Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1977

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Force Development, Doctrine, and Training

While the Army was fulfilling its operating responsibilities, staff members at all levels were planning for the future. The development of forces capable of defending the nation against challenges yet to come, the necessary organizations, equipment, education, and training posed difficult problems. Despite the intangibles involved in predicting future needs and limitations in funds and personnel, the Army had to operate under peace­time constraints and at the same time build a firm base for wartime expansion.

With technology rapidly increasing the destructiveness of weapons and introducing greater sophistication into war, the problem of planning for future conflicts and the forces to fight them becomes more and more difficult. Constantly changing, the ideal mix of infantry, armor, artillery, air, and support units to fight tomorrow's war is seldom attainable in peacetime because of personnel and budget limitations. The objective, therefore, is to push ahead slowly, to adjust along the way, and to modify organization and equipment according to tests and evaluation.

Each year the Army prepares a Total Army Analysis based upon force levels established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The analysis considers the phased wartime deployment of units, the proper mix of active and reserve components, and the resources available. Unsurprisingly, the 1977 Total Army Analysis indicated that the Army needed more units than it could field and more reinforcing units for sustaining combat than the reserve components could provide; units requiring 91,000 spaces in a theater of war such as Europe would accordingly be unmanned. In addition, the Army would have to restructure the reserve components to adjust to changes in doctrine and employment concepts; those shifts would result in a small increase in the Army Reserve and a corresponding decrease in the National Guard in fiscal year 1978.

The Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a study in 1976 on the division foreseen for the 1980's; the Chief of Staff approved the TRADOC concept in January 1977 for testing through 1979. The new heavier division would have more units, but they would be smaller and more mobile. The division would also have additional artillery, separate antitank companies in maneuver battalions, better electronic warfare and chemical defense capabilities, and logistical support

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units oriented on particular weapon systems. At the maneuver level, the battalion would assume many of the administrative, logistical, and coordinating functions presently performed by the company staff, allowing the company commander to devote full attention to training and commanding his unit. The TRADOC study also recommended tests of forward maintenance, forward ammunition transfer, and centralized mess, personnel, maintenance, and supply.

The 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas, became the test division, and a three-phase test was set up. The battalion-level test would extend from September to December 1977 and the test for the division, less some elements, from September to November 1978; the final phase for the whole division would be conducted at Fort Irwin, California, over the next six months. But funding, logistical, and operational constraints, along with congressional concern, forced reconsideration of that schedule. In late September, the Chief of Staff decided to go ahead with the first phase as planned, but combine the second and third phases, using two restructured brigades and headquarters elements of a third brigade, and to conduct both phases at Fort Hood by September 1978. Results and analyses of Phase I would be reported by June 1978 and of Phase II by October 1979.

Accordingly, the restructuring of the 1st Cavalry Division began on 1 July 1977. The test units included three tank battalions, two mechanized infantry battalions, one direct support artillery battalion, one forward support maintenance company, one chemical defense company, one engineer company, one combat intelligence company, one Redeye battery, and one ammunition transfer point. Reorganizing, equipping, and training of these units started, but shortages in equipment made it necessary to transfer many items from other units to the test division and to reduce the scale and length of some of the tests. When the tests start in October 1977, the armor and mechanized battalions will be instrumented, using the TRADOC automated field instrumentation system at Fort Hood. Selected instrumented field exercises, such critical issues as the employment of TOW antitank-missile companies, and overall forward support coordination and execution tests are to be evaluated during the remainder of 1977.

To meet the increasing Soviet armor threat in Europe, the Army also sought to improve its antiarmor capabilities. The goal was to increase the number of aircraft that could be used against armor forces. Additional TOW/Dragon antitank missiles have been issued to ground and air elements, and the 82d Airborne and 101st Airmobile Divisions received more antiarmor units. The Army also forwarded its first Mission Element Need Statement-a new Defense document to the Department of Defense in August requesting approval of funds for further strengthening the antiarmor arsenal.

