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U.S. Army Art Spotlight

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The Professional Bulletin of Army History
The Spring 2014 issue of Army History features two intriguing articles. The first, by Steven L. Ossad, an independent historian and author, brings to life the old Civil War adage that the conflict was one of “brother against brother.” In the case of the prominent Terrill family from Virginia, this could not have been more true. The family was torn apart as one of the Terrill boys, William Rufus, a West Point graduate, decided to remain loyal to his oath and the Union; while the rest of the family declared their loyalty for Virginia and the Confederacy. Because of William’s decision, he would forever be ostracized from his family and his home. Ossad details the lives of various Terrill family members, culminating with the battlefield deaths of two brothers, both of which had reached general officer rank.

The second article, by Kevin M. Hymel, an author and formerly a historian at the U.S. Army’s Combat Studies Institute, investigates the death of Capt. Richard N. Jenson, an aide to Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr., during the campaign in North Africa. Hymel, using a previously unpublished firsthand account of Jenson’s death in conjunction with excerpts from Patton’s own diary and personal correspondence, as well as photographs taken by Patton, pieces together a new version of the story of Jenson’s death. A version that points to a cover-up of the exact circumstances and one in which those close to Patton, including General Omar N. Bradley, may have been complicit.

This issue also includes an excellent Army Art Spotlight, which highlights more recent work from the Global War on Terrorism by Army artist M. Sgt. Martin J. Cervantez.

As always, we feature a few words from the chief of military history, this time on the Center of Military History’s accomplishments of the past year; and the chief historian provides an update on the status of the Career Program 61 initiative.

As always, I invite readers to send in their submissions and comments.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
As with last year’s column, let's take a moment to recap our accomplishments of this past year. I have always felt that it is essential at the end of the year to reflect on where we have been, and on the tasks we have fulfilled, before we move forward into the New Year. It is hard for me to believe that this year will mark the commencement of the centennial of the Great War. As a child, I clearly remember listening to many veterans of the Great War recounting their stories. Sadly, their voices have passed into history. This fact should serve to remind us how vital it becomes to capture the stories of these soldiers while they can still share them with us.

It has been an extremely busy year for the Center of Military History (CMH) underpinned by the continuing threat of reductions, civilian furloughs, shutdowns, transformations, reassignments, eliminations, and terminations.

As in times past, the Center met each challenge and continued to offer history and heritage support and historical context that provides the thread of continuity from generation to generation for our Army’s officers and enlisted soldiers.

Our accomplishments this year have once again been many; and I would like to share some of the highlights of the year at the Center with you.

We culminated our efforts to provide top-notch historical support to military operations in Afghanistan; in April, we deployed Col. Jerry Brooks as the theater historian. Jerry will return to CMH soon, replaced by Mike Knapp, who will report to theater in February and document the final moments of the mission there.

While we continued to organize history operations in Afghanistan, the Field Programs and Historical Services Division continued to ensure the combat readiness of the Military History Detachments here at home—I might add with the greatest of success!

We have remained integral to the Army’s force restructuring efforts, providing advice to the chief of staff of the Army and secretary of the Army on how to preserve the Army’s organization history and lineages while efficiently restructuring/downsizing operations.

We added the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM/Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation NEW DAWN war records mission to our portfolio. This mission is critical both to writing the history of these operations and to supporting our injured veterans’ claims received from Veterans Affairs through the Joint Services Records Research Center. As a result of the ensuing hard work and long hours, the Field Programs and Historical Services Division team kept the project moving forward despite the obvious obstacles. Today, we hold in excess of 110 terabytes of operational records. Historians at the National Archives and Records Administration and the State Department have characterized this collection as a national treasure; it is the only official record of operations in theater extant.

Our Museum Division team developed several new exhibits in the Pentagon, including textual and graphics support for the Joint Services’ Sixtieth Anniversary Korean War exhibit; added exhibits covering Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM; installed exhibits on “Army Families” and “Army Medicine”; and designed a “Soldier Signers of the Constitution” exhibit, which currently awaits funding.

At Quarters One, the chief of staff of the Army’s quarters, we developed a new art scheme that links themes in each room to a specific period of U.S. Army history, enhancing the usefulness of tours of the house as a teaching tool, as well as improving its appearance.

As part of this project, we produced and installed thirty-two reproduction paintings and watercolors in the house, saving tens of thousands of dollars, as well as writing an interpreter’s handbook and tour guide.

We continued to support Army Field Museum exhibits with improvements to the Fort Polk Museum; 10th Mountain Division/Fort Drum Museum; 3d Infantry Division/Fort Stewart Museum; Watervliet Arsenal Museum, and U.S. Army, Africa, headquarters in Vicenza, Italy. We also have designed improvements at Fort Irwin, California, and the Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington National Cemetery.

However, the Museum Division’s most incredible story was the movement of Army macros and collections. This year, using opportunity funding, we moved seven collections to nine different destinations totaling 213 macros and 19,108 micro artifacts, along with the movement of a complete restoration shop.

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New Publications from the Center of Military History

The Center of Military History (CMH) has recently published two new brochures. The first of these is The Civil War in the Western Theater, 1862, by Charles R. Bowery Jr., which is part of The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War series. It examines the campaigns and battles that occurred during 1862 in the vast region between the Appalachian Mountains in the east and the Mississippi River in the west, and from the Ohio River in the north to the Gulf of Mexico in the south. Notable battles discussed include Mill Springs, Kentucky; Forts Henry and Donelson, Tennessee; Shiloh, Tennessee; Perryville, Kentucky; Corinth and Iuka, Mississippi; and Stones River, Tennessee. The brochure has been issued as CMH Pub 75–7 and will also be available for purchase by the general public from the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO).

The second brochure is part of The Campaigns of the War of 1812 series and is titled The Canadian Theater, 1814, by Richard V. Barbuto. The early years of the War of 1812 saw a number of disappointing performances by the U.S. Army. By 1814, the Army was showing marked improvement. By halting the British invasion at Plattsburgh, New York, in September 1814, the Army favorably influenced the outcome of the war-ending peace negotiations in Ghent, Belgium. This brochure has been issued as CMH Pub 74–6 and will also be available for purchase from GPO.

Combat Studies Institute Press Releases New Publication

This past January, the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Press issued a new book titled Robots on the Battlefield: Contemporary Perspectives and Implications for the Future, edited by Ronan Doaré, Didier Danet, Jean-Paul Hanon, and Gérard de Boisboissel. This publication, a joint project with Les Écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan (the French military academy at Coëtquidan), documents the rise in the use of robotics on the battlefield, what some have termed a robolution, and attempts to provide a thorough reflection on the future and impact of military robotics. This publication is available as a free download in PDF format from CSI’s Web site: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/FrenchRobots.pdf. Hard copies can also be requested here: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/csi/PubRequest.asp.

New Virtual Staff Ride from the Combat Studies Institute

CSI has introduced a new virtual staff ride (VSR) covering the 2004
Steven L. Ossad is a retired Wall Street technology analyst and military biographer focused on leadership, the lessons of command failure, and the adaptation of staff rides and other training technologies for use by senior-level executives. He is the coauthor of Major General Maurice Rose: World War II’s Greatest Forgotten Commander (Lanham, Md., 2003) with Don R. Marsh. He received the Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award for his article “Command Failures: Lessons Learned from Lloyd R. Fredendall” (Army Magazine 53, no. 3, March 2003). His article, “Henry Ware Lawton: Flawed Giant and Hero of Four Wars” appeared in the Winter 2007 issue of Army History. He holds a bachelor’s degree, with honors, in philosophy from Wesleyan University, a master’s degree in philosophy from the New School for Social Research, and a master of business administration from Harvard Business School. He is currently working on a biography of Omar Bradley.
A Stereotype Made Real

Whatever the relationships of individuals, the Civil War has always been described in terms of bitter separations. Only in civil wars and revolutions are the grand historical issues between people and states writ small in the dynamics among their families, but the fratricidal theme is not just a popular description without substance or irony. Mark Boatner’s classic Civil War Dictionary includes an entry entitled “Brother against Brother” that cites such complex examples of divided sibling loyalties as the Kentucky-bred Breckinridge family—a Yankee Breckinridge captured his Confederate brother outside of Atlanta—and the Buchanan brothers, both naval officers. At Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862, Franklin Buchanan, commanding the Confederate Merrimac, sank the USS Congress, sending his brother McKeen Buchanan to the bottom.¹

Among the 160 general officers killed in action during the Civil War, split evenly between the two sides, there are also several examples of family members who fell in battle—Richard and Robert Garnett, Confederate generals and cousins, and Robert and Daniel McCook, Union generals and brothers.² But, there is only one example of fallen brothers, both generals, on opposite sides of the conflict. The story of the Terrill brothers—William and James—is unique in American history as it echoed the nation’s agony on a personal level.³

It is scarcely possible to imagine a story as full of impossible decisions, divided loyalties, bitter family conflict, or tragic outcomes as that of the Terrills, and William Rufus Terrill, in particular. Scion of a proud and wealthy Virginia family, he is the tragic symbol of many who have been presented with irreconcilable choices: between home and nation, country and state, and between the wishes of people they loved and their own wills.

Schooled at West Point, trained as a soldier in the small cohesive and tightly knit antebellum regular army, and in love with the daughter of a prominent northern dynasty, William Terrill was the quintessential product of the Virginia gentry: refined, aristocratic, and proud, also bookish, reflective, sensitive, and loving. At the core, however, was his iron will. He was the kind of man for whom an oath is nothing less than words spoken directly to God. When he swore the oath to uphold the Constitution, defend the flag, and wear an officer’s uniform, it set him against his father, brothers, friends, and the very house and soil he loved; but for William there was only one choice.

His brother James Barbour Terrill faced no such anguish. He was a fervent, outspoken Southern patriot and faithful son of Virginia. A mediocre and rebellious student, he turned away from a military career to pursue the law, but before he could even enter that fray, the war interceded. A recent graduate of the Virginia Military

Composite Image: A fictitious rendering of the imagined Terrill monument; detail from “Sketch of the Battle of Perryville, Kentucky, 8 October 1862,” by H. Mosler / Harper’s Weekly, 11 November 1862

IMPOSSIBLE LOYALTIES | IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES

By Steven L. Ossad
Institute (VMI), he served with one of the most illustrious regiments in the Confederate army, but instead of achieving glory, his natural abilities as a soldier were overshadowed by the deeds of greater men. His vain efforts to rise above them led to selfish decisions and resentment among his men and colleagues and his career lagged even further.

These biographical details, though, are not particularly unique. The ending of the story is what sets the story of these brothers apart. Death in battle as generals ended the personal struggles of each, but left behind a bitter legacy for their families, who also suffered the loss of another son in the war along with many other relatives. To the ruin and devastation shared by many, theirs was a special case of “brother against brother,” and a phrase came to describe their special pain: “God Alone Knows Which Was Right.”

**Antebellum Life at Rose Hill**

The Terrill family had deep roots in the soil and people of Virginia. Patriarch William Henry Terrill (1800–1877), son of William Terrill Jr. (1765–1811) was descended from English stock. His mother Jane Morton (b. 1773) was a distant relative of war hero President Zachary Taylor. Like his parents, William Henry Terrill was born and raised in Orange County, and after graduating from Creed-Taylor Law School, in Needham, Virginia, he headed out on his own to the Florida Territory to establish a legal practice. It was during this period that he also had his first brush with local politics, serving a single term in the territorial legislature.

Realizing quite soon, however, that Florida was not big or rich enough to satisfy his personal ambitions, he returned to Virginia and settled in Alleghany County. The presence there of warm pools of “healing waters,” especially near Covington—and the many property issues and transactions that resulted—provided ample opportunities for the growth of William Henry’s law practice, and he soon achieved a position of wealth and reputation. His contacts included many of the visitors to the resorts, which dotted the landscape, and whose guests included the most prominent citizens of north and south alike.

Soon after returning to his native state in 1827, he married Elizabeth Pitzer (1805–1858), a local Covington beauty. Her family connections enhanced his professional standing and business relationships. As the young barrister focused on his career, Elizabeth assumed the role of hostess and was soon presiding over a rapidly growing family at Rose Hill their home. A strong believer in the importance of education, as well as mastery of the social graces, she passed these values to her eight children, all but one of whom (Jeremiah Morton) survived early childhood. She was very close to her children and actively involved in all the details of their lives. They were also close to each other. Fortunately, her husband’s law practice and real estate investments provided ample means to support her ambitions for her sons, all of whom pursued higher education at prestigious universities—unusual for that time. The Terrills were known and respected throughout the surrounding counties, and the children were socially active and all attractive marriage candidates.

William Henry Terrill was the proverbial stereotype of the folksy, “silver-tongued,” anecdote-spouting, Southern country lawyer. Universally referred to as “the Colonel,” though he never held that rank in any military service (regular or militia), he was tall (6 feet 2 inches), portly (more than 250 pounds), and cut an impressive figure, both in and out of the courtroom. He was deeply involved in the affairs of his community. After settling near Warm Springs in 1838, William Henry became Commonwealth Attorney—essentially the county prosecutor, a post he held for more than a quarter century—and served a single term in the Virginia state legislature. His political buddies opened the door to more statewide involvement, and he served on the Board of Visitors of the Virginia Military Institute and the University of Virginia, both institutions attended by several of his children.

William Henry’s influence extended beyond that of traditional politicians despite the fact that he was one of few Southern Republicans and while a slaveholder was also known as a Unionist. His reputation for probity and unquestioned fairness was legendary. In one famous episode, William Henry prosecuted the son of a close friend with unrestrained fierceness and zeal after hearing talk that he was likely to go easy on the lad because of his relationship with his father. Because of such demonstrations of fairness, he was considered professionally reliable and recognized as a lawyer possessed of power, ability, and eloquence. During the Civil War, he remained on the periphery of Virginia politics, and through his various contacts remained connected to the governor’s office. His hopes that those connections would benefit his sons, especially his second born, would be bitterly disappointed.

**From Rose Hill to West Point**

William Rufus Terrill was born on 21 April 1834 in Covington, Virginia. From a very early age he wanted to be a soldier, and his parents supported that ambition. In 1849, though just fifteen years old, his father arranged an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Even in his teens, the face William showed to the outside world was severe, serious, some might even say puritanical. By the end of his
first semester, Terrell had received only five demerits, an incredibly small number that placed him at the top of his class in soldierly deportment. He soon acquired a reputation for discipline and self-control similar to that of West Point Superintendent Robert E. Lee, a distant cousin, who had passed through four years at West Point without receiving a single demerit—a record never since equaled.

William’s outward aristocratic demeanor and seeming grimness, however, masked a more vulnerable and uncertain nature. His letters home reveal a sensitive and homesick boy who found the pain of separation—especially from his mother—difficult to bear. Complaining about the lack of letters from her in one exchange, his tone is fragile, wounded, almost pleading. His letters are openly affectionate; he wanted nothing so much as to please her and make her proud. Following publication of the initial academic rankings—which placed him 16 of 52—he vowed in a letter to her that by the end of the academic year, he would rank higher. That vow remained unfulfilled despite hard work and dedication. At graduation, his class ranking remained exactly where it stood at the end of his first term. His exemplary demerit record, however, did not survive a brief but redeemable bout of drinking and smoking.

He was especially close to his older sister Emily (1832–1906) and wrote to her of his longing for the peacefulness of their home and his struggle to do well and fit in at West Point. In July 1849, just before William was to report to the Academy, Emily had married VMI graduate (1844), Mexican War veteran, and future Confederate Col. George Alexander Porterfield (1822–1919). Emily’s older brother, Dr. George P. Terrill, also a graduate of VMI (1849) and active in alumni affairs, had introduced the couple.

William was fond of Porterfield and found it easy to talk to him. In his brother-in-law, he found a congenial and well-informed interlocutor, schooled in military science and the realities of combat, as well as politically aware. They spent many hours discussing the affairs of the day, as well as more personal and parochial concerns, and maintained their friendship and an active correspondence throughout the next decade.

