Reconnaissance in Force

Between 7 and 15 January, I and IX Corps reconnaissance patrols ranging north of line D made little contact with enemy forces. IX Corps patrols investigated Ich'on and Yoju several times but found the towns empty. In the main I Corps attempt, the 27th Infantry came out of its reserve assembly at Ch'onan to occupy outposts athwart Route 1 generally along the Chinwi River eight miles north of P'yongt'aek and five miles south of Osan. In extensive searches west and east of Route I and north of the Chinwi within three miles of Osan, Colonel Michaelis' forces encountered few Chinese.1

The patrols were numerous and far-ranging enough to certify the absence of any strong enemy force immediately in front of the two corps; yet civilians, agents, and air observers in the same week reported a steady movement of Chinese south from Seoul. The heaviest enemy concentrations appeared to be forming along Route 1 between Suwon and Osan and around the junction of Routes 13 and 17 at Kyongan-ni, sixteen miles northeast of Suwon. General Ridgway considered the nearer Suwon-Osan concentration to be a suitable target for an infantry-armor strike that also could serve as an example of the kind of reconnaissance in force he wanted both General Milburn and General Coulter afterwards to initiate on their own. He ordered the I Corps to investigate the Suwon-Osan area on the 15th with a force that included at least one battalion of tanks. General Milburn was to punish any enemy groupment located there with infantry, tank, and air assaults, then was to withdraw, leaving part of his force in the objective area to maintain contact.2

The Problem of Motivation

Although the I Corps reconnaissance was a step in Ridgway's program of building up offensive operations, the continuing lack of spirit within the Eighth Army worked against the prospects of launching larger attacks. Some indications of recovery and Ridgway's confidence in the Eighth Army's inherent ability notwithstanding, his forces and staff, in the main, were still not "offensive-minded."3


In his constant attempt to reshape the mood of the Eighth Army, Ridgway during the first days of January instituted a morale survey in which his troops repeatedly raised two questions: "Why are we here?" and "What are we fighting for?" These questions clearly reflected the lack of motivation, and both, in Ridgway's judgment, required and deserved well-reasoned replies.4

His answer to the first question was brief and point-blank: "We are here because of the decisions of the properly constituted authorities of our respective governments . . . .The answer is simple because further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the loyalty we give, and expect, precludes the slightest questioning of these orders."

He considered the second question to have greater significance, and he answered at length:

To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is here incidental. It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean allies . . . though that freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.

The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization . . . shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.

If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean allies alone and for their national survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence.

The sacrifices we have made, and those we shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct defense.

In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here in Korea is whether communism or individual freedom shall prevail.5

Ridgway published these replies and distributed them throughout the command in January. Whether they would help to improve the attitude of the Eighth Army depended, he believed, on whether their sincerity was recognized. In any case, the disciplinary tone of the first reply was unmistakable, and the second was an eloquent statement of the war's principal issue as Ridgway believed his command should understand it.

Allies From North Korea

A striking local example of the issue as Ridgway summarized it was at the time being set on a string of islands hugging enemy-held Hwanghae Province on the west coast. Giving up everything but individual freedom, literally thousands of anti-Communist North Koreans were taking refuge on the islands, mainly Ch'o-do and Paengnyong-do, the two largest. Most came from western Hwanghae, the region between and west of Chinnamp'o in the north and Haeju in the south, where an anti-Communist underground existed even before the war. Some underground members had attacked retreating North Korean troops in October 1950 when the Eighth Army moved


above the 38th parallel, and after UNC forces occupied the region a number of anti-Communists had joined UNC security units formed to maintain civil order. Others had openly professed their convictions and thus exposed themselves to retaliation when enemy forces reentered the province on the heels of the Eighth Army's withdrawal.6

The former UNC security groups reinforced by volunteers engaged North Korean troops sent to reoccupy western Hwanghae in December. ROK Navy ships of Task Force 95 in the Yellow Sea, with which the anti-Communists established sporadic radio contact, provided gunfire and arranged some air support. But this help could not compensate shortages in weapons and ammunition among the anti-Communist groups which from the start gave the enemy regulars the deciding edge. Some Hwanghae defenders hid out, hoping that UNC forces would soon return to the province. Most decided to escape to the coastal islands protected by Task Force 95. The exodus, aided by the ROK Navy, which sea lifted many escapees, continued until late January when North Korean troops closed the beach exits.

After reaching the islands the organized groups of refugees, asking only for arms and supplies, offered to return to their home area and resume the fight they had been forced to give up. At Eighth Army headquarters the offer stimulated plans for developing these allies from North Korea as the United Nations Partisan Force. The islands were to become base camps, and the partisans were to be organized, equipped, and trained for guerrilla warfare and intelligence missions behind enemy lines on the mainland.

Regardless of what the partisans might accomplish on the mainland, their occupation of the offshore islands would make the Eighth Army's west flank more secure. Their alliance with the Eighth Army also would be an ideological and psychological thorn in the enemy's side. The partisans themselves, now without status as citizens of either North or South Korea, faced an uncertain postwar future. But they meanwhile had gained personal security for themselves and the many families who had come with them to the islands, and they would receive logistical support for the fight they seemed eager to rejoin.7

The Evacuation Issue Resolved

To the detriment of Ridgway's efforts to restore confidence within the Eighth Army and to increase offensive action, the question raised by the Chinese intervention of whether the United Nations Command could or should stay in Korea had not been resolved by mid-January. Ridgway personally believed the forces arrayed against him did not have the strength to drive the Eighth Army out of Korea. But as long as the


evacuation issue remained undecided at the higher military and political levels, he was obliged to plan for the contingency of further withdrawals, including a final one from the peninsula. The resulting rumors of evacuation scarcely helped to rebuild the spirit of his command, and the possibility of an eventual decision to leave Korea made general offensive operations less practical.

