Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1982

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Force Development and Training

During fiscal year 1982 the Army moved forward with plans and programs to develop modern, well-equipped, adequately supported, and fully trained forces that would be capable of meeting military contingencies wherever they might arise. Europe and the might of Warsaw Pact forces arrayed along NATO's eastern flank continued to be the principal threat, and the greater effort was made to counter it; but the need to have highly mobile, quick reaction forces available for commitment to other critical areas, such as the Persian Gulf, was a growing concern.

Early in the fiscal year the Vice Chief of staff directed the Army staff to prepare a plan that would integrate and provide unified direction for the Army's force modernization efforts. The result was the Force Modernization Master Plan (FMMP), which was published in April 1982. It contained a compendium of modernization goals and objectives, a detailed "roadmap" for transition of the force from its current structure to a modernized one, and a methodology for assessing the Army's capability to carry out its modernization plans. From May to August the Army's major commands assessed their ability to execute the plan. As the year closed, issues raised by the commands were being resolved and changes were being incorporated into an updated FMMP to be published early in fiscal year 1983. Of particular concern was the question of unit stationing in USAREUR.

The Army 90 Transition Plan, a detailed schedule of the actions required to implement Army 86 designs for improving the operational effectiveness of units and increasing the combat effectiveness of both existing and new systems, formed part of the FMMP. Major features of the plan included converting units to new designs as major pacing items-such as the Bradley fighting vehicle and the M1 tank-are received; converting units to transitional designs as facilities and manpower resources become available, thus improving the combat effectiveness of the existing force by achieving the capability to execute advanced tactical concepts using current weapon and support systems; converting division support commands to the maximum extent possible as

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major pacing items are fielded; and converting reserve component roundout units at the same time as their parent units in the active Army. Reserve component divisions and separate brigades would begin converting in fiscal year 1985. The plan also showed, through an extract from the Force Accounting System, all currently planned unit activations, inactivations, and conversions for fiscal years 1984-1992.

A flurry of activity had preceded publication of the first edition of the FMMP and the Army 90 Transition Plan. During the first quarter of the fiscal year, the Army staff reviewed tables of organization and equipment (TOES) for the Army 86 heavy division (Division 86) prepared at TRADOC. The review process considerably increased the size of certain divisional units, to the point that there were more people in the division than the force structure allowed. As a result, TRADOC received instructions in January 1982 to redesign Division 86 within a prescribed active component ceiling of between 17,750 and 18,750. During the entire month of February a task force representing TRADOC, USAREUR, FORSCOM (U.S. Army Forces Command), and the Army staff worked at Fort Leavenworth on a revised Division 86 design and a transition plan for the divisional reorganization. TRADOC presented the results of the task force's efforts at a decision briefing on 5 March. Later in the month the Chief of Staff approved the TRADOC design calling for nine active battalions (five tank and four mechanized infantry) and one reserve battalion (tank for armor divisions and mechanized infantry for infantry divisions, mechanized) with the following changes: all medical companies would be placed in the medical battalion; rifle squads would have ten members in both M 113- and M2 equipped squads; and the tenth battalion of USAREUR divisions would be an active rather than reserve component. To ensure adequate support, the Chief of Staff rejected fielding the M1 tank and the Bradley fighting vehicle in less than full division sets. He also approved transition plan guidelines.

Another aspect of Army 86 planning, the airborne-air assault division, continued under study at TRADOC. As currently developed, the new airborne division would feature nine infantry battalions plus one mobile protected gun battalion and a cavalry brigade (air attack) as maneuver units. Division artillery would contain three direct support battalions equipped with M198 155-mm. howitzers, but no general support battalion. Planning at the close of the fiscal year envisaged an air assault division built around nine infantry battalions and a cavalry brigade (air attack) having the capability to lift the combat elements of two

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maneuver battalions. Artillery components would be the same as for the airborne division. A decision briefing for the Chief of Staff (CSA) on operational concepts and force designs was scheduled for early 1983. Upon CSA approval, TOES will be produced and programming for transition will begin.