The summer of 1851 was especially pleasant for William, as Rose Hill buzzed with activity centered on the social lives of his brothers, and the frequent visits of the sisters and their children. Soon, however, the idyllic surroundings and general pleasantness of life in the big house gave way to terrible anguish. In early August of 1851, just as William was preparing to return to West Point, his oldest sibling Sarah Jane (1828–1851), wife of neighbor and family friend William H. McDonald, died suddenly a few months after giving birth while at Rose Hill. The loss hit the family hard, but the young cadet had little time to mourn. By early spring, he was back at West Point facing the rigorous life of the Academy.

In spite of the difficulties at home and the normal academic pressures, William was beginning to feel more at ease. The intellectual challenge was especially rewarding and he excelled at mathematics and the study of literature. He visited the library often, frequently
spending his weekends there, and developed a hunger for historical novels. He was starting to loosen up a bit and began to shed some of the grimmness that characterized his outward demeanor. He certainly looked like the ideal cadet and gentleman, “of good stature and well-formed. His hair was flaxen and waving [sic], his eyes a tender blue, his complexion rich, and his whole expression kind and gentle, but downright and decided. He had a winning frankness of manner, a steady cheerfulness under all circumstances, and a native cordiality which made it easy to like him. His intellect was clear, practical and judicious.”

However, even if he was mellowing, William’s appearance, background, and personality were bound to antagonize some, especially those who had an instinctive dislike for men of his social rank or regional origin. On 9 September 1851 in an episode still famous in West Point history, Cadet Sergeant Terrill was involved in an incident with Cadet Private Philip H. Sheridan—then a member of the class of 1852—in what the latter described as “a quarrel of a belligerent nature.”

To say that Sheridan was the opposite of Terrill in almost every respect is no exaggeration; the imagination struggles to conjure two greater antagonists wearing the same uniform. A short, belligerent, naturally defensive, and dirt-poor Irish kid from New York, Sheridan was the antithesis of the tall, aristocratic, well-bred Virginian. In retrospect, confrontation was inevitable.

During a drill on the parade ground, Terrill was performing the duties of the “file closer” and ordered the pugnacious and prickly Sheridan to “dress”—in military terms, to get closer to the man to his front. Sheridan took immediate offense, both with Terrill’s order, and as he later explained, especially his tone, believing he was already properly placed in the line. Without comment or warning, Sheridan thrust his bayonet-tipped rifle toward Terrill, shouting, “Damn you sir, I’ll run you through.” After getting a grip on himself—all the while hurling threats and insults against the courtly Southerner, who was, after all, his superior—Sheridan sullenly returned to the line.

The next day, after learning he had been put on report—as was required—Sheridan again accosted Terrill, this time completely losing his self-control and striking the higher-ranking cadet on the side of his head. This attack took place right in front of the barracks and in full view of a number of bystanders. After a scuffle, in which Sheridan was clearly at a disadvantage to the taller and heavier Southerner, the two cadets were finally separated. The subsequent hearing upheld Terrill’s claim that he had acted properly, that the attacks had been unprovoked, and that he had merely defended himself. Sheridan’s explanation that he had been insulted and provoked by the “improper tone” of his superior was summarily dismissed.

Given the violent nature of Sheridan’s actions, he had ample reason to feel lucky that he was suspended for only a year. However, he was not grateful for the lenient punishment, and his humiliation—though well deserved—was nearly as great as his hatred of the man who he held responsible for the entire affair. Sheridan’s reputation as a volatile “hothead”—and the story of the clash—followed the diminutive cavalry officer for a long time—until fate put him on a battlefield where his deeds created a reputation for brilliance that erased all previous questions about character.

**Prewar Duty and Family Strife**

William Terrill graduated from the U.S. Military Academy on 1 July 1853, placing in the top third of his class (16 of 52), one-third of whom were destined to wear the stars of a general officer during the approaching war. As was typical of those with his class standing, Terrill was commissioned a second lieutenant in the 3d Artillery, though the bulk of his service was with the 4th Artillery.

His hardest duty was on the Kansas frontier, where rigorous field conditions, intensified by the virulent political tensions, had ripped the plains communities apart in a terrible foreshadowing. Although Terrill’s sympathies lay with the Southern position, the savagery of the slaveholder’s tactics and his support for the Union also wielded strong influence. He was relieved to be ordered to West Point as acting assistant professor of mathematics in academic 1855–1856, a position he held but briefly. Suddenly transferred to Florida in the summer of 1856, he saw action in the Third Seminole War. As in Kansas, the nature of the war and ordeals of field service on combatants, and suffering of civilians, was hard on the young officer. The final actions were a series of skirmishes between small, roving Seminole bands and units like Terrill’s Company F, 4th Artillery, which was stationed at Fort Brooke (near present-day Tampa).

Both of these prewar assignments were a foretaste of the ordeal to come and consciousness of that certainty weighed heavily on everyone. Terrill’s next posting, however, was a respite and took him for a time away from the pressures—personal and political—assailing him and the country. For two years, until the outbreak of the war, Terrill worked for the U. S. Coast Survey, mapping important waterways, primarily in the Hudson River Valley close to West Point, with expeditions to the south, along the Florida coast, and into the Caribbean. He thoroughly enjoyed the work, which was personally and professionally satisfying. It appealed to his analytical mind, engi-
neering training, as well as his love of tales of explorers. He performed well, earning the respect and praise of his superiors for his diligence, dedication, and "good judgment, industry and success amid many difficulties." During this time, Terrill was also undergoing an evangelical conversion that deepened his relationship with God and church. Such spiritual undertakings were not uncommon during this fervently religious time.

His happiness and peace of spirit was short-lived. Back in Virginia, the family was passing through yet another period of pain and loss. John Allen Terrill (1839–1858), youngest of the surviving Terrill children, and considered the brightest star and most gifted of all, was at the University of Virginia when he was felled by typhoid fever just after New Year 1858. Alarmed by the report of John’s illness, his parents immediately journeyed to Charlottesville, his mother remaining to nurse her son, all to no avail. John passed away in his mother’s arms on 12 January 1858 and was buried next to his brother Jeremiah Morton Terrill at Rose Hill.

Elizabeth was heartbroken at the loss of yet another child. Weakened by grief, she took ill soon after, felled by the dreaded fever. Within weeks she, too, was gone. It was a devastating loss for the entire family, especially William, who was shattered by the double blow. He adored his mother and was inconsolable, pouring out his grief in letters to his sister, letters that seem inconsolable, pouring out his grief in letters to his sister, letters that seem virtually stained with tears. However, the demands of the Army recognized neither grief nor private pain, and William’s mapping assignments were demanding.

Back at Rose Hill, “the Colonel,” gradually moved on with his life. Within a year of Elizabeth’s death, he was courting Miss Rachel Hamilton Scott, a widow from Covington and family acquaintance some years his junior. Not everyone was pleased to see the blossoming romance, and feelings among his children were uniformly negative. William was troubled by the relationship, particularly when it became apparent that his father intended to marry Rachel. In his correspondence with his brother-in-law George Porterfield, William spoke bluntly about his feelings, so much so that George feared that William might clash irreparably with his father. Soon, however, William began to gain some perspective, and backed off his resistance, writing George that while he did not favor the marriage and had actually discussed his reasons with his father, he would no longer oppose it and would “treat his wife with all the consideration due to her as a lady and my father’s wife.” The family discussion ceased when “the Colonel” married Rachel in 1860. At the time everyone accepted it, or so it seemed.

William was, during this period, involved in his own love affair. Through his continuing association with West Point, he met and began to court Emily D. Henry (1840–1884). She hailed from a very distinguished and well-connected Northern family that had achieved both military and political prominence. They likely met at the funeral for her father, William Seaton Henry (1816–1851), a renowned graduate of West Point (1835) and a veteran of the Mexican War. A hero of the Monterrey Campaign, his postwar book about his experiences, Campaign Sketches of the War with Mexico (New York, 1847), received widespread acclaim and became a best seller, but he did not live long enough to enjoy the fame. He died at age thirty-four, leaving behind three small children and a young widow, Arietta, daughter of Daniel Tompkins, a former governor of New York and the fifth vice president of the United States.

Emily’s brother, Guy Vernor Henry, following in his father’s footsteps, graduated from West Point in May 1861, and went on to win great renown in the Civil War (receiving a Medal of Honor), the Indian campaigns, and finally the Spanish-American War, eventually rising to major general and serving as governor of Puerto Rico. Sharing the bond of West Point and the chosen career of soldier, “Fighting Guy,” as he was known in the service, quickly drew close to his brother-in-law. Once again, a brother-in-law provided emotional and professional support when William’s relationship with actual blood family was fracturing. That Guy was a Northerner just extends the irony.

As sectional political divisions intensified, so too did personal strains and resentments among the Terrills. Some of the younger members of the family—especially William’s younger brothers Philip and James—felt that Emily Henry, Guy, and their prominent family and friends had “stolen” William away from his Southern roots, but his sister Emily did not share that view. The two Emilys—Emily Henry Terrill and Emily Cordelia Terrill Porterfield—were especially close and maintained a warm, personal relationship as long as they lived. Oral family history reports that Emily Terrill sent the government payment she received on the death of her husband William to her in-laws. Once again, a brother-in-law provided emotional and professional support when William’s relationship
to her sister-in-law, and maintained their correspondence even during the war, despite the obvious difficulties. One episode is particularly striking. During wartime in late 1863, Emily Henry Terrill went so far as to use her influence to help her in-laws—the enemy, after all—materially. She persuaded her mother, Arietta Tompkins Henry, to lobby Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, a family friend, on behalf of the Porterfields for the restitution of property seized from them by Union forces.22

**The Concept and Cost of Allegiance**

As the prospect of civil war grew more likely, William Terrill understood he would face an impossible personal choice, pitting two powerful and pure loyalties squarely in dialectic opposition. He loved the very soil of Virginia, which held the graves of his beloved mother and siblings. Except for being with Emily, Rose Hill—in the company of his father, sister, and brothers—was the only place William Terrill felt fully at ease and natural.23 If the worst came, he knew all of them would remain loyal to Virginia and stay with it, either in the Union, or to war. That much was clear, but he felt an allegiance they could not understand. From the moment William Rufus Terrill first stood on the parade ground at West Point, and in all the years since, the Army had been exerting as strong a pull as that which drew him to Rose Hill.

William had sworn an oath of allegiance to the United States, its army and flag, and these things—the ideas of nation, service, and union—were inseparable. This was a time when a man’s oath was like a tangible, living thing. Once given, an oath had a permanence and power that could not be diminished. Offers of rank and position proffered by Virginia’s governor could not sway him. As the conflict drew inexorably closer, he wrote to his father, “As long as I have a country and a government to serve I wish to be true to it. Were I to be false to one I could hardly be a valuable acquisition to another.”24 And of course, there was his wife Emily. She would never turn her back on her home or country. How could he fight against her?

In early March of 1861, William was on mapping duty in the waters near the island of Tortuga when Virginia began to consider whether to remain in the Union. His father was a front-row observer in the discussion over secession, and kept William informed by letter about the direction of the debate. “The Colonel” was a staunch supporter of Virginian sovereignty, so there was no question as to what his father would do if Virginia voted to secede. When that happened, William’s father and three brothers quickly declared their loyalty to the Confederacy and were among the first to seek service in its forces. William was also offered a commission for very high-level service, but after agonizing reflection and heated family discussion, he made his choice. “I am as I have ever been true to my oath, true to my country—and true to the flag that floats over [sic], whose folds I should prefer to be my winding sheet rather than see the dissolution of this once glorious country.”25 He would remain loyal to the Union, but it was a decision that cut into the flesh of his family and their anger was deep, raw, and could not be assuaged. News of the terrible decision—and the Terrill family’s reaction—soon reached the officer corps of the small, tightly knit Regular Army, which would become the core of a massive, industrialized military machine. Alexander D. Bache, who had been superintendent of the U.S. Coast Survey and had great personal affection for his young subordinate, was particularly moved. Describing his former aide as “a man of action, industrious, reliable, of good judgment and temper,”26 Bache wrote to Lt. Col. George W. Cullum, then-chief aide to Commanding General of the Army Winfield Scott, to recommend the young officer and request William be transferred to the Western Theater. In support of his petition, Cullum forwarded a copy of “the Colonel’s” last letter to William, evidence, he noted, of the kind of pressure employed to induce William to abandon his flag and country.

In this letter, “the Colonel” uttered words that resonated on some terrible, biblical level. Promising to remove his son’s name from the family rolls, “the Colonel” threatened that Virginia will “know how to deal with traitors,”
and in a ghastly foreshadowing of the nightmare to come predicted, “you will never be permitted to revisit your native state but to die.” Rachel, a fierce supporter of secession and now William’s stepmother, vilified his decision and labeled him a traitor. Of course, Rachel had reasons other than politics for such harsh feelings toward her not-much-younger stepson. She certainly knew of William’s resistance to her marriage to his father and his continued aloofness did not temper her anger.

Philip Mallory Terrill (1842–1864), William’s younger brother, was especially angry at the decision. His pain was even more pronounced because of his deep affection for his older brother, whom he characterized as “the darling of his family.” Writing to his sister Emily eight months after the beginning of the war with the latest news of their brother, his words were almost as harsh as his father’s. Philip described William’s “hireling service among the northern rabble” as having “severed forever the ties that bound him to us, and I cannot but feel that I had rather hear of his death than hear him branded (as he must inevitably be) a traitor to his country.” Realizing that the only way the decision could be reversed was through desertion—impossible to conceive for a man of honor like William—Philip resigned himself to permanent estrangement, and thereafter avoided any discussion of his brother.

Promoted to captain on 14 May 1861, William Terrill took command of the newly organized Battery H, 5th U.S. Artillery Regiment. He spent the next several months in Washington training his men and preparing for action. In both capitals men were lobbying for appointments to command and calling in past favors. Finally, the request of Alexander Bache and the intervention of his well-connected mother-in-law with General Cullum yielded results, and William soon left for the Western Theater. It was a blessing: at least he would be spared the pain of fighting on his home soil, or against his father and brothers, all of whom were serving in some capacity in Virginia.

**Baptismal Fire at Shiloh**

At the end of 1861, William moved his well-drilled artillery battery to Louisville, Kentucky, where he took command of the artillery instruction camp. He remained there until the spring of 1862 when his unit mobilized for action in southern Tennessee. Both Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell,
the commander of the Army of the Ohio, were moving to cut the major water routes crucial to supplying the Confederate states. Southern forces under General Albert Sydney Johnston were moving to block them and had occupied the banks of the Tennessee River at Pittsburg Landing just north of the Mississippi border. There, near a small church called Shiloh, the stage was set for the bloodiest encounter yet of the one-year-old war.

Serving as chief of artillery for the 2d Division commander Maj. Gen. Alexander McDowell McCook—a year ahead of him at West Point and one of the famous “Fighting McCooks”—Terrill arrived at Pittsburg Landing early in the morning of 7 April 1862, the second day of the Battle of Shiloh.31 Maj. John Montgomery Wright, a staff officer aboard the same transport, recalled that as “the first streak of daylight came, Terrill, sitting on the deck near me, had recited a line about the rosy fingered dawn.”32 It was the oft-quoted opening of Homer’s Odyssey, one of his favorites, and apt considering his own personal journey.

Immediately after disembarking, Buell ordered Terrill’s battery to support Brig. Gen. William “Bull” Nelson’s hard-pressed Fourth Division. Nelson later praised Terrill for acting “with decided effect upon the turn of battle in that quarter.”33 McCook noted that in the brutal fighting that day, Terrill “fought his battery gallantly and judiciously and I commend him and his officers to my superiors.”34 At the height of the battle, Nelson ordered the 6th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment to protect Terrill’s battery, screaming that it was the best in the service, and “must not be taken.”35 Even Terrill’s adversaries praised his performance; Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard, himself a West Point–trained artilleryman, attributed the survival of Col. Jacob Ammen’s 10th Brigade, one of Nelson’s units, to “the opportune arrival and effective use of Terrill’s regular battery.”36 It was an impressive performance for a man facing combat for the first time.