At the higher levels, consideration of the question had taken several new turns since 4 December, when the joint Chiefs of Staff. advised General MacArthur that a major reinforcement was physically impossible and that they concurred in the consolidation of UNC ground forces into beachheads. The great concern in Washington was the possibility that China's entry into Korea was only one step in a Soviet move toward global war. Out of this concern, all major American commands received notices on 6 December to increase their readiness, and on 16 December President Truman formally declared a state of national emergency. No full mobilization was called, but action was taken to increase U.S. military strength and to broaden mobilization and production bases.8

Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur on 30 December, was not considered the place to fight a major war. Consequently, although they had concluded from MacArthur's gloomy reports that the Chinese had committed sufficient strength in Korea to drive the U.N. Command off the peninsula, both the current shortage of combat units in the United States and the increased threat of general war now put a major buildup of MacArthur's forces out of the question. But the Joint Chiefs wanted MacArthur to stay in Korea if he could. They directed him to defend successive positions to the south, damaging enemy forces as much as possible without jeopardizing his own. If his forces were driven back to a line along and eastward from the Kum River, roughly halfway between Seoul and Pusan, and the Chinese massed a clearly superior force before this line, the Joint Chiefs would then order MacArthur to begin a withdrawal to Japan.

MacArthur already had directed his staff to develop plans for an evacuation. But when the joint Chiefs asked for his ideas on timing a withdrawal, he responded on 3 January that no such decision would be necessary until his forces were actually pushed back to a beachhead line. He meanwhile started a new round of discussion on how the war should be prosecuted by proposing four retaliatory measures against the Chinese: blockade the China coast, destroy China's war industries through naval gunfire and air bombardment, reinforce the troops in Korea with part of the Chinese Nationalist Army on Formosa, and allow diversionary operations by Chinese Nationalist troops against the China mainland.

These proposals contradicted the established policy of confining the fighting to Korea, a principle that largely unified the nations allied with the United States in the war. After the measures were considered in Washington, the benefit of each weighed against the certain escalation of the war and the likelihood of alienating allied powers, the joint Chiefs of Staff notified MacArthur on 9 January that there was little chance of a change in policy. They re-


peated their 30 December instructions that MacArthur was to defend successive positions and inflict the greatest possible damage to enemy forces. As before, he was to guard against high losses lest he become unable to carry out his mission of protecting Japan. He could withdraw to Japan whenever in his judgment an evacuation was necessary to avoid severe losses in men and materiel.9

These instructions elicited questions from MacArthur on two points. Although a cautious delaying action in Korea could be an initial mission, with a withdrawal to and defense of Japan its logical sequel, MacArthur interpreted the directive to mean that he had to be prepared to carry out both missions simultaneously. Since his command was not strong enough to do this, he responded on 10 January with a question that, in effect, asked which mission he was to consider more important.

His other question stemmed from the authority given him to evacuate Korea whenever he judged it necessary to prevent severe losses and hinged, in a sense, on the meaning of severe. The acceptable extent of losses, thus the evacuation of Korea, should not be his decision, MacArthur contended, until there had been a decision in Washington to maintain a position in Korea indefinitely, to stay for a limited time, or to minimize losses by leaving the peninsula as soon as possible. He was asking Washington to pick one of these three courses.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to explain their directive on 12 January. While they were not sure how long the U.N. Command could stay in Korea, they emphasized that it was highly important to U.S. prestige, to the future of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in Asia that UNC forces not withdraw unless militarily forced to do so. Again the Joint Chiefs asked for MacArthur's estimate of the timing and conditions of a withdrawal.

As of 15 January the evacuation issue remained unresolved. General MacArthur wanted the question answered on the Washington level, but officials there first wanted him to give them the military guidelines. Aware of the repetitive interchange between Washington and Tokyo, General Ridgway worried that deferring a decision would correspondingly reduce chances that an evacuation could succeed. Some withdrawal actions, logistical arrangements especially, would require sixty to ninety days' advance notice if the Eighth Army was to remove the maximum of troops and equipment in minimum time and with minimum loss.10

Having no clear answer also made it difficult to dispel rumors of evacuation spreading through the ranks. South Korean forces were especially fearful of being abandoned. Ridgway wrote and radioed General MacArthur on 6 and 7 January to deplore any withdrawal that would leave ROK forces to face the retaliation of the Chinese and North


Koreans. He urged MacArthur to issue a public statement assuring the South Koreans that they would not be deserted. MacArthur passed Ridgway's request to the joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment that he could not make such a statement until and unless a policy basis for one was established at governmental level. Ridgway himself needed no such backing. On 11 January he informed General Chung, the ROK Army chief of staff, that there was only one military force fighting the enemy, "our combined Allied Army," and that it would "fight together and stay together whatever the future holds."11

Eighth Army plans and instructions issued between 8 and 13 January however prudent, tended to support the current rumors. On the 8th Ridgway traced two new defense lines, E and F, located some twenty-five and sixty-five miles, respectively, behind line D. (The 2d Division's engagement then in progress at Wonju, the fact that the X Corps sector east of Wonju was then unmanned, and the improbability that the ROK III Corps could occupy its sector of line D prompted Colonel Dabney, Ridgway's G-3, to predict on the 8th that a withdrawal to line E would be called in the near future.) Five days later Ridgway established priorities for completing the four defense lines General Walker had ordered fortified in the southeastern corner of the peninsula on 11 December. The Raider line arching around Pusan twenty miles outside the city received first priority. The Peter line (formerly called the Pusan line) just beyond the city limits and then the Davidson and Naktong River lines farther out were next to be completed.12

