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By Bryan R. Gibby

U.S. Army Image Spotlight
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Cover Image: Betwixt and Between, by Oscar Edward Cesare, 1916, pencil and ink on paper /Library of Congress

In this Fall 2013 issue of Army History we feature two interesting articles on very disparate topics. Both articles are timely in that we are in the opening stages of the First World War centennial commemoration and the closing stages of the Korean War sixtieth anniversary commemoration. The first article, by Thomas Boghardt, a senior historian at the Center of Military History, examines the U.S. government’s and the military’s intelligence collection efforts in Mexico in the years prior to U.S. entry into the First World War. In early 1917, the U.S. government learned of a secret German alliance proposal to Mexico: should Washington join the Allies, the Germans would encourage a Mexican attack on the United States and support Mexican annexation of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. American interventionists claimed that the so-called Zimmermann Telegram (after its author, German foreign secretary Arthur Zimmermann) represented the culmination of a series of German plots in Mexico designed to challenge U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere. This article shows, however, that from 1915 to 1917 American intelligence had carefully investigated and comprehensively refuted recurring rumors of German plots in Mexico.

Next we feature an article by Bryan R. Gibby about the Korean War battle for White Horse Mountain (Hill 395). His account, covering September–October 1952, of the harrowing battle for this strategic outpost paints a vivid picture of the intense fighting on and around White Horse Mountain. The vicious nature of the combat and the intense artillery bombardments are captured in detail as the author describes the heroic actions of Republic of Korea and U.S. troops. With peace negotiations at a stalemate, Gibby highlights the strategic necessity of holding the line against Communist forces in order to deny them increased bargaining power.

In addition, the chief of military history offers a few words of congratulations as Army History celebrates thirty years of providing thought-provoking historical articles and content to an ever-growing readership. The chief historian closes the issue with a sobering reminder of Task Force Ranger and the conflict in Somalia that dominated headlines in early October 1993.

As Army History celebrates its thirtieth year of publication I’m reminded of the important role this journal plays, and has played, in educating service members and civilians about the history of our Army. I’m extremely proud of both the job we do and to have been a part of Army History’s long-tenured success.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
In my last Chief’s Corner I discussed the importance of historical anniversary observances and this issue marks one of those important moments—with this issue, Army History celebrates its thirtieth birthday!

First published in 1983 as The Army Historian, those first dozen-or-so-page “newsletters” have become a much lauded powerhouse in both the historical community and the Army writ large.

The first issue was launched with a cover article, “This Enterprise Serves a Worthy Purpose. I Wish It Well.” written by Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr., which was to act as a compass for the endeavor. Secretary Marsh went on to say, “I am honored to introduce The Army Historian, a periodical dedicated to the proposition that an appreciation of military history is a valuable addition to an officer’s intellectual background.” He emphasized that “an understanding of history sharpens judgment and broadens perspectives” and that “the reason I am delighted to introduce The Army Historian is that this publication will help us have a better understanding of the value of history. But, in addition, by careful explanation and provocative example, it should attract the attention of those thus far uninitiated in the uses of this valuable discipline.” To this day, Secretary Marsh remains a stalwart supporter of the Army History Program and the magazine continues to answer his call to action.

But Army History did not spring up out of clay; it has been the dedicated work of a string of committed managing editors who saw that the publication flourished. It all began with one of our community’s icons, Brooks E. Kleber, who served as its first editor (Issues 1–10, Fall 1983–Winter 1986), and continued with Billy A. Arthur (Issues 11–13, Spring 1987–Fall 1989), Arnold G. Fisch Jr. (Issues 14–41, Spring 1990–Spring 1997), Charles Hendricks (Issues 42–81, Summer 1997–Fall 2011), and finally our talented current editor, Bryan Hocken-smith (Issue 70, Winter 2009 [Guest Managing Editor]; Issues 82–89 [Current], Winter 2012–Fall 2013).

Thirty years later, Army History has garnered a reputation as one of the top publications of the Department of Defense (DoD). Numerous articles appearing in the publication have received writing awards from the Army Historical Foundation, the Society for Military History, the Society for History in the Federal Government, and a variety of other professional organizations. A pantheon of preeminent military historians have penned articles for past issues including H. O. Malone, Maurice Matloff, Ron Spector, Jay Luvaas, Dennis Showalter, Jon Sumida, John Greenwood, Gregory J. W. Urwin, Victor Davis Hanson, and Mark Grotelueschen.

Army History continues to thrive. Since 2007, the number of recipients and subscribers has more than doubled. Today, Army History has a print run of over ten thousand copies and ships Army- and DoD-wide—the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is our biggest single print customer, receiving 1,600 copies of each issue for use in its classes. Many thousands more read Army History online, where it is available in Adobe PDF® format through our Web site: http://www.history.army.mil/armyhistory/index.html.

After three decades, Army History is going strong! Happy Anniversary and Keep Army History Alive!
Features

Articles

Chasing Ghosts in Mexico
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By Thomas Boghardt

The Battle for White Horse Mountain
September–October 1952

By Bryan R. Gibby
The U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) has released two new publications. *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811*, is the first in a series (The U.S. Army Campaigns of the War of 1812) of campaign brochures commemorating the bicentennial of the War of 1812 and the Army’s involvement in that conflict. Author John R. Mass examines the period from the end of the American Revolution to the start of the War of 1812. During this time a young and inexperienced U.S. Army faced a variety of challenges both within its own ranks and in the field. The Army faced hostile American Indians in the west, domestic insurrections over taxation, threats of war from European powers, organizational changes, and budgetary constraints. It was also a time of growth and exploration, during which Army officers led expeditions to America’s west coast and founded a military academy. This 60-page brochure includes maps and numerous illustrations. It has been issued as CMH Pub 74–1. It is also available for sale to the general public from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00559-0.

The second publication, *Operation Enduring Freedom, March 2002–April 2005*, by Brian Neumann, Lisa Mundey, and Jon Mikolashek, looks at the second phase of the war in Afghanistan. The authors detail the story of American and international forces working to solidify the initial invasion’s crippling of al-Qaeda and removal of the Taliban. They recount the quest to build a new, democratic Afghan government capable of maintaining internal security and tending to the needs of the Afghan people. This 72-page brochure includes maps, charts, and numerous illustrations. It has been issued as CMH Pub 70–122–1. It is also available for sale to the general public from the Government Printing Office under stock number 008-029-00558-1.

**Army History Article Wins Distinguished Writing Award**

The Army Historical Foundation recognized the recipients of its 2012 Distinguished Writing Awards at its annual meeting held on 22 May 2013. The award for best article in the Army Professional Journals category went to Robert B. Bruce for his article “Tethered Eagle: Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet and the Quest for Military Victory in the Korean War, April–June 1951,” which appeared in the Winter 2012 issue (No. 82) of *Army History*. Bruce holds a Ph.D. from Kansas State University and is an associate professor of history at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, in Quantico, Virginia.

**In Memoriam: Ernest F. Fisher Jr. (1918–2013)**

Ernest F. Fisher Jr. of Arlington, Virginia, a retired Army colonel and a former historian at the Center of Military History, passed away on 21 March 2013 after a brief illness.

Fisher was a World War II veteran and served as a first lieutenant with the 501st Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, parachuting into France on D-Day in 1944. He received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Wisconsin in 1952 and went on to serve as a historian with Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe. In 1960 he joined the staff at the Center of Military History where he wrote a volume of the Army’s official history of World War II. This volume, *Cassino to the Alps*, was first published by CMH in 1977 and gives the account of operations in Italy from Operation DIadem and the capture of Rome to the negotiations for the surrender of German armies in Italy.

Fisher was buried at Arlington National Cemetery on 12 June with full military honors.
Dr. Thomas Boghardt is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received his Ph.D. in modern European history from the University of Oxford, was a visiting professor at Georgetown University from 2002 to 2004, and served as the International Spy Museum historian from 2004 to 2010. Boghardt has published extensively on contemporary and historical aspects of intelligence, and has received the CIA’s Studies in Intelligence Award for his work on Soviet and East German intelligence operations during the Cold War. His two most recent books are *Spies of the Kaiser* (New York, 2005) and *The Zimmermann Telegram* (Annapolis, Md., 2012). He is currently working on an official history of U.S. Army intelligence operations in early Cold War Europe.
In the spring of 1916, the United States suffered the first major attack on its soil since the British invasion during the War of 1812. Shortly before 0100 on Thursday, 9 March, a number of darkly clad figures slipped across the border from Mexico into New Mexico. Armed to the teeth, the men rode silently toward the tiny city of Columbus, just a couple of miles from the border. Within a mile of the city, the horsemen split up into two columns of approximately 250 men each. Around 0400, the inhabitants of Columbus awoke to the ferocious thunder of hoof beats and hoarse cries of “Viva Villa!” and “Viva México!” Some witnesses later reported that they heard the riders scream: “Muerte a los gringos!” Over the next two to three hours, the Mexicans raided the city, torched the business district, and attacked a detachment of the 13th U.S. Cavalry, garrisoned at Camp Furlong in Columbus. The garrison numbered 345 men, including 79 civilians.

Though taken by surprise, the American soldiers responded vigorously to the attack. A private rushed outside and shouted at the Mexicans—clearly recognizable as such in their sombreros—to halt. He was shot in the stomach but still managed to kill three Mexicans before he died. When the raiders broke into the cooks’ shack at Camp Furlong, Army cooks fired at them with shotguns normally used for hunting, hurled boiling water at them, and hacked away at the Mexicans with axes, turning the hand-to-hand combat into a bloody mess. In another part of town, a lieutenant rushed barefoot toward the barracks, then led his men to the supply shack to get their French-made Benet-Mercié machine guns and ammunition. Setting up a machine-gun nest at the railroad tracks, the soldiers relentlessly strafed the Mexicans. Another lieutenant ran across the city to reach his unit when he bumped into a dismounted attacker. He fired several shots at the withdrawing figure and went on to reach his men and lead them toward the business district. When attacked by the Mexicans, the soldiers dropped to the ground and returned fire. Two
Americans were mortally wounded in the ensuing gun battle.

About two hours after the attack started, the Mexicans began to retreat toward the border, pursued by a U.S. cavalry detachment of roughly sixty soldiers. Chasing the raiders several miles into Mexican territory, the Americans killed a few dozen of them while suffering no casualties of their own. When the soldiers ran out of food and water, they returned to Columbus where they observed the dire consequences of the raid. Buildings had been reduced to smoldering shells, and smoke obscured the dawn. The stench of burned human flesh hung in the air while the bodies of dead Mexicans were dumped in a nearby ditch, doused in kerosene, and set afire. Nine civilians and eight U.S. soldiers had been killed, with many more wounded. There was no accurate count of dead Mexicans, with their bodies strewn over a stretch from Columbus to the border and beyond, but estimates placed Mexican casualties at over one hundred. The Americans had captured eight raiders alive.

As the citizens of Columbus set about rebuilding their town, the question of responsibility hovered over the rubble. Some accused the commander of the 13th Cavalry, Col. Herbert J. Slocum, of having facilitated the attack by disregarding earlier warnings about an impending cross-border raid. An Army investigation cleared Slocum of these charges in 1916, though they resurfaced during a Senate investigation four years later. The man who led the raiding party proved easier to identify than Slocum’s portion of the blame. After the battle, American soldiers found a pair of saddlebags lost by one of the Mexican horsemen, containing a letter from Francisco “Pancho” Villa, the leader of an armed faction in the civil war that had plagued Mexico since 1910. The letter was addressed to Emilio Zapata, the leader of another civil war faction in the south, urging him “to march north and join in the attack on the U.S.” The captured Mexicans confirmed Villa’s presence during the attack, as did an American hostage, Maud Hawkes Wright, who had been forced from her farm in Mexico to
join the raiding party after the Villistas had executed her husband. When the Mexican attackers melted away in the hail of American bullets, Villa let Wright go. She later reported that on their way to Columbus Villa had been “cursing and threatening to shoot any man who ran away.”

What motivated Villa to launch this seemingly quixotic attack against the United States? Today, Villa is remembered mostly as a courageous revolutionary, but at the time he was feared and despised as much as he was admired. An American who met Villa in 1911 described him as a sinister character whom “I would not care to meet in a lonely neighborhood on a dark night.” Even though Villa gave no quarter in battle and exploited the resources of northern Mexico ruthlessly, by 1916 he was on the verge of defeat. His rival Venustiano Carranza had established himself as “first chief” in Mexico City, and Carranza’s troops gradually gained the upper hand against Villa’s forces in northern Mexico. On 19 October 1915, Villa had sustained a heavy political blow when President Woodrow Wilson’s administration, originally sympathetic to Villa, extended de facto diplomatic recognition to the Carranza regime, in an effort to stabilize Mexico. Politically isolated and militarily outmaneuvered, the cornered Villa frantically sought to regain the initiative. Raiding Columbus, he reckoned, would
serve the double purpose of taking revenge on Wilson for his “betrayal” by recognizing Villa’s rival Carranza, as well as garnering domestic support for having the nerve to challenge the gringos. Should the Americans opt to chase Villa into Mexico, as indeed they did, the raid would have the additional benefit of bringing the United States to loggerheads with Carranza, who would be hard-pressed to stand by while a foreign power operated on his turf. Moreover, Villa appeared to have had a very personal motive for choosing his target: the city of Columbus was home to an arms dealer, Sam Ravel, who, Villa felt, had betrayed him in a transaction. And sure enough, the raiders torched Ravel’s business on 9 March.11

If Villa had hoped to provoke American intervention in Mexico as a response to his attack, his operation must rate as an unqualified success. The Columbus raid made instant headlines across the United States and prompted several U.S. newspapers to call for armed intervention in Mexico. Just a few months earlier, Villa’s men had captured and executed seventeen American mining engineers at Santa Isabel in Chihuahua, and several hawkish Republican politicians now ratcheted up the pressure on the hesitant president to deal firmly with Villa.

With the presidential elections approaching in the fall, the Wilson administration faced a dilemma. On the one hand, the president and his cabinet feared that U.S. entanglement in the Mexican civil war would divert American energies and attention from the European conflict. Suspecting a German scheme to provoke U.S. military engagement in Mexico, Secretary of State Robert Lansing demanded that “we must not intervene.”12 On the other hand, President Wilson, a Democrat, realized that inaction would play into the hands of the Republican war hawks. On 10 March 1916, Wilson convened a cabinet meeting at which everyone agreed that Villa must be pursued into Mexico. Concerned that Mexico’s de facto president, Carranza, might refuse U.S. troops permission to enter his country, the administration decided that it was best to go ahead and send the expedition while informally asking Carranza to abstain from a diplomatic protest. Five days later, the famous “punitive expedition,” a contingent of 4,000 men under Brig. Gen. John J. “Black Jack” Pershing crossed the border to find Villa or disperse his forces or both.13

Even if the Americans immediately established Villa’s responsibility for the raid, questions about a larger conspiracy emerged. Only a couple of days after the attack, rumors began spreading on Wall Street to the effect that Germany had financed the operation. Apparently, these allegations originated with an Allied representative in New York, Maurice Leon. A prewar counselor to the French embassy in Washington who handled financial and legal affairs for the Allies during the war, Leon suggested two days after the attack that heavy
A German-born soldier of fortune, Sommerfeld came to the United States before the turn of the century, enlisted in and deserted from the U.S. Army, then returned to Germany and participated in the bloody German punitive expedition against the Chinese Boxer rebels in 1899–1900. He subsequently settled in Mexico where he tried his hand unsuccessfully at the mining business. His luck south of the Rio Grande improved with the outbreak of the revolution in 1910. Sommerfeld managed to become a representative of the Carranza faction to the U.S. government as well as an arms purchasing agent for Villa. The latter position gained him an exclusive concession for importing dynamite into Mexico and yielded him a net profit of $5,000 per month. Well aware that a wide array of influential acquaintances provided the best insurance policy in the ever-shifting landscape of the Mexican civil war, Sommerfeld diligently spun a web of useful contacts that came to include Mexican revolutionaries, U.S. military personnel, businessmen, lawyers and diplomats, and, eventually, German officials.