A GENERAL TRAINS HIS TROOPS

After Shiloh, Terrill’s battery saw brief action during the siege of Corinth, Mississippi, moving with the army into Kentucky. By this time,
the commendations of his superiors had moved up the chain of command. There was still a great need for experienced West Point–trained professionals to command the ever-growing list of large formations in the expanding Federal army. Largely because of his service under General Nelson and the official endorsement of prewar engineering colleague and commander of the Department of the Ohio Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright, Terrill was named a brigadier general of volunteers on 9 September 1862.37 Soon after, he took command of the 33d Brigade, assigned to Brig. Gen. James S. Jackson, a well-connected Kentucky lawyer and congressman turned general, commanding the Tenth Division. This brigade was a newly raised outfit of just under 2,500 men, organized into four regiments and filled with raw recruits from Illinois and Ohio.38

A stern and impatient commander with no tolerance for idleness or slackers, he immediately instituted a rigorous training program during a late summer heat spell. It did not endear Terrill to his men. In addition, his cold and distant manner—archly superior some said—led to a feeling in the ranks that Terrill did not understand the volunteer soldier, especially the ordinary citizen from the North.39 In fact, many wondered why he was serving in the Union Army at all. A story circulated among the men under his command that Terrill’s father (mistakenly identified as a “parson”) had dispatched him to West Point with a Bible and the admonition that he should read it every day and always honor his oath of allegiance. That oath, the men believed—rightly, as it turned out—outweighed anything else, including family pressure to swear allegiance to the Confederacy.40

Very soon there was more reason to resent—even hate—the young brigadier general. During one of the hottest and most humid spells on record, General Jackson ordered an elaborate grand review in Louisville on 16 September. It was a disaster. More than fifty men fell out with sunstroke, dehydration, and exhaustion; a handful actually died. Anger directed at both Jackson and Terrill was so great that some soldiers were as anxious to aim their rifles at them as at the enemy. Bliss Morse, a young private in the 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment, wrote to his mother:

Our Brig. Gen. Terrill is a tall light haired man with a coarse voice
the boys to mock at. He loves good liquors and beef for his table was well supplied with them while I was on guard before his quarters. The boys rather dislike him since that review down to Louisville. Some of them swore they would take his life. He heard of it—for the march used up a good many boys who have not got over it yet and did not amount to a row of pins.41

Terrill did have some enthusiastic supporters. As soon as he took over his brigade, he organized his own artillery battery formed mostly from the 105th Ohio Volunteers and a collection of eight artillery pieces.42 Under the command of Lt. Charles C. Parsons, an affable and competent young West Pointer from the 5th U.S. Artillery, the battery became Terrill’s pet project; some described it as an obsession. Incessantly training and drilling his makeshift collection of men and guns, Terrill, the professional artillery officer, was totally in his element and the men responded powerfully to his personal involvement.

Just a few days before Buell’s Army of the Ohio moved out, Terrill happened to meet Philip Sheridan, by then also a brigadier general and commanding an infantry division in Buell’s army. In his memoirs, Sheridan claims to have taken “the initiative toward a renewal of our acquaintance,” possibly to put their previous antagonism behind them on the eve of battle. Time had tempered the volatile Sheridan, who, after a decade of reflection on the incident at West Point, noted:

At the time I thought, of course, my suspension a very unfair punishment, that my conduct was justifiable and the authorities of the Academy all wrong, but riper experience has led me to a different conclusion, and as I look back, though the mortification I then endured was deep and trying, I am convinced that it was hardly as much as I deserved for such an outrageous breach of discipline. There was no question as to Terrill’s irritating tone, but in giving me the order he was prompted by the duty of his position as a file closer, and I was not the one to remedy the wrong which I conceived had been done me, and clearly not justifiable in assuming to correct him with my own hands.43

For professionals and volunteers alike, who knew of the incident—it was common knowledge in the ranks of Terrill’s brigade and certainly among the West Point graduates in Buell’s army—it was a tense moment. However, in a spontaneous gesture of fellowship, both men simultaneously extended hands in an act of reconciliation.44 For Terrill, a man who had alienated his family and closest friends by keeping faith with his oath to his country, it must have been a moment of great emotion. On the eve of battle, he thought, at least one great breach that had marked his life was healed.

**The Battle of Perryville**

Confederate strategy during the fall of 1862 was dominated by attempts, for military and political reasons, to invade the important Border States. In the east, General Robert E. Lee’s magnificent Army of Northern Virginia entered western Maryland in early September, culminating in the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862. Lee withdrew after an all-day slugfest that cost both sides more than 25,000 casualties, the bloodiest single day of the war. But while the Union forces held the field, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, the Army of the Potomac commander, missed a crucial opportunity to cut off Lee, crush his army, and possibly end the rebellion.

In the Western Theater, separate columns under the overall command of Confederate General Braxton Bragg started heading north into Kentucky in August. By mid-September, Confederate forces held Lexington and Frankfort, controlled a large part of the state, and were close to a decisive victory.

By early October, Buell’s army had blocked some of the Confederate thrusts and was moving to confront Bragg. Both armies, parched by heat during one of the worst droughts ever recorded, and looking desperately for water, maneuvered around Perryville, Kentucky. On the evening of 7 October 1862, after some skirmishing around the hills dominating the town
and the meager water sources, the senior officers and staff of Jackson’s 10th Division, part of McCook’s I Corps, met around a campfire for an informal chat. Terrill and his fellow brigade commander, Col. George Webster, traded lighthearted banter with Jackson.

As the evening progressed, the pleasantries gave way to more serious speculation about their prospects for survival in the coming battle. Perhaps to reassure each other about the outlook—their division was made up entirely of raw recruits, while the enemy army was comprised of hardened veterans—the discussion remained somewhat abstract. With a combination of mock seriousness and frivolity, Terrill, the former mathematics instructor, suggested that with so many men on the field, their statistical chances of coming through the battle without serious injury were good.45 Later, however, in a more private conversation, Terrill expressed his trepidations to the chaplain, who admonished him for preparing for the worst. To which Terrill replied, “I have been prepared to die for a long time.”46

By early afternoon the next day, McCook had arrived on the field and deployed his two small divisions. At 1345, McCook ordered Terrill to take his brigade to a ridge on the extreme...
left of the Union line, anchored on Open Hill (also called Open Knob) and covered by Parson’s Battery. Terrill began the march right away, reaching Open Hill by 1400. His division commander, Jackson, joined Terrill just to the rear of Parson’s Battery and both men waited as the Confederates maneuvered in front of them. Within minutes Confederate Maj. Gen. Benjamin Cheatham’s division slammed into the exposed Federal northern flank, the main objective of their attack. Suddenly, and without any warning, Confederate Brig. Gen. George E. Maney’s veteran brigade—four regiments of Tennesseans and a regiment of Georgia boys—emerged from a ravine at the base of the ridge and poured a withering fire directly into Terrill’s Midwesterners. To some survivors it seemed as if the rebel soldiers had sprung up from the earth like the offspring of dragon’s teeth in Greek myth. One survivor described the bullets as “sounding like a swarm of bees running away in the hot summer air overhead.”

Parson’s guns showered the rebels with grapeshot and soon became the main target of the Confederate rifles and counterbattery cannon fire. The hill was a deathtrap. Men and horses began to fall quickly and within a few minutes of the opening attack, Jackson was struck twice, dying within minutes. Alarmed that his precious battery would be overrun, Terrill acted with desperation and ordered the green 123d Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment—organized just one month before—to charge down the hillside. They surged forward and just as quickly broke and fled under the pressure of the determined onslaught and the terror inspired by the rebel yell, leaving almost two hundred men on the blood-drenched slope. The desperate charge was a disaster and a major command blunder. Terrill, seemingly blind to the overall situation, had remained fixated on Parson’s guns as if their preservation was all that mattered.

The 105th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment reached the crest and spread out around the battery just as the broken Illinois boys started streaming back up the hill. By this time, Maney had gotten about halfway up Open Hill before being halted by rifle fire and Parson’s guns, which by then were firing double loads of canister in the faces of the Confederates. Terrill realized that he would not be able to hold, and at 1515, he ordered Parson to withdraw. But it was too late. Five minutes later, Maney’s men reached the crest of the hill and Parson was able to escape with just one gun; the rest were captured.

Terrill, the proud artillery commander who had focused so much attention on his “own” battery, was crushed. His fine handiwork had been destroyed and his entire brigade was now in full retreat, streaming back and exposing McCook’s left—the flank of the entire army—to the enemy. Within minutes, however, Terrill rallied and was able to form a new line, once again taking position near some artillery pieces. It was none too soon as Maney had barely paused around Parson’s guns before renewing his attack, driving his men hard through a cornfield just in front of the Benton Road, where Union Col. John C. Starkweather’s 28th Brigade was strongly entrenched.

Robert Taylor, a soldier stationed nearby, watched in astonishment as Terrill removed his jacket, rolled up his sleeves, and began working one of the guns—perhaps the surviving piece
of Parson’s battery. Just a few minutes later at 1555, Terrill was hit by shell fragments, which tore open his chest and soaked his blouse with blood. Maj. James A. Connolly of the 123d Illinois who also claimed—improbably to some—to have been standing on Open Hill near Parson’s Battery when Terrill was struck, saw his commander fall and hurried to his side. Recognizing Connolly, Terrill asked if the wound was fatal. The major, certain that it was, nevertheless answered, “Oh, I hope not, General.” Before they took him away, Terrill whispered, “My poor wife, my poor wife.”

As a group of soldiers carried Terrill to a makeshift hospital set up in a private house, Maney’s troops crossed the Benton Road, forcing back Starkweather’s brigade. The victory, however, was short-lived; without support Maney was soon forced to withdraw, leaving the Federals in control of the crucial road. A short time later another Union brigade commander, Col. George P. Webster of the 34th Brigade, also fell. Later that night, Brig. Gen. William Rufus Terrill, age twenty-eight, succumbed to his wounds.

The senior leadership of the 10th Division was decimated. A jovial and abstract discussion of statistical probabilities had become the ironic epitaph for the front-line leaders of a fighting division. All three men who had sat around the campfire on the eve of battle chatting amiably and with detachment about their personal chances of survival were dead. So, too, were almost 1,400 other soldiers, and nearly 6,000 more lay wounded or were missing on the battlefield. Terrill’s brigade was reduced to a collection of badly mauled regiments. Altogether, Terrill’s losses were more than 500 men, almost a quarter of those engaged. It was an extraordinary loss for such a brief engagement. Darkness, the arrival of Union reinforcements, and a realization that he was facing Buell’s concentrated army and had evaded total destruction only by luck, had convinced Bragg to pull back.

The Other Terrill Brothers

The Battle of Perryville was over. It was counted a tactical victory for the rebels, but the strategic threat of an invasion of the North was over, for now. The failure of Robert E. Lee’s first invasion at Antietam just one month before ended the same way, with the Confederates still in the field, but failing in their strategy of forcing a political settlement through invasions northward in the Eastern and the Western Theaters. These twin setbacks in the autumn of 1862 spelled the end of the Confederacy’s best chance for success during the early years of the war.

Many other—and greater—battles followed Perryville, and the dead generals who fell there were soon forgotten. William R. Terrill, whose debut as a brigade commander was not impressive, lost the chance to absorb the hard lessons he could have drawn from his performance and later redeemed himself on other battlefields. Whatever promise he might have had as a commander was overshadowed by his mistakes. He passed into obscurity without victory or glory.

On the same day that his brother fell in battle, Confederate Lt. Col. James Barbour Terrill was tending to his regiment, the 13th Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment, which had been badly mauled in the fighting that summer and early fall. He had heard nothing of his brother William for more than a year. Born on 20 February 1838...
in Warm Springs, Virginia, he had also followed the path of a professional soldier, graduating in 1858 from VMI near the bottom of his class (16 of 19). Despite his mediocre record and a penchant for “unauthorized absences” when greater attractions beckoned, he gained the favorable notice of one eccentric West Point–trained artillery officer and professor of natural philosophy named Thomas J. Jackson, whom Terrill jokingly described to a friend as “a character, either a genius, or just a little crazy.”52 Jackson would go on to earn the sobriquet “Stonewall” as well as undying glory.

Instead of active service, however, upon graduation James chose to study law at Lexington Law School in Virginia, under its founder, the distinguished jurist John W. Brockenbrough, a friend of “the Colonel.”53 In 1856 he accepted a militia appointment as a major in the 5th Virginia Volunteer Cavalry Regiment arranged by Governor Henry A. Wise. A year later, James established his practice back home in Warm Springs. As war drew near, he faced no impossible choices, nor had he any doubts where his loyalty and duty lay. While his brother William agonized, James wrote a letter to Virginia’s governor, detailing his military experience and making “a formal tender of my services in a military capacity.”54 His request was quickly granted, and in May 1861 he was appointed a major in the 13th Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment.

James set about his duties with intense devotion, but also made time for his personal life. In early 1862, James married Charlotte Eucebia Drewry of nearby Chesterfield County. They quickly had two children, James Mer-
cer (1862–1880) and Emily Barbour (1864–1943), but as his responsibilities grew Major Terrill had little time to spend with his young family. The 13th Virginia, which was under the command of Col. Ambrose Powell Hill, was continually in action. A legendary outfit in the increasingly famous Army of Northern Virginia, the 13th Virginia received universal praise, and was described by Confederate division commander Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early this way, “The Thirteenth was never required to take a position that they did not take it, nor to hold one that they did not hold it.” It was frequently called upon to do both.

Called “Major Terrible” for his iron discipline, James Terrill was not well liked, a striking similarity with his brother. It certainly did not help that he labored in the shadows of two gifted and talented predecessors: Hill, an exceptionally colorful and dashing West Pointer, and the immensely popular and competent Col. James Alexander Walker (1832–1901), a successful lawyer and politician. For three years, Terrill served as the second in command of the 13th Virginia. He was first cited for bravery on 11 September 1861 when, under command of his cousin, Col. J. E. B. Stuart, he led an infantry detachment in a highly successful raid at Lewinsville, Virginia, earning the commendation of Brig. Gen. James Longstreet for the “handsome use of his light infantry.”

One year later, Terrill was promoted to lieutenant colonel and his regiment was assigned to the command of his old instructor, “Stonewall” Jackson, then campaigning in the Shenandoah Valley. Terrill’s regiment was then dispatched to the fight in the 1862 Peninsula Campaign, General McClellan’s attempt to capture Richmond by an amphibious landing on the Virginia Peninsula between the James and York Rivers. On four successive days of the Seven Days’ Battles, Terrill’s men fought hard in towns around Richmond, including at Gaines’ Mill, White Oak Swamp, and Malvern Hill. Later, at both Cedar Mountain and Second Manassas, James was again cited for gallantry. Both his division and brigade commanders cited Terrill yet again in May 1863 for his performance at Chancellorsville where, under his command, the 13th Virginia hurled back a Federal column that had broken through the Confederate right, threatening the entire Army of Northern Virginia at its moment of victory.

Finally, on 13 May 1863, just days after Chancellorsville—probably Lee’s greatest battlefield victory—James Walker, now a brigadier general, took command of the Stonewall Brigade. Terrill was promoted to colonel and took command of the 13th Virginia. These changes to the command structure came at a time of great upheaval and dissension within the ranks of the regiment. Walker departed right after initiating a request to transfer the regiment to the cavalry, a very popular idea among the troops. Strongly supported by most of the other senior officers, the rank and file were motivated by their positive feelings for their earlier experience under J. E. B. Stuart, and no doubt by the glamour and reputation of the mounted service.

Stuart said of the regiment, “I never asked them to do anything they did not do,” was supportive and issued an official letter announcing the imminent transfer to his command as soon as adequate mounts were available. Terrill, however, opposed the move and effectively ended it. Many felt that personal ambition was at the heart of his opposition. It was well-
known that the chances for promotion to general officer rank were much greater for regimental commanders in the infantry than the cavalry. In spite of the hard feelings, however, Terrill was respected as a combat leader and admired for his skill in handling men and instinctive ability to read the terrain and dynamics of battle. One critic assessed James Terrill as “one of the ablest tacticians in the Army.”