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The Army worked to improve and extend The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) which was established to provide an accurate, responsive, automated system for changing organizational structure and authorizing necessary personnel and equipment. In recent years, the number of changes submitted has increased to a point where the documents had to be revised as many as six times a year. In June the Chief of Staff established a study group to work out other procedures. And in August 1977 the Vice Chief of Staff decided that unit authorization documents would be updated only semiannually, except for emergencies and other unusual cases. New regulations and instructions were to be issued prior to 1 April 1978.

In the meantime, TAADS was extended down to the installation level in March, when Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Fort Knox, Kentucky, received the necessary automated equipment. By the end of the fiscal year nineteen data processing installations were using the TAADS software, and more were expected to be added in the year ahead. The Army staff and TRADOC and FORSCOM instructors provided functional training, and the Computer Systems Command gave automatic data processing training.

One of the continuing problems in planning is the inability to foretell what kind of war the United States might become involved in and the intensity of the fighting. The Army, nevertheless, sought ways to calculate the wartime consumption of conventional ammunition, combat losses of major equipment, and combat casualties. A study was completed in December 1977 defining the methodology to be used; its development was expected to be finished by February 1978, and forecasts of consumption and loss factors could then be used in programming Army requirements through fiscal year 1985.

Under the Vertical Force Development Management Information System, the Army, along with the computer industry, explored an approach to system development that had never been attempted before on such a large scale, utilizing top-down design structured programming techniques. The system would be developed for wartime operations but would be capable of performing with equal efficiency in peacetime; it would extend from Department of the Army headquarters through the major commands down to subordinate commands and installations.

The first two phases were completed in fiscal year 1977 by representatives of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, the Army Computer Systems Command, and the Army Management Systems Support Agency. They considered functional requirements at Department of the Army and major command levels, evaluated automated data processing equipment requirements, assessed available data base management systems, analyzed current force development automated systems, and were developing a communications plan for support

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of the overall system. The need to withdraw members of the team for higher priority projects and indications that funds would not be available in fiscal year 1978 meant that further development of the system would probably have to be deferred, possibly as long as twenty-two months.

The Force Development Integrated Management System, originally scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1977, also ran behind schedule. Integrating four separate systems currently in use proved more difficult than expected, and a new completion date of January 1979 was established. In the meantime, the Army identified and recorded all issues pertaining to the system and completed most of the technical system design and programming for the authorization subsystem; it also prepared a user's guide for the subsystem.

Since the United States signed the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which set forth the rules governing international warfare, experience, situations not fully covered by the conventions, and new weapons and technology have indicated a need to bring the conventions into consonance with the changes of the last quarter century. Accordingly, the Swiss Government sponsored a series of diplomatic conferences in recent years to consider draft protocols prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

As a concerned agency, the Army helped to develop U.S. positions on the proposed protocols during the fiscal year. One dealt with international law as applied to international warfare and another with humanitarian rules to govern civil wars. The Judge Advocate General's Office assisted the departments of Defense and State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by reviewing and analyzing articles adopted during earlier sessions. It also participated in developing position papers and instructions for the U.S. delegation that attended the fourth session in Geneva from March to June 1977, and provided two members of the U.S. negotiating team. That session resulted in two treaties supplementing the old conventions. After the conference, the staff of The Judge Advocate General reviewed and analyzed the new provisions and made recommendations on the U.S. position on the protocols as a whole.

The Judge Advocate General had, in addition, the responsibility for reviewing new weapons to ensure that their intended use in combat would be consistent with the legal obligations of the United States. In that connection, his staff drafted a new regulation to improve existing procedures and to make certain that new weapons would be reviewed at the appropriate time.

At the tactical level, in April the Vice Chief of Staff instructed the Training and Doctrine Command to develop a philosophy and plan for an automated system at corps level and below. The plan involved the ex-

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peditious fielding of systems required for combat readiness, consideration of wartime versus peacetime requirements, and centralized control to monitor the proliferation of automated battlefield systems. TRADOC appointed a small study group at the Combined Arms Center to work out the philosophy and methodology. A progress report was to be given at the tactical battlefield appraisal session which would convene in April 1978.

To improve fire-support coordination at company level, the Army developed the concept of the fire support team. This involved consolidating artillery and mortar forward observers into teams organic to division artillery battalions but organized and assigned on the basis of the type and number of companies to be supported. Team members were trained in a new military occupational specialty, MOS 13F, Fire Support Specialist, to coordinate all fires including naval and close air. The concept also included personnel and equipment increases in the battalion and brigade fire support sections.

