The Chinese Spring Offensive
The Opening

The Enemy Plan

The Air Plan

According to information accumulated by UNC intelligence, the enemy high command during the course of the New Year's offensive had decided to use the People's Air Force in support of future ground operations.1 In addition to more MIG-15s, the Chinese acquired enough Ilyushin (IL-10) ground-attack planes by March to equip at least two air regiments, and they held a special airground training conference in Mukden. The air commander, Liu Ya-lou, meanwhile had worked to develop Korean airfields on which to base supporting aircraft. He began this project at the turn of the year after his superiors forbade him to mount massed air attacks on UNC troops and installations from Manchurian fields for fear of concerted retaliation.2 To get the Korean air bases he needed, Liu had planned to establish air superiority over northwestern Korea and then to repair and improve air facilities in the protected region. Since the MIG-15s and IL-10s were short range aircraft, he also planned to restore forward airfields near the 38th parallel through which to stage them.

Liu was handed control of the air between the Yalu and Ch'ongch'on rivers in January, when the Fifth Air Force demolished its forward fields at Kimpo and Suwon during the New Year's offensive and redeployed all jet fighters to Japan. Even by staging through other fields in southern Korea, the jets' range was too short to hold air superiority in the far northwest. Only in the first week of March was the Suwon field sufficiently repaired to allow jets to stage through it and reenter MIG Alley, and only at the end of the month could the Fifth Air Force compete with Liu's forces on near even terms.


Enemy troops and civilian labor forces meanwhile began rehabilitating airfield runways and constructing revetments for aircraft. Under the MIG umbrella in the northwest they improved fields at Sinuiju, Uiju, and Sinanju. Outside the MIG cover they worked on a cluster of fields in and around Pyongyang, the fields at Wonsan and Yonp'o on the east coast, and four forward fields on the Hwanghae peninsula below P'yongyang.

Far East Air Forces reconnaissance discovered Liu's work in February. Bomber Command prepared plans for attacks on the fields, but Brig. Gen. James E. Briggs (who had replaced General O'Donnell in January) believed the fields could not be destroyed once and for all because of the large repair crews available to the enemy high command. He elected to withhold B-29 strikes until the fields were about to become operational. He intended to bomb the fields out of action at that time and to keep them neutralized with attacks just heavy enough and frequent enough to offset repairs. Aerial photographs showed the fields almost ready to receive aircraft near mid-April, and Briggs delivered repeated attacks between the 17th and 23d, concentrating on the forward fields and those in and around P'yongyang. The strikes stymied Liu's plans and preparations. At least there would be no air support during the spring offensive.

The Ground Plan

The immediate objective of the ground attack was Seoul, whose capture Peng Tehhuai reportedly promised to Mao Tse-tung as a May Day gift. Peng planned to converge on the city, employing principally his fresh III, IX and XIX Army Groups, a force of about two hundred seventy thousand men. From above the Imjin on the west wing of the main effort, the XIX Army Group was to attack southeast toward Seoul, crossing the river on a twelve-mile front centered on the Korangp'o-ri bend and advancing on the capital through a narrowing zone between Routes 1 and 33. (Map 32) The group commander, Yang Teh-chih, planned to cross the Imjin with two armies, the 64th between Route 1 and the town of Korangp'ori, the 63d between Korangp'o-ri and the confluence of the Imjin and Hant'an rivers. Yang's deployment would pit the 64th Army against the bulk of the ROK 1st Division and the 63d Army against the British 29th Brigade occupying the left half of the 3d Infantry Division's sector.4

Out of the ground between the Imjin and Ch'orwon, the III Army Group was to advance south on the Route 33 axis, its three armies attacking abreast in columns of divisions. Nearest the Imjin, the 15th Army had a narrow zone between the river and Route 33 projecting through the area occupied by the 65th Infantry. Along Route 33 and east of it, the 12th Army and 60th Army at group center and left were to attack through ground held by the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team on the right flank of the 3d Division and through the Pogae-san ridges occupied by the Turkish brigade and 24th Infantry in the sector of the 25th Infantry Division.5


Map 32. The Chinese Spring Offensive, the Main Effort, 22-30 April 1951


On the left of the main effort, the IX Army Group was to advance southwest out of the Kumhwa area, guiding on Route 3. Sung Shihlun, the group commander, set the 27th Army on his right for an attack astride Route 3. The 27th thus initially would be advancing in a zone centered on the boundary between the 25th and 24th Divisions. Similarly, the 20th Army on the group's left would attack athwart the I-IX Corps boundary through portions of the 24th Division and ROK 6th Division sectors.6

Peng's plan included auxiliary attacks along each flank of the main effort and another east of the Hwach'on Reservoir. In the west, the North Korean I Corps was to move southeast toward Seoul over Route 1 and through the ground between the road and the Han River, but its leading forces displacing forward from behind the Yesong River would not reach the Imjin in time to participate in the opening attack on the ROK 1st Division. In the area adjacent to the Hwach'on Dam, the somewhat worn 39th and 40th Armies of the XIII Army Group were to assist with holding attacks on either side of Route 17 in the eastern portion of the ROK 6th Division's sector and the sector of the 1st Marine Division.7