Assigned as the provost guard at Winchester, Virginia, he missed the Gettysburg Campaign and its aftermath, but Terrill’s men were back in action for the fighting in the Wilderness, and at Spotsylvania Court House. By this time, Western Theater hero Ulysses S. Grant had taken command of Union forces and had begun the grinding and bloody attritional fighting that would overwhelm the Confederacy and end the war. On 30 May 1864, during the opening stages of the Cold Harbor Campaign, Terrill took temporary command of Brig. Gen. John Pegram’s brigade. It was clear to all that it was just a matter of time before Terrill would be promoted to general.

Personally leading the charge near Bethesda Church on 30 May 1864, Terrill attacked a force of Federal cavalry operating with Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren’s V Corps. By late afternoon, Terrill’s men succeeded in scattering the enemy and captured several guns, but the young commander was badly wounded. With every field grade officer of the brigade killed or wounded, Terrill was called upon to lead a desperate bayonet charge against the enemy. He was shot in the head and killed instantly. His body, first covered with a layer of sand, was identified by Union officers and buried on the field where he fell. The next day, his promotion to brigadier general, which had already been confirmed by the Congress of the Confederate States, was approved by President Jefferson Davis to date from 31 May 1864. Once more, Rose Hill was filled with tears and the anguished cries of mourning women.
At least one family member did not allow the loss of his brothers to temper his hatred for the treacherous enemy. When war broke out, Philip Terrill, the youngest surviving brother, left the University of Virginia and enlisted in the 25th Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment, later transferring to the 12th Virginia Volunteer Cavalry Regiment as a lieutenant. From the beginning, he vowed vengeance against the hated Yankees for this mortal blow to his family. The death of his once favorite brother William had done nothing to soften Philip’s political convictions. Perhaps Philip’s desperation to “even the score” made him reckless, and just six months after James was killed, on 12 November 1864, Philip was mortally wounded at the Battle of Cedar Creek near Winchester, Virginia. 65

War had not only torn a proud family apart, but it had virtually destroyed the male line. The only one left was Dr. George Parker Terrill, who held a medical degree from University of Pennsylvania and had also graduated from VMI in 1849. Although poor health restricted his activities, he served in Salem as a colonel and post surgeon in the 157th Regiment, Virginia Militia, and lived for another twenty years practicing medicine, teaching, and publishing a newspaper.66

**A Family Torn Apart**

The Terrill family, bereaved and devoid of property and income, was a collection of grieving widows, a shattered sister, a single surviving son, and a proud but broken old man. As a former “official” of the Confederate government—Provost Marshal for Bath County—“the Colonel” could not practice law. Until the revocation of the so-called iron clad oath for certain occupations—which required one to swear that he had proffered no aid to the former government—“the Colonel” was deprived of the means to earn a livelihood. He was nearly seventy years old when he was once more allowed to practice law in the county court.

Conditions were difficult for other family members, as well, including Emily Porterfield and her family living in Charles Town, West Virginia. George Porterfield had commanded the small Confederate force that was defeated at Philippi on 3 June 1861 in a brief encounter thereafter referred to as the “Philippi Races.”67 As a well-known, high-ranking Confederate officer, George faced financial and other problems. Sustenance came from William’s widow Emily, who provided emotional and material support to her former “enemies.” Undeterred by the restrictions of Reconstruction, she quietly helped support her sister-in-law’s family financially until George was able to establish a new career as a banker.68

The story of the two Emilys and the two brothers-in-law points the way toward eventual postwar reconciliation, in families and in the country. “The Colonel” remained a tragic figure. Strolling through the streets of Warm Springs carrying his walking stick topped with a fine silver bob, he was a reminder of both pain and pride. When asked about the unique ornament atop the cane, he replied, “It is all I have left from my fortunes.”69 In a final devastating stroke of bad luck, after his reinstatement at the bar, his beloved home of Rose Hill burned to the ground in 1873, under questionable circumstances. Many suspected revenge by some long-forgotten adversary. Others felt that political motives were at work. The cause was never established. Mansion and contents were lost, except for an antique horsehair sofa that still bears the marks of the fire.70 With his home gone, and increasingly beset by illness, “the Colonel” could no longer take care of Rachel or himself. Rachel went to live with her children, and when she died in February 1877, “the Colonel” was in such bad health he could not attend her funeral. He died at Emily’s home in Charles Town on 28 November 1877.71

**The Growth of a Legend**

Decades after the war, a story—a legend, really—spread from Bath County about the final resolution of the terrible breech in the Terrill family. Like other such tales, even serious historians (including this author) picked it up and repeated it uncritically without checking details deeply enough to verify accuracy and those who tried could not do so.72 This is how the tale was told.
Grief-stricken, his face locked in a grimace of sorrow, the old man slowly removed the canvas cover draping the granite headstone. Sons are fated to bury their fathers—except in war—but in this terrible moment, a father stood over a monument to three of his sons, all fallen in battle. Slowly, in a voice trembling with unfathomable emotion, the distinguished lawyer, legislator, and orator eulogized his children. Every member of the solemn gathering—their own pain from the loss of loved ones still raw even after a decade—watched with a full appreciation of the scale of the tragedy that had ripped the family, and their country, apart. The old man then read the inscription aloud: This monument erected by their father; God Alone Knows Which Was Right.

Except the story is fiction.

Within days of his death on the Pernyville battlefield, Brig. Gen. William R. Terrill’s body had passed through the Sanitary Committee in Louisville and, via Cincinnati, to Reading, Pennsylvania, hometown of his wife Emily. There, on 17 October 1862, after a military funeral attended by local dignitaries, he was laid to rest in the Charles Evans Cemetery in a plot belonging to James McKnight, a distinguished citizen and artillery officer in the Mexican War. His body remained there until Emily’s death in February 1884, when the couple was laid to rest together in the cemetery at West Point.73 Several days after James was killed, “the Colonel” recovered his son's body and arranged for burial near Mechanicville.74 Nothing is known about the fate of Philip’s remains.

There has never been a fine stone marker, nor a single grave holding the three Terrill brothers, nor is there any actual monument honoring their memory and the agony of their family. The story of how the legend gained credibility, however, is itself fascinating, and speaks to the power of the Civil War to capture the American imagination and shape legends and memorials—real and imagined—even a half-century after its end and up to today.

According to a local attorney, John W. Stephenson (1850–1921), who knew “the Colonel” in old age, the monument was “built” in Stephenson’s office.75 He described the tale to a visitor in 1918, who in turn reported it to a local newspaper. At the end of the nineteenth century, the famous correspondent Richard Harding Davis (1864–1916) summered regularly at the newly renovated Homestead Resort in Hot Springs. Davis was an acquaintance of Stephenson and frequently visited his office in search of lively conversation and tidbits of gossip he could use in his column for Harper’s Weekly, where Davis served as editor.

One morning the conversation turned to the eccentricities of “the Colonel” and the tragic brother generals. Davis, believing that they deserved to be remembered in some grand way, wrote a story for his newspaper imagining a funerary monument—a cube inscribed on opposite sides to the memory and glorious deaths of the two brothers. Between the opposite faces of the cube, facing the viewer, the imagined inscription would read, “God Alone Knows Who Was Right.”

That is how the story began.76

To say that the monument is fiction, however, is not the same as saying that it does not exist as a powerful image of the sort that attaches to our national imagination, especially about tragedies. The poignancy of the fate of the Terrills, and the notion of absolute loyalty and fealty to duty that their story evokes, are both monument and warning, each harder than marble. Their story is testimony to the private struggles and extraordinary losses and sacrifice among those who rallied to defend their way of life—and the inherently and absolutely irreconcilable claims by either side in a civil war. All that matters is what happens after, and in that regard the story of the two Emilys is as inspiring as any patriotic legend.

Notes


34. Ibid., p. 304.


40. Ibid.


42. Artillery batteries were not assigned to U.S. brigades, but assigned to corps.


50. About 3 percent of the total of both sides engaged were killed (1,355 of 52,940 effective); Terrill’s brigade suffered more than 4 percent killed. See Boattner, *Civil War Dictionary*, p. 644.


53. Ltr. Dr. John Brockenbrough to Senator James Mason, 1 Dec 1848, Special Manuscripts Collection, U.S. Military Academy Library.


57. Evans, *Confederate Military History*, p. 672.

58. OR, ser. 1, vol. 21, pt. 1, p. 664


61. Ibid.


64. There is some confusion about the actual date of Terrill’s promotion. Some sources cite the same day as his death. See Evans, *Confederate Military History*, p. 672.

65. Terrill-Porterfield Families, Papers Regarding Civil War and Other Material 1716–1994 (Terrill Papers), West Virginia and Regional History Collection, West Virginia University Archives and Manuscripts Divi-
The Chief’s Corner

Robert J. Dalessandro

Continued from page 3

The Center completed the move of over seventy macro artifacts from Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, thereby closing the museum and distributing these objects throughout the Army Museum System. We also moved additional collections from the Communications-Electronics Command.

We processed 11,422 artifacts through the collections committee, answered over 525 art and artifact requests for information from the general public and elements of the Department of Defense staff, and funded preservation of two rail guns at a cost of $130,000, one of which was the storied Anzio Annie.

Each of these initiatives saved many millions of dollars as we continued to streamline our Army historical collections.

We continue to support exhibit development for the National Museum of the United States Army project and look forward to the return of the project to the Center and to a June 2019 opening.

This year we have published several new commemorative brochures: In the War of 1812 series, Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811, The Campaign of 1812, and The Canadian Theater, 1813; in the Civil War series, The Chancellorsville Campaign, January–May 1863, The Vicksburg Campaign, November 1862–July 1863, and The Gettysburg Campaign, June–July 1863; and finally a brochure titled Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, March 2002–April 2005. We published three Department of the Army Historical Summaries and revised or reprinted several publications, including Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775–2013, and The Sergeants Major of the Army.

Last but not least, as we celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of Army History, we continued to improve on both quality and success, publishing four issues, on time and on target!

We culminated our work with Native American tribal leaders and advocates, refining the list of World War I and World War II Native American code talkers, and we observed with pride as several code talkers were presented with congressional medals, struck by the U.S. Treasury, at the U.S. Capitol.

Our digital initiatives have been simply astonishing! The CMH Web site remains extremely popular, with more than 14 million hits each month, holding at the second most popular Web site in the Army, only exceeded in usage by the Army home page. The CMH Web site holds the number one position for most downloads of any .mil domain. Meanwhile, our social media engagement grows with the CMH Facebook page becoming ever more popular.

We continue transitioning all of our historical research collections to the “cloud” as we strive to make all Army historical documents and materials accessible to military historians across the Army.

Once again, we worked with media outlets and production companies nationwide to tell our Army’s and our soldier’s story—CMH is, without a doubt, an Army strategic communications giant!

As you can see, it really has been another productive year. Thanks to each of you for all you accomplish as part of the Army History program and thanks to those who support Army History throughout the year.

Have a prosperous New Year!
Battle of Fallujah. The Fallujah VSR features 3D imagery, photographs, video, and firsthand accounts of the battle. This four-hour VSR is well-suited to the development and education of leaders at the brigade and division level. It will enable them to learn from the battle in which Army mechanized units joined Marine Corps forces in an attack against the insurgent stronghold that saw some of the war’s most difficult urban combat. For more information, please visit the CSI Staff Ride page: http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/historical-support_sr.asp.

The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List

The Center of Military History recently released the 2014 edition of The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List. The Chief of Staff’s list of suggested readings on military-related subjects has been selected to stimulate independent study by soldiers at all levels, from cadet and enlisted to officer and general officer, in order to help them prepare for the next higher level of responsibility. This reading list is an important element in the professional development of all leaders in the Army. This reading list has been issued as CMH Pub 105-5-1. A PDF version of the list can be downloaded on the Center’s Web site: http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/105/105-5-1/index.html.

ARMY HISTORY

Call For Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.
While deployed to Afghanistan in the fall of 2008 as the Army’s artist-in-residence, M. Sgt. Martin J. Cervantez witnessed a scene that remained vivid in his mind until he captured it on canvas. That painting, titled *A Huge Responsibility*, depicts a young second lieutenant, an interpreter, and an Afghan police chief reviewing documents together. Painted in an extremely realistic style with dramatic lighting and a theatrical element conveyed by the drawn curtain in the left foreground, this artwork offers a glimpse into a moment in contemporary Army history.

According to then–2d Lt. Patrick Farrell, one of the subjects of the painting and now a first lieutenant, the three were reviewing arms room inventories for the province, which explains the tracking system for weapons. Though he cannot read the writing on the map or inventories, Farrell is portrayed intently following as the interpreter points to various spots on the map, indicating the locations of the arms rooms. The interpreter is situated in the center of the painting, between the Afghan and the American, visually indicating his importance as the link between the two. He is dressed in both American and Afghan apparel, including a New York Yankees baseball cap, reinforcing his role as the key intermediary that enables the two to work together. Though he is literally highlighted by the light source in the painting, his disguise enables him to blend in and protects him from recognition by anyone with ties to al-Qaeda. The Afghan police chief, shown seated at the table, is accompanied by a security guard, who is the figure in the right foreground. This guard is necessary due to frequent attempts on the police chief’s life, often from insurgents within his own ranks. The guard shown in the painting is anonymous and stands with his back to the viewer, protecting the chief from the unknown threat.

The title, *A Huge Responsibility*, relates to the heavy burden that is shared by the three subjects. All are present due to a love of their countries, despite the personal risk. The artist was struck by the level of trust shown to a young lieutenant, as he had personally witnessed the same task being performed by lieutenant colonels. During a visit to the Museum Support Center in April 2012, when asked his feelings on the title, Farrell humbly replied that he was just doing his job, saying that “everyone over there has a huge responsibility, especially working with the Afghans, having to put your emotions aside, and dealing with them at the level of having conversations through interpreters. You get no training for that sort of thing—there’s no way to simulate it. You just get your training on the go.”

Along with the rest of the eyewitness art produced by soldier-artists through the Army’s Artist-in-Residence Program, this piece is part of the Army Art Collection, which is preserved at the Army’s Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Sarah Forgey is the curator of the U.S. Army Art Collection.

Note

A Huge Responsibility, by M. Sgt. Martin J. Cervantez, 2009, oil on canvas
Kevin M. Hymel recently served as a historian for the U.S. Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He earned a bachelor's degree from LaSalle University and a master's degree from Villanova University. He is the author of Patton's Photographs: War as He Saw It (Washington, D.C., 2006), and coauthor of Patton: Legendary World War II Commander (Washington, D.C., 2008), with Martin Blumenson. He also leads tours of Patton's battlefields for Stephen Ambrose Historical Tours. This article was compiled from research he is conducting for an upcoming book.
General George S. Patton Jr. is remembered for his battlefield genius as well as his personal lapses of judgment. From North Africa and Sicily, to continental Europe, he successfully led American troops on brilliant campaigns that helped break the back of the Axis powers. Along the way, he assaulted his own men, disobeyed orders, and even risked his men’s lives on an ill-conceived rescue mission. In each case, Patton’s superiors reprimanded him and tried to cover up his rash behavior, arguing that he was just too valuable to the war effort to send home. There is, perhaps, another incident for which he was never reprimanded.

Although Patton and two other witnesses claim that Capt. Richard N. “Dick” Jenson, Patton’s aide-de-camp, died as the result of combat, a new witness calls these accounts into question. The witness explains that the whole incident was Patton’s fault and that Patton covered up Jenson’s death to save his own career. There is some evidence to back up this claim.

Jenson was not just another aide to Patton. The Patton and Jenson families had been friends back in California, and the 27-year-old captain served as his aide when Patton took command of the 2d Armored Division in the United States. According to Jenson’s mother Echo, Patton had become a father figure to Jenson, whose father had died some years earlier. “You took his place and his [Jenson’s] admiration and affection was undaunted,” she wrote Patton. If Patton had been responsible for Jenson’s death, it might explain Patton’s often-expressed overwhelming grief, which cut him so hard that day and lingered throughout his time in North Africa. The day Jenson was killed, Patton wrote Echo: “Had Dick been my own son I could hardly feel worse. . . . It’s just awful. I can’t realize it.” He told her that he had “kissed him on the forehead as a proxy for you,” and referred to Jenson as loyal, “the bravest and best,” and “a gallant Christian soldier,” adding, “he looked after me as if I was an invalid.” Patton included in his letter to Echo copies of the two last pictures he had taken of Jenson and wrote that when he took them Jenson had said, “I hope this is not a final picture.” It was. Patton concluded by writing, “Words fail me when I try to express to you my sorrow and sympathy.”