On 26 May 1914, Sommerfeld sought out Capt. Karl Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché in Washington,
D.C. In a “most confidential manner” and with a “hushed voice,” Sommerfeld imparted his (largely unremarkable) insights on Villa and the state of the revolution to Boy-Ed. Though the attaché seemed impressed with Sommerfeld, nothing came of the encounter, and the two men apparently did not meet again. Shortly after the outbreak of the European war, Sommerfeld approached another Berlin official, the newly arrived German propaganda director in the United States, Bernhard Dernburg. Playing on German concerns over American munitions sales to the Allies, Sommerfeld told Dernburg that “American factories are shipping c. one hundred million infantry cartridges per month [to Europe], as well as great quantities of explosives and war materiel.” To divert this traffic away from Europe, Sommerfeld suggested provoking American intervention in Mexico, which he could bring about through his association with Villa. Sommerfeld asked Dernburg whether the German government wished for him to proceed with this project. Dernburg reported his conversation to Germany, and requested that Sommerfeld be given a straight “yes” or “no” answer. In Berlin, German foreign secretary Gottlieb von Jagow quickly resolved: “In my opinion, the answer is absolutely ‘yes.’” Both his under secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, and the chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, concurred. But the “Dernburg-Sommerfeld conspiracy,” as one historian has called it, fell apart as soon as German leaders approved it. On 7 May 1915, five days after Dernburg had submitted his memorandum, a German submarine sank the British liner Lusitania, killing 123 Americans, and the ensuing indignation in the United States over Dernburg’s insensitive handling of the incident prompted his recall to Germany. The German records indicate no further contact between Berlin’s officials and Villa’s agent. Upon America’s entry into the war in April 1917, U.S. authorities arrested Sommerfeld as a German agent.

Sommerfeld’s scheming notwithstanding, neither before nor after Villa’s attack did any German official indicate foreknowledge or complicity. In his report on the Columbus raid, the German envoy to Mexico, Heinrich von Eckardt, did not address the allegations of German support for Villa. Rather, his main concern lay with possible repercussions of the Columbus raid on the local German community. Germany’s wartime ambassador to Washington, Count Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff, wrote in his memoirs that “nothing was further from my thoughts than to conspire with Mexican Generals,” and the archival record bears him out. On 29 March 1916, Bernstorff reported to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg: “It is not surprising that an attempt has been made to blame Villa’s incursion on German intrigues, and to portray Germany as the real troublemaker. A substantiation of this nonsensical allegation is, of course, not forthcoming.”
Reactions in Berlin to Bernstorff’s report cast further doubt on the notion of active German support for Villa. One official scribbled the adverb “unfortunately” next to the adjective “nonsensical.” Bernstorff’s message would have been read first by Count Adolf von Montgelas, the foreign office’s counselor for American and Mexican affairs, and Montgelas may well be the author of the cynical “unfortunately” comment. But whoever the author, the remark indicates that, as far as this official was concerned, Germany did not have a hand in the Columbus raid. Subsequently, the foreign office circulated Bernstorff’s report widely through the government, and the heads of virtually all departments in a position to conspire with Villa countersigned it—top navy and army authorities, including the all-powerful chief of the general staff Erich von Falkenhayn, and even the emperor himself. None of the signatories suggested an active German part in the Columbus raid. And even though the absence of evidence is not the same as evidence of absence, the historical record strongly suggests that Villa’s raid took the Germans as much by surprise as the Americans.

Yet many Americans remained susceptible to rumors about German conspiracies in Mexico. For several years, President Wilson had successfully avoided U.S. military involvement in Mexico and Europe, but upholding American neutrality had become increasingly difficult in the face of massive Allied arms purchases in North America, German submarine activity in the North Atlantic, and Villa’s attack on Columbus. Given that U.S. intervention in Mexico was bound to limit Washington’s ability to engage in Europe, it was only logical for the administration to investigate whether Berlin had sought to provoke a U.S.-Mexican war in order to keep the United States from supporting the Allies. For this purpose, the administration turned to the fledgling U.S. intelligence community.

At the time of the Columbus raid, five separate U.S. federal agencies operated in Mexico or along the Mexican border: the Treasury Department’s Secret Service, the Justice Department’s...
Bureau of Investigation, emissaries of the State Department, and Army and Navy attachés. An obvious candidate for examining the circumstances of Villa’s raid on Columbus and the local garrison would have been the U.S. Army’s intelligence service; however, military intelligence was in disarray. In 1916, the service employed merely two officers and one civilian, with an estimated budget of $11,000, excluding salaries. For the most part, this skeletal staff limited its work to archiving randomly incoming reports. As Maj. Ralph Van Deman, the future head of the Military Intelligence Division, remarked in March 1916, information was no longer “collected—it just comes in. . . . As far as any benefit to the Government is concerned, the mass of this information might just as well be in Timbuctoo. It will remain in the Record Section unavailable to the end of time.” In the absence of a capable military intelligence service, the task of investigating German conspiracies in Mexico and Berlin’s possible links to the Columbus raid fell to the State Department and its intelligence component.

Making the State Department the lead agency in investigating German conspiracies had operational implications. Long before the United States entered the war, pro-Allied sentiment had permeated the department and biased many key officials in favor of the Triple Entente powers. In London, the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, Walter Hines Page, had become so utterly pro-British after the outbreak of war in August 1914 that Washington considered his recall a year later. Meanwhile, Page’s counterpart in Berlin, Ambassador James W. Gerard, disdained his hosts and habitually suspected them of hatching sinister designs against the United States. When he heard of the Columbus raid, Gerard noted privately (and without foundation): “I am sure Villa’s attacks are ‘made in Germany.’” With a touch of hyperbole, he added, “Every night fifty million Germans cry themselves to sleep because all Mexico has not risen against us.”

Pro-Allied sentiment extended to the very top of the State Department. In June 1915, the staunchly pacifist Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan resigned over what he considered President Wilson’s overly harsh treatment of Germany in the wake of the Lusitania crisis. In his stead, Wilson appointed Bryan’s deputy, Counselor Robert Lansing, a lawyer from Watertown, New York. Wilson’s advisor, Edward M. House, had urged the president to appoint Lansing because the latter promised to be less headstrong and more compliant than the principled Bryan. In a rather unflattering recommendation letter to Wilson, House portrayed Lansing as “a man with not too many ideas of his own,” and as someone who “will be entirely guided by you without unnecessary argument.” But Lansing turned out to be far less pliable than House had envisaged.

From the beginning of his tenure, Lansing had strongly favored the Al-
lies over the Central Powers. Following his appointment as secretary of state, Lansing drafted a memorandum titled “Consideration and Outline of Policies,” in which he accused Germany of “cherishing [an] ambition of world power,” and concluded that the United States ought to enter the war if Germany gained ascendency over the Allies. “A triumph of German imperialism,” Lansing stated categorically, “must not be [sic].” He also claimed that German agents “undoubtedly” were operating in Mexico against the United States. “The proof is not conclusive but is sufficient to compel belief.” Therefore, the United States should launch “Secret investigations of German activities in Latin America, particularly Mexico, and the adoption of means to frustrate them.”

In 1915, at Lansing’s urging, President Wilson vested overall control of U.S. intelligence in the Department of State. Due to the resistance of other departments, this reorganization had little significance until April 1916, when the State Department created the Bureau of Secret Intelligence (BSI) to supervise and coordinate the various existing American intelligence agencies. Set up in connection with the State Department’s Division of Foreign Intelligence, the BSI enlisted officials from other government agencies as well as American consuls and diplomats for operations that fell outside the purview of traditional diplomacy. Lansing’s deputy, Counselor Frank L. Polk, presided over the extralegal BSI while Leland Harrison of the Diplomatic Service handled the bureau’s day-to-day business.

Lansing created the BSI in the mold of his own pro-Allied mindset. From before the United States entered the war, American spooks posted to Allied capitals worked hand in glove with the local secret services against the Germans. As Lansing freely admitted in his memoirs, BSI agents were “aided materially by the intelligence officers of the Allied Governments, who were only too willing to disclose their knowledge of German plots and intrigues.” Through this liaison work, Lansing claimed, the BSI obtained several German codes, enabling the Americans to decrypt German diplomatic messages. In the capitals of the Central Powers, on the other hand, no such cozy relationship between American and local spies existed. When Lansing’s nephew and future Central Intelligence Agency director, Allen Dulles, prepared for his posting to Vienna in May 1916, BSI director Polk briefed him personally. Dulles traveled to Vienna via London where he may have been in touch with Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), and subsequently he may have worked with SIS in Austria. Once ensconced in the American embassy in Vienna, Dulles carried out routine diplomatic work, but he also pursued his secret mission of driving a wedge between Austria-Hungary and its principal ally, Germany.

By the time BSI began examining German activities in Mexico, the United States could look back on a brief history of intelligence gathering south of the Rio Grande. Until the eve of the Mexican revolution, Washington had relied mostly on reports from the American ambassador to Mexico for information on Mexican affairs, but as the country descended into civil war, no single official was in a position to inform Washington on the permanently shifting alliances of the various factions and their likely goals. Once a diplomat was accredited with, say, the Carranza faction, official dealings with Villa or Zapata were out of the question, and Carranza could not be relied on to give accurate assessments about his rivals. Also, a particular warlord may have been able to provide a local American consul with solid information on his province but very little beyond that. The quick emergence and disappearance of political players, recurrent coups, and a local press devoid...
of reliable facts further complicated the task of Foreign Service officers.

As traditional diplomacy failed to shed sufficient light on the situation south of the border, the Wilson administration dispatched a series of eleven agents on fact-finding missions to Mexico. This group of presidential emissaries included William Bayard Hale, later a correspondent in Berlin for Hearst newspapers, and George C. Carothers, who the State Department tasked to influence, control, and report on Villa. In February 1914, Carothers asked the secretary of state to appoint El Paso Collector of Customs, Zach Lamar Cobb, to relay messages back and forth from Mexico, and during the following years, Cobb assumed the principal role in investigating German conspiracies in Mexico on behalf of BSI and the Department of State.41

Like most officials at the time, Cobb was a political appointee. A progressive Texas Democrat, he stumped for Wilson’s 1912 presidential campaign and in September 1913 received the cushy $4,500-a-year position of customs collector in El Paso as a reward. People who knew Cobb painted a mixed picture of the man and his ambitions. A childhood family friend described him as “a charming companion to be with” and possessing “considerable intelligence.”42 The U.S. consul in Chihuahua, on the other hand, portrayed Cobb as “a narrow and bigoted enthusiast, carried away with the responsibility suddenly brought to him and made to dream that he might play a part as an empire builder.”43 Be that as it may, Cobb was loyal to the Wilson administration and eager to fulfill his intelligence assignments from the State Department.

As customs collector, Cobb’s primary responsibility consisted of enforcing the U.S. arms embargo on Mexico, a task that brought him into contact with a number of valuable sources on both sides of the border. “I mix and mingle with people of all factions, with a view to keeping informed,” he reported in July 1914.44 Tapping his growing network of contacts, he produced a large volume of reports on developments within Mexico. Much of his intelligence focused on Villa, and as early as June 1915, Cobb predicted that Villa’s declining fortunes might lead the Mexican warlord to “make a grandstand play against the United States intending to boost himself.”45

The first piece of circumstantial evidence on possible German intrigues in Mexico reached Cobb in January 1916 by a rather tortuous route. A certain “C. P. Rodgers, a reputable lawyer of El Paso, has been informed by an Englishman named Skates that one Angel Gutierrez claimed to him to have acted as interpreter in a conference between Carranza and German agent wherein arrangements were made for Germany to lend Carranza thirty-two officers and for Carranza to grant to Germany some certain peninsula south of Vera Cruz.” Cobb took care to point out, “[t]here is no way at El Paso to check what credence should be given this statement from Gutierrez. However, Gutierrez, a man about twenty-six years old, can be found in San Antonio where he arrived from El Paso last night, in event the Department considers the report of sufficient
consequence for further investigation.” Lansing immediately pounced on Cobb’s cautiously phrased report. The secretary of state forwarded the custom officer’s account to the White House and the Departments of War, Justice, and Treasury for consideration and investigation. Intrigued, Wilson responded: “Is the information it conveys not worth a very thorough investigation?” No doubt pleased at the president’s interest, Lansing replied on 27 January, “I have the honor to say this Department has taken steps to have the report investigated.”

The State Department’s German plot chase then went full throttle. On 28 January, Lansing gave Cobb the go-ahead for an investigation, referring him to a source that could be expected to have an interest in confirming Lansing’s suspicions: “Informally and unofficially communicate to British Consul, El Paso, and if possible secure his cooperation in investigating the report.” Since the alleged plot centered on Yucatan, the American consul at Vera Cruz, William W. Canada, also received instructions to gather relevant information. The results of this two-pronged investigation, however, were sobering. On 6 February, Cobb reported that the meeting between Carranza and a German agent was no more than hearsay, and that he had been unable to trace Gutierrez, the alleged translator. Canada also came up empty-handed. On 15 March, six days after the Columbus raid, the American consul at Vera Cruz sent a detailed report on his findings to the State Department, concluding: “I am unable to obtain any information which would tend to confirm the report regarding the alleged activities of German agents in Mexico.”

In the wake of the Columbus raid, Cobb renewed his efforts. On 20 April 1916, he informed the State Department of his continued inability to corroborate suspicions of a German-Mexican conspiracy and followed up with a request for more resources: I feel that Germany, either officially or as individuals, are mixing into our Mexican troubles, but without proof. Dare not take the responsibility of making the charge. I would like to undertake the duty of going to the bottom of these indications. Is there any way, without interference with other Departments, but in a way supplemental to their work, that the President might authorize me to secretly employ a few men, without knowledge of any one else here, to work under me in the effort to get this important truth.

After a few consultations, Lansing and Polk concurred, and the secretary of state informed Cobb that he “may employ a few reliable agents for this purpose, provided they do not operate in United States territory.” Still, Cobb failed to produce the evidence that Lansing hoped for.

As his quest went nowhere, Cobb took a more direct approach to the issue by stepping straight into the lion’s den. “There has been so much suggestion of German influence behind Villa,” he reported in January 1917, “that I have watched for every opportunity to seek information upon the subject . . . I watched particularly for a chance to talk with the German Vice Consul at Parral, Mr. Edward Kock, upon one of his recent trips to El Paso, seeking an opportunity to draw him out, without any suspicion on his part.” Although Kock said that some of Carranza’s officers had approached him for help “to drive the Gringos from Mexican soil,” the vice consul gave no hint of actual German assistance.

Even though Polk and Lansing continuously prodded Cobb for results, the latter never confirmed their suspicions. On 4 January 1917, Cobb submitted an insightful commentary along with his report on his conversation with Kock, summing up his yearlong investigation of German activities in Mexico:

This incident [Kock’s statements about Carranzista requests for German assistance], I think goes to explain the German relation to the Mexicans; First, that it is more a case
of Mexican ignorance in expecting assistance than of German intention of giving same; second, that the Germans taft the Mexican authorities, whether Carrancista [sic], Villista or otherwise, who happen to be in the locality at the time, in the course of playing all ends against the middle, for whatever may be to their commercial advantage; and, third, and finally, that the Germans are more interested in seeking their commercial advantage in Mexico than they are in helping the political fortune of any of the Mexicans.55

Meanwhile, parallel investigations by other State Department officials yielded no tangible results either. On 28 March 1916, a consular official at the State Department recorded the report from an American aviator, William J. Mattery, who had served with Villa’s forces in 1914 and 1915. Mattery laid “much stress on the fact that there are THREE GERMAN OFFICERS with Villa in Chihuahua one of them named COLONEL GHEMELN. He said that all these officers appear well supplied with money and appear to dictate to Villa.”56

Apparentely, the State Department considered the claim that a handful of German officers controlled the fiercely independent Villa so improbable that Lansing’s operatives did not follow up on it. On 24 April 1916, Consul Canada suggested the department take a closer look at the German American Hotel in Mexico City, reportedly a popular haunt of German evildoers.57 On the same day, the State Department instructed Charles Parker, representing American interests in Mexico City, to look into the matter,58 but Parker did not confirm Canada’s suspicion: “In lack of slightest tangible evidence,” he reported, “[I] am inclined to opinion that matter thus far still in talking stage.” Parker also discussed the issue with the British chargé d’affaires in Mexico, Thomas B. Hohler, “who has been diligently trying to satisfy himself of exact basis [of] these reports [on German conspiracies];” however, Hohler “thus far has no reason for advising his Government that Germans are playing tricks here.”59

When Canada reported that the German envoy, von Eckardt, was “doing everything possible to induce Mexico to make war on the United States,”60 American officials in Mexico embarked on yet another secret investigation. Keen on quick results and public exposure, Polk wired Parker on 20 June: “If you feel that report is correct, you might arrange for it to reach press here immediately. I am doing this on my own responsibility.”61 But the conscientious Parker did not acquiesce. An American “closer to [Eckardt] than anyone else here and in whom I have every reason to repose absolute confidence” told Parker that the German envoy “would not dare do anything to encourage Mexico into forcing war upon the United States.”62

At the request of the State Department, other U.S. agencies lent assistance in investigating German plots in Mexico. On 23 May 1916, Maj. Gen. Frederick N. Funston, the general commanding the U.S. Army’s southern department, forwarded a report from Mexico, which alleged “German and Austrian Consuls are furnishing money to the group of [Mexican] conspirators who are preparing another invasion of Texas.”63

But Lansing’s operatives were unable to corroborate Funston’s report. As Consul Parker reported two weeks later: “Evidence in support of suspicion that five hundred German reserve officers are in Mexico City is not forthcoming as [a] result [of the] most thorough investigation which it is possible to make.”64

The Justice Department also participated in the investigation. In May 1916, Lansing and the attorney general, Thomas W. Gregory, discussed
the issue of German conspiracies in Mexico. Consequently, Gregory instructed A. Bruce Bielaski, the director of the Bureau of Investigation, to visit the border states for a firsthand look. Bielaski spent two weeks on this mission but returned empty-handed. In his memorandum on “Activities of German Officials in Mexico,” Bielaski reported that the Justice Department had “no reliable or definite information from places outside the U.S.” He recommended that the investigation be handed over to Cobb.