On 29 April 1982 the Commander, Combined Arms Center, briefed the Chief of Staff and major command leaders on the status of Echelons Above Corps 86 force designs and doctrine. Several issues were identified for further study, primarily questions regarding functional (stovepipe) and operational commands. An important result of the meeting was the publication of a draft of FM 100-16, "Support Operations Echelons Above Corps," which serves as interim "how to support" doctrine for the Army. During fiscal year 1983 the draft of FM 100-16 will undergo additional review before final publication.

The Army took steps during fiscal year 1982 to further its High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) program, which consists of TRADOC and DARCOM assets, as well as those of the 9th Infantry Division, I Corps, and Fort Lewis, Washington. The program goal is to field a prototype of a strategically deployable, lean, hard-hitting, and sustainable light division (HTLD) in 1985. In October 1981 intensive work began on developing this division's operational concept and organizational designs. In April 1982 the HTLD operational and organizational design was approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, and plans were begun for testing and transition. In May the initial HTLD materiel requirements were approved, and HTLD funding requirements were added to Army resourcing documents. In September, plans were completed for transforming a brigade slice of 9th Infantry Division units to the HTLD configuration in fiscal year 1983 for evaluation and testing.

The Army initiated, through the joint Chiefs of Staff, an analytical examination of the potential force mix needed to meet national security objectives. Major features of the analysis included compiling all pertinent policy guidance into a single document, establishing a methodology to consider all facets of relevant variables, defining and refining an applicable target base, computer modeling, and executing potential force scenarios. The resulting product will be updated on a continuing basis and refined through the PPBES (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System) process to provide force structures that can be combined with other factors, such as dollar costs, in order to present a choice of viable alternatives for meeting national security objectives.

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Force mix analysis efforts and the damage criteria study noted in last year's summary supported the administration's drive to modernize and expand U.S. strategic forces. As an active participant in this effort, the Army tried to ensure that a healthy perspective was maintained on what was required for a balanced deterrent. While there was no question of the need for an effective strategic deterrent, the high cost of such systems could lead to a deficit in the conventional capabilities that were also required for a balanced deterrent. The Army worked to ensure that conventional forces were neither neglected nor allowed to deteriorate for, if they were, the result could be restrictive and undesirable choices in responding to expected challenges from potential enemies.

In October 1981, the Army began a reorganization of division-level hospitals to improve medical care for the combat zone. A key element of the reorganization was changing the surgical hospital (mobile army) TOE to a new TOE which was given the name mobile army surgical hospital (MASH). The revised structure was designed to increase mobility and better support a fast-moving tactical scenario, while at the same time providing an acceptable emergency surgical-resuscitative capability. In addition to the new MASH, the reorganization would allocate one combat support hospital and two evacuation hospitals to each combat division. Full implementation of the reorganization, which would occur over a five-year period, would increase the number of hospital beds from 800 to 1,060 and the number of operating rooms from fourteen to twenty-two in each supported division; would provide a hospital unit that was staffed and equipped to operate on a continuous 24-hour basis rather than on a "sustained basis"; and would introduce a highly intensive, surgically oriented unit which could be located adjacent to the division's rear boundary and which would provide continuous support-even in-areas where helicopter air ambulances could not be used.

The Force Development Directorate, ODCSOPS, completed work on a revision of Army Regulation 71-11, "Total Army Analysis (TAA)," and publication was scheduled for early fiscal year 1983. The revision changed the TAA from an annual study to a biennial one. Following a review by the Army staff and the major commands, the directorate hosted a three-day conference which began on 14 September 1982 to consider the proposed TAA-89 force for development in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) covering fiscal years 1985-1989. The General Officer Steering Committee met on 17 September to resolve issues left hanging at the conference, to review the base force, and to make

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final recommendations for presentation at the Select Committee (SELCOM) meeting scheduled for November 1982.

