Joint Planning for Global Warfare
The Development of the RAINBOW Plans in the United States, 1938–1941
By Mark E. Grotelueschen

“Useful Information with Regard to the Military Service in General”
The U.S. Army’s Delafield Commission and Its Reports
By John R. Maass
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Issue Cover: A color plate from Report of Colonel R. Delafield, U.S. Army, and Major of the Corps of Engineers, on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855 & 1856 showing rope mantelet used to protect Russian artillerymen from rifle fire.

The Fall 2015 issue of Army History features two studious articles from talented authors. The opening piece, by Mark E. Grotelueschen, illuminates the development of the RAINBOW plans in the years leading up to U.S. entry into World War II. These complex contingencies were designed by officers of the Army’s and Navy’s War Plans Divisions in response to increasing Japanese aggression in the Far East and the looming threat of another war in Europe. Although fallible, these strategic roadmaps were invaluable in the tumultuous early days of 1942. And while RAINBOW’s architects made a number of incorrect assumptions, their plans left the United States much better prepared than it would have been without them.

The second article, by John R. Maass, is a brief examination of the U.S. Army’s Delafield Commission. Named after the commission’s senior officer, Maj. Richard Delafield, this three-member team was constituted by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis and dispatched in April 1855 to observe the fighting on the Crimean Peninsula. The group’s most junior member was a 28-year-old captain named George B. McClellan. The three officers produced individual reports after their return to the United States in April 1856. Covering every conceivable military aspect of European armies at the time, it is not hard to recognize the impact these written accounts had on the antebellum Army. Original copies of two of these volumes, McClellan’s and Delafield’s, were recently “rediscovered” by a librarian at the Center of Military History.

This issue’s Army Art Spotlight again looks at the work of Samuel Johnson Woolf. A continuation of the First World War artwork displayed in the Spring 2015 (No. 95) issue of Army History, we are pleased to present another eleven paintings. Many of which, like before, are published here for the first time.

In his final Chief’s Corner, Dr. Richard Stewart discusses what it takes and means to be the Army’s Chief Historian. This issue also contains a crop of excellent and thought-provoking book reviews.

As always, I invite readers to submit articles, inquire about book reviews, and send us their comments on this publication.

Bryan J. Hockensmith
Managing Editor
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Articles

By Mark E. Grotelueschen

“Useful Information with Regard to the Military Service in General”: The U.S. Army’s Delafield Commission and Its Reports
By John R. Maass
Newly commissioned Army officers are exhorted to “be their own career managers” and “everyone should aspire to become a general officer.” Those who do not heed that first element of advice almost never became general officers because leaving one’s assignments to branch managers generally results in someone else setting the agenda for one’s career. That seldom ends well. But even those who did all that they could to set their own agenda and take the right jobs often failed to reach the general officer level. (The pyramid does get very narrow at the top.) However, they were always competitive and always sought to prepare themselves fully for such a position should they be selected.

The same phenomenon is true, to some degree, for those aspiring to become the civilian equivalent of a general officer: a member of the Senior Executive Service (SES). And for the members of the GS-0170 historian career specialty in the civil service that generally means striving to do all that they can to be qualified to be the Chief Historian of the U.S. Army. But how does one do it? What does one need to do to become competitive for such a position? Here are a few tips that I have found useful in my twenty-eight years in the civil service, the last nine of which have been as your Chief Historian. I hope they give you some food for thought. Is this a hard and fast template for success? Not really. But I think it may provide each of you at least some guidance on how you can prepare yourself better for promotions and future assignments as you move up the career ladder, should you so desire that.

**Education**

Prepare yourself both professionally as a historian and as a career civil servant by taking advantage of all the educational and training opportunities you can. Do you have a Ph.D. in history? If not, go back to school, even at night and on weekends, and get it! It is the mark of the truly professional historian—the union card as some have referred to it. Having a Ph.D. makes you more competitive for more positions throughout the Army History Program and does not limit you to just one office or job. It is possible to fill a number of historian slots in the Army without a Ph.D. (I’ve seen it done), but nondegree holders limit their own ability to grow in those assignments and inhibit their chances to advance. Far from being just an “elitist” notion (I’ve actually heard that, and it is often either ignorance or jealousy speaking—I’m being honest here), the Ph.D. prepares you to be a more effective command historian, research historian, writing historian, teaching historian, and even, yes, organizational historian. If you don’t get your Ph.D., you will not be able to compete fully. It’s as simple as that. Don’t make excuses. Get it!

**Leadership Preparation**

You also need to take all the progressive and sequential Army civilian or military training courses available. These courses range from the various levels of the Civilian Education System (CES) to those at the Command and General Staff College for staff officers and at one of the senior service colleges (National War College, Army War College, Air War College, and so forth). There are also action officer, supervisor development, and program management courses offered. In short, develop yourself to the maximum extent possible as a professional Army civilian, supervisor, and leader in addition to being a professional historian, curator, or archivist. We now have Career Program (CP) 61 for all historians, archivists, and museum professionals that helps make funded professional development and educational opportunities more available on a competitive basis. Learn about CP 61 and make it work for you!

**Take Assignments**

Ask for the tough assignments, and don’t be afraid to move to accept new challenges. If you’re at the Center of Military History, relocate to one of the Army Commands or Direct Reporting Units and become a command historian for four to five years. If you are already in a field history position, transfer to one of the Army Command history offices (such as those at Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], Army Materiel Command...?
and always be tinkering on a book project or preparing papers, commemorative pamphlets, and trifold brochures, articles, papers, short studies, pamphlets, monographs, staff wide variety of venues. Compose and submit for publication long memories and will readily aid those who help them. advice but refuse to provide it in return. Historians have exchange of knowledge is a one-way street. They want your historians (you know who you are!) who think that the you have not been a good colleague, why should someone forth. Someday you’ll need assistance or guidance, and, if research tips, book reviews, answering questions, and so so much of it.) Change in the Army is inevitable. When it is on the horizon, try to find the good in it and work to make it succeed. But also try to find out what is bad about any proposal (not just the uncomfortable but the really harmful) and work hard to mitigate the worst elements of it. Not all change is good, nor is it all bad. Roll with it, shape it, and then improve it. And, in the end, when you have to swallow the bitter medicine of ill-considered reorganizations and personnel cuts, remember the comforting words that have salvaged many careers and preserved many a historian’s sanity: “This too shall pass.”
and convincingly. Think on your feet and communicate your ideas clearly, logically, and cogently. People focus on you when you present ideas, concepts, and studies to them. Use that opportunity to convince them that you are careful with facts, enthusiastic in manner, clear in speech and the written word, unemotional and objective in presentation, and logical in argument. Always be able to defend your profession, your program, or your project at a moment’s notice. The career you save may be your own!

Present Yourself Well

Dress and act like a professional. Leave the jeans and sandals in the closet. Wear a coat and tie regularly (would buying a suit kill you?) and look the part of someone who is serious about his or her craft. Keep a positive outlook and save your whining and complaints for close friends away from the office. If you dress as a professional and behave as one, people will accept you as one. Your attitude, demeanor, and dress will be the first aspect people notice about you and one that they will remember longest.

You don’t want to take my recommendations? Too much trouble you say? You like the jeans and the flip-flops? Fine. No problem. Then learn to be content to lose promotions or assignments to those who try to follow my advice. So if you act on all these suggestions, then you will be the Chief Historian? Well, not necessarily. There are no guarantees. But it will make you more competitive. Regardless of what happens, you will also have a more exciting career as you surmount the challenges presented by new positions and responsibilities. And, at the least, you will get that most satisfying of feelings: the knowledge of a job well done. That’s no small accomplishment to take into retirement someday. But if you attempt to follow the above advice, improve your skills as a historian and abilities as a leader/manager/supervisor, and succeed in each job, you may well find yourself in the SES ranks and sitting in the chair of the Chief Historian. Isn’t it worth the effort? It really is your call.

Finally, this is my last Chief’s Corner and, thus, my Chief Historian’s endnote. I will be retired (or nearly) by the time you read this. I have enjoyed immensely dispensing advice and providing my perspective on history and on the Army History Program and, especially, being your Chief Historian for the last nine years and your Acting Chief of Military History for the past fourteen months. It has been my distinct privilege to serve in the Army in a number of capacities, but the greatest challenge and pleasure has been as your Chief Historian at the Center of Military History. History, and especially Army history, has always been important to me, and I hope that I have assisted in some small way to enhance its value and in helping generate the highest quality historical products possible to make a better Army. I leave you to carry on the important work of ensuring that the Army maintains its history and learns from it. I urge you to take that task seriously and do your whole duty. Best of luck to you all and keep the historical fires burning.

Richard W. Stewart
Chief Historian

Call For Submissions

Army History welcomes articles, essays, and commentaries of between 2,000 and 12,000 words on any topic relating to the history of the U.S. Army or to wars and conflicts in which the U.S. Army participated or by which it was substantially influenced. The Army’s history extends to the present day, and Army History seeks accounts of the Army’s actions in ongoing conflicts as well as those of earlier years. The bulletin particularly seeks writing that presents new approaches to historical issues. It encourages readers to submit responses to essays or commentaries that have appeared in its pages and to present cogent arguments on any question (controversial or otherwise) relating to the history of the Army. Such contributions need not be lengthy. Essays and commentaries should be annotated with endnotes, preferably embedded, to indicate the sources relied on to support factual assertions. Preferably, a manuscript should be submitted as an attachment to an e-mail sent to the managing editor at usarmy.mcnair.cmh.mbx.army-history@mail.mil.

Army History encourages authors to recommend or provide illustrations to accompany submissions. If authors wish to supply photographs, they may provide them in a digital format with a minimum resolution of 300 dots per inch or as photo prints sent by mail. Authors should provide captions and credits with all images. When furnishing photographs that they did not take or any photos of art, authors must identify the owners of the photographs and artworks to enable Army History to obtain permission to reproduce the images.

Although contributions by e-mail are preferred, authors may submit articles, essays, commentaries, and images by mail to Bryan Hockensmith, Managing Editor, Army History, U.S. Army Center of Military History, 102 Fourth Avenue, Fort Lesley J. McNair, D.C. 20319-5060.
The Center of Military History (CMH) recently released four new publications. The first of these, The Army and Reconstruction, 1865–1877, is part of the Center’s commemorative U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War series. This brochure, by Mark L. Bradley, traces the Army’s law enforcement, stability, and peacekeeping roles in the South from May 1865 to the end of Reconstruction in 1877, marking a unique period in American history. This publication has been issued as CMH Pub 75–18.

The second release is also a commemorative brochure and part of the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Vietnam War series. Buying Time, 1965–1966, by Frank L. Jones, examines President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to commit the U.S. military to an escalating role in the ground war against the Communist government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam known as the Viet Cong. The Center has issued this publication as CMH Pub 76–2.

The third new title from CMH, Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962, by Donald A. Carter, is a much-anticipated addition to the Center’s U.S. Army in the Cold War series. This book tells the story of U.S. Army forces in Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s. It spans the period between the return of major U.S. combat forces to Germany in 1951 and the aftermath of the Berlin crisis in 1961–1962. This publication has been issued as CMH Pub 45–3 (cloth) and 45–3–1 (paperback).

Last, the Center recently published In the Line of Duty: Army Art, 1965–2014. This title, the third such volume covering Army art, was a collaborative effort. Sarah G. Forgey, the curator of Army art, served as the general editor; Gene Snyder, a former Army artist, handled the layout and design; while Pablo Jimenez-Reyes photographed all the art. This book presents art from the Vietnam War through the late twentieth to early twenty-first century to more recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The works included are a small sampling of the approximately sixteen thousand pieces of art that constitute CMH’s Army Art Collection. This item has been issued as CMH Pub 70–123.

All of these publications will be available for purchase by the public from the U.S. Government Publishing Office.

The U.S. Commission on Military History (USCMH) proudly announces the 2015 Brig. Gen. James L. Collins Book Prize in Military History. The prize entails a $1,000 award to the author, irrespective of nationality, for the best book written in English on any field of military history published during 2014. The Collins Prize Committee, composed of USCMH members Edward J. Marolda (Chair), Jeffrey J. Clarke, and John Hosler, will review the submitted books and select the winner. Topics in all periods and on all aspects of military history (including naval and air warfare) will be considered.

One copy of books to be considered by the Collins Prize Committee must be submitted to each of the following addresses:

USCMH Collins Prize c/o Dr. Edward J. Marolda, 15570 Golf Club Drive, Montclair, VA 22025
USCMH Collins Prize c/o Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke, 1011 North Van Dorn Street, Alexandria, VA 22304
USCMH Collins Prize c/o Professor John Hosler, 3417 Philips Drive, Pikesville, MD 21208

Copies must be postmarked no later than 30 December 2015. Upon notification from the selection committee, the Collins Prize will be presented at the USCMH Annual General Meeting usually held in early November. For further information, contact the Collins Prize Committee Chair at edwardmarolda@yahoo.com.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Mark E. Grotelueschen is a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force, and currently serves as an associate professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He is the deputy for military history in the department of history and has served as the chair of the academy’s African studies group. He holds degrees from the Air Force Academy, the University of Calgary, and Texas A&M University, and is the author of Doctrine Under Trial: American Artillery Employment in World War I (Westport, Conn., 2000) and The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I (New York, 2007), which was selected for the U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List.
Immediately after hearing the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, General George C. Marshall, the chief of staff of the United States Army, directed all commanders in the Pacific to implement war plan Rainbow 5. While the plan called for the military forces in the Far East to carry out certain tasks, Rainbow 5 was much more than a blueprint to guide specific responses to enemy aggression. It was the culmination of a planning effort that was years in the making. Even before the Second World War began in Europe with the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, military strategists in the United States were struggling to formulate plans that could successfully guard American interests in any number of international situations. This comprehensive peacetime exercise, which seems so commonplace today, was unprecedented in American history.

This effort was an especially glaring contrast to the attitude and behavior that characterized U.S. defense policy during the years preceding U.S. involvement in the First World War. When war broke out in Europe in August 1914, President Woodrow Wilson wasted no time in asserting the neutrality of the United States and in demanding that his fellow citizens be “neutral in fact as well as in name . . . impartial in thought as well as in action.” This attitude, dictated from the nation’s highest office, made the work of U.S. military strategists to prepare realistic contingency plans for the conflict practically impossible.

