Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1984


Force Development

After a post Vietnam period of intense analysis, discussion, and debate, the Army changed the operations doctrine as expressed in FM 100-5. Among the reasons for the Army's shift in operational emphasis were the rapid technological changes in weapon firepower and mobility as well as a growing disparity between the strength of allied and Soviet bloc conventional forces. The original doctrinal revisions, first published in 1976, were revised again in 1982. Because the 1976 version was a radical change from previous operations doctrine, it remained the subject of intense debate within and outside the Army. In fact, the 1982 revision represented a departure from the 1976 version in several major aspects. However, all doctrine is dynamic and the 1982 version is not yet final as current discussion and debate prove. FM 100-5 is the capstone Army manual and directly or indirectly affects every aspect of Army force structure and operations.

The doctrine stated that the Army might face two different combat environments in the future. The first was a "sophisticated battlefield with an existing infrastructure of communications, air defense, logistics facilities, and ports," such as found in a European type of theater of operations. The other would be an arena where the Army would either have "to create an infrastructure or . . . fight without one," for example in Southwest Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. The opponents could range from well-armed insurgents or terrorists to mechanized and armored units with the most advanced weaponry. Army doctrine also warned that future conflict would likely be intense, expensive, and very lethal; the use of nuclear and chemical weapons was not ruled out.

FM 100-5 postulated that the Army faced four challenges:

1. A battlefield of non-linear maneuver will replace the traditional battlefield of clearly demarcated front lines. This means that the Army must conduct deep strikes against the enemy while it is engaged simultaneously in rear area combat. The Army must conduct command and control countermeasures, operate on low levels of logistical support, survive


against highly lethal weapons systems, perhaps fight outnumbered, and perhaps under the threat of use of nuclear or chemical weapons. These new demands of the modern battlefield clearly required a reexamination of Army doctrine.
2. The new demands of combat impose higher standards on leaders. Leadership and unit cohesion will play vital roles in motivating troops to fight resolutely even though they may find themselves temporarily encircled or outnumbered. The highly fluid battlefield requires commanders at all levels to display "skill, imagination, and flexibility" to the fullest extent possible.
3. Personnel and unit readiness is a necessity since future conflicts will offer little time for leisurely deployment. Such readiness, however, is of little value "without logistical readiness-the availability and proper functioning of materiel, resources, and systems to maintain and sustain operations on a fluid, destructive, and resource-hungry battlefield."
4. Therefore, the fourth challenge, training, ties all of the above factors together. For if the officers and men are not professionally and mentally prepared for battle, then the battle is lost. However, training is envisioned as more than individual preparation. It includes the training of units both individually and in combined arms exercises.

Army doctrine defined maneuver and firepower as "inseparable and complementary elements of combat." Although one element may be emphasized more than the other, depending on the combat solution, "the coordinated use of both characterizes all operations." Today, fire support units must be as maneuverable as the combat units they support.

Since the Army doctrine was the blueprint for future combat operations, four major areas of Army planning were directly interrelated: force development, sustainment, mobilization, and training. All are intrinsically related although treated separately in this chapter.

Force Development

Army planners and programmers used the five-volume Force Modernization Master Plan (FMMP, DA Pam 5-26) as a roadmap for the modernization of systems and operations during the 1980s and 1990s. This will guide Army staffers in improving and easing the transition of Army forces into the Army of Excellence configuration. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans pub-


lished the latest FMMP on 1 August 1984, which included the planned transition of units for the coming decades.

After determining the ideal size of the Division 86 force structure, Army planners discovered that although each component's raison d'etre was sound, resources were inadequate to support the proposed force structure. A change in Army leadership also brought a new appreciation of the potential of light forces and an accompanying call for more light infantry divisions. Nevertheless, the Army could organize no new divisions, either heavy or light, if the existing Division 86 structure lacked resources. Therefore, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), tasked the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to study the problem and design a new combat-effective, responsive, and balanced total force within the guidelines of current Army resources. TRADOC, however, received several limitations for the study from HQDA. These included keeping the force structure within programmed Army end strength of 780,800 personnel; determining whether the Army could be manned at Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 2; designing a light division structure capable of fighting a low intensity conflict; reducing the resources of heavy divisions; and moving division assets to corps level. Several issues discussed at the Army Commander's Conference in August 1983 were also included as restrictions: to simplify units' missions, to increase deployment ability, and to enhance some units' ALO structure. The resulting TRADOC study, "Army of Excellence (AOE)," proposed a force structure that met HQDA's guidance, which was gradually being implemented. The Army's 17th and 18th Infantry Divisions will be activated in 1985 with two active light infantry brigades and one reserve component light infantry brigade. Following that, the 7th Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division will be reconfigured as new light infantry divisions. Furthermore, the Army will reactivate the 29th Infantry Division, an Army National Guard unit, in the same light structure. The Army reduced simultaneously the assets of the heavy division to ten maneuver battalions. All units considered better employed elsewhere were assigned to Echelons Above Division (EAD). Work also progressed on providing the light infantry division with additional corps augmentation and support units.

Certain analysts considered the Army of Excellence to be inappropriate for an Army in the middle of a massive modernization program. They questioned the rationale for the new light infantry division as well as the change in Division 86 configuration and movement of assets to EAD level on a reduced scale. Although many planners considered


these moves doctrinally acceptable, critics wondered if the changes, in effect, traded combat effectiveness for an expanded structure.

The reorganization of the 82d Airborne and 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Divisions emphasized their combat capability and streamlined their structures. The new light infantry division design proposed under the AOE study was modified to meet the divisions' special requirements. The changes in force structure also had to incorporate the improved modern equipment being introduced to the force to support the AirLand Battle doctrine. Other improvements included better strategic and local mobility, additional communications equipment, additional antitank firepower, and a lower leader-to-led ratio. As with the heavy divisions, the Army assigned corps-level units to support the divisions. These support units included a parachute rigging unit, a light armored battalion, and several truck companies. Upon conversion to the new force structure each streamlined division will have 20 percent fewer troops. The 101st will convert during FY 86 and the 82d the following year.

TRADOC also studied the Echelons Above Corps (EAC) structure and doctrine as did the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. One of the products was FC 100-16-1 Theater Army, Army Group, and Field Army Operations, a circular which, with FM 100-16, discussed combat support and combat service support operations and doctrine at the EAC level. The relevant parts of both manuals were being combined into a revised FM 100-16 at the end of FY 84. The Combined Arms Center reviewed EAC force structure with respect to recent changes in Army doctrine as expressed in the AOE study. The center's analysts expected this study to continue through 1985 and planned to match the EAC force structure to the current doctrine.

The 9th Infantry Division High Technology Test Bed at Fort Lewis, Washington, was redesignated the Army Development and Employment Agency (ADEA) and kept the same mission of quickly identifying, testing, and recommending to the Department of the Army operational concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel requirements, technology, and training developments, which improve the light infantry division's combat power, development capability, mobilization ability, and sustainment. The 9th Infantry Division will remain as the High Technology Light Division. This term itself was changed to High Technology Motorized Division to differentiate it from the new design light infantry division and to focus on the different equipment and operational doctrine of a motorized division.

The motorized division was organized to fulfill requirements not met by heavy, airborne, air assault, or light divisions. Thus, the mo-


torized division has the strategic mobility of an air assault division and the ground antiarmor capability of a heavy division. Although organized to engage in mid- to high-intensity conflicts with Soviet type opposition, the 9th Infantry Division also remained available for deployment worldwide, not only to areas where its superior ground tactical mobility was best employed. The Army might assign the 9th to a corps or joint task force where it would fight in conjunction with other types of divisions. The 9th's force structure configuration was designed to expand lodgments made by other units.

The structure of the 9th Infantry Division, however, centered around several essential weapon systems, such as the fast attack vehicle (FAV) and armored gun system (AGS). Currently, these items remain below authorized levels. Nonetheless, the division was combat ready in its existing force structure configuration for immediate deployment. It will operate under this new design in FY 87 and will be converted completely to a motorized division in FY 92 with full operational capability soon thereafter.

Besides its role as a motorized division in the Army's force structure, the 9th Infantry Division will retain its test bed role to examine and to test new concepts and technological advances for the Army. The results should indicate which ideas and technologies will be of use to other Army units. Another of the Army's goals with the motorized infantry division was to reduce division personnel to roughly 13,400 by FY90, keeping within DOD manpower guidelines.

The Army continued to increase the role of National Guard and Army Reserve components in the Total Army concept. The Army provided these forces additional units, appropriations, modern equipment, and more responsible missions. Furthermore, Army staffers monitored closely the reserve components to create a well-balanced and equipped force. This resulting mixture was not a permanent figure or fixed percentage but fluctuated with the Army's perception of its doctrine, missions, and costs. Thus, DOD planners expected that the Selected Reserve strength will be higher than that of the Active Army by 1988. However, for such forces to be valuable they must be properly equipped. Consequently, the Army expended tight budget dollars to provide new equipment for the reserve units. The Army also added one new National Guard division (35th Infantry Division) in FY 84 and expected to add another in FY 85. These were the first additional National Guard divisions in forty years. The Army will augment the Army Reserve with 165 new units over the next five years. The Army also retained the current reserve component percentages of Total Army strength in combat support and combat service support (approximately 67 percent), division


combat increments (roughly 40 percent), and maneuver battalions (50 percent). Unit equipment upgrading was on schedule-those deploying first were modernized first.

AirLand Battle doctrine, as the name implies, involves air assets. Thus the Army and Air Force having agreed already in 1983 that FM 100-5 would be used for joint tactical training and field exercises, expanded the manual's role in joint planning of future force development and operational concepts. Both air and ground arms agreed that it was important to use combined air and ground power in a complementary manner to support the theater commander's objectives.

On 22 May 1984, Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr., and Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles A. Gabriel signed a Memorandum of Agreement identifying thirty-one initiatives for development by the Army and Air Force. Titled the "U.S. Army-U.S. Air Force Joint Force Development Process (JFDP)," it was commonly referred to as "The 31 Initiatives." (See Appendix A.) In this agreement, the chiefs perceived the thirty-one initiatives as the initial step in a long-term, dynamic process to institutionalize jointness.

