Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989


Force Structure


The Army in 1989 was the product of a major force restructuring that flowed from the Army of Excellence (AOE) concept of 1983. That concept evolved from the Army 86 concept developed by TRADOC between 1978 and 1982. The AOE force structure was anchored in an active component of five corps and eighteen divisions, with the corps emerging as the center of AirLand Battle doctrine. Tactical divisions also underwent design changes. Heavy divisions were reduced in size but not lethality, and new light divisions were formed. As the Army entered FY 1989, force structure and design were modified to accommodate doctrinal refinements derived from training, field exercises, and new equipment.

The division is the Army's highest tactical unit with a fixed organization. Commanded by a major general, a division is a combined-arms force with permanently assigned forces that perform five principal functions: maneuver, air defense, fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare, and combat service support. A division can fight as a self-sufficient force but is usually augmented with corps troops during sustained operations. Each division organizes for combat by assigning missions and allocating resources to its assigned maneuver brigades. In FY 1989 the Total Army consisted of 28 divisions, 18 in the active component and 10 in the National Guard (ARNG). The Army had 1 active air assault division, 6 infantry divisions each in the active force and the ARNG, 1 active airborne division, 6 active and 2 ARNG mechanized divisions, and 4 active and 2 ARNG armored divisions. Division strength varied from 10,700 to 17,300, and the number of maneuver battalions ranged from 9 to 12. The distribution of major U.S. Army combat units by major Army command at the start of FY 1989 is depicted in Table 2. Several active component divisions have selected reserve component "roundout" units assigned to them.

The corps, usually commanded by a lieutenant general who commands two or more divisions, is the primary headquarters for land combat operations. It has permanently assigned units that include nondivisional maneuver support and air defense, military intelligence, engineer, signal,

TABLE 2 — Active Army Force Structure, FY 1989


1st Armored Division
3d Armored Division
3d Infantry Division (Mech)
8th Infantry Division (Mech)
3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division
3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mech)
Berlin Brigade
2d Armored Cavalry Regiment
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment


2d Infantry Division


25th Infantry Division


82d Airborne Division
101st Airborne Division
1st Cavalry Division (Armd)
2d Armored Division (-)
1st Infantry Division (-)
4th Infantry Division (Mech)
5th Infantry Division (Mech)
6th Infantry Division (LID)
7th Infantry Division (LID)
9th Infantry Division (MTZ)
10th Mountain Division (LID)
24th Infantry Division (Mech)
194th Armored Brigade
193d Infantry Brigade (Panama)
197th Infantry Brigade
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment

and combat service support troops. The active component's five corps in FY 1989 were I Corps, Fort Lewis, Washington; III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas; V Corps, Germany; VII Corps, Germany; IX Corps, Japan; and XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Army combat forces are categorized as heavy or light depending on their design and missions. The Army has sought a balance of heavy, light, and special operations forces, but it also has traditionally addressed force structure mainly in terms of heavy forces. The Director of Force Development, Off ice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), noted in FY 1989 that the bulk of the Army's money, both investment and operating accounts, was driven by decisions associated with its heavy forces and the threat posed by Soviet land forces in Europe. Nevertheless, throughout FY 1989 the Army organized light infantry forces and studied force structure alternatives for low- and medium- intensity conflicts or special operations.

Force Structure and Readiness

The Army Readiness and Equipping Strategy helps create and sustain a meaningful force structure by supporting an established readiness goal.


That goal is for all forward-deployed forces and all major combat forces scheduled to deploy from the United States in the first thirty days (D+30) to attain a readiness status of C-2, which indicates a fully equipped and deployable force. Other deployable forces must attain a C-3 or better rating. To implement this strategy, the Army adopted its "First To Fight- First To Be Resourced" (FTF/FTR) policy that applies to active and reserve components. Combat support and combat service support units are accorded the same priority as the combat units they support. High priority units, as designated in the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL), are also accorded sufficient resources for training and personnel. This strategy has enabled the Army to increase the number of units with a status of C-3 or better by 30 percent since 1985. All Army forward-deployed major combat forces and major combat units deploying from the United States by D+30 were rated C-2 or better in mid-FY 1989.

By the end of FY 1989 most of the major active force combat units in the continental United States and Alaska under FORSCOM's command attained the highest authorized level of organization (ALO) rating, ALO 1, or 100 percent of their authorized personnel and equipment. The Army accomplished this during the past several years by reducing noncombat spaces in the active components and transferring some combat and many combat support and combat service support missions to the reserve components. This enabled the service to keep the strength of its active components within their authorized manpower ceiling despite reductions in end strength. In addition, all twelve FORSCOM divisions had a C-3 status or better; only three divisions received a C-1 rating. The remaining divisions had lower readiness ratings that reflected shortcomings in training. Two divisions, the 1st Infantry and the 2d Armored, maintained forward brigades in West Germany that were assigned to USAREUR. The 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment was the only major combat unit in FORSCOM below ALO 1. It was plagued with maintenance problems and shortages of maintenance personnel and lacked its aviation assets. Of 695 nonmajor, nonorganic active component units under FORSCOM, 502 had a readiness condition of C-3 or better.

While the readiness of USAREUR units was among the highest in the service, some of them had shortages of artillery ammunition and air-to-air missiles. War reserve stocks were also short certain tactical vehicles, radios, and other items. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) was concerned about the readiness of its combat support and combat service support units.

The transition from earlier force designs to the Army of Excellence necessitated the preparation of a new family of tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). The evolution of a unit to its final reorganization and modernization goal is governed by a "living TOE" (LTOE), which the


Army has used since FY 1988. Base, intermediate, and final Toes and other organizational documentation are applicable at different steps. A base TOE contains authority for a unit's initial reorganization. Incremental change packages (ICPs) reflect other organization documents such as the manpower authorization criteria (MARC) and the basis of issue plans (BOIP) or equipment. Base Toes and ICPs are also used to determine requirements for the Army Field Feeding System, approved by the Army Vice Chief of Staff in May 1989. ICPs also document deviations from base Toes caused by the substitution of equipment and reflect modifications that stem from mission or unit-peculiar requirements. All of these modifications are then added to the base TOE to form an intermediate TOE. T h e final TOE represents the unit's attainment of its modernization goals. During FY 1989 TRADOC published 346 new and 129 final Toes At the close of the fiscal year, 68 of the final 129 TOEs had been approved by HQDA. The Army's goal was to convert all TOEs to LTOEs by FY 1992. Keeping track of TOEs and other organizational documentation through the development and approval process was substantially improved in FY 1989 by adoption of the automated Documentation Management System.