The State Department also received assistance from London. In the spirit of the cordial Allied-American intelligence arrangement, the British liberally provided the Americans with allegations about German conspiracies in Mexico. In April 1916, the British Admiralty shared a confidential memorandum about German military activities in Mexico with the Americans. In June, Ambassador Page provided his government with information he had received in London to the effect that a German agent was on his way to Mexico with funds for Zapata “to foment trouble.” And when visiting Washington, Hohler, who as recently as May had known nothing of any German conspiracies, had a conference on 20 October with the U.S. president, at the end of which he cautioned Wilson against German intrigues in Mexico. Yet none of the British leads came with firm evidence of sponsorship by the German government. Off the record, British officials acknowledged as much. Hohler, who transferred to the British embassy in Washington shortly after his October visit to the American capital, confided to presidential adviser House on 9 March that “up to the time I left Mexico there appeared to be no official or concerted action [by Germany], only the activity of a small number of individuals.”

Probably, Hohler was thinking of men like Sommerfeld who styled themselves German agents but in reality did not act in an official capacity for Berlin.

By early 1917, nearly a year after the Columbus raid, the State Department-led investigation into German conspiracies in Mexico had yielded not a shred of evidence. This was remarkable in that many operatives on the ground, including the State Department’s chief agent, Cobb, had initially shared Lansing’s suspicions. Cobb owed his job to the Wilson administration and could expect to reap only benefits from providing Lansing with evidence of a German-Mexican conspiracy. But he turned out to be a capable and conscientious intelligence professional, who did not let politics cloud his judgment. There was no German conspiracy in Mexico, Cobb concluded, and reports provided by other agencies to the State Department supported his verdict. Privately Lansing acknowledged it, too. As he wrote to a friend, Edward N. Smith, in March 1917: “While I have suspected [German] intrigues [in Mexico] for a year and half I never was able to obtain conclusive evidence.”

His department’s failure to produce proof of German schemes in Mexico left Lansing in a precarious position with the president. German plotting had become a central argument in the secretary’s lobbying for U.S. intervention in Europe, but Wilson had never fully bought into these allegations. When Hohler warned the president about German conspiracies south of the border in October 1916, Wilson merely “sniffed disparagingly.” And the president became increasingly annoyed at his secretary of state’s aggressive warmongering which ran counter to his own policy of bringing about a negotiated peace between the Allies and the Central Powers. When Lansing sought to sabotage a presidential peace initiative in late 1916 by making misleading comments to the press, Wilson was so upset that he nearly asked for Lansing’s resignation. In the opinion of Wilson’s foremost biographer, the president would have been fully justified to fire his secretary of state on the spot for this act of insubordination.
All this changed dramatically when the director of British naval intelligence, Capt. William Reginald Hall, gave the U.S. embassy in London the transcript of an intercepted and decrypted telegram from Berlin’s foreign secretary, Zimmermann, to the German envoy in Mexico, Eckardt. In it, Zimmermann instructed his envoy to offer Carranza an alliance in case the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. The text contained the notorious proviso that the overture be based on “an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona.”

Lansing personally handed a copy of the telegram to Edwin Milton Hood, a correspondent of the Associated Press (AP), and the story made front-page news across the United States on 1 March 1917.

An analysis of the Zimmermann Telegram lies outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that the idea originated with a minor German foreign office official, that the text had been drafted, reviewed, and dispatched in great haste, and that the foreign office had not coordinated the project with the German military or the chancellor. If British naval intelligence had failed to intercept Zimmermann’s alliance offer, probably not much would have come of it. Yet the telegram had a considerable impact on the Wilson administration’s perception of German conspiracies in Mexico.

Lansing immediately linked the Zimmermann Telegram to alleged earlier German plots in Mexico and
elsewhere. As he handed a copy of the document to Hood on the evening of 28 February, he provided the AP correspondent with background information that placed the telegram in a larger political context. Hood, in turn, used Lansing’s information to draft a “fully authenticated” dispatch that AP provided, along with the text of the telegram, to newspapers across the nation. This AP dispatch contended that the Zimmermann telegram supplied the missing link to many separate chains of circumstances which, until now, have seemed to lead to no definite point. It sheds new light upon the frequently reported but indefinable movements of the Mexican Government to couple its situation with the friction between the United States and Japan. It adds another chapter to the celebrated report of Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin before the war, of Germany’s worldwide plans for stirring strife on every continent where they might aid her in the struggle for world domination which she dreamed was close at hand. It adds a climax to the operations of Count von Bernstorff and the German Embassy in this country, which have been colored with passport frauds, charges of dynamite plots, and intrigue, the full extent of which never have been published. It gives new credence to persistent reports of submarine bases on Mexican territory in the Gulf of Mexico.

The AP’s far-fetched claims reflected Lansing’s thinking precisely, as evidenced in his above-mentioned letter to Smith. Without providing any evidence, Lansing wrote to his friend that Zimmermann’s alliance offer “was preceded by a period of preparation of the ground for its favorable reception by creating pro-German and anti-American feeling among Mexicans, Villistas as well as Carranzistas.” In a telling revision of his letter, Lansing initially prefaced this statement with the claim that the Zimmermann Telegram “must be predicated on a previous” initiative, though he subsequently deleted these words.

The interventionist press quickly picked up on Lansing’s line of argument. On the day U.S. newspapers first ran the Zimmermann Telegram story, the Atlanta Journal reminded its readers of the year-old allegations about German responsibility for the “Columbus Massacre.” And ten days later, the New York Times magazine contended that the Zimmermann Telegram was merely a smoking gun indicating a much larger German conspiracy:

The Zimmermann note as it comes to the public is only a fragment, and not even German diplomats approach an international agreement of that size with a straight proposition. What we have of the note reads like the tail end of a situation which has been thoroughly felt out and has reached the point where written propositions are demanded. Who was at the other end of it? It is a commonplace of every newspaper office in the country that Villa has been financed by pro-Germans operating in the United States. And what of Germany and Zapata, snug in the heart of the country? What
of Yucatan, abundantly able to create a separate German centre if it so pleases her? Berlin has admitted the trick too easily with a fine air of being willing to confess that it has failed. She hopes, and very likely she is right, that we will be taken in by it and overlook her operations in Costa Rica and Colombia.79

As much as the interventionist press and the secretary of state might clamor for their nation’s descent into war, the final decision lay with the president. The public remained divided and confused over intervention, and it has been argued that the president could have carried majorities for war as well as for continued neutrality.80 Even after the publication of the Zimmermann Telegram, and to the despair of Allied officials and American interventionists, Wilson continued to tread carefully on the question of intervention. The Republican ex-president and arch-interventionist Theodore Roosevelt dismissed Wilson’s cautious foreign policy as “99 percent wrong.”81 Hohler, now at Wilson’s cautious foreign policy as question of intervention. The Republican ex-president and arch-interven-

did not prove that Germany had “from the very outset of the present war” engaged in “criminal intrigues everywhere.” In fact, the years-long U.S. intelligence investigation in Mexico strongly suggested otherwise, at least in regards to that country. In a classic case of politicization of the intelligence gathering process, leading government officials had pressed operatives on the ground for evidence in support of their own political agenda. When American spies refused to conform, interventionists pounced on the Zimmermann Telegram as proof of their claims. For the president, the supposed existence of German conspiracies in Mexico did not constitute the main rationale for going to war, but they proved important enough for Wilson to include them in his relatively brief war address. Despite the absence of hard evidence of Berlin’s meddling in Mexico, the specter of German conspiracies south of the Rio Grande became an important building bloc in the Wilson administration’s case for intervention in World War I.

Notes

2. The following account of the Columbus raid is based on Joseph A. Stout Jr., Border Conflict: Villistas, Carrancistas and the Punitive Expedition 1915–1920 (Fort Worth, Tex.: Christian University Press, 1999), pp. 33–44.


9. Quoted from Stout, Border Conflict, p. 4.


17. For example, see Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Ballantine, 1958), p. 95.


22. Unsigned memorandum [Bernhard Dernburg to Adm Henning von Holtzen-dorff], 10 May 1915, Captured Records of the German Foreign Ministry (hereafter cited as GFM), Mexiko 1, secr., vol. 1, roll 377, M 149, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).

21. Ibid., p. 413.
22. Eckardt to foreign office, 14 Mar 1916, GFM, roll 20, M 141, vol. 56, Mexico 1, NARA.
25. Ibid., p. 413.
26. Eckardt to foreign office, 14 Mar 1916, GFM, roll 20, M 141, vol. 56, Mexico 1, NARA.
29. Marion Lether, Chihuahua, to State Department, undated [late 1915], cited in Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb, p. 16.
35. Ibid., p. 42.
36. Lansing, War Memoirs, pp. 84, 319.
37. Ibid., pp. 319, 325.
41. Marion Lether, Chihuahua, to State Department, undated [late 1915], cited in Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb, p. 16.
44. Cobb, El Paso, to sec of state, 21 Jan 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
46. Cobb, El Paso, to sec of state, 21 Jan 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
47. Wilson to Lansing, 24 Jan 1916, roll 55, M 336 decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
48. Lansing to Wilson, 27 Jan 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
49. Department of State to Cobb, 28 Jan 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
50. Wilbur J. Carr, Department of State, to William W. Canada, Vera Cruz, 1 Feb 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
51. Canada, Vera Cruz, to sec of state, 15 Mar 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
52. Cobb, El Paso, to sec of state, 20 Apr 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
53. Lansing to Cobb, 24 Apr 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
54. Cobb to Department of State, 4 Jan 1917, cited in Chalkley, Zach Lamar Cobb, p. 84.
55. Ibid., p. 86.
56. J. K. Huddle, Department of State, Consular Bureau, 28 Mar 1916, Office of the Counselor, file “J. K. Huddle memoranda” box 11, entry 542, RG 59, NARA. Capitalization and underlining as in original.
57. Canada, Vera Cruz, to sec of state, 24 Apr 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
58. Lansing to Parker, 24 Apr 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
59. Parker, Mexico City, to sec of state, 1 May 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
60. Canada to sec of state, 18 Jun 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
61. Polk to Parker, Mexico City, 20 Jun 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
62. Parker to Polk, 26 Jun 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
63. Maj Gen Frederick N. Funston, Ft. Sam Houston, to sec of state, 23 May 1916, roll 53, M 274, decimal file 812.00, RG 59, NARA.
64. Parker to sec of state, 5 Jun 1916, roll 53, M 274, decimal file 812.00, RG 59, NARA.
65. [Ill.] to Lansing, 7 Jun 1917, “Mexico-Border”, file 18, box 1, Office of the Counselor, classified records of the office of the counselor, 1916–27, RG 59, NARA.
66. Memo, Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs, not dated [Jun 1916], “Mexico-Border,” file 18, box 1, Office of the Counselor, classified records of the office of the counselor, 1916–27, RG 59, NARA.
67. Confidential memo, British Admiralty to Department of State, 14 Apr 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
68. Page to sec of state, 30 Jun 1916, roll 55, M 336, decimal file 862.20212, RG 59, NARA.
74. Telegram, Zimmerman to Eckardt, 13 Jan 1917, R 16919, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes.
78. “Germany Blamed for Columbus Massacre,” Atlanta Journal, 1 Mar 1917.
The U.S. Army has a long history of using Native Americans as scouts. On 28 July 1866, Congress authorized the Army to form a Corps of Indian Scouts. During the nineteenth century the Army often provided scouts with assorted clothing, usually obsolete uniforms; however, in June 1890 1st Lt. Edward Casey, commander of the Indian Scouts at Fort Keogh, Montana, wrote to the secretary of war proposing a special uniform for scouts. Soon War Department Circular Number 10, dated 15 August 1890, was published describing a distinctive uniform for Indian Scouts, virtually unchanged from the one proposed by Lieutenant Casey. The uniform included a black felt fatigue hat with a 3.5-inch brim and a 3.5-inch crown decorated with a white hat cord intermixed with a red strand. The front of the hat carried a silver colored ornament of crossed arrows with USS (United States Scouts) in the upper angle.¹

Few photos exist showing the 1890 uniforms. During recent research at the Cavalry Museum, Fort Riley, Kansas, an original photograph of eight mounted Indian Scouts in their distinctive uniforms was discovered. The paper image was affixed on black photograph mounting cardboard typical for the period of 1890–1910. Much of the upper and lower mounting board was broken off, and the ends were damaged, but the central portion of the photograph remained intact. Unfortunately there were no markings on the reverse to provide additional information such as the date taken or the names of the scouts pictured.

The scouts are holding Krag carbines, which were first issued in large quantities in 1896. The crossed arrows with letters above were replaced by plain block U.S.S. letters in 1903 and 1904, but given the typical practices of the time to issue older insignia first, the Quartermaster General’s Department probably continued to issue the obsolete insignia for a few more years, perhaps until 1907 when authorizations of all hat insignia were withdrawn.² During 1905–1906 the Army began to widely issue new uniforms that had been prescribed in December 1902. The uniform changes and the carbines help date the photograph to between 1896 and 1907.

The scouts shown are all privates; however, at the end of the nineteenth century, of the seventy-five authorized scouts one was a first sergeant. A white chevron with red trim for the lone Indian Scout first sergeant is also pictured here.


Notes

¹ Letter from Lt E. W. Casey to Secretary of War, 3 Jun 1890. Copy on file, Institute of Heraldry.
² Headquarters of the Army, AGO, General Orders No. 132, 31 Dec 1902, para. 105; War Department General Orders No. 169, 26 Jun 1907.
Indian Scouts Photo and Insignia: U.S. Cavalry Museum
Chevron: Author’s Collection
Dr. Bryan R. Gibby, an Army lieutenant colonel, is currently serving as the commander of the 707th Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Gordon, Georgia. He previously served as an assistant professor of history at the United States Military Academy at West Point, specializing in Middle Eastern warfare. A veteran of two tours in Iraq, he was the senior intelligence officer for the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, and the division’s Intelligence Targeting Officer. He has degrees in history from West Point and the Ohio State University. Gibby is the author of The Will to Win: American Military Advisors in Korea, 1946–1953 (Tuscaloosa, Ala., 2012), which won the Army Historical Foundation’s Best Writing Award in 2013. Currently he is researching and writing a second book about the Korean War, focusing on the stalemated period of 1951–1952.

Soldiers from the Republic of Korea 9th Division head for medical treatment after being wounded on White Horse Mountain (Hill 395).
he Korean War was already in its third year as the 1952 U.S. Presidential election approached. Over the previous twenty-four months, American soldiers and marines, along with their South Korean and United Nations allies, had defended a shrinking perimeter in southeastern Korea until the decisive counterstroke at Inch’on reversed the course of the war. They then fought their way to the Yalu River before being repulsed and chased south of the 38th Parallel by the Chinese intervention in November–December 1950. After weathering three more Communist offensives, the American-led Eighth Army (which now also included the Republic of Korea [ROK] Army divisions) went over on the attack, grinding forward well past the 38th Parallel across most of the peninsula. Shortly after the war’s first anniversary, both sides entered into negotiations to implement a cease-fire and hopefully resolve the problem of Korean unification through a political process.

A year later, both sides were dug in, facing off, and trading shots across the width of the peninsula. Negotiations had produced an unintentional cease-fire grounded on tactical stalemate, not a settlement. Naturally, both sides became cautious and defensively oriented; soldiers were leery of becoming the last man to die in Korea for land that would be given up anyway.

By mid-1952, U.S. commanders and soldiers alike realized the cruel trick that had been played on them. No armistice was agreed to. The war would go on, but the Communist had used their unearned de facto cease-fire to good effect. They dug deep into the blasted hills of Korea, turning the naturally strong defensive terrain into a series of interconnected and nearly impregnable fortresses. They also worked hard to shore up their logistics, stockpile ammunition, rest and rotate units, and train for offensive action using new tactics. It was not going to be easy to restart the war.2

It was in this environment that General Mark W. Clark, veteran of World War II and the senior commander of the Italian campaign, arrived in the Far East to replace General Matthew
B. Ridgway as the commander of the United Nations Command (UNC). Clark wanted to fight and he immediately instructed his service subordinates to execute offensive plans. Navy carrier-based and Air Force planes took the lead in a series of aerial campaigns designed to “strangulate” the Communist armies. The most optimistic hoped this would be sufficient. But Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet, the U.S. Eighth Army commander, clearly understood the military predicament. The Communists would never agree to an armistice under stalemated conditions, no matter how much punishment came from the sky. The war’s end could only be settled on the ground.

