Department of the Army Historical Summary: FY 1989



Strength and Demographics

The active component entered FY 1989 with an authorized strength of 771,800, or 8,800 fewer than FY 1988. Actual strength at the start of FY 1989 was 769,369, and that figure was 769,741 at year's end. It consisted of 106,877 officers, 658,321 enlisted personnel, and 4,543 cadets. The Army's operating strength at the end of FY 1989 was approximately 770,000, a decline of 7,000 from the previous year's operating strength. Of a total DOD active uniformed strength of 2,130,229 at the end of FY 1989, the Army constituted approximately 36 percent. The Army 's strength in FY 1989 was its lowest post-World War II strength since the start of the Korean War. At the end of FY 1989, 679,207, or 89.5 percent of the active component, was male: 584,024 enlisted and 94,680 officers. Female soldiers numbered 86,494, or 10.5 percent of the Army's strength, with 74,297 enlisted personnel and 12,197 officers. Female strength at the end of FY 1989 was 2,722 greater than at the end of FY 1988, with the increase concentrated in the officer corps. Black active component strength was 212,157, or 27.64 percent of the force; blacks constituted 30.43 percent of enlisted personnel and 10.4 percent of the officer corps. Other minorities totaled 61,163, or 7.96 percent of the active Army, and 8.51 percent of enlisted personnel and 3.84 percent of the officer corps. The distribution of active component officers and enlisted personnel by grade at the end of FY 1989 is displayed in Table 3.

The educational level of the Army in FY 1989 reflected the service's success in attracting higher quality recruits. Only 1.6 percent of the enlisted force had not graduated from high school. Almost all officers had attended college; 95.2 percent had college degrees. In contrast, only 2.5 percent of enlisted personnel and 22.2 percent of warrant officers were college graduates. At the end of FY 1989, 75 percent of the officer corps and s lightly less than 50 percent of all enlisted soldiers were married. More than 24,000 officers and 4,000 enlisted personnel had spouses who were also service members; 30,550 enlisted members and 2,676 officers we r e single parents. Total dependents (spouses, children, parents, and other adults) numbered 991,035 on 30 September 1989, or 2.51 per family unit..

TABLE 3 — Active Duty Army Personnel by Grade
30 September 1989
Rank (Officers)
General, O-10
Lieutenant General, O-9
Major General, O-8
Brigadier General, O-7
Colonel, O-6
Lieutenant Colonel, O-5
Major, O-4
Captain, O-3
1st Lieutenant, O-2
2d Lieutenant, O-1
Chief Warrant Officer, W-4
Chief Warrant Officer, W-3
Chief Warrant Officer, W-2
Chief Warrant Officer, W-1
Total Officers
Rank (Enlisted)
Sergeant Major, E-9
Master Sergeant, E-8
Sergeant, First Class, E-7
Staff Sergeant, E-6
Sergeant, E-5
Corporal/Spec, E-4
Specialist, E-3
Private, E-2
Private, E-1
Total Enlisted
Grand Total

Recruitment and Retention

The Army's ability to perform its strategic roles depended on the quality of its manpower and its capacity to recruit, train, and retain talented soldiers. During the 1980s the Army conducted a concerted campaign to


increase the number of its personnel with high educational and mental aptitude levels. From the main pool of potential Army recruits (1.45 million 17- to 21-year-old males in the total population), in FY 1989 the Army hoped to recruit one of ten. Given the record low rate of unemployment in FY 1989, recruiters faced a daunting task to meet their goals. The Army's enlisted accession plan for FY 1989 called for recruitment of 111,700 non-prior-service (NPS) volunteers and 8,900 enlistments from those with prior service. The enlisted reenlistment goal was 88,000 (34,400 initial term, 25,400 mid-term, and 28,200 career reenlistments). For officers and warrant officers, the Army's accession goal was to commission 9,440 individuals to maintain the budgeted officer strength objective of 196,877.

The profile of Army enlistees, however, showed a marked increase in the late 1980s in the percentage of high quality recruits and a sharp decline in the percentage of enlistees who tested in the lowest acceptable mental category. Projections made early in FY 1989 by ODCSPER indicated that the pool of eligible enlistees would shrink to about a million men by 1994. If Army strength stayed stable, the Army would have to recruit one of eight eligible males. In FY 1989 the usual term of enlistment was three years, but the combat arms had a two-year enlistment option. Within this environment the Army recruiting goal for FY 1989 was set at 119,901. The Army also expected a 3 percent decline in the number of volunteers who were high school graduates and those who scored in Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Test Category I-IIIA, and an increase from 4 to 10 percent in Test Category IV.

During the first half of FY 1989 the Army experienced difficulty in attracting a sufficient number of high quality recruits. Among NPs enlistments there were declines in the percentage of high school graduates and test scores in AFQT categories I through III, and a small rise in Category IV. The total Delayed Entry Program (DEP) for FY 1989 was 15.7 percent lower than FY 1988, which diminished recruiting and training options for enlistees because of the pressure to accelerate DEP accessions. Continued economic expansion, a widening gap between civilian and military pay, and the elimination of tuition benefits for two-year enlistments contributed to the decline of high quality volunteers. In 1989 TRADOC, the RAND Corporation, and the Army Research Institute conducted several empirical research projects whose results demonstrated a strong relationship between high AFQT scores and performance.

In January 1989 recruiting contracts were 10 percent below force requirements, quality was declining, and the DEP had the smallest group of recruits in six years. To counter these adverse trends, the Army intensified its recruiting and reenlistment efforts and gave wide publicity to its enlistment incentives. The popular Montgomery GI Bill had a monthly


participation rate of 90 to 95 percent. Other popular incentives included the Army College Fund (ACF), which offered selective bonuses that ranged from $8,000 to $14,000 above the basic GI Bill, the higher amounts pegged to longer enlistments. Enlistment bonuses (EB) were designed to attract persons with critical skills. Depending on the skill and length of enlistment, bonuses could vary from $1,500 to $8,000. Higher reenlistments enabled the Army in April 1989 to stop enlisting recruits who tested in Category IV.

The Army conducted several trial programs to boost recruitment of high school graduates in FY 1989. In March it initiated the Hometown Recruiter Assistance Program, which allowed outstanding enlisted soldiers to return to their hometown for two weeks to assist local recruiting efforts. Some monetary incentives were made available to recruits with one or two years of college, and an Early Shopper Bonus was offered to those who signed an enlistment contract by 31 May 1989. The Army continued to pursue legislative authority to test a two-year Army College Fund enlistment for noncombat arms MOS. Known as the "2+2+4 Enlistment term test," this option entailed two years' active training and commitment, followed by two years in a troop program unit in the USAR or ARNG, and the option of fulfilling the remaining four years in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Pending legislative approval, the Army received OSD and congressional permission to test the concept. Beginning in July 1989, under a fifteen-month trial, the ACF enlistment option was extended to noncombat arms specialties to attract college-bound youths. Army recruiters credited it with attracting highly qualified recruits who might not have considered enlisting in the Army.

Despite the troublesome recruiting picture of early FY 1989, the Army attained its FY 1989 recruiting goals but with a slight decline in the quality of volunteers. The number of enlisted personnel accessioned in FY 1989 was 120,558, nearly 5,000 more than FY 1988. The percentage of both women and nonwhite volunteers also inched upward. (See Tables 4 and 5.)