Force modernization and doctrinal changes also affected the Unit Status Report (USR) system (see Army Regulation [AR] 220-1). The USR was modified in FY 1989 to preclude the designation "instant unreadiness" that referred to the unavailability of newly authorized equipment and personnel. The modification in reporting offers a more realistic appraisal of a unit's combat readiness as it aligns itself with its modified TOE (MTOE).

Mobilization Planning

The Army's capacity to mobilize rests on the readiness of its active and reserve components. Some of its endeavors during FY 1989 to improve the total force included an intensive effort to bring the 200,000 Presidential Call-up Package to deployable status. Similar attention was devoted to the M-Day Combat Support/Combat Service Support Force Package, which consisted of forty high-priority active component units. FORSCOM has developed three major force packages to reinforce the unified commands in Europe and Korea or to support deployments to Southwest Asia. The Southwest Asia Force Package, for example, consisted of units assigned to Third U.S. Army, the Army component of the US Central Command, which included the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), as well as 426 other active component units.

With the disestablishment of the US Readiness Command and the US Forces, Caribbean, in the late 1980s, FORSCOM undertook several


measures to enhance rapid deployment. During FY 1989 FORSCOM developed plans for a deployable joint task force (DJTF) headquarters capable of planning and executing the initial stages (72 to 96 hours) of operations and to provide the transition to a conventional JTF headquarters. By the end of FY 1989 FORSCOM had organized a 22-man cell, including 13 from the Army, to serve as the nucleus of the DJTF headquarters. FORSCOM also established an Alert Force Requirement for the 7th Infantry and 10th Mountain Divisions, which were tasked to provide a division ready force and a division ready brigade for rapid deployment within 18 to 48 hours.

Army mobilization also rested on the industrial preparedness program, for which approximately $505 million was allocated in FY 1989. These funds were spent on military construction, research and development, operation and maintenance of the industrial base, and procurement. Among the program's objectives were preservation of Army-owned industrial facilities in a high state of preparedness to accommodate a surge capacity; the procurement, replacement, and maintenance of war reserves; and various modernization programs.

Replenishment of war reserves, a continuing process, was funded as part of the Army Stock Fund in FY 1989. The Army leadership concluded that funding constraints and increasing force requirements had prevented acquisition of sufficient war reserve stocks for the initial stages of war. Stocks at the end of FY 1989 amounted to 23 percent for major and 47 percent for secondary items, and 57 percent for preferred munitions. Continued modernization of the force, together with such force structure changes as increased 155-mm. and 8-inch guns per battery, necessitated war reserves increases as well as stocks to support a mixed inventory of old and new equipment. During FY 1989 Congress was concerned with the length of time required to fill orders; some purchase orders were outstanding for more than five years and tied up money without putting materiel on the shelves. The Army reviewed all outstanding war reserve requisitions and canceled those more than two years old to free funds for higher priority items.

To bridge a potential combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) shortfall in the event of hostilities, the Army has established wartime host nation support (WHNS) and the logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP). The WHNS agreement between the United States and West Germany, signed on 13 June 1989, supplemented a basic agreement made in 1982 and created a worldwide model for burden sharing. The agreements committed West Germany to provide 100 German reserve units of 50,000 personnel to support USAREUR. With full manning and equipping expected by 1993, these units would perform CS/CSS functions for a ten-division D-Day force. WHNS agreements existed with other


NATO allies. The Army estimated that the support rendered by American allies in Europe would equal approximately 65,000 Army personnel. Civil contracts for critical wartime needs awarded under LOGCAP equated to an additional 8,500 Army troops in Europe. Similar arrangements existed with the South Korean government. The Korean government also provided the Korean Augmentation to the US Army (KATUSA), Korean Army personnel who served with Army units, and the Korean Service Corps. The support furnished by South Korea equated to approximately 12,000 Army personnel. The US Army, Japan, has a contingency mutual support (CMS) arrangement with the Japanese government for CS/CSS support. The Army allocated $143 million to support WHNS and LOGCAP programs worldwide in FY 1989.

Equally important to any mobilization was the Army's ability to mobilize rapidly a supporting civilian workforce. Several recent civilian mobilization exercises (CIVMOBEX) have tested the service's ability to hire additional civilians quickly and to replace civilians called to military duty. CERTAIN SAGE 89, the fifth annual retiree recall exercise, entailed the recall of approximately 308 retired military volunteers during a six-month period. They were ordered to active duty for two to twelve days at twenty-four locations. Conducted by FORSCOM, the exercise focused on refining recall procedures, the medical condition of retirees, and the development of deployability criteria for them.

Heavy Units

To remain within legislated strength ceilings, the Army planned to eliminate the 2d Brigade from the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colorado, to avoid a reduction in the strength of forward-deployed units in Europe. To compensate for the loss of an active brigade, the 116th Heavy Separate Brigade of the Idaho National Guard was selected as the division's roundout brigade, effective FY 1990. During FY 1989 HQDA also delayed indefinitely activation of the 177th Heavy Separate Brigade and its support battalion because of lack of funds. The brigade was slated to be stationed at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, as the center's opposition force (OPFOR). At the end of FY 1989 several options were being studied that included relocation of the 194th Heavy Support Brigade (HSB) at Fort Knox, Kentucky, to the NTC and the activation of a heavy armor task force in its place to assume school support missions.

The proper organization for the reconnaissance-counter-reconnaissance-surveillance (RCRS) mission in organizations from battalion to echelons above division became a significant force design issue in FY 1989. In the existing force structure, RCRS missions were normally con-


ducted by the battalion scout platoon, division cavalry squadron, or an armored cavalry regiment. The multiplicity and complexity of the missions assigned to such units raised organizational, training, and doctrinal problems. TRADOC's Combined Arms Center recommended specific remedial training and better dissemination of doctrine, but a restructuring of units responsible for RCRS missions seemed a stronger remedy. General Vuono, in late FY 1989, approved a restructuring of the battalion scout platoon that replaced six M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, considered too big and noisy for the mission, with ten High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV). TRADOC endorsed the addition of a second ground cavalry troop for the light infantry division's reconnaissance squadron, but recommended against the addition of a third ground troop to the heavy division cavalry squadron. General Vuono directed TRADOC to study further the problems of the heavy division cavalry design.