After a TRADOC study showed an appreciable gap between the existing and potential capabilities of U.S. tank forces, the Chief of Staff established the Tank Forces Management Group in August 1976. Since the existing Army management system was functionally oriented and strove to improve combat readiness by increasing the efficiency of functional subsystems, the group decided to approach the problem by considering the tank as a total system-a combination of personnel, training, logistics, and development. The group recommended a special management structure cutting across functional lines and organizational relationships. The structure would not be vertical and separate from the existing staff, but rather would work through existing staff elements. This structure would consist of a Tank Force Management Office (TFMO) at Chief of Staff level and focal points in staffs of subordinate agencies and commands down through corps level.

In May the Chief of Staff approved the eighty-three recommendations submitted by the Tank Forces Management Group and on 1 August the Tank Forces Management Office was established under the Management Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Staff.

Among recommendations submitted by the Tank Forces Management Group, twenty-eight concerned personnel actions. One of the most important was the establishment of a separate armor management field. Some of the broad military occupational specialties such as 11D, Armor Reconnaissance Specialist, and 11E, Armor Crewman, will be broken down into more descriptive categories and assigned new numbers in the 19-series. For example, 11E will be split into five new MOS's-19G Armor Reconnaissance Vehicle Crewman; 19H, Armor Reconnaissance Vehicle Driver; 19E M48-M60A1/A3 Armor Crewman, 19F Tank Driver, 19J M60A2 Armor Crewman; and MOS 11D will be converted

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to MOS 19D Cavalry Scout. This new career management field will become effective 1 March 1978.

The Special Commission on the United States Military Academy, appointed by the Secretary of the Army in September 1976 to assess honor code violations, presented its report in December 1976. The commission found serious fault in some features of the honor system and proposed a number of reforms. Among those was a recommendation that the Academy keep the "nontoleration" clause in the cadet honor code, but with a reinterpretation of the clause to give cadets the additional option of admonishing violators. The clause requires cadets to report violators or be guilty of a code violation themselves. The commission also proposed the introduction of sanctions short of dismissal, introduction of a course on ethics to foster character development, and protection of the honor system to ensure that it is not used as a means of enforcing Academy regulations. The commission also concurred in the decision of the Secretary of the Army to readmit cadets implicated in the cheating scandal.

In response to the commission's proposals, the Chief of Staff formed a U.S. Military Academy Study Group, under the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and headed by three general officers, to examine further the Academy's condition. After a seven-month study, the group made over 200 recommendations in the areas of academics, professional military development, and the environment at West Point. One recommendation endorsed the nontoleration clause and suggested that minor honor code violations be subject to less serious punishment than automatic dismissal. To improve management at the school, the group proposed an external advisory board as well as internal changes in administration and control. The Chief of Staff gave the recommendations to the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy for his consideration. Some of the group's recommendations have already become policy at the Academy. Others were still under review at the end of the fiscal year.

For combat officers, the Vice Chief of Staff approved a command refresher program for colonels and lieutenant colonels selected to lead infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense artillery, and engineer battalions and brigades. Beginning in July 1977, the program consisted of a week at the officer's branch school, on training soldiers; a week at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on fighting; and for all commanders not bound for U.S. Army, Europe, a week on maintenance at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Officers selected to command in Europe received their maintenance training at Vilseck in Germany. The final phase of the program was the Senior Officer Legal Orientation Course at The Judge Advocate General

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School. Officers assigned to Europe received six weeks of language training at the Defense Language Institute. Officers selected to command other types of battalions and brigades would continue to attend the two-week Senior Commanders' Orientation Course at Fort Knox, pending establishment of programs for combat support and combat service support unit commanders.

Centralized selection of field grade officers for attendance at the senior service schools and the Command and General Staff College continued, but Defense officials imposed stability constraints to lessen personnel disturbance. As a result, a little over one third of the officers had to be deferred until they became available for reassignment. For the first time, the Army included all promotable majors and lieutenant colonels with less than fifteen years' service as eligible for selection to attend senior service colleges.