The three similar accounts of Captain Jenson’s death claim he was killed by a bomb dropped by the German Luftwaffe in the Tunisian desert while supporting an armored task force. Patton recorded it in his diary and wrote about it to his wife; General Omar N. Bradley wrote about it in his memoir A Soldier’s Story (New York, 1951); and Capt. Chester “Chet” Hansen penned it in his personal diary. The event was even significant enough to make it into the popular movie Patton (1970).
Jenson was killed on 1 April 1943, two weeks after the start of the Battle of El Guettar. Patton, at the time commanding the U.S. II Corps, had recently been promoted lieutenant general. Bradley, a major general, served as Patton’s deputy commander, while Hansen served as Bradley’s aide-de-camp. Patton claimed to have assigned Jenson and Hansen to Benson Force because it needed staff officers. The armored force, under Col. Clarence C. Benson, had been ordered to punch through the German defenses and link up with the British Eighth Army under General Bernard Law Montgomery, driving up from the south.

Patton described Jenson’s death in his personal diary:

Generals Bradley, ‘Pink’ Bull, Crane, and Dunphie went to Benson’s command post at 10. 12 Junker 88s bombed them with 500-pound bombs with instantaneous fuses. They fell right in the command post. All jumped into slit trenches, of which there were plenty. One bomb hit right at edge of trench Jenson was in, killing him instantly. His watch stopped at 10:12.3

Benson Force had spent the day on a ridgeline twelve miles southwest of El Guettar dueling with the Germans. The “Pink” that Patton referred to was Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bull, the head of the Operations Division; “Crane” was Brig. Gen. William Carey Crane, a staff officer with II Corps; and “Dunphie” was British Brigadier Charles Dunphie, Patton’s assistant chief of staff.

That night, Patton wrote a letter to his wife Beatrice, confessing that “it [Jenson’s death] was my fault in a way.”4 Patton revealed to his wife that he had written to Jenson’s mother, Echo, about his death but
“I saw a flight of 12 JU–87 twin-engine bombers headed toward our position at almost 8,000 feet [sic].” Bradley went on to recount:

A few minutes later the whistle sounded again. The bombers had circled around and this time they were headed for us. As the AA guns pumped into the sky we made for the trenches. The ground heaved beneath us as a salvo of bombs splashed across our position, tearing the helmets from our heads and searing us with sand. Seconds later a nest of antipersonnel butterfly bombs fell into the CP [Command Post]. I climbed from my trench to find Dunphie bleeding from a wound in his thigh.

. . . A bomb had fallen between two trenches one of which was occupied by Hansen, the other by Patton’s aide, Captain Richard Jenson of Pasadena, California. Jenson had been killed and his watch shattered by the concussion. . . . Later that afternoon Hansen carried Jenson’s body into Gafsa on his jeep. Patton climbed into his car and drove immediately to the small French cemetery in the European section of town. . . . Patton knelt by the body of Jenson with tears running down his face. He removed a small pair of scissors from his pocket and clipped a lock of Jenson’s hair to be sent to his mother. Patton folded the lock into his wallet and drove wordlessly back across town.

Captain Hansen recorded the following on 1 April in his diary:

Ten minutes later 9 JU88’s came over, disappeared and returned out of the sun [sic]. We ran for the trenches—generals rather casually. I last remember looking up to see ships. Terrible concussion hit me—tore back my helmet—dropped to slit trench thinking I had been hit in neck. No blood, greatly relieved. Shrapnel breaking overhead, riddled my rifle. Got out, helped wounded. Aided general in bandaging Lou who was hit in arm. Others in party badly shook up including Brig. Dunphies [sic] with piece through eye. Plucky boy.
Two others in his trench horribly hit in legs. Kept my composure. Dick Jenson was killed—500 pounder landed 14 feet from me—smashed . . . . Scroghan picked up Dick’s body. Put in a jeep and I drove jeep in. Took body to cemetery. Got Patton. He cried, kneeled, cut off lock of hair.8

The “Lou” Hansen referred to was Lewis Bridge, another one of Bradley’s aides. There is no record of a “Scroghan” in Bradley’s memoirs or in Patton’s letters and diaries. While similar, Bradley’s and Hansen’s accounts differ about the wounding of General Dunphie. Bradley claimed he was wounded in his thigh, Hansen wrote it was his eye. Bradley also claimed that they were bombed by JU–87s, not JU–88s. Altogether, Patton, Bradley, and Hansen agreed that Jenson died miles away from Patton’s headquarters while visiting Benson Force.

The one dissenting witness to the three versions claimed, “Patton concocted the story, that he assigned Captain Jenson temporarily to Benson Force. This military force (group) was in the process of advancing to contact General Montgomery’s infantry progressing up from southern Tunisia, and that it was here that Jenson was killed. THIS IS NOT TRUE. I was there [sic].”9 So claimed Jack Copeland, who, as a private first class, served as a driver in II Corps’ Headquarters Company. He wrote about his World War II experiences in a 1996 unpublished memoir, “Secrets of an Army Private,” now filed in the World War II Veterans Survey Collection at the U.S Army Heritage and Education Center in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. In it, Copeland reveals that he was within shelling distance of Jenson when the Luftwaffe attacked. More importantly, he claimed that Patton was present at Jenson’s death.

According to Copeland, Patton wanted a corps command post near the front lines, so he ordered engineers to clear out an area about five miles east of El Guettar. A few days later, on 1 April, Copeland led the way to the new location in a scout car, accompanied by Bradley. Patton followed in his command car, Jenson in Patton’s jeep, and Hansen in Bradley’s jeep. Other jeeps, trucks, and light tanks followed. Copeland recalled they were an obvious target because “any child could see such a concentration of antennas and vehicles.”10

Along the way, Patton pulled ahead to lead the column and picked up an engineer. Upon arriving at the designated area, Patton jumped out of his vehicle and began directing traffic. A low ridge running north to south blocked the view of the eastern battlefield. Once everyone had parked around 0800, Patton ordered Copeland to reconnoiter the ridge. Copeland had started his way up when an enemy artillery shell whizzed over his head and exploded on the road leading to the front. Several more followed. “Copeland!” Patton shouted, “Get down here, the enemy are shooting at you on top of that ridge!”11 Copeland worked his way back to Patton and reported he had never made it to the top. He added that there were Germans on the ridge, emphasizing his point by motioning northeast with his field glasses. “It’s flat trajectory and they cannot get to us,” Copeland reassured the general.12 Patton did not respond, but instead turned and headed for his communications truck.

The artillery rounds were a bad omen. Two hours later, Copeland saw a flight of JU–88s flying north along the eastern ridgeline at about 3,000 feet. They turned to their left and came out of the sun, heading for the command post. “I am sure the German soldiers on the range were watching the whole show and telling them by radio of our concentration of vehicles and the importance of the mass of vehicles,” he wrote.13 Copeland jumped to the .50-caliber machine gun mounted to the back of the scout car and began firing. Again, according to Copeland: “Patton and Bradley both jumped into the same large foxhole dug for them about 70 feet from the side of my vehicle. They both yelled at me to get into a foxhole, but I ignored them.”14

Copeland continued to fire. He had trouble seeing the bombers coming out of the sun and could not swivel his machine gun fast enough, so he swung around, waited for them to pass and fired as they flew away. According to Copeland: “Both Patton and Jenson yelled at me again to get into a slit trench, but I knew if I tried this other way, I might have a better chance.” His plan worked. He knocked down one of the last bombers. “Kid,” Patton shouted at Copeland, “you’ll get a silver star for this action today [sic].”15 Bradley also
said something about the excellent shooting and seeing the tracer bullets going through the aircraft, but Copeland could not recall his exact words.

Then Copeland revealed what happened to Jenson.

One bomb had hit within 30 feet of the rear of the scout car leaving a hole in the sand five feet deep and twenty-five feet across. Why I was not killed, God only knows. Captain Jenson was in a trench about 50 feet from me, when he was killed by concussion. I felt the concussion of this one, but was again saved. General Patton was very upset on the discovery of the death of his aide. General Bradley helped Patton over to his jeep, where he sat down in grief. Within a few minutes he left the CP area in his command car for Gafsa.16
Copeland deduced that Jenson had died because his chinstrap was fastened, which snapped his neck when the bomb’s concussion forced his helmet upward. Copeland and Hansen lifted Jenson’s body out of the trench and placed it in Hansen’s jeep, for the trip to the collection point in Gafsa.17

The drivers, according to Copeland, were forbidden to talk about the incident: “The press tried at different times, but our lips were sealed, they had to be.”18 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander Allied (Expeditionary) Force, had specifically cautioned Patton against rash behavior when he gave Patton command of II Corps back on 7 March. Navy Capt. Harry C. Butcher, Eisenhower’s naval aide, who was present at the meeting of the two generals, wrote in his diary:

I spoke to you about personal recklessness. Your personal courage is something you do not have to prove to me, and I want you as a Corps Commander—not as a casualty. I am quite well aware that in getting ready for the tasks to come, you must see every portion of your troops and of the positions they occupy; but don’t forget that in actual battle under present conditions a Commander can really handle his outfit only from his Command Post, where he can be in touch both with his Commander and with his subordinates.20

Patton never mentioned Eisenhower’s warning in his diaries, and the only reference he made to his wife was to write, “D[wight] met me at the airport gave me some verbal instruction.”21 But according to Copeland, “All the staff knew about this order. It was no secret in the II Corps Headquarters.”22 Copeland believed that since Patton had commanded II Corps for less than a month, he would worry that
Eisenhower would send him home if he learned that he had been so reckless so soon. Eisenhower might even question his judgment and ability to lead a corps in the future, much less an army. Eisenhower had sacked Patton’s predecessor, Maj. Gen. Lloyd Fredendall, for his failures at the Battle of Kasserine Pass. During most of the action, Fredendall had remained far behind the front lines in a large cave that served as II Corps headquarters. Although Patton was showing leadership by moving his headquarters so close to the front, it was against the intent of Eisenhower’s orders.

As for Copeland, he may have been compelled to write his memoir because he considered Jenson “a father to me.” Jenson had given Copeland some clothes after Copeland’s ship was torpedoed during Operation TORCH, the amphibious assault on Morocco. He also kept Copeland out of trouble with higher-ups and assisted him with some of Patton’s more demanding requests. Copeland felt duty-bound to make sure his version of Jenson’s death saw the light of day.

Copeland also questioned the story about Dunphie’s wounding during the raid. “I could be wrong, but I do not remember a British Brigadier Dunphie ever being with our group of officers.” But Dunphie, a veteran of the battles of El Almain and Kasserine Pass, was wounded at some point under Patton’s command. He encountered Patton at the end of 1943 when the general gave him a Silver Star off his own uniform, “which he had apparently given me when I was wounded,” said Dunphie, who never explained the circumstances of his wounding, or if it was his eye or thigh.

Copeland never got his promised Silver Star. If his story is true, Patton could not have afforded to reveal the details of Copeland’s action, fearing that Eisenhower might discover what really happened. There are no records of II Corps for the month of April 1943 at the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, to corroborate or deny any of the versions of Jenson’s death. As Copeland prepared his memoir, he wrote a letter to then-retired Lt. Col. Chester Hansen in 1995, asking if he remembered the same story. Hansen wrote Copeland back on 28 August 1995. He maintained the Benson Force story but admitted the following: “I frequently recall how Dick Jenson was killed. While you were firing that ’50, I headed into a slit trench along with Dick, General Bradley and Lou Bridge. Indeed, you may have been one of the guys to lift Dick’s body into my jeep.” So while Hansen’s letter does not place Patton at the scene, it does place Copeland there, firing the .50-caliber machine gun, just as Copeland claimed. Copeland was probably the “Scroghan” Hansen had penned in his diary, who...
helped Hansen put Jenson’s body in the jeep. It is also possible that Patton ordered Hansen to create a cover story before he wrote his diary entry for 1 April.

Additional evidence supports Copeland’s claims. While Chet Hansen’s diary relates the story of Jenson’s death on 1 April, while the two captains were supposedly sent to support a force short of officers that was grappling with the enemy, Hansen’s entry for the next day, 2 April, reveals that he visited friends in the hospital, picked up his pay “in rear echelon and mailed it home,” and bought flowers and candy for the staff; hardly the chores of a man sent the previous day to a frontline unit in desperate need of staff officers. The following day he returned to his duty as Bradley’s aide, never returning to Benson Force.28

Patton may have also left a clue about his whereabouts on 1 April. Patton took reels of photographs during the war, which eventually filled eleven photo albums, now stored at Library of Congress’ Manuscript Division. Patton visited Benson’s command post on 30 March and took numerous pictures, including a portrait of Jenson, helmet on with goggles and chinstrap clasped. In the photo album Patton wrote underneath the picture: “Captain Jenson A.D.C. [aide-de-camp] killed on April 1, 1943.” The second picture shows Jenson talking with some other officers. Patton wrote: “Just before the start,” referring to Benson Force’s jump off, timed for noon.29

There is one photograph in the collection that Patton could not have taken on 30 March. It shows Jenson’s slit trench, the bomb crater, and Lt. Alexander Stiller, another aide, standing in the crater. Patton never claimed to have visited the location of Jenson’s death in his detailed diary, only that he visited Jenson’s grave the next day, “and put some flowers on it.”30 Two days later, he visited Benson’s headquarters again, but there was no mention of traveling to the location of Jenson’s death. It is possible, however, that Patton took this photograph on 1 April, the day Jenson was killed.

Could Patton have loaned his camera to someone that day to take the picture for him? Not likely. Patton treasured his Leica-brand black-and-white camera and brought it almost everywhere he went during the war. If Patton ever handed his camera over to someone, it was to have his picture taken. The only photo in existence showing someone else holding the camera was taken on 24 March 1945. It shows Patton’s aide, Lt. Col. Charles Codman—Jenson’s replacement—walking away from Patton with the camera in his hand, while Patton urinated into the Rhine River.31 Additionally, Patton always credited other people’s photographs he posted in his photo albums. Army Signal Corps photographs were distinguished by the Signal Corps stamp in a lower corner, printed dates and the occasional crop mark.32 The photograph of Jenson’s foxhole and bomb crater are grouped in the albums with the other pictures Patton claimed he took.

While Hansen’s diary and Patton’s photographs are not definitive evidence, they add credence to Cohen’s cover-up accusation. Cover-ups plagued Patton through the war. When he slapped two soldiers in Sicily, Eisenhower and Bradley tried to cover up both incidents. Eisenhower held a closed-door meeting with the senior war correspondents, extracting promises not to report the story, explaining that Patton was too important to the war effort and might have to be relieved if the story became public. Bradley received a report on the slapping incidents but locked it in his safe. The story still made it into the press back in the United States, and Patton basically sat in exile in Sicily for five months.33

When Patton’s political remarks at a welcome club for American soldiers in Knutsford, England, made it into
newspapers two months before D-Day, Eisenhower was furious. Patton was in England training his Third Army for its eventual role in Europe, but his name had been leaked to the Germans as the ground commander preparing to lead an invasion at Pas de Calais. He was not to reveal himself, lest the Germans suspect he was up to anything but preparing to invade. Immediately after the incident, Eisenhower complained to General George C. Marshall, the Army chief of staff, of Patton’s “habit of getting everybody into hot water through the immature character of his public actions.”

While there was no way for Eisenhower to cover up Patton’s actions, he dressed Patton down about his lapse, but told Patton he needed him for his “fighting qualities and your ability to lead troops in battle.”

Later in the war, Patton ordered a cover-up of his ill-conceived mission that failed to rescue his son-in-law, Maj. John Waters, and other prisoners from a German prisoner of war (POW) camp in Hammelburg, Germany, in 1945. After Patton’s rescue force surrendered, he stonewalled the press and members of his Third Army staff as to the true nature of the mission. Bradley, now Patton’s superior as Twelfth Army Group commander, chose not to punish Patton, explaining: “Failure itself was George’s own worst reprimand.”