**Tactical Counteroffensives**

The transition of UNC forces under Clark had not gone unnoticed. Chinese commanders worried that the status quo developed under General Ridgway would be jeopardized by Clark’s aggressive posture and rhetoric. In June, ROK and U.S. troops launched a short series of limited attacks, Operation Counter in the U.S. I Corps sector that captured key terrain along the Yelkok River to include Hill 395 (later christened White Horse Mountain) and Hill 281 (Arrowhead), and Operation Creeper in the U.S. IX Corps area. The latter operation moved the U.S. main line of resistance (MLR) much closer to Hill 1062 (the dominant terrain feature known to the GIs as “Papa-san”), the anchor for Chinese defenses north of Kumhwa and the southeast apex of the Iron Triangle. More significantly, the U.S. advance put the two sides nearly face-to-face with very little no-man’s-land in between. As if this tactical aggressiveness were not enough, in August the Chinese believed that the U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team had deployed from Koje-do (an island south of Pusan where the UNC kept its prisoners) to the mainland. The appearance of the U.S. 1st Marine and 1st Cavalry Divisions rehearsing amphibious movement, and the additional air and naval forces making their presence felt along the coasts and in the interior of North Korea, all signaled to the Communists that Clark was up to something.

General Douglas MacArthur’s Inch’on attack had made such a deep impression on the Chinese that they constantly feared an amphibious end run against their flanks. General Clark’s arrival in the Far East must have heightened the strategic tension, for he had faced a very similar tactical situation in Italy from 1943–1944, and had then presided over the amphibious assault at Anzio—a failed attempt to outflank strong German defenses and seize Rome by a coup.
Deng Hua, acting Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) commander in chief, assessed that given the political deadlock and the tactical capabilities at the UNC’s disposal, such a course of action was again likely. Consequently, the area around the Iron Triangle, particularly the region of the northern apex at Pyonggang, assumed great importance. Any amphibious attack would likely be presaged by a thrust against this town, which if lost, would severely compromise the Communists’ ability to supply and move their troops from west to east or vice versa. To preempt the UNC, Deng ordered a campaign of Autumn “Tactical Counterattacks” to buy some breathing room around the Iron Triangle, inflict casualties on ROK and U.S. units, take back some of the ground lost during Operation Counter, and gain additional offensive experience for newly rotated CPVA units. He directed the campaign to begin by 20 September and finish thirty days later.7

The tactical counterattack order explaining the strategic situation facing the Chinese and North Korean armies and giving Deng’s operational intent was issued on 12 September. The CPVA 39th, 12th, and 68th armies were to “conduct continuous tactical counterattacks on three to five selected targets to wipe out enemy troops and inflict substantial enemy casualties.” Deng further instructed commanders to conduct thorough reconnaissance on their objectives and insert “elite groups” to the rear and flanks of the targeted positions. It was critical that the attacking troops could identify all defensive positions, artillery emplacements, reserves, and obstacles. Artillery and infantry operations needed to be strictly coordinated with a unified plan shared between the two arms. In line with the CPVA’s updated tactics, known as niupitang, if first and second echelon forces suffered inordinate casualties, then the action should be suspended; but, if the combination of constant infantry pressure and artillery fire could lure defenders “out of their defense works . . . it would be well worth it . . . [to] encourage annihilation battles at the front.”8

Although Chinese forces struck all along the front starting in mid-September, two positions attracted the most attention as “annihilation battles” and were bitterly contested. The Chinese captured the first hill, known as Outpost Kelly and defended by the 65th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division; the second was Capitol Hill, successfully defended by the ROK Capital Division.

Outpost Kelly was like any number of forward positions meant to provide early warning to troops on the MLR. In September it was defended by one company occupying a circular trench line and four bunkers. Beginning on the evening of 17 September, enemy troops from the CPVA 116th Division...
assaulted the hill and quickly overran the defenders. Two U.S. battalions launched counterattacks but failed to dislodge the Chinese. American casualties were heavy; the regiment called off the attack to prepare a deliberate assault with three infantry companies and better artillery support. Early on 24 September tanks and howitzers opened up, firing 25,000 shells at Outpost Kelly. An hour later, at 0610, the infantry moved forward and was immediately met by accurate enemy machine-gun fire, grenades, and mortars. The attack stalled with two companies isolated and out of contact with the battalion headquarters. By 1000, the regiment had lost its momentum and the division ordered further attacks to end.9

On the eastern side of the Iron Triangle, the Chinese 34th Division began the contest for Capitol Hill. Under cover of artillery and mortar shelling, Chinese infantry rushed the ROK soldiers and drove them from the outpost. The latter returned the following day and began the see-saw struggle with bayonet and rifle butt, even as artillery shells from both sides exploded all around. Once Korean soldiers regained the hill, they dug in to stay and valiantly fought off repeated counterattacks. Although ultimately successful, the ROK defense of Capitol Hill (and nearby Finger Ridge) was still an expensive undertaking. It was also a harbinger of what was to come. The initial Chinese attack was supported by twenty-one howitzers, four self-propelled guns, six tanks (used as mobile artillery), and thirty-three mortars. Subsequently, additional artillery entered the fray. Chinese gunners even engaged in limited counterbattery fire against American artillery battalions supporting the Koreans. The Chinese were getting more proficient and more prolific with their fire support.10

This phase of tactical counterattacks lasted eighteen days, and the Chinese gained several advantageous positions. They also inflicted thousands of casualties against U.S. and ROK units, but from a strategic viewpoint the results were disappointing. Although Clark convened an emergency meeting with his army commanders, there was no major shuffling of units and most importantly, the Americans remained just as inflexible at Panmunjom, continuing to insist on voluntary repatriation of war prisoners. Therefore, the Sino-Korean Joint Command quickly decided to launch a second, even more ambitious, stage of counterattacks.11

On 3 October Deng signaled his army group commanders to prepare “to further disperse enemy forces...
and firepower and to deliver harder blows [against the] enemy.” This second stage of tactical counterattacks would differ from the previous by timing and intensity. Whereas the first stage of attacks were conducted sequentially as units felt prepared and involved elements of three armies, the CPVA commanders decided to launch simultaneous attacks beginning 6 October, employing elements of seven armies supported by 760 artillery guns.12

According to CPVA history records, Chinese troops successfully stormed and retained twenty-one of twenty-three UNC positions attacked across a front of 180 kilometers during this second stage of counterattacks. However, the main effort in the 38th Army’s sector resulted in an epic ten-day battle, and its failure cast a pall over the Communists’ effort to force political concessions through offensive action. It also directly encouraged the UNC to launch its own counter-counterattack campaign in an attempt to wrest the tactical initiative from the Communists.13

A HILL CALLED WHITE HORSE

The battle for White Horse Mountain lasted ten days and was a confusing melee, with both sides attacking and counterattacking, fighting often at night and at very close quarters. The action can be divided into four phases, one preparatory and three of actual fighting. Each of the three fighting phases was punctuated by a major Chinese effort to dominate the hill and beat back any Korean riposte. However, backed by overwhelming artillery and air support, the Koreans inevitably returned and flung the Chinese off the hill. The battle ended with the utter exhaustion of the CPVA 38th Army and the triumph of the ROK 9th Division.

Phase one began on 3 October as UN forces reacted to increasingly convincing intelligence indicators that a major offensive was brewing northwest of Ch’orwon, the southwestern apex of the Iron Triangle. Phase two occurred on 6–8 October, when the Chinese first gained control
over the crest of the hill and battled against the ROK 30th and 28th Regiments. The third phase opened with additional Chinese units being thrown into the fray and beaten back only after the ROK 29th Regiment launched a full-scale counterattack. In the final phase, the Chinese again took control of White Horse Mountain, but the Korean commanders launched a well-prepared and rehearsed division-level response that generated enough momentum to carry ROK troops to the Chinese side of the valley before the fighting died off. When it was over, the hill had been stripped clean and thoroughly pummeled, such that many observers looking at the bare hill saw the shape of a white horse lying on its side. Thereafter, the name stuck and the ROK 9th Division became known as the “White Horse” Division.14

White Horse Mountain, known by its military designation as Hill 395, was the dominant terrain feature overlooking the North Korean town of Ch’orwon and the Yokkok River Valley. It was virtually surrounded by the Yokkok River, which meandered around the hill’s eastern, southern, and western slopes, and appeared to simplify the Chinese’s task in terms of being able to isolate the hill and focus their offensive power on a relatively narrow zone. However, Hill 395 and its neighbor, Hill 281—also known as Arrowhead Hill—were the only two UNC positions on the north side of the river, the loss of which would compel the U.S. IX Corps to withdraw substantially south, uncovering the flank of the U.S. I Corps to the west and opening up a potential avenue to threaten Seoul. The corps would have also lost its lock on the southwestern region of the Iron Triangle, imperiling its ability to supply and support UN forces further east. Therefore, its importance both tactically and strategically was such that the IX Corps commander, Lt. Gen. Reuben Jenkins, was not going to treat Hill 395 as just another outpost.15

An attack of such magnitude was hard to completely conceal. On 1 October, ROK patrols found propaganda leaflets and a series of colored flags—red, white, blue, and yellow—emplaced not far in front of the Korean lines. These markers were likely guide points to identify where units were to assemble and then advance into the attack. U.S. artillery observers and aircraft also noted increased enemy movement and activity—the IX Corps after action report indicated that the corps...
witnessed “the highest number of vehicle sightings ever recorded in this portion of the IX Corps sector” in the days leading up to the Chinese assault. But the greatest intelligence prize came three days prior to the Chinese attack, when a CPVA officer deserted his unit and was captured by ROK soldiers on nearby Hill 284, just to the east of Hill 395.

Because of the intervention of an American artillery officer, the anonymous prisoner was sent to the rear where he revealed the intention of the 114th Division to assault Hill 395 and Hill 281 on 4–5 October. The prisoner indicated the size of the units involved (six companies from one regiment) and techniques of the assaulting elements, which intended to seize the crest and then briefly withdraw to allow their artillery to inflict maximum losses against the expected Korean counterattack.16

Although not totally convinced by the prisoner’s story, General Jenkins and his subordinate commanders set in motion a series of moves to reposition artillery, armor, antiaircraft, and engineer units to backstop the ROK 9th Division. The Korean troops defending Hill 395 also took supplemental measures. In addition to the whole of the 30th Regiment already on the MLR, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Kim Jong-oh, positioned the 3d Battalion, 28th Regiment, into a support position close to the hill by 4 October. The rest of the regiment, already off the MLR, was designated to act as his reserve counterattacking force. Kim also had the ROK 51st Regiment, a newly formed and as yet untested unit, in division reserve. American artillery fired specific missions to interdict and disrupt Chinese activity and to suppress their artillery, which became more active beginning on 4 October. When the expected attack failed to materialize that night, Kim still sensed an attack was imminent and he ordered all ROK 9th Division troops to hold their current positions for at least another three days.17

American forward observers (FO)—the eyes of the IX Corps artillery—had two outposts supporting the ROK 9th Division, one on White Horse Mountain itself and one on Hill 284, about 1,500 meters to the east. From these two locations, the Americans could observe the valley between the Chinese-held Hill 396 and the Korean lines on White Horse Mountain. Hill 284 also had good observation northward covering part of the backside of Hill 396. These observation positions (OP), nicknamed OP Love (Hill 395) and OP Roger (Hill 284), would play significant roles in helping to defend White Horse Mountain. A forward observer stationed at OP Roger, one
of the few U.S. personnel actually on the ground during the battle, remembered his commander telling him, "If you see a target, call it in, regardless of what it is."18 Throughout the first week of October the FOs were active identifying likely and suspected enemy artillery and mortar positions, infantry bunkers, assembly areas, and attack positions—covered or concealed areas where troops would concentrate just prior to launching an assault. Having identified these potential targets, the FOs reported the map coordinates and target descriptions to their respective artillery battalion headquarters. These "target reference points" (TRPs) then became preregistered firing solutions, enabling an FO to request fire using an abbreviated procedure that would result in a much faster response from the firing batteries.19

As part of the corps commander’s reorganization of command and supporting relationships, the 1st Field Artillery Group was directed to support the ROK 9th Division with its three Korean 105-mm. battalions. Two U.S. medium (155-mm. howitzer) battalions, the 213th Field Artillery Battalion and the 955th Field Artillery Battalion, were ordered to provide "general support, reinforcing fires" to the 1st Field Artillery Group. This meant that the U.S. artillery would fire in response to the 1st Field Artillery Group’s requests to engage targets either out of range of the smaller Korean howitzers or when the heavier firepower of the American battalions was required to augment the Korean 105s on a particular target. The guns of the 937th Field Artillery Battalion (155-mm.) provided counterbattery punch and range to shoot well beyond the limits of visual observation. Finally, to ensure artillery dominance, Jenkins had his artillery command assign a "reinforcing" role to Battery B, 17th Field Artillery, and Battery A, 424th Field Artillery. Both batteries employed massive 8-inch howitzers and would fire in response to the U.S. battalions’ requests. The addition of these sixteen heavy pieces gave the Americans bunker busting and fearsome anti-personnel capabilities. Additionally, because its FOs were the ones calling for and adjusting fire, the 213th’s fire direction center was designated as the artillery command and control headquarters for the entire corps artillery capable of firing in support of the ROK 9th Division. All requests for fire support would come through and be coordinated by this single fire direction center. This arrangement was crucial, as it allowed the Korean commander, through his American FOs, to call on an unprecedented weight of explosives and metal in support of a Korean unit. The 213th Field Artillery Battalion also assigned U.S. artillerymen as liaison officers to the Korean artillery battalions to ensure unity of fire and help avoid fratricide. Because of this careful alignment of firepower, along with the prepositioning of tanks, and other supporting troops, William Russell, a combat correspondent for U.S. Eighth Army recalled that nowhere “was an army more prepared for an attack” than was the U.S. IX Corps.20

The importance and flexibility of the U.S. IX Corps artillery was demonstrated even before the battle began. During the night of 5–6 October, Chinese mortars had already begun a harassing bombardment of White Horse Mountain, and soon the heavier Chinese artillery pieces added to the volume of shells falling on Hill 284 and White Horse. First Lt. Jack Callaway and his team on Hill 284 were the first to observe and report on the Chinese preattack preparations. Callaway even observed enemy mortar teams ventur-
ing out on the front, southern slope of Hill 396, which was the CPVA’s 38th
Army’s main position to support the attack. Calling for illumination rounds
first, Lieutenant Callaway then began a methodical attack by fire, calling for
and adjusting between two and six 155-mm. shells to scatter or kill each
team he observed. This was done under strenuous conditions, as Chinese
artillery falling around and on top of OP Roger often obscured his vision or
threatened his small team with instant annihilation. After nearly twenty-
four hours of this heavyweight game of cat and mouse, Callaway finally
observed the first Chinese infantry formations and called for “battalion
shoots,” doctrinally known as a “time on target” (TOT) where all rounds of
a firing unit were timed to land at the same target location simultaneously.
It was a technique perfected in World War II, and when used with variable
time fuses—which detonated the artillery shell about ten meters above the
ground—the results were devastating.21 U.S. artillerymen, armed only
with a radio, would be the first to fire at the Chinese infantry advancing
against White Horse Mountain.