Between these actions Ridgway received MacArthur's evacuation plan and instructions to prepare, as a matter of urgency, his supporting plan. Ridgway's staff completed a broad outline on the 10th. In concept, the Eighth Army would fight delaying actions to Pusan from the lettered and named lines already delineated. No supplies or equipment would be abandoned, all units would embark at Pusan with basic loads, and the entire ROK Army plus prisoners of war would be evacuated. 13 There would be no mass evacuation of South Korean civilians. Since features of the concept, such as the evacuation of the ROK Army, were subject to revision, Ridgway insisted that knowledge of the outline and of the operational and logistical details yet to be developed be limited to those American commanders and staff members required to participate in the planning.14 But from any planning map showing the lettered and named lines previously established it was simple to project an Eighth Army withdrawal through shorter and shorter lines and off the peninsula through the Pusan port. This picture, available at several headquarters, partially nullified the


special precaution Ridgway had applied.

Some light was shed on the evacuation issue in Tokyo on 15 January when General Collins, accompanied by Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, arrived from Washington to confer with General MacArthur. Collins informed MacArthur that just before he and General Vandenberg left the United States it was agreed during a conference with President Truman that an evacuation of Korea would be delayed as long as possible without endangering the Eighth Army or the security of Japan. In this decision, Collins added, the objective was to permit the longest time possible for political action by the United Nations and the fullest opportunity to punish the Chinese. Collins also settled the matter raised by Ridgway of the disposition of the ROK Army. If an evacuation became necessary, President Truman wanted not only the ROK Army but also the members of the ROK government and the ROK police force, altogether more than a million people, taken out of Korea.15

Further clarification of the issue came later on the 15th after Collins and Vandenberg flew to Korea for a meeting with General Ridgway at Taegu. The main discussion centered on Ridgway's current operations and plans and on their relationship to the Washington concept of evacuation. Ridgway urged, lest his forces face a difficult withdrawal, that any high level decision to leave Korea be kept a closely guarded secret until he could get his forces below South Korea's main mountain ridges. Ridgway estimated, and by so doing answered the joint Chiefs' question on timing previously posed to MacArthur, that he could stay in Korea at least two or three months. Collins also heard firsthand that the Chinese so far had made no move to push south of the Han, that when counterattacked they usually withdrew, that they seemed to be having supply and morale difficulties, and that the North Korean infiltration in the east was being checked. This information was encouraging, and quite in contrast to the dismal tone of MacArthur's reports to Washington.16

On the negative side, Ridgway brought up the need to improve the leadership of some corps and divisions. Except for allowing General Almond to dismiss General McClure, Ridgway had relieved no one. He had attempted instead to better the performance of his principal subordinates by exhortation and example. But after observing more poor performances during the withdrawals from line B to line D he was no longer hopeful that encouragement and admonishment would produce the quality he considered essential. Writing to General Collins on 8 January, Ridgway had urged the chief of staff and, through him, commander of Army Field Forces General Mark W. Clark, to insist that all general officers of combat commands "attain the highest standards for our military traditions. Let's pour on the heat in our training, and above all, let's be ruthless with our general officers if they fail to measure up."17


At Taegu on the 15th Ridgway told Collins that he could not execute his future plans with his present leaders. But this statement was hyperbole, not a move to sweep the command posts clean. Nor was Ridgway recommending disciplinary action. Well aware that "not all battle casualties are caused by bullets," he largely attributed the lack of aggressiveness of some corps and division commanders to the wearing effect of four to six months of hard fighting and discouraging experience. His most pressing need, he told Collins, was for a corps commander. Ridgway recommended Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, who had served under him in Europe and whom he knew to be a man who would "keep his feet on the ground and turn in a splendid performance at the same time." He planned to give General Moore the IX Corps and to move General Coulter to Eighth Army headquarters as deputy army commander responsible for maintaining liaison and representing Ridgway in dealing with the ROK government. In evidence that this change was no derogation of Coulter's professional competence, Ridgway recommended that he receive his third star. Collins approved both recommendations.18


Ridgway would soon lose two division commanders under a recent Department of the Army decision to rotate senior commanders from Korea to training posts in the United States, where their recent combat experience could be put to good use. Later in January General Barr, commander of the 7th Division, would leave Korea to become commandant of The Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and General Church would relinquish command of the 24th Division to become commandant of The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. During his conference with General Collins Ridgway requested that, in the future, any senior commander returned to the United States simply because he was worn out be protected under this rotation policy. Collins agreed.19

For all practical purposes, General Collins settled the evacuation issue in an announcement to the press following his meeting with Ridgway. Imbued with the Eighth Army commander's personal confidence and encouraged by the report on the Chinese, Collins told correspondents that "as of now, we are going to stay and fight."20 When he returned to Tokyo on the 17th after a tour of the front that revealed considerable evidence of Ridgway's strong leadership, he sent his views to Washington. The Eighth Army was improving daily under Ridgway's command, he reported, and on the whole was in position and prepared to punish severely any mass enemy attack.21 Before returning to the United States, Collins, with Vandenberg, met again with MacArthur and read this report. MacArthur, who as recently as 10 January had described his military position in Korea as "untenable," now agreed that the situation had improved enough to permit his forces to hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely. But he reiterated his strong belief that the issue of whether to evacuate Korea was a purely political matter and should not be decided on military grounds.22 The issue, of course, really had been resolved, and on a military basis.

