Disengagement in the West

General Walker reached his Pyongyang headquarters from the meeting in Tokyo during the afternoon of the 29th. The Eighth Army at the time was making a second short withdrawal, organized by his staff not long before he arrived, in response to the threat of envelopment from the east which overnight and through the morning had further enlarged.

The Threat of Envelopment

Toward Sunch'on

On the Sunch'on road at the army right, General Gay's decision against moving the 7th Cavalry up from Kujong-ni to the Pukch'ang-ni area on the 28th left the initiative to the Chinese. Shortly before daylight on the 29th the 125th Division, 42d Army, whose regiments air observers previously saw passing through Pukch'ang-ni, sent forces against the ROK 6th Division three miles below town. (Map 9) The ROK troops immediately withdrew five miles to Walpo-ri, but pursuing Chinese readily flanked the new position, and the South Koreans scattered rearward toward the 7th Cavalry two miles below them.1

Col. William A. Harris, the 7th Cavalry commander, had his reserve battalion collect South Korean troops as they came through his forward line. Refugees streamed south with the ROK forces, and either North Korean guerrillas or disguised Chinese regulars who had joined the civilians harassed the cavalrymen as they entered the regimental position. Hand grenades thrown by the infiltrators killed a company commander and wounded eight men.2

The problem of refugees was not peculiar to the 1st Cavalry Division sector. Throngs of civilians had begun to move south across the entire front. Crowds of refugees on the roads threatened to interfere with the movement of troops and supplies, and drifting columns of civilians everywhere offered the enemy a vehicle for infiltration. Both dangers prompted army orders late on the 28th directing that refugees be diverted before they could enter Eighth Army lines.3

The men of the 7th Cavalry found it difficult just to halt the early morning influx in their sector and had only partially restored order by 0630 when leading forces of the 125th Division opened fire from high ground to the northeast. Exchanges of small arms fire contin-


Map 9. Battle of the Ch'ongch'on, 28 November-1 December 1950


ued until artillery concentrations silenced the Chinese two hours later. ROK troops and refugees continued to enter the regiment's line during the firefight. Panic spread through an approaching ROK artillery column when its lead vehicle stalled about a quarter mile north of the cavalrymen. Instead of shoving the obstructing truck out of the way, the ROK artillerymen simply abandoned guns and trucks and ran toward the regimental position. The motor officer of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, and six of his men later went forward and recovered eight howitzers and sixteen vehicles.4

At midmorning, after the troopers finally gathered all South Korean forces and cleared their position of refugees, General Gay ordered the 7th Cavalry to withdraw to Sinch'ang-ni, three miles south, unoccupied since the 8th Cavalry had left for Songch'on. The regiment and the ROK 6th Division pulled back during the afternoon, the 7th Cavalry taking position astride the Sunch'on road just above Sinch'ang-ni, the South Koreans occupying adjacent high ground on the west. Acting on Gay's previous instructions, the 5th Cavalry meanwhile organized defenses astride the Taedong River two miles north of Sunch'on, aligned with but not physically adjoining the ROK 6th Division to its right; the 8th Cavalry, en route to Songch'on, placed its leading battalion in the new area by nightfall. The Chinese on the Sunch'on road did not pursue the 7th Cavalry's withdrawal and remained out of contact while Gay's division and the South Koreans deployed along the Sunch'on-Sinch'ang-niSongch'on line.5

At Kunu-ri

On the eastern side of the river in the Ch'ongch'on valley, the forces of the 40th Army who, beginning about midnight on the 28th, had pushed the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry below Pugwon, were joined in the town after daylight by sister forces that had come down the opposite side of the Ch'ongch'on. The latter forces had turned the right flank of the 24th Infantry, 25th Division, then had moved their main strength southeast across the river into Pugwon.6

Ahead of this juncture, Colonel Sloane withdrew the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infantry around 0600, first taking them behind defenses hurriedly established by the 23d Infantry astride the valley road below Pugwon, then moving them to an assembly two miles southwest of Kunu-ri. Sloane's 1st Battalion, which late on the 28th had taken position at the right rear of the 24th Infantry on the west side of the Ch'ongch'on, rejoined the regiment at the assembly area late on the 29th after a full day of operations with the 25th Division. The 40th Army, after joining assault forces at Pugwon, meanwhile prepared to attack Kunu-ri on a wide front, spreading units from Pugwon southeastward over Piho-san Ridge four miles above Kunuri. This ridge, under General Keiser's plan for defending the Pugwon-Wawon sector, was to have been occupied by the 38th and ROK 3d Regiments.7