General Kim also made some last minute arrangements to ensure no
Chinese infiltrators would outflank the division by positioning tanks,
searchlight batteries, and antiaircraft weapons along the flank approaches.
The latter, with their high rate of fire and longer range, were especially
fearsome and effective at destroying formations.22 On the hill itself
the troops worked hard to improve their positions by stringing 725 rolls
of concertina wire and 2,000 roles of barbed wire and emplacing 2,000
mines and 500 trip flares. Engineer troops also contributed to construct-
ing additional fortifications and bunkers using 450,000 sandbags and
6,400 board feet of heavy timber.23 As anticipated on the morning of 6 Oc-
tober, the Chinese destroyed the levee of the Pongnae-ho reservoir, flooding
the Yokkok River, which surrounded Hill 395 on three sides. Fortunately,
the effects of this tactic were minimal (the water level rose less than one me-
ter) and really served only to alert the defenders, unnecessarily so because
throughout the day the steady stream of falling artillery was proof enough
that the enemy was coming.24 As the sun set that evening (about 1915),
six companies and two platoons of infantry—a total strength of about
two battalions from the Chinese 340th Regiment—moved forward to
assault the northern slopes of Hill 395. One hundred twenty pieces of
artillery plastered the Korean defend-
ers. Simultaneously, one battalion
from the Chinese 113th Division
began a diversionary attack against
Hill 281, defended by the French bat-
talion assigned to the U.S. 2d Infantry
Division. Additional artillery fire was
directed against the U.S. 7th Infantry
Division on the Koreans’ east flank.25

The Chinese assault was well
planned and supported. Nearly
twenty-five hundred shells of all
calibers hit the defending Koreans
during the first six hours of the battle
(1900–0100). Although U.S. and ROK
artillery took a fearsome toll on the
attacking troops, they still managed
to overrun the ROK outposts on the
northeastern tip of the hill and seize
the crest by 2400. Three U.S. artil-
lerymen, 1st Lt. Joseph Adams, Sgt.
Roland Oxendale, and Cpl. Joseph
Augustyn, occupied OP Love on
Hill 395, on the northern slope just
below the crest. From here they ob-
served the Chinese infantry moving forward despite their casualties and under coverage of their own mortars, a favorite support weapon—both flexible and highly portable. Artificial illumination lit the battlefield in eerie glows and exaggerated shadows. Throughout the first few hours, Lieutenants Adams and Callaway (still on Hill 284) cued each other to bring down a hail of steel splinters accompanied by high explosives. Still, the Chinese came on and eventually the ROKs who survived the onslaught withdrew.26

By 0200 on 7 October, the Chinese had forced the 1st and 2d battalions of the 30th Regiment back and had advanced to the southern slope of the hill, but the Americans remained firmly ensconced in their well-built bunker. Artillery and mortar explosions pounded the bunker, but its supporting struts held. A direct hit crumpled the northwest side and knocked down a piece of timber that hit Corporal Augustyn, who escaped with minor cuts, bruises, and a punctured eardrum. What was worse, though, was the damage to the radio—their lifeline to the battalion and their principal weapon. Then, the Americans heard nothing—no explosions, screaming, rifle fire, or the staccato of machine guns. The sudden silence left them in an ambiguous isolation. The fighting had cut wire communication lines to the rear and the radio remained inoperable. Unknown to Lieutenant Adams, the Koreans were reorganizing and the Chinese had passed them by, taking the sounds of the battle to the other side of the hill.27

Adams decided to go out and look for himself. Exiting the outer bunker entrance into the trench line, Adams’ senses struggle to appreciate the devastation. The impulse to look around and take in the blood-soaked moonscape terrain strewn with mangled bodies competed with his instinct to stay low and move quickly to an observation point about thirty yards away. From this vantage point he observed Chinese troops downslope picking through the dead and recovering salvageable weapons and equipment. A close sounding explosion caused him to duck momentarily, which probably saved his life.

A rifle shot rang out and a moment later Lieutenant Adams was flung to the ground. The Chinese bullet had hit the top of his helmet, creased his scalp, and exited through the front of the helmet. Briefly stunned, he slowly gained awareness as he heard yelling voices and the distinctive report of a Chinese “burp gun” (Type 50 submachine gun). Sprinting away at a low crouch, Adams dashed to the bunker,
bowling over Sergeant Oxendale as he dove through the narrow entrance. Shouting that the Chinese were right behind him, Adams rushed to the radio (which by this point was working again) and furiously yelled into the handset, “THE CHINESE ARE ALL OVER THE . . . PLACE START SHOOTING AT MY BUNKER.” Within moments, a close-range shoot-out at the bunker entrance ensued, with the Americans tossing grenades and firing into the smoke and dust as the pursuing Chinese infantry tried in vain to force an entrance into the Americans’ sanctuary.28

Miraculously for the Americans, Adams’ transmission broke through the static that had filled the ether for the past several minutes and was received at the fire direction center of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion. Lt. Col. Leon Humphrey, the battalion commander, unhesitatingly ordered a TOT, to include the ROK 105-mm. battalions and the U.S. 8-inch howitzers. The call was risky, as an accidental impact, especially by one of the heavy 8-inch shells, could easily destroy the OP and kill its occupants. However, the FO’s call left no doubt as to the tactical necessity. The TOT would impact on OP Love within minutes of Adams’ transmission.

Lieutenant Callaway on OP Roger heard the battalion’s fire commands and immediately began to call adjustments saying, “I can even see people on top of his [Adams’] bunker.” As each round of shells exploded over OP Love, Callaway called back to the battalion requesting to shift the next concentration by forty meters. In this way, after four adjustments he completed a full “box” around the target area. The result was catastrophic for the enemy. Inside the bunker, the Americans huddled into as tight a ball as they could manage while the Chinese outside were cut down. The variable time fuse was an efficient device, using radio signals to detonate a 100 pound shell ten to thirty meters above the ground, sending thousands of pieces of jagged metal arching down in a cone-shaped funnel. The dozens of bursting shells ensured nothing above ground level would survive. “How many damn rounds are they going to shoot?” wondered Lieutenant Adams. Some shells failed to detonate or were mistakenly fused as impact. Each time one of these hit the ground, the bunker shuddered, but held. The shelling was so severe that when Callaway ordered, “Cease fire,” he could not tell if the bunker had even survived. For several days he was sure that his friend Adams and his team had perished in the maelstrom.29

In reality, many Chinese had congregated around OP Love in the vain attempt to capture the bunker, and a large number were killed in the continuous bombardment near the crest of Hill 395. The loss of these troops and the shattering effect of the U.S. TOT allowed the ROKs to disengage, reorganize, rearm, and bring up the reserve troops from the 28th Regiment to counterattack. By sunrise on 7 October, the Koreans had recovered their original positions at a cost of less than three hundred total casualties and were digging in, anticipating the next Chinese move.30

During the first twelve hours of the battle the CPVA’s losses had been severe with over seven hundred dead. The Koreans also recovered four recoilless rifles, ten light machine guns, thirty-eight automatic rifles, and three mortars. The counted dead may have been exaggerated, but the recovered weapons and equipment indicated that two, possibly three, battalions had been roughly handled.31 In response, the Chinese 38th Army immediately committed four more battalions from the 114th Division. Once again, overcome by the size of the Chinese force, the Koreans had to abandon their main positions. Just after 2400 on 7–8 October, the Chinese again controlled the heights; now it was their turn to defend against the inevitable counterattacks and the fearsome pounding by eight American and Korean artillery battalions. General Kim responded by recalling the 30th Regiment and ordering the 28th Regiment to assume responsibility for the battle. He also redeployed the 51st Reserve Regiment to cover the eastern portion of the division’s line (including Hill 284) and repositioned the 29th Regiment to backup the 28th’s attempt to recapture the hill, which it did after 2400 on 8 October.32

Intercepts of Chinese reporting showed the strain
of the battle: “Situation is bad. Need reinforcements; cannot hold out much longer; 7th and 8th companies very short of men. Need more artillery.”

By now the Chinese had also reinserted the 112th Division, even though they had taken a serious beating. The Korean troops had also suffered serious losses, with more than six hundred casualties. Fortunately for the Koreans, though, the artillery continued its crucial support. A significant contribution was made by American firepower as the fighting ground on during the early evening hours of 8 October. Two groups of Chinese infantry, assessed as battalion units, were identified assembling on the forward slopes of the northwestern ridge of White Horse Mountain. In a repeat performance of the variable timed fuse TOT, artillery salvos bracketed and pummeled these troops, scattering those who survived, and denied the Chinese the ability to reinforce their beleaguered troops struggling to hold onto the crest. A subsequent air strike completed the disintegration of this enemy force. A captured Chinese soldier revealed that the 335th Regiment, 112th Division, suffered exceptionally heavy casualties from air attack while in a preattack assembly area on the north side of Hill 395 and was unable to join the battle as ordered. Another prisoner later admitted that the unrelenting air and artillery bombardment crushed their morale and contributed to the huge butcher’s bill the 38th Army had to pay to keep the battle going.

Just prior to 2400 on 8–9 October, the two sides faced off merely twenty-five meters apart, throwing hand grenades and occasionally sniping. Neither side owned the crest. Now, the crescendo of the battle approached as fresh Chinese infantry—three battalions in successive echelons—supported by heavy concentration of artillery swarmed over Hill 395 beginning at 0100 on 9 October and within two hours had complete control over the hill’s peak, crest, and the ridge running from the crest to the northwest. Kim and his staff prepared a deliberate attack, with U.S. artillery and tactical aircraft to support the 1st and 2d battalions of the 29th Regiment. Over seventeen thousand shells, bombs, napalm canisters, and tank rounds pounded the crest, suspected reserve positions, and the Chinese artillery. A nighttime assault paid dividends as the Koreans regained the hill’s crest for the sixth time since the battle began four days earlier. By 0400 on 10 October, the Chinese returned and in a shower of grenades and bitter hand-to-hand fighting the two Korean battalions managed to maintain their hold and report as of 0630 hours their continued possession of White Horse Mountain’s crest. That night, a Chinese company attempted to cross the Yokok River between Hill 395 and Arrowhead Hill. Because of coordinated illumination support, Company C, 73d Tank Battalion, turned back this effort with severe casualties for the Chinese. Indeed, throughout the day, tank support had been critical for the Koreans’ endurance. Korean and U.S. tank crews fired 585 rounds of 90-mm. gun ammunition, 62,975 rounds of .50 caliber machine gun rounds, and 56,250 .30 caliber rounds.

There was hardly a pause for the exhausted ROK soldiers, as a few hours later the Chinese returned, but the pattern was by now well established—a frontal assault in battalion strength, straight at the crest of Hill 395. The UNC response was by now also well-rehearsed, as U.S. fighter-bomber aircraft screamed overhead and dropped ordnance with impunity, and U.S. and Korean gunners fired hundreds
of shells on preplanned target reference points. Although the Chinese did manage to seize the crest, their success was short-lived as an immediate two-battalion counterattack rushed the summit and drove the Chinese back again. The fighting became intensely bitter, with fifty Korean volunteers, self-described as “a forlorn effort” reoccupied the crest. But this time, the ROK soldiers continued to advance, moving three hundred meters down the northern slope. The Chinese responded this time with concentrated mortar and artillery fire, which sent the Koreans back to regroup after the commander of the 2d Battalion fell mortally wounded. At 2200, though, the Koreans were moving forward again, which signaled a third evolution in the battle, as the UNC began now to take more aggressive and offensive actions against the battered 38th Army.

General Jenkins, eager to exploit the Americans’ mobility and get more firepower into the battle, ordered the 140th Tank Battalion to prepare one company to team up with a Korean infantry company and conduct a raid about half a kilometer north of the MLR. At 0400 on 11 October, Company B, 140th Tank Battalion, accompanied by a company from the ROK 51st Regiment moved forward to a position due east of Hill 396. Unopposed, the tankers fired round after round at Chinese infantry, artillery, and logistics units on Hill 396 and the north slope of Hill 395. Later the same day, a similar task force composed of Company B, 73d Tank Battalion, and the ROK 2d Battalion, 30th Regiment, attacked up the western draw separating Hill 395 from the Arrowhead. After two hours of heavy fighting, the Korean infantry dug in on the western ridge. The Chinese recognized the danger of this position on the flank and they spared no effort to wipe it out. Although the 29th Regiment held the crest, by nightfall the western flank position had to be abandoned.

On 12 October, General Kim sensed the intensity of the Chinese attack...
had diminished, and he ordered his units to begin a “leap-frog” assault to keep the pressure on the Chinese and inflict maximum casualties while maintaining fresh troops in reserve to guard against a Chinese counter-maneuver. The staff planning and artillery preparation that accompanied this plan demonstrated how far the Korean leadership had progressed over the past year, as such an attack—requiring close coordination, fire control, and situational awareness—was clearly an advanced and difficult maneuver. However, the Korean troops and officers were up to the task. Elements of the 3d Battalion, 30th Regiment, were eager to get at the enemy and strike a severe blow. As they passed through the 29th Regiment, they were met by a strong Chinese thrust. Having reached a point one hundred meters north of the crest of the hill, the Koreans dug in and remained to defend throughout the night. Chinese efforts to force them back came to naught. An intercepted Chinese message said, “We have stopped our artillery. You start attacking position number five.” The troops on Hill 395 radioed back, “We have no strength [to attack].” 39

As U.S. and Korean officers assessed the results of the battle, the statistics were impressive. Certainly, the Chinese had never suffered so many casualties and such loss of equipment in fighting a single ROK division. The Koreans claimed 3,244 enemy killed (confirmed and counted), an additional 1,966 estimated killed, 4,021 estimated wounded, and 54 prisoners taken. Even allowing for inflation or exaggeration in the estimated killed and wounded categories, the CPVA 38th Army had suffered a significant defeat, using up two divisions against White Horse Mountain and a third assaulting Arrowhead Hill (Table 1). 41 According to several prisoner reports, company strength in the assaulting regiments was down to an average of only fifteen to twenty men. Prisoners also revealed that Chinese dead far exceeded the number of wounded because of a lack of evacuation facilities and the tremendous destructiveness of UNC air power and artillery that interdicted much of the Communists’ motor transport. 42

After the battle the Chinese attributed their failure to capture the two heights for three reasons: “The corps [38th Army] had made too hasty plans on the operation, selected inappropriate targets, and had the plan leaked by a defector.” These points certainly played a role in the battle’s outcome, but the Chinese failed to give due credit to their enemies. They assumed that the ROK 9th Division, whose fighting record up to this point was mediocre, would be easily pushed off the hill and that the Americans would accept, with equanimity, the loss of their positions north of the Yokkok River. These two assumptions led the Chinese to attempt too much by assaulting both Arrowhead Hill and White Horse Mountain with the same formation. They also committed too few troops to the initial assault and were unprepared for the amount of attrition they would suffer under UNC artillery bombardment, which made the ROK counterattacks more challenging to deal with when they came. The Chinese learned valuable lessons about the effectiveness of UNC artillery and tactical airpower, especially when there were inadequate anti-air defenses, troop assembly areas, and logistical support areas. In addition, artillery batteries were positioned in the open or in areas that were exposed to observation. However, the Chinese learned fast and these lessons would be well applied during the next confrontation in central Korea, the fight for Triangle Hill and Sniper Ridge, which the Chinese called the Battle for Shangganling. 43

On the Korean side, the reasons for success fall under two categories, one material and the other technical. Indicators of an impending attack and information from the captured Chinese officer prompted the division commander to begin fortifying his MLR and laying additional mines and obstacles, which greatly improved the defensive power of the Korean troops. Reinforced fortifications, even though hastily constructed, undoubt-
edly helped to spare many Korean soldiers from the effects of the initial Chinese bombardment. Based on the prisoner’s interrogation, Kim committed two additional battalions to the defense of Hill 395. The unexpected increase in Korean manpower threw the initial attacking force off balance and frustrated the original attack plan, which had been based on a defending force of one battalion. The fortuitous capture (and survival) of the CPVA defector also allowed the U.S. corps commander to adjust his supporting artillery to ensure maximum coverage with as many American guns (heavier than their Korean counterparts) as prudent. The IX Corps artillery officer ensured close collaboration and centralized direction of all indirect fire support units shooting for the ROK 9th Division. Between the IX Corps headquarters and the 213th Field Artillery (FA) Battalion, a complete counterbattery preparation plan was prepared and disseminated to all the American battalions by 5 October. The plan was executed as soon as the Chinese attack began and was revised throughout the battle. U.S. Army Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) officers advising the ROK 9th Division testified to the effectiveness of artillery fire support, reporting “TOT’s involving several battalions time and time again hit the enemy at critical periods in the battle and played a major part in his inability to hold ground gained. Likewise, [CPVA] reinforcements were dispersed . . . when their commitment to the battle could have been influential.” The net result was a decrease in Chinese artillery effectiveness, isolation of the battlefield that prevented Chinese infantry from bringing to bear their numerical advantages, and a large butcher’s bill for the 38th Army to pay.44

An aspect of the battle typically neglected is the role of Korean gunners, freshly graduated from intensive on-the-job training with the First Field Artillery Group. These young artillerymen did yeoman’s work, slinging thousands of artillery shells with effect in support of the Korean infantryman, who struggled to survive repeated Chinese assaults and the more than 43,000 shells fired at them by Chinese artillery and mortar men (Table 2).45

General Jenkins also massed additional corps assets such as engineers, antiaircraft batteries and searchlights, and tanks. Over terrain that was decidedly not “tank country,” U.S. and Korean armor crews turned in an impressive performance. The IX Corps special after action report credits tanks for significant actions.
that interdicted all routes of approach against the flanks of the Hill 395 defenders, forcing the Chinese to persist in costly frontal attacks on ground well saturated by air and artillery fire. At the same time, Korean troops could maneuver along these same flank approaches when required, as they did in the battle’s last phase. Korean tank units also received their baptism by fire at White Horse Mountain. Twenty-two M36 tank destroyers from the ROK 53d Tank Company covered the eastern flank of Hill 395 and played a key role to observe and interdict the movement of Chinese reinforcements.46