In what would be essentially a separate effort east of the Hwach'on Reservoir, North Korean forces were to strike for Yanggu and Inje, where breakthroughs could open up Routes 29 and 24 leading southwestward to Ch'unch'on and Hongch'on. The North Korean III Corps, whose 1st, 15th, and 45th Divisions had been holding the entire eastern front except for the coastal area, had sidestepped westward into a narrow zone abutting on the reservoir for the attack in the Yanggu area. Moving south through the upper Soyang River valley from its assembly at Komisong, the North Korean V Corps had deployed in the vacated ground for the attack toward Inje. The V Corps commander, General Pang, chose to attack with his seasoned, if understrength, 6th and 12th Divisions, keeping in reserve the 32d, a nearly full strength but green division that had replaced the 7th while the corps was in Komisong.8 III Corps commander General Yu elected a different course, committing only the 45th Division in what would be its first offensive of the war, perhaps because it had the virtue of eighty-six hundred men, more than twice the strength of either of Yu's other divisions. The deployment of the 45th Division set it against the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division at the edge of the reservoir above Yanggu and the 17th and 32d Infantry Regiments of the 7th Division in the adjacent ground to the east. On the opposite wing of the North Korean effort, the 6th Division faced the ROK 3d Division. At center, the 12th Division was poised for an attack in a zone straddling the X Corps-ROK III Corps boundary and leading directly to Inje.9

Panic at the IX Corps Left

During the afternoon of 22 April, IX


Corps airborne artillery observers located and brought down fire on a large enemy force concentrated ahead of the ROK 6th Division. Anticipating an attack, General Chang halted his division's advance toward line Wyoming about 1600 and ordered his forward regiments, the 19th and 2d, to develop defensive positions tied in with each other and with the 24th Division and 1st Marine Division on their respective outside flanks. Chang moved his reserve 7th Regiment into supporting positions immediately behind the 2d Regiment, ahead of which more enemy forces had been observed than ahead of the 19th Regiment. Placing reserves so close to the front went against the recommendation of his KMAG adviser, but Chang intended that this show of support would counter uneasiness that had begun to spread among his line forces at word of a probable Chinese attack.10

General Hoge moved three corps artillery units forward during the afternoon to help the 1st Marine Division and, in particular, to reinforce the support being given the ROK 6th Division by the New Zealand artillery; Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and the division's own 27th Field Artillery Battalion. The corps' latest ground gains had opened Route 17 in the 1st Marine Division's sector far enough north to allow use of a twisting, narrowly confined valley road branching west off Route 17 near the village of Chich'on-ni into the ROK 6th Division's rear area. The 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved up Route 17 and out the minor road to the west edge of the Marine sector from where its 155mm. self-propelled howitzers could support both the marines and the South Koreans. The 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery, both equipped with 105mm. howitzers, used the winding valley road to reach the right half of the ROK sector, where they took position behind the 7th Regiment near the South Korean artillery and American 4.2-inch mortars.11

For reasons that never became clear, the 2d and 19th Regiments failed to develop the defensive positions ordered by General Chang. With numerous gaps and open outside flanks, the division front was vulnerable to infiltration, and the nearby reserves were almost as subject to attack as were the forward units. Forces of the 60th Division, 20th Army, hit Chang's lines about 2000. Without artillery support and with little other supporting fire, van units of the 179th Regiment, 60th Division, struck the inside battalion of the 2d Regiment. Forces following punched through a central gap, some veering west and east behind the 19th and 2d Regiments, others continuing south toward the 7th Regiment. Within minutes both line regiments were in full flight. Caught up in the rush of troops from the 2d Regiment, the 7th Regiment joined the wild retreat. Abandoned weapons, vehicles, and equipment littered vacated positions and lines of drift as the South Koreans streamed south, east, and west,


rapidly uncovering the fire support units.12

The New Zealand artillery supporting the 19th Regiment in the west managed to withdraw with guns and equipment intact down the Kap'yong River valley to a position four miles north of the British 27th Brigade assembled near Kap'yong town. To the east, Chinese following the 2d and 7th Regiments caught the ROK 27th Field Artillery Battalion in position. Under fire, its members abandoned guns and joined the southerly surge of infantrymen. The American support units pulled out all weapons and equipment but came under fire as they moved east on their narrow access road to join the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Hampered further by ROK troops, trucks, and paraphernalia cluttering and finally blocking the poor road, Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery reached the 92d with none of their principal weapons, the 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion with about half its equipment.13

Having lost radio and wire communications with his regimental commanders soon after the panic began, General Chang was hard pressed to regain control of his forces, even when they outdistanced the Chinese pursuit after midnight. Traveling rear areas throughout the night, Chang and his staff established a degree of order near dawn, collecting about twenty-five hundred members of his three regiments some ten miles south of the division's original front.14 To the same depth, the South Korean rout had peeled open the flanks of the 24th Division and 1st Marine Division to the west and east.