However, as the likelihood of war in Europe approached again in the 1930s, the attitude of President Franklin D. Roosevelt was markedly different from his First World War predecessor. From the mid-1930s on, Roosevelt regarded Germany’s Adolf Hitler as a dangerous man, who if not successfully convinced to follow a policy of disarmament would be a threat to other nations. As the possibility of war in Europe increased throughout the late 1930s, Roosevelt’s speeches began to more and more associate American interests with a stable peace in Europe. During these years, he was also concerned about the menace across the Pacific Ocean, where Japanese expansionism threatened U.S. interests throughout the Far East and Southwest Pacific. Roosevelt’s words were backed with some action. In 1933, he designated depression relief funds to begin a ship-building program for the Navy, and from that point financing of new ships increased every year until the United States entered the war.

As international developments in both Europe and Asia began to increase the probability that the United States might be drawn into war, American military planners were encouraged, and even required, by the president and his senior advisers to prepare plans that would guide national strategy in the event of war. The officers in the War Plans Divisions (WPD) of both the U.S. Army General Staff and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) handled nearly all war planning in their respective services. Through their coordinated efforts on the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) of the Joint Army-Navy Board, these men were responsible for developing the nation’s strategic war plans. This article explores just one of the many ways that the U.S. military attempted to prepare itself, and the nation, for the Second World War.

The prewar strategists of the Army and Navy were working on designs of unprecedented complexity, dealing with an extremely volatile international environment, and attempting to protect the interests of a nation. They had to look at the forces currently available, as well as those projected to be ready at future dates, and determine what was possible, what was necessary, and what was worthwhile. The story of just how the planners sought to overcome the variables and the unknowns of the prewar years to produce a basic, but effective, war-fighting strategy, is an important one.
The final plan, like its design process, was far from perfect. Senior leaders and strategists formulated some assumptions that were incorrect, held a number of unrealistic expectations, and made errors of omission, but in the end the plan offered valuable strategic guidance that helped U.S. military leaders prepare for, and then fight, the largest and most complex war in the nation’s history.

Any examination of this planning effort must provide the context of the international and domestic environment within which the strategists had to work during the immediate prewar years. The events in Europe and Asia that preceded the Second World War helped create a very complicated planning situation. Furthermore, these men were saddled with the task of determining the best way to defend national interests, while those very issues were being hotly debated by the American public. Finally, the planners had to deal with an initially low, but increasing, level of military capability.

In 1935, Hitler repudiated the Versailles Treaty, and Benito Mussolini’s troops invaded Ethiopia. In 1936, after sending troops into the Rhineland, Hitler joined with Mussolini in forming the Berlin-Rome Axis. Both Germany and Italy aided Fascist forces during the Spanish Civil War between 1936 and 1939 by supplying arms and men to General Francisco Franco. In September 1938, after absorbing Austria in the Anschluss, Hitler pushed Europe to the brink of war by demanding that the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia be turned over to German control. This event resulted in the Munich Crisis and proved to be a pivotal point in U.S. war planning development.

The threat of war, which was exceedingly high from 1938 on, was especially disconcerting when one compares the fervor of German rearmament with the relative level of defense spending in France and Britain. From 1936 through 1938, while Germany increased defense spending from 13 to 17 percent of its gross national product, France and Britain increased theirs from just 6 to 8.2 percent and from 5 to 8 percent, respectively. When Charles Lindbergh visited Germany in 1937, he described the growth of German military aviation as being “without parallel in history.” He went on to assert that the Luftwaffe was more powerful than the air forces of Great Britain, France, and the United States combined. Political and military leaders in other European countries, as well as those in the United States, had ample reason for concern. Unfortunately for U.S. planners, the dangers in Europe were only part of the problem.

While the rivalry in the Pacific between the United States and Japan extended back before the First World War, throughout the 1930s relations between the two nations steadily deteriorated. Beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931, the Japanese government, under the increasing control of various militarists, embarked on a policy of territorial expansion that greatly disturbed American politicians and military leaders. Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. secretary of state, responded by announcing that the United States would not recognize any “situation, treaty or agreement” that was achieved by the use of force. This policy became known as the Stimson Doctrine. When a special investigating commission of the League of Nations condemned the Manchurian invasion, Japan promptly withdrew its membership from the league.

In July 1937, the Japanese invaded central China, a clear violation of the Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 in which Japan, the United States, and seven other nations guaranteed Chinese sovereignty and territorial independence. The United States, along with other nations, relied on diplomatic efforts to end the war in China and was patently unsuccessful. Japan backed up its policy of territorial expansion with a rapid military development program. Between 1922 and 1941, the size of Japan’s navy nearly doubled, eventually becoming more powerful than the combined U.S. and British Pacific Fleets. The Japanese Army was increasing at a torrid pace as well, growing from a force of seventeen divisions in 1931 to thirty-four in 1937, and finally to fifty-one in 1941. Furthermore, there was little doubt that Japan would use those forces when it so desired. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew warned his own government that if Japan was denied access to strategic materials such as petroleum, rubber, and tin, it would go and take them from British Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies by armed force. Increasingly, Japan was becoming an object of concern to U.S. diplomats as well as military planners.

President Roosevelt spoke gravely about the dangers that existed both in Europe and across the Pacific. In 1937, in response to the Japanese invasion of China, Roosevelt delivered a speech in Chicago in which he called on responsible nations to “quarantine” war as though it were an infectious disease. During the midst of the Munich Crisis in September 1938, Roosevelt told European political leaders that in the event of a general European war, the American people knew “that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.” There was no doubt that the president believed the security of the United States was threatened by the rampant fascism and militarism that he saw across the oceans.
This opinion was not universally shared by American citizens, the majority of whom wanted nothing to do with any wars on other continents. The history of American isolationism stretched back to George Washington’s farewell address in 1796, in which he asserted the American policy of avoiding political entanglements with foreign nations. Many Americans felt that the United States had been misled into entering the European bloodbath of World War I and wanted no part of the next European war. Most of the nation’s twelve million German Americans were strongly opposed to the United States involving itself in a second war against their ancestral “fatherland,” many of them fearing a repeat of the hostility they experienced as first-, second-, or third-generation immigrants from an “enemy nation.” They were supported by many of the fifteen million Irish Americans who sought to prevent the United States from allying itself with their traditional enemy—Great Britain. There were others as well, such as Italian Americans who shared the fear of a war against their homeland, Scandinavian Americans who carried a strong pacifistic heritage, and a number of die-hard anti-Communists. These groups found a home together when the America First Committee was formed in 1940.

There was of course a minority of determined Americans who were convinced that the United States had to cross the ocean and defeat the militant totalitarian regimes before they were powerful enough to isolate and attack the Western Hemisphere. Many Americans of British descent joined Jewish Americans, East Coast businessmen, and various academics in the belief that the fate of the United States was linked to the security of the European democracies. Despite their efforts, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, polling showed that 80 percent of Americans opposed a declaration of war. The fear of being dragged into another foreign conflict led Congress to pass a series of neutrality bills, which were specifically designed to prevent the United States from repeating the problems that many people believed led the country into World War I, such as the sale of munitions and granting of monetary loans to belligerent nations. As late as 1938, the House of Representatives voted 209 to 188 in favor of a proposed constitutional amendment requiring a national referendum before the United States could go to war. This was the state of public sentiment during the years leading up to World War II.

Not only did the military planners have to concern themselves with the international situation and domestic public sentiment, but they always had to keep in mind the capabilities of the military for which they were planning. The U.S. Army in 1938 numbered just over 184,000 men and women, counting all officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted soldiers. Approximately 25,000 of those troops were in the U.S. Army Air Corps, which possessed just 2,500 aircraft. It was a far cry from the massive force that had existed at the end of World War I.

While the U.S. Navy had not experienced a reduction in strength in any way comparable to the Army, it had in fact lost ground, both in real terms and, more important, in relation to other powers. By 1936, fourteen years after the Naval Limitation Treaty was negotiated in Washington in 1922, the U.S. Navy had seen its total tonnage decline by over 55,000 tons, while Japan’s tonnage increased by over 230,000 tons, and Italy’s by over 90,000 tons. The U.S. ship-building program that began in 1933 helped to strengthen the Navy, but very slowly. Furthermore, while Japan spent the interwar years fortifying its naval bases and Pacific island possessions, the United States was prohibited from improving the defenses of its outposts, most notably in Guam and the Philippines.

These were the forces that the planners were readying in the late 1930s. The strategists were, of course, members of the armed forces themselves, nearly all of them serving in the WPD of either the Army or Navy. While each WPD was responsible for developing war plans for its respective service, the complexities of modern war, and especially of war in the Pacific, required that the designs of the two services be coordinated. This was not a simple task because the Joint Chiefs of Staff had yet to be created, and the two services still reported to different civilian chiefs (the Army to the secretary of war, the Navy to the secretary of the Navy).

The key to the combined planning process was the Joint Army-Navy Board. The Joint Board was created in 1903 to prevent the confusion that characterized U.S. military operations in the Spanish-American War. The board was to serve as a continuous body to coordinate policy and strategy for the two services. Composed
of three senior officers from each service, the Joint Board met only when there was a specific need for joint discussion. Because the board members did not have the time to perform the intensive research and write the draft proposals relating to joint war plans, the board relied heavily on an adjunct committee, the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), which was created in the Joint Board’s reorganization of 1919. The JPC was composed of four officers from each service’s WPD and performed the task of coordinating and drafting all of the nation’s joint war plans.

From 1919 until 1938, the JPC spent most of its time working on the “color plans,” a series of contingencies in which the enemy nation was given a color designator: Japan was Orange, Great Britain was Red, Germany was Black, and so forth. (See Appendix 1.) When one considers the weakness of the U.S. Army in the interwar years, it becomes apparent that most of the plans would have been all but impossible to put into action and may have had little value besides the staff training it afforded. The only exception to this might have been War Plan ORANGE, which pertained to an armed conflict between the United States and Japan. The most detailed of all the war plans written in the interwar years, War Plan ORANGE was revised at least six times between 1924 and 1938.

A typical feature of the color plans was the assumption that the United States would fight alone against an adversary who was likewise fighting without allies. The one noticeable exception to this rule was the Red and Orange plan of 1930, in which the planners considered a war against both Great Britain and Japan. While this was probably the best example of a war plan that far exceeded the capabilities of the nation’s armed forces, it did represent some considerable advances in strategic planning. In the Red and Orange plan, the designers considered a war against an alliance, and, more important, one that involved fighting in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans simultaneously. It is significant that the planners decided that the most advantageous method of prosecuting the war was to first defeat Red, the Atlantic power, while staying on the defensive in the Pacific. While completely beyond the reach of the forces of the day and based on an admittedly “highly improbable” situation, this plan reflected most closely the challenges of the immediate World War II years.

In November 1938, in response to the Munich Crisis as well as the general deterioration of international affairs in Europe and Asia, the Joint Board decided to implement a review of U.S. defense strategy. The board directed the JPC to “make exploratory studies” in the event of the “violation of the Monroe Doctrine by one or more of the Fascist powers,” and a “simultaneous attempt to extend the Japanese influence into the Philippines.” The investigations were to assume that Germany, Italy, and Japan may be joined in an alliance and that other democratic nations would be neutral as long as their colonies in the Western Hemisphere were not involved.

The JPC worked on this study for nearly six months, finally submitting its report to the board in April 1939. It identified what advantages might be gained by a German-Italian violation of the Monroe Doctrine and described what the incursion might entail. The planners believed that the Axis Powers would attempt to set up “German and
Italian regimes that would approach or attain the status of colonies.” They might even have been able to gain control of areas that would allow them to threaten the Panama Canal. However, it was thought that the danger of a Fascist offensive into the Western Hemisphere would only become acute if Germany felt that Great Britain and France would not intervene and if Japan had already attacked the United States in the Philippines or Guam, followed by a U.S. offensive in the Pacific. The JPC explained that in the event of “such a concerted aggression there can be no doubt that the vital interests of the United States would require offensive measures in the Atlantic against Germany and Italy” and that to do so it would “be necessary to assume a defensive attitude in the Eastern Pacific.” The study concluded by stating that the problem of concerted aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan was one that needed to be considered in future planning.

This final admonition led to a series of letters sent back and forth between the Army chief of staff, the CNO, and the officers of the Army and Navy WPDs, some written by individuals in their staff capacities and others as members of the Joint Board and JPC. On 11 May, the JPC submitted a proposal to the board to research and draft four new war plans designated Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow, Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4. The board’s approval began a new era in U.S. war strategies—the Rainbow series.

The Rainbow plans were to respond to a situation similar to the one most recently studied by the JPC, in which “Germany, Japan and Italy, acting in concert, violate the letter or the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine.” In addition, Japan “violates by armed aggression [the] vital interests of the United States in the Western Pacific.” The United States would be unsupported by European democracies as well as the states of Latin America, which would all remain neutral. The four plans can be briefly described as follows:

Rainbow 1: A defense of the Western Hemisphere, from anywhere in the north to just south of the eastern bulge of Brazil (10 degrees south latitude). No forces would be projected outside of the Western Hemisphere.

Rainbow 2: Carry out Rainbow 1, and project forces into the Western Pacific to protect U.S. vital interests there.

Rainbow 3: Defend the Western Hemisphere all the way to the southeastern tip of South America or project forces to the Eastern Atlantic.

Rainbow 4: Carry out Rainbow 1, and project forces to the Eastern Atlantic, Africa, or Europe. This plan assumed concerted action between the United States, Great Britain, and France.

By 23 June, the JPC realized that the requirements of Rainbow 4 were so different and divergent from the first three, that it was “impracticable to provide for this situation as a modified alternative to each of these plans.” In response, the committee asked to add a fifth plan and for a change in the order of the plans. The request was approved by the board a week later, generating the following changes:

Rainbow 1: No change.

Rainbow 2: Carry out Rainbow 1. The United States, Great Britain, and France are allied. The United States “does not provide maximum participation” in Europe but takes as its major responsibility the defense of all three nations’ interests in the Pacific.

Rainbow 3: Carry out Rainbow 1 and protect U.S. interests in the Western Pacific (same as the old Rainbow 2).

Rainbow 4: Protect the Western Hemisphere, including all of South America (same as old Rainbow 3).

Rainbow 5: Carry out Rainbow 1. The United States, Great Britain, and France are allied. The United States will project forces to the Eastern Atlantic, Africa, and/or Europe to “effect the decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or both.”