These thirty-one initiatives had a far-reaching impact by consolidating and eliminating programs as well as clarifying roles and missions. The initiatives deleted several programs, such as the Air Force Comfy Challenge electronic combat system. The Army Mohawk Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System was incorporated into the Air Force C-18 system. A study was mandated of potential modifications of traditional roles and missions, including the Army's assuming rotary wing lift support for special operations forces and the Air Force's undertaking responsibility for area surface-to-air missile defense. The initiatives required greater joint war-fighting concepts and capabilities. These included an assessment of how to counter jointly the heliborne assault threat and tactical missile systems as well as how to improve identification-friend-or-foe systems. Moreover, the initiatives looked at long-term requirements and concepts coordination in new aircraft starts, tactical reconnaissance systems, and intratheater airlift. The thirty-first initiative, the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) priority list, was the most crucial, since it attempted to make the JFDP permanent by formalizing cross-service participation in the POM development process. All of the initiatives required the service staffs and unified, specified, and major commands to coordinate in new areas that, ultimately, would provide the necessary catalyst to institutionalize jointness.

To infuse jointness throughout the two services, Generals Wickham and Gabriel directed the Army DCSOPS and the Air


Force DCSOPS to implement the agreement. As a result, they disbanded the original study group and in June 1984, created a permanent office, the joint Assessment and Initiatives Office, to assume the study group's responsibilities and tasked the service proponents to participate.

While FM 100-5 was being reviewed as current doctrine, TRADOC was working on its successor, Army 21, which forecast the years 2000-2015 and the AirLand Battle concept in the twenty-first century. TRADOC examined future concepts to prepare, through doctrinal development, forces design, and resource planning, for the future Army and its combat role. Army 21, an evolutionary concept, will cover areas not previously emphasized. The Army fully expects that technological advances will alter the shape of Army 21.

The Army force structure established light divisions to counter low-intensity threats to United States interests. These divisions were to be highly mobile strategically and were to have more than one-third of personnel in combat arms specialties. Army planners envisioned using light divisions to secure airheads for follow-on heavier units as well as for operations in restricted terrain during high-intensity conflicts.

The present commitment was to convert or to activate five light infantry divisions by FY 89; the timetable was:

1. 7th-Fort Ord. Complete conversion in FY 85.
2. 25th-Hawaii. Begin and complete conversion in FY 86.
3. 10th Mountain Division-Fort Drum. Activate over period of FY 85-89 with part of one brigade and its support temporarily at Fort Benning.
4. 6th-Alaska. Activate from FY 86-87.
5. 29th-ARNG, Maryland and Virginia. Activate from FY 86-87.

The 10th Mountain Division represented the only new activation. The Army will create other light divisions from existing units, except for the 6th, which will incorporate the 172d Infantry Brigade.

Since 1981 and the continuing spiral of terrorism, the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the United States have received increased attention and support from the President and Congress. As a demonstration of increased legislative interest, the Readiness Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee established a new panel to oversee improvements in Special Operations Forces. Furthermore, the Army implemented the 1984 SOF Master Plan during the year. The plan reviewed force structure requirements and assets, then recommended ways to correct deficiencies during the years 1986-1990.


The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force agreed that all SOF rotary wing support would be provided from Army assets. An Army Air Force Working Group was laying the groundwork for the transfer of Air Force rotary wing assets to the Army at the end of FY84. However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense had not given final approval to implement the decision and the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee opposed this decision based upon testimony and information provided to the special SOF panel.

A fourth active component special forces group was activated in September 1984. Other activations included a Ranger regimental headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger, on 1 July 1984 and the 3d Ranger Battalion on 1 October 1984) . Furthermore, the Army planned to activate Special Operations Communications Support Elements (SOCSE) in FY 86 and to increase their strength in FY 88. These SOCSE's provided additional resources to establish, maintain, and operate Command, Control, and Communications (C 3) systems among theater, special operations, Army SOF subordinate, and other commands as needed. The SOCSEs will operate C 3 missions simultaneously in two theaters.

An austere Special Operations Support Element (SOSE) was under development to provide support to SOF units for short, low visibility operations. The SOSE included support unavailable elsewhere within the theater. It will be able to support two theaters simultaneously. An FY 86 activation is planned.

TRADOC analyzed a combat service support concept for the 1st Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to determine whether support services should be provided by units integral to 1st SOCOM or by augmentation with selected active and/or reserve units. TRADOC also reviewed a combat arms reorganization plan that would allow the Army to satisfy all unified and specified commands' requirements without increasing space requirements. Moreover, a reorganization of the 4th Psychological Operations Group was investigated.

As a part of the Army's planned expansion to a 28-division force structure, it activated the 35th (Santa Fe) Infantry Division (Mechanized) in 1984. Identified by the National Guard Bureau in 1983 as the ninth National Guard division, the 35th Infantry Division (Mechanized) comprised the 67th Infantry Brigade of Nebraska, the 69th Infantry Brigade of Kansas, and the 149th Armored Brigade of Kentucky. Prior to their consolidation into the 35th Infantry Division these units existed as separate brigades. Other units from Colorado, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska, both in existence and newly organized, will fill out the 35th Division's remaining organization. At the end of FY 84, the division's tenth maneuver battalion and


air defense battalions were unidentified. The division headquarters is located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the National Guard plans to have the division completely organized by FY 89.

One of the major components of the AirLand Battle doctrine was the ability to deploy rapidly personnel and materiel for both strategic and tactical purposes. The glaring absence of such capability, both in sealift and airlift, became a major issue during congressional hearings and interservice studies. As one commentator noted, no matter how excellent the quality and quantity of the people and equipment, if they cannot be moved to where they are needed, they are worth nothing. The Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study (CMMS) of 1981 established a 66 million-ton-miles-per-day (MTM/D) goal for strategic airlift and 100,000 short-tons-per-day goal for sealift to meet projected 1986 defense requirements for four scenarios. The goals represented the minimum capabilities based upon probable available fiscal assets and, in fact, did not meet the operational lift needs for any of the projected scenarios. Furthermore, less developed areas of the world, particularly Southwest Asia, remained unsuitable for air lift. These potential trouble spots, as well as other likely flash points for the outbreak of low intensity conflict, necessitated dependence upon an augmented sealift capability.

Under the congressional requirement, the Military Airlift Command was to have the capability to move 60 tactical fighter squadrons, 1 Marine amphibious brigade, and 6 Army divisions to the Middle East within ten days. To accomplish this ambitious goal, the Air Force planned to add 50 C-5Bs, 44 KC-10s and 3 of the new C-19s to its fleet. These aircraft and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) modification program will ease the airlift problem, but a projected 17.5 MTM/D shortfall still existed for FY 89. This, in turn, meant that insufficient airlift was available to move three Army divisions to the Middle East within the ten-day limit established by the CMMS.

General Mahaffey, then Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee's Subcommittee on Sea-power and Force Projection in March 1984. He stated that "Airlift is the cornerstone of force projection during the early days of deployment." (Armed Forces Journal [AFJ], July 1984) Another complicating factor was the Army's plan to increase the amount of outsized equipment that only new C-5Bs could carry. A possible solution lay in the C-17, which had the capability to carry outsized equipment and use forward area airfields. Even with congressional funding, the G-17 would not be available for seven years. The CRAF program, in which civilian airlines provided planes to supplement military airlift capability, also faced problems from eco-


nomic dislocation in the commercial airline industry. In fact, projected cargo capacity will probably drop over the next several years.

These problems were concerned primarily with strategic airlift. At that time, no tactical airlift or sealift requirements were established. On 22 May, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force agreed to establish an office to determine tactical airlift requirements. The Senate Armed Services Committee told the Department of Defense (DOD) on 31 May to provide a report on tactical airlift requirements by March of the following year.

The Navy's Military Sealift Command also fell short of meeting sealift needs for both the Army and Marine Corps. Although the CMMS requirements ordinarily would have been met, an OSD-conducted study showed that, based upon a worst-case scenario in FY 88 (rather than FY 86), the Navy would have a 9 percent shortfall of lift. A later review of the study by the Maritime Administration showed that the shortfall would be in the 20-25 percent range because the American Merchant Marine's sealift capacity was falling, not remaining constant as planners had postulated. Furthermore, the Navy had a shortage of roll-on/roll-off ships, essential for rapid deployment of Army materiel as well as ships able to steam faster than eighteen knots. A shortage of break bulk ships also loomed on the horizon as more and more shippers converted to containerization.

The Navy pursued programs to increase its sealift capabilities. The Near-Term Pre-positioning Force consisted of thirteen ships (break bulk, lighter aboard ship, roll-on/roll-off [RO/RO], and tanker) stationed in the Indian Ocean to shorten the response time of Army forces by having the units' materiel already in the region, awaiting the arrival of troops. The Fast Logistics Ships program increased Army surge capability by converting T-AKR container ships to an RO/RO configuration. These boats traveled faster than eighteen knots and could deliver an Army heavy division to the Persian Gulf region in 14 to 16 days. At the end of FY 84, Military Sealift Command had contracts on 8 RO/RO ships (also known as SL-7s) or roughly 45 percent of all RO/RO flying U.S. flags. The Navy received four SL-7s during the fiscal year. Berthed on the East Coast, they will be able to put to sea within four days.

Composed of 288 ships, the National Defense Reserve Fleet contained the military's troopships and needed a minimum of 90-120 days to begin operations. Part of this fleet, the Ready Reserve force, was upgraded from 34 ships, available in FY 84, to 77 by 1988. Response time was established at 5 to 10 days, meeting the troops as they arrived at embarkation ports. The Navy requested $31 million for purchasing 19 vessels in FY 85.


Besides converting container ships to an RO/RO configuration, the Army and Navy worked together to adapt the converted vessels to carry outsized Army equipment that was too large for containerization. Two programs, flatrack and seashed, were used to modify these vessels. Flatracks were posts and decks that could be arranged either vertically or horizontally to make space for bulky items. Seasheds could change a single container cell into three contiguous cells with temporary decks for storing heavy lift equipment. All of the services looked at airlift and sealift mobility with renewed interest, and future plans and budgets included an increased emphasis on the ability to deploy the land force wherever it may be needed.