The Director of Military Personnel Management approved the discontinuance of the Fort Leavenworth phase of the Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) for reserve officers. The phase was no longer necessary because the same work was incorporated in the Army Reserve school and correspondence programs. By curtailing the course, the Army expects to save more than $2.3 million annually. Beginning in fiscal year 1978, officers could meet the CGSOC requirements by fulfilling one of the following options: completion of all six phases of the Army Reserve school program and completion of the writing requirement; completion of all fifteen correspondence subcourses and completion of the writing requirement; any appropriate combination of the Army Reserve school and correspondence programs.

The Chief of Staff appointed a study group to review officer education and training and come up with policies and programs that would meet Army requirements and satisfy individual needs in each specialty area, yet remain within budget constraints. The group was expected to present a report and plan to the Chief of Staff by the summer of 1978.

In the medical field, the Army had 1,196 Army and 78 Air Force and Navy physicians in its Graduate Medical Education Program. Those doctors were in twenty-one residency specialty areas and thirty fellowship areas, and the training was offered at twelve different Army teaching hospitals and several civilian institutions, all approved by the American Medical Association. An Army Nurse Corps Continuing Health Education Program was published in July 1977, and the Army Nurse Corps then applied for accreditation as an approving body for similar programs. In September, the North East Regional Accreditation Committee of the American Nursing Association visited the locations for the proposed programs. The Army Dental Corps joined the American Dental Association Continuing Education Registry in May. Maintaining a centralized, nation-wide system for recording continuing education experience for

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dentists, the association provided semiannual computer printouts of that experience to the Chief of the Dental Corps, local dental commanders, and major commands.

The Academy of Health Sciences prepared and conducted 102 initial skill, skill progression, functional, and continuing education courses for active and reserve officers and enlisted men. Over 33,000 individuals (22,435 active Army, 9,373 reserve components, and 1,194 others) were enrolled in the education and training programs of the academy and its satellite organizations. In addition, with Army financial support, over 7,700 Army medical personnel attended short courses at civilian institutions.

The Surgeon General continued to have over two hundred medical courses reviewed; many are being redesignated and substantial savings are expected. A task force analysis of the basic patient care MOS (91B) led to a career plan expected to produce better training and conserve training resources. To remedy shortages in clinical specialists (MOS 91C), in December 1976 The Surgeon General approved a two-phase, sixteen-week course providing initial training in that field. After a four-week course at the Academy of Health Sciences and a twelve-week course at selected Army medical centers, 647 students were assigned to fill vacancies in medical units.

To promote Army capabilities in law, twenty-five officers were selected to begin their legal education with the aid of Army funds. In addition, sixty judge Advocate General Corps officers completed courses at advanced Army, Defense, and civilian schools.

The one station unit training (OSUT) concept has proved entirely satisfactory. Soldiers being trained in ten initial entry military occupation skills received their instruction under OSUT during fiscal year 1977, and two more skills will be brought under the system in fiscal year 1978. The Training and Doctrine Command study of the program in 1976 suggested that the concept worked well. Nevertheless, there was still a belief that similar results could be achieved through different methods, and Congress directed the Army to conduct a test of initial entry infantry training at two stations to determine whether benefits similar to those of OSUT could be achieved with an integrated training program split between two training installations. The test will be conducted during fiscal year 1979.

After Basic Initial Entry Tests conducted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in the fall of 1976 were completed, TRADOC supported the adoption of Common Entry Level Training (CELT). The tests were held to evaluate the ability of women to undergo the same basic training as men and demonstrated that, except for less upper body strength, women performed comparably with men. They also showed that physical training could be modified for women without changing content or value or

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lowering the male standards. Other results were that the women tested felt more challenged physically, were better prepared for service in units than those who had undergone Women's Army Corps basic training, and could use basic tactical skills and employ weapons necessary for individual and unit survival in a defensive battlefield environment.

The CELT program, as a consequence, began in September 1977 at Fort McClellan, Alabama, with all-female units, and mixed unit training was scheduled at Fort Jackson early in fiscal year 1978. Initially, men and women would be segregated in separate platoons of the same company. The more rigorous training in mixed units should prepare women more thoroughly for assignment to combat support and combat service support units vulnerable to attack on the modern battlefield.