The Army's recruiting success in FY 1989 was aided by an increase in the funds, $621.7 million for the fiscal year, that covered advertising, enlistment bonuses, recruiter support, military pay, and other recruitment-related costs. The Army's advertising budget attracted congressional concern because of the rapid growth of this cost during the early and mid-1980s. The Army emphasized the importance of advertising and attributed its success in recruitment in part to the positive image of the Army portrayed in advertising campaigns. In FY 1989 the Army introduced a new theme to buttress its recruiting efforts, one that stressed the benefits of Army service to future success in civilian life. Advertisements suggested that Army veterans earned more in the private sector than nonveterans and that soldierly qualities were highly valued by employers.


TABLE 4 — Army Enlisted Accessions, FY 1988 and FY 1989, by Gender
(in thousands)

  FY 1988   FY 1989

  Male Female Total   Male Female Total

Non-Prior Service:
Prior Service:
Objective NPs:
Objective PS:
Total Objective:
% of Objective NPs:
% of Objective PS:
% Total Objective:

Source: DOD/PA 585-89, 19 Dec 89.



TABLE 5 — Enlisted Accessions, FY 1989, by Race
(in thousands)

  FY 1988   FY 1989

Number Percent   Number Percent


Source: DOD/PA, 585-89, 19 Dec 89.

Reenlistments enabled the Army to retain sufficient numbers of high quality and technically proficient soldiers to provide the experience and leadership needed for a professional career force. The Army leadership understood that soldiers and their families must have adequate compensation, quality of life benefits, and professional satisfaction comparable to civilians. In recent years the Army had succeeded in retaining high caliber volunteers even in the critical category of first-term reenlistments. Of the 119,997 soldiers eligible to reenlist in FY 1989, 74,716 reenlisted, for an unadjusted rate of 62.3 percent. First-term reenlistments reached a record high in FY 1989, totaling 42,911 out of an eligible 87,232, the highest number since FY 1982. At the outset of the fiscal year the Army had pro-


jected a requirement for 34,400 first-term reenlistments, about 10,000 more than in FY 1988. The Army's success in exceeding its first-term reenlistment goal helped offset the decline in NPs recruitment by allowing the service to accept fewer marginally qualified enlistees.

Career reenlistments, which had reached a record high unadjusted rate of 98.1 percent in FY 1988, dropped slightly to 97.1 percent in FY 1989; 31,805 career soldiers, out of 32,765 eligibles, reenlisted. The high number of career reenlistments was credited to better leadership by officers and NCOs and to greater command involvement in reenlistment programs. The high percentage of career reenlistments also allowed the Army to be more selective, especially with first-term reenlistments, which are traditionally the most difficult group to retain. The minimum "quality points" needed to reenlist (points that reflected civilian education, military test scores, and military training) was raised from 66 to 70 on a scale of 100.

The Army attributed the high rate of all reenlistments to several factors- job satisfaction, potential for advancement, and retirement benefits. Accelerated promotions for outstanding soldiers in the lower NCO ranks, an increase in the number of monthly promotions for NCOs, and selective reenlistment bonuses were important retention incentives. Of the Army's 368 job specialties, 102 were subject to some retention incentive. The Selected Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) and the Bonus Extension and Retraining (BEAR) programs offered junior and mid-level enlisted personnel in critical or understaffed MOSes monetary incentives to reenlist for three or more years.

During FY 1989 the Army tailored both the SRB and BEAR programs to increase selectively bonuses for various specialties. Bonuses were usually offered for a limited amount of time to induce reenlistment when recruitment rates fell. SRBs were increased in ninety-seven military specialties and reduced or removed in ten others. SRBs were off e r e d for most combat skills and for a variety of maintenance, intelligence, and communication specialties. Because of a slow d own in promotions to E-4, SRBs were extended for the first time to two - year enlistees who had yet to be promoted above E-3, provided that they reenlisted for a second t e rm. Bonuses under the BEAR program applied to only ten Moses Using a formula that combined basic pay, years of reenlistment, and skill multipliers, an individual could receive a $20,000 bonus. To attract experienced Special Forces NCOs, the Army agreed to reinstate qualified E-6s and E-7s to active duty without loss of rank within three years of their retirement.

Nonmonetary incentives for reenlistments available to the Army included allowing certain soldiers to serve a second consecutive tour at one station, retraining into an underpopulated MOS to enhance career


advancement, and reassignment to a location of choice where a valid vacancy existed. Soldiers who reenlisted for their current assignment could choose a two-year reenlistment; the other options required a reenlistment for at least three years.

Volunteers must pass a battery of physical and mental tests to qualify for enlistment. Individuals who scored below Category IV of the AFQT or who failed certain physical standards, including testing positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), were prohibited from joining the Army. Even though only 5 percent of the recruits tested positive for drugs or alcohol, suggesting to Congress that testing and remedial treatment of such recruits might be deferred until basic training, the Army continued to test for drug and alcohol abuse during entrance processing during FY 1989. During the last six months of 1988, out of 100,000 recruits tested, the Army rejected 4.1 percent who tested positive for marijuana or cocaine; 0.10 percent who tested positive for alcohol were eventually rejected. Recruits took a series of skill and aptitude tests as an aid to branch and vocational assignments. Beginning 1 January 1989, DOD modified the Armed Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), in use since 1976, to emphasize mathematical rather than clerical skills. The change reflected the growing need for enlisted personnel with aptitudes for more complex technical training. Personnel officials anticipated that the revised ASVAB would favor white males and cause a slight drop in the number of minority males and all female recruits that qualified for highly technical training. The new test was not expected to cause a decline in the total number of recruits.

Enlisted Personnel

During FY 1988 Congress mandated a reduction in NCO strength from 284,000 to 277,000 by the start of FY 1989. With only seven months to attain this goal, the Army pared enlisted strength by about thirty-five thousand with a combination of waivers for service obligations for early retirements, an early-out program, and a slowdown of promotions. Promotions in the top five NCO grades in FY 1988 amounted to only 37,707, which precluded the need to freeze all NCO promotions and conserved nearly $140 million in personnel costs. For FY 1989 Congress mandated an additional 4,000-man reduction in the NCO authorized strength, with a year-end goal of 273,000. Because of the larger than anticipated number of NCO separations in FY 1988, the Army entered FY 1989 with nearly twelve thousand fewer NCOs than it was authorized. This large deficit enabled the Army to increase moderately the rate of promotions for the top five NCO grades but also caused imbalances in the enlisted force structure.


The shortage of NCOs had several adverse effects throughout the Army. In the active component, NCO operating strength in career fields for infantry, artillery, and armor was 96 percent of the authorized strength for those fields. USAREUR, for example, had a deficit of about five thousand NCOs, which represented about 50 percent of the Army's total NCO shortage. NCO shortages were prominent in combat support and combat service support units, especially E-5s. USAREUR considered its NCO shortage as its most pressing readiness problem. It had a potentially deleterious effect on training and readiness, and the inability to expeditiously promote outstanding NCOs threatened morale. To alleviate the problem, USAREUR increased the number of intra-theater transfers and encouraged NCOs to extend in their current assignments or to sign up for a consecutive overseas tour.