An important element in determining the composition of forces to be developed is how well they can be sustained overseas under combat conditions. Important factors in this regard are war reserves, POMCUS, host nation support, and rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

In February 1981 the U.S. Army Logistics Evaluation Agency (USALEA) reported on its study of management policies, procedures, and programs covering secondary items in the war reserve. The report noted four major problem areas that hampered effective war reserve management: (1) insufficient central control and direction; (2) ineffectual or conflicting guidance and inadequate instructions for preparing war reserve budgets; (3) confusing, conflicting, and cumbersome selection procedures; and (4) inadequate management information. Short-range and long-range actions recommended in the report to correct these problems have been accepted and are being implemented by DARCOM and the Army staff.

To improve the accuracy of war reserve asset information reported by major commands, the U.S. Army Logistics Center (LOGCEN) developed and tested a standard report for worldwide use having common data elements that would be auditable. The fruit of this effort, the War Reserve Reporting System (ALS-8), was implemented in June 1982 as part of the Standard Army Intermediate Level Supply System-Expanded (SAILS-ABX).

The major change in the pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS) during fiscal year 1982 was the realignment of logistical and medical support packages in the divisional sets. POMCUS fill increased in Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) during the year, but declined in Central Army Group (CENTAG) because of the effects of redesigned USAREUR force requirements and POMCUS restructuring. Funding for spare parts has raised the fill of authorized stockage lists-prescribed stockage lists (ASL-PSL) to an all-time high.

Construction started on shortage sites for POMCUS division set five in Belgium and the Netherlands, and land acquisition began in the Netherlands for set six. Although Congress deleted funding for these sets in the fiscal year 1982 budget, this presented no problem since land procurement and site construction had been delayed. A skeletal force from the 7th Support Com-

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mand and a small element of the 54th Area Support Group moved into the area of Rheinberg, Germany, to plan, coordinate, receive, and provide initial support for the reinforcing divisions which are part of the NORTHAG expansion. The 54th Area Support Group will also provide community support activities for U.S. personnel assigned in the vicinity.

The Army continued to emphasize host nation support (HNS) to satisfy some of its combat support and combat service support requirements. The use of HNS resources to complement U.S. military capabilities and force structure, within the bounds of prudent risk, is considered essential to attain the support level necessary for maximum combat power of forward deployed and deploying U.S. forces.

Following lengthy negotiations, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) signed a host nation support agreement on 15 April 1982. It calls for additional negotiations on three technical agreements covering military support, civilian support, and reinforcement exercises. The agreement on military support will provide for the formation of German reserve units containing approximately 93,000 reservists, whose mission will be to support U.S. air and ground forces in time of crisis or war. As the fiscal year ended, U.S.-FRG working groups were putting together details of the military support agreement; the reinforcement exercise agreement was in draft; while work on the civilian support agreement was expected to get under way early in fiscal year 1983.

Regarding other NATO-related HNS matters, progress was made on the preparation of joint logistical support plans to cover the details of host nation support provided under umbrella and general technical agreements which the U.S. has signed with Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Italy. Also, USEUCOM initiated action to establish logistics coordination cells to operate as in-country extensions of the command in developing joint logistics support plans.

Host nation support in Korea is provided through the combined defense improvement projects (CDIP) program, and in Japan by arrangements for base rentals and construction cost avoidance. Elsewhere in the Pacific, HNS was in a rudimentary state. WESTCOM (Western Command) has begun the friendly-allied nation support (FANS) program to determine the ability of countries to provide support. In Southwest Asia, U.S. policy was to begin discussions with selected countries on possible contingency support for U.S. Forces Although the political climate has inhibited initiatives, some progress has been made in the

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areas of access agreements, pre-positioning, and the start of HNS talks.

In the area of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability, the primary effort continued to be the establishment of standardization agreements (STANAG) and interoperable weapons systems, logistics, equipment, and procedures in order to conserve resources and increase the combined combat capability of U.S. and allied ground forces. Concept and doctrinal issues, including AirLand Battle 2000 and land force tactical doctrine, were also raised. The Army, through participation in an interservice working group, actively supported the development, operation, and maintenance of an automated system to manage the status and implementation of standardization agreements, allied publications, and quadripartite standardization agreements.