Three days later MacArthur visited Eighty Army headquarters for the first time since Ridgway had assumed command. At a press conference there he confirmed the decision to stay. "There has been a lot of loose talk about the Chinese driving us into the sea," he told reporters. "No one is going to drive us into the sea."23 The report Collins filed from Tokyo and briefings he and Vandenberg gave upon their return meanwhile reassured officials in Washington, including President Truman. They "were no longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea," Collins wrote later, "and, though it was realized that rough times were still ahead


of us, no longer was there much talk of evacuation." In placing credit for resolving the evacuation issue, Collins emphasized that "General Ridgway alone was responsible for this dramatic change."24

Operation Wolfhound

For Ridgway, the decision to stay in Korea underlined the challenge of the complete tactical control of ground forces given him by MacArthur on 26 December. During World War II he had had the normal experience of operating under higher commanders with greater troop resources to whom he could turn for assistance. But in the present circumstances Ridgway had to make tactical decisions in full realization that with the exception of ten artillery battalions earmarked some time back for shipment to Korea after training, "what I already had [in combat units] was all there was." Ridgway's six Army divisions were still understrength in infantry and artillery troops; indeed, the Department of the Army had not yet been able to send replacements to the Far East at a rate that would raise the divisions to full strength by March, as predicted earlier.25 (See Chapter II.) These limitations by no means ruled out offensive operations, but they dictated deliberate, cautious advances.

Accordingly, Ridgway warned General Milburn against permitting any situation to develop during the I Corps' reconnaissance in force on 15 January that would require additional forces to extricate those initially committed. Neither was Milburn to attempt a large scale exploitation, if that opportunity occurred, except on Ridgway's order. If all went according to instructions, Ridgway estimated, the operation would be concluded by dark on the 15th or, at the latest, on the 16th.26

Milburn assigned the main task to the 25th Division, instructing General Kean to attack the Suwon-Osan area with an infantry regiment and a battalion of tanks supported by artillery and engineers. Kean selected as the central force the 27th Infantry, from whose nickname the reconnaissance was tagged Operation WOLFHOUND. To protect the main force on the east, Milburn ordered the 3d Division to send a smaller force of infantry and tanks to cut the Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni stretch of the lateral Route 20 and instructed the ROK 1st Division to send a battalion as far as Ch'on-ni, on Route 17 three miles south of Kumnyangjang-ni. Ridgway notified the IX Corps also to provide protection on the east, for which General Coulter directed the ROK 6th Division to station a battalion in blocking positions just east of Kumnyangjang-ni.27

On the 15th the South Korean battalions reached Ch'on-ni and Kumnyangjang-ni over Route 17 without contact. But the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, and two companies of tanks from the 3d Division which followed the same axis to Kumnyangjang-ni received small arms and heavy mortar fire after turning west for a mile on Route


20 toward Suwon. An exchange of fire with some six hundred to eight hundred Chinese held the 3d Division force in place for the remainder of the day.28

WOLFHOUND forces elsewhere met no opposition but were delayed by damaged roads and bridges. The bulk of the reinforced 27th Infantry moving over Route 1 in the main effort halted for the night at the northern edge of Osan.29 The 1st Battalion of the regiment and tanks following Route 39 near the coast stopped at Paranjang, ten miles to the west.30

As Colonel Michaelis' two columns converged on Suwon over Routes 1 and 39 on the morning of the 16th, General Milburn ordered the WOLFHOUND forces to withdraw to the Chinwi River at 1400. Having so far met only a few Chinese, who appeared to be stragglers, Michaelis ordered a motorized company of infantry and a company of tanks from each column to sprint ahead and inflict as much damage as possible on enemy forces discovered in Suwon before withdrawing. On the left, after the tank-infantry team moving on Route 39 to Route 20 and then turning east came to a destroyed bridge two miles southwest of Suwon, dismounted infantry continued the advance and investigated the southwestern edge of town without finding enemy forces. On Route 1 the tanks and infantry received fire from a strong Chinese force deployed five hundred yards south of Suwon and from machine gunners atop buildings inside town. Michaelis' team deployed and returned the fire for a half hour, then under the cover of air strikes withdrew out of range.31

The WOLFHOUND forces developed a corps outpost line along the Chinwi with a westward extension to the coast and pushed patrols back into enemy territory. Ridgway commended them, more for the offensive spirit displayed than for results achieved. But General Milburn estimated that the two-day operation had inflicted 1,380 enemy casualties, 1,180 by air strikes, 5 captured and 195 killed by ground troops. His own losses were three killed and seven wounded. The Chinese captives identified three armies, but since the 27th Infantry had taken these prisoners before running into the Chinese position at Suwon, the identity of the unit defending the town was obscure. Most pertinent, the reconnaissance revealed that no large force was located south of the Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni line but that organized groups did hold positions along it.32

Having served up WOLFHOUND as an example, Ridgway on 20 January instructed his American corps commanders to devise similar operations. General Milburn responded on the 22d with an infantry-armor strike built around the 35th Infantry that in concept nearly duplicated Operation WOLFHOUND. Two small encounters


during the one-day operation resulted in three enemy killed and one captured with no losses to the regiment. The strike confirmed the absence of strong enemy forces within ten miles of the I Corps front. It also raised the possibility that North Korean forces were now operating south of Seoul when the captive identified his unit as the 8th Division, part of the I Corps.33