Of course, the slapping and Knutsford incidents occurred after Patton’s stunning victories in Sicily, while the Hammelburg debacle occurred in the last months of the war after Patton had helped liberate France and relieved Bastogne. Jenson’s death occurred before Patton had really proven himself as a successful battlefield commander. Indeed, Patton’s career depended on a few cover-ups for success.

If Patton had covered up Jenson’s death, he would have needed Omar Bradley’s help. Bradley and Patton have been regarded as rivals, but if they made a pact to cover up Jenson’s death, they may have had deeper bonds. On the other hand, Bradley may have resented Patton for the cover-up. Any future animosity with Bradley may have originated from being forced to lie about Jenson’s death. In light of this new evidence, the Patton/Bradley relationship might need to be reexamined.

In Tunisia, Patton may have felt compelled to move II Corps headquarters closer to the front in light of stiff German resistance, the reluctance of his subordinates, and the lack of British confidence in American forces. The days before Jenson’s death had been frustrating ones. On 29 March, Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, the 1st Armored Division commander, flummoxed Patton with his lack of initiative. “I would relieve Ward,” Patton wrote in his diary, “but fear this is not the right time.”

Then there was the insult by British General Harold Alexander, the commander of 18th Army Group, telling Patton to place certain battalions in specific positions on the battlefield—something unheard of in the U.S. Army. American commanders told their subordinates what to do, not how to do it. Again, Patton vented in his diary: “I feel that, for the honor and prestige of the U.S. Army, I must protest.” As a result, Patton organized Benson Force to break through the German lines. The next day, Patton visited Benson to watch the noon
jump off. “I watched from a hill and got shelled,” he reported, “then went forward over the road, which was under pretty accurate fire.”40 A German minefield stopped Benson’s attack cold. Patton was not satisfied.

The following morning, 31 March, things were not any better. “We seem to be stuck everywhere,” Patton wrote.41 He ordered Benson to sacrifice an entire tank company if it meant a breakthrough. Earlier that morning, Patton had ordered Maj. Gen. Manton Eddy, the commander of the 9th Infantry Division, to destroy a German battery on a ridge that was firing on Benson Force. When Eddy asked to change the plan, Patton told him it was too late. Later that afternoon, Patton finally received some good news: Benson had at last broken through the German line. “Had I listened to him [Eddy], Benson would not have got through,” Patton wrote.42 But Eddy was right. News of Benson’s breakthrough was premature. He was still held in check by the Germans. Later that afternoon, Maj. Gen. Walter “Beetle” Smith, Eisenhower’s chief of staff, and some other general staff officers visited Patton’s headquarters and offered a plan of attack that Patton had recommended the day before. “It would have worked then,” Patton fumed. “Now, as usual with them, it is too late.”43 Later that day Patton ordered Ward to attack, but Ward said he could not successfully. “It is disgusting,” Patton lamented. He later confessed to his diary, “I feel quite brutal in issuing orders to take such losses, especially when I am safe, but it must be done. Wars can only be won by killing and the sooner we start the better.”44 Patton may have believed that only by relocating forward he could better control his corps, and his own fate.

In addition to visiting Jenson’s grave the day after his death, Patton visited Jenson’s grave again on 15 April before leaving Tunisia “to tell Dick goodbye.” As he had done before, Patton left flowers on the raised burial site. The following day, while visiting Eisenhower, Patton reflected on the grave visit. Tears streamed down his face as he told Eisenhower in a shaky voice, “I really guess I am a Goddamn old fool.”45

The evidence reviewed certainly calls the original accounts of Jenson’s death into question. The exact details may never be known, unless other veterans speak up or evidence presents itself to weigh in on the events.

Notes

1. Ltr, Echo Jenson to George S. Patton (GSP), 10 Apr 1943, box 10, folder 17, GSP Collection, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GSP Collection, LC).
2. Ltr, GSP to Echo Jenson, 1 Apr 1943, George S. Patton Jr. Papers, box 4, U.S. Army Military History Institute (USAMHI)/U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC), Carlisle, Pa. (hereafter cited as USAMHI/USAHEC).
3. GSP Diary, 1 Apr 1943, box 2, folder 13, GSP Collection, LC.
4. Ltr, GSP to Beatrice Ayer Patton (BAP), 1 Apr 1943, box 10, folder 17, GSP Collection, LC.
5. Ltr, GSP to Echo Jenson, 1 Apr 1943, George S. Patton Jr. Papers, box 4, USAMHI/USAHEC. 6. Ltr, GSP to BAP, 1 Apr 1943, box 10, folder 17, GSP Collection, LC.
7. Hansen War Diary, 1 Apr 1943, box 4, folder 1, ser. 2, Chester Hansen Collection, USAMHI/USAHEC; Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 17.
10. Ibid., p. 48.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 49.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
21. Ltr, GSP to BAP, 6 Mar 1943, box 10, folder 15, GSP Collection, LC.
28. Hansen War Diary, 2 Apr 1943.
29. Oversized 14 (Photo Album), GSP Collection, LC.
30. GSP Diary, 2 Apr 1943.
32. Hymel, Patton’s Photographs, p. 27.
34. Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 2:446.
35. Ibid., 2:447.
36. Bradley, Soldier’s Story, p. 543.
38. GSP Diary, 29 Mar 1943, box 2, folder 13.
39. Ibid.
40. GSP Diary, 30 Mar 1943.
41. GSP Diary, 31 Mar 1943.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
Review by Kevin Dougherty

In The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz, author Beatrice Heuser highlights a series of lesser-known strategic thinkers spanning the period from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. Heuser, who holds the chair in international relations at the University of Reading in Berkshire, United Kingdom, identifies three purposes of her book. The first is to “resurrect wisdom long forgotten that is still of great relevance today” (p. ix). She also hopes to find out something about the strategic thinking of the past. Finally, the book is intended to make works unfamiliar to non-English-speaking readers more accessible.

Heuser specifically explores eight strategic thinkers. Each chapter begins with some biographical information about the subject as well as some key points relating to the themes. For example, of August Ruhle von Lilienstern, Heuser writes: “Perhaps [his] greatest insight, remarkable even today, is that military victory is by no means the one and only political aim of all warfare” (p. 174). These analytical portions of the chapter are brief, the bulk being reserved for extracts from the strategist’s original writings. This organization facilitates primary source analysis and allows her subjects to stand alone, but a more readable alternative may have been for Heuser to intersperse the primary source material within her analysis. Different readers will no doubt prefer different formats, and either way, the author has certainly made the information available for the researcher.

Whatever their merits as strategists, Heuser’s subjects are not for the easily bored or distracted. Even their champion notes the challenge. Raimond de Beccarie de Parie’s writings, she concedes, are “difficult for today’s readers to digest” (p. 34). Don Bernardino de Mendoza’s “book’s style is even less digestible than that of Fourguevaux” (p. 88). One of the reasons for Santa
Cruz de Marcenado’s work being “now all but forgotten” is “because of its cumbersome format” (p. 127). Heuser has provided a valuable service in not only translating into English works originally written in French, German, Spanish, Italian, Latin, and Greek, but she has also painstakingly modernized and edited the selected texts. Despite this herculean effort, The Strategy Makers is still very heavy reading.

One cannot help but be impressed by the breadth of Heuser’s research, her linguistic skill, and her appreciation for lesser-known strategic thinkers. Her work fills a neglected spot in the literature and raises awareness of several strategists who have previously escaped notice. At the same time, readers are cautioned not to enter her subject lightly. The Strategy Makers is important but advanced-level reading.

Kevin Dougherty is an adjunct professor in the Departments of History and Political Science at the Citadel. He is the author of several books, including Civil War Leadership and Mexican War Experience (Jackson, Miss., 2007).

Dividing the Spoils: The War for Alexander the Great’s Empire

By Robin Waterfield
Oxford University Press, 2011
Pp. xxv, 273, $27.95

Review by Christopher M. Brown

As part of the Oxford University Press’ Ancient Warfare and Civilizational series, Robin Waterfield’s work clarifies and gives modern relevance to an era often overlooked in the classical historical record. Dividing the Spoils: The War for Alexander the Great’s Empire not only provides the continuity between Alexander the Great’s conquests and the rise of the Roman world, but also offers a clear-headed assessment of the pragmatic bases for the foundation of the Western state system. Beginning with the death of Alexander, the book encompasses roughly forty years of near-constant warfare among the successors of his vast empire and their bloody competition for dominance of the known world. The author succeeds in his goal of illuminating an era often eclipsed by the perseverance of the cult of Alexander and the glory of Rome. It is during the age of the Successors that Western civilization becomes the archetype for the global geopolitics of future eras.

According to most traditional accounts of the period, the story of Alexander the Great as conqueror is given a full treatment; however, it is in the chronicle of the Successors who were left to consolidate those conquests that the cultural spread of Hellenism turns. While much of the work discusses the diplomatic and military accounts of the rival dynasts, the deeper context in which events unfolded are given fresh significance: each of the key powerbrokers understood each other in terms of a shared common culture. Thus, the consolidation of Alexander’s far-flung empire under the Successors is a narrative of the consolidation of Hellenism as the basis for organizing classical society. Furthermore, while Alexander may have nominally ruled a vast, disorganized empire, the generations of conflict among his former comrades redefined the basis of political authority. By the end of the era of the Successors, it was no longer practical to speak in terms of global domination; ultimately, political leadership would come to recognize that its identity could only be realized while in possession of its territorially linked cultural core. Thus, from a single empire arose a multipolar political reality that embraced “balance of power” politics. Far from being merely a bridge between tales of great powers, the Successors and the world they created can be seen as the beginnings of our own understanding of civilization.

Following the death of Alexander until the death of the last Successor, the book is organized chronologically and is centered on the primary antagonists during each phase of the wars during the period. The conflicts between the Successors are established early in the debates over how to govern and to rule an empire that spans from southern Europe to Afghanistan without a legitimate heir. While Alexander left little more administration than military occupation and his own inclinations, the preservation of this empire would result from the consolidation of smaller regions dominated by a group of men most of whom had served at Alexander’s side since their youth. It was now a contest among them to see who would earn the right of legitimacy of succession. As personalities rise and fall, the author attempts to capture the impact of these intrigues on subsequent developments, and also on the wider cultural expansion taking place. The text is likely best enjoyed by readers who are familiar with the classical world; however, Waterfield does a commendable job of explaining the background of the Macedonian world in short asides for clarification of the main narrative.

One of Waterfield’s greatest strengths as raconteur is that he explains the contextual elements of the main theme in concise sections of the text. In doing so, he underscores that the socio-political and economic environment serve to condition the reality of the key agents. In order to understand the world in the aftermath of Macedonian Conquest, Waterfield explains the Greek social structure and its relationship to those conquered peoples. Interestingly, it is the adaptation of Macedonian lifeways to local realities along with the expansion of Greek immigration that provides for the foundation of a universal Hellenism that becomes the vehicle for the diffusion of Greek culture outside of mainland Greece. Of particular interest during
the era of the Successors is the rise of egoism and the transformation of the Greek notion of citizenship (from being an agent for the greater good of the community to an emphasis on the value of individualism). Waterfield also explains how the new egoism brought about, due to the disempowerment of citizens in favor of the prerogative of the dynastic kings, and is revealed in the philosophical and artistic medium of the era.

The author does an admirable job of tracing the string of unbroken conflicts that comprise the entire era. In essence, the forty years addressed in the book is a long series of diplomatic and military engagements against those agents powerful enough to vie for the lost empire of Alexander. Waterfield reminds the reader that these conflicts were for all intents and purposes “world wars” since they occurred all over the known world and, furthermore, each of these wars had as its goal nothing short of global domination. Nevertheless, it is also quite remarkable that these conflicts were all part of a widespread civil war among fellow Macedonians. Detailed descriptions of land and sea warfare tactics and strategies are welcome additions to the main narrative. And while the text includes a very useful atlas, given the emphasis on military tactics, a set of smaller maps might have been helpful in tracing campaigns.

Explanations of life inside the Greek city-states is given greater contemporary relevance when undertaken in terms of efforts of winning the “hearts and minds” of civic leaders, particularly in the internal politics of Athens. Some of the minor themes evoked from the text are the manner in which the Successors sought to cajole the varieties of local political groups into supporting one faction over another. Furthermore, as the duration of warfare served to impoverish the Greek mainland, wealthy benefactors were able to profit due to their connections with rival factions, leading to rising inequality as well as a reliance on patronage for the development of culture and sciences.

In seeking to manage their kingdoms, the Successors established widespread and common mechanisms for administration; albeit, they would be conditioned by local exigencies. As a consequence, administrative means were required, providing the basis for Greek-influenced infrastructure such as census, coinage taxation, and state-run banks. The Successors’ efforts at economic self-sufficiency and more efficient political control served to fuel the conflicts for generations after the death of the primary antagonists.

The era of the Successors was over by the summer of 281 BCE when the last of those who had ridden with Alexander had died. In the aftermath, the empire would be divided along the lines established during these contests. Administrations created to gain legitimacy and extract wealth as a means to support warfare would become the basis for modern territorial states. And while in hindsight the Greek world seems less martial and more sophisticated than the Roman world that would replace it, it is important to realize that Hellenism and the high culture of Western civilization became institutionalized through the blood-letting of the Successors. This is the critical lesson that has been obscured in the traditional accounts, but ably recovered through Waterfield’s treatise.

Dr. Christopher M. Brown earned his doctorate in international relations from Florida International University in Miami. His research addresses normative issues of democratization and democracy theory. He has recently completed a manuscript on democratic purgatory and how democracies can break down through democratic means. Currently, he is beginning a new project on the concept of “verisimilitude” as an artifact of post-materialistic civic engagement in advanced democracies. He is also continuing his research into the intersection of sports and conflict resolution through an examination of Irish rugby.
York in 1756, and a French victory at Fort Ticonderoga against the attacking British the same year cast a gloom over King George II’s prospects of defeating the French in the vast American wilderness. The siege of Fort William Henry, located on the southern shore of Lake George in the colony of New York, was also a disastrous defeat for the British during the summer of 1757, made more so by the atrocities committed by France’s native allies following the redcoats’ surrender.

Hughes outlines the French campaign against Fort William Henry in a clear, straightforward narrative, as he explains the strategic importance of the Lake Champlain/Hudson River corridor to both sides, primarily as an avenue of attack. With the French at Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain, the British established Fort William Henry as a counterweight to this threat, and stationed the 35th Regiment of Foot under Lt. Col. George Monro to garrison it. The British also manned nearby Fort Edward on the Hudson, about fifteen miles south of Monro’s post, and commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel Webb. The attacking French forces, including several thousand Native American warriors, were under the command of General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm, who managed to bring his troops and a train of artillery down the length of Lake George to surround Webb’s position and open a traditional siege on 3 August. Montcalm’s heavy guns pounded the wooden fort for days, while his soldiers and Indians maintained a steady fire on the garrison. Cut off from resupply and denied adequate reinforcements from the irresolute Webb, Monro capitulated to the French six days later, after an honorable defense.

Following the British surrender, Monro began to march his soldiers, provincial troops, and camp followers to Fort Edward, in accordance with the terms of surrender he and Montcalm had signed. Montcalm’s native warriors, however, were not to be denied their traditional post-victory rewards of loot and scalps, and as the paroled column began the trek southward, unrestrained Indians attacked Webb’s soldiers and civilians, having earlier killed many of the British sick and wounded left behind inside the fort. French officers did little to protect the victims or call off the native attackers, as many Englishmen took to the woods to escape. Eventually order was restored, after perhaps seventy-five to two hundred troops and followers were killed, wounded, or captured.

The account of the siege and its aftermath in Hughes’ study is supplemented by excellent maps, a chronology, and a helpful glossary. Perhaps the book’s strongest feature is the author’s depiction of the siege and fall of Fort William Henry in a wider context. Hughes not only describes Montcalm’s successful operation against Monro’s outpost, but also gives the reader the American strategic setting in 1757, details of life in the 35th Regiment and the provincial forces, the modus operandi of Indian war parties and their use by the French, and eighteenth century siege warfare operations. Hughes’ account of the relationship between Monro and his superior, General Webb, is a fascinating picture of military leadership, in which Webb appears vacillating and cowardly for failing to attempt a rescue of Fort William Henry, only half a day’s march from his position. *The Siege of Fort William Henry* is a valuable addition to the growing body of French and Indian War literature.