Maj. Gen. Bobby J. Maddox, first Chief of the Army Aviation Branch, stated in Army (March 1984) that "Army aviation will play a key role in any future AirLand Battle because of the unique maneuver capability and firepower it possesses and the added dimension its systems bring to the battlefield. Army aviation offers a significant potential for substituting technology for manpower to neutralize or defeat any adversary's tactical war-making machinery." The AirLand Battle concept outlined in FM 100-5 as operational doctrine reemphasized the Army's concerns for close air support. Almost all phases of the AirLand Battle doctrine demanded the participation of U.S. Army helicopter assets. The Army's aviation assets, however, were divided between several arms for support. Consequently, on 12 April 1983, the Secretary of the Army recognized aviation's role as a combat arm and approved formation of an Aviation Branch. The Army Chief of Staff concurred with the Secretary's decision, and on 6 June ordered studies conducted for the establishment of an Aviation Branch and its role and missions. The Aviation Branch spent FY 84 formulating doctrine and operational plans as well as identifying the assets, force structures, personnel, and training requirements for the new branch.

The Army expected its aviation resources to destroy enemy armor and mechanized infantry either directly with TOW missiles or indirectly with laser target identification. This action would delay enemy advances, which, in turn would allow allied forces to seize the initiative. The Army Attack Helicopter Battalion was the most maneuverable and deadly unit that a division commander could use. Additional Army aviation assets provided air assault capability, reconnaissance, communications, command, and control assets to commanders; supplied special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA); inserted and extracted SOF personnel; and evacuated the wounded.

The United States Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC), Fort Rucker, Alabama, worked on planning the force structure to con-


duct all these functions. Their complex task of fielding a new branch and separate combat arm was complicated by the concurrent change from Army 86 to an AOE force structure. Army aviation had a key role on any future battlefield and aviation doctrine within the capstone of FM 100-5. It influenced the Army's ability to conduct the operational requirements identified therein. New aviation weapon systems already fielded, in production, or in planning stages included the UH-60A Black Hawk, the AH-64 Apache, the Army helicopter improvement program (AHIP), the CH-47D Chinook, the light helicopter program (LHX), SEMA, and the heavy lift helicopter program. The Army made preliminary recommendations of aviation force structure and operational doctrine for all levels (division, corps, and echelons above corps [EAC]). Army aviation planners and analysts emphasized the combined arms concept that Army ground and air units employed in Vietnam. This integration of ground and air assets was vital to the accomplishments of AirLand Battle operational goals.

The role and missions of Army aviation will change significantly by the end of this century if the Army implements current plans and is able to maintain the present rate of progress. By 2000, the Army will reduce its rotary wing fleet from twenty-two types of helicopters to seven. A new generation of light helicopters designed for scout, attack, utility, and observation roles was under development, and the Army considered a new heavy lift helicopter. A tilt rotor aircraft may also be introduced to assume rotary-wing operations. The Army may adapt helicopters to carry air-to-air missiles, such as the Stinger, for a defensive air-to-air capability although some aviators sought them to use offensively against enemy aircraft. Special electronic mission aircraft (SEMA) will play a more important role in the next decade in target designation, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.

An Army study group worked on Army Airborne Intelligence 2000, a study on the use of SEMA. The Army focused attention on both manned and remotely piloted aircraft and linked these with requirements for intelligence gathering and electronic warfare to determine the best aerial platform for a particular mission. These will not be limited to Army platforms but will look at all applicable Air Force vehicles as well. The Army study will be combined with the Air Force's "Theater Intelligence Reconnaissance and Surveillance" study in FY 85 as the services cooperate to identify common aerial reconnaissance platforms for joint Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence (CEWI) activities.


The Army also planned to expand the aviation flying-hour program from 124,000 hours (18.4 hours/aircraft/month for 560 aircraft) to 134,233 hours (more than 19.5 hours/aircraft/month for 600 aircraft) in FY 85. Aviation training would increase from 15.6 hours to 16.8 hours/aviator/month. As the new Apache helicopter was fielded, the Army increased night training and planned for further increases in FY 85. General Robert W. Sennewald, Commanding General of Forces Command, U.S. Army (FORSCOM), announced that all AH-64 Apache attack helicopter training would be consolidated at Fort Hood, Texas, by mid-1985.


With a suitable and properly equipped force structure, and the capability to deliver these forces where required, a significant determinent of success is the ability to sustain the force-the ability to supply the force with the ammunition, spare parts, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), and water required to accomplish the mission. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, voiced concern over what he termed the services' "dangerously low sustainability posture." He blamed this deficiency on defense budget cutbacks following the Vietnam War; the lack of "glamor" of this type of materiel compared to new or modernized weapon systems; and the popular notion that American industry would be able to mobilize quickly for wartime production in a national emergency. (Defense 84, January) Others also identified the increasing technological complexity and cost of new weapon systems as factors that extended production time and contributed to the shortage of sustainment items. Each weapon system requires an adequate supply of spare parts, ammunition, POL, and other items necessary to make that system continue to function effectively on the battlefield. Like sealift and airlift, sustainment items do not have as high a priority as weapon systems, and both are overlooked and underfunded. Suddenly, the Army has weapons and a force structure, but no way to deliver them to a theater or to sustain them once they arrive.

Commanders of unified and specified commands placed "near-term improvement in materiel sustainability" as their most important priority. They saw that the current military forces lacked an adequate capability to sustain the force and probably would suffer from this condition for several more years, despite Army awareness and attention to the problem. Army planners recognized that a bal-


ance between weapon system production and modernization and the acquisition of sustainment items was needed.

Although the Department of Defense Guidance for Fiscal Years 1983-1987 listed sustainment as a high priority, progress in meeting near- and mid-term goals was slow. The reason was that sustainment money was programmed to the outyears of fiscal years 1986-1988 both in the 1983-1987 and 1984-1988 Guidance. Dr. Korb observed that these increases were removed from the budget as each outyear turned into a budget year. Army funding for fiscal years 1985-1989 did not meet the Department of Defense Guidance for sustainment by fiscal year 1988. Furthermore, proposed cumulative funding through FY 88 fell short of requirements by $2.5 billion. This remained a difficult problem. An examination of the Army's ammunition and tracked vehicles (tanks and armored personnel carriers) programs illustrates the problem. The ammunition program placed increased procurement funding in the outyears while the tracked vehicles program budgeted less procurement funding. However, as the outyears approached actual budget years, the program's share of funding reversed.

The Army used its funds for sustainment in the most economical manner and improved sustainment, though much remained to be accomplished.

The War Reserve program improved sustainment, strategic mobility, and support of contingency operations. War reserves assumed a particularly vital role in combat operations of the type described in FM 100-5. These intense and highly lethal scenarios will place a heavy burden on the intheater pre-positioned war reserve materiel stocks, which will be the only materiel immediately available for commanders to use to sustain their forces' fighting ability. War reserve stocks included all replacement items, ammunition (including missiles), equipment, and POL procured during peacetime and used to replace combat wear and losses until the Communications Zone can forward supplies from a mobilized CONUS industrial base.

The intheater pre-positioned war reserve materiel was located as near the planned area of use as possible in order to conserve the time needed to resupply units. During FY 84, the Army stored materiel in Hawaii, Panama, Alaska, Japan, Korea, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance countries. Pre-positioning these stocks overseas was vital since the Army's strategic lift capacity remained limited, and the planned mobilization of the national industrial base was expected to require time. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) planners considered pre-positioned stocks as adequate if they could sustain


the operations of all forward-deployed and reinforcing U.S. units until CONUS resupply was established on a normal basis. A safety factor, taking into account underestimation of consumption and/or delays in the establishment of resupply from the United States, was inherent in the stockage levels. The FY 84 levels of war reserve stocks were so low that the industrial resources would need an eight- to ten-month lead time to replace combat losses and use.

Some war reserve stocks were positioned within the United States to meet other Army requirements. These CONUS war stockpiles, for example, served as backup for certain materiel pre-positioned overseas and would be a source of equipment for a worldwide contingency force (such as the Army's Rapid Development Force units). In addition, the Army earmarked materiel for upgrading reserve units to a war footing.

Other war reserves were available for purposes other than sustainment. Pre-positioning of materiel configured to unit sets (POMCUS), and non-POMCUS for special contingencies, contained stocks for the initial supply of arriving units or materiel in excess of unit authorization for special contingencies in CONUS, the Pacific, and especially Europe.

Each year, members of the Army's major commands meet with ODCSLOG personnel to identify problems, discuss solutions, and plan for actions to resolve war reserve issues. The Army held four of these war reserve conferences during the year.

The War Reserve Automated Process (WRAP) was a standard automated system that determined wholesale and retail secondary item war reserve requirements and prepared the funding and programming reports required under the Army's current policies and guidance. The reports produced by WRAP serve as the official documentation justifying the secondary item war reserve budgets and programs. In FY 84, the Army developed, tested, and sent WRAP to all Headquarters, Army Materiel Command, major subordinate commands (MSCs). At the end of FY 84, it was operational at the wholesale level and will be deployed and operational at the retail level by the end of August 1985.

POMCUS stocks are war reserves stored in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany for the use of specified CONUS-based units, which will deploy to NATO shortly after mobilization. Since POMCUS are complete equipment authorizations for the deploying units, the units' personnel can be airlifted to Europe without their accompanying equipment. This conserves valuable space and allows the maximum number of personnel to be


airlifted, given current strategic airlift and sealift capability shortages compared-to the Army's requirements.

The Army kept POMCUS stocks in operating condition by storing them either inside specially constructed facilities or in the open, as appropriate. Specialists maintained the equipment under a cyclic set program in which all unit sets not stored in humidity-controlled buildings were inspected and repaired every two years with the remainder maintained on a four-year cycle. Significantly, REFORGER units used POMCUS stocks, and all equipment employed during REFORGER exercises was cleaned, inspected, repaired, and returned to storage after the completion of the exercise.

The Army continued filling POMCUS stocks during FY 84. Congress included funds in the FY 84 defense appropriations bill for Division Sets 5 and 6, to be located in Belgium and the Netherlands. The bill also required that the levels of active component stockage not fall below 70 percent and reserve component stockage below 50 percent. However, since the construction of facilities necessary to store these division sets remained unfinished, the Army shipped no equipment during FY 84.