Task Force Johnson

During the week before Ridgway issued his 20 January directive he had prodded General Coulter to increase the strength, continuity, and depth of the IX Corps' reconnaissance. He also had directed Coulter to move the 1st Cavalry Division's 70th Tank Battalion from its deep reserve location near Sangju in the Naktong River valley to Chinch'on, fifteen miles behind the corps front. From Chinch'on the tankers were to back up the ROK 6th Division and also were to be employed in a reconnaissance in force wherever Coulter saw an opportunity.34

Regardless of Ridgway's dissatisfaction, Coulter was certain that his patrols had shown the IX Corps sector below the Kumnyangjang-ni-Ich'onYoju road to be free of any large enemy force. Since 12 January the 24th Division had kept a battalion in Yoju, and on the 21st General Church dispatched another battalion accompanied by tanks and a battery of artillery to Ich'on with instructions to stay until pushed out. At the corps left, the ROK 6th Division had not established outposts that far forward but had placed a battalion at Paengam-ni on secondary Route 55, six miles short of the Kumnyanjang-niIch'on stretch of Route 20.35

After receiving Ridgway's instructions on the 20th, Coulter scheduled for the 22d a one-day operation built around the 70th Tank Battalion in which his force was to push north of Route 20 between Kumnyangjang-ni and Ich'on. The 1st Cavalry Division was to mount the operation, developing and punishing the enemy in the objective area without becoming heavily engaged.36

General Gay organized a task force under the 8th Cavalry's Col. Harold K. Johnson that added infantry, artillery, and engineers to the tank battalion.37 Colonel Johnson was to move up Route 55 through the South Korean outpost at Paengam-ni to Yangji-ri on Route 20, then investigate east and west along the road and the high ground immediately above it.38

Johnson's principal engagement was an exchange of fire with an enemy company discovered on the reverse slopes of the first heights above Yangji-ri. The task force suffered two killed and five wounded, while enemy casualties were


estimated at fifteen killed by ground troops and fifty by air strikes. The lack of contact before reaching Yangji-ri supported General Coulter's conviction that the area below Route 20 was unoccupied, while the Yangjiri exchange supplied further evidence that organized enemy groups were located along the road.39

Operation Thunderbolt

Ridgway, however, wanted a clearer picture of enemy dispositions below the Han before committing forces to general offensive operations. On 23 January his G2 reported the bulk of the XIII Army Group to be below Seoul in the area bounded by Route 20 on the south and the Han River on the east and north. Air reconnaissance had been reporting steady troop movements below the Han but did not confirm the presence of such a large force in that region. Nor had recent ground contacts developed any solid enemy defense at the area's lower edge. Resolving the ambiguities, Ridgway judged, required a deeper and stronger reconnaissance in force, which he scheduled for the morning of the 25th under the name Operation THUNDERBOLT.40

In the THUNDERBOLT operation General Milburn and General Coulter were to reconnoiter as far as the Han, each using not more than one American division reinforced by armor and, at the discretion of each corps commander, one South Korean regiment. Each corps force was to establish a base of operations on the night of the 24th along a line of departure ten miles ahead of line D, from the coast through Osan to Yoju, then advance to the Han in multiple columns through five phase lines about five miles apart. (Map 18) To insure a fully coordinated reconnaissance, Ridgway made Milburn responsible for ordering the advance from each phase line in both corps zones; to guarantee the security of the advance, he instructed Milburn to order each successive move only after he had clearly determined that no enemy group strong enough to endanger any column had been bypassed. Ridgway intended that his ground troops would have ample air support. He planned to postpone the operation if for any reason on the 25th General Partridge could not assure two successive days of maximum close support. Ridgway also arranged for the I Corps to be able to call down gunfire from a heavy cruiser and two destroyers of Task Force 95 stationed off Inch'on.41

The X Corps was to protect the right flank of the THUNDERBOLT advance. On 23 January Ridgway had his deputy chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, deliver instructions to General Almond requiring the X Corps to maintain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju and to prevent enemy movements south of the Yoju-Wonju road. Almond, as he had been instructed three days earlier, also was to send


Map 18. Operation THUNDERBOLT, 25-31 January 1951


forces in diversionary forays north of this road.42

In a personal effort to develop the disposition of enemy forces before Operation THUNDERBOLT began, Ridgway on the 24th reconnoitered the objective area from the air with General Partridge as his pilot. The two generals flew low over the territory twenty miles ahead of the I and IX Corps fronts for two hours but saw no indications of large enemy formations. Although this flight did not conclusively disprove the current G-2 estimate, Ridgway was more confident that his reconnaissance in force would reach the Han, and he also saw possibility of holding the ground covered. That night, from a forward command post established at I Corps headquarters in Ch'onan, he ordered Milburn and Coulter to prepare plans for holding their gains once their forces achieved the fifth phase line stretching eastward from Inch'on. The two corps commanders completed these plans on the 25th. Thus the THUNDERBOLT reconnaissance tentatively assumed the nature of a general attack within a few hours after it started.43

In the I Corps zone, the first


THUNDERBOLT phase line lay four miles short of Suwon in territory already well examined. Milburn picked the 25th Division reinforced by the Turkish brigade to make the advance. According to the scheme of moving in multiple columns, General Kean sent the 35th Infantry up Routes 39 and 1 in the west, the Turks over a secondary road between Routes 1 and 17 and up 17 itself on the east. Out along the coast, a fifth column made up of the reconnaissance companies of the 25th Division and the 3d Division screened the west flank of the advance.44

The initial phase line in the IX Corps zone traced the high ground just above Route 20 which included the area previously reconnoitered by Task Force Johnson. Coulter again ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to advance. Choosing to start in two columns, General Gay sent the 8th Cavalry north on Route 55 toward Yangji-ri, where Colonel Johnson had met resistance on the earlier mission, and the 7th Cavalry up Route 13 into the territory above Ich'on.45