The Department of the Army International Rationalization Office (DAIRO) was disbanded and its functions transferred to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff of Operations and Plans. In conjunction with the demise of DAIRO, AR 34-1, "U.S. Army Participation in International Military Rationalization and Standardization Interoperability Programs," and AR 34-2, "Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Policy," came under revision. The result is expected to be a single regulation which will incorporate both policy and program.

Bilateral Army staff talks were held with the armies of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. AirLand Battle 2000 figured prominently among the topics discussed. The U.S.-Canadian Permanent Joint Board for Defense and the Canadian-U.S. Cooperation Committee also met to discuss matters of mutual interest. The Army took part in NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG) panels and working groups. At the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), the Army participated in the promulgation of 31 new STANAGs and allied publications, the amendment of 197 others, and various actions to develop and ratify 109 more. STANAG 2868/ ATP-35(A), Land Force Tactical Doctrine, was forwarded to participating governments for final review and is expected to be ratified in early 1983.

Mobilization efforts during fiscal year 1982 focused on the following issues: reviews of mobilization and deployment planning, continued development of augmentation and preassignment programs to provide pretrained individuals to Regular Army

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and reserve component units upon mobilization or in a national emergency, use of civilian personnel, and industrial mobilization.

Based on initiatives by the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff, the Army conducted two mobilization planning reviews in March 1982. The first, held on 6 March, considered the Mobilization Acquisition Plan, the update to the Remedial Action Program, and FORSCOM and TRADOC Remedial Action Program management. On 25 March the Vice Chief of Staff chaired a general officer mobilization review which all those in charge of major commands attended. The meeting's agenda included the Mobilization Aquisition Plan, MOBEX 83, and mobilization issues facing FORSCOM, TRADOC, and DARCOM. If program deficiencies uncovered at the meetings are not resolved satisfactorily, both reviews will be conducted again in fiscal year 1983.

Full implementation of the Army Mobilization and Operation Planning System (AMOPS) moved forward during the past year with the publication of AMOPS Volume II, "Strategic Employment of Army Forces," and Volume IV, "Army Crisis Action System." Volumes I and III had been published in 1981.

Following publication of a critical Inspector General report in January 1982, the Army staff acted to develop a more timely process for producing mobilization training requirements. The ODCSOPS Training Directorate assisted ODCSPER in revising an automated system to give it the capacity to produce mobilization training requirements. This joint effort neared completion by the end of the fiscal year. The Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) was significantly refined to reflect course capacities more accurately and to determine requirements for functional or non-MOS courses. A special ODCSOPS task force met during the year to prepare a blueprint for mobilization training in a constrained environment. The task force, called WARTRAIN, examined manpower, facilities, stationing, base support, manning, structure, and equipment requirements for providing trained manpower during a full mobilization. The task force determined that equipment remained the pacing item for any emergency expansion of the training base, that a continuous review of equipment availability was necessary to project the effects on training base capacities, and that there was a need to review and improve mobilization plans and to focus on a comprehensive training strategy.

Implementation of the retiree preassignment and recall program gained momentum during fiscal year 1982. The Army began issuing recall preassignment orders in November 1981, and by the end of fiscal year 1982, more than 97,000 retirees had

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received "hip pocket" mobilization preassignment orders to Army installations within the continental United States. Another 2,100 retirees residing in Europe also received orders. Most were involuntarily assigned Regular Army retirees under the age of sixty; but some 1,300 were volunteers, both above and below age sixty and both regular and reserve retirees. Reserve retirees can be contingently preassigned, but can be recalled only after a declaration of war or national emergency by Congress, and only after the Secretary of Defense has concurred with the Secretary of the Army's determination that no other reservists are available.

During the past year the Army identified approximately 48,000 reserve retirees for preassignment. These assets will be matched against remaining retiree requirements and, where appropriate, contingent preassignment orders will be issued in fiscal year 1983. The Army also expanded the retiree recall program to include preassignment to nondeploying MTOE units.