In an unusual turn of relations normally characterized (charitably) as interservice rivalry, the IX Corps leadership sang praises for the U.S. Air Force’s commitment to the battle, acknowledging the timely and effective support provided both during daytime and nighttime operations. Air support planning, coordinated with the artillery plans, also proceeded unencumbered by the usual frictions for close air support to the Koreans; weather was also considered exceptionally permissive and did not hinder observation or attack from the air. Pilots claimed to have destroyed 25 artillery positions, 61 bunkers, 870 meters of trench line, 4 tanks, and 4 other vehicles. One dedicated aircraft provided aerial flares under control of the Tactical Air Control Party stationed with the 1st FA Group headquarters. The flare ship dropped one to three one-million candlepower flares on each run across the battlefield. This illumination mission was crucial to allow FOs to spot targets at night and call for fire or provide early warning (Table 3).48

The second factor was the vindication of General Van Fleet’s soldier and officer training initiatives, started in the fall of 1951. Under KMAG’s direction, every Korean division participated in an eight-week regimen to rearm, resupply, and retrain at one of four Field Training Commands established in each U.S. corps sector. The 9th Division completed its Field Training Command rotation in October 1951 and even sponsored its own unit training program to keep their tactical skills sharp and provide officers with additional experience planning and executing specific tasks.49 This sense of modern professionalism among the Korean officer corps was evident at Hill 395. Kim and his staff performed magnificently to command and control the tempo of the battle. Both during offensive and defensive actions, Kim enforced a periodic rotation of units to keep troops fresh and prevent battle losses from undermining unit cohesion and effectiveness. Friendly casualties, which were substantial for a ten-day period of “stalemated” fighting, included 505 killed, 2,415 wounded, and 391 missing (prisoners or presumed killed). Korean officers played a much more prominent role, too, ensuring that their visible presence kept Korean soldiers focused on the enemy in front of them rather than the potential escape to their rear. Keeping the Korean soldiers in the trenches, or conversely, bringing

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<th>Table 3—Air Support for ROK 9th Division</th>
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<td><strong>Sorties Flown 6–15 October</strong></td>
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<td>Daytime</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 lb. bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firebombs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

them up the slopes over and over to face automatic weapons fire and hundreds of grenades was an incredible feat of leadership, perseverance, and patriotic motivation.50

In his own assessment, General Kim attributed the victory to four factors. First, the rapid acceptance and exploitation of intelligence information ensured that the division and the corps were as prepared as possible to not only defend but to also assume an offensive posture under the appropriate conditions. Second, the commander’s orders and staff directives were carried out precisely and promptly. Every unit commander understood his particular role, task, and purpose. The division commander’s intent was also crystal clear: the Koreans would hold Hill 395. Third, the cooperation of infantry, tanks, artillery, and air support was unprecedented and contributed to the lopsided casualty figures. Finally, the aggressiveness of his battalions defending, withdrawing, and counterattacking in turn kept the initiative from passing fully to the Chinese. As a result, the Koreans were able to wear down the 38th Army to the point that it was no longer capable of further offensive action.51

**Autumn Counterattack Operations**

On 21 October, Deng signaled his commanders that the counterattack operations had been a stunning success. “Our forces have gained tremendous experience,” he wrote, “and have inflicted heavy casualties [against] U.S. and its [ROK] forces.” With the U.S. offensive, Operation Showdown, already in progress further east, Deng prudently alerted his commanders that further retaliation attacks should be expected. “All [armies] must now go back to regular active defense operations starting on October 22.” But, the pressure of the American-Korean offensive at Kumhwa caused Deng almost immediately to countermand his order. He and his senior commanders decided to extend the counterattack campaign at least until the end of the month. During the last week of October, CPVA units across the front launched attacks against twenty-one additional objectives.52

The Autumn Counterattack Campaign was the first major offensive operation the Chinese and North Korean forces initiated since UNC forces had assumed their own active defense in the late fall of 1951. The Chinese believed these attacks had taken the UNC by surprise, and in addition to causing casualties and seizing valuable terrain, had disrupted or delayed Clark’s plan for a major offensive. The units involved learned to make elaborate and deliberate preparations for each attack, to include rehearsals and extensive political indoctrination to explain the purpose of the attack to the troops.53 The most successful attacks typically involved a small-scale “annihilation operation” based on the Communists’ fortified defensive tunnel and cave positions. They also tended to use fewer troops and more artillery than in previous offensives. The forceful use of artillery in these attacks helped the CPVA to achieve its tactical and operational goals at a much lower cost in casualties. Mao Zedong boasted to Joseph Stalin that the CPVA had learned great lessons and inflicted serious damage against the UNC during this campaign. He further explained “the reason we have achieved such an enormous victory . . . is—in addition to [the] bravery of [the] troops and commanders, solid works,
appropriate command and adequate supplies—the ferocity and accuracy of the artillery fire, which turned out to be the decisive factor."

Although defeated at White Horse Mountain, the Chinese proficiency with artillery was plainly manifest and documented by the Americans in a special after action report for the battle. U.S. analysis and evaluation of Chinese indirect fire methods and techniques gives a good illustration of just how sophisticated the Chinese had become using artillery in support of the infantry battle. In the ten days prior to the battle, the 38th Army had visibly increased its artillery positions, engaged in more counterbattery fire than before, and integrated additional reinforcing artillery. Few registration rounds were required for these new units, indicating Chinese gunners had a thorough understanding of enemy positions and the capabilities of their own guns. As a result of these enhancements, artillery fire during the attack was “timely, accurate, and usually effective.” The supply of communist artillery was also assessed as adequate as the number of rounds fired into the U.S. IX Corps sector reveals (Table 4).55

Two final points need to be made regarding this campaign and the battle for White Horse Mountain. The first is that from the Chinese
perspective, their tactical military efforts—excepting the rebuff at Hill 395—were an unqualified success. Not only did the UNC have to bear the responsibility for breaking off negotiations in early October, the Communists could look back on the month’s fighting with satisfaction that they had made the UNC pay for its unreasonable intransigence at Panmunjom. Furthermore, the Chinese in particular learned crucial lessons fighting modern war that translated into further strategic confidence. The shift from mobile to protracted war was working. Mao could, with equanimity, let the strategic impasse continue without fearing a major military reverse or penalty for his intransigence.56 Last, the counterattack campaign did finally provoke an ill-considered and hasty military response from the UNC. During this phase of the autumn fighting, the Communists would be able to reverse its strategic initiative and were using it to score cheap tactical victories, which would make it harder to bargain for an endgame that accomplished the UNC’s military goals and the policy objectives of President Harry Truman’s administration in Korea. As military men, both Generals Clark and Van Fleet understood the calculus. The Chinese advances would have to be met by an equally forceful offensive, if nothing else to demonstrate that the failure to agree to an armistice carried a price tag. To reverse the perception of Communist momentum in the fall of 1952, on 8 October—the same day that UNC negotiators broke off talks at Panmunjom and as the Chinese assault on Hill 395 was reaching its climax—General Clark gave approval for the bloody, and ultimately futile, limited attack that came to be known as Operation SHOWDOWN.57

Table 4—Artillery Fired Against U.S. IX Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Number of rounds (excluding mortar shells)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 5 (1800) to 6 (1800)</td>
<td>1,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6 (1800) to 7 (1800)</td>
<td>10,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 7 (1800) to 8 (1800)</td>
<td>2,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8 (1800) to 9 (1800)</td>
<td>12,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9 (1800) to 10 (1800)</td>
<td>4,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10 (1800) to 11 (1800)</td>
<td>4,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 11 (1800) to 12 (1800)</td>
<td>3,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 12 (1800) to 13 (1800)</td>
<td>5,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 13 (1800) to 14 (1800)</td>
<td>5,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 14 (1800) to 15 (1800)</td>
<td>4,631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Americans viewed the autumn fighting from the inverse perspective. The Koreans had fought magnificently. U.S. artillery had once again demonstrated its overwhelming capabilities and power. However, excepting White Horse Mountain, it appeared that the Communists had the strategic initiative and were using it to score cheap tactical victories, which would make it harder to bargain for an endgame that accomplished the UNC’s military goals and the policy objectives of President Harry Truman’s administration in Korea. As military men, both Generals Clark and Van Fleet understood the calculus. The Chinese advances would have to be met by an equally forceful offensive, if nothing else to demonstrate that the failure to agree to an armistice carried a price tag. To reverse the perception of Communist momentum in the fall of 1952, on 8 October—the same day that UNC negotiators broke off talks at Panmunjom and as the Chinese assault on Hill 395 was reaching its climax—General Clark gave approval for the bloody, and ultimately futile, limited attack that came to be known as Operation SHOWDOWN.57

Notes

5. Operation COUNTER was undertaken by the newly arrived U.S. 45th Infantry Division to establish a stronger outpost line and provide greater security for its main line of resistance. In addition to the above mentioned hills, the division also successfully captured Old Baldy and Porkchop Hill—both would be heavily contested until the end of the war. Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1992), pp. 288–91.
8. Ibid., pp. 597–98.


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 604.

14. KIMH, KW, 3:458–64 summarizes the Korean action on White Horse Mountain. Scarce mention, though, is given to the invaluable U.S. support (material and psychological), and there is little analysis as to why the ROK 9th Division fought as well as it did against overwhelming Chinese numbers.


19. Ibid., pp. 10–11.


22. IX Corps, Special AAR, p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 40.

24. KMAG Command Report, October 1952, Annex F-50, ROK 9th Division, pp. 10–11. For the period of 3–4 October, ROK troops counted 117 rounds landing on Hill 395; on 5 October the daily average doubled to 132 and in only six and one half hours on 6 October (0600–1230) the total spiked by almost ten times, to 1,291 rounds. Six hours later, just as the Chinese infantry began their attack, more than 3,300 rounds had hit the Koreans’ positions. IX Corps, Special AAR, pp. 7, 8–10, 89.


29. Sobieski, *A Hill Called White Horse*, pp. 119–31. Adams was evacuated immediately after his ordeal, but Callaway stayed on OP Roger for several more days. It was not until after the battle was over that the two lieutenants enjoyed an emotional reunion.


35. KMAG Command Report, October 1952, Annex F-50, ROK 9th Division, p. 29. KMAG officers reported that from 0001 to 0400 on 9 October 2,149 shells fell on the hill and were the primary reason for the Korean withdrawal. KMAG Command Report, October 1952, Annex F-50, ROK 9th Division, pp. 92–93.


42. IX Corps, Special AAR, p. 20.


44. IX Corps, Special AAR, pp. 6–7, 29, 31–32.


46. IX Corps, Special AAR, pp. 32, 36.

47. There is some disagreement between the two reports as to the number of rounds fired by caliber. The IX Corps totals are in some cases, as with 105-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars, significantly higher than the Korean report. The discrepancy is likely due to the close proximity of other engagements (Arrowhead Hill and Hill 381) to Hill 395 that drew on IX Corps artillery assets, and therefore, inflated the corps’ reported numbers.


53. IX Corps, Special AAR, p. 23.


55. IX Corps, Special AAR, p. 24. The average number of Chinese artillery shells (not mortars) in the previous thirty days was 244 per 24-hour period.


Coming Soon...
The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed Up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (A Way Forward)

By Stephen L. Melton
Zenith Press, 2009
Pp. xiv, 306. $30

Review by Antulio J. Echevarria II

The Clausewitz Delusion is an enormously subjective book, worked out in some detail and argued with vigor, but ultimately with too little evidence to be convincing. That is a shame, as parts of the book raise important questions, though not necessarily the ones the author intended.

Stephen L. Melton attempts a compound argument that Clausewitz’s ideas, combined with the onset of the Cold War, reinforced a defensive strategic mindset that quickly forgot the U.S. military’s long tradition of offensive wars, and what it takes to win them, this in turn has made the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan more difficult than they needed to be. Unfortunately, parts of this argument are as unnecessary as they are distracting, and do little more than undermine the author’s case and credibility. The first part of the compound argument—that Clausewitz is to blame for the Army’s performance in the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan—is the least useful, and the most indefensible. It is also completely unoriginal. A number of authors have already attempted to decry Clausewitz’s alleged negative influence: how his ideas were too dynastic, too state-centric, too battle-centric, and in the end simply too antiquated to be applied to contemporary wars. In every case, these authors can be shown to have misread or misstated Clausewitz, and to have ascribed too much influence to his ideas. To be sure, there was a “Clausewitz renaissance” of sorts in the U.S. military, which began in the late 1970s and continued through the 1980s; and a vast number of quotes related to concepts such as friction, center of gravity, culminating points, and other theories, appeared frequently in the military literature of that period. However, as the authors of the 1982 Field Manual 100–5 AirLand Battle have attested, several other esteemed theorists, such as the elder Moltke, Heinz Guderian, John Boyd, Marshall Tukhaschevsky, and Sun Tzu, were also quoted repeatedly. The point is that the renaissance of the American Army after Vietnam involved reaching out to a number of ideas and theorists, not just Clausewitz. The influence of any one theorist is, in any case, difficult to isolate, or compare. In short, this part of the compound argument is weak, and one has to wonder why the author opened with it.

The second part of the Melton’s argument is that the U.S. Army either does not have an institutional memory, or does not make a habit of accessing it. According to Melton, the military does not appear to value historical data, and what they might teach; nor does it appreciate the value of history in general. As a result, the military is forced to “relearn” the lessons of its own history, and sometimes at great cost; it has fought many wars similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan before, and done so successfully. Yet, the lessons from those previous conflicts were not taught in the institutions responsible for professional military education; nor were they incorporated into modern doctrine. Consequently, officers of all ranks were unprepared for “Phase IV” or stability and reconstruction operations. Hence, the U.S. Army had to learn again what it should already have known and had to do it under fire while insurgent forces in Iraq were rapidly gaining momentum.

However, this part of the argument has two problems, which the author fails to address. The first is that professional historians know that there is a difference between the past—which is what actually happened (and cannot be fully known)—and history—which is what historians write about the past, filling in the gaps as necessary. This difference is not insurmountable, but it does mean that extreme caution must be exercised whenever one draws “lessons from,” or searches for “patterns in,” history. It takes time to develop a critical eye and time is at a premium in an officer’s career. Where should this skill reside, and how should it be...
cultivated? Second, Melton does not address the problem of institutional memory. He raises the issue, but not as institutional memory as such, and does not offer any remedies for increasing access to it. The problem is recognized by the Army and other organizations, and addressing it may require changing our approach to military education. In short, the first two elements of the compound argument raise troubling questions, but not about Clausewitz’s ideas or institutional memory, per se; instead, they cast doubt on the quality of modern professional military education, particularly in the U.S. Army, and particularly at Ft. Leavenworth. What Melton ultimately says, whether he intends to or not, is that the faculty at military schools are generally incompetent. In other words, the modern military education system is broken because (a) it has no way of assessing whether what it teaches is accurate, or (b) necessary, and that (c) it is not interested in learning from the past.

Instead of addressing these important issues in any depth, Melton shifts to the third part of his argument, the notion that “offensive war” offers a better framework for understanding the conflicts the U.S. finds itself fighting today, and that this should be the model for contemporary professional military education and force structure. The taxonomy the author offers, which is neatly portrayed on two charts (pp. 21–22), is not without its uses; it would be a functional starting point for a professional development seminar, for instance. However, the various case studies offered are simply too thin. They need more historical context to anchor them, and more analysis to be compelling. Indeed, if the Army is not doing enough historical analysis, one wonders why there is not more of it in this book to set an example. This reviewer believes Melton is right in asserting that the U.S. military is as culpable as its political leadership for making the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan more difficult than they needed to be. However, we cannot truly begin learning from our mistakes until we stop deluding ourselves that Clausewitz is to blame for them.

Dr. Antuilio J. Echevarria II became the director of research for the U.S. Army War College after a military career of 23 years. He has held a variety of command and staff assignments in Europe and the United States. He is the author of Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford, 2007), Imagining Future War (Santa Barbara, Calif., 2007), and After Clausewitz (Lawrence, Kans., 2001).

U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror

By Walter E. Kretchik
University Press of Kansas, 2011
Pp. xv, 392. $39.95

Review by Thomas A. Bruscino

In U.S. Army Doctrine, Walter Kretchik provides a good and balanced account of Army doctrine from the 1770s to the 2000s. He does not review all doctrine—his focus is on “keystone doctrine,” which he defines as the single manual that is dominant for its era. When it comes to the manuals, he begins with Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben’s 1776 Regulations, continues through the various Infantry Tactics manuals of the nineteenth century, and then onto the Field Service Regulations and Field Manuals (FM) 100–5 and 3–0 Operations of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Along the way, Kretchik makes a strong case that Army doctrine writers deserve more credit than they commonly receive. They did not just try to prepare to fight the last war or the types of wars they wanted to fight. They tried to write fundamental doctrine to prepare the Army for an uncertain future by attempting to square American interests and Army fighting traditions with perceived threats, new technologies, and likely operating environments. Kretchik’s analysis does not stray much beyond those individual manuals and their application in a few illustrative conflicts or missions. So, at the very least, U.S. Army Doctrine is an excellent summary of the content of the manuals under review, and it is therefore valuable to both historians and military professionals who want an introduction to Army keystone doctrine over the course of the past 250 years.