Screening wide to the flanks of each axis lest they bypass an enemy force, the THUNDERBOLT columns on the 25th developed islands of opposition, mostly light, along or just below the first phase line. Sharp counterattacks hit the Turks on the secondary road east of Route 1 and the 8th Cavalry in the Yangji-ri area, but in both instances the Chinese eventually broke contact. Captives identified only two divisions of the 50th Army across the thirty-mile front of the advance. This disclosure and the general pattern of light resistance indicated that the XIII Army Group had set out a counter-reconnaissance screen to shield defenses or assembly areas farther north. According to the prisoners, some positions would be found between two and five miles farther north. This location would place them generally along the second THUNDERBOLT phase line, which coincided with Suwon and a stretch of Route 20 in the west, then tipped northeast to touch the Han ten miles above Yoju.46

On the 26th General Milburn allowed the I Corps columns to move toward the second phase line while the IX Corps forces continued to clear the area along the first. Again against light, scattered opposition, the two columns of the 35th Infantry converged on Suwon and occupied the town and airfield by 1300. Elsewhere in both corps zones the advance became a plodding affair as the troop columns searched east and west of their axes while driving north for short gains through tough spots of resistance. The Chinese fought back hardest at Kumnyangjang-ni, which the Turks finally cleared at 1930, and in the heights above Yangji-ri, where the 8th Cavalry lost 28 killed and 141 wounded while managing little more than to hold its position. The inability of the 8th Cavalry to move forced the 7th Cavalry to the east to stand fast alon the first phase line just above Ich'on.47

Gains on the 27th were short everywhere, more because of the requirements for close coordination and a thorough ground search than enemy


resistance. The deepest I Corps advance was on the left, where the 35th Infantry moved about two miles above Suwon, while the leading Turk troops on the right got about a mile above Route 20 into the T'an-ch'on River valley between Suwon and Kumnyangjang-ni. The heaviest fighting again occurred near Yangji-ri when the 5th Cavalry passed through the 8th and attacked west. Killing at least three hundred Chinese before reaching Kumnyangjang-ni, the 5th Cavalry then turned up Route 17 to reach the first phase line a mile and half to the north. The 7th Cavalry, in the meantime, continued to hold near Ich'on.48

Captives taken during the day identified the third, and last, division of the 50th Army. The full deployment of the 50th and the absence of contact with any other army on the THUNDERBOLT front supported the previous conclusion that the 50th had a screening mission. The intelligence rationale now taking shape assumed the Chinese units originally moving south of the Han to have started a gradual reduction of forward forces after determining generally the extent of the Eighth Army withdrawal. Behind the 50th Army screen, the remaining five armies of the XIII Army Group and the North Korean I Corps apparently were now grouped just above and below the Han to rest and refurbish those Chinese who had been in combat longest.49

To meet the probability of stronger resistance nearer the Han and to prepare for holding all ground gained, Ridgway on the 27th authorized Milburn to add the 3d Division to the I Corps advance. Milburn gave General Soule the Turkish brigade zone east of Suwon and sent the Turks west to advance along the coast toward Inch'on. On the 28th Soule's 65th and 15th Regiments moved north astride Route 55 in the T'an-ch'on valley while the Turks shifted westward and joined the advance of the 35th Infantry. Against moderate, uneven resistance, the enlarged I Corps force reached within two miles of the third phase line, which lay roughly halfway between the line of departure and the Han.50

To the east, where resistance in the Yangjiri-Kumnyangjang-ni area had kept the IX Corps THUNDERBOLT forces slightly behind the others, the 1st Cavalry Division received clearance on the 28th to advance to the second phase line. In the slow going imposed by careful screening and moderate opposition, the 5th Cavalry, moving along Route 17, reached the new objective while the 7th Cavalry, advancing above Ich'on in a wide zone astride Route 13, stopped for the night about a mile short. The cavalrymen had encountered two new regiments, one athwart each axis of advance. These, as identified by Chinese captured later during sharp night assaults against the 7th Cavalry, belonged to the 112th Division, 38th Army. Previously assembled in a rest area about seven miles above the front, the 112th had received sudden orders to move south and oppose the IX Corps advance.51


In anticipation of heavier opposition to the IX Corps advance and to help hold the ground taken, Ridgway on the 28th instructed General Coulter to commit the 24th Division. Coulter gave Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan, who had replaced General Church on 26 January, until the morning of the 30th to assemble the 24th behind the Ich'on-Yoju stretch of Route 20, whence the division was to advance on the corps right.52

Also on the 28th Ridgway again instructed General Almond to maintain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju, to block enemy moves below the Yoju-Wonju road, and to create diversions north of the road.53 X Corps forces, having only recently check the North Korean advance east of Route 29 and reoccupied Wonju, were then just beginning to carry out similar instructions received on the 20th and 23d.

