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Surrender on the Air

An Official Signal Corps History of Message Traffic on
the Japanese Capitulation.

IN the closing hours of the Japanese war, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, in Manila, became the main stage of a historic radio drama bringing to an end the blood bath that had drenched the world for six years.

The Japanese government had accepted the surrender terms with a provision that the Emperor remain on the throne, the United Nations had conceded with a provision of their own, that he be subject to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander, and the world waited. Meanwhile, the war was continuing. Bombs were falling, guns were firing, people were dying.

In the teletype conference room in the battered City Hall of Manila, several GHQ officers were gathered at a table, reading a routine message from the War Department at Washington. It was nearly 0900, Manila time, of the morning of 15 August 1945.

Suddenly, in the midst of the teletype conference, came the extraordinary order from the War Conference Room, Washington: "STAND BY FOR IMPORTANT MESSAGE."

Then came the message that affected the destinies of millions of the world's population. The complete message read:

IN THE CLEAR

From: General Marshall
To: General MacArthur
Info: Nimitz Deane and Wedemeyer
NR: 1408

With reference to paragraph 2 of WARX 49182, you are hereby officially notified of Japanese capitulation. Your directive as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is effective with the receipt of this message.

Marshall

The telecon channel was not the customary one for messages to MacArthur. Evidently, an alert Signal Center Officer in Washington had found it open and shoved the message through on it. A few minutes later the same message came over the regular San Fran-

cisco-Manila channel after relay from Washington.

Receipt of an important message uncryptographed from the War Department broke a long precedent. But it was shortly followed by a request from station WAR for an officer qualified to accept a top secret urgent message in the usual cryptographed form. Then came the detailed instructions.

At approximately 1100 hours, the following message was transmitted to Japan:

IN THE CLEAR OPNL PRIORITY

15 August 1945

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
To: The Japanese Emperor, the Japanese Imperial Government, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters
NR: Z-500

I have been designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (the United States, the Republic of China, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and empowered to arrange directly with the Japanese authorities for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest practicable date. It is desired that a radio station in the Tokyo area be officially designated for continuous use in handling radio communications between this headquarters and your headquarters. Your reply to this message should give the call signs, frequencies and station designation. It is desired that the radio communication with my headquarters in Manila be handled in English text. Pending designation by you of a station in the Tokyo area for use as above indicated, station JUM on frequency 13705 kilocycles will be used for this purpose and WTA will reply on 15965 day and 7090 night. Upon receipt of this message, acknowledge.

MacArthur

Naturally, there had been no radio intercourse with the Japanese since 1942. Efforts

to establish contact with JUM, which had handled commercial traffic with the United States before the war, were made but this proved to be a large order. Meanwhile, the war was continuing.

The transmitters were immediately tuned to JUM's receiving frequency, 15,965 kilocycles, and our receivers zeroed to its transmitting frequency, 13,705 kilocycles.

Then, our preamble (call signs, etc., preceding the text of the message) was sent in English, in Kana and in Romaji, the two adaptations of the Japanese language to Morse code: "JUM FROM WTA (Manila). WE HAVE AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU." JUM did not reply.

Efforts were made to contact other Tokyo stations, any Tokyo station. We could hear the Japanese broadcasting and receiving on many circuits. As fast as our receivers picked them up, our transmitter would adjust our frequencies to theirs and an effort was made to try to break in with our important message, but no Japanese station would acknowledge us.

Tokyo was talking to Geneva. We came in

"TOKYO FROM MANILA. WE HAVE AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU."—No reply. Tokyo was talking to Singapore— "TOKYO FROM MANILA. WE HAVE AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU."

Tokyo was talking to Stockholm, Saigon, many other places. Always the Japs played deaf, although we knew our transmitters were blanketing their other receptions because we could hear them exchanging readability signals as a result of our interference.

We were getting nowhere, and the war was continuing. The Chief Signal Officer then arranged for a battleship in Manila Bay to broadcast a message to JUM on the international distress frequency, 500 cycles, requesting they contact WTA on 15,965 kilocycles. He also had the Army Airways Communications Service send the same message on our meteorological frequency, which the Japs were known to listen to assiduously.