Another heavy unit force design issue considered in FY 1989 was the formation of an aviation support battalion to provide better support to the division aviation brigade. TRADOC recommended that the battalion be formed from existing aviation brigade and division support command assets. General Vuono, in August 1989, directed TRADOC to conduct a one-year evaluation of the concept in USAREUR.

Light Divisions

The organization of light infantry divisions in the Army stemmed from the changing international environment in the early 1980s, national strategy, and an extensive review of Army force structure. Strategically and tactically sound and capable of rapid deployment, the division could be used across the operational continuum, according to Army leaders. With an authorized strength of 10,778 and lighter equipment, the division could be transported by fewer aircraft than heavy divisions. In FY 1989 the Army had 5 light infantry divisions; 2 had completed their organization, and 3 were still being formed. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) was activated in FY 1985 at Fort Ord, California, as the first LID. It completed certification for the light infantry design in August 1986, while the 25th LID in Hawaii completed its conversion in October 1987. Both were poised for rapid deployment to meet specified contingencies.

The 10th Mountain Division (Light) was activated at Fort Drum, New York, in February 1985. At the start of FY 1989 the division was still being formed, its organization depending on the construction of facilities at Fort Drum. With the organization of an infantry brigade that moved from Fort Benning, Georgia, to Fort Drum and activation of the division's air defense artillery and military intelligence battalions, activation of the 10th was completed on schedule in FY 1989. The division's two active compo-


nent infantry brigades are rounded out by the 27th Infantry Brigade of the New York National Guard. During FY 1989 the Army also explored a restructuring of the division's support command (DISCOM) to make it closer in design to the DISCOM of the heavy divisions. This change would enable the 10th Division to better support a light-heavy mix of forces. This change, which entailed reorganizing the division's DISCOM from a functional organization to a forward support/main support battalion configuration, was endorsed by the Army Logistics Center late in FY 1989. General Vuono approved the restructuring of the LID logistical base but directed that it be done without increasing the division's strength.

The 6th Infantry Division (Light), the newest LID, was activated in March 1986 at Forts Richardson and Wainwright in Alaska by using the 172d Infantry Brigade as its nucleus. In FY 1989 the division lacked an active component brigade and two battalions. The division's roundout brigade, the 205th Infantry Brigade (USAR, Minnesota), was converting to the light infantry design. The activation of two active component infantry battalions for the 6th Division, planned for FY 1989, was canceled because of strength reductions required in the FY 1988 budget. One battalion was replaced by the activation of the 6th Battalion, 297th Infantry (L), of the Alaska National Guard in the latter half of FY 1989. During the year the division also activated the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the Division Artillery and a military police company. The division headquarters, located at Fort Richardson, is slated to move to Fort Wainwright in FY 1990, where its 2d Brigade is stationed; its 1st Brigade is at Fort Richardson. This impending change also delayed filling some of the division's outstanding force requirements. Its roundout brigade, the 205th Infantry Brigade, however, remained under FORSCOM's command because it was stationed in the continental United States.

The 29th Infantry Division (Light) was activated in the National Guard in October 1985 with its headquarters located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. It was formed from two existing National Guard separate infantry brigades, the 116th of Virginia and the 58th of Maryland, each reorganized in the light division design. By the end of FY 1989 the division was complete, except for its air defense artillery battalion.

During FY 1989 TRADOC began a reexamination of the light infantry division as an effort related to the assessment of the heavy-light force concept directed by General Vuono in August 1988 and the Army's light force modernization plan. The concentration of armored forces in mid- or high-intensity war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact raised questions regarding the suitability of the Army's light forces for such conflicts. Completed late in FY 1989, TRADOC's assessment of the LID validated its role as a strategic Army force; however, TRADOC underscored the weaknesses of the light division. The study endorsed the concept of


combining heavy with light forces, but also noted that the LID's greatest utility was in contingencies and low-intensity conflicts. According to TRADOC, the division's simple design was its greatest advantage, but this quality made it difficult to organize balanced brigade combined arms task forces. The Lid's insufficient man-portable tank-killing weapons, vehicular mobility and staying power, and often outmoded equipment ill-suited it for participation in mechanized warfare operations.

In the summer of FY 1989 General Vuono directed TRADOC to develop a light force modernization plan focused on system modernization rather than structural changes. Initial work on the LID modernization plan by the Combined Arms Center demonstrated the difficulty of separating system modernization from force design. TRADOC planners had already formed a new light division structure as part of the Infantry Division 96 study, which closely related to work on A L B - F. The LID of 1996 was unlikely to fight as a complete division, but rather as task-organized brigades or battalions and as elements of a task force or corps for specific missions. In its role as a rapid reaction force, the LID of the future would no longer be limited to securing lodgments for subsequent reinforcement, but would possess sufficient combat power to alter favorably the balance of power. This concept suggested converting one of the Lid's three brigades to a medium or heavy brigade and pooling much of the division's combat and combat service support for disposition by corps headquarters for specific missions. In addition, planners considered modifying the structure of each light division commensurate with its most likely strategic role and giving LIDs priority for new equipment.

Designed as a rapid intervention force for deployment by air to trouble spots in Latin America, the Middle East, or Asia, the LID also had shown enough promise as part of a heavy-light force for use in mid- and high-intensity warfare. The Army explored this concept in several training scenarios at the NTC, during REFORGER 88, and during CARAVAN GUARD 89, conducted in Europe near the end of FY 1989. In REFORGER 88, the experience of a battalion task force of the 10th Mountain Division demonstrated its ability to operate independently as companies, platoons, or squads; to move quickly by foot in terrain inhospitable for armored operations; and to contend with heavy forces as long as they did not directly engage them on open ground. That heavy-light forces could be synchronized to increase a heavy division's effectiveness was also demonstrated in CARAVAN GUARD 89. In that exercise the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, operated with elements of the 3d Armored Division. The exercise demonstrated that light infantry performing in a zone reconnaissance role for a heavy force can enable the heavy division to move deeper and faster in a European mid-intensity conflict.