ODCSLOG personnel responded to the twin concerns of the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army over the state of POMCUS readiness and the lack of an accurate gauge to measure the progress of stocking the POMCUS. ODCSLOG determined that the Vice Chief of Staff concerns were justified and proposed corrections, namely to articulate the total POMCUS requirement and use the POMCUS Authorization Document ( PAD) to identify which units the Army could add to POMCUS each fiscal year as additional storage facilities became available.

The Army maintained small elements from the 7th Support Command and the 54th Area Support Group in Rheinsberg, Germany, to implement POMCUS. Army planners also worked to obtain congressional approval to acquire permanent facilities for these two units and to improve community support at the remote sites in northwestern Germany where they were stationed.

Although the Army's operational doctrine matured and modernized equipment entered the force, the Class IX Management System to support these initiatives has remained unchanged since 1970. General Richard H. Thompson and Lt. Col. Robert P Stisitis pointed out in Army Logistician (Nov/Dec 84) that the current prescribed load lists (PLLs) and authorized stockage lists (ASLs) were outmoded, overstocked, and only partially supported combat readiness. ODCSLOG decided to make doctrinal and managerial changes to upgrade the system provided to combat, combat sup-


port, and combat service support units. Several initiatives in the modernization of the Class IX Management policy balanced the forward-positioned stocks with those stockpiles depending upon delivery through the transportation and distribution system and, thereby, improved the system's responsiveness to units and guaranteed that materiel readiness would be sustained during combat. In FY 84, the Army attempted to guarantee- 85 percent stockage of a unit's items. The new policy, under study, recommended stocking only those items essential to fulfill immediate requirements. (See Charts 1 and 2.)

(Heavy Division)

Stocks to meet the need for any part for any equipment.

Quantity-10,500 line items.
Weight-2,500,000 pounds.
Volume-124,000 cubic feet.

Source: Army Logistician.


(Heavy Division)

Focuses on readiness of key critical combat weapon systems.

Quantity-7,000 to 7,500 line items.
Weight-1,500,000 pounds.
Volume-76,000 cubic feet.

Source: Army Logistician.


A major part of the PLL/ASL problem was the expansion of the support list allowance card (SLAG) brought about by the influx of new equipment into the force. Spare parts for new equipment created an additional burden on the unit's time, space, personnel, and mobility because they coexisted with stockage of parts for older equipment. Furthermore, the technological sophistication of new weapon systems usually increased the number of spare parts a unit must maintain to keep "down-time" to a minimum.

ODCSLOG planners worked to reduce stockage list allowances of new equipment and to develop a system to identify and remove


from the PLL and ASL parts for equipment no longer used. In the future, the PLL/ASL will stock, as nondemand-supported provisioning items, only high-mortality parts essential for the equipment in operation and parts necessary to satisfy safety and legal requirements. The implementation of the new criteria could reduce requirements for parts by 90 percent. These interim criteria will be replaced by a standard Total Army mandatory parts list (MPL) based upon an empirical validation. Other items essential to the combat readiness of equipment, but not included under these criteria, will be stored at corps or installation level, thereby maintaining readiness but alleviating storage problems for the forward supporting and supported units. Fringe requisitioning at the depot level will make nonessential items available at the depot level. AMC planners worked on developing a program to update wholesale data bases, which should improve the management of stocks at all levels and enhance combat readiness.

The second part of the new supply policy used the standard combat PLL and ASL program to develop an MPL. At the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, ODCSLOG investigated the problem of a sufficient breadth (number of lines stocked) and depth (number of items for each line) in the Total Army PLLs and ASLs to maintain critical equipment during combat. Aided by simulations, ODCSLOG planners determined the operational availability of equipment required for combat operations, a departure from the previously used peacetime demand-oriented system to project wartime requirements.

AMC tested a high-priority delivery system in the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), to fulfill not-mission-capable supply requirements for specified end items. Using commercial delivery services, this Rapid II system reduced the order shipping time to 90 hours-CONUS to Europe.

As the Army fields an increasing number of modern weapon systems employing modules, the emphasis of ASL management will change from parts to be discarded to those that can be repaired. The Army made an important policy change last year when it gave major commands the responsibility to manage reparable parts. Logisticians at the end of FY 84 worked to develop a synchronized supply, maintenance, and distribution system to improve reparable management while keeping costs and stockage low.

ODCSLOG improved the supply policy and distribution system by developing two new microcomputer systems. The Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS) began as the tactical organizational paperless service support system, a SMART (Supply and Maintenance


Assessment and Review Team) program initiative in the 24th Infantry Division. It automated almost all of the PLL transactions, decreased the PLL workload, and increased transaction accuracy at the unit level. The Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) will be fielded in forward support battalions to receive and process ULLS data, generate stock issue and inventory management data, and prepare transactions for Direct Support Unit Standard Supply System processing. All of these transactions were designed to decrease response time to meet lower level units' high-priority needs.

The Army Logistics Center, after reexamining recent technological advances and the threat to the rear area divisional support area, reappraised its centralized materiel management policy. Planners believed that daily logistical functions were more likely to survive hostile action if they dispersed among the division's direct support units. The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) served as a test bed for decentralizing daily logistical functions management. The 9th provided a demanding test for the new system because the division was configured for rapid deployment. Its maneuver units were highly mobile because of organic ground and air transportation assets. The Army designed proposed doctrinal changes in supply policy to provide a logistics system that could support rapidly moving combat elements similar to the 9th Infantry Division.

The Army logistical organization, at the end of FY 84, followed several principles while developing a supply policy to meet FM 100-5 doctrinal requirements. For example, logisticians identified the challenges of force modernization and made progress in meeting them. Planners recognized also that they must strike a balance between the level of stockage and the level of usage to keep PLLs and ASLs more mobile and less expensive. The distribution system was the vital key to the timely and adequate resupply of combat units.

In 1980 the Secretary of Defense designated the Army the DOD Executive Agent for land-based water resources. Since then the Army has worked on developing, coordinating, and implementing a totally integrated tactical water support system. Primarily, ODCSLOG, as the Army's water resources proponent, focused its attention on the needs of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) because operations in that area of the world would occur in an arid environment with high ambient temperatures and few sources of fresh water. ODCSLOG used a systems approach to determine water support requirements for such functions as detection, production, treatment, distribution, storage, and cooling. The Army transferred the responsibility for all of


these functions, except for detection and production, from engineer elements to combat service support units.

A two-part program was used to satisfy CENTCOM water requirements. The first, completed by the end of the FY 82 funded delivery period, fulfilled the minimum essential needs of the near-term force. Redesignated petroleum, engineer, and transportation units used commercially obtained equipment to establish and operate the System. The second involved the creation of a comprehensive tactical water support capability for the expanded force by the close of the FY 87 funded delivery period. ODCSLOG programmed the necessary materiel and force structure requirements to meet the deadline.

ODCSLOG successfully demonstrated a 300,000-gallon-per-day, barge-mounted, reverse osmosis water purification unit during the Joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise II. The Army will deploy the water purification unit in CENTCOM. It also pre-positioned more equipment for water units in CENTCOM's Near-term Prepositioning Force (NTPF). In addition, the National Training Center started unit water training.

The Army was responsible for the inland distribution of bulk Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants to all services in both developed and undeveloped theaters. Its mission was to maintain a flow of fuels and lubricants from a combination of offshore tankers and pier-side discharge systems through a network of onshore storage and distribution systems to the user. This mission was critical for force readiness and sustainment. Requirements steadily increased during the year.

In response to growing requirements, the Army established a General Officers Steering Committee and an Action Officers Workshop to study POL Logistics-Over-the-Shore (LOTS) and inland distribution capabilities. Both groups emphasized the need to modernize the petroleum systems within the Army Facilities Component System; to revise the 1978 "Petroleum Distribution in a Theater of Operations" study; to modify the Army Concept of Operations to include the increased use of tactical pipeline; and to work on inland distribution plans.

The Action Officers Workshop completed the evaluation of aluminum instead of steel piping and the use of new quick lock couplings rather than steel bolted couplings in POL tactical pipelines. In January 1984, the Army accepted the aluminum pipe and the quick lock couplings, both commercially available equipment, as Class IX items in the Army Facilities Component System and included the equipment in an Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) design. ODCSLOG saw the benefits of the new equipment and realized that the movement of large volumes of POL through pipelines was


the most efficient and least labor-intensive method. Therefore, it programmed a larger use of tactical pipeline to offset the Transportation Medium Truck Company (POL) force structure shortfalls. Initial procurement began in FY 84.

Last year, the 5,000-gallon collapsible fabric POL storage tank was the largest in the Army's inventory. This year, the Army started procurement of the Bulk Fuel Tank Assembly (EFTA), a 5,000-barrel (210,000-gallon) collapsible storage tank. It was used successfully during the joint Logistics Over the Shore Exercise II.

An Army/Navy OPDS (Offshore Petroleum Discharge System) Steering Group was established in FY 84 to prepare joint OPDS policy, procedure, acquisition, and compatibility. The group will have a Common Offload and Discharge Memorandum of Agreement ready for Chiefs of Staff signature next year. This agreement will clarify each service's responsibilities. The OPDS is scheduled for demonstration testing in FY 85.

The Petroleum Distribution System, Korea (PDSK), handled the general support POL mission. ODCSLOG changed its Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organization to that of a Table of Organization and Equipment unit providing an in-place cadre to support a rapid increase of personnel and mission during wartime. The PDSK became the 2d Petroleum Group, Korea, in September 1984 and required neither additional personnel for its peacetime mission nor increases in the manpower ceiling of the Eighth U.S. Army.