At the first indication of the South Korean retreat, the 1st Marine Division commander, General Smith, had begun to shore up his left flank, drawing a battalion from the 1st Marines in reserve near Ch'unch'on and sending it out the valley road from Chich'onni to establish defenses tied in with the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. En route aboard trucks before midnight, the 1st Battalion struggled west against a current of retreating South Koreans and scarcely managed to establish a position before dawn.15

Operating in a zone coinciding with the eastern third of the ROK 6th Division sector and the western edge of the Marine sector, the 40th Army of the XIII Army Group was well situated to exploit the exposed Marine flank. The 120th Division at the army's left, in particular, had virtually the entire night to move deep into the vacated ROK sector and sweep behind the Marine front. But, either unaware of the opportunity to envelop the marines or, more likely, unable to change course rapidly, the 120th attempted only local frontal assaults on the 7th Marines west of Hwach'on town, none of which penetrated or forced a withdrawal. Farther east, forces of the 115th Division, 39th Army, penetrated the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment above the Hwach'on Dam and slashed southwestward to occupy heights commanding the town of Hwach'on in the 5th Marines' central sector; American


and ROK counterattacks eliminated this penetration near dawn, and the 115th made no further attempt to take the dam or town.16

Eager to close ranks as the IX Corps front quieted after daylight on the 23d, General Hoge ordered the ROK 6th Division to occupy positions on line Kansas, which was some three miles north of the area in which General Chang was reassembling his forces. The 1st Marine Division was to pull back against the Pukhan River to a line anchored near the Hwach'on Dam and curving southwest to a juncture with the South Koreans.17 Manning the long curve would compel General Smith to commit his entire division, and even then he would not be able to set up a solid front. And General Chang faced no small task in recovering troops who had scattered east and west into adjacent sectors, reorganizing his entire division, and then moving his nervous forces north toward the enemy. But the adjustments, if achieved, would retain control of the Hwach'on Dam, eliminate the marines' open left flank, and join the two IX Corps divisions with a minimum of movement.

Below Ch'orwon and Kumhwa

At the right of the I Corps, the 59th Division, 20th Army, though kept under artillery fire while massing in the Kwandok-san ridges below Kumhwa, struck hard at the center of the 24th Division. Leading forces opened a gap between the 19th and 5th Infantry Regiments; reinforcements widened the attack but concentrated on moving through the gap and down a ridge behind the inside battalion of the 19th Infantry. Pressure on the adjacent battalion of the 5th Infantry forced it to withdraw almost a mile. Quick to follow, Chinese reengaged the battalion within an hour.18

Regimental reserves took up blocking positions on the flanks of the enemy penetration and helped to confine it, but General Bryan's attempt to move part of his reserve 21st Infantry from line Kansas north onto high ground at the point of penetration failed when Chinese occupied the ground first. By daylight the Chinese drove almost three miles through the center of the division. Bryan withdrew his line regiments down the sides of the enemy wedge into positions below it, where, though kept under pressure at center, they were able to stand. Meanwhile, on learning of the ROK 6th Division's retreat on his right, Bryan set the 21st Infantry in blocking positions along the endangered flank. The Eighth Army Ranger Company, attached to the 21st, patrolled east in search of Chinese approaching the flank but made no contact.19

In the Pogae-san ridges below Ch'orwon, the 2d Motorized Artillery Division prepared the way for infantry attacks on the 25th Division with a threehour bombardment, dropping most of its fire on the Turkish brigade along Route 33. On the east wing of the III Army Group, the 179th Division, 60th Army, attacked behind the fire about midnight, its bulk hitting the Turks, some forces spilling over against the 24th Infantry at division center. The latter bent back the left of the 24th's


line while the forces attacking the Turkish position penetrated at several points and so intermingled themselves that artillery units supporting the brigade were forced to stop firing lest they hit Turks as well as Chinese. Further fragmented by persistent attacks through the night, the Turkish position by morning consisted mainly of surrounded or partially surrounded company perimeters, and Chinese penetrating between the Turks and the curled-back left flank of the 24th Infantry moved almost two miles behind the division's front. Ahead of the 27th Infantry on the division's right, enemy forces (apparently the westernmost forces of the 27th Army) massed and began their approach at first light, but heavy defensive fire shattered the formation within half an hour, and the Chinese attempted no further attack on the regiment.20

Near dawn General Bradley ordered the 24th and 27th Infantry Regiments to withdraw two miles and instructed the Turkish brigade to leave the line and reorganize south of the Hant'an River. The 35th Infantry came out of reserve to take over the Turkish sector. The Turks fought their way off the front during the morning and, except for one company that had been virtually wiped out, assembled below the Hant'an in better condition than Bradley had expected. The Chinese followed neither the Turks nor the two regiments, and the division sector quieted as Bradley developed his new line.21

Along the Imjin

General Soule considered the 3d Division's front along the Imjin between Korangp'o-ri and Route 33 to be particularly vulnerable to attack, not only because the line was long and thin with gaps between defensive positions but also because it lay generally alongside and at no great distance from Route 33, his main axis of communications. The 65th Infantry and the attached Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team occupied the right half of the line, with the Filipinos on the outside flank athwart Route 33 and the 2d and 3d Battalions facing northwest and west along the Imjin. In regimental reserve, the 1st Battalion was located along Route 33 just above the Hant'an River.22