While such exercises helped the Army to define better the operational capabilities of light infantry forces and to clarify the doctrinal role of heavy-light forces in AirLand Battle, serious questions remained in FY 1989. One unsettled issue was the number of aircraft flights needed to move a light division. A calculation that an LID could be transported anywhere in the world in six days in 500 C-141 flights seemed unattainable in recent computer analyses due to several factors — differences between Army and Air Force calculations of lift capacity, modifications in TO E s that replaced original equipment or added new equipment, and the tailoring of force requirements to meet specific contingencies. According to Army analysts at the Combined Arms Combat Development Activity, earlier lift estimates were based on less men and materiel than more recent ones.

Conversion of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized)

The 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) was conceived by the Army leadership as a test bed for the design of a high technology, motorized light division. Advocates believed that it offered distinctive advantages in strategic deployability and sustainability and a high degree of tactical mobility and lethality if properly equipped, and at a low cost. Advocates contended the division could effectively meet mid-intensity and regional threats usually addressed by heavy conventional forces. In 1988 the Army ended this experiment and began to convert the division to a mechanized infantry design. Congress had refused to fund a light attack vehicle (LAV) and an armored gun system (AGS) that the Army considered necessary for a motorized division. The AGS, a twenty-ton tracked vehicle that mounted a 105-mm. rapid-f ire cannon that could be airlifted in a C-130, was canceled in 1987. The configuration and role of the 9th Infantry Division (Motorized) raised many doctrinal issues regarding the feasibility of organizing specialized divisions whose equipment was not standardized throughout the Army 's force structure. Other questions concerned the suitability of the division's equipment for its intended mission. For example, the HMMWV, the centerpiece of the motorized concept, seemed to lack the payload and armor protection to serve as a weapons carrier or platform .

Conversion of the 9th Division from a motorized to a mechanized division proceeded slowly in FY 1989. The Army liquidated the unorthodox test agency, the Army Development and Employment Agency, which had tried to adapt off-the-shelf, high-technology systems to the motorized division concept. A decision on the division's conversion to mechanized awaited approval of an environmental impact statement, not executed until FY 1990, regarding the effect of mechanized operations at


Fort Lewis. The Army inactivated the division's 2d Brigade in FY 1988 to meet end strength reductions called for in the FY 1989 amended Army budget. In mid-FY 1989 the 9th Division's two active brigades, the 1st and 3d, each had three combined arms battalions (CAB). The 1st Brigade had a combined arms battalion (heavy) with two assault gun companies and an infantry company, a combined arms battalion (light) with two infantry companies and an assault gun company, and an armor battalion. The 3d Brigade was composed of a combined arms battalion (heavy), a combined arms battalion (light), and a light attack battalion of HMMWVs mounted with Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided Missiles (TOWs) and machine guns. The division's third brigade was replaced by an ARNG roundout brigade, the 81st Mechanized Brigade of the Washington ARNG .

The division's organization in FY 1989 was temporary pending a study of several configurations. One configuration envisioned a division of three brigades-armored, mechanized, and motorized. On 18 May 1989, the Chief of Staff endorsed planning that entailed creating a division of four armored, three mechanized infantry, and three motorized battalions and directed TRADOC to develop an appropriate AirLand Battle doctrine for this configuration. He also directed TRADOC to avoid impinging on the heavy modernization plan as it developed the division's design and to study the feasibility of adopting the Marine Corps' widely used Light Armored Vehicle (LAV-25). During FY 1989 General Vuono approved the conversion of two of the division's CAB (Light) battalions to mechanized infantry battalions. Planners were also entertaining a heavy design configuration of five armored battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions in an Army of Excellence design as a long-term goal.

Artillery and Rocket Forces

During FY 1989 the Army enacted several measures that affected field artillery forces. The ongoing 3x8 conversions of the artillery forces-three firing batteries and eight guns per battery-were suspended in late FY 1988 because of insufficient M548 ammunition carriers and conflicting priorities for the distribution of M109 howitzers. This issue, also affected by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and by budgetary considerations, remained unresolved in early FY 1989. Previously approved 3x8 conversions necessitated changes in the artillery force structure. For example, during FY 1989 Battery C, 5th Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, relocated from Fort Bragg to Fort Campbell in order to fill the void left when the 2d Battalion, 31st Field Artillery, was inactivated during the XVIII Airborne Corps' conversion to the 3x8 design. HQDA also canceled inactivation of the 3d Battalion, 18th Field Artillery.


Rocket and missile forces were influenced by other factors in FY 1989. A devastating explosion in May 1988 at the Pacific Engineering Production Company at Henderson, Nevada, destroyed half of the United States' production capacity for the rocket fuel oxidizer ammonium perchlorate (AP). In December 1988, because of a worldwide shortage of AP, the Joint DOD/NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) AP Allocation Board allotted the Army 86.7 percent of its AP requirements through June 1989. Army Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) forces were allotted only 85 percent of their authorized requirement. The Army anticipated that shortages of ammonium perchlorate would be alleviated by the end of FY 1989 after a new AP production plant being constructed at Cedar City, Utah, began full production.

International arms control efforts profoundly affected the structure of Army missile forces in Europe. The INF Treaty, signed in December 1987 by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, required that four US and six Soviet missile systems be destroyed by 31 May 1991 and prohibited further production of these systems. The treaty called for verification by on-site inspections of the elimination of an entire class of US and Soviet land-based missile systems with ranges of 300 and 3,400 miles. The four US systems affected are the ground launched cruise missile (BGM-109G) and the nuclear-equipped Pershing II, 1A, and 1B; the six Soviet systems are the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, SS-23, and SSC-X-4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition had responsibility for ensuring DOD's compliance with the INF Treaty. Responsibility for verification of Soviet compliance was vested in the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Charged with eliminating its Pershing II and 1A missiles erected in Europe, the Army was engaged in this task at three sites — launchers were being destroyed at the Equipment Maintenance Center in Hausen, West Germany, while missiles were being eliminated at the Pueblo Depot Activity in Pueblo, Colorado. Both missiles and launchers were being destroyed at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant in Marshall, Texas. The Army also supported the INF Treaty by detailing linguists, inspectors, missile specialists, and security support personnel to the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA), a DOD agency established in January 1988 to help implement the INF Treaty. At Army bases subject to Soviet inspection, base commanders prepared and carried out site plans and procedures to support Soviet inspection and OSIA escort teams. Members of the Army's Intelligence and Security Command also furnished security and counterintelligence support. The Army reported on its work with the INF Treaty to the US Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, a State Department office. The total cost to DOD to implement the INF Treaty in FY 1989 was about $95 million, of which the Army incurred about $24 million. In FY


1989, 200 Army military personnel and 257 Army civilians were involved in the effort.