The Army could not sustain its forward-deployed and deploying forces because of inadequate air and sealift capability and a shortage of war reserves. Planners, however, implemented several actions to improve sustainment. One major sustainment program, Host Nation Support (HNS), used allied assets to fulfill part of the U.S. Army's combat support and combat service support requirements and to attain the Army's force structure objectives. Since the NATO area was vital to U.S. interests (the majority of troops were deployed there), most HNS was also found in Europe.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) signed a Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) Agreement on 15 April 1982. According to this agreement, West Germany will supply wartime essential services from its civil sector and perform service support functions for U.S. forces from a newly created 50,000-man reserve. The United States agreed to provide a ten-division force by D-day. At the end of FY 84, the two countries were developing the Civilian Support Technical Agreement to identify the civilian support the FRG will make available during war and the Military Technical Agreement to specify reservists' support. The former is planned for com-


pletion in FY 86 and the latter by the end of FY 85. On 21 January 1983, West Germany and the United States signed the Reinforcement Exercise Technical Agreement, which established German support for U.S. peacetime exercises such as REFORGER. The two countries, this year; agreed on the single source of equipment issue, the allocation of funds, and the approval of HNS as a part of the NATO infrastructure, which established guidelines for future activations.

Bilateral agreements with NATO allies assure HNS for vital U.S. lines of communication. Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Canada, and Italy have signed general (government to government) agreements and technical (host nation ministry of defense and Headquarters, United States European Command) agreements. Furthermore, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed joint Logistical Support Plans (JLSP), and negotiations were under way with Norway, Italy, and Denmark. Negotiations for JLSP have not yet been started with Spain, Portugal, and Greece while awaiting State Department approval. The United States European Command established Logistical Coordination Cells (LCC) to act as in-country agents to develop JLSP They were essential for the continued rapid delineation and agreement on the detailed support to be given to U.S. forces. The LCCs will also develop joint Implementation Plans to provide operational plan-level detail.

The HNS policy for Southwest Asia was in the initial negotiation stage with U.S. allies in that region. Discussions covered the development of possible contingency support for U.S. forces by these countries.

The Combined Defense Improvements Projects (CDIP) program, which handled HNS in Korea, continued its successful operation. During FY 84, Japan provided support to the United States through base rentals and by assumption of construction costs.

The Western Command (WESTCOM) continued to work on the Friendly/Allied Nation Support (FANS) program, which determined and cataloged other Pacific countries' ability to provide the U.S. with supply and service support.


A suitable force structure, a flexible imaginative doctrine, and a sustainment capability all depend upon the mobilization of national reserves to support deployed forces with reinforcing units, replacement personnel, and replenishment supplies. Mobilization brings the required resources to the necessary state of readiness or


to production. This task is accomplished by expanding existing facilities and establishing training bases to process untrained civilians; bringing reserve component personnel onto extended active duty; preparing CONUS transportation systems to move men and materiel; and converting factories to the production of war materiel. Mobilization of the Total Army implies that the Army will complete these actions effectively and quickly.

An initial mobilization action occurs when the President of the United States calls up reserve units to active duty. In that situation, current Army doctrine states that approximately 20 percent of Army Reserve elements will deploy overseas within 30 days after mobilization, 64 percent within 60 days, and almost all within 90 days. These units, however, represent only those designated for outside continental United States (OCONUS) deployment.

In FY 84, the Army added full-time reserve staff to vital active commands and posts to assist in mobilization planning. In addition, the Army continued to add reserve management information systems to the Continental Army Management Information System (CAMIS)-the primary Army Reserve and National Guard information system. Selected reserve centers and National Guard armories already using CAMIS will be joined by more than 5,000 subscribers by October 1986.

Since the Corps of Engineers was responsible for several of the mobilization actions mentioned above, it provided the United States with a strong reserve for engineering services and construction management through its civil works and military programs. The Corps' peacetime construction force (two-thirds involved in civil works) formed the backbone of the mobilization preparedness program. This program expanded during the year. Engineers in cooperation with Major Army Command staffs identified specific construction projects required for personnel mobilization. Furthermore, the civilian personnel of the engineer districts worked with Army installation planners to prepare mobilization master plans and Installation Support Books that established the necessary actions to satisfy personnel mobilization requirements. Most engineer districts and divisions established plans to support the Army's mobilization bases and to augment their staffs to meet personnel mobilization surges. The Chief of Engineers created a program of direct and general support districts to integrate the newly transferred civil works personnel into the military construction program. Direct support districts (fourteen districts handling peacetime military construction) supported installation commanders and facilities engineers in the United States. Since mobiliza-


tion demands could overwhelm these districts, general support districts (twenty-two civil works districts with no peacetime military construction) will provide reserve support.

The Installation Support Book (ISB) program, which provided essential information to district support and general support staffs for designing and building mobilization facilities, expanded during FY 84. The Corps of Engineers provided funds for adding 30 ISBs to the 101 installations, 55 reserve component mobilization stations, and 46 Development and Readiness Command production base facilities already in the program.

The Corps' mobilization preparedness level continued to decline because of reductions in its civil works manpower and the amount of design and construction work it authorized and performed. The augmentation of the military construction program suffered as a result. However, the Corps' emergency operations centers for floods, hurricanes, and other disasters did prepare Corps personnel to operate under extreme conditions that were similar in certain respects to those found during mobilization.

The Corps established the Corps of Engineers Corrective Action Program (CECAP) to provide an automated inventory of mobilization issues raised by OCONUS and CONUS districts and divisions. CECAP also identified a responsible proponent to resolve each issue and to monitor progress on the issue until its resolution. While contending with the same mobilization problems of CONUS, OCONUS districts and divisions faced several additional unresolved issues such as wartime construction requirements, resource management, and command relationships.

TRADOC completed the Training Base Capacity Study II and forwarded it to HQDA. The exhaustive study reviewed the equipment requirement to support the training base after full mobilization. The study group estimated equipment costs to meet present mobilization requirements at nearly $3.8 billion. Based on the TRADOC study, HQDA planners wrote a Program-Development Increment Package to alleviate some of the shortages in future POM cycles. Planners also used the study to examine the stated requirements for accuracy. It will be updated annually to monitor changing equipment requirements.

The Corps of Engineers prepared a proposal to amend Title 10, United States Code (USC) 2808, and sent it to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in January 1984. The proposal allowed a presidential determination of "imminent threat" to trigger mobilization (training base) construction using previously appropriated MILCON funds. Title 10, USC 2808, required that mo-


bilization construction start after a public declaration of national emergency or war. The FY 85.military authorization bill, forwarded to Congress on 3 February 1984, included the proposal. The final bill, signed by President Ronald Reagan on 20 August, did not contain it. The defeat of the Corps' proposal led to reassessing the timing and direction of the long-term effort to possess needed mobilization authority and to obtain relief from unreasonable statutory constraints.

Industrial mobilization complements personnel mobilization. The industrial base provides the equipment and materiel to support and sustain the forces engaged in combat, combat support, and combat service support. The Department of Defense continued to emphasize initial combat capability over industrial preparedness. This directly affected the Army because of low equipment and materiel stockpiles. Serious deficiencies still existed between the time required to mobilize the production capacity of U.S. industry and the time to meet ongoing combat demands. Several studies and reports (Ichord hearings, General Accounting Office reports) called attention to the defects of DOD's "short war" planning philosophy. These deficiencies in industrial preparedness were readily apparent in MOBEX 78 and MOBEX 80.

Dr. Korb stated that the United States had neglected industrial mobilization since World War Il but in the past several years had emphasized industrial preparedness in several ways. The President established the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board in 1982. In 1984, DOD and White House planners worked on emergency legislation that the President could use in a national emergency to remove impediments, such as long production lead times, to quickly meet mobilization requirements. During FY 84, the Army stockpiled critical components for systems with long lead times to shorten weapon systems production time upon mobilization.

The Secretary of the Army noted in the October 1984 Association of the United States Army Green Book that the Army was "not satisfied with our present ability to mobilize quickly." He stressed several areas that needed improvement: "getting more manpower with required skills, raising the readiness levels of reserve components combat service support units, improving the capability of continental U.S. installations to handle deploying units and upgrading our command and control structure to ensure the timely movement of critical resources." He stated that the Army was working on improving these areas. While some progress had been made, the Secretary acknowledged that much more needed to be done.



Following the publication of the operational doctrine in FM 100-5, the Army changed its training programs to complement the offensive emphasis of the revised manual. The philosophy to train as the Army fought permeated all levels of the Army organization as trainers incorporated this concept into all elements of the training program. These included individual, unit, and combined arms activities; institutional instruction; and training support. The demands occasioned by FM 100-5 doctrine required a level of training and proficiency far greater than that of our potential adversaries. American soldiers must often fight outnumbered in both personnel and equipment, as well as at the end of extended supply lines. The Army's primary training mission, in support of the Army of Excellence, was to turn newly inducted civilians into disciplined and skilled soldiers; to provide a cadre of highly capable noncommissioned officer trainers; and to improve the officer corps' capabilities. A new force structure placed further demands on training requirements as did fielding new or modernized weapon systems and adding new training courses. The Army responded by increasing instructor personnel authorization by 600 spaces, despite overall limited resources.

The soldier's most important peacetime activity is to train and prepare for war. Such training is vital for a force that fights according to a doctrine calling for rapid deployment of operational forces into a highly confusing, violent, and lethal theater of operations. All members of the Total Army need to understand and be trained under the principles of FM 100-5 so that they can fight and win the battle in such an environment.

The thirteen-week Infantry One-Station Unit Training (OSUT) program at the Infantry Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, took civilians and turned them into well-trained infantrymen. Those who will use Bradley fighting vehicles received additional training during a three-week, add-on course designed to familiarize them with the new equipment. The OSUT course emphasized tactical realism, reinforcement of mastered subjects in subsequent lessons, and after-action reviews. These actions improved the soldier's tactical and technical proficiency. In FY 84, the OSUT proved successful as evidenced by soldiers scoring an average of 268 out of 300 points on the demanding final Advanced Physical Readiness Test (APRT) and 92.4 percent on the Performance-oriented Infantry Qualification Test (POIQT) containing thirty-two Skill Level I tasks.

Initial Entry Training provided soldiers with a foundation of basic skills. Upon completion of basic training, the soldiers were


well motivated and well disciplined, but still needed further training on Skill Level I subjects. After arrival at their assigned units, they received additional training to sharpen their skills, to learn new and more advanced tasks, and to become team members.

A unit's efficiency and effectiveness depends upon its members' confidence in each other and in their leaders. Consequently, the Army worked to ensure that all leaders were tactically and technically competent to instill confidence in their subordinates. The Army also recognized that future conflicts, described in FM 100-5, would be highly lethal, demanding proficient leadership to conserve unit fighting strength on the complex modern battlefield. Therefore, it not only provided training for the soldiers' current assignments, but also trained them for more responsible future assignments.