Since 1985 the Army 's Enlisted Alignment Plan had been the vehicle to align Moses and grade levels to satisfy authorizations. The Army had used more refined recruiting for critical skills, promotions, and reclassification and retraining for understrength Moses to address imbalances in critical Moses In January 1989 the Army began reviewing its about 330 enlisted MOs codes to reduce the number. Chaired by the U.S. Army Personnel Information Systems Command (USAPIC), Alexandria, Virginia, and consisting of representatives from ODCSPER and PERSCOM, the group charged with this task recommended the deletion of fifty Moses but obtained the concurrence of proponent branches for only eight of them. On 21 August 1989, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel tasked each branch to restudy the recommendations. The Army expected to promote an estimated fifty-nine thousand NCOs in FY 1989, but such restrictions as the one that limited the grades of sergeant major and master sergeant to 1 and 2 percent, respectively, of the total enlisted strength reduced the Army 's number of top-graded NCOs. The top five enlisted grades accounted for 41.6 percent of the Army 's FY 1989 total enlisted strength of 660,400.

In January 1989 Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., along with Chief of Staff General Vuono and Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates, declared the Army theme for 1989 as "The Year of the NCO." General Vuono viewed it as an opportunity to enhance both the responsibilities and the status of the NCO corps by programs that underscored the four enduring roles of NCOs-leader, trainer, role model, and standard-bearer. General Vuono authorized an adjustment to the Army budget that allowed an additional 3,000 enlisted personnel to be promoted to sergeant E-5 during the last eight months of FY 1989. Shortages in that grade accounted for two-thirds of all NCO vacancies. Approximately 60,000 of 202,000 specialist E-4s and corporals were eligible to advance to sergeant E-5. The Army estimated that a 1 percent increase in NCO operating strength caused nearly a 2 percent increase in the number of units that


reported readiness ratings at or above their authorized level of organization (ALO). By his action, the Chief of Staff raised the NCO strength to nearly 276,000.

The NCO ranks of E-6 through E-9 had an exceptionally good yea r for promotions in FY 1989. Promotions increased as much as 45 percent in senior grades. This followed the increases approved by the Chief of Staff in operating NCO strength. Promotions in FY 1990 returned to a more normal level. The 5,997 NCOs selected for promotion to sergeant, first class, E-7 in November 1988 represented a drop from 15 to 11 percent of those eligible compared to the previous year, presaging the return to more normal rates in the future (FY 1990). The rate for promotion to master sergeant E-8 in FY 1989 was 12.9 percent, slightly higher than the 10.8 percent rate of FY 1988. Of the approximately 22,000 soldiers considered for promotion to master sergeant, the E-8 selection board chose 2,834, or about 600 more than the prior year's total of 2,200. Promotions to master sergeant were above average in fields such as special operations, aviation maintenance and avionics, ammunition, and topographic engineering and below average in combat arms except for air defense and armor.

A hallmark of "The Year of the NCO" was the work of the NCO Leader Development Study Group. Organized by TRADOC in October 1988, the eight-month study was conducted at the Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, by a task force that included representative s from TRADOC, PERSCOM, the Center for Army Leadership, the Health Services Command, and the reserve components. On 22 August 1989, General Vuono approved eighteen of the group's recommendations during a briefing at the Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth , Kansas. Many of the group's recommendations stemmed from initiative s contained in an earlier study, the 1985 NCO Professional Development Study. That study prompted the Army to modify the NCO evaluation system and to tie NCO promotions more closely to the NCO Education System (NCOES).

The NCO Leader Development Study Group's most salient area of recommendations was its identification of skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKAs) expected of NCOs at each level and formulation of career or leader development models for both active and reserve component NCOs. SKAs were the foundation for the NCOES. Leader development programs in service schools, units, and operational assignments were based on SKAs developed for each grade based on the nine leader competencies described in FM 22-100, Military Leadership — communication, supervision, training/counseling, soldier-team development, technical/ tactical proficiency, decision making, planning, the use of available systems, and professional ethics. Other skills were identified and defined


using NCO leader training curriculum, FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 100-5, Operations, the Army 's capstone doctrinal manuals for training and operations. The study group identified specific know l e d g e requirements for each skill. Attitudes deemed essential for successful NCO leaders were derived from the tenets of professional ethics in FM 100-1, The Army; FM 22-600-20, The NCO Creed; and the Oath of Enlistment. Unlike skills and knowledge, the attitudes were the same for all NCO grades.

The second key area of the study group's recommendations linked NCO advancement to attainment of specific levels of training in the NCO Education System and leadership qualities that included continuing education and self-development. As a prerequisite for advancement, the group proposed that NCOs attain minimum reading standards. About 30 percent of the Army's soldiers read at the 9th grade level or lower. For NCOs attending the primary, basic, and advanced NCO courses, a 10th grade reading level was expected. Students at sergeant major courses were required to read at the 12th grade level. Remedial instruction would be afforded to NCOs and an extensive program of diagnostic testing that used the Test of Adult Basic Education (TABE) would be instituted at regional and installation NCO academies.

Some improvements were made in 1988 to the Qualitative Management Program (QMP), which prescribed stringent standards for promotion and retention in the four highest NCO grades and became the basis for a new NCO evaluation report (NCO-ER). The QMP provisions were published in FY 1989 as a revision of AR 601-200, Enlisted Ranks Personnel Update 15. The rigor of the revised screening process for promotion was evident when a promotion board for sergeant, first class, in early FY 1989 tagged 904 staff sergeants E-6 from a pool of 55,000 for possible involuntary separation. Adverse ratings on the NCOs' records included several factors, such as failure to meet minimum performance standards, numerous Articles 15, letters of reprimand for driving under the influence, the inability to carry out duties commensurate with grade, or a lapse of moral or ethical rectitude. The period for an appeal was shortened from a year to ninety days. A sustained finding on appeal was followed by separation from service within ninety days. NCOs within two years of retirement, however, could remain on active duty until they attained twenty years of service.

After almost a year's experience with the new NCO-ER System both NCOs and raters accorded it high praise. Required quarterly counseling by a senior officer, already required for E-5 through E-9, began for corporals in December 1988. An assessment of the new system indicated that counseling engendered a better understanding among NCOs of their duties and compelled unit officers to become more actively involved in the


evaluation process. The QMP fostered unit cohesion and discouraged inflated ratings by the substitution of short narrative evaluations for numerical scores. The new evaluation system enabled selection boards to identify more accurately the best qualified NCOs for advanced schooling and promotion. A modified NCO-ER was introduced in the reserve components in FY 1988 and FY 1989.

High priority was given to NCO training and education as a requisite for promotion. By FY 1989 most facets of a revised NCO Education System that based advancement on satisfactory completion of a sequential mandatory education and training program were in place. The NCOES spanned the development of fire-team leaders in the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) to schooling for command sergeants major. Since NCOs were first-line supervisors, NCO training emphasized "training the trainers." Basic was acknowledgment of the NCO's crucial role in integrating individual and unit training and determining training plans and objectives. NCO training focused on how each training task developed wartime skills, or "battle competencies." The PLDC was the initial rung in the NCO educational ladder, a four-week resident course conducted at twenty-five regional NCO academies in the United States and overseas. Each academy followed a common curriculum with the aim of preparing promising corporals and specialists to be sergeants and team leaders. A requirement was adopted in FY 1988, effective FY 1990, that specialists and corporals must complete the PLDC before promotion to sergeant. In FY 1989 the Chief of Staff made the PLDC more performance oriented; classroom instruction was reduced from twenty-one to eight days, and the time devoted to hands-on training was increased. Many NCO academies lacked the capacity to train the large number of E-4s on selection lists. On 28 March 1989, the Chief of Staff modified promotion policy to allow E-4s nominated for promotion during FY 1989 to retain their eligibility for advancement to sergeant E-5 during FY 1990.