On 1 October 1981, the Mobilization Designation (MOBDES) Program was redesignated the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program. All participants became members of the Selected Reserve and subject to active duty service under the President's authority to call up 100,000 selected reservists for a period of one year. In November the program was expanded to include assignment to active Army MTOE units. This action significantly enlarged the scope, size, and impact of the Army's premobilization assignment effort and, for the first time, allowed large numbers of junior enlisted personnel to be included in the program. By the close of the fiscal year, approximately 7,800 selected reservists were preassigned to positions they would fill upon mobilization under the IMA Program.

Mobilization of civilians to meet wartime production and support requirements received unprecedented emphasis during fiscal year 1982. The Civilian Personnel Center's San Francisco field office conducted a thorough study of civilian mobilization planning within the continental United States during the period January-May 1982 to determine how well major Army civilian personnel offices were carrying out assigned responsibilities in this area. The study report recommended numerous actions to improve mobilization readiness. One of the most significant was a complete revision of the Army's regulation on civilian mobilization planning, which was completed by the close of the fiscal year.

Other actions taken during fiscal year 1982 to improve mobilization planning and management included discerning civilian employees who are reservists or retired military members in

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preparation for automating this data early in fiscal year 1982; identifying civilian positions and employee assignments according to their status during mobilization; and determining retired military members who serve in key positions and submitting requests for their exemption from recall to active duty during a mobilization. In addition, civilian personnel offices servicing more than one command were directed to establish priorities for assigning available persons among serviced activities having common requirements during mobilization. Overseas commands were to determine the CONUS assignments of civilian employees who would be evacuated in the event of mobilization or hostilities.

The Army took several actions during fiscal year 1982 in the area of industrial preparedness to promote the development and maintenance of an industrial base able to support military operations during peacetime and mobilization.

Army Regulation 700-90, "Army Industrial Preparedness Program," published in March 1982, consolidated the Army's policy and procedures for industrial preparedness into a single document. Three new Department of Defense regulations -4005.1, "Industrial Resources"; 4005.2, "Industrial Preparedness Planning"; and 4005.3, "Industrial Preparedness Planning Manual"- also provided guidance in this area. They were the product of the joint task force formed to carry out the Department of Defense Action Plan for improving industrial preparedness, noted in last year's report.

In another joint effort, the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering sponsored a triservice committee which drafted a DOD instruction supporting an expanded Army Industrial Productivity Improvement program and an Air Force Technology Modernization program. In addition, the instruction would encourage industry through contract incentives to increase substantially capital. investments in productivity-enhancing technology, processes, and modern plants and equipment for defense work. Special emphasis would be given to increasing the productivity of subcontractors and vendors. By the close of the fiscal year the proposed program had been informally coordinated with the military services, with the Defense Logistics Agency, and with industry and had been well received. Formal coordination and implementation should be underway early in fiscal year 1983.

ODCSRDA (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition) specialists conducted numerous field trips across the country in support of the Army's assessments of the industrial base. Prime contractors and subcontrac-

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tors were visited to determine how well their plants could respond to multiple demands from the three military services. Extensive interdependence among weapon systems and the supporting subcontract structure was discerned. For example, Hughes Aircraft Corporation, the prime contractor for the AH-64 helicopter, was a subcontractor for the TOW 2 missile. In many cases, a single contractor supplied the military services with similar products for use in different weapon systems.

During the spring of fiscal year 1982 the Army assisted the Department of Commerce in a study to evaluate the nation's need for foundry capacity during peacetime and during mobilization. The Department of Commerce was especially interested in assessing the impact of military procurement on the economy of the country in peace and war. The Army reported that it experienced no difficulties in meeting casting requirements, even large or unusual ones. The Department of Commerce study was expected to help the foundry industry project future business and capital improvements.

The Army's training goal is to develop and sustain a competent, combat-ready Total Army prepared to mobilize, deploy, fight, and defeat any enemies of the United States in support of worldwide national commitments. To this end, the Army must be ready to undertake and support wartime missions on short notice, regardless of type unit, component, or branch. Forces must then be sustained through well-planned, -supported, and -executed mobilization procedures. Despite a changing world environment and threat, the Army's training mission will not change significantly over time. It will continue to train and develop soldiers, teams, crews, units, and forces individually and collectively to become combat-ready combined arms forces.