Enemy small arms, machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire, as well as minefields (though neither extensively nor well laid) kept gains short in both corps zones on the 29th. Information supplied by prisoners taken during the day indicated that six divisions now opposed the THUNDERBOLT advance. In the area between the west coast and Route 1, the North Korean 8th Division stood before the Turks and the left flank units of the 35th Infantry. West to east between Routes 1 and 17, the Chinese 148th, 149th, and 150th Divisions of the 50th Army opposed the 25th and 3d Divisions and the left flank forces of the 1st Cavalry Division. From Route 17 eastward to the Han, the Chinese 113th and 112th Divisions of the 38th Army occupied positions in front of the remainder of the cavalry division.54

Even though the opposition had tripled, the dotted pattern of enemy positions, mostly company-size, made clear that the THUNDERBOLT forces were still battling a counter-reconnaissance screen. There was now some doubt that a main enemy line would be developed below the Han. Prisoners made no mention of one but spoke mainly of regroupment. Neither did air observers, although they warned of prepared positions along Route 1 north to Yongdungp'o. Thus the refurbishing needs of the XIII Army Group might be great enough to keep it from establishing solid defenses south of the Han, or the group commander might have chosen not to stand with the river at his back.55

Exercising a prerogative given in Ridgway's initial order, Milburn and Coulter on the 30th each added a South Korean regiment to their THUNDERBOLT forces to help push through the enemy's tighter screen. With the opening of the 24th Division's advance on the IX Corps right on that date, the additions doubled the forces who had begun the reconnaissance five days earlier. Ground gains against the six enemy divisions nevertheless were hard won and measured in yards during the last two days of January. Milburn's forces barely gained the third phase


line on the 31st, and IX Corps forces reached little farther than the second.56

Ridgway in the meantime converted his reconnaissance in force to a fullfledged attack. On the 30th, although his assault forces were some distance short of the fifth phase line, where he originally had planned to establish the remainder of the I and IX Corps, he authorized Milburn and Coulter to bring their remaining units forward from line D to hold the ground that had been gained. He did not release these forces for commitment in the advance, but he did take steps to ease the progress of the attack by instructing Milburn to plan a strong armored thrust through the coastal lowland on the west flank. Beyond this, he directed his G-3 to arrange a maximum air effort to isolate the battlefield south of the Han.57

He also began to widen the offensive. On the 30th he asked General Almond and the ROK Army chief of staff, General Chung, for recommendations on sending the X Corps and the ROK III Corps forward in the fashion of Operation THUNDERBOLT. The purpose of the advance, he explained, would be to disrupt the North Korean II and V Corps, which were still regrouping east of Route 29. On 2 February he ordered the ROK I Corps to join the advance. The South Koreans were to move as far north as the east coast town of Kangnung.58

When executed, the instructions Ridgway issued at the turn of the month would set the entire Eighth Army front in forward motion. In terms of ground to be gained and held, however, Ridgway intended that this motion carry his forces no farther than the lower bank of the Han in the west and a general line extending eastward from the Han River town of Yangp'yong through Hoengsong in the center of the peninsula to Kangnung on the coast. Only if enemy forces elected to withdraw above the 38th parallel would he consider occupying a defense line farther north, and in this context he asked his staff near the end of January for recommendations on the most advantageous terrain lines for the Eighth Army to occupy during the spring and summer months. Otherwise, his current judgment was that the ground farther north, to and including the 38th parallel, offered no defensible line worthy of the losses risked in attempting to take it.59

In limiting the Eighth Army's defense line in the west to the lower bank of the Han, Ridgway excluded Seoul as an objective. Occupying the capital city, in his estimation, would provide no military advantage but would, rather, produce the disadvantage of placing a river immediately in rear of the occupying forces. He had in fact directed his staff to prepare plans for crossing the Han and capturing the city. But, in line with his views, these plans were not to be carried out unless there arose an op-


portunity to destroy a major enemy force in which the retaking of Seoul was an incidental possibility.60

In any event, Ridgway entertained no thought of a prolonged effort to hold any line. Knowing that there would be no major reinforcement of the Eighth Army and assuming that enemy forces would keep trying to drive the Eighth Army out of Korea or destroy it in place, he saw no wisdom in accepting the heavy attrition that a static defense seemed certain to entail. In sum, he considered the permanent acquisition of real estate an impractical, if not unachievable, objective. In his mind, inflicting maximum losses on the Chinese and North Koreans, delaying them as long as possible if and when they attempted to advance, preserving the strength of his own forces, and maintaining his major units intact remained the only sound bases of planning, both for current operations and at longer range.61

Ridgway informed General MacArthur of these tactical concepts by letter on 3 February. MacArthur agreed that occupying Seoul would yield little military gain, although he believed that seizing the city would produce decided diplomatic and psychological advantages. On the other hand, he stressed to Ridgway the military worth of nearby Kimpo airfield and the port of Inch'on, both below the Han, and urged their capture.62 These facilities already had become objectives of Operation THUNDERBOLT.

To Ridgway's larger concept of holding along the Han River-Yangp'yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung line unless enemy forces voluntarily withdrew above the 38th parallel, MacArthur responded in terms of developing the enemy's main line of resistance. If Ridgway developed the line below the Han, he should not attempt to break through it, but if he reached the Han without serious resistance, he should continue north until he had defined the enemy line or discovered that no line existed.63

As a general concept, MacArthur had in mind "to push on until we reached the line where a balance of strength was achieved which was governed by the relativity of supply."64 Ridgway, on the other hand, was primarily interested in holding whatever line best suited his basic plan of punishing the enemy as severely as possible at the least cost to his own forces. The difference in concept was perhaps subtle but was substantial enough to prompt Ridgway to bring up the matter again when MacArthur next visited Korea.


1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
2 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 13 and 14 Jan 51; Rad, GX-11066 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 14 Jan 51; Rad, G1-1081 KAR, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 14 Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Jan 51.
3 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 382; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51.