Completion of the PLDC was required for selection to a Basic NCO Course (BNCOC). A promotion policy change stipulated that, effective FY 1991, promotion to sergeant, first class, E-7 and selection to the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) would be contingent on graduation from the basic course. For the combat arms, a five-week BNCOC was given at eighteen NCO academies in the continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama. Combat BNCOCs prepared sergeants E-5 and staff sergeants E-6 to become squad and section leaders or tank commanders. For combat support and combat service support MOSes, the BNCOC was conducted at stateside branch service schools. During 1989 attendance rates stayed at 105 percent for the third consecutive year. The BNCOC lasted from 3 to 18 weeks, with 8 weeks the average, and had about 22,000 spaces and nearly 150 courses. The highest lev-


els of NCO training were offered at the ANCOC and the Sergeants Major Academy. Late in FY 1989 the Army made the ANCOC, geared to producing platoon sergeants, mandatory for promotion to sergeant, first class, effective October 1990. The ANCOC was also required for promotion to master sergeant E-8.

Graduation from Sergeants Major Academy or an equivalent course was necessary to be appointed as a command sergeant major. In FY 1989 the Army selected 1,224 senior NCOs from approximately 5,000 candidates to attend the Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, or an equivalent Air Force or Navy NCO school, or to enroll in the academy's two-year sergeant major correspondence course. A total of 945 NCOs attended one of Sergeants Major Academy's three classes scheduled in FY 1989, nearly twice the number selected in previous years when promotions were fewer to meet the lower NCO strengths mandated by Congress.

Other changes occurred in NCO personnel policies during FY 1989. Beginning 1 January 1989, the Army ended its long-standing practice of computing dates of rank (DOR) separately from effective promotion dates for the four highest NCO grades and made both dates the same. This system is comparable to the one employed to manage the officer corps. Limitations on the size and rate of NCO promotions extended to the lower enlisted ranks as well. At the start of 1989 new enlisted personnel policies curbed the growth of the E-4 population caused by the slower rate of NCO promotions. Advancement from private, first class (E-3), to specialist (E-4) and corporal was managed by MACOM commanders rather than the Total Army Personnel Agency, which controlled E-5 through E-9 promotions. Enlisted personnel with twenty-six months of service, six of them as E-3, were eligible for promotion to E-4. Accelerated promotion was permissible for soldiers with twelve to twenty-five months' service and three to five months as E-3, but was limited to 20 percent of a unit's E-4 strength.

The normal period for promotion from private E-1 to private E-2 was six months. Company commanders, however, had authority to reduce that period by two months for E-1s who demonstrated exceptional leadership qualities. Potential leaders were given opportunities to volunteer for extra training and placement in a fast track NCO leadership development program. In early 1989 the Army allowed commanders to award accelerated promotions to 10 percent of the E-1s within their commands, provided they successfully completed a fast track program or were satisfactorily progressing and had at least four months' service. In addition, the Army granted commanders authority to appoint specialist E-4s as corporals. This action required no local selection board, provided the selectees were assigned to NCO positions. Once appointed to corporal, enlisted personnel would retain their rank and insignia even if reassigned to a non-NCO position.


Unit Manning

In February 1988 General Vuono approved a plan to continue and expand the Unit Manning System. Under the plan commanders of combat units would replenish personnel in peacetime with either company-size units or packages of trained troops rather than replacing soldiers individually. The new system, started on a trial basis in 1988, was a modification of the existing Cohesion, Operational Readings, and Training (COHORT) system to enhance unit cohesion and facilitate the transition of the Army to a unit/package versus an individual replacement system. When fully implemented, about one-third of all Army combat units would be manned using the unit manning methodology, which had two forms-traditional and sustained COHORT. The traditional COHORT system would be used by seventy-six company-level units to support requirements in South Korea. These units would form and spend their first two years in the continental United States or Hawaii before rotating to Korea for a one-year tour. The companies that comprised the rotating units would reach the end of their life cycle after the one-year tour in Korea and be replaced by new COHORT companies, which normally would be manned by first-term soldiers who had trained together. The sustained COHORT program relied on the package, or group, replacement system rather than an individual or a unit rotation system. Under this concept, most other Army units received sustainment packages of officers and enlisted personnel once every four months, or once a year in the case of the 6th and 7th Infantry Divisions (LID). Replacement packages could contain as many as 500 men, but would not be organized into teams, crews, and squads, as they would in wartime, until after arrival in the battalions.

Unit personnel stability improved in FY 1989, attributable in large measure to the extension of tour lengths, better force alignment, and a reduction of the NCO shortfall. As a measure of unit personnel stability, the number of enlisted personnel who remained in the same unit for a year increased from 39.4 percent in FY 1985 to 45.6 percent in FY 1989, while the percentage of officers to do so increased from 40.3 to 42.7 percent. The gains in unit stability reflected a proactive approach by Army personnel managers to the distribution of personnel at battalion and lower levels during a period of declining operating strength.

Speaking before the U.S. Army Personnel Management Symposium in early FY 1989, Lt. Gen. Ronald L. Watts, the commander of VII Corps, USAREUR, praised the quality of NCOs and junior officers being assigned to his command. The benefits of the revised NCOES and emphasis on leadership training were manifest in the way NCOs took charge of individual and unit training. General Watts also indicated that frequent changes in personnel authorizations caused by grade and skill restructur-


ing, the introduction of new equipment and attendant TOE modifications, and the tasking of new missions made it difficult to keep tactical units fully manned with qualified personnel. Shortages were acute among critical Moses in combat service support units, and combat personnel were often diverted to perform combat support tasks. The personnel system, Watts suggested, was not fully supporting warfighting and training requirements in the VII Corps.


Between 1980 and 1985 the officer corps grew by approximately 11,400, but active authorized strength stayed about 781,000. The Army used the additional officers to increase the number of combat units, fill vacant officer billets in existing combat units, and enhance capabilities in critical specialties. Of the 11,400 new officers, 9,400 newly commissioned officers and 2,000 warrant officers, 83 percent of commissioned officers were lieutenants and captains assigned to the combat arms. Sixty-four percent of the warrant officer increase was also attributable to the growth in combat units. Field grade officers, major through colonel, accounted for the remaining 17 percent of commissioned officer gains, and 97 percent of this increase was in the medical branches.

In FY 1987 Congress directed DOD to reduce active component commissioned officers by 6 percent during a three-year period based on the total officer strength as of 30 September 1986. Reductions would occur at the rate of 1 percent in FY 1987, 2 percent in FY 1988, and 3 percent in FY 1989. OSD reduced Army strength by 1,635 officers (1.5 percent) in FY 1987 and by 1,515 (1.4 percent) in FY 1988. The Army achieved these reductions through voluntary and involuntary release programs, the induction of fewer second lieutenants, selective early retirement boards for senior colonels and lieutenant colonels with twenty or more years of service, and tighter standards for promotion and attainment of career status. Junior officers absorbed most of the cuts. During FY 1987 and 1988 approximately seven hundred fewer lieutenants were commissioned than required and seventeen hundred lieutenants and captains chose to or were forced to leave the Army. About half of them left involuntarily because they had been passed over for promotion twice.