The JPC immediately set out to develop Rainbow 1 because that plan was the basis for all of the others and was also the simplest to complete. It was finished in August 1939 and approved by the president two months later. Despite this, the committee had since June believed that Rainbow 2 fit the situation best. It thought that France and Britain would be able to contain Germany and Italy and provide a strong naval barrier in the Atlantic. The United States would be able to move into the Pacific with authority, secure the interests of the Allied Powers in the Far East, and defeat Japan.

On 23 August 1939, the German and Soviet governments signed their nonaggression pact, followed just one week later by the German invasion of Poland. The proximity of the two
events makes it difficult to determine the separate effects of each on U.S. strategists, but taken together the planners were impacted in two ways. First, the fact that a state of war now existed in Europe meant that a completed Rainbow 2 became urgent. Second, whereas before the German invasion the plan’s designers were considering the Soviet Union as a potential ally, afterward they had to assume that it might become an enemy.43

Work continued on Rainbow 2 throughout the fall and winter of 1939–1940. Meanwhile, the “phony war” continued in Western Europe. The planners’ efforts highlighted the need for increased strategic coordination with the European democracies that possessed territories and military forces in the Far East, namely Britain, France, and the Netherlands. In April 1940, the planners proposed that discussions should be conducted among the potential allies, “as soon as the diplomatic situation permits.”44

On 9 April, Germany ended the so-called Sitzkrieg by invading Denmark and Norway. On the same day, the JPC submitted a letter to the Joint Board updating the RAINBOW plans to reflect the current state of war in Europe but keeping U.S. responses essentially the same. RAINBOWS 1 and 4 were expected to become factors only after the “termination of war in Europe.” Rainbow 2 considered that Italy and Russia (the Soviet Union) might enter the war on Germany’s side and assumed an attack by Japan would occur while war raged in Europe.45 In this situation, the United States would immediately take the offensive in the Pacific. Rainbow 3 presumed a Japanese attack during the European war but allowed the United States to make a slower advance in the Pacific. Rainbow 5 postulated the “possible defeat of Great Britain and France with a resultant threat to the security of the United States” and to “the Monroe Doctrine.” Additionally, the entry of Italy, Russia, and Japan into the war could be expected.46 The board approved the update on 10 April and instructed the JPC to complete the RAINBOW plans in the following order: Number 2, Number 3, Number 5, and then Number 4. By the end of the month, Germany had completely defeated and occupied Denmark and Norway.

On 10 May, Germany invaded the Netherlands and Belgium, and within the week German armed forces had cracked the French line in the Ardennes. By the end of May, the troops of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) were evacuated from the continent at Dunkirk. Nearly all of the BEF’s equipment had to be left behind. On 10 June, Italy was sufficiently convinced of a German victory to declare war on France, and a week later France sued for peace.47

The fall of France and the apparent weakness of Great Britain had a shocking effect on the United States. The threat of a German move into the Western Hemisphere seemed greater than ever, especially if Germany could gain control of the French Fleet. While General Marshall, the chief of staff, and Admiral Harold Stark, the CNO, petitioned for immediate enactment of the Selective Service program to increase the size of the armed forces, the planners continued a hurried review of U.S. strategy. By late May, the JPC had already ceased working on Rainbow 2 and 3 in order to rapidly complete a draft of Rainbow 4, which one month earlier had been placed dead last in priority. The president saw and approved Rainbow 4 on 14 August.48

Rainbow 4 reflected the strategists’ tendency to focus on the “worst possible situation,” which entailed both Britain
and France being knocked out of the war, major portions of the French Fleet (and possibly the British Fleet as well) falling under enemy control, a subsequent German strike in the Western Hemisphere, and a Japanese attack in the Far East. Concern over the Allied naval forces was so great that the planners designated the date of the fleets’ demise as the trigger to begin U.S. mobilization.49

In order to gain a better understanding of the situation, three senior officers (one each from the Army, the Army Air Corps, and the Navy) traveled to England in the summer of 1940 in an effort to determine the likelihood that the British Isles could hold out alone against the German onslaught. While there, the U.S. officials discussed the nature of Anglo-American cooperation, especially in the Far East. Despite the difficulties in Europe, British officials were convinced that the United States should maintain a strong presence in the Far East, especially at Singapore, if at all possible. The two Army officers returned to the United States a few weeks later, but the Navy officer stayed in England on extended duty.50

While the British were lobbying for the United States to be strong in the Far East, U.S. military and diplomatic officials were reaching the opposite conclusion. They saw the most serious threat to U.S. interests as coming from Europe, not Japan, and considering U.S. capabilities at the time, they resolved to make every effort to avoid a confrontation in the Pacific or Far East. Unfortunately, the Japanese soon made two moves that would prove to challenge this policy. On 22 September, Japan invaded northern Indochina and five days later signed the Tripartite Pact aligning itself with the Rome-Berlin Axis. The United States was closer to a feared two-front war than ever before.

In November 1940, Admiral Stark submitted a memorandum to Secretary of the Navy William Franklin Knox outlining the strategic situation at that time. Stark mentioned the tenuous position of the British and reminded Knox that the British must do more than just survive; they needed to be able to defeat the military forces of the Axis Powers. Great Britain did not have the strength to do this on its own.
and would thus require allies—namely the United States. America would need to provide more than just naval support, it would have to send large air and land forces to Europe and Africa and take a major role in the forthcoming land offensive. In addition, there was the enormous task of transporting Army forces over the ocean to be considered. Stark then proposed four plans for U.S. responses that paralleled closely with the RAINBOW concepts.\(^51\)

The Joint Board reviewed Stark’s memo and subsequently directed the JPC to make a comprehensive study of the proposal. The committee quickly rewrote the memo as a joint document, following almost exactly Stark’s suggested plans of action. In response to the dangerous international situation, the United States had the following alternatives:

A: Make its principal effort the defense of the hemisphere and guard against attack from either or both oceans.

B: Prepare for a full offensive against Japan, counting on assistance from British and Dutch forces in the Far East, and remain on the defensive in Europe and the Atlantic.

C: Send the strongest possible military assistance to both Europe and the Far East.

D: Direct U.S. efforts toward an eventual major offensive in the Atlantic as a British ally and toward a defensive posture in the Pacific.\(^52\)

The JPC asserted that if the United States was to “undertake war,” plan D, referred to as plan “Dog” in military jargon of the day, was “likely to be most fruitful.” This was because the first three plans would not provide enough assistance to help Britain win the war. The committee claimed that chances of success under plan Dog were good, particularly if the United States insisted “upon full equality in the political and military direction of the war,” because “British leadership has not had the competence in any sphere that would justify our entrusting to it the future security of the United States.”\(^53\)

The JPC closed its report by recommending that the United States adopt plan A for the immediate term while building up its forces. The United States “ought not willing engage in any war against Japan,” but, if forced into one, it should join the war against Germany under plan Dog. Finally, America should begin to coordinate earnestly with potential allies on common objectives, theater strengths, proposed plans of operations, and desired command arrangements.\(^54\)

Military leaders set out immediately to arrange for discussions with the British because they had critical input to U.S. plans in both the Far East and the Atlantic. While there is no record of the president approving the basic strategy of Admiral Stark’s proposal, he did authorize conversations between American and British military staff members. The conference was quickly arranged for late January, and the JPC began to draft an agenda, a statement of the U.S. position, and instructions for the U.S. delegates. On 26 January 1941, just three days before the meetings started, President Roosevelt approved the JPC proposals.\(^55\)

The JPC reminded the U.S. delegates that “recent British political and military leadership has not been outstanding” and that the United States “could not afford, nor do we need, to entrust our national future to British direction.” Additionally, the delegates were told that “Great Britain cannot encompass the defeat of Germany unless the U.S. provides that nation with direct military assistance.” From this firm posture, the United States had to assert its “national position”: that the Western Hemisphere remain secure, that the United States was following a policy of material assistance to Britain, and that the United States has opposed, diplomatically, any Japanese territorial expansion.\(^56\)

The American-British staff conversations were held in Washington, D.C., from 29 January through 29 March, during which fourteen sessions were conducted.\(^57\) The primary purpose of the talks was “to determine the best methods” by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth and its allies (designated the Associated Powers) could defeat the German alliance, if the United States was “compelled to resort to war.” The result of the discussions, known as the ABC–1 Report, outlined strategic defense policies, various strategic concepts, and guidelines for military operations and command relationships.\(^58\)

The fundamental strategic defense policy of the United States was the protection of the Western Hemisphere, while the British designated the security of the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth, and the maintenance of a position in the Far East as the foundation of its defense policy. The strategic concept of the allied
war effort called for seven offensive policies: the application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces; a sustained air campaign against German military power; the early elimination of Italy from the war; the use of military force for raids and minor operations “at every opportunity”; the support of resistance efforts in Axis-occupied areas; the buildup of forces for an eventual campaign against Germany; and the capture of positions from which to launch that offensive.59

ABC–1 designated the Atlantic and European theater as the decisive theater, stated that “the principal military effort” of the United States would be in that theater, and asserted that U.S. operations in other theaters would be “conducted in a manner so as to facilitate that effort.” The principal task of the U.S. Navy was to protect shipping. The allied nations were to attempt to keep Japan out of the war, but, failing that, they would maintain a defensive in the Far East. Toward this end, the United States did not intend to add to its terrestrial military strength in that theater but would employ the Pacific Fleet offensively to weaken the enemy and support the defense of the Malay Barrier.60 The allies sought to achieve air superiority over the enemy alliance and would join together in a common air offensive against “German military power at its source.”61
ABC–1 also determined that each nation would be charged with the strategic direction of all military forces operating in certain designated geographical areas. The forces of each nation would work under their own commanders. In the Western Atlantic theater, Army forces were to protect the Western Hemisphere and build up strength for eventual offensive action against Germany, while the Navy was to safeguard allied sea communications.62 In the Pacific theater, the Army was to hold Oahu, defend the Panama Canal, and be prepared to support endangered Latin American republics.63 The Navy had a larger mission—to “divert” enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier by capturing the Marshall and Caroline Islands, destroy enemy sea communications, aid British naval forces within a certain area, and protect allied territory in the Pacific.64 In the Far East area, Army forces were given the rather poorly defined task of defending “the Philippines” and assisting the naval forces in the area. ABC–1 did not specify just how much of the Philippines was to be actively guarded. The naval forces in the Far East were to raid Japanese sea communications and support the land forces securing allied territories. The commander of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet was specifically directed to aid in the protection of the Philippines “so long as that defense continues.”65

The ABC–1 Report also called for the establishment of military missions between the Associated Powers to ensure adequate coordination. This proposal was initiated immediately after the staff talks ended, and by 19 May the Army’s Special Observer Group was commissioned in London. The Navy had set up a similar office there as well. By the end of June, the British mission was established in Washington. From the first of the ABC–1 meetings forward, U.S. planning would be continuously coordinated with its potential allies.66 In April, military representatives from the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the “Free French,” are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:

- a. Germany, Italy, Roumanian [sic], Hungary, Bulgaria, or
- b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumanian [sic], Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.69

It also assumed that “the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC–1 and ABC–22.” The “Concept of War” section came...
directly from ABC–1, confirming the broad strategic objective as “the defeat of Germany and her Allies.” To aid in that endeavor, the seven “principal offensive policies,” of ABC–1 would be followed. It went on to assert that the primary immediate effort of the U.S. Army was to be the buildup of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers and that the initial tasks of U.S. forces were to be limited so as to not delay and that the initial tasks of U.S. forces were to be limited so as to not delay that undertaking.70

The missions of the Army and Navy in each theater (Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East) were essentially the same as those identified in ABC–1, although often more specifically defined. Whereas in ABC–1 the military forces in the Far East were directed to protect “the Philippines,” the first version of Rainbow 5 followed the “citadel type” defense scheme of the most recent War Plan Orange versions and instructed only the safeguarding of the entrance to Manila Bay.71 Noticeably absent from the April version of Rainbow 5 was any specific plan to employ land forces in a major offensive against Germany. An officer in the Army’s WPD explained to his chief of staff that a great deal of consideration was given to the employment of major land forces, but very correctly no plans for these land operations were formulated; a plan must be formulated upon a situation and no prediction of that situation which will exist when such a plan can be implemented should be made now. One of the principal policies enumerated in Rainbow 5 is “The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.”72

The planners did call for the establishment and strengthening of numerous overseas garrisons. A total of 220,900 troops were to be shipped to places like Hawaii (44,000), Alaska (23,000), Panama (13,400), the Caribbean area (45,800), and Iceland (26,500)—all in the first few months of the mobilization. Other forces were to be sent to the United Kingdom (53,200). This was all predicated on war not occurring before 1 September 1941 because that was the date designated in ABC–1 for certain U.S. troops to be ready for assigned missions. These forces would be moved on a predetermined schedule after “M-day” (mobilization day), which could be declared before or after hostilities began.73

The Joint Board approved Rainbow 5 (and ABC–1) on 14 May 1941. After approval by the secretaries of War and the Navy, the plan went to the White House, where in June the president read both documents, neither approved nor disapproved them, and directed that in the case of war both should be sent back for his approval.74 With this, the Army and Navy planners continued to draft the more specific service-level war strategies based on the joint-level Rainbow 5 plan.75

On 22 June 1941, German forces attacked the Soviet Union. After this, U.S. planners gradually adjusted their opinions on the security of the British Isles, believing that even if the German Army secured its easternmost objectives by autumn, there would be no serious threat of a cross-Channel invasion before spring of 1942. The only noticeable change to Rainbow 5 was the addition of Russia to the list of Associated Powers that opposed the Axis.76

In November 1941, the planners made their final revisions to Rainbow 5. The most significant changes concerned the defense of the Philippines. The deteriorating diplomatic situation with Japan and the increasing availability of aircraft, artillery, and other equipment led military leaders to begin an upgrade of the Philippine garrison’s capabilities and to expand its mission. The final Rainbow 5 plan directed military forces to protect the entire Philippine archipelago (as opposed to only defending the entrance to Manila Bay) and to carry out air raids on Japanese forces.77

On 27 November, after seeing the latest diplomatic efforts to maintain peace with Japan dissolve, General Marshall alerted the Army’s field commanders that the situation had deteriorated and that “a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including attack on Philippines or Guam” was possible. The commanders in Hawaii, the Philippines, and San Francisco were told to implement Rainbow 5 in the event of Japanese aggression.78 After the Japanese strikes at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, Marshall notified all Army commanders that the United States had been attacked and that the U.S. response would follow Rainbow 5, to the maximum extent possible.79

In assessing the effectiveness of Rainbow 5, it is important to take into account the massive defeat suffered by the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Among other losses, the near total destruction of the fleet’s battleship force immediately changed the balance of power in
both the Pacific and the Far East in a way that could not have been foreseen by U.S. planners. RAINBOW 5 called for the Pacific Fleet to act as a flanking counterweight to any Japanese long-distance southward advance. The possibility of that occurring disappeared in the fire and smoke at Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{80}

The loss was especially tragic after the recent reinforcement and change in mission with respect to the Philippines. Even with the improvements that had occurred in the last months of 1941, the chances that the Philippine garrison would be able to hold out without the support of an active U.S. Pacific Fleet were exceedingly slim. The damage at Pearl Harbor was compounded by the destruction of U.S. air forces in the Philippines when they were caught on the ground on 8 December. To the military leaders in Washington, the potential for loss in the Pacific and Far East far exceeded the scope and the rate foreseen by any planner during the previous months.