Well-trained units capable of carrying out their wartime missions are developed by skilled commanders and leaders who know how to plan, manage, and conduct mission-oriented training. Approved strategy gives commanders a long-term focus for Total Army training. It creates an integrated, war-fighting, mission-oriented theme to prepare active Army and reserve component forces and establishes the training base for peace and war. Strategy provides the framework to deal with the changes associated with force modernization, doctrine, tactics, threat, organization, demography, and technology and to realize full potential, capitalize on increased capabilities, and exploit oppor-

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tunities. The training principles of decentralization, modernization, standardization, and sustainment provide the structure for follow-up plans of action, such as Army Training 1990, to support the Army readiness goal: generating and sustaining a modern, combat-ready, well-led, and supported total force that can fight and win.

Better management of training resources continued to be emphasized during fiscal year 1982. A major element of this effort was the Army-wide Standardization Program, which had the objective of standardizing procedures used by soldiers to operate and maintain major systems, thereby saving time spent teaching local modifications of basic tasks and reducing retraining requirements for soldiers joining a new unit. Phase I of the program, which has already been implemented, was oriented toward combat arms units and involved drills that relate to soldier-crew functioning on weapons or equipment, for example, gunnery-crew drills, biological and chemical procedures, and combat vehicle preoperational checks. Phase II of the program, which began in 1981, was an ongoing effort by schools, centers, and major commands to identify possible procedures for standardization. Training and Doctrine Command had overall responsibility for the program, while schools and centers and designated chiefs from the Department of the Army standardization branches were responsible for all aspects of the program which pertained to their specialties. An Inspector General investigation of the program carried out during fiscal year 1982 uncovered several problems that required attention, which will lead to some redirection in the coming fiscal year. The inspection report also found that commanders supported the spirit of standardization and that numerous initiatives were under way.

Improved management of training resources was also the objective of the Standards In Training Commission, which was formed to determine the amount of ammunition needed to train and sustain crews and individuals at a prescribed readiness level. The commission developed standard training strategies for thirty-eight weapons systems, which will be implemented in the field in fiscal year 1984, and identified training ammunition requirements, which will be used by program and decision makers in preparing and justifying the fiscal year 1984 budget request. Efforts were begun to expand the scope of the commission's work to cover management of time, fuel, spare parts, and training land and ranges.

Training devices and simulations had become increasingly important in recent years in getting the most out of training

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resources. During the past year a regulation on training device policy and management was staffed, and publication is expected in fiscal year 1983. In June 1982 the Training Directorate of ODCSOPS sponsored and the Army Training Support Center hosted the Army's first Worldwide Training Devices Conference with the objective of laying out training device strategy-how devices are developed, acquired, supported, and used. Presentations included the work and methodology of the Standards in Training Commission, a white paper on streamlining acquisition of institution-type simulators, and lessons learned from fielding battle simulation devices. During June and July of 1982 the Defense Science Board conducted a summer study on training and related technology. Out of it came a recommendation to consolidate and increase funding for research in these areas.

The Director of Training, ODCSOPS, chartered the Training Aids Work Group to develop alternatives and recommend improvements in providing and supporting efficient and effective training for the active Army and the reserve components. Participating in the work group would be the Training Support Division, Directorate of Training, ODCSOPS; ANG; Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR); TRADOC; DARCOM; FORSCOM; USAREUR; and USAHSC. The Training Aids Work Group would focus its work on policy, management, organization, and procedures for devices and simulators, literature and graphic aids, and audiovisual products and user-operated audiovisual equipment. A report of issues, findings, and recommendations will be provided to the Director of Training in February 1983.