Because of the Army's progress in meeting the officer reduction goals, Congress eased the size of the reductions slated for FY 1989 and FY 1990 and required only a 500-man reduction in each of those years. Congress exempted all medical officers because of critical shortages of doctors and nurses. The Medical Department accounted for 17,508 officers, or about 19 percent of active component officers. DOD also assessed small decreases of seventeen and thirty officers in the Army in FY 1989 and FY


1990, respectively, following its review of unified and specified command headquarters staffing. The Army's officer strength reductions for FY 1987 through FY 1990 would total 4,196, or 3.89 percent. As FY 1989 began the Total Army Personnel Agency (TAPA) established an FY 1989 end-of-year officer strength goal of 106,380 which it planned to reach by slowing the rate of officer accessions and release of additional first lieutenants who had been twice passed over for promotion.

Early in FY 1989 the Chief of Staff issued guidance on how to achieve the 500-man officer reduction within the context of the Army's Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). He stressed the importance of fully supporting war fighting companies, maintaining adequate officer strength in USAREUR and Eighth Army, and retaining sufficient qualified officers for joint duty positions. Aggregate officer support levels for TRADOC and AMC were reduced in FY 1989. The Army decided to retire involuntarily as many as 260 senior colonels and lieutenant colonels and achieve further reductions through voluntary retirements. Higher reductions of field grade officers were necessary for the Army to comply with the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1981, which specified strength percentages for each field grade based on total officer strength. The Army proposed that field grade officer strength should decrease by nearly 825 by the end of FY 1990.

The officer corps had structural imbalances caused by excess officers in certain higher grades. On 29 November 1988, the Chief of Staff established the Authorization Discipline Task Force (AUDIT) to align field grade officer authorizations with officer operating strength. AUDIT sought to achieve this goal through better management of officers in transit, holding, and student status and by adjusting officer billets in TOEs by making the battalion S-3 a captain, thereby eliminating a field grade officer billet. AUDIT's overriding goals were to protect the officer requirements for combat forces, to provide a minimal essential officer force structure for other functions, and to man joint positions.

To correct the grade imbalances and remain within congressionally mandated grade ceilings, General Vuono also directed the Army to establish Selective Early Retirement Boards in FY 1989 to reduce senior officer overages. He also directed a steady accession of junior officers to sustain readiness and provide qualified future leaders. General Vuono approved policies that allowed promotion boards to choose 10 percent of their selectees from below the zone of consideration and eliminated ceilings on centralized command selections of officers from the first-time-considered category. Selection boards were advised to choose the best qualified candidate regardless of date of rank.

Since 1985 the distribution of officers promoted from above and below the zone of consideration had been reversed as the number of


selectees from below the zone of consideration increased as a career incentive for young, promising field grade officers during periods of slack promotions. During FY 1989, as officer promotions increased and cuts decreased, the number of officers selected for early promotion also diminished. Table 6 shows a gradual increase for the period. In FY 1989 the Army began placing greater emphasis on physical suitability as a condition for promotion. Personnel files of thousands of overweight officers were flagged by TAPA early in FY 1989, which forestalled promotion, reenlistment, and selection to attend service schools.

TABLE 6 — Elapsed Time for Officer Promotion, 1984-1989
(Expressed in years and months)

Rank 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Goal
Lieutenant Colonel

Source: Officer Policy Office, Total Army Personnel Command


The rate of promotion for minority officers to major and lieutenant colonel was slightly below the Army average, but it was the same for first lieutenant and captain. Among explanations for the disparity was a 3 percent lower selection rate for minority officers for the Command and General Staff College. The rate of selection of minority officers for branch or specialized schools was equal to that of nonminority officers. The selection rate of female officers to service staff colleges was generally higher than for males.

The promotion rate for first lieutenants in FY 1989 was 61.8 percent, or 1,068 out of 1,727 considered, and was below the 84.2 and 82.9 percent rates of the two previous boards. In addition to slower promotion rates in FY 1989, 371 first lieutenants selected for promotion to captain were rebranched or assigned to branches with shortages of junior officers- military intelligence, quartermaster, signal, ordnance, and transportation. Captains in the combat arms branches-air defense, armor, aviation, field artillery, and infantry-normally were assigned a secondary or functional career specialty after qualifying in their basic branch. This usually happened following completion of an advanced course in their basic branch or about their seventh year of service. Based on the Leader Development Plan, TAPA accelerated assignment of functional career specialties in FY 1989 to near the end of a captain's fifth year of commissioned service. The new policy would also speed up combat arms branch qualifications.


Officers whose basic branch was in combat support or combat service support would follow their basic branch as a single career track.

By mid-FY 1989 the number of second lieutenants commissioned in the Army was several hundred below the service's own estimated requirements. In addition, the use of first lieutenants to offset shortages of captains threatened to limit the number of lieutenants available for assignment as platoon leaders. During 1989 the Army added approximately fifty-eight hundred second lieutenants to its rolls. Most of the new officers were graduates of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. A total of 4,879 ROTC cadets were selected by the Cadet Command of TRADOC in September and November of 1988 for commissioning, compared with 4,062 for FY 1987 and 3,594 for FY 1988. Cadets selected in FY 1988 entered the Army between April 1989 and March 1990. About one thousand graduates of the US Military Academy (USMA) received commissions in FY 1989. When possible, newly accessioned lieutenants were given one-year assignments that provided experience in the command of troops, usually in Korea. Lieutenant billets without troop command responsibilities were filled, to the extent possible, by lieutenants who returned from short-tour command assignments.

Late in FY 1989 the Army issued its FY 1990/1991 Transition Officer Distribution Plan (ODP). The ODP reflected the work of AUDIT and contained guidelines for the requisition and distribution of officers to align actual strength with force structure. The ODP contemplated a decrease of 1,423 authorized officer positions, 1,181 of them company officers. To redress imbalances in field grade officers, the ODP provided for redistribution of approximately two thousand captains in FY 1990 to serve in positions normally filled by majors. To enable better management of its officer corps, the Army Research Institute (ARI) embarked on an Officer Longitudinal Research Project, Project PROTEUS. ARI began a survey of 9,000 majors, captains, and lieutenants randomly selected by TAPA that would track officers for four years to identify significant factors in career choices. It would expand on similar earlier surveys of USMA graduates and include officers commissioned from other sources.

Title IV (Joint Officer Personnel Policy) of the Goldwater-Nichols 1986 Defense Reorganization Act strengthened the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified commands. It prescribed a formal program of joint duty assignment for senior officers to form a reservoir of officers with joint duty experience. As a requisite for promotion to general officer, the act required most senior officers to serve in a joint duty assignment and attend professional joint education courses. Officers in certain technical fields who received a presidential waiver were exempted from serving in a joint duty assignment prior to promotion, but they had to serve their first tour of duty as a brigadier general in


a joint duty assignment. Congress established a new officer skill qualification — joint duty specialist or joint service officer (JSO)-to identify officers with multiservice training and experience. Congress left the detailed definition of joint duty to the services, but it stipulated that such positions be under the JCS, in a unified or specified command, or in a DOD agency. An initial Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) was approved by the Secretary of Defense in FY 1987 and revised in June 1988.