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**Dr. John R. Maass** is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor’s degree in history from Washington and Lee University and a Ph.D. in early U.S. history from the Ohio State University. He is the author of the first pamphlet in the Center of Military History’s Campaigns of the War of 1812 series, titled *Defending a New Nation, 1783–1811* (Washington, D.C., 2013).

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**Kennesaw Mountain: Sherman, Johnston, and the Atlanta Campaign** makes the book available in plenty of time for the sesquicentennial of the pivotal Atlanta Campaign of 1864. The fall of Atlanta on 2 September eliminated a key Confederate logistical base and did more to ensure the re-election of President Abraham Lincoln than perhaps any other event of the Civil War. Historian Earl J. Hess focuses on a crucial phase of that campaign, when the outcome was still very much in doubt. A prolific author, Hess has written extensively on the Civil War, and over the years, he has produced an impressive body of work. *Kennesaw Mountain* enabled him to indulge two longtime interests of his: field fortifications and Western Theater campaigns.

Chapter One, “The Road to Kennesaw,” provides an overview of the initial phase of the Atlanta Campaign. In this case, the “road” was the Western & Atlantic Railroad. Both Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s army group and Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee depended on the Western & Atlantic for logistical support, and neither could afford to stray from it for very long. Starting on 8 May, Sherman moved southward, prying Johnston from eight major fortified lines in...
northwest Georgia before hitting the ninth—and by far the most formidable line—at Kennesaw Mountain in mid-June. Up to this time, Sherman’s larger force had usually outflanked Johnston and attempted to cut him off from his supply base at Atlanta. Although the Union general had succeeded in maneuvering his Confederate adversary out of each successive line, Johnston had managed to keep both his army and his line of communications intact. Thus far, Sherman’s force had suffered relatively few casualties, especially when compared to the carnage of Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s Overland Campaign in Virginia.

The seven-mile Confederate line at Kennesaw presented the Federals with a daunting obstacle. Johnston’s fortifications were anchored on a single mountain with three peaks that dominated the landscape—Big Kennesaw, Little Kennesaw, and Pigeon Hill. Worse yet for Sherman, incessant summer rains had slowed the Union advance to a crawl, and he was losing patience with the cautious style of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, the commander of the Army of the Cumberland. “A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column,” Sherman complained, “and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend.” While Hess notes that Sherman was prone to exaggerate, he also concedes that caution gripped a large part of Thomas’ army (p. 14).

Chapter Two focuses on the Battle of Kolb’s Farm. Fought on the Union right flank, Kolb’s Farm featured a disastrous attack ordered by Confederate corps commander Lt. Gen. John B. Hood to prevent an expected Federal assault. Hess argues that the best means of accomplishing that objective “was to assume a good defensive position and dig in.” He further criticizes Hood for launching the attack “with an appalling ignorance of what lay before his men, even though there was ample time to reconnoiter and learn details of the terrain” (p. 45). Although Hood’s mismanaged assault resulted in “the needless sacrifice of one thousand” Confederates, it “effectively blocked” the Federals. Having failed to turn the Confederate left flank at Kolb’s Farm, Sherman considered other options.

Chapter Three covers Sherman’s decision to attack the center of Johnston’s Kennesaw Mountain Line. Frustrated at the slow progress of his army group, Sherman opted for a frontal assault over a flanking maneuver, deeming the likelihood of heavy casualties acceptable in view of the potential rewards: splitting Johnston’s army in two and cutting off the Confederates from the railroad. Having decided on the target, Sherman gave his subordinates considerable leeway in determining which units would participate and how they would execute the attack. Eight brigades from three different corps—nearly 15,000 soldiers in all—would participate. The strike force began moving into position on 26 June in preparation for the attack on the following day.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six recount the assault of the Union Fifteenth, Fourth, and Fourteenth Corps, respectively. Not surprisingly, this part of the book is by far the most compelling. Hess expertly weaves numerous Federal and Confederate eyewitness accounts into his narrative, providing a graphic account of the fighting. The Union strike force attacked the Confederate line from Pigeon Hill southward to Cheatham Hill. The 27 June assault lasted for two hours, beginning at 0800 and ending around 1000. Thanks to the strength of their fortifications, the heavily outnumbered Confederates repulsed the Federals, exacting a heavy toll on the attackers.

On Cheatham Hill, soldiers of Col. Daniel McCook’s brigade fell back to a steep slope and frantically dug in while the rest of the Union strike force withdrew to the main line. McCook’s men were quite literally just a stone’s throw from the Confederate line. The Tennessee soldiers of Maney’s and Vaughan’s brigades defending this sector nicknamed it the “Dead Angle” because their position prevented them from firing on McCook’s men, who were sheltered by the true military crest.

Chapter Seven opens with an account of a Union probing attack against the Confederate left flank made by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield’s Army of the Ohio, which began during the 27 June attack and continued for the rest of the day. Though limited to two miles, Schofield’s advance provided Sherman with valuable intelligence and reminded him of the advantages inherent in flanking maneuvers as opposed to frontal assaults. The rest of the chapter deals with Union and Confederate casualty figures, treatment of the wounded, and the reaction of officers and enlisted men to the failed Union attack.

Chapter Eight covers events along the Kennesaw Line following the 27 June assault. The stench of rotting corpses in the midsummer heat induced the calling of several truces to enable Federals and Confederates to bury their dead. Sharpshooters, meanwhile, posed a constant danger for soldiers on both sides. Of greatest interest, perhaps, was the mine that Union soldiers on Cheatham’s Hill were digging with the intent of detonating it under the Dead Angle on the Fourth of July.

The mine, however, proved unnecessary. On 2 July, Sherman outflanked Johnston’s Kennesaw Line, and by daybreak of the third, the Confederate trenches were empty. Hess closes Chapter Nine with the Federals approaching the banks of the Chattahoochee River and catching their first glimpse of Atlanta. This spelled the end for Johnston’s tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee; his replacement was none other than General Hood, whose recklessness had proved so costly at Kolb’s Farm.

In the Conclusion, Hess criticizes Sherman for launching a frontal assault on Johnston’s Kennesaw Line when flanking maneuvers had been so effective, but he notes that the damage done to his army group was comparatively light and did not hinder its effectiveness. In a 27-page appendix, Hess traces the efforts to preserve the battlefield at Kennesaw Mountain, and he provides an excellent survey—complete with photographs and maps—of the extant field fortifications. In short, Kennesaw Mountain maintains the excellence of Hess’ previous work. It is highly recommended to any student of the Civil War’s military operations.
Review by Paul E. Teed

In recent years, historians have argued that during the late nineteenth century, the nation’s memory of the Civil War was dominated by a sentimental language that celebrated the courage and masculinity of white soldiers on both sides. This discourse promoted national reconciliation in the wake of a bloody civil conflict, but did so at the expense of African Americans whose service to the Union cause was forgotten and whose civil rights were brutally repressed by white supremacy forces. While the southern Lost Cause tradition played a central role in this cultural process, several studies have argued that the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the premier Union veteran organization, bears some responsibility for abandoning the memory of black service in the war. According to Professor David Blight’s acclaimed book Race and Reunion, “virtually all GAR posts were segregated” by the 1880s, and the organization failed to combat the nation’s growing amnesia about the role of slavery in causing the war.1 Blight argued that white GAR members simply ran “out of time and interest” in racial issues and were more likely to shake hands with former enemies at Blue-Gray Reunions than in supporting their former black comrades.2

While this understanding of the GAR has gained widespread acceptance among historians of the Civil War, Barbara Gannon’s The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic makes a strong case that it is not only inaccurate, but also obscures an important history of biracial camaraderie among Union veterans. After painstaking research in African American newspapers and state GAR records, she has documented the existence of hundreds of integrated posts as well as extensive evidence that African Americans enjoyed a substantial degree of equality with their white comrades in the organization. The formation of integrated posts was impossible in most areas of the South, she argues, but the region’s all-black GAR posts became important sites for the preservation of an antislavery memory of the Civil War. By naming their posts after abolitionist heroes like John Brown or Robert Gould Shaw, black veterans made their own understandings of the war clear to the larger national organization they joined. All-black posts have usually been described as chronically underfunded and often moribund, but Gannon paints a different picture. In celebrating Memorial Day, organizing bugle and drum corps, or providing relief to sick or indigent veterans, black posts mobilized the African American community in remembering the wartime struggle for freedom.

The main thrust of Gannon’s book, however, is that the shared suffering of the Civil War created a powerful bond between white and black soldiers, which even the nation’s addiction to brutal racism could not erase. The GAR formally prohibited the exclusion of veterans on racial grounds, but Gannon points out that the white members could easily have proscribed African American veterans by voting against their admission to local posts. The fact that they rarely did so suggests a comradeship based on traumatic memories that “allowed the GAR to overcome racial divisions” (p. 124). Although white and black Civil War soldiers served in segregated units, Gannon notes that their participation in the same military campaigns and battles, where death and terrible injuries were visited on soldiers of both races, laid the basis for postwar comradeship. This was particularly true in the western armies, which included significantly more black units than did the Army of the Potomac, and which were more directly involved in enforcing the Emancipation Proclamation. The fact that integrated GAR posts were more common in the Middle West than in the Middle Atlantic states seems to strengthen Gannon’s argument that specific wartime experiences were crucial in laying the groundwork for postwar comradeship.

Bound together by the “consummate power of tragedy” (p. 114), white and black veterans were not willing to allow their former enemies to control the nation’s collective memory of the Civil War. In response to the growing cultural power of the southern Lost Cause writers, veterans forged what Gannon calls the Won Cause tradition, emphasizing “Liberty and Union,” the defeat of treason, and the abolition of slavery as the key outcomes of the war. She shows that late-nineteenth-century GAR members were well aware of the nation’s growing amnesia about slavery and deplored the tendency to see the Confederate and Union causes as moral equivalents. They strongly protested the use of school textbooks that failed to condemn the Confederate cause and consistently demanded public recognition that slavery had motivated the rebellion. In numerous speeches and resolutions, GAR leaders also made the case that the war could not have been won without the abolition of slavery and that emancipation had redeemed the sacrifice of the men of both races who had been killed or maimed in the war.

Dr. Mark L. Bradley is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He is the author of Bluecoats and Tar Heels: Soldiers and Civilians in Reconstruction North Carolina (Lexington, Ky., 2009).
But was the Won Cause tradition an effective or even sustained response to Lost Cause writing? In her zeal to demonstrate the GAR’s role in preserving an antislavery memory of the war, Gannon is often too eager to see the organization’s rhetoric as emancipationist in nature. When GAR leaders spoke in general terms of the war’s preservation of “Liberty and Union,” they allowed their audiences to define those terms in different ways. Black veterans surely understood the concept of liberty in relation to chattel slavery, but white audiences could just as easily have understood it in relation to national government power, just as the Lost Cause writers did. Quoting from a speech by GAR leader Rutherford B. Hayes, in which the former president quoted from Daniel Webster’s famous “Liberty and Union” address of 1830, Gannon insists that the veterans in the audience “believed that Webster’s plea for a permanent Union was achieved only with the end of slavery” (p. 156). While this may have been the case, it is certainly possible that many of them also regarded the war as having established the proper balance between national and state power, a balance that preserved the integrity of the federal government while allowing states to enforce discriminatory racial policies.

A more careful study of the ambiguity and racial ambivalence of GAR rhetoric would have helped Gannon to explain the obvious unwillingness of white veterans to support the political rights of the black comrades in the age of Jim Crow and lynching. Why, if the memories of shared suffering remained powerful enough to create a biracial comradeship, did white veterans in the GAR leave their black counterparts to the mercy of their old southern enemies? She points out that white veterans regarded emancipation in a largely symbolic fashion, an act that had purged the flag and the nation of the “stain” of slavery (p. 159). They also regarded it as an accomplished fact, a shared achievement of the Civil War generation that allowed the nation to move into a new era in its history. To see black freedom as an ongoing struggle, one that required present-day commitment, as well as historical remembrance, was to undercut their own achievements as soldiers and to call the nature of their wartime sacrifices into question. Gannon acknowledges all of this, but in her quest to rescue the GAR from charges of direct complicity in the culture of postwar reconciliation, she sometimes overstates the organization’s immunity from these influences.

Yet for all this, The Won Cause is an important and very impressive book. In chronicling the hidden history of biracial comradeship, Gannon moves the discussion of Civil War memory in a more positive and complex direction. She reminds us that the collective memory of catastrophic events like the Civil War is always contested and that individual memories play an important role in affirming or challenging the larger culture of remembrance. Far more than we have realized, GAR posts were places where Civil War veterans, black and white, remembered both their cause and their shared sacrifices. In the process, they challenged a culture that was willing to forget slavery and the soldiers who had fought to end it.

Notes

2. Ibid., p. 193.
The author has skillfully blended his analysis of the campaign with scores of personal accounts from both sides that fought at Gallipoli, and there are numerous maps to help readers better understand the progress of the fighting. Those who are interested in the First World War will find this a most compelling book, as we seek “to resolve the conundrum of how something so stupid, so doomed from the outset, can remain so utterly fascinating” (p. 462).
and Harvard—all members of America’s privileged class—came to the conclusion that they could no longer stand by while fascism wrapped its brutal hands around the civilized world. Journalist Rachel S. Cox’s book *Into Dust and Fire: Five Young Americans Who Went First to Fight the Nazi Army* is the gripping story of these five men, who collectively decided that though America would not yet go to war in defense of the free world, they would.

Were it not for a chance moment of serendipity, the incredible story of Charles Bole, Robert Cox, Jack Brister, William Durkee, and Heyward Cutting may have simply faded into the morass of history. After noticing a portrait of her uncle, Robert Cox, hanging above her grandmother’s bed at her small Vermont home, Rachel’s curiosity was struck by the questions surrounding the man in the portrait she knew so little about. How could someone with so much privilege and with so much to lose voluntarily go off to war? “It would take decades” she wrote, “my father’s death, and growing confidence in myself as a journalist to get back to that story” (p. xvi). *Into Dust and Fire* is the culmination of her five-year quest to understand the story of these five men, as well as what drove them to sacrifice their entitled futures for what they believed in.

Cox’s book paints a colorful picture of the spring and summer of 1941, when controversy over the growing “European problem” abounded in the United States. Sharp lines were drawn between the isolationist majority who believed that war in Europe was simply Europe’s problem and the burgeoning minority who believed that it was America’s responsibility to defend democracy where it was being threatened. Writing to his mother, Robert Cox was succinct in his reasons for wanting to join the fight: “There were four reasons for going: nothing better to do; adventure; curiosity; and belief. I came for all four. But mostly for shame. I was ashamed of America. . . . For America is not just a place between two oceans. America is a faith and because it is a faith must be dynamic or perish” (p. 300). As the idealistic minority, in May 1941, Bole, Cox, Bris-

ter, Durkee, and Cutting took matters into their own hands and joined the 60th British Rifles—otherwise known as the King’s Royal Rifle Corps—and shipped out for England less than six weeks later. They would not be joined by their American compatriots for another seventeen months.

After basic training, the five college dropouts were sent to the Officer Cadet Training Unit and then sent off as motorized infantry officers to North Africa to join the British Eighth Army, then battling Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s infamous Afrika Korps. Participating in the Second Battle of El-Alamein—the twelve-day tank battle that eventually turned the tide for the allies in North Africa—four of the five young Americans were wounded, though all recovered. Some would go on to continue to fight and ultimately die, while those who lived came back permanently altered—either physically, mentally, or both. Yet all were trailblazers, who unlike many of their contemporaries saw the value of others’ freedom as equal to their own.

The strength of Cox’s book is not simply in the innate power of the story being written. The truly magnificent part of *Into Dust and Fire* is the way in which it explores the depths of the motivations and convictions that spurred these men to take such drastic action. Relying on interviews, diaries, and letters, Rachel Cox was given the rare opportunity to delve deeper into their psyches to answer the myriad of questions surrounding their entrance into the war. We read of the tender thoughts of loved ones back home, of the internal battles fought within each man in the face of immense suffering, and the ideals that steered their resolve to keep training and fighting.