The Army also expanded and established several programs for the professional development of career soldiers. For example, funding was provided to begin an FY 87 expansion in the number of senior NCOs engaged in training. The First Sergeant's Course will be expanded to 1,010 students per year, while the Sergeant Major Academy will train an additional 128 sergeants annually. The Army, after analyzing the NCO ranks, identified a shortage of Skill Level 2/3 technical training for combat support/combat service support soldiers. In response, Army trainers began primary and basic technical courses to improve the technical competency of E-5 and Er6 NCOs and make them fully qualified in their respective military occupational specialties (MOS). By FY 86, the Army will have 157 such courses in operation.

The emphasis in FM 100-5 on maneuver warfare demanded unit cohesion, small unit leadership, and independent operations. Leadership qualities of competence, toughness, resourcefulness, and flexibility were necessary to take full advantage of the latest doctrine. Thus the length of most officer basic courses increased from four to five weeks to offer more field training in tactical, maintenance, physical, and leadership skills. Trainers added a seven-day Tactical Leadership Course (TLC) to the Infantry Officers Basic Course to improve newly commissioned second lieutenants' tactical and leadership skills. Following TLC, the officers went through a light infantry field training exercise (FTX) and a mechanized infantry FTX. The Army incorporated the twenty drills of the TLC into the light infantry unit training program and may use them for active and reserve component field units as well.

Moreover, the appearance of a new three-tier training plan for warrant officers revised and expanded existing courses. Under the new program all newly appointed warrant officers will attend a six-


week, entry-level leadership course, and later during their career take an advanced course with selected officers attending a senior-level course. The new policy's mandatory entry-level training will improve the officer's ability to handle responsibility.

The conversion and establishment of divisions into the light infantry configuration and the restructuring of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) prompted the Army to explore the units' training programs as they experimented with new operational concepts. This was especially true of the units found in the light infantry force.

The Infantry School established a light infantry training program to improve light infantry skills during OSUT; to conduct special light infantry training at Fort Benning for unit leaders; and to increase gradually the percentage of Ranger-trained leaders in the light infantry divisions. The key battalion leaders will be Ranger-trained, and all infantry platoons will have some Ranger-trained personnel. The light infantry training program comprised three courses: the Light Leader Course, the Light Fighter Course, and the Light Infantry OSUT COHORT

Ranger-qualified senior NCOs conducted the four-week Light Leader Course at the Ranger School, Fort Benning. The course trained battalion sets of unit leaders (team leader to company commander) to become better trainers themselves by improving their proficiency in leadership abilities and soldier skills. The first class commenced in August, and a new Light Leader Course was planned for FY 86.

All light divisions conducted a Light Fighter Course that concentrated on squad and platoon training. The course lasted four weeks for infantry companies and one week for noncombat units. The 7th Infantry Division began training in the fall with the two-phase course. All soldiers who passed Phase I training were certified as light infantrymen and were sent to Phase II. In this phase, the light leader graduates trained their units in various tactical skills, which included rappelling from helicopters, traveling on snowshoes and skis, setting up hasty ambushes, and performing reconnaissances.

The proposed fifteen-week Light Infantry OSUT COHORT Course will employ a battalion of the 7th Infantry Division as a test unit during FY 85. After careful analysis of the results achieved in this battalion's training cycle, the Army will determine whether to continue the course.

The Ranger School, currently limited to a nine-week Ranger training program, will expand in FY 87 to support the Army's emphasis on increasing light infantry training requirements. The school's priorities were to soldiers assigned to Ranger battalions and


light infantry units as well as to all Infantry Branch lieutenants. The goal was to increase the number of hardened, combat oriented, tactically skilled leaders to light infantry divisions. The expansion will also support the larger SOF force structure, which added a Ranger battalion and Ranger regiment.

This training program supported the Army's goal of rapidly establishing a high-quality light infantry force. The Army will monitor and study the training process and the results. TRADOC will evaluate the organizational concept and performance of the light infantry division in terms of the new units' ability to meet the rigorous light infantry standards and the Infantry School's ability to support the training program during the transition of Division 86 units into light infantry units. However, light infantry was not the only unit training in progress.

Each unit, whether using a single weapon system or providing a support function, must be proficient in its specialty. Using the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), units established programs for individual and collective training in critical battle tasks. The Army revised its ARTEPs during the year, especially through the use of expanded training and evaluation outlines. Using these, commanders determined training performance and planned to correct deficiencies.

Individual and unit training formed the basis for the Army's readiness, while the training of the battalion task force inculcated principles of combined arms warfare in units. Furthermore, FM 100-5 identified the battalion as the basic combat unit. Thus the combined arms task force concept integrated various complementary weapon systems with a greater level of combat support and combat service support. One significant problem associated with battalion task force-size training was a lack of space to exercise full capability. The battalion's new weapon systems extended the range and scope of live-fire exercises beyond all but a few military reservations.

One Army response was the establishment of the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. According to Maj. Gen. Frederic J. Brown, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center, starting full-scale operation in 1982, "the tough, realistic, force-on-force training with MILES as the NTC is the best combined arms training, short of actual combat, that has ever been conducted in the U.S. Army" (Armor, Nov/Dec 84) The NTC's large maneuver area, skilled opposing force, live fire, multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES), and standardized evaluation combined to offer an unparalled training operation. Operations group observer-controllers, through computer-aided standardized evaluations, pro-


vided thorough after-action reviews to each unit following the two-week-long training mission. MILES provided timely and accurate determinations of individual and vehicle hits and near-misses that allowed, in turn, simulation of realistic force-on-force combat with realistic weapons simulation and casualty determination.

The NTC also improved the proficiency of unit leaders as they rotated through the center as well as enlisted personnel who had the opportunity to use skills learned at their home station. The units that trained at the NTC also incorporated "lessons learned" into their home station training programs. Thus NTC influence extended far beyond the two-week course and spread throughout the Army, thereby improving readiness.

In FY 84, the NTC first witnessed a unit (2d Brigade, 2d Armored Division) equipped with Ml Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles training at the center. These new weapons improved the brigade's ability to maneuver more rapidly across rough terrain. Simultaneously, while on the move, the improved technology increased their ability to hit targets accurately. Thermal sights enhanced the crew's target acquisition when operating under conditions of reduced visibility. FY 84 also witnessed the first National Guard battalions using the NTC. These were the 2d,Battalion, 136th Infantry (Mechanized), from Minnesota and the 1st Battalion, 108th Armor, from Georgia.

Army personnel and units engaged in numerous exercises during the fiscal year. Most occurred at the units' home stations with the aim to familiarize personnel with small unit tactics. Each exercise, whether CPX (command post exercise), FIX (field training exercise), STX (situational training exercise), or CALFEX (combined arms live-fire exercise), was an essential block of the foundation for larger combined arms training such as that conducted at the NTC. Moreover, leaders received training in FCXs (fire coordination exercises), LCXs (logistics coordination exercises), and MCXs (movement coordination exercises).

Each year the Army participates in two major Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)-sponsored and -conducted command post exercises selected from four possible scenarios: mobilization, general war/nuclear crisis, NATO reinforcement, and regional exercise. In FY 84, the CPXs were NIGHT TRAIN 84 and PRESSURE POINT 84. NIGHT TRAIN 84, a nine-lay CPX conducted in two phases between 5 and 13 April 1984, focused on survivability, continuity of operations, and reconstitution following a nuclear strike against the United States. HQDA established eight exercise objectives to evaluate Army command and control, decision making, residual capabilities, military assistance to civil authorities, and


capability to support reconstitution efforts during a nuclear crisis. This marked the first time in an extended interval that the Army examined its ability to transfer command and control functions to alternate locations. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) directed the participation of several federal civil agencies in NIGHT TRAIN 84 under its own exercise title of Readiness Exercise (REX) 84 BRAVO. The participants identified several deficiencies during the exercise, but in general found improved results compared to the previous nuclear CPX. However, the Army contended that the design of the previous three nuclear CPXs made it very difficult, if not impossible, to assess the progress and trends of correcting past deficiencies.

The other major JCS-sponsored and -directed command post exercise was PRESSURE POINT 84, which evaluated crisis management procedures and the operational and logistical aspects of sustainment in a major conflict. The federal civil and military agencies of both the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK) participated in the two-phase exercise from 17 October to 22 November 1983. Unlike the most recent comparable exercise, POTENT PUNCH 81, which evaluated plans and operations during the initial stages of a conflict in Korea, PRESSURE POINT 84 concentrated mainly, but not exclusively, on sustainment of forces during a crisis. The Army found this emphasis useful, because it could evaluate sustainment capabilities in greater depth than before and it could better articulate the severity of shortfalls in materiel and other critical areas of sustainment. The exercise scenario portrayed an escalation of worldwide tensions that led to several regional conflicts, including the outbreak of a conventional war on the Korean peninsula. The participants had already faced many of the crisis management, mobilization, and deployment problems of PRESSURE POINT 84 during POTENT PUNCH 81. However, this CPX examined these issues in greater detail in the new context of sustainment.

Any Army after-action assessment of PRESSURE POINT 84 noted a continuing shortage of ammunition stocks, several major equipment items, and combat arms replacements that severely limited the Army's ability to sustain combat operations. Although of less importance, limitations placed upon the Army by chronic deficiencies in medical, engineer, and transportation support capabilities appeared. Conversely, significant improvement in planning and operational procedures, including, with certain reservations, the procedures for supply support to the Republic of Korea, demonstrated the advantages accrued from "lessons learned" in previous exercises.

The Army also conducted several large-scale exercises to test combat readiness. Logistical planners held LOGEX 84, a CPX war


game, at Fort Pickett, Virginia, from 8 through 20 July 1984, to train participants in the command and staff procedures of joint operations within a NATO AirLand Battle scenario. Furthermore, LOGEX 84 demonstrated the interaction between combat, combat support, and combat service support units, operations, and missions. The exercise provided rewards for proper planning and execution and exacted penalties for violations of doctrine or sound practice. This demonstrated the effects of the participants' decisions on combat operations. In addition, trainers taught current doctrine, as found in FM 100-5, and introduced emerging concepts. Early deploying reserve components received training in their wartime mission, in addition to meeting and working with members of other units and services they would deal with in wartime.