The British 29th Brigade with the Belgian battalion attached held the remainder of the division's line. The 1st Battalion of The Gloucestershire regiment (Glosters) anchored the brigade's left flank astride minor Route 5Y near the villages of Choksong and Solmari. The right flank of the ROK 12th Regiment, the nearest position of the ROK 1st Division, was a mile to the southwest. Northeast of the Glosters, beyond two miles of unoccupied hills, the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, held a central position below the lower arm of the rightangle bend in the Imjin. At the brigade's right, the Belgian battalion occupied Hill 194, a low mass located above the Imjin inside the rightangle bend. Placing the battalion above the river entailed a risk, at least to Belgian vehicles. Although the Imjin behind Hill 194 was fordable, the east bank in that area was almost vertical. Vehicular movement to and from the


position followed secondary Route 11, the 29th Brigade's supply road to the south, and depended on two ponton bridges, one crossing the Hant'an near its mouth, the other spanning the Imjin a half mile farther west. The only alternate route was a rudimentary track that followed the upper bank of the Hant'an and connected with Route 33, and its use depended on the Imjin span. Both bridges were vulnerable to enemy action, resting as they did in a milewide gap between the Belgians and fusiliers. Reserves available to the 29th Brigade included the 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, and the 52-ton Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars. Both units were centrally located along Route 11.23

Looking at the 3d Division's line as the Chinese might see it, General Soule believed the most vulnerable point was the Imjin angle: a penetration there could easily cut Route 33 and imperil the 65th Infantry north of the cut. Because of this danger the British had set the Belgian battalion above the river inside the angle. Without the 15th Infantry, which was in corps reserve, Soule clustered what reserves he had behind the Imjin east of the Belgians. He set the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry and the 64th Tank Battalion just above the Hant'an, principally to thicken the central position, and the remainder of the 7th Infantry below the Hant'an for possible employment either north in the 65th Infantry's sector or west in the British sector.24

Vanguards of the 34th Division, 12th Army, and 29th Division, 15th Army, opened stinging assaults on the 65th Infantry about midnight, driving one company of the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team off position almost immediately. Through the remainder of the night the two enemy divisions failed to reinforce their attacks beyond replacing losses, and they made no further gains. The attacks subsided after an early morning Filipino counterattack recovered the ground lost in the initial assaults. But the withdrawal of the Turkish brigade then under way to the east was uncovering the 65th's right flank, and the regiment's position, as General Soule had anticipated, was also threatened by XIX Army Group attacks on the British 29th Brigade to the southwest.25

Patrols of the 187th Division, 63d Army, approached the three battalions on the British front near midnight on the 22d. Entering the gap between the Northumberland Fusiliers and Belgians, a large patrol moved along the Imjin on the Belgian side of the river, passed by a Belgian listening post below Hill 194, and continued east toward the two unguarded bridges on the Belgian access route. On receiving the Belgians' report of the patrol at brigade headquarters, Brigadier Brodie sent a motorized detachment from the Ulster battalion to secure the bridges, but while moving up Route 11 to the Hant'an crossing the detachment drove into an ambush and was all but wiped out.26


A Chinese force following the patrol split as it reached Hill 194, some members turning to attack the Belgians, the remainder continuing toward the bridges. Most of the Belgian front was under assault by first light. The Chinese who bypassed Hill 194 meanwhile reached the bridges, crossed the Imjin, and attacked Company Z of the Northumberland Fusiliers on Hill 257 bordering the river almost due south of the crossings.27

Company Z was the right rear unit of a squarish fusilier position marked out by four widely spaced company perimeters at the corners. Well downstream from Z, Company X at the left front corner occupied Hill 152, the crest of a ridge edging the Imjin. Chinese fording the river and attacking Hill 152 forced Company X to withdraw about the same time that the attack out of the Belgian area carried Chinese inside Company Z's position on Hill 257. Thus Company Y at the right front corner, though not under assault, was precariously situated, with Chinese moving past on left and right.28

About daybreak, reinforcements, apparently from the 188th Division, 63d Army, doubled the strength of the Chinese attacking the Belgians on Hill 194. A Belgian patrol slipping off the rear of the hill meanwhile confirmed that Chinese controlled the two bridges on the access route by firing from the near slopes of Hill 257. As the Chinese stepped up their attack, General Soule sent a company of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and two platoons of the 7th's tank company to reclaim the bridges and remain in support of the Belgians. Reaching the bridge area over the track along the Hant'an, the tankers found no Chinese at the crossings but came under mortar and small arms fire from Hill 257, fire which kept the following infantry at bay. One tank platoon moved to Hill 194 to reinforce the Belgians while the other deployed near the bridges and fired on Hill 257. The amount of Chinese return fire raised doubts that foot troops and wheeled vehicles could pass safely through the bridge area.29

Wary of a strike down Route 11 by the Chinese attacking the fusilier battalion, in particular by those attacking Company Z on Hill 257, Brigadier Brodie after daylight on the 23d organized defenses athwart the road about two miles below 257. The fusiliers withdrew to a ridge bordering Route 11 on the west while the bulk of the Royal Ulster Rifles battalion occupied positions east of the road. The Chinese, as a result, gained control of a wide expanse of ground between Brodie's new central position and the Belgians. There also remained between the fusiliers and Gloster battalions a two-mile gap, which aerial observers as early as 0830 reported Chinese to be entering. Having all but depleted brigade reserves, Brodie asked for help from General Soule, who agreed to send the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to establish positions be-