On the right flank of the 2d Division sector, the 38th Army assaults opened against the Turkish brigade at Sinnim-ni during the first hours of the 29th were still in progress at daylight. Because neither wire nor radio communications existed between the Turk forward units and brigade headquarters in Kaech'on, three miles west of Sinnim-ni, General Yasici knew nothing of the attack until his artillery battalion pulled back to Kaech'on. According to the artillery commander, the three infantry battalions were surrounded. Yasici delayed countermeasures until daylight, then dispatched an infantry company from his replacement battalion and the platoon of tanks attached from the 72d Tank Battalion to clear the road and deliver instructions for a withdrawal to Kaech'on. The task force reached Sinnim-ni easily, and the infantry battalions withdrew without interference. But Chinese forces moved west with the withdrawal, marching over the ridges below the Kaech'on River, which coursed westward just south of and parallel to the Tokch'on-Kunu-ri road.8

In response to the nighttime and morning changes in the 2d Division sector- the lose of Pugwon, the enemy's occupation of Pihosan Ridge, and the Turk withdrawal to Kaech'on- General Keiser and his forward unit commanders worked out a new defense line by noon on the 29th. At the left, two battalions of the 23d Infantry blocked the Ch'ongch'on valley road in depth, the 2d holding a forward position two miles below Pugwon, the 3d astride the road two miles north of Kunu-ri. The 1st Battalion was a mile and a half east of the 3d, blocking a valley approach to Kunu-ri.9

Immediately east, the 38th Infantry's new line slanted southeast over lesser hills below Piho-san Ridge to the Tokch'on-Kunu-ri road at the northeastern edge of Kaech'on. The attached ROK 3d Regiment held the left sector directly below Piho-san. The 2d and 3d Battalions, facing northeast and east, carried the remainder of the line to the boundary with the Turks at Kaech'on. Colonel Peploe kept his command post and 1st Battalion in the assembly area established the Porevious night a mile east of Kunu-ri.10

The Turks were expected to anchor the 2d Division's right flank. Some were to occupy a bit of high ground at the eastern edge of Kaech'on. The rest were to move below the Kaech'on River to refuse the flank and block a valley where the road from Sunch'on, previously cut by the Chinese at Samso-ri farther south, made its exit before crossing river to enter Kaech'on. But regardless of repeated urgings from the American advisers, General Yasici failed to place troops below the river. At noontime two Turk companies occupied the small hill just east of Kaech'on town. The remainder of the brigade was assembled inside town with sentinels posted along the outer limits.11

At the Bridgehead

Unlike the enemy efforts toward Sunch'on and Kunu-ri, the Chinese above the Ch'ongch'on made no concerted daylight attack against the I Corps. The 24th Division had no con-


tact at all as General Church started his forces toward Sunch'on, as ordered by General Walker the day before. The only enemy action in the ROK 1st Division's sector was small arms and artillery fire placed on General Paik's delaying forces in and west of Yongsan-dong before they pulled back to the bridgehead during the morning. Eastward in the 25th Division's sector, the 39th Army launched local assaults on the 27th Infantry in the division center about the same time that 40th Army forces turned the 24th Infantry's right flank. But these attacks posed no serious threat to the corps bridgehead.12

The real danger lay below the river. By noon on the 29th only two battalions of the 23d Infantry stood before the 40th Army forces on the Ch'ongch'on valley road. Should these be eliminated, a follow-up Chinese thrust down the twenty-mile stretch of road between Kunu-ri and Sinanju would trap General Milburn's forces above the Ch'ongch'on.

To respond to this danger and to tighten the defense against the two arms of the Chinese enveloping maneuver, Colonel Dabney, the army G-3, radioed instructions about an hour past noon for a withdrawal to a line that followed the lower bank of the Ch'ongch'on upstream almost to Kunu-ri, then curved southeast to join the 1st Cavalry Division's new line from Sunch'on through Sinch'ang-ni to Songch'on. The bridgehead and Kunuri thus would be abandoned, and the Eighth Army's east flank position would become longer than the front.13

The Second Disengagement

Kunu-ri Abandoned

Early in the afternoon of the 29th, before General Keiser learned of the army order to withdraw south of Kunuri, the 40th and 38th Armies converged on his arch of positions north and east of the town. (Map 10) Just north of the Turks at Kaech'on, 38th Army forces moving west along and above the Tokch'on-Kunu-ri road attacked the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, quickly overrunning its right flank position. Sensing the start of a strong enemy effort, Brig. Gen. J. Sladen Bradley, the 2d Division's assistant commander, radioed orders to Colonel Peploe for relay to General Yasici to attack and reestablish the lost position. But Bradley's order brought no more results than the earlier recommendations of Yasici's advisers that the Turks take position south of the Kaech'on River.14