The Army Personnel Performance and Training Research and Development Program was another sign of the growing importance of women in the armed forces. Among other topics in a $22.3 million program, the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences conducted research on the role of women in. the Army. A major field test was held to determine whether the number of female soldiers in a unit would have a measurable impact on the unit's performance. Other subjects included the improvement of unit training techniques, training individuals within units, and the development of guidelines for skill qualification tests.

In another experimental area, the Human Factors Engineering Program, concepts for mounting the Dragon antitank weapon on the armored personnel carrier, protection for TOW antitank weapons, and an artillery fire control measuring system were tested.

To increase battlefield effectiveness and to bolster night flying combat skills, the Army started a restructured initial entry rotary wing training program in June 1977. Students trained on both the UH-1 utility and the OH-58 observation helicopters; about twenty-five percent of the students would be qualified as OH-58 aeroscout pilots. Using the self-paced mode of instruction and relying heavily on simulators and training devices, the revised course was more efficient and less expensive. The Training and Doctrine Command also set up a five-week refresher course for officers who had not had a flying assignment within three years and an aviator commander's readiness course to help key officers get the most from their aviation assets.

In April the Army changed its policy by restricting airborne training to officers on assignment to airborne units. An exception would be made for U.S. Military Academy and ROTC cadets in the classes of 1977, 1978, and 1979, as well as OCS graduates in classes through fiscal year 1978, who did not take airborne training as students because they thought it would be available after entry on active duty. Beginning in fiscal year 1981, only 400 officers, the minimum needed to meet airborne unit

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requirements, would receive airborne training. That restriction, however, would not affect the availability of voluntary precommission training for Military Academy and ROTC cadets.

The Vice Chief of Staff approved in concept the recommendations of an Army Linguist Personnel Study in early 1976, and by the end of fiscal year 1977 forty-eight had been carried out. The Army validated 5,000 out of 6,500 submissions as linguist requirements. The remaining 1,500 will have to be resubmitted. Although lack of personnel to review language proficiency questionnaires slowed down a program to identify and retest linguists, 6,200 records were received and used to update the linguist qualification data base during the period. To eliminate some of the difficulties in existing methods of reporting, the Army began to plan the automation of linguist data and requirements. Preliminary surveys and. evaluations of various systems were under way at the close of the year.

Although enlistment bonuses went into effect for Polish, Czech, Slovakian, Arabic-Syrian, and Korean linguists, Defense officials ordered that the bonus be justified on a language-by-language basis beginning in fiscal year 1978. Effective 1 October 1977, an enlistment bonus will be available for enlistees who are Korean linguists. To aid soldiers in improving their language skills, the Army expended $280,000 to prepare self-paced instructional packets for persons learning Arabic-Syrian, Japanese, Korean, and Portuguese.

To secure more accurate data on training costs for budget submissions, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans convened a conference with representatives from the major commands in February to work out instructions to the field for providing the necessary information. The conference concluded that funding should be in five different categories: garrison operations and training costs, field training costs, operational requirement costs, special costs (one-time or occasional expenditures), and missile tests firing costs. As a result, the principal unit of measure used by the major commands to report field training costs became the number of battalion field training days regarded as essential to attain and sustain required levels of proficiency and readiness. For fiscal year 1979 submissions, major commanders were permitted to combine garrison and field training costs if they could not be separated with any degree of certainty. As cost figures were submitted, a wide variation surfaced. Some commands, such as Forces Command, had fewer battalion field training days for its units because of responsibilities for support to schools, tests, and reserve component training. Others, including the overseas commands in Europe and Korea, required more to maintain combat readiness and to participate in joint and combined exercises. Continued efforts were under way to refine the available data and to develop a model to display the relationship between funding and readiness.

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Ammunition is an important item in training costs. Under a four-phase plan, the Training Ammunition Management System (TAMS) moved in February 1977 from orienting major commands and testing the computer-based information system to the second stage: the world­wide collection of data; the installation of data terminals at TRADOC and FORSCOM in the United States and in Europe and Korea; and training sessions on the use of the terminals and seminars on TAMS management functions. By the end of the fiscal year the information system had been refined, required documentation had been submitted to the Director of Army Automation, and major commands had identified and received approval for the additional manpower required. Phase III was scheduled to get under way in October 1977 with the expansion of the system to selected installations, the development of the first training ammunition authorization for the fiscal year 1979, and the revision of appropriate tables of allowances.