At 1600, still without an acknowledgment,

General MacArthur's message was sent to the office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, with a request that all possible facilities be employed in trying to have it acknowledged by Japan.

The first message had not been cleared when General MacArthur's second message was received at the Signal Center at 1403. Aimed at the immediate ending of hostilities, it was even more important than the first. It read as follows:

IN THE CLEAR
URGENT

15 August 1945

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: The Japanese Emperor, the Japanese Imperial Government, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters

NR: Z-501

Pursuant to the acceptance of the terms of surrender of the Allied Powers by the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese government and the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers hereby directs the immediate cessation of hostilities by Japanese forces. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is to be notified at once of the effective date and hour of such cessation of hostilities, whereupon Allied forces will be directed to cease hostilities.

The Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers further directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send to his headquarters at Manila, Philippine Islands, a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender. The above representative will present to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers upon his arrival a document authenticated by the Emperor of Japan, empowering him to receive the requirements of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The representative will be accompanied by competent advisers representing the Japanese army, the Japanese navy and the Japanese air forces. The latter adviser will be thoroughly familiar with airdrome facilities in the Tokyo area.

Procedure for transport of the above party under safe conduct is prescribed as follows:

Party will travel in a Japanese airplane to an airdrome on the island of Ie Shima, from which point they will be transported to Manila, Philippine Islands, in a United States airplane. They will be returned to Japan in the same manner. Party will employ an unarmed airplane, type Zero model 22, L2, D3. Such airplane will be painted all white and will bear upon the sides of the fuselage and top and bottom of each wing green crosses easily recognizable at 500 yards. The airplane will be capable of inflight voice communications, in English, on a frequency of 6970 kilocycles. Airplane will proceed to an airdrome on the island of Ie Shima, identified by two white crosses prominently displayed in the center of the runway. The exact date and hour this airplane will depart from Sata Misake, on the southern tip of Kyushu, the route and altitude of flight and estimated time of arrival in Ie Shima, will be broadcast six hours in advance, in English, from Tokyo on a frequency of 16125 kilocycles. Acknowledgment by radio from this headquarters of the receipt of such broadcast is required prior to take-off of the airplane. Weather permitting, the airplane will depart from Sata Misake between the hours of 0800 and 1100 Tokyo time on the 17th day of August 1945. In communications regarding this flight, the code designation "Bataan" will be employed.

The airplane will approach Ie Shima on a course of 180 degrees and circle landing field at 1000 feet or below the cloud layer until joined by an escort of United States army P-38's which will lead it to a landing. Such escort may join the airplane prior to arrival at Ie Shima.

MacArthur

Tensely, tirelessly, operators kept trying

to make Tokyo listen, not just in Manila, but all over the world.

In his efforts to stop the fighting, General MacArthur ordered the officer in charge of the Tokyo circuit to send his second message first.

Transmission of the second message to Washington for rebroadcast by all other available facilities crossed with Washington's report on their efforts with the first message.

The hours ticked on and the guns and bombs blasted on, and the blood of human beings pulsed into the earth in many places while man's most powerful agencies of communications the whole world over tried vainly to make one city respond.

Three times we had sent our message out blind (without receipt), but in Signal Corps procedure a blind message is little better than no message transmitted.

Sweat drenched the shirts of the men laboring in the radio operations room of the Signal Center in oven-hot Manila. They had been at the keys or with the earphones clamped on their heads for ten futile hours. A frantic undercurrent gripped everyone present. There was no drama of the obvious sort, but each man knew that lives were being blotted out for lack of an acknowledgment to the message they were trying to get through. Quietly, they talked about it, cursing.

Each time a Tokyo station came in on the receiver, someone phoned the transmitter station to adjust its frequency to that station, and the key began pounding its unheeded monotone.

Now it was Tokyo talking to Taihoku. Our transmitters were tuned to the proper frequency.

TOKYO FROM MANILA. WE HAVE AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU.

In Romaji, in Kana, in—

But the Tokyo station acknowledged the Kana preamble.

With painful restraint, slowly, so that the Japanese operator would not miss it, our operator began sending MacArthur's second message.