Shortly afterwards, mortar fire struck the Turks inside Kaech'on, and the 38th Army forces who had moved west below the Kaech'on River came out of the unguarded valley south of town. Though taken under fire from across the river by Yasici's tanks, the Chinese slanted northwest toward a hill mass rising just north of the river a mile behind Kaech'on, where they could block the road to Kunu-ri at the western half of a pass. Yasici promptly withdrew and soon filled the road from Kaech'on westward through the pass with a double column of troops and vehicles.15

To assist the 2d and 3d Battalions of


Map 10. The 2d Infantry Division at Kunu-ri, 29-30 November 1950


the 38th Infantry, both now engaged in a firelight with Chinese to their front and both just as much in danger of being enveloped as the Turks, Colonel Peploe ordered his reserve 1st Battalion, less Company C, to move up on the regimental right. But when the battalion mounted trucks and started east over the road toward Kaech'on, it found the way blocked by the oncoming Turk traffic. Peploe drew the stymied battalion back to a blocking position astride the road a mile east of Kunu-ri and instructed his forward battalions to make their way behind this position as best they could. Forces of the 40th Army meanwhile struck south of Pihosan Ridge against the ROK 3d Regiment. Peploe pulled the 3d back to a position a little over a mile northeast of Kunu-ri and tied its right flank to the left of his 1st Battalion to strengthen the cover for his forces withdrawing from the east.16

While Peploe organized the covering position, his 2d and 3d Battalions disengaged and filed out of the hills above Kaech'on onto the Kunu-ri road with the Turks. The Chinese swinging in from the southeast by that time held the hill mass overlooking the pass from the south and soon halted the westward flow of traffic with a heavy volume of fire. Taking cover north of the road, Americans and Turks in the pass area returned fire until long past dark. But the Chinese fire continued to block all movement except for some tanks and vehicles carrying wounded that managed to move around the pass over a trail to the north.17

A B-26 strike finally dampened the Chinese fire. Both the equipment and techniques of the Fifth Air Force were extremely limited for providing close air support at night and in bad weather. Although General Stratemeyer and General Partridge had tried almost from the beginning of the war to obtain sufficient equipment and develop effective procedures for furnishing such support, they now had only the 1st Shoran Beacon Unit, whose operations so far had been unsatisfactory, and three AN/MPQ-2 radar detachments. The successful, if out-of-the-ordinary, B-26 strike carefully brought in on the pass after dark permitted the Turks and Peploe's troops again to move west. Peploe reorganized most of his men behind his covering positions before midnight, but the Turkish brigade was in disorder, with units disorganized, key leaders missing, and Turks scattered in clumps all along the way from the pass through Peploe's position and Kunu-ri to the 2d Division command post six miles south of Kunu-ri.18

Amidst this melee east of Kunu-ri, General Keiser issued instructions, instigated by the newest directive from army, for the 2d Division's withdrawal below the town. Partially covered by the ROK 3d Regiment and 38th Infantry northeast and east of town, Colonel Freeman was to move first, pulling his 23d Infantry out of position north of Kunuri and taking it south of the Kaech'on River below town. Here, between the Kaech'on and the parallel Chot'ong River about a mile farther south, a low ridge reached northwestward athwart the Kunu-ri-Sinanju


stretch of the Ch'ongch'on valley road. Defenses along this height would block the road and would provide excellent observation and fields of fire across the river flats toward Kunu-ri.19

After Freeman was in position, Peploe was to withdraw to a position on the low ridge east of the 23d. But since Peploe's route passed through the southern outskirts of Kunu-ri before turning south over the Kaech'on, Peploe anticipated being cut off if Chinese stormed into Kunu-ri on the heels of Freeman's withdrawal. Against this possibility, he arranged for Freeman to leave a rifle company and a platoon of tanks in Kunu-ri to cover the withdrawal of the 38th and ROK 3d Regiments.20

The disintegration of the Turkish brigade spoiled General Keiser's plan to employ the Turks below Kunu-ri along the northern six miles of the division supply road. Located along this road segment, which followed generally the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on rail line, were all the division artillery and, at the most southerly point, the division headquarters. Keiser had intended that the Turks deploy east of this stretch of road. But his order giving the brigade this assignment was not even acknowledged. While confused Turkish troops straggled into and south of Kunu-ri, General Yasici headed out over the road to Sinanju on a roundabout ride to Sunch'on where he hoped eventually to reassemble the brigade. Keiser's supply road, command post, and artillery base meanwhile remained wide open to attack from the east.21

