campaign’s effectiveness is surprising after his analysis of motivation by social class. Without an evaluation by Reese, this section’s contribution to the integrity of his overall argument is weak.

In Reese’s final section, he finds female volunteers and conscripts were not only effective, but also vital to Soviet wartime success. Although the Soviet state initially had little intention to draft women or allow them to fight at the front, both the ideology of gender equality and the necessity of mobilizing the entire population led to an increase from 1,000 to 800,000 women in uniform. As with other beneficiaries of Communist Party policies, patriotism and a desire for vengeance motivated female volunteers. Some sought to make ideology reality by proving themselves the equals of their male counterparts, pushing their way to the front and literally fighting like official accounts of Great Patriotic War heroism. These stories touch on darker themes such as encirclement and collaboration, religion, nationality, and the NKVD. Kazakevich describes the NKVD and State Directorate of Counter-Intelligence (SMERISH) questioning the loyalty of a soldier who escaped from behind enemy lines and returned to his unit. The soldier responds to this skepticism by fighting to redeem himself, which Ellis remarks likely satisfied Stalin’s censors, but failed to convince readers who would have understood this vignette as criticism of a cruel and arbitrary military justice system. Baklanov’s tale relates how the NKVD undermined Red Army cohesion as soldiers avoided comrades under scrutiny. Baklanov seems to blame the nature of military conformity and the demoralizing effect of the purges for this behavior, criticism beyond the usual Khruschev-era focus on Stalin. Ellis believes these stories show Soviet citizens understood more of the war’s complexities than state histories would suggest.

Reese concludes that although sometimes inefficient, the Red Army was effective throughout the entire conflict. Similar to Kenneth Slepian’s work on Soviet partisans, Reese’s nuanced look at Red Army motivation through the lenses of class, nationality, and gender make this an indispensable work to understanding not only Soviet military success on the eastern front, but also Soviet society under Stalin.

The second work, Frank Ellis’ *The Damned and the Dead: The Eastern Front through the Eyes of Soviet and Russian Novelists,* is a work historians might be inclined to pass over because it deals with war fiction rather than historical documents. Make no such mistake—Ellis quickly establishes that Soviet authors have been addressing topics forbidden to Soviet historians, beginning only a few years after the end of the Great Patriotic War. Where official Soviet doctrine ignored, avoided, or revised controversial historical themes from the World War II era, Ellis uncovers war fiction’s surprisingly critical portrayal in censor-approved and post-Soviet literature. He asserts that although the characters are fictional, the ideas are historical. By presenting these works in both the historical context of the events they describe and of their date of publication, Ellis joins the discussion of who fought and why, the significance of Stalingrad, and how Russian understanding of the Great Patriotic War has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. Ellis reviews twenty-five pre- and post-Soviet war novels, with a study of historical NKVD documents as an interlude. As a guide to the genre, Ellis’ work is exceptional, deftly leading readers through the nuances of Soviet code-speak, immutable norms of censorship, and the changing political climate. Ellis captures the essence of the works he reviews, their historical significance, their places within the genre as a whole, and offers a lesson in how the memory of such a monumental event in Russia’s history is changing over time.

Ellis begins with works from the first two decades after the war by veterans Grigrii Baklanov, Iurii Bond-arev, and Emmanuil Kazakevich. Unlike official accounts of Great Patriotic War heroism, these stories touch on darker themes such as encirclement and collaboration, religion, nationality, and the NKVD. Kazakevich describes the NKVD and State Directorate of Counter-Intelligence (SMERISH) questioning the loyalty of a soldier who escaped from behind enemy lines and returned to his unit. The soldier responds to this skepticism by fighting to redeem himself, which Ellis remarks likely satisfied Stalin’s censors, but failed to convince readers who would have understood this vignette as criticism of a cruel and arbitrary military justice system. Baklanov’s tale relates how the NKVD undermined Red Army cohesion as soldiers avoided comrades under scrutiny. Baklanov seems to blame the nature of military conformity and the demoralizing effect of the purges for this behavior, criticism beyond the usual Khruschev-era focus on Stalin. Ellis believes these stories show Soviet citizens understood more of the war’s complexities than state histories would suggest.