The first missile eliminated, a Pershing 1A, was destroyed in September 1988 at the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant by static firing and crushing in the presence of a Soviet inspection team. Most Pershing missiles were destroyed by explosive demolition or burning, the solid fuel being burned during static firing, after which the missile canister was crushed. All 169 Pershing 1A short-range missiles were eliminated within the eighteen-month deadline, or by 7 July 1989. The Soviets eliminated all 957 declared shorter range missiles by November 1989. Destruction of Pershing II missiles continued in FY 1989 at the Longhorn and the Pueblo depots.

Demolition of the Pershing missiles also affected the status of approximately twelve thousand Army troops in Europe. Despite strong congressional sentiment to reduce US military strength in Europe by about twenty-five thousand, the total number of American troops made excess by the destruction of missiles under the INF Treaty, Army commanders in Europe sought to retain most of the Army troops by reclassifying or retraining them. The Army discontinued four enlisted Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) and one warrant officer MOS peculiar to the Pershing, but the majority of Pershing technicians were transferred to the MLRS MOS. Some electronic and mechanical repairmen were transferred to aviation repair specialties. The Army also planned to reassign the 2d Battalion, 4th Infantry, which provided security for Pershing missile sites, to the Seventh Army training facilities at Hohenfels, West Germany, as a permanent opposition force (OPFOR).

Destruction of the Pershing coincided with the Army's plans to expand its MLRS forces. These plans called for converting three battalions of the 56th Field Artillery Command (Pershing) and the 2d Battalion, 32d Field Artillery (Lance), to MLRS battalions beginning in FY 1989. The Army also intended to convert two Pershing batteries of the 3d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (Pershing), at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to MLRS batteries. Equipment for this conversion was available from on-hand assets at Fort Sill and the loan of MLRS launchers from the Oklahoma National Guard. Fort Sill would provide equipment to field A and B Batteries while the Oklahoma ARNG would have nine MLRS launchers to support individual training. The 3d Battalion, 9th Field Artillery, would retain one Pershing II battery for training and rotational purposes through the INF Treaty period, or until FY 1992. The Army intended to "backfill" the battalion with new production MLRS launchers in FY 1991. The conversion plan also affected several support companies. Plans to convert two 8-inch howitzer battalions in USAREUR to MLRS and two self-propelled 155-mm. artillery battalions at Fort Sill to MLRS configuration were under review


by HQDA in FY 1989. The delay in converting the latter units was attributed to a lag in the production of MLRS launchers. The Army planned to upgrade USAREUR's field artillery forces with the introduction of ATACMS, the long-range missile for the MLRS launcher, by FY 1990.

The INF Treaty did not affect the Army's Lance missile, a nuclear-armed tactical missile with a range of approximately seventy-eight miles. Eighty-eight Lance launchers were assigned to NATO in FY 1989. The Army considered extending the range of the Lance to three hundred miles, but West German officials urged removal of the Lance from Europe. In discussing the future of the Lance in NATO, however, the alliance's High Level Group reported to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in the spring of 1989 that the United States had selected the M270 MLRS launcher as a Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL).

Special Operations Forces

Established on 1 October 1982, and recently subordinated to FORSCOM, the Army 's 1st Special Operations Command (Airborne) commanded all Army special operations forces. These included special forces, rangers, psychological operations and civil affairs units, and special operations aviation units. The US Special Operations Command (USSO-COM), a unified command located at MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa , Florida, set major policy and exercised operational command over SOF of all services assigned to it. In August 1989 the Army Chief of Staff approve d designation of the 1st SOCOM as a major Army command effective in early FY 1990. FORSCOM's Special Operations Division controlled much of the Army 's planning and management of SOF, and it transferred approximately 75 percent of the responsibility to the 1st SOCOM by the end of FY 1989. With its headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and a strength of about eighty-five hundred, the 1st SOCOM also became the Army component of USSOCOM. The 1st SOCOM's major subordinate units are the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger); the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 10th Special Forces Groups (Airborne); the 4th Psychological Operations Group; the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion; the 528th Support Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne); the 112th Signal Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne); and the 1st Battalion and Company A, 3d Battalion, 160th Aviation Group (Special Operations) (Airborne ) . FORSCOM's exercise of control, however, was an intermediate step in the Army 's goal of forming a U.S. Army Special Operations Command with two major subordinate commands: the 1st SOCOM for active component SOF and a US Army Reserve SOCOM for reserve component SOF.

Several SOF command issues were unresolved as FY 1989 ended. Among them were funding arrangements and the relation of the 1st


SOCOM to Army Reserve special operations forces. FORSCOM proposed establishing an Army Reserve SOCOM at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to exercise command and control of reserve component SOF. In August 1989 General Vuono approved FORSCOM's concept for an organization to be known as the US Army Reserve Special Operations Command. He deferred assigning it an activation date pending approval by DOD and Congress. In the interim the 1st SOCOM would exercise operational control over reserve component SOF units while FORSCOM supervised the training of 11,500 reserve component special operations forces dispersed throughout thirty-seven states. Approximately 50 percent of the Army's SOF, 33 percent of the total special operations aviation assets, and more than 90 percent of the Army's psychological operations and civil affairs capabilities were in the reserve components.