RAINBOW 5 did not specify any reinforcements be deployed to the Far East after fighting started. Despite this, General Marshall, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and President Roosevelt all agreed that they should do whatever they could to strengthen the U.S. position in the Philippines. Unfortunately, they could do very little for the Philippines proper due to the speed of the Japanese advance. What could be done was to build up U.S. forces in the nearest safe place—Australia. While Australia received practically no troops and only 13 percent of all U.S. cargo shipped in December, between January and March, it received 50 percent of all troops deployed and 33 percent of cargo shipped.\textsuperscript{81} While some of this was most likely pulled from the planned reinforcement of Hawaii, the rest had to come from other sources and other theaters. Certainly, the United States did add forces to the Far East theater in spite of the fact that the plan did not call for such action. Also, there can be no doubt that the whole schedule of force movements, as described in RAINBOW 5, was altered nearly beyond recognition.
It appears that during the last months of 1941 the changes with respect to the Philippines were accompanied by a shift in overall strategy. By then, the nation’s political and military leaders did not intend to stand idly by and watch the Japanese drive their forces completely out of the Far East theater (although military planners had expected this for years), while large-scale combat with Germany still seemed far off. The last revision of RAINBOW 5 did not seem to address this concern adequately.

The difficulties that the military had reacting to the situation in the Pacific and Far East are in part related to a flaw in the plan. The planners developed RAINBOW 5 to respond to the European threat first, with the understanding that a war with Japan was likely. It had no special provisions for a U.S. countermove to an initial Japanese strike that occurred before the United States was even at war with Germany. The resulting confusion, admittedly driven in large part by the disaster at Pearl Harbor, could have been guarded against to some degree by addressing this issue of an initial Japanese attack in the plan itself.

Another flaw in RAINBOW 5 relates to the plan’s directed troop movements all being based on a predetermined schedule (for example, "M
plus”). While this may have been fine for an existing force, it was a dangerous gamble for units that were still in the process of being created and developed. The writers of the official history of the Army Air Forces in World War II noted that the weaknesses of the air forces, coupled with an unknown M-day, made anything more than a minimum air commitment “highly unrealistic.”82 This could be said for other Army units as well. The planners certainly seemed to overestimate the rate of preparation of their future forces. ABC–1 had specified that six divisions and six air combat groups should be ready by the 1 September 1941 deadline. However, as that milestone approached it became obvious that not even the 1st Infantry Division, which received every extra advantage to prepare itself, was going to be fully combat ready on time. Similarly, by September only a hodge-podge collection of squadrons of various types of aircraft would be prepared. Ultimately, it took until March 1942 for the forces called for in ABC–1 to be ready for combat.83

Despite these problems, many portions of RAINBOW 5 served the American political and military leadership well. Chief among the plan’s benefits was the establishment of the strategic goal of focusing U.S. efforts on the more powerful German threat, regardless of the actions of Japan. Simply put, the plan directed the “Germany first” strategy, and American leadership maintained that basic approach, more or less, throughout the entire war. The fact that leaders in Washington attempted to strengthen forces in the Pacific and Far East after the Japanese attack or that the United States engaged in offensive operations in the Pacific before defeating Germany, does not mean that there was a wholesale abrogation of the specific Germany-first strategy or, more generally, of RAINBOW 5.

RAINBOW 5 clearly allowed for offensives in secondary theaters, which the Pacific and the Far East were, even when they seemed to be the only active theater. The reinforcements sent to and through the Pacific may not have been explicitly directed in RAINBOW 5, but other phrases in the plan implied that military leaders would have to make decisions as to the proper allocation of resources throughout the global war. While the plan stated that operations in secondary theaters would “be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate” operations geared toward Europe, it also stated that “the details of the deployment of the forces . . . at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military [sic] situation in all theaters.”84

The planners of RAINBOW 5 also correctly identified the offensive policies that the Associated Powers followed throughout the war. The application of economic pressure was clearly carried out, as was the sustained air offensive against German military power. The drive through the Mediterranean and then up the boot of Italy obviously brought about the early elimination of Italy from the war. The Allies con-
ducted raids and minor offensives at every opportunity throughout the prosecution of the war (for instance, the Dieppe raid in France and the Doolittle raid on Tokyo). The Allies encouraged and supported resistance groups, with varying degrees of success. Lastly, there is no doubt that the buildup of forces for the eventual offensive against Germany was finally carried out in Operation OVERLORD, the 1944 cross-Channel invasion and subsequent sweep across Europe.

The plan did not, and could not, solve the problem of determining how to allocate military resources among those offensive policies. How important were the minor operations that competed with the grand military buildup for a cross-Channel invasion? How much manpower and materiel was to be allocated to the sustained air offensive? How far could the Japanese go in the Far East and Pacific before the situation was critical enough to warrant a diversion of some resources from the Atlantic-European effort? These questions were beyond the scope of any prewar construct and beyond the responsibility of the planners themselves. They were questions that had to be answered and then reanswered time and again by the nation’s highest ranking political and military leaders while they were actually waging the war.

A final benefit of Rainbow 5, and of the entire planning effort as well, was the development of a system of coordination among the nation’s most likely wartime allies, most importantly Great Britain. The military missions called for in the ABC–1 agreement, and described again in Rainbow 5, led to the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff within the first weeks of the war. This body was responsible for controlling grand strategy and allocating military resources in all theaters.

Appendix 2: Basic Assumptions and Circumstances of the RAINBOW Plans (as of June 1940) *

General Situation: A European war is in progress, which may involve other nations and expand the field of military action. There is an ever-present possibility of the United States being drawn into this war. There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in which the United States will be forced to defend, without allies, the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and its interests in the Pacific.

RAINBOW 1: The termination of war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against U.S. interests in the Far East. Other nations are neutral. The United States will use naval and military forces to defeat enemy forces, particularly those in the territory and waters north of 13 degrees south latitude. The United States restricts, initially, the projection of Army forces to the American continents, north of 13 degrees south latitude, and to U.S. possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway.

RAINBOW 2: A European war is in progress, with Great Britain and France opposed to Germany. Italy and Russia, while neutral, are sympathetic to Germany and their entry into the war as allies to Germany may be expected. Britain and France are exercising effective control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and continued control appears assured. Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, takes armed aggressive action against the Far East interests of the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands, causing those countries to join in concert for action to protect their territories. The United States undertakes to operate in the Pacific with its armed forces, in concert with the forces of the Democratic Powers, for the defeat of enemy aggression.

RAINBOW 3: A European war is in progress, with Great Britain and France opposed to Germany. Italy and Russia, while neutral, are sympathetic to Germany and their entry into the war as allies to Germany may be expected. Britain and France are exercising effective control of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and continued control appears assured. Japan, supported by Germany and Italy, takes armed aggressive action against the Far East interests of the United States, Britain, France, and the Netherlands, causing those countries to join in concert for action to protect their territories. The United States will control the eastern Pacific, extend control westward as rapidly as circumstances permit, and work in concert with the forces of the Democratic Powers for the defeat of enemy aggression.

RAINBOW 4: The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against U.S. interests in the Far East. Other nations are neutral. The United States will defeat enemy aggression anywhere in the territory and waters of the American continents, the eastern Atlantic, and westward to Unalaska and Midway.

RAINBOW 5: A European war is in progress, with Great Britain and France opposed to Germany. The developments in this war indicate the possible defeat of Britain and France with a resultant threat to the security of the United States and to the Monroe Doctrine. Italy, Russia, and Japan, while neutral, are sympathetic to Germany and their entry into the war as allies to Germany may be expected. The United States will prepare to project forces to the eastern Atlantic and to either or both of the African or European continents as rapidly as possible to operate in concert with Great Britain and France for accomplishing the decisive defeat of Germany.

* Taken from Ross, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, pp. 79–81.

Notes

3. David R. Woodward, in Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917–1918 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), pp. 18–19, cites the example of Wilson accusing the chief of the U.S. Army’s War College Division (the General Staff division responsible for war planning) of possessing plans for an offensive war with Germany (the division chief insisted there was no offensive plan). Woodward also identifies the problems caused by the National Defense Act of 1916, which reduced the number of effective officers in the U.S. Army’s General Staff and limited its ability to examine issues pertaining to collective security with Great Britain.
7. Robert A. Doughty, "The French Armed Forces, 1918–40," in Military Effectiveness, vol. 2, p. 44. This is not to suggest that Germany had become obviously more militarily powerful than France or Great Britain during the period. France had maintained what was regarded as the largest and best army in post–World War I Europe. The importance of the figures is that they demonstrate the urgency with which each nation viewed military development, as well as the relative change in military might.


9. Morison, Rising Sun, p. 11.


11. Ibid., p. 19.


15. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1938 Volume: The Continuing Struggle for Liberalism, comp. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 531, 535. The following day Roosevelt wrote a second letter to Hitler warning of "the unforeseeable consequences and the incredible disaster which would result to the entire world from the outbreak of a European war."

16. Washington said, "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world." George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the United States, 19 September 1796.


18. Ibid., p. 16.


20. Pogue, George C. Marshall, p. 3.


22. There were approximately 2 million U.S. troops in Western Europe in November 1918. See Woodward, Trial by Friendship, p. 216. At the height of the war effort in 1944, the Army Air Forces had over 2.2 million men and women in uniform and about 79,000 aircraft. Nalty, Winged Shield, p. 378.


24. The prohibition of improving fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific was a provision of the Washington Naval Limitation Treaties of 1922. In 1934, Japan announced that it was terminating all treaties pertaining to naval armament. This officially ended the binding nature of the Washington naval treaties in 1936. Despite this, the United States continued to abide by the treaties' provisions. See Ibid., p. xxxx; Morison, Rising Sun, p. 30.

25. The Joint Board was created in 1903 by an agreement between the secretaries of war and Navy. The board first consisted of eight, and then, from 1920 on, of six senior officers: the Army chief of staff, the chief of Operations and Training Division (later replaced by deputy chief of staff), the chief of WPD, the chief of naval operations, the assistant chief, and the head of Navy's WPD. In July 1941, the senior air officer of each service was added to the board. A brief discussion of the Joint Board is contained in Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 79–81.


27. Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 87.


33. Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 98.


35. Watson, Chief of Staff, p. 103.

36. Ross, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, p. 70.

37. Ibid., p. 71.

38. Ibid., p. 74.

39. See Appendix 2 for a full description of each RAINBOw plan.


42. Ibid., p. 25.

43. Ross, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, p. 73. In fact, not only had the powers of Western Europe been working on a potential pact with the Soviet Union, but President Roosevelt had urged Stalin to make such an agreement. See Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 34–43.

44. Morton, "Germany First," in Command Decisions, p. 27.

45. Though the primary source documents in Russia, the author and editors recognize that this is a reference to the Soviet Union or USSR.

46. Ross, Plans to Meet the Axis Threat, pp. 77–81.

47. Morton, "Germany First," in Command Decisions, p. 27.


49. Ibid., pp. 34–35.


52. Ibid., pp. 295–98.

53. Ibid., p. 299.

54. Ibid., p. 300.

55. Ibid., pp. 306–07, 322.

56. Ibid., pp. 309, 315–16.
57. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, p. 32.
59. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
60. In Rainbow 5, the planners defined the "Malay Barrier" to include "the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia." I assume the term had the same meaning in ABC–1. Steven T. Ross, American War Plans, 1919–1941, vol. 5, Plans for Global War, Rainbow 5, and the Victory Program, 1941 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992), p. 4.
63. Ibid., p. 31.
64. Ibid., p. 29. The U.S. Pacific Fleet was to aid the British as far west as 155 degrees east, but south of the equator only. This would extend as far west as the Solomon Islands and the eastern tip of New Guinea.
65. Ibid., p. 34.
67. Ross, Coalition War Plans, pp. 73–146. This meeting was not as successful as the ABC–1 meeting. U.S. military officials in Washington did not concur with the proposals included in the conference report and would not approve them. Most notably, they protested the report’s treatment of Singapore as being of primary importance as well as the recommendation that the United States reinforce the Philippines. See Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, p. 67.
68. Stanley W. Dziuban asserts that records in U.S. files do not explain the reason for use of the number “22” in the name ABC–22 or the connection between the “22” and the numbers in ABC–1 or ABC–2 (the Air Collaboration Plan). See Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939–1945, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1959), p. 104.
69. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, p. 43.
70. Ibid.
73. Ibid., p. 46. The other 15,000 troops were to deploy to air defense installations in Great Britain as well as other overseas naval bases in foreign territories.
74. Ibid., p. 45. There was discussion among U.S. military leaders as to whether the president had given the planners sufficient room to continue with respect to Rainbow 5. General Marshall decided that since the president had not disapproved it, they could move forward with the required lower level plans.
75. After completing the joint Rainbow 5 plan, the designers had to develop the more detailed plans that were service specific. The War Department completed an Operation Plan Rainbow 5 and a Concentration Plan Rainbow 5, which were approved by the chief of staff on 19 August 1941 and sent on to the various Army commanders. Ibid., p. 47n54.
76. Ross, Plans for Global War, p. 98.
77. Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 100.
78. Ibid., p. 119.
79. Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942, pp. 80, 81n57. According to Matloff, “The only official paper on presidential approval of Army execution of Rainbow 5 is a penned note signed by General Marshall which stated ‘I read to the President and Mr. Hull our message to MacArthur in Manila and to Commanders of Defense Areas, overseas garrisons, etc. They were approved orally.’”
80. At Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific Fleet lost 8 battleships, as well as 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and other auxiliary vessels. In addition, 92 naval aircraft were destroyed and 31 more damaged. The Army had 96 aircraft destroyed. There were 2,403 people killed and 1,178 wounded. Morton, Strategy and Command, pp. 132–33.
83. Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940–1943, p. 73.
Coming Soon

The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns
1861–1865

The Civil War on the Atlantic Coast
1861–1865

The Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi Theater
1861–1865
In 2014, the U.S. Army Art Collection acquired twenty-three World War I paintings by artist-correspondent Samuel Johnson Woolf. The scenes depicted are from Woolf’s time embedded with the American Expeditionary Forces in France. Eleven of these paintings, along with a short narrative by the curator of the Army Art Collection, Sarah Forgey, were published in the Spring 2015 (No. 95) issue of Army History. We are pleased to continue, in this edition, the display of this important artwork.