Field validation testing of the Training Management Control System (TMACS)-an automated aid to help the unit commander at the battalion, brigade, or division level to plan training, evaluate the benefits and resource impact of training plans, and record training accomplished and resources expended-was successfully completed at Fort Carson, Colorado, in February 1982, and equipment distribution to the field began. During the period April-May 1982, FORSCOM held courses for unit trainers in the use of the system at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The trainers then accepted TMACS equipment into their units and instructed their own people in its use. By the close of the reporting period, 215 TMACS sets had been delivered to the field, and the Army was studying interfaces between TMACS and other systems to further relieve the training management burden borne by unit commanders.

The opening class of the First Sergeant Course got under way at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy on 5 October

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1981. The purpose of the course was to prepare senior noncommissioned officers for the position of first sergeant in a company, battery, troop, or similar-sized unit. The curriculum included physical training, field operations, training management, unit administration, personnel actions, logistics, unit security, discipline, soldier problems, and communication skills. Five eight week classes offered in fiscal year 1982 had a capacity of 312 students. Six classes capable of handling 384 students will be offered in fiscal year 1983. USAREUR also planned to offer a first sergeant course in 1983 for some 300 students.

During fiscal year 1982, 2,223 active Army and many reserve intelligence specialists participated in the Tactical Intelligence Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program. Training was focused on in-unit activities and intelligence production. For the first time participants included intelligence specialists assigned to special forces and psychological operations units as well as personnel from the intelligence staffs of tactical battalions. TROJAN, an associated program, will bring live intercepted signals to signal intelligence specialists at two FORSCOM installations in fiscal year 1983 and to USAREUR's 1st Armored Division.

The Skill Qualification Test (SQT) program continued to come under fire during fiscal year 1982. At the Army Commander's Conference held in October 1981 there was general agreement that steps should be taken to streamline the program, make it more flexible, and minimize the "surge" aspect of individual training and evaluation. TRADOC received the task of adapting the program to meet these objections. Staffing of TRADOC's proposals to modify the SQT was influenced by a draft audit of the program prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO), which was released in January 1982. The audit was highly critical of the program, as was the final GAO report dated 30 March 1982.

On 22 April 1982 the Chief of Staff approved changes to streamline the SQT program. A core or common-task test would be given to all soldiers up to the grade of E-4. Rules for administration and the application of results for personnel management would be flexible and based upon the local commander's judgment. Hands-on tests of military occupational specialty (MOS) tasks would be designed by the unit commander; the results of the evaluations would not be used directly for consideration of promotion, but would be used by supervisors in preparing the soldier's overall performance rating. Also, performance-based, written tests of generic MOs skills would be given annually to most soldiers in skill levels 1-4. These test scores would be used

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as objective indicators for promotions and other personnel management decisions. To improve equity and test validity, as well as simplify administration, test notices would only list possible tasks to be tested.

These changes closely paralleled recommendations contained in the GAO's audit report in March. But while the Army supported the thrust of the GAO's recommendations, it did not agree with the agency's assertion that the SQT was ineffective. The Army continued to maintain that the SQT was "a principal tool in the simulation and evaluation of individual skill training and proficiency," that the program "has been an effective indicator for promotion and other personnel management decisions," and that, except for a small number of tests which have been discarded, "SQTs are as valid or more valid than any comparable test instrument used to assess individual task proficiency."

Meanwhile, following a GAO briefing on the SQT audit, Congress reduced spending for the program in fiscal year 1982 from $18 million to $9 million in December 1981. After the Army briefed Congress in June 1982 on the reforms made in the program, Congress restored $4 million for the development of SQTs in fiscal year 1983.

Eight brigade task force training rotations were completed during the first year of operations at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. Amex Corporation finished installing an extensive instrumentation system at the center to monitor and evaluate unit performance during live-fire exercises and force-on-force maneuvers. TRADOC and the Combined Arms Center will analyze unit performance data to determine "lessons learned" with regard to training doctrine and tactics.