4 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 369.
5 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 370-71.
This section is based on Mono, "AFFE Military History Detachment, U.N. Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict," copy in CMH.
By war's end the United Nations Partisan Force reached a strength of twenty thousand divided among six regiments, one of which had received airborne training. Its members at that time included South Korean volunteers who were allowed to join the partisans in lieu of conscription into the ROK Army. Partisan units eventually occupied island strongholds off both coasts of North Korea, although the major strength remained off Hwanghae Province. Beyond harassing the enemy rear along the west coast, the value of partisan operations is a matter of speculation.
8 For a detailed discussion of the evacuation issue, see Schnabel,
Policy and Direction, chs. XVI and XVII.
On 18 December MacArthur had requested that four National Guard divisions called into federal service the previous September be moved to Japan to complete their training so as to be at hand to protect Japan against any Soviet attack. Because no final government decision had yet been made as to the future U.S. course of action in Korea, the Joint Chiefs on 23 December notified MacArthur that no divisions would be deployed to the Far East for the time being. Japan was left virtually without combat troops.
10 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 383-84.
11 Ibid.; Rad, G-1-1594 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 7 Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 312; Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Maj Gen Chung It Kwon, 11 Jan 51.
Eighth Army Opns Plan 21, 8 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Log Comd, 13 Jan 51, sub: Defense Line Construction.
13 Prisoners of war then numbered 137,791, of whom 616 were Chinese and 137,175 were North Koreans.
DF, Eighth Army G3 to CofS, 10 Jan 51, sub: Evacuation Plan; Eighth Army Opn Plan 2-25, Draft no. 1, 10 Jan 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Log Comd, 10 Jan 51, sub: Operation Plan 2-25; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 313.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for General J. Lawton Collins, CS, USA, 15 Jan 51, sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS, 17 Jan 51.
17 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51.
18 Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Gen Mark W. Clark, 5 Mar 51; Rad, G-1-1299 KCG, CG EUSAK to CS USA, Personal for Haislip from Collins, 16 Jan 51; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 257.
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
21 Later, after Ridgway saw press reports of Collins' views, he radioed MacArthur: "May I suggest for such use as you think it might merit, my firm conviction that recently reported press statements that members of the JCS had announced `the Eighth Army has plenty of fight left and if attacked will severely punish the enemy' are great understatements. This command, I am convinced, will do far more." See Rad, G-1-2148 KCG, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, Personal for General MacArthur, 26 Jan 51.
Rad, C-53613, Bradley from Collins for JCS, 17 Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 327.
Statement to the Press, General MacArthur, 20 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 255.
25 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 388-89. See also Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 342-44.
Msg, Ridgway Personal for Milburn, 150900 Jan 51, copy in I Corps G3 Jul file, 15 Jan 51.
I Corps Opns Dir 38, 14 Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Jan 51; Rad, CG-1-1066 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 14 Jan 51; Rad, IXACT-697, CG IX Corps to CG 6th ROK Div, 14 Jan 51; 25th Div 01 46, 14 Jan 51.
28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1 Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51, and 377, 16 Jan 51.

The 89th Tank Battalion; 8th Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, 90th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A, 65th Engineer Battalion; 25th Reconnaissance Company; a detachment of the 25th Signal Company; and two tactical air control parties were attached.
30 25th Div 0146, 14 Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 Jan 51; 1 Corps POR 378, 16 Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Unit Rpt no. 16, 16 Jan 51.
I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 and 17 Jan 51; Ltr, CG 25th Div for general distribution, 19 Jan 51, sub: Commendation. See also various reports on Operation WOLFHOUND in the 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Jan 51.
33 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 39, 21 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jul, Sum, 20 and 22 Jan 51; Ltr, CG 25th Div to CG I Corps, 26 Jan 51, sub: Evaluation of the Limited Objective Attack, 22 Jan 51.

Rads, G-1-980 and CG1-1535 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 13 and 19 Jan 51.
Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 21 Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
36 IX Corps Opn Dir 23, 20 Jan 51.

Task Force Johnson included the 70th Tank Battalion, the 3d Battalion and a platoon of the heavy mortar company of the 8th Cavalry, a battery of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, and a platoon of the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion.
1st Cav Div Opn Dir 1-51, 21 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div, Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; TF Johnson Opn O no. 1, 21 Jan 51.
TF Johnson Periodic Operations Report, 22 Jan 51; TF Johnson Periodic Intelligence Report, 22 Jan 51.
40 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 381; Eighth Army PIR 195, 23 Jan 51.
Rads, CG-1-1895 KGOO, CG-1-1888 KGOO, and CG-1-1889 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, all 23 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-1929 KAR, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 24 Jan 51; Rad, CTF 95 to COMCRU DIV 1, 23 Jan 51; Rad, CTG 95.1 to CTE 95.12, 24 Jan 51.
Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CC X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms oral instructions delivered by Gen Hodes on 23 Jan 51).
MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 381; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 263; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps Opn Plan "Exploitation," 25 Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Plan 11, 25 Jan 51.
I Corps Opn Dir 40, 23 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
IX Corps Opn O 11, 23 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Opn 0 1-51, 24 Jan 51.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 197, 25 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 198, 26 Jan 51.
48 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 26 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 199, 27 Jan 51, and 200, 28 Jan 51.
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 27 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jut, Sum, 27 Jan 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 41, 27 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 28 Jan 51.
1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 125, 29 Jan 51.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 25, 29 Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
53 Rad, GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 201, 29 Jan 51.
Ibid.; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Jan 51.
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51.
57 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
58 Rad, GX-1-2257 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 30 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 31 Jan 51; Rad, GX-2-118 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb 51.
59 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 386.
60 Ltr, Ridgway, to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Rad, CICOS-14376, CG Eighth Army to C/S Eighth Army, 26 Jan 51.
61 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51.
62 Ibid.; Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army Personal for Ridgway 4 Feb 51.
63 Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army, Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51.
64 MacArthur,
Reminiscences, p. 384.

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