Throughout FY 1989 the Army sought to strengthen its special operations forces through restructuring, activating selected units, and modernizing. A Special Forces Branch was established in FY 1988, which allowed Special Forces officers and NCOs to pursue a career in their specialty without having to transfer between their basic branch and the Special Forces. The Army enhanced career management in FY 1989 by establishing the new branch's first advanced NCO course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Army Special Forces in FY 1989 were organized into eight groups, four each in the active and reserve components. The four active groups are the 1st Special Forces Group at Fort Lewis, Washington (its 1st Battalion was forward-deployed in Okinawa); the 5th Special Forces Group at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (its 3d Battalion was forward-deployed to Panama); and the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Devens, Massachusetts (its 1st Battalion was forward-deployed to Bad Toelz, West Germany). During FY 1989 the Army was completing plans to activate an additional group, the 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne). Four special forces groups were in the reserve components, two each in the USAR and the ARNG.

Effective September 1989 SOF units began converting to Army of Excellence force designs and changed from the "H" series TOEs to the revised "L" series. The conversion affected ranger, special forces, and active psychological operations units. The new force design complemented other AOE initiatives in restructuring heavy and light forces and took better advantage of recent modernization efforts. The three separate functional support companies of a Special Forces group were to be inactivated and replaced by four multifunctional support companies with responsibilities similar to the old companies. One company will be assigned to each of a group's three special forces battalions, while the fourth company supports the group headquarters. Other changes entailed the activation of two


chemical reconnaissance detachments and a Special Operations Aviation (SOA) battalion.

Nearly all of the Army's psychological and civil affairs capabilities were assigned to the reserve components. The 4th Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was the Army's only active component PSYOP unit. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), also at Fort Bragg, was the Army's sole active component civil affairs (CA) battalion. In accord with Total Army Analysis-96, the Army planned to activate as many as thirty-one PSYOP units in the future. Throughout FY 1989 the Army and USSOCOM debated whether Army civil affairs and psychological operations units should be part of SOF. The Army held that they were, while the Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command (CINCSOC), maintained that they were not. By existing statute, CINCSOC is responsible for functional PSYOP and CA activities but only insofar as they relate to special operations. CINCSOC's narrow interpretation of USSOCOM's relation to Army PSYOP and CA units had significant implications for Army force structure, command and control, doctrine, training, and other matters. Formal discussions on this issue continued into FY 1990.

Army Special Operations Aviation units included one SOA Group, the 160th Aviation Group (SO) (Airborne), consisting of two battalions, a separate company, and a forward-deployed detachment. One of the group's battalions is assigned to the Oklahoma National Guard. With a strength of 828 men, the 160th is equipped with a mix of gunships and utility helicopters (MH-60A, MH-47D, UH-1H, and MH/AH-6 helicopters). Known as Task Force 160, or the Night Stalkers, the group specializes in night operations. It has state-of-the-art radars, navigational aids, radios, and an array of electronic countermeasures. The group's helicopters can insert, resupply, and extract special operations forces from hostile territory or furnish limited airlift of troops and equipment, fire support, and air and sea rescue service. Under a reorganization approved by the Army Chief of Staff in 1987, the SOA structure will evolve into an SOA regiment consisting of 4 SOA battalions (3 active and 1 reserve), 2 separate SOA companies, and 1 forward-deployed SOA detachment. The regiment will eventually have 144 aircraft.

A detachment of four specially equipped UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters is assigned to each Special Forces group. The Army planned to eliminate these detachments from all SF groups by FY 1991 and to make the groups totally dependent on theater army general support aviation and Air Force resources. Army SOFs are also supported by Air Force helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The feasibility of transferring the entire special operations airlift mission to the Army was examined but rejected by a DOD study in late FY 1988.


Army Aviation

Army aviation force structure was affected by two primary factors in FY 1989-the modernization of Army helicopters and budgetary constraints that reduced active component aviation personnel, units, and equipment. As directed by DOD, the Army had already eliminated 2,200 aviation-related manpower spaces in FY 1988. DOD also directed the Army to eliminate 450 aircraft by the end of FY 1988 and an additional 900 over the next five years. Much of this reduction was carried out in FY 1988/1989 through turn-in of obsolete, unrepairable, or damaged aircraft without replacement and by reducing TDA and general support aviation companies. In FY 1989 the Defense Resources Board instructed the Army to eliminate 7 attack helicopter battalions (2 active, 3 National Guard, and 2 Army Reserve) and to decrease the number of active component AH-64 aircraft from 18 to 15 in each battalion. These measures were expected to eliminate 2,141 additional aviation-related personnel spaces (754 active, 831 Guard, 566 Reserve) between FY 1990 and FY 1994. The Army Staff recognized that leaner budgets required that it stand down aviation units in all components and downsize remaining units.

To reduce further its aviation force structure, the Army eliminated six OH-58A observation helicopters from each division's aviation company, effective September 1989. It downsized AH-1 attack helicopter battalions from 21 AH-1, 13 OH-58D, and 3 UH-1A aircraft to 18, 10, and 2, respectively, which also reduced each battalion by eighteen crew members. Downsizing aviation units before new high-performance helicopters were fielded posed risks to readiness. The AH-1 Cobra attack helicopter refurbishment program, for example, lagged behind expectation and resulted in some decrease in readiness and delays in training the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Mountain Division (LID), and the 6th Attack Helicopter Battalion (Army Reserve), according to FORSCOM. Shortages of pilots and aircraft maintenance personnel adversely affected OH-58 Kiowa and AH-1 fleet operations. Shortages of night-vision goggles posed safety hazards.

Throughout FY 1989 the Army upgraded its aviation force structure by converting AH-1 Cobra battalions to AH-64 Apache attack battalions. It gave priority to fielding combat-ready attack helicopter battalions to Europe and other high-priority national defense requirements. Conversion training from the AH-1 to the AH-64 was conducted at Fort Hood, Texas. The following units trained and were relocated during FY 1989: the 4th Attack Helicopter Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment, to Illesheim, West Germany; the 1st Attack Helicopter Battalion, 1st Aviation Regiment, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky; the 2d Attack Helicopter Battalion, 229th Aviation Regiment, to Fort Rucker, Alabama; the 3d Attack Helicopter


Battalion, 1st Aviation Regiment, to Ansbach, West Germany; the 3d Attack Helicopter Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, to Hanau, West Germany; and the 1st Attack Helicopter Battalion, 24th Aviation Regiment, to Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia. At the end of FY 1989 the Army had 14 AH-64 battalions in its active force structure (9 in CONUS; 5 OCONUS), an increase of 4 since the end of FY 1988.