The percentage of positions designated as Joint Duty Assignments in organizations varied. Nearly 100 percent of the positions in OSD, the JCS, and the unified and combined commands were included on the JDAL. Other agencies, known as Category II through IV activities, had no more than 50 percent of their billets accredited as JDA. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) adopted this lower percentage to constrain the size of the JDAL because of problems with the capacity of Joint Professional Military Education programs, tour lengths, and the drain of high quality officers from the services. The law prohibited the services from nominating their own billets for the JDAL. Because of its decline in officer strength, the Army felt that selective inservice positions were a reasonable option, but Congress refused to allow it. Congress, however, made some concessions. In September 1988 it gave DOD an extra year to implement the program. Congress reduced the tour length for JDAs from forty-two to thirty-six months for field grade officers in the continental United States and to two years for combat arms and combat engineer officers. In addition, the amended law allowed some brigadier generals to be promoted after twenty-four rather than thirty-six months in a joint service tour. Accommodating changes in joint duty tour lengths proved difficult at times because it required reprogramming automated personnel management systems and altering professional development patterns.

DOD concomitantly broadened the definition of joint duty positions to include certain uniservice assignments that responded to both joint and single service organizations, single service assignments that dealt extensively with multiservice matters, and service assignments that were evaluated by a joint duty officer from a joint, combined, or international organization. These changes enlarged the JDAL by approximately a thousand positions, but they required the Army to transfer some billets to joint manning authorization documents. By April 1989 the Army had identified 3,050 joint positions for JSOs and planned to fill 50 percent of them with field grade officers on three-year tours. Most of these officers would enter their first joint assignment after completing the first phase of their joint education requirement. About 12.5 percent of the assignments, 360 to 370, were available to combat arms officers, who served the two-year tour. Another 12.5 percent of the positions were deemed "critical," which obligated the Army to fill them with colonels or lieutenant colonels who had


completed their required joint education and also had previous joint assignment experience. Problems resulted from the fact that 58 percent of the Army's officers were in the combat arms, while the majority of JDAL positions were in combat support and combat service support specialties. This factor raised the possibility that many highly qualified combat officers might be deprived of promotion opportunities. Moreover, the Army leadership feared that the diversion of combat arms officers from their basic branch to JDA assignments threatened combat readiness and could aggravate the structural imbalances in the officer corps. The Army planned to assign combat arms officers to joint positions by their secondary specialties, which allowed these officers to serve as JSOs in operations and plans or intelligence.

To manage the assignment of JSOs, the Army established the Joint Management Office within PERSCOM and a standing board to review eligible officers. The board reviewed 450 officer files per month in FY 1989. Most officers who qualified for a JDA did so by virtue of either previous training in joint operations or an earlier joint assignment. Only 12 percent of those awarded the new JSO skill code (3L) were fully accredited under the qualifications slated to become effective in FY 1990. Officers classified as JSOs would be required to complete formal joint training at an appropriate service school and the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. After 1 October 1989, half of the 8,200 billets identified as JDA by DOD would have to be filled by JSOs or an officer nominated to that specialty. General Vuono was concerned about the need for a clear concept of required knowledge and skills for JSOs in order to develop the proper training.

In FY 1988 Congress stipulated that joint professional military education (JPME) would be provided exclusively by the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., and the Armed Forces Staff College , Norfolk, Virginia. Late in FY 1988 the JCS promulgated a new JPME plan that stressed both assignments and education. All the armed services obtained permission to modify the curricula at their intermediate and senior officer schools to qualify temporarily for an approved JPME program. Phase I of the JPME became effective at the Command and General Staff College and at the Army War College during academic year 1989-1990. By the start of FY 1989 the Army had begun pilot JPME Phase I and II at intermediate and senior level service colleges. Phase I stressed the development of core joint curricula at the Command and General Staff College and at the Army War College during FY 1989. Resident students would then complete Phase II of the JPME, which consisted of intermediate- and senior- level courses provided at the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC), expected to begin in mid-1990. While not all officers assigned to J DAL positions were required to attend Phase II, completion of both phas-


es was required for designation as a JSO. Officers in critical occupational specialties could be nominated as JSOs and serve their first JDA before attending Phase I. In FY 1989 Congressman Ike Skeleton, head of the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Military Education, issued the Skeleton Report, which recommended a two-tiered program of joint education with emphasis on exposing senior officers to strategic studies at a national senior war college. A study by a committee appointed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) proposed modifying the National Defense University (NDU) curriculum, increasing its faculty, and creating a national center for strategic studies.

In a separate initiative that also affected the number of joint positions, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense found approximately 7,300 positions (2,100 military and 5,200 civilian) of the unified commands and the Joint Staff that either overlapped or duplicated other positions. The Army offered 1,115 positions for possible elimination, but the OJCS objected to cutting a majority of them. In December 1988 the Secretary of Defense declared about three thousand of the seventy-three hundred joint positions as superfluous. The Army was slated to lose 1,123 military and civilian spaces during a three-year period, 379 of them military.

Warrant Officers

By implementing new policies and through the enactment of legislation, the Army sought to create a warrant officer (WO) personnel management system similar to the DOPMA system used to manage officers. The Army wanted to stem the exodus of warrant officers at mid-career and the loss of their technical skills. Studies indicated that 50 percent of warrants who reached twenty years of service left the Army by their twenty-second year, at an average age of forty-one. A better alignment of actual warrant officer strength with authorized spaces was needed. Congress authorized 15,330 warrant officer spaces for FY 1989, which continued a recent trend in which authorized TOE and TDA positions exceeded actual strength. To remedy this discrepancy and obtain a better mix of occupational specialties, the Army planned to eliminate 2,010 excess warrant officer spaces. This would be done by converting 1,500 spaces to civilian or enlisted personnel status, transferring warrants from several overly filled Moses to ten understaffed ones, and discontinuing fifteen warrant officer specialties. The Army hoped to make these adjustments through voluntary MOS transfers, some involuntary transfers, and attrition.

Adopted in May 1987, the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS) became the core of the Army's warrant officer personnel reforms. A major feature of TWOS was streamlining the dual-track system that governed


warrant officer promotions and career development. As an amendment to TWOS, the Army proposed the Warrant Officer Management Act of 1989 to create a single active duty list and promotion system. This approach would incorporate all warrants into the Regular Army when promoted to CW3 and accord them permanent status. Beginning in FY 1988 most enlisted personnel who became warrant officers were given five-year appointments as active duty reserve officers, and their eligibility for career status was assessed after five years. Favorable consideration allowed them to receive a Regular Army appointment upon promotion to CW3. By law the Army must promote no less than 80 percent of the warrant officers who qualify for promotion for the first time to CW3 or CW4. The new policy would also convert all existing senior WOs to Regular Army status so that the Army could manage them by the year in which they were commissioned rather than by total service time, enlisted service plus warrant. To further enhance the status of WOs, the proposed legislation called for a new pay grade of CW5, equal in basic pay to a major. Although CW5 existed in FY 1989, its pay was the same as MW4. The new CW5 grade would be limited to about five hundred senior warrants or 5 percent of the warrant officer corps. In May 1989 DOD approved the Warrant Officer Management Act and submitted it to the Office of Management and Budget. The proposed legislation had not been introduced in Congress by the end of FY 1989.