tween Brodie's central and left flank defenses.30

At the brigade's left, the Gloster battalion also had had to give ground after a hard, costly battle lasting the night. The battalion's position astride Route 5Y, as originally developed, was a set of company perimeters about a mile and half below the Imjin. From Hill 148 west of the road and Hills 182 and 144 east, Companies A, D, and B commanded long spurs sloping toward the river. Giving the position some depth was Company C, a mile behind Company D on Hill 314 below the towering crest of Karnak Mountain (Hill 675), easily the dominant height in the entire brigade area. West of Route 5Y opposite Hill 314, battalion pioneers secured Hill 235. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. James P. Carne, had set up headquarters and placed his mortars along 5Y where it bent through a valley behind Company G and just above the village of Solma-ri. After Chinese patrols were observed on the north bank of the Imjin during the day, Colonel Carne established an additional position at last light on the 22d. Certain that the Chinese had located Gloster Crossing, a ford straight ahead of his lines, since his sappers earlier had marked its course with buoys, Carne concealed sixteen men of Company C in ambush in ruined buildings at the near end of the crossing.31

Able to see the far bank clearly by the light of the full moon, the ambush party watched seven Chinese step into the water about 2200, allowed them to reach the near bank, then shot down all seven with a brief burst of fire. Before withdrawing to their company position after exhausting their ammunition, the sixteen Glosters defeated three more crossing attempts, killing altogether some seventy Chinese. The small force itself suffered no casualties.32

On the heels of the ambush party's withdrawal, a battalion of the 559th Regiment, 187th Division, forded the river at Gloster Crossing and a mile and a half west at an underwater bridge that past Gloster reconnaissance had somehow failed to reveal. British artillery bloodied and delayed the forces at Gloster Crossing, but the Chinese approaching from the northwest were already climbing the long spurs toward Company A.33

Company A turned back repeated charges until almost dawn, when its fifty-eight ablebodied men lost the dominant platoon position located among the ruins of an ancient castle near the crest of Hill 148. Company D lost no important ground on Hill 182 to the Chinese attacking out of the Gloster Crossing area but also suffered high casualties. Company B on Hill 144 was no more than brushed by Chinese patrols and survived the night intact.34


Colonel Carne pulled his forward companies back to the Solma-ri area shortly after daylight, covering their withdrawal with heavy mortar and artillery fire and air strikes. West of Route 5Y, much-reduced Company A occupied Hill 235 and Company D a squarish flattop hill extending east from 235 toward the position of Company C on the opposite side of the road. Company B took position just east of Company C. Under the pounding covering fire, the Chinese went to ground, either to take cover or to hold up their attack until reinforcements crossed the Imjin.35

Adjusting the Line

Considering the forward I Corps and IX Corps positions untenable, opened to envelopment as they were by the flight of the ROK 6th Division, General Van Fleet about midmorning on 23 April ordered General Milburn and General Hoge to withdraw and directed all corps commanders to develop defenses in depth along line Kansas. At the same time, Van Fleet canceled the advance to line Alabama which was to have been opened on the 24th by forces east of the Hwach'on Reservoir.36

For the forces east of the reservoir, the initial task created by Van Fleet's order was to block a North Korean salient being driven into line Kansas. (Map 33) Above Yanggu, adjacent to the reservoir, the inexperienced North Korean 45th Division had attacked during the night behind mortar and artillery barrages but had made only a few local gains against the 32d Infantry on the right flank of the 7th Division. On the east flank of the enemy attack, the North Korean 6th Division was more successful in assaults on the ROK 3d Division. Forcing its left and center units to the southwest, the North Koreans by midmorning on the 23d pushed the 3d Division well back from Route 24, partially opening the way to Inje.37

A bigger threat to Inje materialized at the right flank of the X Corps, where the North Korean 12th Division caught the X Corps and ROK III Corps part way through the shift of divisions required for the now canceled advance to line Alabama. The 12th Division struck the 35th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division at midnight on the 22d and began sliding forces into the twomile gap between the 35th and the 5th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division to the east. By first light the 35th Regiment abandoned its position and fell back in disorder almost to the Soyang River below Inje. Taken under frontal attack and threatened with encirclement by the North Koreans working through the gap, the 5th Regiment followed suit but withdrew in better order, falling back gradually while still in contact toward a line two miles above Inje. During the day, Col. Min Ki Shik, in command of the ROK 5th Division, took charge of all forces in the Inje area, which now included the 3d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division, and organized defenses above Inje generally in the area toward which the 5th Regiment was withdrawing. By evening of the 23d Colonel Min set the 27th, 36th,


Map 33. The Eastern Front, 22-24 April 1951

and 3d Regiments on the line while the 35th Regiment continued to reorganize behind it and the 5th Regiment continued to withdraw toward it.38