Participants included members of 11 Active Army, 38 Army National Guard, and 48 Army Reserve units from CONUS and USAREUR, as well as active and reserve component personnel from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine Corps. Personnel of military organizations from nine allied nations represented those countries' logistical support activities to make LOGEX 84 as realistic as possible. The training covered policies and procedures for operations in the theater environment, necessary operations to support the AirLand Battle, and appropriate responses to Soviet/Warsaw Pact operational concepts and tactics. The trainers used microcomputer technology to generate and transfer to player units a significant amount of real-time scenario information.

The Army also increased its participation in several more highly visible, large-scale, complex joint and combined exercises from 28 in FY 83 to 31 in FY 84. These exercises, particularly the OCONUS ones, improved the Army's ability in combined combat operations with allied forces, projected its operational capability, tested joint and strategic mobility, and trained Total Army personnel to work in the joint arena with members of other U.S. services. Two of the most ambitious and well-known exercises were REFORGER and TEAM SPIRIT.

REFORGER (Return of Forces to Germany) involved the deployment of U.S. units from all three services and their reserve components to Germany for training with NATO units. They performed all operations under simulated wartime conditions designed to test the U.S. military's ability to deploy rapidly and operate in Europe. REFORGER also demonstrated both our military credibility and our commitment to our allies within NATO. The Army deployed 16,966 soldiers from elements of the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized); 1st Brigade, 2d Armored Division; 224th Engineer Battalion; 2d Battalion, 75th Rangers; and other active and reserve com-


bat, combat support, and combat service support units. Once in Europe, the NATO allies and U.S. forces conducted a series of exercises called AUTUMN FORGE that stressed the solidarity of the Allied Command and tested host nations' capabilities to mobilize and commit their forces for the defense of Western Europe.

Over 200,000 ROK and U.S. personnel in three corps elements and nine divisions participated in TEAM SPIRIT 84, which was held in Korea during the spring of 1984. A further four divisional headquarters simulated second and third echelon activities. This year marked I Corps' (Fort Lewis, Washington) first participation in TEAM SPIRIT. Other American units involved included a headquarters and brigade task force from the 2d Infantry Division (stationed in ROK), a brigade headquarters and battalion task force from the 7th Infantry Division, a headquarters and brigade from the 25th Infantry Division, and 2d Engineer Group. Beyond active forces, the Koreans activated two reserve divisions for the exercise. The exercise planners emphasized interoperability by interchanging units from one organization to another. Thus, divisions included ROK and U.S. Army elements and later ROK and U.S. Marine units.

The newly created combined aviation force (CAF) participated for the first time in TEAM SPIRIT 84. Composed of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) and ROK aviation units, the CAF offered ground commanders maximum use of scarce aviation assets and provided tactical air mobility. Exercises begun in September 1983 identified deficiencies in the areas of air mobility, attack, air assault, and observation. The 17th Aviation Group, for instance, had an assault helicopter battalion and a medium transport helicopter battalion, but lacked attack, scout, and observation helicopters. Conversely, ROK aviation units had attack and air assault helicopters but no medium lift aircraft. Additional C 3 systems and logistical strengths and weaknesses also affected the allies' air support role. U.S. and ROK assets were combined into the CAF, thereby employing the available assets of each army to best complement the aviation role. The CAF used 15 Black Hawks, 27 Hueys, 31 Chinooks, and 24 500-MDs (ROK Army's attack/scout helicopters) to provide exercise forces with agility, depth, initiative, and synchronization.

Central America became even more turbulent as Marxist guerrilla operations spread farther and grew more violent in the region. The President of the United States continued to demonstrate his commitment to U.S. allies in Latin America by conducting joint and combined exercises there. These exercises assisted host nations in enhancing the readiness and capability of their military forces and demonstrated American willingness to support our al-


lies against aggression, to provide a local military presence, and to offer American units the opportunity to conduct joint exercises involving all services and their components. Honduras was the major theater of operations for these exercises. The U.S. Army played a major role in a regular series of training operations.

The two largest exercises were AHUAS TARA II and GRANADERO I. United States Readiness Command and FORSCOM provided joint operations command support as well as the Army forces employed. Experienced in operating joint exercises, USREDCOM established a joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to plan for AHUAS TARA II. After the exercise began, JTF II, under the command of United States Southern Command, controlled the units and operations. During the course of the exercise, 5 August 1983 to 8 February 1984, the commander of JTF II directed units from all services as well as several Honduran Army units. The 43d Support Group, Fort Carson, Colorado, provided logistical and administrative support while the 41st Combat Support Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, supplied medical support. The hospital personnel also engaged in humanitarian projects in the Honduran countryside. The 3d Battalion, 319th Field Artillery, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, worked with two Honduran Army mortar battalions that were converting to 105-mm. towed howitzer battalions. Meanwhile, the 7th Special Forces Group assisted Honduran infantry battalions in counterinsurgency and antitank exercises. To support the wide-range exercise, the 46th Engineer Battalion, Forts Rucker and McClellan, Alabama, built one airfield, upgraded another, and instructed Honduran forces in anti-armor defenses. The U.S. Marines, in addition to assisting a Honduran battalion in amphibious operations, also directed a combined Honduran Army and U.S. Army-Navy-Marine maritime interdiction training exercise. Army forces, working in challenging and difficult conditions, often had to construct new base camps for operations. However, Army personnel still found time for humanitarian projects, which included medical treatment for Honduran citizens, veterinary care for their animals, assistance to orphanages, and distribution of clothing received from several American military installations.

Based on the results of AHUAS TARA II, Secretary of Defense Caspar W Weinberger ordered the Commander in Chief of SOUTHCOM to continue the American operations through June 1984. The Commander in Chief redesignated JTF II as JTF "Alpha" and assigned it the operational responsibility for command and control, support functions, communications, and security of heavy equipment in the follow-up exercise, GRANADERO I.


Conducted during May and June 1984, GRANADERO I resembled AHUAS TARA II because it was a combined and joint exercise. The 864th Engineer Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington, arrived a month before the start of the exercise and built two airfields capable of handling C-130 aircraft. On 23 May, JTF 7 arrived to commence the exercise with the 227th Assault Helicopter Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas; the 47th Field Hospital, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; several teams of the 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the 169th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS), Peoria, Illinois; a USAFRED (U.S. Air Force Forces, Readiness Command) unit; and several logistical and communications units. El Salvador sent an infantry battalion, while Honduras provided an infantry and an airborne battalion. Panama assigned an observer team to the exercise. The units spent a week engaged in combined operations and a second week performing a multinational airborne/air assault at Jamastran near Honduras' southern border with Nicaragua. As during AHUAS TARA II, Army personnel performed humanitarian acts to assist the local inhabitants, including medical and veterinary care as well as an airlift of food and medical supplies for Indian refugees.

New weapon systems, a new force structure, and a changing operational doctrine necessitated increased training for Army personnel. The Army also faced training restrictions imposed by scarce resources, which reduced the amount of available fuel and ammunition. In addition, most of the available maneuver areas were too small to handle the increased ranges of weapons and vehicles. Since new weapon systems, such as the Ml, M2, and M3, introduced more capabilities and ways of employment than their predecessors, personnel required a concomitant increase in training on these systems. Budgetary constraints implied either a reduction of the amount of training time or of the size of the force to receive training. Rather than choose a reduction, Army leadership decided to increase the use of training devices and simulations, thereby conducting necessary training in the most economical manner.

Training devices served as training enhancers and resource conservers. One of the most important of these devices was MILES, which used lasers to simulate realistic combat exercises. Fully fielded in the active component, funding for MILES was begun in the reserve components. The Army also introduced MILES equipment for Ml, M2, and M3 vehicles, thus completing the system for major Army close combat vehicles.

Other major advances in training equipment were in the area of simulators and computer-assisted simulations. The Army's use of simulators for missile and artillery firing practice represented an


inexpensive yet efficient means to train gunners while conserving extremely costly ammunition. Combined with unit training devices, this equipment achieved a substantial savings of Class II, V, and IX materiel. However, these savings were not sufficient, so TRADOC and AMC designed more advanced simulators to conserve more materiel and enhance training.

The unit conduct-of-fire trainer (UCOFT), a computer simulator, will assist tank and infantry fighting vehicle crews in meeting gunnery table proficiency. UCOFT successfully completed validation and verification testing during the year. Fielding will begin in March 1985. Army planners expected UCOFT to pay for itself, on mileage savings alone, within 7.6 years. However, since UCOFT significantly reduced ammunition requirements programmed for training, the payback period, if ammunition savings are included, will be shortened to three years. Army trainers expected UCOFT to save each tank battalion $473,000 for 105-mm. shells and $1,295,000 for 120-mm. shells. The entire field force could be equipped with UCOFT devices for the cost of several M1 tanks.

The Army Armor Center, in conjunction with AMC and TRADOC, also worked on other training simulators for the armor force. Trainers designed the videodisc gunnery simulator (VIGS) to substitute for the first two gunnery tables and provide a foundation for UCOFT and PCMT (platoon combat mission trainer) training. The PCMT, another computer-assisted system, reproduced the combined arms environment through the generation of digital images to depict the external environment as viewed from inside an armor vehicle. The software allowed platoons, while in the simulator room, to perform maneuver missions, solve field problems, and handle free play. USAARMC expected that it would be available by FY 85 and would substantially reduce training costs within the armor force.

Work also progressed on the Army training battle simulation system (ARTBASS), an automated interactive battle simulation for commanders and staffs of maneuver battalions. ARTBASS was the beginning of a conversion from manual to computer-assisted war gaming. The eventual goal is an automated or computer-driven system. By the 1990s FORSCOM wanted to have a complete set of automated battle simulations to train combat, combat support, and combat service support personnel from platoon level to echelons above corps. In FY 85, FORSCOM will distribute ARTBASS to the first maneuver battalions.