Ellis finds the Brezhnev- and Gorbachev-era publications of another veteran, Vasil’ Bykov, collectively so important that he devotes an entire chapter focusing on Stalin. Ellis describes Bykov as a truth-seeker and a student of human behavior under stress. His stories are of interest because their main characters are in small groups isolated from the Red Army, thus providing a window into motivation absent active state influence. Bykov’s nuanced literary treatment of sensitive questions challenges official interpretations of events. Is collaboration treachery, or is it required to survive? Are all who resist fighting for Stalinism, or is nationalism or some “higher power” more important? Do gestapo atrocities spur resistance, or is the NKVD just as bad? In total, Bykov’s works offer historians a glimpse of important themes that were unacceptable in official histories.

Brezhnev-era publications by Ivan Stadniuk and Vladimir Bogomolov, by contrast, paint Stalin as a military genius and the NKVD as the country’s saviors. Ellis ultimately finds these
state-sanctioned accounts unconvincing in light of historical evidence, and doubts that Soviet citizens were fooled. However, Stadniuk and Bogomolov show how Brezhnev influenced the state’s memory of the Great Patriotic War. Additionally, Bogomolov mentions resistance to the return of Soviet power in Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland, a topic typically off-limits to Soviet historians.

Ellis devotes his next chapter to the literature of the Battle of Stalingrad, asserting that the battle’s historic and symbolic importance is overstated because of the Red Army’s previous failures. The Soviet state sold the battle as a major success, with journalists promoting positive themes about the Soviets’ star rising and the Nazis’ falling, the battle’s unique contributions to military lore, and Russia’s rebirth and testing. Comparatively, war literature by Viktor Nekrasov, Konstantin Simonov, and Iurii Bondarev was unusually critical, and Vasili Grossman’s Stalingrad works completely unorthodox. Themes of Stalin’s misjudgments, love of Mother Russia, confusion, desertion, executions, condemnation of Stalinism, war crimes, and the impacts of the purges and censorship somehow survived the censor’s cuts. It is in this section that Ellis’ detailed reading of multiple editions of each manuscript and careful decoding of the authors’ word choices reveals underlying meaning that an untrained or non-Russian speaking reader would otherwise miss, providing valuable context to scholars of the battle.

Ellis follows his analysis of Stalingrad in war literature with a section on NKVD reports during the battle, focusing on the effectiveness of punitive measures. Like Reese, Ellis suggests the threat of execution by one’s own side may have actually contributed to desertions; however, Ellis asserts these documents prove far more of these executions occurred than Reese acknowledges. Ellis also departs from Reese’s conclusions by judging that Soviet propaganda had little effect on motivation because soldiers recognized propaganda as lies and distrusted the regime. Ellis’ argument would benefit from some sources to corroborate the NKVD’s self-assessments, however. Although they disagree on supporting points, Ellis ultimately agrees with Reese that the Soviet state’s combination of sticks and carrots was successful in motivating the Red Army to continue to fight.

Ellis’ final chapter is an excellent guide to three significant works in post-glasnost Russian war literature that are not easily accessible to most historians. While many Soviet-era works are available in translation from various American universities, Georgi Vladimov’s The General and His Army (Moscow, 1997) is only available in Russian and German. Viktor Astafev’s The Damned and the Dead (Moscow, 1994), and others, are not readily available in either Russian or English; however, Ellis provides an excellent guide to their major themes. Ellis not only highlights the authors’ take on the war, but also the critical response from Russian contemporaries accusing them of having gone too far in rejecting the Communist Party’s official line—the ongoing debate over the memory of the Great Patriotic War. In these novels, religion takes on renewed significance, communism is evil, and peasant life is again the essence of what it means to be Russian. Ellis notes striking similarities between works by Vladimov and Bogomolov’s Brezhnev-era In August 1944 (Moscow, 2000) that, taken with Bogomolov’s scathing review of The General and His Army, suggest Vladimov wrote with an agenda. Ellis finds that post-Soviet authors describe one reason Soviet citizens remained loyal to Stalin’s regime as the power of the collectivist ethos that some historians trace back to the roots of Russian civilization. Within the military and the NKVD, another is the power of hierarchy and the reluctance to break ranks by dissenting or disobeying an order. He closes by suggesting that as controversial as these works are, they challenge official lies and enable the rebuilding of Russian identity.