As the initial IX Corps step to the rear General Hoge let stand his plan to pull the 1st Marine Division onto a line curving from the Hwach'on Dam southwestward along the Pukhan River and to push the ROK 6th Division north onto line Kansas. The marines occupied their arching line, designated Pendleton, by late afternoon, the 1st Marines taking up widely separated battalion positions on the division's left to refuse the flank and stretch the line toward the planned connection with the South Koreans. With all regiments on line, the division faced as much to the west as to the north. The 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion and the units that had joined it after scrambling out of the ROK 6th Division's sector withdrew to the vicinity of Chich'onni, where the bulk of the Marine division's artillery, the 11th Marines, was clustered. General Hoge directed the 92d, which absorbed the members of the weaponless 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery, and the halfequipped 987th Field Artillery Battalion to reinforce the fires of the 11th Marines. Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion, out of action for lack of weap-


ons and equipment, left the division sector for refurbishing. 39

Since the ROK 6th Division had lost its artillery support during the debacle of the previous night, General Hoge directed the British 27th Brigade to recommit the New Zealand artillery and transferred the 213th Field Artillery Battalion from a reinforcing mission in the Marine sector to support the South Koreans. During the afternoon the New Zealand unit, accompanied by the Middlesex battalion for protection, moved up the valley of the Kap'yong River while the 213th circled out of the Marine sector and moved up the valley of a Kap'yong tributary in the eastern portion of the South Korean sector.40

Meanwhile, as the day wore on, the move of the ROK 6th Division north to line Kansas appeared less and less probable. Still reorganizing the division at midday, General Chang informed corps headquarters that he would have his forces on the line by 1700. But as that hour approached, no part of the division had yet moved forward.41

Wary of another failing performance by Chang's division, General Hoge in midafternoon ordered the British 27th Brigade to block the Kap'yong River valley behind the South Koreans to prevent enemy forces from coursing down the valley and cutting Route 17 at Kap'yong town. Brigadier Burke was to establish the blocking position along the trace of line Delta four miles north of town where the Kap'yong River flowing from the northwest was joined by the tributary from the northeast just above a large bend turning the Kap'yong southwest toward the Pukhan. From hill masses rising on either side of the junction of the Kap'yong and its tributary the commonwealth forces could cover both valley approaches.42

Burke organized the block with the 3d Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and 2d Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, setting the Australians in the Hill 504 mass on the right to block the valley approach from the northeast, the Canadians on the crest and slopes of Hill 677 to control the Kap'yong valley. Four American units-all but one platoon of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion; Company B, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and Companies B and C, 74th Engineer Combat Battalion-moved up in support, the tankers taking position with the Australians, the mortarmen setting up in a small lateral valley behind Hill 504. The engineers bivouacked along the Kap'yong about a mile in rear of the blocking position.43

The artillery battalions assigned by


General Hoge to support the ROK 6th Division were still moving into position when reports reaching corps headquarters indicated that General Chang had given up attempts to move his division to the Kansas line and had deployed in the vicinity of his assembly area. Doubtful that the division was in position or condition to perform better than it had the night before and thus fearful that the supporting battalions were out on a limb, the corps artillery officer authorized the 213th Field Artillery Battalion to withdraw behind the 27th Brigade's blocking position at the first sign of another ROK rout. Alerted to the possibility of a repeat performance by the South Koreans, Brigadier Burke prepared to pull out the New Zealanders and Middlesex battalion and at dark placed the forces at the blocking position on a 50 percent alert.44

General Chang's failure to place the 6th Division on line Kansas also left the 1st Marine Division vulnerable. Its long front along the Pukhan was protected on the east by the barrier of the
Hwach'on Reservoir, and its west flank was no longer wide open as it had been the night before, but the nearest solid


position was that of the 27th Brigade above Kap'yong. The intervening seven-mile gap offered the Chinese an open southeastward shot at Ch'unch'on and the intersection of Routes 17 and 29 and thus an opportunity to envelop the marines or at least cut their lines of communications. Balancing this risk against that of a nighttime withdrawal that probably would have to be made while under attack, General Hoge directed the Marine division to withdraw to line Kansas the following morning. This move would shorten the front enough for the bulk of one regiment to be taken off the line and sent south to defend Ch'unch'on.45

Along the eastern portion of the I Corps line, the 25th Division, whose front had quieted after daylight on the 23d, was on line Kansas by midafternoon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments reoccupied the division's former positions on the ridges between the Hant'an and Yongp'yong rivers while the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade assembled immediately behind the Yongp'yong. At the far corps right, Chinese maintained pressure against the center of the 24th Division, mainly against the 19th Infantry, and attempted to follow the division's withdrawal but gave up after suffering heavy casualties to the covering artillery fire. The division occupied line Kansas about 1800, the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments on left and right, the 5th


Infantry in reserve about five miles behind the line. Later, on receiving word that the ROK 6th Division would not move north onto line Kansas, the 21st Infantry refused its right as far as possible with its reserve battalion, and General Bryan deepened the protection by moving a battalion of the 5th Infantry into blocking positions along the east flank.46

Under General Soule's plan for pulling back the 3d Division's rightmost forces, the 7th Infantry was to occupy the division's eastern sector of line Kansas. Protected on the west by the Belgian battalion, the 65th Infantry was to leapfrog off line Utah, pass through the 7th Infantry via Route 33, and assemble in division reserve near Route 33's junction with Route 11. Exactly how the Belgians would then get out of the Imjin angle was yet to be determined.47

The battalions of the 65th Infantry began bounding off line Utah about noon, moving easily as the Chinese opposite made no attempt to follow. Except for the tanks supporting the Belgian battalion, the division reserves stationed earlier above the Hant'an dropped below the river during the


65th's leapfrog action. No interference materialized out of the Imjin angle as the Belgians, though heavily engaged, held their ground with the assistance of air strikes and artillery and tank fire. Bringing up the regimental rear, the 3d Battalion of the 65th, reinforced by the 3d Reconnaissance Company and 64th Tank Battalion, occupied a position blocking Route 33 just above the Hant'an, which was to be held until the Belgian battalion had withdrawn from Hill 194.48