In pulling out of position north of Kunu-ri, Colonel Freeman kept his 3d Battalion astride the Ch'ongch'on valley road two miles above town as cover while he moved the remainder of the 23d Regiment during the early evening hours to the new position south of the Kaech'on River. The covering battalion, after being hit hard by Chinese coming down the valley road, withdrew at 2200. Company L and a platoon from the 72d Tank Battalion dropped off at the northern edge of Kunu-ri while the remainder of the battalion continued to the new regimental line.22

A Chinese battalion caught up with Freeman's force at the upper edge of Kunuri around midnight. The infantrymen and tankers threw back four strong assaults before pulling south and so gave Colonel Peploe the time and protection needed to move vehicles, casualties, and then his main strength through the lower edge of town and south behind the 23d Infantry. Peploe's rear guard, the 1st Battalion of the ROK 3d Regiment, received fire from Chinese following the withdrawal from the east and northeast but broke away in the darkness near 0400 and withdrew cross-country.23

Through the remainder of the night Peploe gradually collected the somewhat scattered units of the 38th Infantry a mile southwest of Freeman's position but was unable to locate the main body of the ROK 3d Regiment. He had instructed the South Koreans to take position to the immediate right of the 23d. Instead, they had gathered in small groups along the 2d Division supply road not far from division headquarters. They intended, according to


orders from their own regimental commander, to continue south to an assembly in Sunch'on.24

In the Bridgehead

Late in the afternoon of the 29th General Milburn ordered the I Corps to abandon its bridgehead in a two-step withdrawal. The ROK 1st and 25th Divisions first were to fall back after dark to a line running from a western anchor three miles above the Ch'ongch'on northeast to the mouth of the Kuryong River, then along the lower bank of the Ch'ongch'on to the 2d Division's left flank below Pugwon. The two divisions were to pull completely behind the Ch'ongch'on at daylight on the 30th. This second move would be covered by the 5th Regimental Combat Team, now detached from the 24th Division and under corps control, from positions immediately north and northeast of the river crossings in the Sinanju-Anju area.25

Milburn's forces occupied the first phase line before midnight. At the far right, the 3d Battalion of the 24th Infantry, which had tied the 25th Division's position to that of the 2d Division about 2100, was left with an open east flank an hour later when the 3d Battalion of the 23d Infantry withdrew after being hit by the Chinese coming down the Ch'ongch'on valley road. Near midnight, when the Chinese battalion opened assaults on Colonel Freeman's blocking force at the northern edge of Kunu-ri, part of the enemy unit also attacked the command post of the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, which had been established inside Kunu-ri at city hall. The attack came while the battalion commander was talking by phone with the regimental commander, Colonel Corley, to arrange a withdrawal southwest of Kunu-ri to tie in with the 23d Infantry's new main position below the Kaech'on River. Battalion communications with both regiment and the frontline companies went out soon, thereafter, and the battalion headquarters group withdrew, with some difficulty, to the regimental command post five miles southwest of Kunu-ri. Colonel Corley and the battalion commander then arranged air support and placed guides along the Kunu-riAnju road in an effort to help Companies I, K, and L move south past Chinese, who meanwhile had swept to behind them from the east. The three companies finally got out at 1630 on the 30th at a cost of 1 killed, 30 wounded, and 109 missing.26

Attack at Sinch'ang-ni

At the army right, the respite gained by the 7th Cavalry when it disengaged at Kujong-ni on the Sunch'on road during the afternoon of the 29th lasted not quite to midnight. At 2230, heavy small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire swept the 7th's new position above Sinch'ang-ni; a half hour later, Chinese following the road wedged between the two forward battalions. Heavy defensive mortar and artillery fire threw back the assault, but not before a hundred fifty Chinese slipped through the opening in the cavalry line and attacked the command posts of both battalions.