“What the war is about,” Cox wrote in his diary, “is economics and political theory, and dynamic democracy, and nationalism, and jealousy, and thousands of big words, but basically it is for the right to live. . . . to live in that way most true to our nature, for economics and politics and the like are only a way and a means to existence” (pp. 131–32).

*Into Dust and Fire* is both a well-written and well-organized book, which speaks volumes of an important minority in American society in the months before Pearl Harbor. Though there were many powerful and poignant moments throughout the book, there were times when the writing almost felt meandering. There was excessive description of some of the more mundane aspects of the soldiers’ journey to war. In other places, though conclusions about the importance of events and conversations were implied, they did stand well on their own without explanation. Overall however, these points were minor, and Cox’s story remains a testament to five men whose story simply demands to be told. Their brave and inspiring lives, and the sacrifices that they made, stand as monuments to the power of courageous idealism and its place in American society and culture. This book is the stuff of tragedies: brimming with romance, heroism, humor, death, and loss, and for just a few hundred pages we are able to walk with these men, to understand them, and to reflect on their sacrifice. As a whole, it is exceedingly powerful.

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Joshua Shiver received a master’s degree in American history from the University of North Carolina at Wilmington. He is currently pursuing a doctorate degree in American history at Auburn University. His primary interests include the relationships between American soldiers in combat as well as the history of southeastern North Carolina.
Review by Donald A. Carter

At first glance, the title of Robert S. Jordan’s book *An Unsung Soldier: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster* is a bit misleading. Goodpaster’s credentials as a soldier and a scholar are undeniable and well recognized throughout the professional military community as well as by contemporary historians. What becomes clear from the beginning of the book, however, is that the author intends to sing his praises anyway, and loudly.

Jordan’s earlier biography on Lauris Norstad, the Air Force general and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander, included detailed and balanced considerations of the issues Norstad faced, particularly as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), before extolling his accomplishments. Unfortunately, in this volume, the author gives rather short shrift to the issues and moves right into the accomplishments. Much of the text is derived from memos, reports, and evaluations praising Goodpaster for his judgment and analytical abilities. In many cases, particularly in the section describing Goodpaster’s role as presidential adviser, the narrative would have benefited from a more balanced and detailed description of the issue at hand, the counsel he provided, and its influence on the president’s decision. The reader receives assurances from all directions that Goodpaster was a remarkable man, but is presented with too few opportunities to make that judgment.

In proclaiming his subject’s importance and influence, the author also makes claims that perhaps stretch the point a bit too far. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Goodpaster agree that the Kennedy administration might have avoided their mistakes had they not disbanded most of the Eisenhower administration’s national security decision-making apparatus. Left unsaid is the fact that most of the planning for the operation had been done by that same apparatus. Later in the book, the author overstates Goodpaster’s role in preparing for the admission of women to the United States Military Academy. In addressing the idea of separate barracks for the women cadets, the author cites a *New York Times* article dated 5 April 1977. By that time, the women had already been present at West Point for a full year and those decisions had already been addressed by Goodpaster’s predecessor as superintendent, Lt. Gen. Sidney B. Berry. A more detailed examination of the general’s role in helping the academy to restore the cadet honor code might have burnished his reputation even further. Curiously, the author makes no use of the Borman Commission report, which recommended a course of action for the new superintendent to remedy the underlying causes of the 1976 honor scandal.

Nonetheless, there is much to like in this book. As part of President Eisenhower’s inner circle, Goodpaster provided the author with unique insight into some of the Cold War’s seminal events. The chapter on the U-2 spy plane program, and particularly the chapter on the president’s health issues, illustrates how Goodpaster was able to provide a sense of stability and practical advice during periods of crisis. The latter shows clearly how close the relationship between Goodpaster and the president had become, and how much Eisenhower had come to rely on Goodpaster as an adviser and sounding board. The brief chapter describing the general’s tenure as NATO commander provides just enough information to pique a reader’s interest.
Service at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, has written a comprehensive book on Israeli counterterrorism and defensive measures.

The main focus of the book are the events in the latter half of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century, specifically the second intifada, the operations in Gaza, skirmishes on the Lebanese border, and the policy of targeted killings. Byman links these later events to a chain of developments that occurred decades earlier, especially the efforts in the 1990s when Al Fatah, the largest faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Israel began a peace process known as the Oslo Accords. This process tried to establish a long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by increasing collaborative security in Gaza and the West Bank.

The author not only offers insights into this regional conflict, but he also challenges “common wisdom” and public assumptions by those not directly affected by the violence. As Byman notes, Israel is at the forefront on the war on terrorism and how Israel handles this war is intensely followed by other countries, mainly because Israel faces an enemy that has become more experienced and innovative. Byman also discusses how the influx of resources from other countries that use terrorists as proxies, especially Iran in its dealings with Hamas and Hezbollah, adds another layer of complexity to the conflict.

Counterterrorism as a double-edged sword is a common and interesting theme throughout the book. The author gives numerous examples where the intended effect might be reached in a counterterrorism effort, but where it could also lead to other negative consequences that would nullify or even supersede the initial intended effect. One example is the Israeli policy of targeted killings of senior terrorists. Byman notes that targeted killings serve Israeli politics well; Israeli prime ministers can gain popularity with their constituency when they respond forcefully to terrorists after Israeli civilians are attacked. Byman also points out how targeted killings can affect terrorist organizations by disrupting their operations and weakening their leadership. By eliminating senior leaders, who use terrorism as a means of political dialogue instead of other options, younger, more inexperienced leaders emerge. Instead of breaking the pattern of repeated suicide attacks using targeted killings, this form of violence becomes established. The new leaders often lack political experience; they have no interest in communicating or interacting with their Israeli opponent to defuse the conflict, and so the spiral of violence only increases.

The author captures the Israeli political sentiment well, especially the sensitivity for Israeli casualties in the conflict. Byman explains the motivation of Israeli politicians to engage in deals with their enemy in which hundreds of prisoners are exchanged for one Israeli or even human remains.

The book is an excellent reference on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, conventional conflict, and strategy. Byman presents some examples of Israeli strategic errors, which often stem from applying short-term solutions to long-term problems or underestimating the enemy. One example is the Israeli use of the South Lebanese Army (SLA) as an auxiliary allied force against the Lebanese Hezbollah to take some pressure off Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). After the SLA failed to maintain the security zone, the IDF was dragged deeper into the Lebanese conflict and was forced to fight reactively rather than proactively.

The last chapter titled “What Israel Can Teach the World and What Israel Should Learn” discusses several topics on the difficulty of deterring terrorists, democratic values in a dirty war, and how to avoid feeding future hatred. This chapter serves as an excellent conclusion to the book. Overall, Byman forces readers to think about terrorism from different angles. Readers will find no simple answers on the conflict here, but they will gain a better understanding of the complexities of the issues in this volatile region.

A High Price is recommended not only as an introductory text to readers new to the subject, but also as a reference book for experts. The quality of the research makes it a valuable resource.
counterinsurgency doctrine, from its dramatic birth in the 1960s to near death in the 1970s, a timid resurrection in the 1980s in the guise of “low intensity conflict,” a sickly adolescence as “operations other than war” in the 1990s, and finally its precipitous rise to robust maturity in the early 2000s. The author places each phase of counterinsurgency’s volatile life into the context of parallel evolutions in U.S. national policy and strategy. Along the way, the book describes how the Army actually practiced counterinsurgency and similar activities in places like Vietnam, El Salvador, the Balkans, Somalia, Kuwait after the First Iraq War, Iraq during the Second Iraq War, and Afghanistan.

Central to the book is the Vietnam War, or more precisely, how soldiers, scholars, and policymakers remembered the war, and how those remembrances changed over time and influenced subsequent policies and actions. Fitzgerald demonstrates that the memories and lessons of the war were fluid, contested, and changeable as each generation of soldiers and statesmen interpreted the past to better understand their present circumstances, to illuminate future possibilities, and to bolster arguments in support of their preferred policy choices.

The author is generally fair in his appraisal of the U.S. commander in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, General William C. Westmoreland. He rightfully dismisses as baseless Dr. Lewis Sorley’s “better war” thesis that Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., had essentially won the conflict by 1972 through the improved application of counterinsurgency precepts. One of the ironies of the story, however, is that by the 2000s the Army had largely accepted Sorley’s inaccurate interpretation as fact, providing inspiration to those who wished to elevate counterinsurgency doctrine and inspiration to those who wanted to believe that the tough battles in Iraq and Afghanistan could still be won despite previous errors. The allure of “the Army finally got it right” thesis is so powerful that even the author succumbs at times. For example, he accepts the notion that counterinsurgency was never central to the Army’s consciousness in Vietnam, when in fact it was. Similarly, he accepts the view that Abrams opposed the “strategy of attrition” when the documentary record is clear that he embraced “body counts” as a metric of success and repeatedly urged his subordinates to generate big kills. Questionable positions like these muddle the presentation and tarnish the “reality” that he imparts to his readers. In the end, however, the differences—alleged or real—between Westmoreland and Abrams are immaterial to the author because he considers that the war had been essentially unwinnable from the first no matter what the United States might have done.

Following its discussion of Vietnam, the book thoroughly recounts counterinsurgency’s three-decade exile from the halls of U.S. military thought before its resurrection after the onset of the Second Iraq War. The book never adequately states exactly what counterinsurgency is, or at least what it means to the author. Nor is the term of nation building defined, a potentially radical transformative phenomenon that some regard as the sine qua non of counterinsurgency despite the lack of historical evidence that such transformations are characteristic of most successful counterinsurgencies. Indeed, the book misses the opportunity to explore whether “classical” counterinsurgency theory was worth resurrecting after Vietnam based on its failure in that conflict and its uneven performance in other conflicts of the late twentieth century. Perhaps the lack of critical analysis of “classical” counterinsurgency is a reflection of one of the book’s strengths—the even-handedness with which it treats the many competing interpretations that it discusses. Such objectivity is laudable, but the omission of analysis gives a somewhat false impression of the alleged merits of a code of beliefs that—like the theories of “Air Power” during the 1920s and 1930s—has always been based as much on wishful thinking than hard historical analysis.

The book blames weaknesses in planning for the Second Iraq War on the unfamiliarity of Army leaders with counterinsurgency principles, but given the existing constraints, it is debatable whether such an understanding would have made much of a difference. More knowledge is always desirable, but even more than having an understanding of counterinsurgency, I think the Army would have been better served by having a robust doctrine for old-style military government, an art jettisoned during the heyday of the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s that the book does not discuss.

Quite appropriately, Fitzgerald heralds the December 2006 publication of Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, as marking counterinsurgency’s ascent into doctrinal nirvana. He states that the Army’s doctrine of 2006 was superior to that of the 1960s, which is curious since much of it was based on the same 1960s authors that the first doctrine writers had consulted. Indeed, any 1960s soldier who had read the relevant manuals of his day would find little that was conceptually new in the manual of 2006.

If 2006 and the following few years represented counterinsurgency doctrine’s high-water mark, the rest of the story is not so bright. Fitzgerald ends his book by describing the doctrinal and policy debates that followed the termination of the Second Iraq War and America’s impending withdrawal from Afghanistan. In these debates, the “revolution” that the author believes occurred within the Army during the last half of the first decade of the twentieth century has been faced with counterrevolutionary forces that may well topple counterinsurgency from its pedestal. No one should doubt that counterinsurgency is a contingency that U.S. security forces will always have to wrestle with. No doctrine or policy can simply wish it away. Nevertheless, the true questions are whether America’s conception of counterin-
surgency is viable, and how much effort should be devoted to preparing U.S. forces for internal warfare missions. Although the lack of an existential threat like the Soviet Union might work in counterinsurgency’s favor this time around, the same factors that conspired to push it to the sidelines in the 1970s—doubts over its efficacy, institutional culture, the inherent difficulty of counterinsurgency warfare, and disenchanted policymakers’ reluctance to deploy major ground forces to future counterinsurgencies (indeed, the United States has never deployed such forces into an existing insurgency since Vietnam)—are once again at play. What counterinsurgency’s future will ultimately be is thus still uncertain. What is not in doubt is that soldiers, scholars, and policymakers will once again employ varying interpretations of history—not just of the Vietnam War, but of the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan—to buttress their arguments. For the good of the country, we can only hope that the most accurate interpretation will prevail.

It’s been a while since I last updated all the members of the Army Historical Program about developments in Career Program (CP) 61 for Historians, Archivists, and Museum professionals. As you probably remember, this is the newly formed CP for all career civilian employees in historical, archival, or museum programs throughout the Army. We have about four hundred members of the CP at this time and a lot has been happening over the past year as we begin our first full year of initial operating capability.

First of all, we now have an actual training budget (although only a small one) to help fund some competitive professional development opportunities for members of the CP. Over time, we will make announcements of such opportunities along with how to apply. These announcements will be on the CP 61 portion of the Center of Military History’s Web site (http://www.history.army.mil/banner_images/focus/CP-61/index.html) and on the Army Career Tracker (ACT) “landing page” for CP 61 (you must have an ACT account to log in). In addition to our New Historians, Archivists, and Museum Professionals Orientation course (conducted in February of this year), we will soon offer Basic and Advanced Museum Curators’ courses and several developmental assignments here at the Center. We will try our best to advertise these opportunities widely, but don’t wait for the course or assignment announcements to trickle down to you. Keep checking our Web sites, pester your supervisors for information, and contact the Center directly for details. Then start putting these courses (and others that will be forthcoming) onto your Individual Development Plans (IDPs). You say you don’t have an Individual Development Plan? Well, create one, and then sit down with your supervisor and hash out the when, where, and the “who pays” angles of getting more professional development training. You are your own career manager!

Another big development was that we now have a fully approved Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS). If you have not seen this plan, go to the CP 61 Web page on the Center’s Web site (see the above address) and check it out. It outlines career paths, promotion ladders, professional development targets, professional organizations, skill sets at each level of the career ladder, and it provides other good information. If you apply for professional development training, and it’s not in the ACTEDS plan, you probably won’t get funding for it. It’s as simple as that. At the same time, the ACTEDS plan is revised every year, so if you have changes to suggest, send them to the CP 61 mailbox at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.cp-61@mail.mil. Like Army SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), the CP 61 ACTEDS is a living document.

The CP will also have its first full-time Career Program Manager on-board in the near future. Despite the fact that the Army has been cutting civilian positions or implementing hiring freezes lately (you may have noticed), the Under Secretary of the Army and the Army G–1 believe so strongly in the need to have fully functioning Career Programs for all civilians in the Army that last year they authorized some eighty new civilian positions in order to hire full-time Career Program Managers for all the CPs. This is a mark of true commitment to the program. In the Army it is often said, “Don’t listen to their words, watch where they spend their money.” In this case, the Army senior leadership is putting their money where their mouth is and showing that they will do all they can to create a viable civilian professional development infrastructure.

We are also continuing to make some progress, albeit slowly, to finalize the list of competencies for each of our six career fields (Historian, GS-0170; Museum Curator, GS-1015; Museum Specialists/Technicians, GS-1016; Exhibits Specialists, GS-1010; Archivists, GS-1420; and Archives Technicians/Specialists, GS-1421). Many of you may have seen a request asking you to participate in a survey from the Army G–1 to help determine which of these competencies are most important to you and your supervisor. I ask that you cooperate and
take this short survey. We still do not have the necessary minimum participation level in taking those surveys to finalize the selection and wording of the competencies. Only when we reach that minimum level of participation will the requests to complete the surveys stop flowing to your mailboxes. So it behooves you to participate (if you haven’t already) and encourage your coworkers to participate as well.

In short, working together with Center and field program representatives, subject matter expert panels, and our Board of Directors for CP 61, we have laid the basis for years of increased professional development opportunities and increased funding to improve the overall level of professionalization in the history, archival, and museum fields in the Army. We will all face challenges in the years ahead as we implement these competitive programs, but we have taken the first steps. Your level of participation in these programs, surveys, and development opportunities will determine whether we succeed or fail in our goals in the long run. So find out more about CP 61 and the professional development opportunities it may hold for you. It’s out there now. Use it.

As always, I can be reached at Richard.Stewart2@us.army.mil.

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