Battle Scene with Barbed Wire, oil on canvas, 1918
Crucifix and Dead Soldier, oil on canvas, 1918
A Machine-Gun Nest, oil on canvas, 1918
Soldiers at Camp, oil on canvas, 1918.

Courtyard of an Evacuation Hospital, oil on canvas, 1918.
Portrait of General John Joseph Pershing, oil on canvas, 1918
Grave on the Marne, oil on canvas, 1918
Dr. John R. Maass received his Ph.D. degree in early U.S. history from Ohio State University. He is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and is the author of *The Road to Yorktown: Jefferson, Lafayette and the British Invasion of Virginia* (Mount Pleasant, S.C., 2015) and *The Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns, 1864–1865* (Washington, D.C., 2014).
During the 1850s, the United States Army was a small organization primarily occupied in frontier constabulary duties and garrisoning coastal fortifications. Its strength during the first several years of this antebellum decade was about 10,000 officers and men, increasing to almost 16,000 troops by January 1856. Throughout this time, and for several decades beforehand, American military leaders sought to improve the combat capability of the Army utilizing recent technological advances, innovative ideas, and new weaponry.

One of the most ardent proponents of military modernization was Jefferson Davis, the secretary of war from 7 March 1853 to 6 March 1857. Davis was uniquely qualified to oversee the War Department because he was an 1828 West Point graduate, a U.S. Army officer, a Mexican War veteran, and both a congressman and senator from Mississippi. Davis was an innovator and reformer. He supported surveying expeditions west of the Mississippi River to explore future rail routes to western posts, tried to develop a camel corps for use in the deserts of the American Southwest, and was able to add four new regiments to the Army’s establishment during his tenure as secretary. He introduced new Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, including breech-loading rifles. Davis focused on new technologies, experimented with metal cannon carriages, fought for the standardization of ammunition, and placed an emphasis on rifled shoulder arms.

Secretary Davis encouraged Army officers, for their own professional development, to study the new technological advances and practices of foreign armies so that American military forces could consider and adopt the latest military weapons, equipment, and doctrine. “Happily we may profit by the experience of others without suffering the evils that attend the practical solution of such problems,” he wrote in support of these excursions. Trips abroad to study foreign armies and military science had been going on since the end of the War of 1812, amounting to over 150 overseas trips by professional officers in the pre–Civil War period. Some commissions were to observe armies in action, while others were to tour military academies or gather highly specific technical information on matters of ordnance, logistics, engineering, and equipment. Among these was a year-long European tour in 1855 of an active theater of war, fortifications, and other important military sites, which included among its commissioners a future commander of the United States Army.

The impetus for Davis’ decision to send a three-member commission to Europe in the spring of 1855 was the ongoing conflict known as the Crimean War, which Davis recognized as an opportunity for American officers to observe several foreign armies at war in the Ottoman Empire and western Russia. This conflict from 1853 to 1856 pitted France, Great Britain, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Sardinia against the Russian Empire. The war erupted due to disputes among the European “great powers” in the Middle East and from Russian demands to control the adherents and clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church within the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, Russia and France became enmeshed in an argument over the privileges of the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in Palestine and its holy sites. Although some military action took place on the Baltic Sea, its shores, and in the Caucasus,
most of the fighting occurred on the Crimean Peninsula of the Black Sea. In March 1855, Davis ordered three well-regarded U.S. Army officers to report to him in Washington to begin planning for what would be a long trip. Davis’ choices to make up the commission were not officers in line regiments but instead were experienced in military engineering and ordnance. All arrived in Washington in early April to meet with Davis and prepare for the mission.

The senior member of the commission to the Crimea was Maj. Richard Delafield. Born in New York City in 1798, he graduated first in his class from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1818. After being commissioned in the Army’s Corps of Engineers, Delafield was involved in a number of engineering projects, including construction of Fort Monroe and the defenses of Hampton Roads, Virginia; Mississippi River delta fortifications and surveys; the Cumberland Road, the first federal highway in the United States; and eight years superintending the construction of New York Harbor defenses, in addition to other projects. He was superintendent of West Point from 1838 to 1845 and designed several new campus buildings and their arrangement there. Major Delafield did not serve in the Mexican War (1846–1948) but instead was involved in engineering projects in New York.

Davis chose Maj. Alfred Mordecai to join the group as well. A native of Warrenton, North Carolina, Mordecai graduated from West Point at the head of his class in 1823, having entered the academy at age fifteen, and was commissioned in the Engineer Branch. After spending many years as a lieutenant, Mordecai received a promotion to captain in the newly expanded Ordnance Branch in 1832 and was ordered to serve as military assistant to Secretary of War Lewis Cass. In 1833, Mordecai took a leave of absence from his official duties so as to take a European trip for professional development, during which he visited military schools, forts, and arsenals in France, England, Prussia, Italy, and Belgium. In 1839, he received an appointment to the War Department’s Ordnance Board, on which he sat for his entire military career. Major Mordecai traveled again to Europe, where he spent nine months studying ordnance improvements in England, France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and several German states. He began serving as commander of the Washington Arsenal in 1842, where he remained during the Mexican War. He authored several important artillery and ordnance manuals and reports and was promoted to major in 1854, just before being summoned to Davis’ office to receive his assignment with Delafield.

The youngest member of the commission was Capt. George B. McClellan, aged twenty-eight. A precocious native Philadelphian, McClellan began his distinguished military career after entering the United States Military Academy in 1842, having previously studied law for two years at the University of Pennsylvania. He graduated second in his class at West Point in 1846 at age nineteen and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers. McClellan served conspicuously under Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott during the Mexican War, helping to construct roads and bridges for the Army and receiving brevet (honorary) promotions to first lieutenant and captain for his gallant conduct under fire. McClellan returned to West Point as an instructor after the war and helped translate a French manual on bayonet tactics. He also saw service as an engineer at Fort Delaware, on expeditions to explore the Red River, and on surveys of possible routes for the transcontinental railroad. In order to advance, he transferred to the Cavalry Branch and received a captaincy in 1855, just as his participation with the Delafield commission was about to commence.
Davis met the three officers in Washington on 5 April to discuss the objectives of their journey to obtain, in his words, “useful information with regard to the military service in general, and especially the practical working of the changes which have been introduced, of late years, into the military system of the principal nations of Europe.” He tasked the commissioners with studying several areas of interest for the U.S. Army, to include examining “the organization of armies and of the departments for furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially in field service.” Davis also directed the officers to observe “vessels for transporting men and horses,” medical services and ambulances, uniforms and camp equipment, arms and ammunition, and “particular attention” to cavalry operations, organization, and arms. Major Delafield and his companions were also instructed to inspect artillery, ordnance, siege operations, the construction of fortifications, and engineering projects. In addition to their duties in the field of “active operations,” Davis ordered the commissioners to inspect the Baltic Sea theater of operations and to tour military sites in England, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia before returning by November 1855 to the United States, although the secretary allowed Delafield the flexibility of extending the mission if need be.\(^2\)

Delafield, Mordecai, and McClellan left from Boston on 11 April on a steamship and arrived in Liverpool, England, on 22 April. Continuing on to London, they met with senior British officials to secure permission to visit the British forces in the Crimea, had a brief audience with Queen Victoria, and toured several military installations around the city.

The American officers then proceeded to Paris in early May to make similar arrangements for observing French forces in the Crimea. Here, however, they ran into difficulty gaining prearranged access to the French positions and were told by Foreign Minister Count Alexandre Colonna-Walewsky that they could only tour the major French siege works around the city of Sebastopol if they did not subsequently visit the Russian lines guarding the port. Since these restrictions were unacceptable to the commissioners, they elected to visit the Russian defenses first, then cross over to French lines. With this plan in mind, the Americans traveled to Berlin to visit with the Russian ambassador there and to begin making the necessary plans.

After their arrival in Berlin on 1 June, Delafield, Mordecai, and McClellan obtained assistance from U.S. Ambassador Peter D. Vroom but received little cooperation from the Russian Embassy. The Prussian foreign ministry permitted the commissioners to tour all military installations in Prussia, and, in their haste to get to the Crimea to see the actual fighting around Sebastopol, they left on 4 June for Warsaw, from where they planned to travel down the Dnieper River to the Crimean Peninsula. They toured several military sites in the Warsaw area but learned that to gain access to Sebastopol, they would have to obtain permission from Russian authorities in St. Petersburg. After a week-long carriage journey, the Americans arrived in the Russian capital on 19 June. They were presented to Czar Alexander II, witnessed military reviews, and were well-treated by the Russian officials and officers they met. Although the commissioners were able to tour the Russian defenses around Kronstadt on the Baltic Sea, no approval to go to the Crimea was forthcoming, and by late June they received news that the British and French had already stormed Sebastopol on 7 June and captured the city’s southern defenses.

The three left Russia on 2 August to go back to Berlin. For most of August the commission inspected forts, hospitals, a cavalry school, and other facilities in and around the Prussian city of Konigsburg. They returned to Berlin and from there continued to attempt to gain permission from France to go to the Crimea but met only delays. Sebastopol fell to British and French forces on 4 September. Leaving Berlin eight days later, the Americans eventually reached Constantinople. In early October, the commissioners managed to board a British steamer to travel to the Crimea, where they finally disembarked at Balaklava on 8 October.

Delafield, Mordecai, and McClellan were well received by their British hosts. They toured battlefields, trenches, batteries, and also gathered technical details on artillery, engineering, medical care, logistics, field fortifications, and weaponry. The French commanders in the theater, however, were much less hospitable to the American officers and allowed only limited access to their
positions and troops. Having missed observing the actual siege operations at Sebastopol, the commission left the battered city on 31 October and traveled to Austria, Prussia, France, and Great Britain. During this time, they studied numerous military establishments and sites, including the Waterloo battleground, although the French continued to limit their access to useful inspections. From London, they took a ship home on 19 April 1856 and reached New York ten days later, having traveled, in total, almost 20,000 miles.

After reporting to Secretary Davis in Washington, each of the commission members received orders to write accounts of their European experience and the lessons learned from the year abroad. They also deposited the hundreds of books, maps, and other papers they accumulated during their travels at the commission office in Washington, D.C. McClellan, focusing on cavalry topics, worked from Philadelphia, while Delafield wrote primarily about engineering and fortifications from his post at New York. Mordecai remained in Washington to complete his report, which was mostly about ordnance matters, and he acted as custodian of all the materials the commission had collected. No single, overall record was produced, and Delafield’s, a massive tome with an impressive number of exquisite maps and illustrations, was not submitted until November 1860, just a month before South Carolina seceded from the Union on the eve of the American Civil War.

Major Mordecai called his 232-page report his “notes and observations on certain military subjects” from his European tour. It was a commentary on artillery and ordnance, filled with a large amount of technical data, plates, tables, and figures. He described the various European armies’ organization, military academies, soldiers, staffs, and arsenals in great detail, although he offered little opinion or analysis and few recommendations. He did suggest the adoption of French field artillery and rifled small arms, along with wrought-iron gun carriages for artillery in coastal forts and batteries. Overall, the report was cautious in tone and urged patience, scientific research, and testing before the Army adopted any new technologies. Mordecai finished his summary and sent it to the War Department in March 1858, although by this time Davis was a U.S. senator, and the new secretary of war was John B. Floyd of Virginia.

Captain McClellan submitted his report to Davis in early 1857, and later that year Congress published 5,000 copies. With a tone of false modesty typical of McClellan, he introduced his narrative by stating that “I somewhat reluctantly undertake the task of attempting to give a succinct account [of his extensive European tour] believing that the officers of the army have a right to know the opinions formed by one of their number.” The young captain provided a long overview of the Crimean War’s battles and sieges and was not hesitant to make observations or give opinions on the events. McClellan’s report also included sections on European engineer troops, military bridges, and siege works. Much of the chronicle is highly detailed, offering diagrams, tables, and illustrations of such minutiae as grappling hooks, pontoon boats, trenches, canteens, and wagons.

McClellan also described the organization, equipment, and strength of the European infantry forces in the conflict, including a separate chapter on the Russian Army, which was largely unknown to American military officers at the time. He devoted much of his work to the cavalry of various armies he observed on his tour, particularly the equipment of dragoons, from which he would later develop and patent a saddle adopted by the Army in 1859 that would bear his name. Detailed accounts of cavalry equipment, arms, tactics, drill, and formations make up his written observations. Numerous plates accompany the text to depict cavalry unit movements and “evolutions.” Having inspected the cavalry forces of many European powers, McClellan concluded that the American Army "ought not to follow blindly any one system, but should endeavor to select the good
features, and engraft them on a system of our own.⁴ He went on to make an extensive set of recommendations and suggested regulations for U.S. mounted troops including their tactics, schools, depots, uniforms, pay, and the purchase of horses. Most of these offerings were based on a Russian manual McClellan had translated. His lengthy report was all the more remarkable, and perhaps presumptuous, given that he had never served in the field with a cavalry unit.

Report of Colonel R. Delafield, U.S. Army, and Major of the Corps of Engineers, on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855 & 1856 is the title of Major Delafield’s account, submitted to the War Department in 1860 and published the following year. Delafield, by that time a colonel of engineers and superintendent of West Point, provided a narrative of the travels made by the commission and the difficulties its members encountered merely getting to the scene of the hostilities, including the “vexatious annoyance of procrastination” they encountered trying to make travel arrangements in Poland, Prussia, France, and Russia.⁵

Delafield’s report is a detailed analysis mainly focused on engineering topics, including coastal forts, logistics,
hospitals, ironclad naval vessels, and the need for steamships. Weaponry was a significant concern of the major’s, particularly breech-loading rifles, conical bullets, and field artillery. Many technical diagrams accompanied the text, such as those depicting artillery shells, ammunition, rifles, the construction of defensive works, field bread ovens, transport ships, tents, and ambulance stretchers. Delafield included meticulously drawn plates of harbor defenses, which were of great interest to American military officers at the time, given the country’s extensive coastline.