The text was in English. When it was half transmitted, the Jap broke in with a flood of Japanese questions. Evidently, he had been trying to receive it in Japanese. Then he began sending us cryptographed Japanese traffic. It was incredible, but he apparently thought we were a Japanese station—in Manila!

We were forced to go back to monitoring JUM and the other Japanese circuits, while the war was continuing.

All around the world, powerful radio stations were doing the same thing, minute after minute, calling Tokyo, calling Tokyo, calling Tokyo. One of them was KER, commercial station in San Francisco.

In bland disregard of the electronic commotion, JUM was sending financial messages to Handelsbank, Stockholm.

Suddenly, the operator in the Signal Center held up his hand for attention and began to type:

KER DE JUM ZOK GA 40/SWO ZHC?
2105JIT

The Japanese Station, using commercial radio procedure, was saying:

KER FROM JUM. OK. GO AHEAD. SEND 40 WORDS PER MINUTE, ONCE. HOW ARE (receiving) CONDITIONS? 2105 HOURS JAPANESE IMPERIAL TIME.

KER replied but, tuned to JUM's transmitting frequency, we did not hear it. Then, from JUM:

KER DE JUM HR UNABLE START JUJ (evidently meaning "we are unable to start JUJ," another Japanese Station) PSE (please) REMAIN JUM TKS (thanks) AR (end of transmission) 2109 JIT (Japanese Imperial Time).

The next interception was:

KER DE JUM ZSF FIVE.

The Jap operator was boasting. He was telling KER, in commercial radio language, to send five words a minute faster.

After that came:

KER DE JUM HR NW XQ SF BT (here now service message to San Francisco, break.) WE WILL ZOA (start up) JNU3 (another Tokyo circuit, 13,475 kilocycles) IN FEW MINS (minutes) FOR YOU CMF STP

(Confirm, Stop.) YR MSG BQ NR 76500 RVD OK BT (your message with text 76500 received OK. Break.) TOK AR (Tokyo. End of Transmission.) 2140JIT.

That meant that Tokyo had received a message from an American station. But, was this acknowledged message, number 76500, a MacArthur message? We called USF, San Francisco Army Station, on a voice circuit, and asked the Duty Officer to phone KER and learn whether 76500 was the all-important second message of General MacArthur, or either one of his messages. In three minutes, he phoned back across the Pacific—it was the first MacArthur message!

Over local phones the word went out—Tokyo had acknowledged!

JUM was very busy sending regular commercial messages to San Francisco, resuming its traffic suspended three and a half years ago, just as though there never had been a war! We tried in vain to break in:

Now JUM was receiving from Singapore.

The Singapore operator sends the "wait" signal, indicating a pause in his transmission. It is shortly after 2300. Our transmitter is tuned to JUM.

JUM FROM WTA (Manila). WE HAVE AN URGENT MESSAGE FOR YOU.

JUM sends a signal to Singapore to stand by. He has heard us!

He returns our call.

Then messages pour into the Signal Center from military radio installations all around the Manila area, alerting WTA to the fact that JUM is calling. Stations everywhere had been listening in on the greatest radio drama ever staged and they all wanted to make sure WTA didn't miss its cue.

From Manila went this service:

JUM DE WTA (Tokyo from Manila) HR URG MSG HW (Here is an urgent message. How about it?)

JUM serviced back a request that WTA transmit to JNP, Tokyo.

The service was repeated to JNP, and JNP replied:

GA (Go ahead.)

MacArthur's second message followed. Re-

cept for it came at 2333 hours. It was followed by this message:

JNP de WTA. You will stand by and monitor WTA on 15965 Kc continuously. Continue to transmit on JNP until further notice in answer to our messages. Establish monitoring on your transmitting frequency and advise this headquarters at once of any unauthorized or unofficial transmission.

MacArthur

Then WTA sent MacArthur's first message, and gained a receipt at 0025 of 16 August, although the radio channel, meanwhile, had been transferred to Station JNU3, on 13,475 kilocycles, evidently in the same room in Tokyo, because JNP had begun to fade at about 2330 hours.

A comic ante-climax came when JNU3, a commercial station, with a hint of apprehension over a possible loss of revenue, inquired: ARE YOU GOING TO SEND PRIVATE MESSAGES?