The main question is why should we care? Why would anyone be interested in such a broad overview of a narrowly defined concept as keystone doctrine? That question is not meant to be dismissive, but rather to look more closely at the issue at hand. Most observers outside of Army culture probably have no idea why such a singular focus on keystone doctrine would be so important to someone like Kretchik. For contemporary Army officers, the answer is obvious. Indeed for such officers, including the now-retired Kretchik, the concept of a keystone or capstone doctrine is so ingrained in the culture that they assume it had always been there. That is not the case. Kretchik’s book, whether it was his intent or not, is actually an account of how it came to be that so-called keystone doctrine became such a central part of contemporary Army thinking.

The early chapters of the book are especially telling in this regard. For example, even though Kretchik chooses to focus on the individual Infantry Tactics manuals, it is clear that Army officers at the time did not see such manuals as the central guide to the Army’s role in the nation’s defense. Even the Field Service Regulations of
the first half of the twentieth century did not carry the weight of shaping the entire Army to meet every contingency. It really was not until after World War II, when the concerns of the Cold War and the proliferation of nuclear weapons led to the Army struggling to define its role and secure a larger share of the defense budget, that FM 100–5 became an instrument to make the strategic case for the role and importance of land power. The real arrival of a single manual as keystone doctrine came in the 1970s, when FM 100–5 became an instrument to make the Army’s strategic purpose and began to be used more explicitly to guide Army training and education. After that, the Operations manual became a veritable catch-all of Army activities—a single document that defines the Army and all it does.

Since then, the Army has become positively spellbound by keystone doctrine, believing it to align the entire force into a coherent pattern of organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities. Kretchik seems to favor this interpretation, which is perhaps not surprising because he helped write the 2001 FM 3–0, the manual that formalized “full spectrum operations.” It does not get more catch-all than that.

The interesting thing is that the history covered in Kretchik’s account consistently calls into question the centrality of keystone doctrine to the story of the Army’s performance in war. At every turn, Kretchik’s summary of historical wars and missions leads to questions about what role was played by military theory, non-keystone doctrine, personality, individual experience and temperament, nonkeystone doctrinal education and training, technology, chance, fog, friction, and so on. He leaves these questions largely unanswered, but that should not be held against him. The truth is that his subject, the keystone doctrine itself, leaves those questions unanswered. As well it should. The Army did not succeed in World War II solely or even largely because of the content of a single doctrinal manual, just as the U.S. did not fail in Vietnam because something was missing in the various editions of FM 100–5. Those wars—all wars—are far too complex for that. This is not a critique of doctrine; it is an observation, but one with an important implication.

The untouched issues in reading U.S. Army Doctrine are a constant reminder that even keystone doctrine is after all just a small subset of the military experience, and really not even that essential to the overall structure of the Army. If the supposedly keystone doctrine cannot explain how or why the U.S. Army does well or poorly in wars, then maybe it is not so foundational after all. It is true that manuals guiding infantry tactics and Army operations have implications for how the entire force will be prepared and postured for war, but the main and most important purpose of the Operations manual is providing fundamental guidance on how Army units conduct operations. That is a lot, but it is not everything.

The Army’s latest doctrinal project—captured in the ongoing production of the short Army Doctrinal Publications—seems to have reduced this focus on keystone doctrine as the lodestar for all the Army is and does. The new manuals more narrowly focus on the fundamentals of the topic at hand—operations, mission command, the operations process, etc.—to provide basic guidance for those activities. In the opinion of this reviewer (who, in the interest of full disclosure, had a very small hand in the writing of ADP 3–0) this more modest approach better captures what doctrine, even keystone doctrine, can and should do for the Army. It will be up to history, maybe a future edition of Walter Kretchik’s thought-provoking book, to decide.

By Norman Youngblood
Pp. xvi, 258, $45

Review by David J. Ulbrich

In The Development of Mine Warfare, Norman Youngblood makes a chronological examination of mine warfare from antiquity through the twentieth century. He believes that too many studies have focused on recent history to the exclusion of earlier periods. Youngblood tries to correct this presentist approach by tracing trends of functions and designs of mines.

The Development of Mine Warfare is divided into seven chapters, four of which concentrate on the pre–World War I period. Youngblood begins and ends with coverage of bans on land mine use and the immorality of land mines. At their most basic levels, Youngblood finds similar purposes for land mines (explosive devices buried in the ground designed to kill or terrorize people and to impede enemy movement), sea mines (explosive devices floating or submerged in water designed to damage or restrict movement of enemy ships), and mines (excavated tunnels or shafts designed to undermine and collapse enemy position).

Put in other terms, these three types of mines yield advantages in mobility, countermobility, or survivability, all of which are classic battlefield functions of combat engineering. Youngblood also finds many pieces of evidence in the centuries before World War I that
using mines was seen as cowardly or barbarous. Mines were unseen weapons that caught enemy combatants by surprise. Those combatants could not fight back. Their best hope of survival lay in detecting mines before they detonated or before the devices were command detonated remotely.

Youngblood correctly argues that the advent of the tank in World War I created a desperate need for land mines and changed the moral implications of their use. Because heavily armored tanks were impervious to small arms fire and could breach obstacles, the defending forces needed a cost-effective way to disable or destroy tanks. The land mine represented the solution. World War I and more recent conflicts also saw the advent of more reliable detonation and fusing processes that increased the destructive potential of mines, while allowing the enemy to remain largely safe from counterattack.

Two of the more useful facets of Youngblood’s book can be found in his descriptions of mines and in the stories of the men who designed those mines. He explains how the fougasse—an early version of an improvised explosive device (IED)—was designed and deployed in eighteenth-century Europe. He gives a brief biography of Immanuel Nobel, the nineteenth-century Swedish figure who developed mines for Imperial Russian, who Youngblood calls the “father” of mine warfare. The author also discusses various mines introduced during the American Civil War by Confederate Brig. Gen. Gabriel Rains. Rains held the distinction of creating a relatively reliable mechanical fuse for his mines. More recently, in the twentieth century, Youngblood details the designs and uses of the German S-mine and the American Claymore.

As it is conceived, Youngblood’s book is a survey text with sweeping coverage supplemented by detailed sidebars. However, this book suffers from weaknesses and shortcomings that reduce its relevance and value. First, the dust jacket is misleading vis-à-vis the book’s content: seeing a photograph of a forlorn child holding his bandaged arm and another photograph of a humanitarian demining worker walking next to a sign reading “Oprez Mine! Zabranjen Pristup” makes the reader think that Youngblood’s book will concentrate on the post–Cold War era. However, this book includes only one short paragraph on mining and demining in the Balkans in the 1990s, a topic that requires much more careful analysis because land mines in that region have shaped public and military discourses ever since. Although Youngblood completed his dissertation, on which this book was based, in 2002 and this book subsequently appeared in print in 2006, sufficient documentation on the Balkans was available in the 1990s and early 2000s to support more thorough examination of that region.

Another weakness can be found in the flow of Youngblood’s book. His narrative becomes disjointed and uneven as his survey moves into the twentieth century. The period from 1945 to 2000 receives twenty pages of coverage, including only two pages for the Korean War and ten pages on Vietnam. In this latter section, no mention is made of the U.S. Army’s Mine Warfare Center, nor is there sufficient analysis of American training, doctrine, or lessons learned processes performed at this center. Youngblood does not include U.S. Army documents like the TC 5–31 Viet Cong Booby Trap, Mines, and Mine Warfare Techniques (1967) or the substantial Study and Evaluation of Countermine Activities (1967). Both key sources would have bolstered Youngblood’s arguments and added much nuance to his interpretations.

This book’s dearth of sources on Vietnam goes to its most significant shortcoming. Although Youngblood may have utilized the resources at Texas Tech University where he completed his doctorate, he did not look far afield in his research. Texas Tech’s holdings on Vietnam are substantial, but there is no substitute for conducting additional research at such repositories as the National Archives at College Park, Maryland; the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; or the U.S. Army Engineer School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Even allowing for a publication date of 2006, more thorough assessments of land mines in Korea and Vietnam would have illuminated continuities and trends applicable to recent efforts in the Middle East to defeat IEDs and the networks that produce them. The North Korean, Chinese, Viet Cong, and North Vietnamese army’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for deploying IEDs and land mines are strikingly similar to those TTPs used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ultimately, in leaning so far away from presentist studies of mine warfare, Youngblood’s book loses much relevance to today’s fight.
Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat: The Third United States Artillery Regiment in the War of 1812 simply as hagiographic popular study of its subject of little use except to a nonspecialist audience. It is clearly a labor of love and Barbuto does have a somewhat dramatic prose style, but this would be to overlook the virtues of this handy little volume. In addition to synthesizing readily available sources, Barbuto also makes deft use of archival materials, particularly the regiment’s Orderly Book. If one wished to quibble, one might question the absence of Boyd Dastrup’s King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery (Washington, D.C., 1992) and Janice McKenney’s The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775–2003 (Washington, D.C., 2007) from Barbuto’s bibliography, but his narrative does not appear to have suffered from the omission.

After a useful discussion of the organization and equipment of American artillery on the eve of war, Barbuto uses the occasion of the prewar authorization of the 3d Artillery to provide a brief sketch of the intracies of recruiting in the early nineteenth century. In addition, the reader is treated to biographical resumes of many of the regiment’s more prominent officers, both in the body of the text and in lengthy sidebars on Alexander Macomb and Ichabod Crane. Barbuto also conveys the difficulties of training, provisioning, billeting, and retaining troops that all American units faced as they mobilized and moved into their various areas of operations, particularly on the northern frontier.

There may not have been the scope for it in a work of this size, but one incident in particular might have benefited from greater explication. As several companies of the 3d marched through the upstate New York town of Russia, frictions with the local citizenry degenerated to such an extent that a bayonet charge against a posse of townsfolk was necessary for the soldiers to continue on toward Sackett’s Harbor. Although Barbuto notes the irony of the situation, it might have prompted a bit more commentary on civil-military relations.

In the coverage of the 3d Artillery’s operational history, the heart of Barbuto’s narrative is necessarily episodic, mainly dealing with events on the U.S.–Canadian frontier. Although a good portion of the regiment did operate together, the individual companies often found themselves widely scattered across the northern theater, operating as infantry more often than manning artillery. Given the fractionated operations of U.S. artillery regiments in the War of 1812 and the fact that in 1814 the 1st, 2d, and 3d Regiments of artillery were consolidated into a Corps of Artillery, the regimental perspective of the book is a sometimes awkward prism into the activities of what sometimes seems a collection of vaguely related companies. However, this is simply the nature of the beast, and Barbuto should be commended for bringing order to the situation.

The reader is treated to narrative resumes of all the major actions in which elements of the 3d Artillery participated and the specific parts they played. Thus, Barbuto covers in good detail the Battle of Queenston Heights in the Fall of 1812, the abortive campaigns of 1813 including the capture of York and Fort George, and the defense of Sackett’s Harbor as well as the battles of Chateauguay and Chrysler’s Farm, and the defense of Oswego, Fort Erie, and Plattsburg in 1814. So thorough is his coverage that Barbuto even includes the Chesapeake campaign of 1814 and the defense of Fort McHenry though the only member of the 3d present was Major George Armistead.

A final chapter detailing the postwar fates of several of the 3d Artillery’s officers provides a fitting closing. Overall the apparatus of the book is valuable, including useful maps and illustrations, detailed sidebars, a good chronology, and a biographical appendix that helps the reader keep track of the various personalities involved. It is hard to imagine what more one might have reasonably expected in such a work.
1861, the Civil War, and the period from 1865 until World War I, both world wars, and the period from 1945 until the present. Four categories are devoted to the U.S. Army Air Force—U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, and he also has separate categories for African American women and for juvenile titles. It should come as no surprise that the largest of the twelve categories is the Civil War, whose ninety pages comprise almost one-quarter of the book. The most recent entries come from 2009, which means that there have probably been several score more articles and books, such as the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862–1867 (Washington, D.C., 2011), which will have to be added to revised editions of this bibliography.

Controvich’s work begins with a user’s guide that offers a concise description of each category. There are a number of errors in this brief section. In his discussion of the Civil War, Controvich maintains that there were only seventy-five African American commissioned officers (p. 2), when in fact there were at least eighty-seven African American line officers and an additional twenty-one officers who served as chaplains and surgeons for the U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) in the Union Army. In discussing the period between the Civil War and World War I, he writes that four black regiments were added to the Army’s “active forces” (p. 3); actually, six black regiments were added to the Regular Army in 1866 and then consolidated to form four regiments three years later. Controvich also writes that state militias began to organize black units after the Civil War (p. 3); however, four states—Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Rhode Island—had already organized black militia units during the war. During World War I, Controvich writes that the American Expeditionary Forces’ two black divisions (the 92d and 93d) combined National Guardmen with draftees and volunteers (p. 4), when in fact all of the black National Guard units were assigned to three regiments in the 93d Division. He also maintains that both divisions served under the French Army, but only the 93d Division’s regiments fought under French command. During World War II, he notes that Benjamin Davis Jr. served with the “Tuskegee Airmen” and became “the first African American to reach the rank of general in any of the services.” (p. 6) However, although Davis did become the Air Force’s first black brigadier general in 1954, it was his father, Benjamin Davis Sr., who became the nation’s first black flag officer (in the Army) in 1940.

A few additional errors were noted within the chronological categories. In the Civil War section, this reader’s article, “Douglas’s Battery at Fort Leavenworth,” which appeared in the Winter 2000–2001 (vol. 23, no. 4) issue of Kansas History, is listed under the “Independent Colored Battery, Kansas Light Artillery” (p. 145), when in fact the unit’s official title was the Independent Battery, U.S. Colored Light Artillery. In the post–Civil War section, an article on the First Arkansas Colored Regiment is listed within the “State Militia–National Guard Units” subsection (p. 211), when that regiment actually belonged to the USCT (as the 46th U.S. Colored Infantry) during the Civil War, and it was not a part of the Arkansas militia during the Gilded Age.

The aforementioned errors are relatively minor, however, and all in all, African Americans in Defense of the Nation is a useful and much needed bibliography that will be greatly appreciated by aficionados of black military history. Unfortunately, the volume’s high cost will probably limit its sales primarily to libraries.

Roger D. Cunningham graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1972 and retired from the U.S. Army in 1994. He is the author of The Black Citizen-Soldiers of Kansas, 1864–1901 (Columbia, Mo., 2008), as well as numerous articles and book reviews, many of which have appeared in this journal.

Review by Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas

The performance of the small British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in Belgium and northern France in the late summer and autumn of 1914 is the stuff of legend. Although in retreat, the professional “Tommies” of the storied regiments that had expanded and policed the British Empire for generations caught the conscript, but well-trained and well-drilled, German army by surprise. Mons, the Yser Canal, and Le Cateau stand as tribute to British rapid rifle fire and its devastating effects.

In recent years, there has been a controversy among British military historians as to how much of the BEF’s success can be traced to its experience in the 1899–1902 Second Anglo-Boer War. Did the British Army learn anything from the struggle to defeat the
Boers, and if it did, were those lessons a key to the disruption of von Schlieffen’s timetable, a factor that bought enough time for French troops to counterattack at the Marne and prevent the Germans from taking Paris in the first few weeks of the war?

Spencer Jones’ book, *From Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army, 1902–1914*, endeavors to answer this question and settle the discussion. He begins by giving an excellent overview of the Boer War, including the causes, the battles, and the aftermath. This recitation is followed by his examination of the British experience during the Boer War, and its effects on the three branches of the army: the infantry, artillery, and cavalry. Jones, a teacher at the Centre for First World War Studies at the University of Birmingham, England, wraps up his conclusions by restating the points that he had made at the beginning of each of these three areas.

In all three of these discussions, he draws on a wealth of sources that are all listed in the voluminous bibliography and clearly cited in the notes. It is obvious that Jones is not only very well acquainted with the most recent scholarship on the subject, but that he has read all of the pertinent and appropriate documents, newspaper articles, manuals, and publications that appeared over a twenty-year period from 1894 to 1914. There are some obscure treatises listed in the bibliography and quoted or referenced in the notes, to be sure!

In his look at the infantry Jones examines the use of cover by British troops, but focuses on the rifle, rifle marksmanship, and volume of fire. While he devotes a paragraph on page 95 to the introduction of the Short, Magazine, Lee-Enfield (SMLE) rifle in 1903, he does not point out the advantages of this new rifle over the “Long Lee” version used in the Boer War, except to infer that its intermediate-length barrel provided a compromise weapon that replaced the old infantry rifle and the cavalry carbine. There is no discussion of the much-improved rear sight on the SMLE—the most exacting sighting arrangement (in terms of yardage increments) of any battle rifle in the world at that time. Readers would have welcomed an explanation of the reasons why the Boers were able to shoot more accurately at long range than the British, when the British rifle had the ability to adjust for windage, and the Boer Mauser rifles did not. Jones gives a very good description of the increased marksmanship training courses instituted in the British Army after the Boer War and the introduction of the “mad minute” of fifteen rounds of aimed rapid fire, but neglects to tell the reader why the insistence on fifteen rounds was so important. This is linked to the conundrum of how the Boers were able to overwhelm their opponents with sustained rifle firepower when the internal magazines of their Mauser rifles only contained half the number of cartridges in the detachable magazine of the SMLE. A discussion of the advantages of the lowly and simple stripper clip, or charger, would have been very appropriate here. Volley fire sights and magazine cut offs (and their disappearance during World War I) are also an important part of the story, and the book would have benefited from a discussion of their origins and use. However, aside from these minor points, Jones’ conclusions are sound.