Both Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought and The Damned and the Dead provide multifaceted and uniquely Russian perspectives of why Soviet citizens resisted the German invasion and will be of interest to historians of World War II’s eastern front. Memoirs, official documents, and the evolving views of veterans under every political regime from Stalin to Putin provide rich perspective on the history of the conflict and how it is remembered. In considering the choices Soviet citizens made yesterday, we must also consider the consistency of our own views about the state’s role in the Soviet victory over the Germans and the legitimacy of Stalinist policies. Reese and Ellis have effectively captured not only historical complexities, but also the essence of the debate in post-Soviet space today over the significance of the Great Patriotic War.
view of the United States’ first battle in Afghanistan. This book, which appears well researched, looks at the battle from multiple perspectives, including the U.S. military and other coalition partners involved in the effort. Lester Grau has written other books on Afghanistan while his coauthor, Dodge Billingsley, is one of the first journalists to cover U.S. operations in Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September 2001.

The book opens with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which seems to have sown the initial seeds of discontent that would germinate and grow in the decades following. The authors do well to prepare the reader with the relevant history of Afghanistan prior to direct U.S. involvement. This introduction not only reflects well on the authors’ understanding of Southeast Asia, but prepares the reader for the nuances of working in and around the region.

Grau and Billingsley present a first person account as well as the planning leading up to Operation Anaconda. This information is gleaned from numerous interviews and allows for a more personal retelling of the operation than merely providing maps and unit designations. Additionally, these interviews were conducted not only with U.S. military personnel, but also with service members from coalition partners like Canada and Australia. These varied perspectives help present a much more complete view of the operation. However, the large number of interviews sometimes leads to overlapping and repetitive descriptions of the same event which, if the reader is not careful, may be mistaken for separate and different accounts. The experienced military reader, familiar with U.S. joint operations, will be quite at home with this work’s wording and terminology. In fact, this knowledge will serve the reader well as the authors seem to assume knowledge of U.S. combat command organizational structure.

During Operation Anaconda, U.S. and coalition forces sought to trap their Taliban and al-Qaeda enemy in the Sharh-i Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan. U.S. light infantry and air mobile units planned to close the mountain passes to the east while Afghan coalition troops flushed the enemy toward the waiting American forces. Although the plan was well thought out, complications, largely unforeseen during the planning stages, mounted with execution.

While the operation ultimately appeared to be, on the whole, a success, the authors do note a few elements that did not go smoothly. To the extent that mistakes and errors were made, they are attributed almost entirely to the usual suspects like command and control failures, communication breakdowns, and the inability of the services to work together. In this case, it seems that the Central Command headquarters largely deferred to the individual units to do bottom-up planning, often without the required resources. Again, the units on the ground experienced difficulty communicating with the air assets. Worse, the air components were not notified of the operations until a few days prior to the start, extending the communication problem beyond the technical challenges of disparate radios. Additionally, the special operations forces did not appear to be as well integrated as they could have been. This seems largely due to communication errors, but also to the idea that everyone (primarily the special operations forces) should get a chance to be involved in the operation regardless of which available units might best perform the designated task. All of these are shortfalls experienced in joint operations going back to the Desert One fiasco and beyond to Vietnam—shortfalls that were supposed to have been remedied by the Goldwater-Nichols Act that sought to create a series of combatant commands that would allow a single commander control over the joint employment of force.

Overwhelmingly, the key feature of Operation Anaconda is the research behind it. The authors provide an impressive glossary, bibliography, and other notes. While they likely did this to make for an easier read, in some cases the reader is forced to flip back and forth to truly grasp the overall story. Even more impressive is the DVD included with the book that features over an hour of documentary footage and interviews. This bonus material helps the reader visualize the region’s terrain and to better understand the keys to the battle. The addition of this topographical information is invaluable to the reader as it allows a better understanding of how the battle played out.