When the American Signal Officers finally figured out that the Jap was worried about commercial traffic, they decided not to answer.

Then JNP, another Japanese station, came in to inquire:

DO YOU WANT AN ANSWER TO YOUR MESSAGE?

"Hell, yes!" roared the officer-in-charge when shown the query.

The operator smiled and turned to his key. JNP FROM WTA, he telegraphed—YES.

With the circuit established, an interchange of highly significant messages began which culminated in the surrender of Japan.

They are reproduced here in their proper order:

IN THE CLEAR
ROUTINE

16 August 1945

To: General of the Army MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: The Japanese Government

NR: None

Communication dated August 16th from the Japanese government and Imperial Japanese Headquarters to General of the Army

MacArthur Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. We are in receipt of the message of the United States government transmitted to us through the Swiss government and of a message from General MacArthur received by the Tokyo radiograph office, and desire to make the following communication.

1. His Majesty the Emperor issued an imperial order at 1600 o'clock on August 16th to the entire armed forces to cease hostilities immediately.

2. It is presumed that the said imperial order will reach the front lines and produce full effect after the following lapse of time:

A. In Japan, proper, 48 hours.

B. In China, Manchuria, Korea, Southern regions except Bougainville, New Guinea, the Philippines 6 days.

C. In Bougainville 8 days.

D. In New Guinea and the Philippines, in case of various local headquarters 12 days but whether and when the order will be received by the 1st line it is difficult to foresee.

3. With a view to making the august wish of His Majesty regarding the termination of the war and the above mentioned imperial order thoroughly known to all concerned, members of the Imperial Family will be dispatched as personal representatives of His Majesty to the headquarters of the Kwantung army, expeditionary forces in China and forces southern regions respectively. The itinerary, type of aircraft, markings, etc., will be communicated later. It is accordingly requested that safe conduct for the above be granted.

4. As regards the request to dispatch a competent representative accompanied by service advisers to the headquarters of General MacArthur in Manila leaving Sata Misaki in Kyushu on August 17th, we feel greatly embarrassed as it is impossible for us to arrange for the flight of our representative on August 17th due to the scarcity of time allowed us. We will, however, proceed at once with necessary preparations and notify General MacArthur as to the date of the flight of such a representative which will take place as soon as possible.

5. It is proposed to make the communica-

tions with the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers in the following manner:

A. Sender and receiver on the Japanese side—the general headquarters or the government.

B. Radio stations on the Japanese side—Tokyo station call sign JNP frequency 13740 kilocycles.

C. Means of communications—radio-graph.

D. Language—English.

6. We fail to understand the type of airplane described in the communication received from General MacArthur. We request, therefore, that the message be repeated bearing upon type fully and clearly.

7. In order to make sure that we have received without fail all the communications sent by General MacArthur, we beg him to repeat once again through the route of communication specified under heading 5 of the present communication.

No Sig

Time of receipt: 162330I

IN THE CLEAR
ROUTINE

16 August 1945

From: The Japanese General Headquarters

To: Headquarters of General MacArthur

NR: 2

Regarding item 3 of our first radiogram: Itinerary expected to leave Tokyo at 9 o'clock on August 17th "the party (3) for the south is due to leave on 18th" by way of the following route the itinerary is subject to some alterations owing to weather and other conditions

1. Bound for Manchuria (Tokyo-Yonago-Seoul)

2. Bound for China (Tokyo-Fukuoka-Shanghai-Nanking)

3. Bound for the south (Tokyo-Fukuoka-Shanghai ((staying one night))-Canton-Tourane-Saigon)

Type and markings of airplanes

1. Planes for Manchuria and China are low-winged monoplane twin-engined middle-sized transport of Mitsubishi MC20-2 type

2. Plane for the south is middle-winged

monoplane twin-engined middle-sized bomber with the cigar shaped fuselage resembling that of B28

3. Markings are sun flag with red streamer of 4 meters length

Time of receipt: 170050

IN THE CLEAR
URGENT

17 August 1945

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: Japanese General Headquarters

NR: Z-502

Your messages of August 16th numbers 1 and 2 have been received and are satisfactory. Every possible precaution will be taken to insure the safety of the planes bearing the Japanese representatives on their missions. My two messages will be repeated as requested. Notify this headquarters as soon as possible of the proposed date of flight of the Japanese representatives to Manila. Type of plane desired is Douglas DC-3 type transport understood to be your navy type Zero model 22, L2, D3 or your army type 100 transport plane K1 57. If necessary you are authorized to change the type of plane bearing your Manila representatives, giving description thereof.