The section on artillery is well written and analyzed, and Jones shows a very good understanding of artillery fire, explosive charges, and the terrain of South Africa. While the nomenclature being used by the author is understandable, readers could be confused by the continued use of the simple term “pom-pom” gun, without a description of the gun, as this name can be applied to entirely different weapons in history—the Boer War version is a 37-mm. Maxim gun and the “pom-poms” of World War II can be several types of 40-mm. automatic cannons.

Jones brings forth all of the arguments, pro and con, concerning the continued use of sabers and lances in his discussion of the cavalry. His characterization of Erskine Childers simply as “a civilian who had served as a volunteer artilleryman during the war” is an understatement of Childers’ wide range of interests and abilities (p. 185). Childers’ opinions on the *arme blanche* were very appropriate. The refusal of the 5th Royal (Irish) Lancers to take up the rifle in lieu of the lance could use more explanation (p. 174). While a lancer could have retained both the lance and the carbine (since the carbine was carried in a saddle boot), he could not carry both the lance and the rifle as the rifle would have to have been slung over the shoulder thus interfering with the lance. The section on mounted infantry units is very illuminating, and it appears that this advantage was lost on those British commanders who gained so much (indeed, perhaps their initial military victory over the Boers) from the employment of these units. While the soldiers of the newly formed mounted infantry units may not have been trained cavalymen, and may not have cared for their mounts as they should have, they did give the advantage of mobility—the telling characteristic of the Boer commando—to the foot-weary British Army in South Africa.

While the author continues to remind the reader about the clarified air and long sighting distances that are peculiar to South Africa, some of the statements by serving British officers that he selected to illustrate his points do seem to be a bit overstated. For instance, an officer of the 18th Hussars noted that “all the Boers had to do was keep at 2,000 yards from our cavalry in the hills, and could shoot them down with impunity . . .” because the Lee-Enfield carbine supposedly was only accurate up to 1,200 yards and could not return fire, although it was sighted to 2,000 yards (p. 172). The officer also notes that his men were under “heavy rifle fire” at ranges of 2,500 to 3,000 yards, inferring that this was aimed rifle fire at an individual. While the M1895/6 Mauser is sighted to a maximum range of 2,000 meters, there is no adjustment for windage—and at that distance, the least bit of wind makes a big difference. Although the Boers were excellent shots because of their reliance on hunting for wild game, it is very doubtful that were a Boer aiming at an individual Tommy Atkins over the fully extended sight ladder on his Mauser at these distances, he would actually hit him. Long-range sniper shooting today in Afghanistan, with telescopic sights, is considered remarkable at far shorter distances.

Finally, the book would be more readable had the editor expunged all of the standard phrases (such as, “I plan to show . . . ,” “In this
Review by Gates Brown

The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal effectively discusses the evolution and capabilities of America's nuclear arms through the post–World War II period. Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris begin the work with a quick overview of the development of nuclear weapons and their role in national defense and the Cold War. The work then gives a brief technical overview of warheads, strategic aircraft, tactical aircraft, strategic missiles, tactical missiles, rockets, artillery, and antisubmarine weapons. Each of the chapters features an alphabetic listing of the weapons in that category with an operational description and a brief technical explanation of the capabilities of the weapon discussed.

The opening chapter's description of the formation of America's nuclear arsenal allows the reader to understand why the United States developed and improved upon its nuclear weapons during the Cold War. It also describes the aftermath of the Cold War and how the security paradigm changed the planning assumptions for nuclear warfare. Polmar and Norris show how the United States altered the nuclear triad from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), strategic bombers, and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM), to a triad that de-emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in national defense. In the new defensive triad they were only one part of a triangle that included a national missile defense system and a quickly deployable conventional force.

The subsequent chapters discuss warheads, delivery vehicles, artillery, and antisubmarine weapons individually. This allows the reader to understand the development and scope of America's nuclear weaponry. This is one of the best aspects of the book; it gives the reader an appreciation of the vastness of America's nuclear weapons programs. The authors show that these weapons were not only strategic in conception but that tactical nuclear weapons were also part of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.

The treatment of atomic warheads provides the reader a chance to see how these weapons developed over time. The alphabetical suborganization allows for an overall outline that is basically chronological. This is helpful because it shows the dramatic changes in the destructive power of these weapons. The book begins with a relatively in-depth discussion of the development of the first two atomic warheads, Fat Man and Little Boy. Once again the authors use their brief narrative to concisely describe the importance of these weapons systems.

The work divides aircraft into two categories, strategic and tactical. Polmar and Norris discuss the development of strategic aircraft in an effective chapter introduction. They also devote several pages to discussing some of the more important aircraft and giving a brief history of them. Aircraft such as the B–2 Stealth Bomber and the B–29 Superfortress each receive relatively in-depth treatment. The discussion of tactical aircraft is less in-depth, primarily because of the lack of emphasis from the Air Force on this category of airframe. The coverage of aircraft takes almost half of the entire work, showing the importance of these delivery vehicles in the American nuclear weapons program.

Polmar and Norris separate their discussion of missiles into strategic and tactical missiles, with the coverage of nuclear capable rockets coming with the review of tactical missiles. Atomic artillery and antisubmarine weapons each receive their own chapter. These final chapters discuss some of the more interesting aspects of nuclear weapons in the Cold War period. Weapons such as the Davy Crocket and the M65 280-mm. atomic cannon demonstrate the influence of atomic weapons at every level of warfare in the early Cold War era.

There are three appendices: a section on the development of America's nuclear stockpile, a section on the effects of nuclear weapons, and a table showing the U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces from 1945 through 2008. The appendix on the effects of nuclear weapons shows the magnitude of an atomic strike and what the likely damage would be. This gives a valuable perspective and provides the reader with a greater understanding of what a 1-megaton weapon would do as compared with a 10-megaton weapon. This appendix also gives a detailed explanation of how nuclear weapons differ in their destructive capabilities from conventional weapons, specifically radiation and electromagnetic pulse.

The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal is an invaluable reference. There are few works that treat all aspects of America's nuclear weapons program in their entirety. The authors provide a comprehensive understanding of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. They also provide the reader with a format that shows how these weapons, particularly the warheads, improved over time. Photographs of almost every weapon system discussed are provided. This shows the level of research and seriousness that the authors dedicated to this volume.
Polmar and Norris provide an effective treatment of the American nuclear weapons arsenal. This book is a valuable starting point for understanding how nuclear weapons fit into America’s defense system in the atomic age. It also shows how these weapons grew in importance and how their role in national defense changed throughout the Cold War.

Dr. Gates Brown, a former Army officer and history instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an analyst for the Department of the Treasury. He earned his doctorate from the University of Kansas. His main research focus is the early Cold War period and the influence of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s defense policy on the U.S. Army and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962

By Jonathan M. House

University of Oklahoma Press, 2012

Pp. xiv, 546. $45

Review by Donald A. Carter

In the preface of A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962, author Jonathan M. House describes the current state of Cold War history as “voluminous;” literature, he says, that tends to two extremes, either macro accounts focusing on national security and diplomatic history, or chronicles describing the individual experiences of soldiers, commanders, and political leaders. In this book House lays claim to the middle ground, to describe how politicians and military officers have designed, organized, and equipped military forces, and then committed those forces toward some goal of national policy.

Chapter by chapter, this is a well-written, thoroughly researched, and judiciously documented contribution to the study of Cold War military history. Instead of simply rehashing familiar discussions of the Korean War and the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria, the author also considers conflicts and insurgencies that have not received extensive popular consideration. An early chapter on the Greek civil war not only details the various stages of American involvement, but also describes how that effort became a model for future anti-Communist efforts. A section on the Chinese civil war is probably a bit too brief, but is detailed enough to illustrate the foolishness of U.S. political repressions regarding who “lost” China. The author’s objective to demonstrate how nations used military force to achieve political goals is perhaps best exemplified in passages covering British counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya, Cyprus, and Kenya. The attempts of the European powers to maintain their colonial holdings in the post–World War II era prompt several interesting discussions and challenge assumptions regarding the use of military force to achieve political goals.

Other more familiar Cold War events are also included, although of necessity, in a fairly cursory manner. The Korean War is a well-worked historical field and there are no new revelations here. A section on French actions in Indochina and Algeria is nicely tied together and raises the issue of how the French armed forces were influenced by their experiences in those countries. House includes those “Veterans of Unfought Wars” who, for years, prepared for a World War III that never came. His chapters on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and the adaptation of the U.S. military to the nuclear age serve as useful springboards for more detailed examinations of the armed forces who served during the Cold War. The author’s previous excellent work on the Soviet army during World War II is also reflected in several interesting passages devoted to its postwar evolution and employment during uprisings in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

The most compelling section of the book, however, is that dealing with the Cuban missile crisis. The political narrative of the crisis is familiar to most, with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council meetings leading to a decision to blockade, and clandestine communications leading to a face-saving deal for Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Here, however, House describes in some detail U.S. mobilization plans and depicts the increasingly antagonistic relationship between President John F. Kennedy and his military advisors. The implications presented in this penultimate chapter cast an ominous shadow on U.S. civil–military relations moving into the mid-1960s.

The only quibble this reviewer has is that, jacket blurb notwithstanding, the whole here is not greater than the sum of its parts. Each chapter is well-written and thought-provoking; however, taken together, they do not lead in any clearly defined direction. Chapters bounce around geographically and, in some cases, chronologically, giving the work more of an almanac quality than the author probably intended. There is little sense of how any of the events described are interrelated or influenced by one another. The preface gives some indication of where House intends to go and a concluding chapter tries to tie everything together at the end, but the pieces do not fit together as neatly as they could.

By limiting his study to those conflicts occurring between 1944
and 1962, House has succeeded in keeping the book down to manageable proportions while still covering each event in considerable detail. Hopefully he has a second volume under consideration. Similar studies of conflicts in Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Indian subcontinent during the 1960s, 70s, and 80s would also be a welcome addition to the overall body of Cold War literature. Nonetheless, by itself, the book stands as an excellent reminder that the Cold War was not necessarily “cold” for everyone. It succeeds in portraying the connecting point between political policy and military action. More importantly, it raises questions regarding the effectiveness of military force as a political tool in the emerging nuclear age. A Military History of the Cold War, 1944–1962 is a worthy addition to the library of anyone interested in the period of the twentieth century that historians have come to call the Cold War.

Dr. Donald A. Carter is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degree and Ph.D. in military history from the Ohio State University. He is currently working on an official history of the U.S. Army in Europe from 1951 to 1962.

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Twenty years ago in October I traveled to Somalia as a historian working for Army Special Operations Command to capture oral history interviews of Army Rangers, Special Forces, and Special Operations aviators who survived the 3–4 October firefight in Mogadishu. I conducted dozens of interviews to capture the firsthand accounts of the battle while the memory was still fresh. It was important to capture the valor and sacrifice of these men so that their story could be told accurately. Now, twenty years later, it is again time to reflect on the short but strategically significant combat actions in Somalia that grew out of a noble attempt to save a people from starvation.

The humanitarian mission to Somalia, started by President George H. W. Bush and continued by his successor, President William J. Clinton, had been a well-publicized success in late 1992 and early 1993. U.S. and allied troops (an early example of a “coalition of the willing,” in this case backed by a United Nations [UN] resolution) had intervened in overwhelming force, over-awed the local warlords, established an uneasy peace, and began the distribution of much needed food supplies. The starvation in Somalia, as much the result of political chaos and feuding warlords as actual food shortages from the drought, was well on its way to ending. So confident was the Clinton administration of success, that it brokered a deal in the UN to hand over the mission to that organization in May 1993 and remove the majority of U.S. forces, leaving only some logistics troops, aviation assets, and a battalion-sized quick reaction force (QRF) from the 10th Mountain Division. The results were nothing short of disastrous. The UN was slow to set up its headquarters, slow to find a “pickup” military staff to man those headquarters staffs, and even slower to identify and move sufficient troops from other nations to fill in the gaping hole left by the departure of powerful U.S. Army and Marine units.

Almost immediately, the disaffected warlords, who feared for their dominance, moved against the weakened UN structure and began ambushing UN relief stations, convoys, and headquarters. The worst incident occurred on 5 June with the deliberate ambush and slaughter of twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers by the forces of Somali General Mohammed Farah Aideed. The UN Security Council quickly adopted a more aggressive military stance against Aideed and the UN representative to Somalia, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, issued an arrest warrant for him. The stage was set for direct military confrontation. The UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, asked the U.S. for direct military assistance and, as a result, U.S. Special Operations Command put together a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) that arrived in Somalia at the end of August.

The JSOTF, nicknamed Task Force (TF) Ranger, consisted of Rangers from the 3d Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, assorted elite Special Forces soldiers, and aviation elements from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. They immediately began conducting a series of raids against locations suspected of harboring Aideed or his key lieutenants. On the whole, their first six raids were tactically successful and the JSOTF was beginning to capture increasing numbers of members of Aideed’s inner circle, although not Aideed himself. Finally, on 3 October, Task Force Ranger conducted its boldest and costliest strike into the heart of Aideed’s sector of Mogadishu near the Bakara Market.

Initially the raid was a success. The Rangers secured the perimeter of the target building while the special operations forces cleared the building and captured a number of key Aideed adherents. However, the operation was soon disrupted, first by the downing of one of the circling MH–60 Black Hawk helicopters and then as the troops scrambled to secure the crash site, by the shooting down of a second helicopter. Contingency plans were prepared for the possibility of such an emergency and a team fast roped in from a designated helicopter to help secure the first crash site, but the TF was not prepared for two simultaneous emergencies. In addition, the supporting ground force was ambushed as it attempted to...
linkup with the cutoff elements and it was forced to return to the Mogadishu airport to regroup. The team at the first crash site was cut off and surrounded as they attempted to protect the sites and crews. They took heavy casualties and were only extricated the following morning by a hastily organized relief convoy of Malaysian armored cars and Pakistani tanks, along with two companies of the U.S. QRF from the 10th Mountain Division. The second crash site was quickly overwhelmed by mobs of enraged Somalis despite the valiant efforts of Sfc. Randall D. Shughart and M. Sgt. Gary I. Gordon, who had volunteered (three times) to fast rope down to the site to protect the trapped survivors. They were killed by the Somalis and, for their conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

Casualties of the 3–4 October firefight included eighteen soldiers killed, another seventy-nine wounded, and one captured. The Malaysian coalition partners had two killed and seven wounded and the Pakistani suffered two wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties between 500 and 1,500 but the actual figure will never be known.

The battle of 3–4 October was a watershed in U.S. involvement in Somalia that affected the entire rescue effort. The U.S. military presence in Somalia temporarily increased significantly and total coalition troop strength rose to nearly thirty thousand but it was too little too late: the political situation was beyond repair. The Clinton administration focused on using those forces only to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. personnel with the president announcing his intent on 7 October that all U.S. forces would leave Somalia by the end of March 1994 and only engage in self-defensive actions until then.

The story of TF Ranger in Somalia and its valorous fight twenty years ago should not be forgotten. While not on the scale of the wars against terrorism after 9/11 in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was still a significant military operation that changed lives. The human cost of warfare, on whatever scale, should always be remembered no matter the outcome. The men of TF Ranger certainly came close to success. The soldiers and aviators were well-trained and well-led. They fought hard and gave better than they got. It was, in the words of the commander of TF Ranger, Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, who had experienced many tougher fights in Vietnam, “just one hell of a firefight.” It was also a firefight that we won, but there are times when valor and tactical victory aren’t enough. The Clinton administration, which had not adequately prepared the American people for a continuing fight in Somalia, was determined to get back the one American captured (aviator Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant) and then wash its hands of the whole endeavor. Tactical actions, even successful ones, often can have unexpected strategic results.

So now, twenty years later, it is important to remember all our soldiers of Task Force Ranger who fought and died and others who today fight in obscure alleys or isolated outposts. They fight for their country and their comrades, and their sacrifices—even if thrown away by whatever political administration is in power at the time—still mean something. The men of Task Force Ranger gave their all on the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, so take a moment this 3 and 4 October and remember these men. They are now part of the history of our Army and I am proud to have helped capture some of the record of their bravery and sacrifice.

As always, you can contact me at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.