During fiscal year 1982, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) training for NATO and CONUS-based forces continued to be limited by a lack of training facilities. However, the increased emphasis on MOUT doctrine and training during the previous year's programming efforts yielded the Army's first new MOUT training facility at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This facility was completed in July 1982 and will serve as a prototype for future construction in FORSCOM, USAREUR, and WESTCOM. TRADOC's Directorate for Army Ammunition, Ranges, and Targets (DAART) has also developed a prototype MOUT facility and a combat assault course for individual skills. FORSCOM is expected to program some of these facilities for fiscal year 1985 and 1986, depending on the availability of military construction funds.

Army forces participated in ten exercises directed by the JCS and thirty-two exercises coordinated by the ICS in fiscal year

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1982 at a cost of $67 million. These included two command post exercises sponsored by the JCS; two major field training exercises, TEAM SPIRIT 82 in Korea and BRIGHT STAR 82 in Egypt; and BOLD EAGLE, a large-scale USCINCRED field training exercise carried out in the continental United States. Joint exercises provided the opportunity, often not obtainable in any other training situation, to accomplish specific objectives in the areas of mobility, command and control, and communications.

REFORGER 82, conducted in September 1982, was the largest JCS exercise of the year and the fourteenth in the annual series of exercises begun in 1968. It involved the deployment of over 18,000 Army soldiers and their equipment from the continental United States to Europe in 212 C-141 and C-5A aircraft and in 3 roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) ships, which moved over 1,500 wheeled and tracked vehicles to Europe. Army CONUS units included most of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3d Brigade (-) of the 82d Airborne Division, the III Corps battle staff, and an engineer battalion of the USAR.

Over 58,000 USAREUR soldiers participated with the CONUS deploying forces in Europe. CENTAG's CARBINE FORTRESS was a field training exercise conducted in the central and eastern parts of the Federal Republic of Germany involving over 72,000 NATO personnel.

Major innovations in REFORGER 82 included a substantial effort to adhere to and evaluate war plans; a no-notice exercise, GOLDEN THUNDER, which rapidly deployed an Army battalion from CONUS to Europe; deployment of a USAR engineer battalion to Europe; deployment from CONUS of two airborne battalions, which parachuted into Germany; and tactical crossings of the Rhine and Main rivers.

Army Study Program

The Army Study Program is designed to provide the means, through formal analytic effort, for the Army to examine critical problems and improve the quality and usefulness of analyses in support of planning, programming, and budgeting decisions. Studies are defined as a broad class of intellectual activity characterized by the application of the tools of operational and systems analysis.

Approximately 360 studies were worked on during fiscal year 1982, about 54 percent of which were continuations of efforts begun earlier. The studies covered a wide range of topics, from

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innovative concepts to applications of new technology. About two-thirds of the studies were conducted solely by Army military and civilian members of study organizations; about half of the balance that were conducted under contract also had participation by Army study personnel.

Studies related to operations and force structure required over 55 percent of the in-house analytical staff time and accounted for about 24 percent of the contract funds. Studies dealing with science, technology, systems, and equipment accounted for about 17 percent of the in-house staff and about 34 percent of the contract funds. The balance of contract effort (42 percent) was distributed over personnel, logistics, management, intelligence, and planning studies. Total contract expenditures were about $15 million; in-house staff time represents about $117 million. Thus the total study program in fiscal year 1982 was somewhat more than $130 million.

A major new development in support of the Army Study Program was the establishment of an Army studies and analysis element at the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The element, which began conducting Army studies late in the fiscal year, will meet the need for forward-looking policy and technical studies to support Army planning and programming for future change.

During the past year the Chief of Staff changed the methodology used to choose the subjects addressed by Army studies. Priority problem area analysis, the previous technique, consisted of ten general areas-including force design, manpower, modernization, and training-used to guide studies toward problems of critical importance to the Army. While logically appealing, the procedure suffered from three basic problems: the priority areas were very broad; in the field, the problems changed by the time the elaborate analytical process identified them; and the process was not universally understood. The Office of the Chief of Staff found no convincing evidence that the effort expended produced a commensurate improvement in studies management. After some experimentation with substituting major mission statements for priority area analysis, the Office of the Chief of Staff issued a statement on 7 December 1981 of Total Army goals and performance management initiatives, which directed that each staff agency assign one point of contact for Army studies.

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