MacArthur

Time of origin: 170341I

IN THE CLEAR

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Allied Supreme Commander

NR: 3

At about noon August 16 a group of some 12 Allied transport approached extremely near the coast of Kochi Shikoku at that time the imperial order to cease hostilities had not yet been issued and our air units ventured to attack the Allied vessels apparently causing some damage.

At 4 PM the order was issued to cease hostilities as stated in our radiogram No. 1.

It takes some time for the said order to reach the front line and produce full effect.

It is earnestly requested that the Allied forces will refrain from approaching the home

waters of Japan proper until the order will have been fully effectuated.

Time of receipt: 171019I

IN THE CLEAR

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Supreme Allied Commander

NR: 4

1. It is stated in the message of the President of USA transmitted on August 16 through the Swiss government "send emissaries at once to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and fully empowered to make any arrangements directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to enable him and his accompanying forces to arrive at the place designated by him to receive the formal surrender." According to this message the task of the "emissaries" is to be understood to make necessary arrangements for the reception by the Supreme Commander and his accompanying forces of the formal surrender.

2. However in the "urgent" message sent by the Supreme Commander to the Japanese emperor the Japanese government, the Japanese General Headquarters which was received by the Tokyo radiograph office and to which reference was made in our first radiogram it is stated that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers further directs the Japanese Imperial Government to send to his headquarters in Manila a competent representative empowered to receive in the name of the Emperor of Japan the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender. According to this message it appears that the task of the Japanese representative is to receive "certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender."

3. We should like to clarify the following points because the forms and contents of the "full powers" to be issued will be different depending upon your answer.

A. Can we proceed according to the understanding stated in the said item 1

assuming that the Supreme Commander's message has the same meaning with the President's message in this respect?

B. If not please explain exactly what is meant by the "certain requirements for carrying into effect the terms of surrender." In any way we assume that the signing of surrender terms is not among the tasks of the Japanese representative in question.

Time of receipt: 171010I

IN THE CLEAR

URGENT

From: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: The Japanese General Headquarters
NR: Z-504

Reference your radiogram number 4 of August 16th. Your assumption that the signing of surrender terms is not among the tasks of the Japanese representative to Manila is correct. The directive from this headquarters is clear and explicit and is to be complied with without further delay.

MacArthur

Time of origin: 171241I

IN THE CLEAR

URGENT

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Allied Supreme Commander

NR: 5

While on our side the imperial order has already been given to cease hostilities, the Soviet forces are still positively carrying on the offensive and their spearhead is reaching near a point west to Mukden early this morning. As the result, the Japanese forces in Manchukuo are meeting great difficulties in carrying out the imperial order. It is urgently requested that the Supreme Commander would take proper steps to bring about immediate cessation of the Soviet offensive.

Time of receipt: 171505I

IN THE CLEAR

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese Government

To: The Allied Supreme Commander

NR: 6

Please correct the sender of our radiogram number 4 from "Japanese GHQ" to the "Japanese government."

Time of receipt: 171527I

IN THE CLEAR

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Supreme Allied Commander

NR: 7

Our representative to Manila selected. Due to necessary internal procedures he is scheduled to leave Tokyo on August 19. Further details will follow.

Time of receipt: 171640I

IN THE CLEAR

URGENT

17 August 1945

From: The Japanese General Headquarters

To: The Headquarters of General MacArthur

NR: 7

Re our radiogram number 2,

1. The parties for China and Manchuria left Tokyo today at 9:30 A.M.

2. The party for the south, reported in our previous message to leave on the 18th, left Tokyo also today at 9:30 A.M. in order to avoid possible delay due to bad weather.