The book has many strong points but some minor deficiencies do exist. There are many inconsistencies in the use of military rank abbreviations. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force does not operate F–18 Hornet fighter jets and the B–1B bomber is not a stealth bomber. The authors also attempt to avoid naming a few individuals and places “for security reasons.” In some cases this is explained and in others it is not. While understandable at first, it grows tiresome when the authors provide such detail that any doubt about the actual locations or individuals being described disappears.

All told, Operation Anaconda presents a compelling telling of a key point in the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. This book would be a useful and interesting read for both the experienced as well as the casual reader of military history.

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According to the author, militant Islamist ideology is a narrow and ill-informed interpretation of Islam that has been hijacked by individuals like Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden and other militant leaders cloaked themselves and their message and export it around the world. Aboul-Enein makes an important distinction between militant Islamists and Islamists. While he leaves it to the reader to consider if groups such as Hamas are an Islamist or militant Islamist group, he writes that many Islamist parties such as the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) work peacefully within the government and constitution (p. 3). His view is very nuanced, but ultimately correct. Aboul-Enein argues that the U.S. government must assess each Islamist party individually, and to not view the groups, or Islam, as a monolith.

Aboul-Enein’s study does a great job defining and explaining these very complex differences in Islam. He does this by not only discussing the differences between Islam, Islamists, and militant Islamists, but by giving the reader a history of Islam and Islamic interpretation. He focuses on the Qur’an, and what is being and not being taught in the Islamic world. Ultimately, the author writes that militant Islamist theorists discount most of the Qur’an and reduce Islamic history into small sound bites (p. 9). This reductionist interpretation is easily digested by the poor and uneducated youth in the Middle East and Central Asia.

A majority of the book focuses on the history of militant Islamist ideology and its theorists such as bin Laden and Sayyid Qutb. While multiple volumes have been written about bin Laden and Qutb, the author gives a basic background into their lives and their thinking. While it helps the reader understand the ideas of two of the most prominent militant Islamist theorists, those looking for detailed biographies on bin Laden or Qutb should look elsewhere.

Aboul-Enein concludes his fascinating study with a warning for current and future military and political leaders. He urges them to read more on Islam and the Islamic world, and to not view Islam through the mutated lenses of militant Islamist ideology. This is extremely wise. Most U.S. Army officers and soldiers have a shallow and minimal understanding of Islam. This book will not provide all the answers, but it is a strong starting point that has already been incorporated into Intermediate Leader Education at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat is an important book, and one that should be read by those serving now and in the future.
The United States Army in Afghanistan

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

March 2002–April 2005
In a previous issue of Army History (no. 86, Winter 2013) I listed the Career Program (CP) 61 “core competencies” developed by the CP 61 Board of Directors in consultation with several subject matter experts, or SMEs. These SMEs met several times in 2012 during the creation process for the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) Plan for our new CP and had many long discussions about which competencies were “core” to all of CP 61 and which were specific to only one job series. As that was happening, the Army G–1 mavens changed the terminology and now lump all “core” and “functional” competencies into a single category of “technical” competencies (as opposed to a new category of “nontechnical” or leadership competencies). However, I believe that the core competencies, by whatever name, are still valid for historians, archivists, and museum professionals. If you remember, those six core competencies were Knowledge of Career Program Functions, Administration of Career Program Functions, Supervision of Career Program Functions, Knowledge of Professional Methods and Techniques, Knowledge of History, and Program Advocacy. In addition, each discipline within the CP developed a set of competencies that were specific to that discipline. I would like to share with you in this column the competencies we considered essential for historians (GS 0170) within the Army:

Historical Project Planning
Historical Research
Historical Factfinding
Historical Analysis
Historical Synthesis
Historical Presentation
Management of Historical Programs

Although the degree to which each historian at each level should become proficient in these competencies may vary (especially those competencies involving project planning or program management), they are all skills that Army historians need to have in order to perform their jobs effectively. Let’s briefly look at each one.