The Army had planned to acquire a total of 573 Apache helicopters, but in FY 1988 Congress increased the total purchase to 975 and approved a procurement program slated for completion by FY 1991. Based on that number, the Army planned to field a total of 48 AH-64 battalions by FY 1996, depending on whether the battalion had 18 or 15 helicopters. In FY 1989 DOD reduced the Apache procurement objective from 975 to 807 aircraft, resulting in elimination of five Apache battalions from the Army's projected force goal of forty-eight. Funding for the AH-64 increased from $911 million in FY 1988 to about $1.7 billion in FY 1989. Higher unit costs reduced the number of Apache helicopters that the Army bought from 77 in FY 1988 to 72 in FY 1989. The accelerated production schedule for the AH-64 threatened to leave the Army with a cold production base for attack helicopters until the LHX entered production.

To meet the Apache battalion fielding plan, the Army resorted to manning them with experienced Cobra pilots, a policy that contributed to shortages of the latter. By mid-FY 1989 the Army was short 383 active duty warrant officer Cobra pilots. A shortage of Cobra aircraft required the Aviation Systems Command to reduce AH-1 training by 4 to 6 students per class, with the potential loss of an additional 54 to 84 newly trained pilots in FY 1989. Shortages of funds and replacement parts also contributed to difficulties in maintaining deployed Apache units and adhering to the fielding schedule. HQDA and several Army MACOMs — AMC, TRADOC, FORSCOM — sought to stabilize the organization of Apache units by minimizing MTOE changes, deleting obsolete items, and redistributing assets within units. These and other measures helped the readiness of Apache battalions that had recently converted to the new "L" series Toes to support contingency and mobilization requirements.

On 13 May 1989, violent winds in excess of 100 miles per hour damaged or destroyed 142 of the 495 aircraft at Fort Hood Army Airfield and nearby Robert Gray Army Airfield. The III Corps' fleet of 150 AH-64s, one-third of the Army's Apache inventory, was hit the hardest. Apaches from the 1st Cavalry Division, the 2d Armored Division, the 6th Cavalry Brigade (the Army's only separate air combat brigade), and the Apache Training Brigade were damaged. Of the 101 Apaches damaged, 31 needed depot repairs. Thirty to forty other helicopters (UH-60s, OH-58s, UH-1s, CH-47s, and AH-1s) were severely damaged. Most of the helicopters suffered damage to the main rotor blades, structural faults, and


damage to transmissions. Losses were initially estimated in excess of $600 million, which included facilities repair. A second severe storm in early June damaged about fifty helicopters at Fort Polk, Louisiana, with losses there estimated at $9 million.

After assessing the damage, General Vuono indicated that the Army would not reconstitute the Apache fleet at Fort Hood by transferring helicopters from other posts since that would lower the readiness of other Apache units. Fort Hood would absorb the losses, but the Apache Training Brigade would be reconstituted to minimize slippage in unit activation, conversion, and training. By "cross-leveling" equipment between units, borrowing Apaches from the National Guard, and acquiring new aircraft, an additional seventy-five AH-64 helicopters were made available while damaged aircraft were being repaired. In May damage assessment teams suggested that the damage was not as severe as originally believed. Some aircraft originally thought to be unsalvageable were repairable. A new estimate lowered the repair cost to $101.6 million and indicated that most repairs could be made in about one year. In July 1989 Congress passed the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill, which gave DOD authority to transfer approximately $176.7 million from various DOD accounts to the Army to defray the cost of emergency repairs.

Nevertheless, an assessment of available Apaches made by the Army in mid-June indicated that the combat capability of thirteen aviation battalions or battalion equivalents had been impaired. Despite the damage to the Apache fleet, the Army planned to field attack helicopter battalions OCONUS on schedule and expected a delay of one to two months to field CONUS attack battalions. By August 1989, 11 of 101 damaged Apaches were returned to service. Under Project Broken Wing the majority of the Apaches were being repaired at Fort Hood by Army mechanics. Some of the most seriously damaged helicopters were being refurbished by Lockheed Support Services, Inc., at nearby Killeen Municipal Airport in Killeen, Texas.

Other force structure changes in Army aviation that occurred in FY 1989 included the activation of the 3d Battalion, 160th Aviation Regiment, at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; the establishment of a provisional assault helicopter battalion at Fort Riley, Kansas, from assets of the 1st Infantry Division; the activation of the 3d Assault Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, at Fort Campbell to provide the 101st Air Assault Division with a third airlift battalion; and the activation of Company C, 3d Battalion, 159th Aviation Regiment, at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The activation of Company C on 16 October 1989 converted the NTC's Flight Detachment from a TDA to a TOE unit. To flesh out the structure of the 6th Infantry Division (LID), FORSCOM assigned the 2d Battalion, 123d Aviation Regiment, to the division's roundout


brigade. In addition, the 4th Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was transferred to US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) for employment by US Army, South (USARSO), effective 1 August 1989. In July 1989 FORSCOM activated the Air Traffic Control Platoon of the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York. FORSCOM assumed responsibility for the Army's air traffic control functions from the Information Systems Command in FY 1987 and planned to convert these units from a Signal Corps TDA structure to Army of Excellence TOE units.

The Army's aviation force structure also contained a variety of special mission aircraft for SOF (see discussion of SOA above) and to support other Army and national intelligence requirements. These Special Electronic Mission Aircraft (SEMA) are in the active component force structure as part of the Army's Intelligence and Electronic Warfare tactical mission responsibilities. The fleet in FY 1989 included the RV-1D (Electronic Intelligence-QUICKFIX), the OV-1D (Side-Looking Airborne Radar) aircraft, the RC-12D and RC-12H/K (GUARDRAIL- signals intelligence) aircraft, and the EH-60 electronic warfare helicopters. The OV-1D, in the Army's force structure since the Vietnam War, is the only aircraft organic to Army corps that can monitor moving targets. It supports NATO's Follow-on Forces Attack doctrine by enhancing the corps' deep battle capability with multiple sensors that develop target information. The EH-60 helicopter allows division commanders to disrupt hostile communication on the battlefield.