3. The type and markings of the planes and their routes are as communicated before.

Time of receipt: 171705I

IN THE CLEAR

18 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces

NR: 8

Regarding the advance notice of flight schedule of our representatives to Manila, will broadcast at 2000 August 18, using however the frequency of 16145 kilocycles instead of that of 16124 which you designated by your first message of August 16.

Time of receipt: 181730I

IN THE CLEAR

18 August 1945

From: The Japanese GHQ

To: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

NR: 9

Schedule of our planes movement regarding our representative flight to Manila, the party will employ two unarmed twin-engined single winged land attack planes of the type 1 (ITI Shiki Rikujo Kogekiki) with markings as designated by you. Weather permitting, the planes will leave Kisarazu airdrome on the 19th at 0700, pass over Sata Misaki on the southern tip of Kyushu at about 1100 and then proceed via Nakanoshima, Takarajima, Torijima and a point 35 nautical miles north of Ie Shima, reaching Ie Shima at about 1320 on the same day. During the flight over these points, they will take an altitude of 6000 to 9000 feet. In approaching Ie Shima, the planes will as you designated take the course of 180 degrees and circle landing field at an altitude of 1000 feet or below the cloud layer until joined by your escort.

Communication contact your planes call signs are JBACY and JBACZ and as you designated we desire to contact your airdrome by radio with the frequency of 8915 Kcs, besides carrying on in flight voice communication with the frequency of 6970 Kcs. Please notify us of the station designation, call sign and frequency of your station at Ie Shima.

Time of receipt: 181905I

IN THE CLEAR

URGENT

18 August 1945

From: The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

To: The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters

NR: Z-509

In reply to your message number 9 dated 18 August 1945 aircraft control tower at Ie Shima is designated MOCA repeat MOCA and will guard 6970 kilocycles for voice com-

munications. The air communications center will guard 8915 kilocycles with voice call PINBALL repeat PINBALL and RP 7 repeat RP 7 for voice or code transmissions. Desire your two airplanes use call signs Bataan 1 and Bataan 2 as designated in my radio of 15 August.

MacArthur.

Time of origin: 182317I

IN THE CLEAR.

19 August 1945

From: Japanese GHQ

To: The Supreme Commander for Allied Powers

NR: 10

The planes carrying the party of representatives have left Kisarazu airdrome on 0718 August 19.

Time of receipt: 191010I

Each of these messages was transmitted by the fastest possible means without regard to normal routine procedures. United States Army Signal Corps teamwork around the world had repaired in ten hours and forty minutes a communications link between the United States and Japan which had been broken for almost four years of warfare.

Wars are fought today not solely by ground, naval and air forces but by all citizens united in a joint effort which touches every phase of national and private life. The danger zone of modern war is not restricted to battle lines and adjacent areas but extends to the innermost parts of a nation. No one is immune from the ravages of war.

With present equipment, an enemy air power can, without warning, pass over formerly visualized barriers or "lines of defense" and can deliver devastating blows at our population centers and our industrial, economic or governmental heart even before surface forces can be deployed. Our own Air Force, when mobilized and deployed, would have a similar capability and might attack an enemy within hours instead of days, weeks, or months required by our surface forces.

Future attack upon the United States may well be without warning, except what may be obtained from an active national intelligence agency.

In any future war the Air Force, being unique among the services in its ability to reach any possible enemy without long delay, will undoubtedly be the first to engage the enemy and, if this is done early enough, it may remove the necessity for extended surface conflict.

Air superiority accordingly is the first essential for effective offense as well as defense. A modern, autonomous, and thoroughly trained Air Force in being at all times will not alone be sufficient, but without it there can be no national security.

—General of the Army Henry H. Arnold

Vitaly important in the strategic defense of the United States is Brazil which offers the nearest point of approach to this continent from the east. It is also vital to the security of the Panama Canal that the various avenues of approach through Brazilian territory be in friendly hands and adequately guarded. The traditional friendship between Brazil and the United States and complete agreement between the two peoples on matters of interest to the Western Hemisphere have had an important bearing on our defense preparations. Close cooperation between the United States and Brazil was crystallized through the formation of a Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission in May 1942. This Commission has since been working on mutual defense plans and matters related to our common war effort.

—General of the Army George C. Marshall