The Army also sought to improve warrant officer career progression by emphasizing leadership and tactical training concurrent with traditional technical training. Warrant officer training programs would be geared to three groups-a basic level for warrant officers CW1 and CW2, a senior level for CW3 and CW4, and a master level for the new grade of Master Warrant, or MW4, and the proposed CW5. A new program to train MW4s began at the Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Rucker, Alabama, in September 1988. The first class consisted of thirty highly qualified CW4s. This course fulfilled Phase II, or the resident phase, of the Master Warrant Officer training program and emphasized writing, speaking, and managerial skills. To qualify for the 8-week course, candidates were required to complete Phase I, a 100-hour correspondence course. Upon completion of both phases, warrants could enroll in Phase III, a proposed step in the MW4 program that consisted of additional MOs-related training. Upon satisfactory completion of Phase III, a participant would be designated MW4, senior to all CW4s.

Women in the Army

At the start of FY 1989, 11,900 female officers and 71,700 enlisted women were in the active component, constituting 10.8 percent of active


strength. Between 1977 and 1987 the number of females in the Army nearly doubled. Five-year projections indicated that the number of female soldiers would reach approximately 11.5 percent by 1994. While the Army experienced no shortages of female enlistees, the female enlisted retention rate was sharply below that for males. Despite their growing strength in the active force, some female soldiers felt that DOD and Army policies prohibited full equality of opportunity for them. Others complained of sexual harassment. Women in the armed services made some gains during FY 1989. DOD increased maternity leave from four to six weeks on 6 February 1989. The primary object of dissatisfaction centered on the DOD policy that barred women from several noncombat jobs and excluded them from serving in combat units.

The Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) urged the Army to liberalize its assignment policies with respect to women in combat units. The GAO suggested in late FY 1988 that the Army assignment policies for women stunted their careers and proposed that the service liberalize its restrictive interpretation of the risk rule. That rule excluded women from noncombat positions in units if the risk of those units becoming involved in combat were equal to, or greater than, combat units in the same locality.

The conclusions of a DOD task force that also studied career opportunities of women in the armed services supported the GAO findings. In response to both studies, the Army opened 11,138 new positions to women by a slight liberalization of the risk rule. Under new guidelines, 56 percent of all authorized spaces in the Army could be filled by women. They were eligible to serve in 86 percent of the 368 enlisted Moses, in 91 percent of the 77 warrant officer Moses, and in 96 percent of the 207 officer Moses Previously prohibited positions such as signal lineman, truck and construction equipment operators in engineer units, and a variety of headquarters billets in infantry, armor, and artillery combat units were opened to women. As Army planners addressed recruitment quotas and training spaces for women in FY 1989, the Army initiated the Female Officer Professional Development Review to determine the impediments female o officers encountered as they advanced through the officer ranks. The Adjutant General, Finance, and the Quartermaster Corps branches were surveyed in FY 1989, with the other branches to follow.

A related issue was whether female soldiers would remain in their positions in overseas commands in the event of mobilization or hostilities. On 27 September 1988, DOD informed the Army of its policy to keep female soldiers in the theater in the event of either mobilization or hostilities to perform the same jobs in wartime as in peacetime. During FY 1989 the Army considered eliminating women from the field artillery branch, in which there were 430 women and 51,000 men.


The impetus came from the phase-out of Pershing II missiles from Europe under the INF Treaty. Nearly 46 percent of the females in the branch, 163 enlisted women and 32 officers, were assigned to Pershing missile units in Europe and training elements in the United States. In addition, a small number of women served in the headquarters elements of eight short-range Lance missile battalions in Europe. Female members of the Field Artillery branch, joined by DACOWITS, expressed concern about the potential loss of career opportunities for female members of the branch. In June 1989 the Army Staff recommended to the Chief of Staff that women members already assigned to the branch be allowed to remain in it, but that no additional field artillery units or positions be opened to them. At the end of FY 1989 the issue remained unresolved.

Retirees and Transition Programs

Liberal retirement benefits have been one of the compelling incentives for enlistment and reenlistment in the Army. In 1986 two retirement systems were created: one for soldiers already in the Army and another one for new personnel. Neither system was altered in FY 1989, but there were proposals to consolidate all military personnel into the new system, to decrease retiree cost of living allowances, and to impose user fees for retirees at military health facilities. The Army opposed any erosion of retirement benefits, which underscored its concern for retirees as part of the Total Army Family. General Vuono viewed retirees as important links to the active Army. They participated in Installation Retiree Councils and had a voice on health, commissary, post exchange, and other installation councils. Selected members of the Installation Retiree Councils also served on the Chief of Staff 's Officer and Enlisted Retiree Councils, which met annually with the Army leadership to discuss retiree and family programs.

Helping soldiers make the transition to civilian life became a growing concern as the Army downsized. The Army paid $65 million annually in unemployment benefit costs for veterans unable to find employment after leaving active service. To help place retiring soldiers in new careers, the Army and the Department of Education established a clearinghouse to match military personnel with available teaching positions in states that hire teachers with nontraditional certification. Anticipating increased force reductions during the next five years, the Army was developing plans for other transition assistance programs in FY 1989 that would utilize Army alumni and create a network of job banks around the country. The Transition Management Program was tested at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and five other stateside installations in FY 1989. It offered transition counseling to soldiers leaving the Army, whether they were first-


term soldiers or career retirees. This program sought to help soldiers successfully enter the civilian job market or institutions of higher learning, and also persuaded soldiers to reenlist. Skeptical of claims that a similar Air Force program produced effective results, Congress discontinued funding for both the Air Force and the Army programs.

Miscellaneous Personnel Issues

While reducing its officer strength in FY 1989, the Army discovered problems in relating its personnel accounting systems to DOD programming and budget systems. The Secretary of Defense directed the Army to refine its personnel accounting systems and to provide specific billet information from The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS) to justify its five-year manpower requirements. By early FY 1989 the Army had successfully aligned its requirements with the DOD Five Year Defense Plan by consolidating manpower projections provided by each MACOM into an overall Army requirement in tune with DOD's programming cycle.

In FY 1989 the Army neared the final stages in the development and fielding of a portable individual data storage device. The Individually Carried Record (ICR), developed by the Army Soldier Support Center, would contain an electronic file of a soldier's personnel, medical, and finance data. Positive results expected of the ICR were a decrease in the use of printed forms, reduced communication requirements, accelerated processing of personnel actions, and simplified mobilization operations.

The Army's Personnel Information Systems Command was developing an Optical Digital Image Military Personnel Records System for the active and reserve components. Most individual personnel records for active component personnel were converted to microfiche between 1973 and 1977, but there were difficulties regarding slow access to records and keeping them updated. The new system was slated to enter production in FY 1990. The Soldier Support Center and PERSCOM have simplified personnel administration by equipping units with the computerized Company/Battalion Administrative System (CBAS), compatible with the Tactical Army Computer System (TACCS) and the Standard Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS). Testing of the CBAS by the 24th Infantry Division was completed early in FY 1989. The CBAS was designed to eliminate most typing by companies and to facilitate the processing of promotions, the rating of personnel, and the completion of daily status reports.