Delafield came back from Europe not only enlightened regarding the advanced state of European military technology and prowess, but also concerned about what he considered America’s unpreparedness. He brought to the attention of Davis, and Davis’ successors, the lack of U.S. coastal ordnance and fortifications, and pointed out that those installations that did exist were undermanned and poorly maintained. He even warned that several of the European powers were quite capable of invading the United States by amphibious operations. “Disciplined armies,” he cautioned, “could land in six hours after anchoring,” and “do us injury and cripple our resources to an extent that would require a long time to restore.” He feared “this unprepared state” of defense and was also “more impressed than ever with our comparative want of preparation and military knowledge in the country.” All the more reason, Delafield may have thought, for the reports of the commission to receive the widest distribution to military officers and War Department officials.6

**Editor’s Note**

The author and the managing editor would like to thank Mrs. Carrie Sullivan, librarian at the Center of Military History, and Mr. Pablo Jiménez-Reyes, photographer at the Museum Support Center at Fort Belvoir, for their assistance with examining and photographing the Delafield and McClellan volumes.

**Notes**

2. Ibid., pp. 109–10.
4. Ibid., p. 277.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
This concise volume examines the officer corps of the U.S. Army during the period between the Spanish-American War and the advent of the Global War on Terrorism. The purpose of the work is to supplement a series of six monographs published by the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in 2009 and 2010. The author, Arthur T. Coumbe, a retired Army colonel, intends this study to provide a historical context for the development of an officer corps strategy that was discussed in these earlier monographs.

Over the nine decades researched, the Army’s officer corps changed in many ways, not the least of which was its size, which grew from only about 2,500 officers to just over 91,000, with much larger peak strengths during the war years. During this period of growth, the Army passed through several watersheds—the reforms instituted by Secretary of War Elihu Root (1899–1903) after the Spanish-American War, post–World War II reforms, and the evolution that occurred between the early 1960s and the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) at the end of the Vietnam War. The Root reforms “determined that the professional officer should be broadly trained and versatile,” while post–World War II reforms “determined that the Officer Corps would be large, varied, and broadly based.” The final watershed suggested that “Army officers should be analytical, lucid, and capable of defending their positions in words and in writing” (p. 18).

The author proceeds from his overview to examine officer talent in general and how it has been retained, accessed, developed, employed, and evaluated. In his look at the retention element, he notes that after World War II, “the material incentives [pay, housing, and other benefits] associated with a military career declined” (pp. 77–78). The prestige that had been associated with being an officer fell, as the officer corps became “distended, mottled, and loosely integrated” during the era of the Cold War (p. 78).

While looking at the accession of officer capability, the author writes that during World War II the Army Ground Forces staff “noted a marked decline in the quality of new officer accessions [through Officer Candidate School] as the war progressed” (p. 91). One of the most striking changes in the officer corps caused by World War II was the reduction in the percentage of college graduates, from over 75 percent before the war to only 49 percent by 1955. With the advent of the AVF in the early 1970s, women and minorities “assumed a much larger role in the Army’s officer accessions plan” (p. 105). The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) was fully opened to women in 1973, and the first women were admitted to the U.S. Military Academy in 1976. The Army also made a concerted effort to commission more black officers, and, by the end of the 1970s, African Americans made up more than 10 percent of the annual ROTC commissioning cohort.

Coumbe argues that the Army has developed its officer talent through a combination of education, training, and experience. He focuses on the first of these elements and explores the Army’s school system and especially the fully funded civilian graduate education program. In the early 1960s, the Army ran into problems in its dealings with new Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara—a Harvard Business School graduate—who was not impressed with the intellectual talents of the senior officers assigned to the Pentagon. Tensions between McNamara’s well-educated civilian “whiz kids” and those senior officers “led to some embarrassing confrontations” (p. 130). The Army decided that it needed many more officers with graduate degrees, so although it had already been increasing the number of officers it sent to graduate school since 1946, the 1960s and the early 1970s became “the golden age of fully funded graduate education in the Army” (p. 139).

In his examination of how officer talent has been employed, Coumbe writes that the Army’s career progression model sought to produce a broadly experienced generalist. This was based on the assumption that
a good officer could do almost any job well. The Army usually adhered to this model, even though as the century progressed there was an increasing need to produce highly skilled specialists.

The author’s comments on evaluating officer aptitude focus on the evolution of the officer efficiency report (OER) that has been modified numerous times over the years. He stresses the unfortunate fact that “the OER has not, in the main, lived up to the exalted hopes that the Army and its leaders have had for it” (p. 181). He also points out, however, that many officers with exceptional skills “have emerged over the course of the last century despite the failings in the evaluation system” (p. 194).

This reader has never seen the earlier SSI monographs referred to by the author, so it is difficult to assess how well he accomplished his mission of providing historical context for them. Two additions to this volume, however, would have been quite useful. First, two appendices would have aided the reader: one listing the annual strength of the officer corps during the ninety-year period covered and the other showing a breakdown of where these officers secured their commissions. Second, and more important, the work should have been provided with an index. These shortcomings aside, this is yet another of the well-researched studies that readers have come to expect from the Strategic Studies Institute.
combined with science and the rigors of a military education. This thinking produced a four-year curriculum that could be used as a model for Virginia as a whole. The author argues that while several other individuals had similar thoughts and ideas regarding repurposing the arsenal and building a school, only Preston merged the vision with action to create the institute. In doing so, he shaped its curriculum over time to make it all work, despite the multitude of changes and challenges that arose due to competing plans, a lack of resources, and, of course, the Civil War. Given the research that went into Shaffner’s manuscript, it is hard to argue with his conclusions.

The author describes Preston’s life and relationships with renowned individuals such as VMI instructor Maj. Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and does not shy away from contention regarding the institute’s role in the Civil War. Preston did not view Jackson as a viable professor because of a difference in teaching techniques, which surprised this reviewer. In fact, Jackson was only chosen to instruct at the institute because he was the last candidate available. That did not stop Preston and Jackson from forging a solid friendship and familial relationships, with Jackson later becoming Preston’s brother-in-law. Preston later served as Jackson’s aide-de-camp and de facto chief of staff for much of the war before returning to the institute.

No account of VMI, its founders, instructors, and Corps of Cadets would be complete without a discussion of the Civil War and slavery. As with much of the United States in the nineteenth century, Virginia, slavery, secession, and, ultimately, the war divided Lexington, Preston, and VMI. Traditionally antislavery, although perhaps not outright abolitionist, Lexington gradually shifted to a states’ rights perspective because of actions by radical abolitionists like John Brown (Preston and a cadre of VMI cadets were present at his execution) and the perception of Federal interference in state affairs. Meanwhile, the institute taught its cadets that slavery was the basis of prosperity and happiness for the South.

Preston himself was divided and nuanced in his views of slavery, having been a proponent of shipping freed slaves to the newly formed African nation of Liberia, while famously stating, “So perish all such enemies of Virginia!” at Brown’s execution. He criticized radicalism on both sides of the slavery debate. Shaffner details how Preston did not own slaves until after reading Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin (Boston, 1852), which is somewhat inexplicable to anyone (at least in today’s age) who has read it. The author makes the case that Preston used his classical education to derive the conclusion that, while slavery was a negative institution, the practice of it in America was positive because of the more advanced civilization in the United States than in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

The war took its toll on Preston. He ultimately lost one son in action, another was wounded, and a third was claimed by disease. Jackson, a friend and brother-in-law, was wounded by his own troops at the Battle of Chancellorsville, ultimately succumbing to pneumonia during his recovery, adding to Preston’s gloom.

Shaffner closes the book with a description of Preston’s life in the postwar years, until his death in 1890 at age seventy-nine. Although a complicated man when it comes to his views on slavery, Preston maintained consistency in his life’s work by staying true to his concepts of education, dedicating himself to the antebellum rebuilding of the institute, to his faith, and to his family. In 1939, the institute memorialized Preston by naming its main library after him, appropriately so.

The Father of Virginia Military Institute is a thorough biography of a complex man, but the author tells Preston’s story in a very readable manner, while simultaneously relating the story of his family, friends, VMI, Lexington, and Virginia society. The book would make a great first study for anyone looking at the history of one of the nation’s top military schools or for more details on its founding father. Certainly, it should be required reading for all Rats.

Cdr. Jeffrey B. Barta is the deputy for the Museum System Office at the Naval History and Heritage Command. A naval aviator, he has a bachelor’s degree in history from the University of Wisconsin and a master’s degree in international relations from Troy University. He is a visiting scholar at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum.

Review by Fred L. Borch III

The Battle of Gettysburg is generally seen as the turning point in the Civil War, in that a Southern victory might have changed the course of the conflict and breathed new life into the Confederate cause. Regardless of whether this is true, what is uncontested is that 90,000 Union troops battled nearly 43,000 Confederate soldiers for three bloody days near this small Pennsylvania town. When the fighting was over on 3 July 1863, more than 53,000 Americans were dead, wounded, captured, or missing—almost one out of every three soldiers who clashed there. From that day forward—now more
than 150 years—men and women have visited Gettysburg to explore for themselves the meaning of the “costliest single military engagement on North American soil” (p. 1).

Anyone planning to visit Gettysburg National Military Park should have this field guide with them. Written by Carol Reardon (a prolific author well known to readers of Army History) and Tom Vossler (former director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute), it is a comprehensive resource that gives a wealth of information yet never overwhelms with too many facts. Even those who have been on more than a few staff rides to Gettysburg or studied the event extensively will find something valuable in its more than 400 pages.

The guide has thirty-five tour stops and each offers “a detailed account of a specific element of the three-day engagement.” Stop 18, for example, examines what happened at Little Round Top on 2 July. After discussing the terrain and providing an orientation for this key landmark, Reardon and Vossler discuss who was in command that day, the units fighting for control of this piece of high ground, and what the participants had to say about their actions at Little Round Top after the battle was over. An added bonus is a series of individual vignettes of young men on both sides who were at Little Round Top, such as Lt. Barnett H. Cody, 15th Alabama Infantry, and Sgt. William S. Jordan, 20th Maine Infantry. Eighteen-year-old Cody was mortally wounded by a bullet to his groin, and Jordan, also just eighteen, was killed when a bullet struck his lung. By talking about the soldiers who were there on 2 July, A Field Guide to Gettysburg ensures that the human tragedy that befell both soldiers and civilians is not forgotten.

The goal of this fine book is to encourage the audience to be an active learner at Gettysburg, so that one will “know where to look, which way to turn, and how to find the essential visual cues to help [one] appreciate the battle as it unfolds” (p. 7). In this, A Field Guide to Gettysburg easily succeeds. Its hundreds of color and black and white photographs provide context to the narrative, and numerous maps and diagrams ensure that the reader understands how the battle progressed. Additionally, the volume’s reasonable price makes it rather affordable.

Fred L. Borch III is the regimental historian and archivist for the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He earned history degrees from Davidson College and the University of Virginia and law degrees from the University of North Carolina, the University of Brussels (Belgium), and The Judge Advocate General’s School. He also has a master’s degree in national security studies from the Naval War College.

The Purge of the Thirtieth Division

By Maj. Gen. Henry Dozier Russell
Edited by Lawrence M. Kaplan
Naval Institute Press, 2014
Pp. xviii, 206. $59.95

Review by William M. Donnelly

One ever-present aspect in the relationship between the National Guard and the Regular Army has been whether Guard general officers and senior field-grade officers are qualified to command their units in combat. Since 1917 this question has arisen whenever Guard units have been mobilized for overseas service, and working out the answers has often strained the relationship between the National Guard and the Regular Army. Of the eighteen Guard division commanders mobilized in 1940–1941, only one retained command of his unit after 1942 and led it in combat for the remainder of the war. Most Guard general officers and senior field-grade officers also were relieved before their units deployed overseas.

These reliefs were widely seen by guardsmen as a purge conducted by the Regular Army, not for the purpose of improving unit performance, but rather to create career opportunities for regular officers. Regulars, in turn, argued that soldiers heading into combat deserved the best available leaders and that the relieved officers did not meet that standard. Two fine case studies have been published examining this issue: Michael E. Weaver’s Guard Wars: The 28th Infantry Division in World War II (Bloomington, Ind., 2010), and John Kennedy Ohl’s biography of the only Guard division commander to lead his unit from mobilization to demobilization, Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler (Boulder, Colo., 2001).

Now Lawrence M. Kaplan has added a third important source on this topic, the memoir of one of the relieved division commanders. In 1932, Henry Dozier Russell, a Georgia lawyer, took command of the National Guard’s 30th Infantry Division, composed of units from Georgia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas. Eight years later, he led the division into federal service as the nation began mobilizing for war. In May 1942, after appearing before a reclassification board, the 52-year-old General Russell was relieved from command. While the 30th Infantry Division went on to fight in Europe, its former commander served in various administrative assignments stateside for the remainder of the war. Following his release from federal service, Russell returned to the Guard, where after its postwar reorganization he took command of the 48th Infantry Division (Georgia and Florida) until his military retirement in 1951.

Russell privately published this book in 1948 and distributed copies among
senior Guard officers. He used his experiences as a division commander during 1940–1942 as a case study upon which to base an indictment of the Regular Army officer corps for this purge, which Russell describes as a conspiracy initiated by the chief of staff, General George C. Marshall, and overseen by the commander of Army Ground Forces, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair. Both men are portrayed as self-centered, implacably hostile toward Guard officers, and unfit for their positions.

This is an angry book written in the style of a lawyer's brief. Russell argues that he was a competent division commander whose only failure was his refusal to relieve capable Guard subordinates to make way for grasping incompetent regulars. His account repeatedly stresses that Guard citizen-soldiers are professionally and morally superior to almost all regulars, whose “contempt for all things civilian” marks them and their institution as more Prussian than American (p. 4). He details efforts by regular officers to undermine Guard officers by falsifying inspection reports, lying about Guard performance, and rigging maneuvers against Guard units. This pattern culminates in Russell’s reclassification board, which is a farce: “We had the evidence, but Marshall had the court” (p. 145).