The cost of firing a live TOW missile (about $10,000) and a Hellfire missile ($40,000) made extensive firing prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, Army aviators had to maintain their target acquisition proficiency, and simulators provided the means. Army aviators also


increased their flying proficiency by using flight training simulators. The Apache helicopter program was the first in which Army planners concurrently funded a simulator along with a helicopter. Since flying the Apache was 10-15 times more expensive than flying in the simulator, the Army expected substantial cost savings. FORSCOM also worked on the design of the ACATT (aviation combined team training) computer simulator, which aviation battalions should receive in FY 86 or FY 87.

The Army also was involved in simulators and simulations on a joint services level. USREDCOM worked on a joint theater-level simulation (JTLS), which will offer air, land, and sea battle simulation. The Army planned on placing JTLS at USREDCOM, the Army War College, and the Army Concepts Analysis Agency in early FY 85. The USREDCOM also continued the development of the joint Exercise Control System UECS), a computer-aided system for automating the operation of command and staff training exercises. It will be field tested during BOLD VENTURE 85, a USREDCOM CPX conducted at Fort Lewis, Washington.

The Air Force, under Project Warrior, established the Warrior Preparation Center at Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, to train Air Force and Army commanders and staffs in combined force employment in NATO. The Warrior Preparation Center taught Warsaw Pact threat status and countermeasures, as well as performed battle simulation. The center proved to be a valuable tool for Air Force and Army staffs to use to sharpen their command and control skills.

Congress, through the efforts of the House Armed Services Committee, had encouraged the joint services to coordinate their training research and development work in 1978. The committee then reemphasized its guidance in 1980, and DOD established the joint Service Research and Development Program. The Navy started manpower and personnel elements for the program and the Army followed suit in FY 84, appropriating $6 million for training and technology projects. The Training Activities Subcommittee of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Steering Committee on Training and Training Technology oversaw the program. The subcommittee, composed of military and civilian members of the four services, reviewed potential projects and selected four or five a year for funding.

The perennial debate over officer training versus officer education continued during the year. While acknowledging that unit-level tactical training remained vital, most commentators favored more education in war fighting and principles of wax at higher level military schools such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff


College (USACGSC). The CGSC's curriculum, a two-year course in 1929, was shortened to one year after World War II and later reduced to ten months. The emphasis on tactical and operational lessons of warfare was further abbreviated to allow more time to study the complex Cold War arena; to maintain units at a high level of readiness; to develop new officer skills; and better to use constrained resources. Tactical and operational lessons were shortened from a total of 665 hours in 1951 to approximately 170 hours in 1984. The CGSC, in FY 84, increased tactics lessons in the electives program and included three one-week-long, college-wide exercises to remedy the drift away from the study of the lessons of warfare. The current conduct of war under FM 100-5 and its increased use of technologically sophisticated weaponry and highly mobile forces increased the amount of tactical and operational material, that the tactics section of the CGSC curriculum had to cover.

CGSC consequently added an eleven-month Advanced Military Studies Program to provide an in-depth study of the science and art of war at the tactical and operational levels (division and corps). In FY 84, the pilot stage of the program had a small, high-quality faculty capable of teaching as many as ninety-six CGSC graduates annually. The students will receive instruction in all aspects of G1, G2, G3, and G4 operations as well as a study of ranges of possible conflicts from terrorism to nuclear war. The new course emphasized thinking based on the study of military theory and application, both historical and contemporary, to allow officers to arrive at creative yet practical solutions to operational problems. According to Colonel Huba Wass de Czege (Military Review, Jun 84) , the Advanced Military Studies Program was the Army's "long-term investment in future capability."

Army Chief of Staff General Bernard W. Rogers in 1977 ordered a study to be made of officer training and education requirements through the 1990s. The Review of Education and Training for Officers (RETO) study group completed its analysis of requirements from pre-commissioning through general officer levels the following year. The study group made several recommendations such as expanding officer basic courses and changing advanced courses into functional courses dedicated to specific duty positions. Another recommendation was the establishment of a course to teach staff skills. The RETO study group based this recommendation upon several findings. First, the selection rate of officers for CGSC was below 50 percent of total eligible officers, which meant that the majority of Army officers received their last formal education at the officers advanced course. Second, CGSC


graduates were not assigned to tactical-level staff positions, thereby depriving tactical units of trained and qualified staff officers. However, the complexity of modern warfare placed a premium on staff skills at these lower echelons.

Initially, the Army planned the proposed staff officer course as an alternative program of instruction (POI) for those officers not chosen for the CGSC course. After exploring this proposal, the Army found that all Army officers required non-branch specific instruction in staff skills beyond the officers advanced course level. Therefore, this alternative POI proposal was dropped, and a working group was formed at Fort Leavenworth in 1979 to design a new POI and program of implementation for a Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3). According to Lt. Col. Karl Farris, CAS3 was "to provide Active and Reserve component officers the instruction necessary to serve as staff officers with Army field units." (Military Review, Apr 84) The school's instruction had to meet three objectives: "to teach what staffs are by defining and tracing the development of staff roles; to teach what staffs do by presenting instruction on common and collective staff procedures and skills; and to teach how staffs operate." The goals of CAS3 were derived from these objectives and were prominently displayed in each classroom:

1. Improve the ability to analyze and solve military problems.
2. Improve the ability to interact and coordinate as a member of a staff.
3. Improve communication skills.
4. Improve one's understanding of Army organization, operations, and procedures.

The Army, following another RETO study group recommendation concerning the POI, set up a two-phase CAS3. The first, or non-resident, phase contained fifteen self-paced modules, which all officers completed at their home stations. After passing the open book examination, they were eligible for the resident, or second, phase. The first phase provided a common background in communicative arts; historical development of staffs, staff skills, roles, and relation ships; decision-making process; quantitative skills; personnel and administration operations; basic principles of logistics; training management; staff leadership; budget; reserve components and mobilization; tactics; threat forces; and organization of Army divisions.

Phase II, a nine-week resident course held at Fort Leavenworth, used small group seminars to improve upon the skills learned in Phase I. The student body was divided into twelve-person groups, each led by a lieutenant colonel battalion commander. The students


rotated through various staff positions within the fictitious 52d Infantry Division (Mechanized), a roundout unit based at Fort Riley, Kansas. The instruction focused on six broad, problem-solving exercises in staff techniques, training management, budget, mobilization, preparation for combat operations, and a command post exercise. By the end of the course, each student had worked extensively on solving over sixty complex individual and group problems.

The pilot program began in April 1981 with 117 officers from all Army branches as well as the National Guard and Army Reserve. CASs conducted two validation and verification courses the following year. Based on these courses, the Army made adjustments to the program and began regular classes.

The Extension Training Management Division at Fort Leavenworth sent Phase I packets to all Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD)-managed officers after they completed the officers advanced course. The officer's period of eligibility for the resident phase began with successful completion of Phase I and lasted through the officer's ninth year of service.

All OPMD-managed officers, starting with year group 1977, had to attend CAS3. For those in earlier year groups, the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) made the selection. However, CAS3 must expand its facilities before full implementation can begin. In the summer of 1983, the CGSC started an expansion of its facilities to handle the instructional load of CAS3. With completion scheduled for the fall of 1985, CAS 3 will begin educating 4,500 captains per year.

At the end of FY 84, the instructors, students, and Army educators were satisfied with the results of CAS3. The junior officers received broad training applicable to all of their duty positions and, upon graduation, had a common understanding of staff procedures, which would be valuable on the modern battlefield. Overall, CAS3 met, and in some cases exceeded, its instructional goals. The small-group, staff-leader method of instruction in conjunction with peer interaction and the exercise method of instruction contributed to this result.

The Army, in an attempt to increase the mid-level officer schooling program's cost effectiveness, required that all officers attending advanced schools and certain special programs add an extra one- to three-year service obligation to their careers upon graduation. The new regulations took effect during the summer and fall of 1984. Officers attending an advanced course that began on or after 1 October 1984 would incur a one-year obligation. Legal officers attending the judge Advocate General's Graduate Course were required to serve two additional years. Starting 1 July 1984, officers


selected as astronaut candidates had a three-year service obligation added to their careers after they left the space program.

The Army continued to expand modernization training initiatives during FY 84, particularly in four areas. The first area was the development of an automated and viable data base to support Army Modernization Training (AMT). The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management approved the Mission Elements Need Statement (MENS) and the Project Managers (PM) Charter during FY 84. This data base combined all modernization training information into one system so that AMT managers will be better able to implement AMT.

Second, HQDA established a New Equipment Training (NET) Manager's Workshop to provide NET managers with information on the AMT process. It also provided new equipment trainers with a method to bring problems to the attention of both the training community and Army leadership for resolution.

The Consolidated Training Support Work Group (CTSWG) process was the third area receiving attention. It was an ad hoc forum for the major players in the New Equipment and Doctrine and Tactics Training activities that review consolidated training plans to resolve problems therein. Formerly there were eight CTSWGs, one conducted by each materiel developer every six months. The Army reduced that number to two held every six months, known as CTSWG East, which met at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and CTSWG West, which met at St. Louis, Missouri, in the spring of 1984, and at Detroit, Michigan, in the fall of 1984. The fourth area of improvement provided initiatives for training reserve components. Active reserve component representatives developed several realistic and supportable training plans, which emphasized the reserve components' unique training requirements.

The Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) worked on determining the amount of training ammunition required by individuals, crews, and units of the Total Army to attain and sustain weapons proficiency. The commission considered aids, devices, simulators, simulations, and sub-caliber firing in developing qualification training strategies for thirty-eight systems. STRAC drafted DA Circular 350-XX, which documented the type of attainment and sustainment event; integration of training devices and simulators; standard training strategy; frequency of repetition; and training ammunition requirements to attain and keep the four established separate training readiness conditions. After being reviewed Army-wide, the draft was revised as DA Circular 350-84-2, Standards in Weapons Training, for FY 85 publication.


The Army Study Program

The Army Study Program denotes a collection of analytical activities sponsored and carried out by HQDA agencies and major commands to provide quality information to help senior Army leaders make sound decisions. During FY 84, a new initiative, the Issue Assessment Process (IAP), ensured that the Army's analysis community studied the most important problems. Started in the fall of 1983, UP quickly reached the stage where its products influenced the analytical program of the Arroyo Center, the Army's policy and analytic organization. The Chief of Staff also decided during the fiscal year to move the Arroyo Center from the jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology to the Rand Corporation.



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