As in the past, special training exercises were held in environments varying from the heat of the jungle to the bitter cold of the arctic. Four battalions rotated to Alaska for four-week periods, eight went to the Canal Zone for three weeks of training; and five battalion task forces moved to Fort Irwin, California, for four weeks in the desert.

MOBEX 76, a major Army mobilization exercise, and the first of its type, was conducted from 8 November to 9 December 1976 to test recently revised mobilization plans and procedures, evaluate the Army's capability to support full mobilization for a conflict in Europe, and assess nondeploying support requirements. The exercise involved six installations-Fort Benning, Fort Drum, Fort Hood, Fort Lewis, Camp McCoy, and Camp Roberts. Elements of the Army staff, the Materiel Development and Readiness Command, the Military Traffic Management Command, and the Military Personnel Center also participated. Mobilization procedures and concepts were tested among 590 reserve component units, 31 state adjutants general, and 18 Army Reserve commands. Areas examined were alert, personnel, materiel, and movement requirements, and training evaluation; 186 mobilization problems were identified. MOBEX 76 brought to light a number of deficiencies and shortfalls associated with mobilizing and deploying both active and reserve components. These are being corrected and regulations and plans related to mobilization are being amended. The exercise also demonstrated the need for a joint mobilization and deployment exercise which has been scheduled for late 1978.

During fiscal year 1977, the Army also participated in twenty-seven exercises, including five major ones, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directed/Coordinated Exercise Program. The training accomplished in joint exercises is the culmination of unit and uniservice training, and gives

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combat units experience with mobility, command and control, and communications under conditions that would likely prevail during wartime.

The Management Directorate in the Office of the Director of the Army Staff continued to manage the Army Study System. Priority problem areas were identified by the Army Secretariat, the Army Staff, and major commands and were published as the fiscal year 1977 Study Planning Guidance. Priority problem areas addressed were : soldier quality, recruitment, training, and retention; human, materiel, and energy resources utilization; peacetime efficiency and wartime effectiveness; readiness; modernization; future planning and forecasting; and Army roles, missions, and capabilities in light of changing conditions, relationships, and threats.

Based on the planning guidance, Headquarters, Department of the Army, staff agencies, and major commands contributed studies to the fiscal year 1977 Army Study Program. Distributed in October 1976, that program listed 363 studies covering manpower and personnel, concepts and plans, operations and force structure, logistics, science and technology, and management.

In preparing the Study Planning Guidance document for fiscal year 1978, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for Operations Research, working with the Management Directorate, analyzed recently completed study reports and efforts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Army to identify study gaps in critical areas. The fiscal year 1978 guidance document was issued in December 1976. It provided guidance from the Army leadership down; previously Army staff agencies and major commands had provided the major input. Additionally, specific staff agencies were directed to develop substudy programs addressing priority problem areas: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans: short war survival, containment of the Warsaw Pact armored threat, Army readiness, tactical nuclear doctrine, intelligence systems, mobility and combat power, air defense, and force structure and personnel allocation-Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel: recruiting and personnel management models-Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics: logistics.

A substantial revision of Army Regulation 5-5, The Army Study System, was published in July 1977. The revision included findings and recommendations from the Engineer Study Group's "Results and Use of Army Studies" submitted in August 1976, and completed Army implementation of DOD Directive 5010.22 on the management and conduct of studies and analyses, dated 22 November 1976. During the year the Study Management Office of the Management Directorate served

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as the Army point of contact for the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee to supply the cost of Army studies and the savings and benefits obtained.

The fiscal year 1977 study program of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel consisted of twenty-four studies. Contract funding was $402,000, plus an in-house expenditure of twenty-four professional man-years. The program addressed problems in procurement, management, welfare and morale, mobilization, law enforcement, and the role of women in the Army. Twelve studies were completed. The program for fiscal year 1978 consisted of fifteen studies.

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