The editor has included a biographical sketch of Russell and a few endnotes to each chapter, noting errors of fact and providing information about some of the men mentioned by Russell. Kaplan also has included two contributions: a foreword by Michael D. Doubler, who has written the best history of the Army National Guard, and a preface by retired Maj. Gen. Harry B. Burchstead Jr., the former adjutant general of South Carolina. These contributions add some historical context for Russell’s story. While both men point out that the book is “laced with intemperate language and unsupported allegations” (p. xiii), only Burchstead briefly considers whether Russell’s relief was justified.

Doubler believes that republication of this book is useful because it “contains unique insights on the roles of Regulars and Guardsmen” (p. x), while Burchstead argues it is valuable as the only memoir of a Guard division commander from the 1940–1941 mobilization and that it “brings into sharp contrast the cultural differences between the National Guard and the Regular Army” (p. xiv). In these respects, the reissuing of the account does bring easier access to an important primary source. Readers, particularly those not familiar with the 1940–1941 mobilization, should keep in mind that this is a primary source that provides only one side of what was a very contentious episode in Guard–Regular Army relations.

Because of Russell’s vivid language and his serious charges against the Regular Army, one finishes this book most curious as to whether Russell was relieved because he would not sacrifice his fellow guardsmen or because he was not qualified for command in combat. Hopefully, someone will be motivated by this volume to examine this question with the same care displayed by Weaver and Ohl in their books.

Review by Glenn V. Longacre

Since the epic Band of Brothers miniseries debuted in 2001, there has been a seemingly never-ending supply of published unit histories and personal reminiscences of troopers who served with the 101st Airborne Division. One might ask if the late Donald Rich’s memoirs, while noteworthy, warranted publication in book form. The answer is a resounding yes.

Rich’s memoirs, coauthored with Kevin Brooks, detail the activities of a common soldier who served in an uncommon unit: the glider infantry. While there are a number of excellent books written by men who served in the parachute infantry, only a fraction document the experiences of those who rode gliders into combat. Rich’s candid, and sometimes gut-wrenching, description of flight in gliders, whether it be for training or actual combat, is graphic and, at times, challenging to read.

A midwesterner, Don Rich was born in the eastern Iowa farming town of Wayland in Henry County. A self-proclaimed farm kid, the nineteen-year-old Rich originally intended to enlist in the U.S. Army but was instead drafted by Uncle Sam in February 1943. Rich was inducted at Camp Dodge near Des Moines. Following basic training at Camp Roberts, California, Rich and the other troops were transferred to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for their
unit assignments. Rich was assigned as a bazooka gunner with Company G, 2d Battalion, 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, then undergoing training and organization at the post.

Following weeks of intensive conditioning and preparation and a brief leave to visit his family in Wayland, Rich and the members of the 101st Airborne Division sailed from New York for England. Once there, the 327th was stationed at Camp Ranikhet near Reading for its D-Day preparations. The strength of Rich’s preinvasion recollections are his descriptions of camp life, his familial relationship with the Hollingsworth family in nearby Reading, and the constant training.

As the 101st Airborne Division’s parachute elements began landing in France on 6 June 1944, Rich found himself and his fellow troopers not silently gliding into France on a dark night, but tossed around in a landing craft crossing the English Channel with the rest of the invasion fleet. With some minor exceptions, the 327th waded onto Utah Beach with relative ease late on the afternoon of 6 June. On 11 June, during the ensuing battle for Carentan, Rich was wounded in the left leg and evacuated to England.

Following six weeks in the hospital, Rich rejoined Company G as it prepared for Operation Market Garden. On 18 September, one day after the initial invasion into the Netherlands, Rich and the rest of the 327th arrived by glider. Rich’s narrative centers on the battles to clear the Zonsche Forest and secure the city of Veghel, a key objective that straddles the north-south road soon to be christened Hell’s Highway.

After Market Garden’s ultimate failure, Rich and the 327th participated in the fighting on the strip of land between Nijmegen and Arnhem known as the Island. The hard-fought battles on the Island, particularly for the village of Opheusden, only recently have begun to receive some well-deserved attention by military historians. In late November 1944, after seventy-two days of combat in the Netherlands, the 327th was ordered back to France to rest and reorganize. The respite was short-lived, however, as German forces attacked in the Ardennes less than three weeks later.

Rich and his fellow soldiers were positioned southeast of Bastogne near the tiny hamlet of Marvie, Belgium. Here the 327th, among other units, repelled repeated attacks by German armored forces attempting to encircle and destroy American forces guarding Bastogne. Rich’s narrative of the Ardennes Campaign provides a vivid depiction of what would become the 101st Airborne Division’s most celebrated battle. His descriptions of the ferocious combat, German tank attacks, the confusion in battle, the appalling weather, and bitterly cold temperatures that caused many cases of frostbite are noteworthy.

Following the Battle of the Bulge, Rich and the 327th participated in the bitter fighting in January 1945 to reduce the bulge. Afterward, the men were ordered to Alsace in northeastern France where they were positioned along the Moder River near the city of Haguenau. They were then assigned to occupy and guard Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest in southern Bavaria. By late summer and early fall of 1945, however, thoughts of home were on the minds of every soldier, including Rich. After accumulating the required point totals for discharge, he sailed for the United States. In November 1945, Rich arrived home in Wayland.

Perhaps, the most unique and welcome feature found in Rich’s recollections is his frank admission and discussion in the book’s prologue and afterward of his decades-long struggle with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Rich’s description of the recurring bouts of depression and bitterness over battle-related events will resonate with today’s men and women who served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Fortunately, Rich admits that writing and publishing his memoirs was cathartic in easing his illness.

The book’s other author, Kevin Brooks, the son of one of Rich’s best friends and Second World War comrade, has done an admirable job in coauthoring the volume. In addition to Glider Infantryman, Brooks established a Facebook page dedicated to Rich and the troopers who served in Company G of the 327th.
Review by Matthew Shannon

Frank Leith Jones resurrects the work of “Blowtorch” Bob Komer, one of the Cold War’s most committed national security professionals. Most readers will know Komer as the architect of the U.S. pacification effort in South Vietnam. Yet Komer’s career began during the Second World War and continued unabated for four decades. His life was intertwined with the most important developments of the Cold War era, including the formation of the intelligence community, the relationship between academia and foreign policy, the effect of the Vietnam War on the conduct of future conflicts, debates between multilateralists and unilateralists, and the ways in which Democratic administrations responded to nonalignment in the 1960s and the shifting security environment of the post-détente era.

The book is illuminating on multiple levels. Methodologically, this intriguing biography tackles the life of a “second echelon” official whose ideas and actions are often peripheral to studies of U.S. presidents. Jones also seeks to amend the typical characterization of Komer as either a “caricature, a self-important sycophant . . . or a symbol of American hubris” (p. 3). Instead, Jones’ central argument is that Komer was a strategist who embodied a “pragmatism . . . deeply rooted in the American ethos of problem solving through experience and common sense” (pp. 36–37). While his findings do not completely erase the old caricature, they do demonstrate how the first generation of national security professionals shaped, and were shaped by, the Cold War.

Jones divides his study into three well-defined sections. The first traces the early life of Komer, who was born into a middle-class Jewish family in St. Louis, Missouri. He enrolled in Harvard University in 1940 at a time when its president was attempting to transform the school into a more meritocratic institution. While not an émigré like Henry Kissinger, who arrived in Cambridge a decade later, Komer’s experience was similar in that he was a social outsider who earned the respect of his mentors. Komer was an honors history student whose analytic skill and aptitude for strategic thinking prepared him to write an official history of civil affairs and military government efforts in the Mediterranean theater during the Second World War. After earning a master’s of business administration from Harvard, Komer joined the staff of his former adviser, William Langer, in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of National Estimates. The combination of historical knowledge and managerial expertise propelled Komer through the national security bureaucracy during the 1950s. While he became disillusioned with Dwight Eisenhower’s national security structure, he saw eye-to-eye with the incoming Kennedy administration concerning the need for an action-oriented foreign policy.

While the author does not make it explicit, this early material is vital for understanding why Komer was eager to devote his considerable energies to improving U.S. standing in the nonaligned world as a top adviser on McGeorge Bundy’s National Security Council. In his undergraduate thesis, Komer expressed admiration for the “indirect strategy” that Winston Churchill and Lloyd George championed during the First World War. Komer came to believe that nations could alter the terms of a conflict by avoiding what Carl von Clausewitz described as the enemy’s “center of gravity” in favor of making gains along the periphery. During the crisis years of the early 1960s, Komer thought that the United States could make the greatest gains by forging new relationships with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt and Jawaharlal Nehru’s India. Jones does make the connection between Komer’s formative years and his time as head of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. Since his college days, Komer shared Georges Clémenceau’s belief that “modern war is too serious a business to be entrusted to soldiers” (p. 14). In the mid-1960s, Komer was the most persuasive of Johnson’s advisers who advocated for civilian leadership of the pacification effort.

The second section—“Lyndon Johnson’s Man”—is devoted to the thirty-two months that Komer was responsible for the “other war” in South Vietnam. Komer assumed that the United States would succeed once its leaders integrated the nation-building effort in the South Vietnamese countryside with General William Westmoreland’s military command. The author echoes other scholars who identify Komer as being responsible for managing the transition from the earlier Office of Civil Operations to the CORDS program as it existed after the Tet offensive under General Creighton Abrams and William Colby. By the time Komer departed Vietnam in 1968, he had built CORDS into a $350 million program that staffed nearly 4,000 people in forty-four provinces (p. 138).

The final section examines the little-known end of Komer’s career in public service when he worked in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown’s Pentagon during the Jimmy Carter administration. Known as “Mr. NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization],” he labored to beef up the alliance’s conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, improve cooperation between member nations, and devise a sound long-term defense strategy (pp. 224–25). In addition, Komer thought hard about his nation’s changing role in the Middle East after the Iranian
revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He helped to implement the Carter Doctrine, created the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), and otherwise “codified the Persian Gulf security framework” (p. 247). Komer’s work during the Carter years led the press to describe him as “the most influential civilian within the Pentagon since . . . Robert McNamara” (p. 245).

Despite many insights, the book falters when the author accepts as normative many of the opinions, prejudices, and mentalities that pervaded the Cold War national security establishment. The lack of critical analysis during the Vietnam section produces a narrative that is at times choppy. While Jones conducted extensive research, readers will get bogged down in certain parts of the book where the author opted to summarize individual policy papers instead of synthesizing key themes within the larger argument. Beyond stylistic issues, Jones is not critical of the thinking that drove the Johnson administration’s war policy in Vietnam. For example, when discussing the need for the Saigon government to assume responsibility for building its nation, he writes that “Komer and CORDS could only act like ‘beaters’ in a hunting expedition, flushing the prey for the hunter to kill” (p. 169). This language not only dehumanizes the Vietnamese Communists, but it provides an image of sport rather than a picture of a devastating war that was a regional, national, and international calamity.

Many readers will also wonder why, given Jones’ deft analysis of Komer’s strategic thought, the author chose not to discuss in greater detail the relationship between CORDS and post-2006 thinking on nation building and counterinsurgency. The omission leaves this reader wanting more. The authors of Field Manual (FM) 3–24, Counterinsurgency, published in 2007, hail CORDS as a successful model to be emulated in America’s wars of the twenty-first century. Like the field manual, the author does not question Komer’s assumption that the U.S. military actually has the capacity to simultaneously destroy and rebuild nations over long periods of time without losing domestic support or making new enemies abroad. Despite these drawbacks, Blowtorch is a fine addition to the historiography of U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War and a model for scholars seeking to tease out the larger significance of individual lives in the biographical format. This book was also the recipient of the 2015 Brigadier General James L. Collins Jr. Book Prize in Military History for the best book written in English on U.S. military history, as awarded by the U.S. Commission on Military History.

Prof. Matthew Shannon is an assistant professor of history at Emory and Henry College in Emory, Virginia. He received his doctorate in history from Temple University in 2013. He is currently revising for publication a manuscript on American-Iranian relations during the Cold War. His original research has appeared in Diplomatic History, International History Review, and The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics, and Culture.

Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir

By General John R. Galvin
University Press of Kentucky, 2015
Pp. xv, 517. $39.95

Review by Donald A. Carter

Fighting the Cold War: A Soldier’s Memoir, by retired U.S. Army General John R. Galvin, is such a good read that its flaws, minor though they may be, are all the more frustrating. Galvin is a skilled raconteur, and his narrative holds a reader’s attention as he moves from story to story. His writing has a stream of consciousness sense about it. In his own words, “I began to view life as a series of overlapping stories—and the more of them you can hold on to, the better” (p. 120).

The book, then, is a series of vignettes and anecdotes, somewhat rambling, but always interesting and insightful. Galvin punctuates his narrative with excerpts from letters, especially those to and from his father, and observations culled from the ever-present note cards he carried with him throughout his career. The stories move quickly, from his boyhood years in Wakefield, Massachusetts, through early stints in Latin America and Vietnam, and culminating in a large section dealing with his experiences as supreme allied commander in Europe. With a career that spanned more than forty years, Galvin has the opportunity to describe and comment on most of the seminal events of the Cold War. Particularly enlightening are his interactions and exchanges with Army personalities such as William Westmoreland, Andrew Goodpaster, Alexander Haig, and David Petraeus, who served as Galvin’s aide-de-camp with the 24th Infantry Division and later with Galvin in Germany.

General Galvin uses the memoir format to relate a great deal of his own leadership philosophy. The book is full of vivid descriptions of problems he faced and the manner in which he went about solving them. In most cases, his ability to communicate his ideas clearly to both seniors and subordinates led to a successful mission completion. He is also quick to acknowledge his missteps and failings and usually explains how he benefited from the lessons learned. His story shows how senior mentors aided in his professional development and how he, in turn, was able to assist others. Young officers would do well to consider the general’s approach to leadership.

More frustrating to the reader is the author’s somewhat relaxed approach
to dates and a sequential format. Although the memoir generally follows a start-to-finish chronology of the author’s career, it often lapses into a flashback. For the reader, this occasionally leads to flipping back and forth between chapters in an attempt to confirm dates and locations. This casualness also lends itself to some inexact historical identifications, as when he describes his entry into “the Pentomic Army” in August 1954, when the service’s commitment to that organization was still a few years away. Early in the book, the author also refers to the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1948, seven years before its actual birth. Such errors are admittedly minor, but, for someone viewing the book as history, they are speed bumps that cause one to pause in the middle of the story.