In FY 1989 experienced artillery noncommissioned officers (NCOs) began replacing officers as aerial observers in OH-58D Kiowa scout helicopters as part of the Aerial Fire Support Observer Program. The first NCO aerial observer class graduated in November 1988 at the Aerial Observer Branch of the Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Operational tests under the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) had demonstrated that the Kiowa's capabilities were enhanced when experienced NCO artillery observers replaced less experienced lieutenants. Another factor that influenced the change was the general reduction of officer strength and a consequent conversion of officer observer positions in division artillery and field artillery brigades to NCO positions.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support

The Total Army's combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) force structure experienced manpower and equipment shortages in FY 1989. The Army had a shortfall of 37,400 CS/CSS personnel from the authorized level of organization (ALO) but planned to reduce this deficit


by about 3,400 during the next five years. These deficits were compounded by soldiers' lacking MOS qualification, especially in the reserve components. The reserve components adopted several remedial measures that addressed this deficiency (see Chapter 9). Shortages among Army support units in Europe and reserve component units earmarked to support forces in USAREUR were brought to the attention of Congress by the Commander in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), in FY 1988. Manpower and equipment shortages in the active component CS/CSS units were shared proportionally by theater with distribution determined by local requirements, major force OPLAN arrival dates, and order of precedence on the Army's Master Priority List. In FY 1989 the equipment readiness status of CS/CSS units ranged from C-1 to C-4. Equipment currently in the Army's inventory, however, together with equipment scheduled for procurement over the next five years, was regarded as sufficient to enable all CS/CSS units to attain a readiness level of C-3 or better. The Army's policy regarding the CS/CSS force structure was not to activate or convert any CS/CSS unit to a new TOE unless it could meet a combat readiness status of C-3 or better.

During FY 1989 active component chemical companies that had been split between stations were consolidated. The 84th Chemical Company was consolidated at Fort Polk, Louisiana, in September 1988; the 172d Chemical Company at Fort Carson, Colorado, in March 1989; and the 164th Chemical Company at Fort Irwin in June 1989. The capability of other chemical units was enhanced by the fielding of the M1059 Smoke Generator Carrier. The 144th Chemical Company received its initial increment of the M1059, while the 31st Chemical Company, Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 45th Chemical Company, Fort Polk, Louisiana, were issued their full complement of new generators. Additional deliveries were made also to the 84th and 172d Chemical Companies. Two smoke generator battalions, two smoke companies, and one chemical decontamination company were activated in the National Guard. During FY 1989 HQDA conducted a force validation review of the chemical force structure in the reserve components that indicated a sharp reduction in the number of activations and conversions planned in FY 1990.

Since it was designated DOD's executive agent for land-based water resources in 1980, the Army has developed its Tactical Water Program with manpower and equipment to detect, produce, treat, store, distribute, and also cool water in arid regions. The Army, under ODCSLOG's proponency, has focused on supporting the US Central Command (CENTCOM), whose likely area of operations experiences an acute shortage of fresh water. In FY 1989 the Army acquired a 3,000-gallon reverse osmosis water purification unit to supplement existing smaller units. Most general support (GS) water units designated to support CENTCOM are in the


reserve components. The majority of the planned fifty-three GS water units have been organized, and the remainder are expected to be organized by the end of FY 1990. To train these units, eleven water training sets were assembled and assigned to the CONUS armies for water supply company and tactical water distribution system training. A centralized training facility is also being established to allow reserve component water purification units to train during their two-week annual training.

In accord with TOE changes derived from the Logistics Unit Productivity System (LUPS) analysis of combat service support functions, the Army activated the 54th Quartermaster Company Graves Registration (GRREG) on 6 December 1988 at Fort Lee, Virginia. The activation of two additional GRREG companies, one in Germany and the other in the Pacific, was postponed until FY 1998. Army officials anticipated that the delay would create a shortfall in GRREG capabilities during the first 180 days of a large mobilization. To mitigate this situation, the Army considered stationing GRREG platoons in EUCOM and PACOM. The absence of GRREG refresher unit training conducted for the Army Reserve in FY 1988 and FY 1989 adversely affected GRREG readiness. A disagreement among the Army Quartermaster School at Fort Lee, Virginia, FORSCOM, and the continental United States armies (CONUSAs) regarding proponency curtailed all GRREG training in FORSCOM. A 1988 agreement between the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force transferred the mission of the port of entry (POE) mortuary to the Air Force. On 30 September 1989, the Army closed the Army mortuary at Oakland Army Base, California. The facility will be reestablished at Travis Air Force Base (AFB) in California and will be patterned after the one at Dover AFB, Delaware, to handle mass casualties.

The Engineers

During FY 1989 the Engineer Center and School completed the draft of a new force design concept, the Engineer Force, or E-Force. It addressed both combat engineer support of heavy forces in close combat in the AirLand Battle and engineer requirements for AirLand Battle-Future. The AirLand Battle concept envisioned an increase of engineer support to divisions to accommodate their greater maneuver requirements. The E-Force consisted of the combined assets of a division combat engineer battalion and a corps combat engineer battalion that formed a headquarters and three engineer battalions, and each battalion would support a maneuver brigade. The battalions would deploy well forward in the brigade area to perform mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks. This concept would eliminate the current division-corps split in task-organized engineer forces. Under the E-Force concept the division engineer


would synchronize the support of engineer forces to combat units in forward areas as the tactical situation evolved. The CG, TRADOC, approved the E-Force concept in FY 1988 but directed that it be tested using the 7th Infantry Division before submitting it to HQDA for approval. TRADOC coordinated a test plan with USAREUR and FORSCOM that was scheduled to begin in June 1990 in CONUS and to culminate in Europe in October 1990 during REFORGER 90.


Army force structure in FY 1989 demonstrated a shift from an overwhelmingly Warsaw Pact threat-based force structure to a capabilities-based structure. Within the context of the Army's strategic roles, current and potential threats, and cost considerations, the Army sought to maintain sufficient ready forces to provide versatile force projection and forcible-entry capabilities for crisis responses and to sustain forward-deployed forces in Europe and Asia. Consisting of heavy, light, and special operations units, their supporting elements, and sustaining base activities, the Army's force structure in FY 1989 reflected its orientation to AirLand Battle doctrine. Army force structure development during FY 1989 also reflected a widening doctrinal scope that included further growth of its light infantry divisions, experimentation in combining heavy and light forces, and the augmentation of special operations forces.



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