In considering ways to get the Belgian battalion out of the Imjin angle, Brigadier Brodie early in the afternoon proposed to General Soule that the Belgians destroy their vehicles and withdraw east across the Imjin off the back side of Hill 194. But Soule believed that the bridge area could be opened for the vehicles by attacking Hill 257 from the south. About 1400 he ordered the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to make the attack and instructed the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, then leading the 65th Infantry off line Utah, to join the 29th Brigade and take over the 1st Battalion's previously assigned mission of occupying a position in the gap between the fusilier and Gloster battalions.49

In carrying out its original mission, the 1st Battalion, with a platoon of regimental tanks attached, by 1400 had moved up Route 11 behind the fusiliers, turned its three rifle companies west on a wide front, and begun sweeping the slopes rising to Hill 675, the peak of Kamak Mountain, in the gap area. It was 1800 before the commander, Lt. Col. Fred C. Weyand, could reassemble the battalion and open the attack on Hill 257 to the north. Once above the fusilier-Ulster lines, the battalion came under heavy fire from the flanks and front and had to fight off Chinese groups who attempted to knock out the supporting tanks with grenades and shaped charges. By 2000 the battalion had gained no more than a foothold in the 257 hill mass.50

In the Belgian withdrawal, begun as the attack on Hill 257 opened, the bulk of the battalion moved off the back side of Hill 194 and waded the Imjin under the cover of artillery fire and air strikes. Harassed by mortar fire until they ascended the steep east bank, the Belgian foot troops by 1830 were out of contact and en route east to Route 33 and then south to an assembly area to await the battalion's vehicles. In column, drivers raced the vehicles over the Imjin bridge while the 7th Infantry tankers sent to the Belgians during the morning fired on the slopes of Hill 257 to the south and the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved into the hill mass from the opposite direction. Incoming fire from 257 destroyed four trucks but was generally weak. Although it had not cleared 257, Colonel Weyand's battalion apparently had distracted most of the Chinese holding the hill. Once the last vehicle had crossed the bridge about 2000, the motor column followed


the track along the Hant'an to reach Route 33. Troops and vehicles reunited, the Belgian battalion moved south and assembled near the Routes 33-11 junction.51

Behind the Belgians, the 3d Battalion of the 65th Infantry, 64th Tank Battalion, and 3d Reconnaissance Company left their Hant'an blocking position, the 3d Battalion joining the 7th Infantry on line Kansas, the tankers and reconnaissance troops assembling close to 3d Division headquarters near the Routes 33-11 junction. With considerable difficulty the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, meanwhile disengaged at Hill 257 and returned to the 7th's sector of line Kansas, where it went into reserve. Ahead of all these movements, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, en route to occupy the gap in the 29th Brigade's lines, reached the brigade headquarters area along Route 11 about 2000, too late in the day, Brigadier Brodie decided, for it to attempt to take position between the fusilier and Gloster battalions.52


The withdrawal to line Kansas and other force adjustments swung the 3d Division south like a gate hinged on the west at the position of the Gloster battalion, which, after Colonel Carne consolidated forces in the Solma-ri area, had remained quiet throughout the day except for meeting engagements between patrols in Company B's sector at the far right. Both the 64th and 63d Armies, however, had built up forces below the Imjin to the front and flanks of the battalion.53

To the left of the Glosters, the 192d Division, 64th Army, had begun to ford the Imjim at three points on the Korangp'o-ri bend by daybreak. Sighted by air observers, the crossing operation was shut off by 1100 by air strikes and artillery fire, and most of the Chinese who had crossed by that time hesitated in areas not far below the river. A few company-size groups moved south and tested positions of the 12th Regiment at the right of the ROK 1st Division but were turned back by noon. Sorties by two task forces of South Korean infantry and tanks of the 73d Tank Battalion, which was attached to the 1st Division, punished Chinese forces ahead of ROK lines until dusk. One task force estimated that it killed three thousand Chinese.54

Gloster forces on Hill 235 meanwhile caught sight of Chinese on the near high ground in the gap between the battalion and the ROK 12th Regiment. They had come either from the Korangp'o-ri bend or out of the Gloster Crossing area, where, despite British mortar and artillery fire, the 187th Division, and apparently the 189th Division, pushed additional forces over the Imjin. To the northeast, units of the 187th and 188th Divisions continued to enter the gap between the Glosters and fusiliers, directing their movement mainly toward Hill 675. Some forces worked through each gap and reached Route 5Y early in the afternoon. An attack by these forces on the Gloster supply point along the road made clear that the battalion at Solma-ri had been surrounded.55

Given this penetration and the buildup of Chinese below the Imjin in the west and given, in particular, the frail central position of the ROK 6th Division and open ground on either side of it, which invited envelopments both west and east, it was doubtful that the I and IX Corps lines as they stood at dark on the 23d could be held against the next surge of enemy attacks. Earlier in the day a number of officers had recommended long withdrawals to General Van Fleet to gain time to organize stronger defenses. One division commander in the I Corps had proposed falling back to line Golden just above Seoul. But Van Fleet had refused to give ground voluntarily in deep withdrawals. While by no means assuming a stand-or-die position, the enemy, he insisted, would have to "take all he gets."56


1 In assessing their New Year's offensive, the Chinese reportedly attributed its failure largely to the absence or air support. With strong air support, a Chinese special aviation group concluded, "we could have driven the enemy into the sea." See Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 265.