The Federal Employment Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (PL 100-694), enacted 18 November 1988, immunized Army personnel, military and civilian, from common law torts for performing


their official duties. The legislation made the United States the defendant instead of individual federal government employees. The act did not extend to suits based upon violations of the Constitution or federal statutes that concern breaches of civil rights. The 1988 act became the exclusive remedy for suits against the US Government and required suits introduced in state courts to be vacated to the federal judiciary. The Office of Management and Budget required the Army to collect delinquent debts owed to some federal agencies by military personnel. Monies were collected each month from nearly two thousand soldiers by payroll offsets that, by law, could not exceed 15 percent of a soldier's net income. The US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFC) administered salary deductions for debts owed to the Department of Education, the Office of Housing and Urban Development, and the Veterans Administration. Early in FY 1989 the USAFC expanded its collection efforts to debts owed to five additional federal agencies: the Small Business Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. HQDA reemphasized to commanders the Army's policy of providing financial counseling to all military personnel with debt problems and to give soldiers the opportunity to remove erroneous information from their financial and credit records.

Civilian Manpower

The Army's total civilian strength at the end of FY 1989 was 487,852 (based on fractionalized counting of part-time permanent employment). The US citizen appropriated fund work force numbered 376,213 at the end of FY 1989 (347,090 in military functions, 28,989 in civil functions, and 134 in cemeterial functions). Including direct and indirect hire foreign national employees, the total appropriated fund civilian strength was 447,644. Civilians comprised most of the Army's sustaining base and worked in over six hundred occupations. They constituted the majority of Army manpower assigned to logistics, communications, training, and depot operations. The vast majority of appropriated fund American civilian employees worked in the continental United States, but more than 30,700 were employed in foreign countries and US territories. Of the Army's 71,431 foreign national employees at the end of FY 1989, more than 48,000 were employed in West Germany.

Throughout FY 1989 the Army pursued civilian leadership enhancement and modernization of civilian management systems. It had recently succeeded in reducing internally generated civilian personnel regulations by more than 50 percent and in delegating more authority to MACOMs for civilian personnel management. Army managers received authority to hire more civilians directly; this stemmed from a congressional decision


to waive civilian personnel strength ceilings and instead set a dollar limit. An Army initiative, Managing the Civilian Work Force to Budget (MCB), delegated authority for position classification and management of civilian personnel resources to the lowest practical level of supervision. During FY 1989 MCB was tested at several Army activities. It was slated to begin Army-wide implementation in FY 1990, pending evaluation by the Army Audit Agency.

During FY 1989 the Army also tested and began installing its Army Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS), which supported civilian personnel management and processing in the field and at HQDA. The system would replace the Standard Civilian Management Information System, the Corps of Engineers Management Information System, and the Civilian Personnel Accounting System. In the field, Army civilian personnel offices will use ACPERS to support recruitment, training, retention, and separation of civilian personnel during peace, mobilization, and wartime. To create ACPERS, the Army adopted and modified the existing Air Force Civilian Personnel System. Following systems acceptance tests at the Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas, in late 1988, phasing in of ACPERS began at various MACOMs during FY 1989. ACPERS was scheduled to be fully operational by March 1991.

Modernization of civilian management entailed greater use of automated data systems to manage current programs and to analyze future civilian manpower requirements. The Civilian Employment Level Plan (CELP) was prepared by each MACOM, based on relevant Program Budget Guidance and the Annual Financial Target. HQDA fashioned them into a single Army CELP, which was used to generate extensive detailed reports to OSD and Congress on all categories of civilian employment by appropriation. The Army Personnel Proponent System (APPS), a life-cycle management system, centralized all phases of managing military personnel — the structure of the work force, manpower acquisition, training and education, sustainment, professional development, and separation. In 1987, as a result of the Civilian Personnel Modernization Project, the Chief of Staff directed creation of a Civilian Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS) comparable to APPS. Under CIPPS one proponent agency became responsible for monitoring several civilian occupations and established career patterns for them from entry through separation. CIPPS provided the Army with a means to coordinate military and civilian manpower management requirements more closely. Throughout FY 1989 the Army continued to phase in CIPPS and to test pilot programs in various MACOMs and agencies, with full implementation planned by FY 1991.

Closely related to CIPPS was the Army Civilian Training , Education, and Development System (ACTEDS), which mapped out


sequential work assignments and training for civilian employees in specific career fields from entry level to senior executive positions. It provided a structured approach to technical, professional, and leadership training for Army civilians. During FY 1989 ACTEDS managed twenty-four civilian career fields and planned to incorporate others. These plans would be merged into the Army 's Training Resource Access Information Network (TRAIN) and made accessible to personnel officers throughout the Army, with eventual consolidation into CIPPS. Another program subsumed under ACTEDS was the Civilian Leadership Training Program (CLTP), which consisted of three career levels — intern, supervisor, and manager — controlled by the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) at Fort Leavenworth. Through the end of FY 1988 CAL had trained 2,179 civilians and anticipated training an additional 1,760 civilians in FY 1989. The highest level of the CLTP was conducted at the Army Management Staff College in Alexandria, Virginia. Both military officers and civilian executives attended this fourteen - week course. Its curricula included acquisition, resource, personnel, logistics, and installation management.

The Army also supported the affirmative action policy by reaffirming the importance of providing Army-sponsored training that included enrollment in senior service schools and fellowships for qualified minority applicants with leadership potential. The Army has had limited success in carrying out this policy. Minority participation in managerial training programs increased from 8.6 percent in FY 1987 to 15 percent in FY 1988, but female participation decreased from 22.9 to 14.7 percent during the same period.

Since the mid-1980s Army personnel policies have addressed the use of illegal drugs and the incidence of AIDS among its civilian workforce. Beginning in 1986 the Army administered random drug tests to detect the use of cocaine and marijuana to about ten thousand civilian workers annually. These workers were concentrated in selected occupations — security guards, pilots, alcohol and drug counselors, and employees in nuclear and chemical surety programs. Civilian employees we r e not tested for AIDS except when working overseas if the test was requested by the host nation. The Army 's drug testing program was challenged and declared unconstitutional in a lower court but upheld in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on 29 August 1989. T h e appeals court found testing of civilian pilots, aircraft mechanics, security personnel, and alcohol and drug counselors to be constitutional. Testing of civilian personnel in nuclear and chemical surety programs was returned to the lower court for further evidence. The Court of Appeals ruled against random drug testing for laboratory technicians and individuals who administered drug tests.



During FY 1989 the Army conducted many programs to improve personnel management. As the fiscal year ended, the key manpower issues remained quality and stability, as suggested by the experience of VII Corps. The recruitment and retention of high quality soldiers by special incentives and strong leader development programs such as the new NCOES were major ingredients of this effort. In FY 1989 the Army sought to lay the foundation for the force it expected to field in the 1990s and into the next century. Many characteristics of that future force seemed discernable in FY 1989. Tomorrow's soldiers would be volunteer, more comfortable in the high-tech and joint military environment, older, more mature, and better trained. They would have less combat experience, and there would be fewer of them. The force would also include more minorities and women. General Vuono urged planners to take full a d vantage of the capabilities of NCOs that were enhanced by NCO career development programs. Whether this vision of the Army of the future would be realized remained to be seen. Personnel, like any other resource, were affected by the fiscal, strategic, and domestic climate in which the Army existed and operated.




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