Historical Project Planning is obviously crucial before undertaking any major historical task. Just as a student who is working on a master’s thesis or Ph.D. dissertation needs to prepare a prospectus and research plan before beginning work, all historians need to do a “mission analysis” of each new historical task to evaluate the scope, breadth, depth, and audience for the completed work or project. A thorough project plan should be quite detailed and comprehensive and can take a great deal of time to prepare. Of course, a command historian writing a staff paper to assist the G–3 with a deadline of “close of business” will certainly accomplish the project planning stage much more quickly than a staff historian contemplating writing a volume in the official history of the Army, but the planning or decision making steps will still be the same. (See Army doctrine about the difference between the “time constrained environment” and the “deliberate” decision making processes.)

The next competency, Historical Research, is critical in all that we do. The diligent historian consults a wide range of primary and secondary sources to assemble evidence for evaluation. Research is somewhat of an art form because the historian has to think deeply and widely about where relevant documents might be, how to locate and use personal papers, and how to navigate through often arcane archives or collections. Only through exhaustive searches of government archives, manuscript repositories, oral history collections, and libraries can enough evidence be assembled to give you a “critical mass” of facts. And without research skills, a historian cannot hope to establish a firm base of evidence.

Once enough evidence has been assembled (and it is often hard to say when one has enough), it is vital that a historian determines the difference between fact and fiction and between reality and myth. Thus the historian uses the skill of Historical Factfinding to evaluate each piece of evidence as critically as possible, examining it...
from every angle and testing it against other known facts. If a historian can’t find enough evidence that holds up as fact, he or she can only speculate about what may or may not have happened, and that seldom comforts the reader who is looking for answers based on hard facts.

Historical Analysis takes factfinding one step further. Analysis breaks down a complex historical phenomenon for closer examination and scrutiny. Each military historical event is invariably composed of multiple parts (time, location, friendly forces, enemy forces [if any], personalities, political context, etc.) with often subtle relationships between the parts. Through analysis each event is broken down into its subcomponents and interrelationships as the historian tries to understand all the important dynamics. Analysis is critical to our understanding of what historical events actually mean.

Next we have Historical Synthesis. Just as it is important to break down events into component parts to truly understand them, it is equally important to take those insights and use them to recombine the relevant information into a complete and coherent picture. A historian has to try and make sense of the many details of an event using value judgments gained through his or her analysis of the relevant facts. Historians must try to make sense of events in order to construct an accurate narrative and not leave a reader with all the pieces spread out on the floor for them to look at and puzzle over on their own. As historical professionals we have to take risks and bring all the complex pieces together into a coherent narrative with conclusions and judgments.

All historians also need to master Historical Presentation. Presentations can take the form of traditional written products or lectures, or they can be postings on Web pages or social media, electronic books, or historical text in a museum exhibit. Even if the historian prepares a written product he or she can publish it in numerous formats including as an information paper, pamphlet, monograph, Web page, or briefing. Oral presentations can take the form of lectures, discussion groups, professional military education classes, or even after-dinner speeches. Regardless of the presentation framework, the historian tries to master organization, clarity of expression, and coherency to present historical results to the right audience in the right format.

Finally, historians at virtually all levels, beyond the most basic entry-level positions, must master the competency of the Management of Historical Programs. The necessary level of skill in this competency only increases the higher up the Army Historical Program ladder the historian ascends. A small command history office may not have many people to manage, but each such office will still require the juggling of the competing demands of writing articles, preparing staff papers, conducting oral history interviews, and fighting (sometimes tooth and nail!) for budgets, office space, and administrative support. At the major subordinate command or major command level, historians spend enormous amounts of time organizing, managing, and sustaining wide-ranging historical programs that always seem to be under attack in these times of limited resources. In particular, there is no question that for the long-term survival of the Army History Program writ large, all historians of any major program must do their utmost to locate and hire (despite all the attempts by the civilian personnel office to prevent it—the topic of another day) new historians that will sustain Army history after we have moved on. Without new and talented historians entering into the civil service the entire program is in jeopardy. All these elements are essential parts of managing historical programs to ensure the long-term health of history in the Army.

In short, we all need to evaluate our skill level in each of these competencies and do our best to close any gaps we see in our abilities to perform these tasks as best we can. The Army History Program needs us all to bring our “A-game” every day to the historical fight in order to better serve our Army and our nation.

As always, you can contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

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