2 General Ridgway received authority for precisely such retaliation in late April. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told him: "he might now use United States forces within his command to conduct high altitude reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and on the Shantung Peninsula, and further, that if United Nations forces in Korea were subjected to major enemy air attacks from outside Korea, he could at his discretion, and without the necessity of securing prior approval of the JCS, or higher authority, attack enemy air bases in the areas mentioned above." See MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 163.

3 The information in this subsection is based on Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 265-78.

4 Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Array, p. 162; USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, April 1951, copy in CMH.

5 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 1, 1-31 Dec 52.

6 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53.

7 Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53.

8 The North Korean 7th Division, which had been reduced to about regimental strength during recent operations, was transferred to the VII Corps in the Wonsan area.

9 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle Information, North Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.

10 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951, a special file of correspondence and reports on the operations of the ROK Division, 22-24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with Lt Col Thomas E. Bennett, KMAG Advisor to 7th Regt, ROK 6th Div, in CMH; Eighth Army POR, 22 Apr 51.

11 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, IXACT-1288, CG IX Corps to CG IX Corps Arty, 14 Apr 51; Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p. 155.

12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951.

13 Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 73-74; Eighth Army AG File 6 ROK Div, 1951; 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson, "Artillery in Perimeter Defense, April 1951," copy in CMH.

14 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951.

15 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 22-23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The EastCentral Front, pp. 104-05.

16 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, 23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp. 105-07.

17 Rad, IXACT-1330, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div et al., 23 Apr 51.

18 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

19 Ibid.

20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51.

21 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51.

22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

23 Ibid.; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 60, 74, 80; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves).

24 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves).

25 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

26 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 75-76; 3d Div POR 158, 22 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2 and 24, 23 Apr 51.

27 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, p. 76; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 27, 38, 46, 52, and 65, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51.

28 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2, 24, 38, 39, 46, and 52, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62.

29 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 62, 65, 75, 97, 105, and 114, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 2225 Apr 51); Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 76-79.

30 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves); 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 34 and 81, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51.

31 3d Div Sit Ovlay, 22 Apr 51; E. J. Kahn, Jr., "A Reporter in KoreaNo One But the Glosters," New Yorker, 26 May 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 11-13, 16-18. Captain Farrar-Hockley was the adjutant of the Gloster battalion during the battle at the Imjin.

32 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 2, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 18-22; Robert O. Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers (London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 150.

33 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 22-25; Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 150.

34 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 25-31, 36.

35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 74, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 30-35.

36 Rad, GX-4-4635 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 23 Apr 51.

37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 1000, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51.

38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Entries 1405, 1500, 2130, 240905, and 240940, 23 Apr 51, and Briefing Notes for CG; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51.

39 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-CentralFront, pp. 110-13; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Artillery in Perimeter Defense"; 1st Marine Div POR no. 230, 23 Apr 51; Rad, IX ART-68, CG IX Corps to COs 987th FA Bn, 92d AFA Bn, and 11th Marine Regt, 23 Apr 51.

40 Rads, IX ACT-1338 and IX-ACT 1330, CG IX Corps to CG 27th BCB and CG 1st Marine Div, respectively, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, 1st Lt. Martin Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Maj Don W. Black, Asst S3, IX Corps Arty, and Ca apt Blaine Johnson, Asst S3, 213th FA Bn.

41 Ltr, Brig Gen George B. Peploe, IX Corps CofS, to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April 1951, in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.

42 Rad, IX ACT-1338, CG IX Corps to CG 27th BCB, 23 Apr 51.

43 Ibid.; Rad, IX ACT-1340, CG IX Corps to CG 27th BCB, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with 1st Lt Kenneth W. Koch, CO, Co A, 72d Tank Bn, and Maj Wade H. Padgett, S3, 74th Engr Cmbt Bn; N. Bartlett, ed., With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp. 91-92; Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 74-75; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 68.

44 Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51; sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April 1951, and Overlay, Disposition of 6th ROK Div, 231800 Apr 51, both in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Black and Johnson; Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 67; Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea, p. 94.

45 Rad, IX ACT-1339, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div, 23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, p. 117.

46 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

47 3d Div 01 15-12, 23 Apr 51.

48 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 112 and 143, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

49 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 108, 110, 112, and 114, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.

50 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 61, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51). See also article by two participants in the Hill 257 battle, Capt. William F. Long, Jr., and Capt. Walter M. Turner, "Challenge Accepted," in Combat Forces Journal, January 1952, pp. 12-16.

51 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 79-81; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 2225 Apr 51).

52 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 139, 141, 148, 157, 180, 182, and 189, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51); 3d Div PORs 159 and 160, 23 and 24 Apr 51.

53 Farrar-Hockley The Edge of the Sword, pp. 30, 36.

54 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51.

55 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, p. 34; Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 152, 155; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 14 (Summary of Enemy Operations); Kahn, "A Reporter in Korea- No One But the Glosters."

56 Interv, Appleman with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51, copy in CMH.

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