Small annoyances aside, Galvin’s memoir is an entertaining endeavor full of fascinating observations on the personalities and events of the Cold War. It captures the feel of that epoch’s waning years as East and West moved toward a wary rapprochement. Reading the book is time well spent for both military personnel and civilians interested in the career of one of the Army’s most distinguished officers of the Cold War period, as well as the history of the era itself.

Dr. Donald A. Carter is a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. He received a bachelor’s degree in engineering from the U.S. Military Academy and a master’s degree and Ph.D. in military history from Ohio State University. He is the author of Forging the Shield: The U.S. Army in Europe, 1951–1962 (Washington, D.C., 2015).

Review by Keith J. Allred

The rapid advance of U.S. forces into Iraq in March and April 2003 resulted in the near-immediate collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government, and the slow-motion spiral of Iraqi society into chaos. The brilliant military planning and execution of the ground war allowed U.S. forces to drive, almost unimpeded, to Baghdad and to capture the capital city within a few short weeks. Military officers assumed that civil administrators would follow the military advance and undertake the running of the country as soon as major offensive operations were finished. But it soon became apparent that there had been no significant planning for how to govern such a massive and populous country during the transition to new Iraqi rule.

There had been some outlining, to be sure, but Iraqis in exile like Ahmed Chalabi had led U.S. officials to believe that with Saddam Hussein gone, Iraq would be like a blank slate on which the U.S. forces could simply create a democratic government for a willing Iraqi society. This was not to be the case. Retired General Jay Garner and his Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance were not even allowed into the country for a month after the fall of Baghdad. When he arrived, he was woefully understaffed, underfunded, and underequipped to bring a civil society from the chaos. A number of early misunderstandings and civilian casualties had already begun to poison the well between ordinary Iraqis and the U.S. forces, and progress understandably founndered. General Garner was fired in April 2003, and Paul Bremer arrived in May to preside over the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Bremer quickly purged nearly all Ba’athists from the Iraqi power structure, effectively dismissing what might have been the foundation for a new Iraqi government. He disbanded the Iraqi army, which might have helped to provide security to a new government, and instantly created hundreds of thousands of unemployed and angry citizens, many of whom were armed.

To top it all off, Bremer’s CPA adopted a formal policy of not working with or giving credence to Iraqi tribes and their traditional leaders. Bremer and Pentagon planners saw tribalism as a relic of the past, an archaic form of government that must be bypassed in favor of the new and modern national government. Bremer rejected offers from tribal leaders to bring security to the countryside because of this desire not to take the new country “backward” to ancient tribal modes of living. A CPA program to distribute electricity evenhandedly backfired, as did a CPA program intended to provide jobs. The minority Sunnis, who had dominated Iraqi society for hundreds of years, began to see their places taken from them and to fear that the Shi‘ites would capture power in the new order and exercise that power to the Sunnis’ disadvantage. Within months of the fall of Saddam Hussein and his government, the United States had a mess on its hands. Iraq was broken and now needed to be fixed.

With this background established, author Richard Shultz sets the stage for the professional education the U.S. marines would undergo in Al Anbar Province over the next four years. With substantial assistance
and encouragement from the Marine Corps University and its president emeritus, Maj. Gen. Donald Gardner (Ret.), the author examines the years-long learning process that gave the marines, and by extension all U.S. ground forces, some hands-on experience in modern counterinsurgency warfare. Given his background as a professor of international politics at Tufts University’s Fletcher School and numerous prior published works on terrorism, contemporary combat, and covert warfare, Shultz is ideally positioned to undertake this study.

The marines’ education began in the cauldron of insecurity that swept Iraq in April and May 2003. At the time, Saddam Hussein’s government had been decapitated, most of Iraqi society was in turmoil, and many former government workers were newly unemployed. These factors were coupled with the growing fear that Sunni-Shi’a tensions would further erode the safety of Sunnis in Al Anbar Province. With so few “civil society” experts to support them, the U.S. marines of I Marine Expeditionary Force were suddenly assigned a mission for which they had not planned: occupation and reconstruction of a society. After rotating home and then redeploying to Iraq to take over from the Army’s 82d Airborne Division in 2004, the marines sought to distance themselves from an earlier approach they felt had been too “kinetic,” instead trying to achieve success in a counterinsurgency environment by winning the support of the people. Careful not to openly criticize their Army predecessors, the marines began to move in a new direction. However, no sooner had the marines returned when they found themselves in the middle of combat operations in and around Al Fallujah. On 31 March, an ambush of a convoy of contracted guards employed by Blackwater thoroughly altered the landscape, with the bodies burned and hanging from an Al Fallujah bridge. The city became a safe haven for the training and operations of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) until it could be retaken in a second Battle of Fallujah in November 2004.

Although it had lost Al Fallujah, AQI continued its insurgency against the marines in Al Anbar Province. In early 2005, the CPA was still not ready to cooperate with tribal leaders, but, by November, AQI missteps in Al Anbar had so alienated the tribes and their sheikhs that tribal leaders were ready to turn against AQI in favor of an alliance with coalition forces. At the same time, changing U.S. perspectives led to a new willingness to recognize the reality of tribal loyalties and the effectiveness of tribal sheikhs in controlling their people. This helped turn the tide against AQI.

Urban battles in the cities of Ar Ramadi, Al Fallujah, Al Qa’im, Hut, and elsewhere taught U.S. policymakers and marines on the ground that a substantial element of future warfare would be in cities, house-to-house, and in immediate proximity to the civilian population, where tolerance for collateral damage must be very low. The marines moved from controlling the roads and countryside, while the insurgents dominated the cities, to a complete exchange of places. The marines took the cities, protected the civilian populations, and banished the insurgents to the hinterlands. Only then could the United States begin the process of infrastructure repair and relationship building that was so important to a successful transition to full Iraqi sovereignty.

The generals, the sheikhs, the battles, and the details of a four-year campaign against an insurgent foe are well and thoroughly described in The Marines Take Anbar. In a summary format, the book interweaves those details into the larger narrative of the flow of power from Iraqi insurgents, including AQI, to the coalition forces and their developing allies, the Iraqi tribal and local leaders. At least as important as the battles and their dates is the larger battle for the hearts and minds of Al Anbar Province between 2003 and 2007. It taught the U.S. military invaluable lessons about the relationship between military success on the battlefield and respect for the local traditions, culture, and power arrangements. Only by gaining the acceptance and approval of the local population can a foreign force secure its cooperation in rooting out an insurgency.

The Middle East remains unstable, large parts of Africa are under the sway of various insurgent groups, and the possibility of participation in future counterinsurgent warfare for U.S. armed forces is a real one. The history of the marines in Al Anbar Province will inform and direct those engagements as they come. Indeed, it seems likely that this book will join the required reading list for officers in the ground forces. There will always be a place for “kinetics” in warfare, even in the urban warfare of the future. But the larger purpose of gaining the trust of a population so it will ally against the insurgents, of integrating the people’s needs for security and development into U.S. military purposes, and of engaging the enemy in urban warfare while protecting the civilian population will call for a measured application of force. This must to be done, while respecting the culture, history, tradition, and local power structures, so as to avoid giving unintended offense to those we need on our side.

Keith J. Allred is a retired U.S. Navy captain who served in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps. He was the trial judge for the military commission trial of Osama bin Laden’s driver at Guantanamo Bay between 2007 and 2009. A fellow of the International Center for Law and Religion at Brigham Young University between 2006 and 2013, he is now a federal judge in Dallas, Texas.
Review by Ted Roberts

The name Al Fallujah conjures images of scruffy marines clad in ballistic vests and oversized helmets hurrying through dusty city streets. Muffled explosions and cracking small-arms fire accompany the troops’ movements. Images like these were beamed into American homes each night from Iraq during six weeks of intense fighting in late 2004. Two Marine Corps regimental combat teams (RCT), reinforced by Army combined-arms battalions, engaged more than 3,000 fanatical jihadists who had entrenched themselves in the ruins of Al Fallujah. The maneuver battalions that made up RCT 1 and RCT 7 eventually recaptured the city, but they did so at great cost. Unfortunately, in the months following the tactical success of Operation Al-Fajr, Al Fallujah continued to be a violent place. As the marines were forced to turn over the city to the Iraqi government, insurgents began slowly moving back into the old neighborhoods. Though coalition forces had won the battle, by late 2006 it appeared as though al-Qaeda might well win the war.

Few readers may be familiar with events in Al Fallujah after Al-Fajr. Dr. Daniel R. Green (U.S. Navy Reserve) and Brig. Gen. William F. Mullen III (U.S. Marine Corps) attempt to fill that knowledge gap with their collaborative work, *Fallujah Redux: The Anbar Awakening and the Struggle with Al-Qaeda*, a well-written and detailed account of how cooperation between coalition forces and the Iraqi people eventually won back the city. It is a chronological narrative giving a behind the scenes look at the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to defeat al-Qaeda during the Sunni “Awakening” of 2007. Green and Mullen describe the courage of individual Iraqis who rose to critical positions of leadership and how those leaders influenced the outcome of eventual victory.

In 2007, Mullen was a lieutenant colonel commanding the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines. Before taking over the unit, Mullen had served in Iraq as the operations officer, or S-3, for RCT 8 from February 2005 to February 2006. Al Fallujah was just one of several areas of responsibility held by RCT 8 on that rough tour. During that same period, Green had served as a young lieutenant in the U.S. Navy Reserve and had just recently returned from a stint in Afghanistan as a civilian political officer in a State Department Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). In 2007, Lieutenant Green was activated for deployment to Iraq where he would be the tribal engagement officer for SEAL (Sea, Air, and Land) Task Unit–Fallujah, consisting of elements from SEAL Teams 7 and 10.

The account begins with Mullen’s first impressions of the tactical situation in Al Fallujah as the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, arrived in April 2007. Green then relates his initial impressions of the sociopolitical environment and how he approached his mission. The reader is able to visualize just what an “outlaw town” Al Fallujah had become by the spring of 2007. The “whack-a-mole” counterinsurgency strategy of the coalition forces was failing, and the terrorists were gaining the upper hand. Mullen summed up the atmosphere succinctly, “The most frustrating aspect of counterinsurgency warfare is that if one is not clearly winning, one is losing” (p. 74).

Green then provides valuable background on the Sunni Awakening, which began in western Al Anbar Province in early 2006. For example, Green describes events in Al Qa’im, a town on the Syrian border astride Highway 12 west of Ar Ramadi and Al Fallujah. There the Sunni Abu Mahal tribe successfully revolted against al-Qaeda because its obsessive religious zealotry interfered with the smuggling efforts of Abu Mahal’s Bedouin traders. The revolt had a catalytic effect that rippled all the way back to Ar Ramadi, the Al Anbar Province capital. There, additional tribes joined the rebellion, and insurgent activity declined precipitously. Curious about the success, Mullen dispatched his executive officer to see what coalition forces were doing differently in Ar Ramadi. Mullen and his staff realized that defeating al-Qaeda in Al Fallujah could best be achieved by using the Al Qa’im tribal uprising as a model for an indigenous resurgence. The operational plan that Mullen and his battalion staff produced, later dubbed Operation Alljah, would prove to be incredibly successful.

Operation Alljah sought to conquer small sections of Al Fallujah piece by piece using tribal security forces, neighborhood residents, and the Iraqi police as the main effort. Pacified areas were consolidated into police precincts, each containing a Joint Security Station (JSS). Each JSS housed not only an Iraqi police detachment, but also a Marine Corps infantry platoon that worked side by side with Iraqi police counterparts. With marines sent into each neighborhood protecting the populace and with Iraqi security forces leading the way, Al Fallujah’s residents more willingly and readily turned against al-Qaeda. Very soon, Green and Mullen were witnessing unbelievable results.

The authors are careful to credit key players who were instrumental in the success in Al Fallujah prior to Green’s and Mullen’s arrivals. Mullen acknowledges his predecessor, Marine Corps Lt. Col. Harold Van Opdorp, for removing the local gun-running Iraqi Army brigade commander and the corrupt Al Fallujah chief of police. Van Opdorp helped install the new police chief, Chief Faisal, who proved
to be critical to the success of Operation ALLJAH. Green gives kudos to his predecessor, a shadowy figure he refers to only as “Joe,” a SEAL petty officer. Green tells us that Joe was proficient in the Arabic language and thoroughly knowledgeable of Arab culture. Joe parlayed his understanding of Arab history and language skills into becoming the “go-to” tribal engagement officer in Al Fallujah. Joe routinely accompanied Marine Corps Brig. Gen. John R. Allen on clandestine missions to Jordan to entice expatriate tribal sheikhs to return to Iraq and lead their tribes against al-Qaeda.

Green’s account of Joe’s vital contribution to victory in Al Fallujah is merely one of several interesting narratives available in this informative and instructive book. The authors acknowledge that careful mental and physical preparation for counterinsurgency operations was instrumental to mission success. Mullen credits preparing his marines for the counterinsurgency environment with guidance from Sir Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London, 1966), David Galula’s The Pacification of Algeria, 1956–1958 (Santa Monica, Calif., 1963), and John Mack’s A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence (Boston, 1975). Lessons from these works are evident in Mullen’s approach to leading operations in Al Fallujah.

Green praises T. E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Oxford, U.K., 1922), John Bagot Glubb’s The Story of the Arab Legion (London, 1948), and David Fromkin’s A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York, 1986). To Green, these volumes gave him a better understanding of Arab culture and Middle Eastern history.

In the preface, Mullen and Green quote B. C. Forbes, “How you start is important, but it is how you finish that counts” (p. v). Fallujah Redux treats this quote as the challenge of their mission in 2007: to intelligently exploit the gains achieved by Operation ALLJAH coopting the indigenous citizenry and security forces as stakeholders in restoring their war-torn city. The volume is both excellently crafted and well informed by a depth of knowledge of counterinsurgency doctrine and experience. It is reminiscent of Francis J. West’s great book on counterinsurgency, The Village (New York, 1972), and it is likely that Fallujah Redux will one day become required reading for future counterinsurgency warfighters.

**Notes**

1. RCT 1 consisted of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines; 3d Battalion, 3d Marines; and 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry. RCT 7 consisted of 1st Battalion, 8th Marines; 1st Battalion, 3d Marines; 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry; and 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry.

Ted Roberts earned a master’s degree from Tarleton State University in Stephenville, Texas, where he now teaches history. He served in Iraq as an infantry platoon leader and assistant operations officer with the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in 2006–2008 and 2009–2010. He is also a former marine.
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