Some of the attackers made it all the way into Sinch'ang-ni.27

From below Sinch'ang-ni, a rifle company, two tanks, and a motorized section of heavy machine guns of the reserve battalion counterattacked at 0200 and cleared the forward headquarters areas. Near 0230 the Chinese began to pull out of contact, electing only to harass the cavalrymen with mortar fire through the remainder of the night. The 7th Cavalry suffered 38 killed, 107 wounded, and 11 missing during the engagement. Known enemy losses were 350 killed and 10 captured. One prisoner identified the assault unit as the 37th Regiment of the 125th Division, whose mission, he asserted, had been to open the road preliminary to an attack on Sunch'on by a larger force.28

Trouble on the Lines of Communication

On the Anju-Sunch'on Road

By morning of the 30th the 24th Division, less the 5th Regimental Combat Team, was available to help block any attempt to seize Sunch'on. General Church had started his forces out of the I Corps sector near noon on the 29th. Col. Ned D. Moore's 19th Infantry and its combat team attachments moved first, motoring from Pakch'on to Anju and then down a diagonal road leading southeast toward Sunch'on. Col. Richard W. Stephen's 21st Regimental Combat Team followed late in the afternoon after being relieved at its position at the I Corps left by South Korean Troops.29

While the 19th Regimental Combat Team was moving the first four miles down the diagonal road below Anju, Church received aerial observer reports that the road ahead of the team was blocked in two places. He instructed Colonel Moore to destroy the blocks with part of his force and to shift the remainder westward to take Route 1 south to Sukch'on, then a lateral road east to Sunch'on. Leaving the intelligence and reconnaissance platoon, an infantry company, and a tank company to deal with the roadblocks, Moore took the rest of his combat team over the new route, assembling it near Sunch'on shortly after dark. Colonel Stephens' combat team also used Route 1 and the lateral road, taking up the better part of the night to reach the Sunch'on assembly.30

Moore's task force meanwhile encountered the first roadblock about 1400, after moving three miles farther down the diagonal road, and drove the Chinese away with only small arms fire. Another three miles southeast, the force spotted Chinese in high ground overlooking the road near an irrigation reservoir. Tank fire, mortar fire, and an air strike killed several Chinese and scattered the remainder. The task force then continued to Sunch'on, reaching the assembly area at 2300.31

On the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on Road

The Chinese on the diagonal road evidently had moved in the van of the enemy's westward push toward Kunu-ri. While they proved no real hindrance to the 24th Division's move to Sunch'on, it became clear that forces following


them had established a much stronger block farther east on the 2d Division's supply road between Kunu-ri and Sunch'on.

Before daylight on the 29th, Turk soldiers from a convoy carrying supplies to the brigade stopped at the 2d Division command post six miles below Kunu-ri to report that they had encountered a roadblock while traveling north from Sunch'on. At 0900 a patrol from the division military police company moved south to investigate, came under fire about four miles below division headquarters, and lost one man killed and three wounded in attempting to define the enemy position.32

General Keiser next ordered his reconnaissance company to clear the obstruction, evidently only a fire block centered in a pass four miles south just above the village and railroad station of Yongwon. Keiser apparently did not know at the time that a platoon of tanks, attached from the 72d Tank Battalion to the British 27th Brigade but not moving with the brigade from Kunu-ri to Chasan on the 28th, had just headed south over the blocked road. Only the protection of armor allowed this platoon to proceed through the pass under intense fire from what appeared to be two enemy companies in the surrounding high ground.33

The reconnaissance company reached the pass at midmorning but, despite fire support from a battery of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion, stalled before the Chinese position around noontime. Keiser then called for a rifle company from the 38th Infantry. Colonel Peploe sent Company C, now no more than seventy-five men who, accompanied by a tank platoon from the 72d Tank Battalion, in midafternoon joined the reconnaissance force at the pass. This combination also was unable to eliminate the fire block, and near dusk Keiser ordered the force to withdraw into positions around division headquarters. The Chinese unit in the pass was now believed to be a battalion.34

General Coulter meanwhile started part of his reserve north toward the roadblock. Earlier in the morning he had ordered Brig. B. A. Coad, commander of the British 27th Brigade, to send a battalion to Samso-ri to eliminate the Chinese encountered there the previous day by the 5th Cavalry. After learning of the 2d Division's predicament about 0830, he redirected the British against the newer roadblock. The Middlesex Battalion, motorized for its mission, headed toward its new destination shortly after 1000 and in the remaining daylight assembled seven miles south of the blocked pass.35

Coulter informed General Keiser that the British battalion would move toward the roadblock from the south at daylight on the 30th and instructed him to mount in concert a vigorous attack from the north. The 2d Division commander needed little prompting. To his front, the 40th Army was pressing the


single battalion of the 23d Infantry still north of Kunu-ri; to his right, the 38th Army had partially enveloped the 38th Infantry and the Turkish brigade; and in the immediate rear area, all of his artillery and division headquarters were vulnerable to attack from the east. (See Map 10.) In all likelihood, further withdrawals would become necessary, and the road south, if it was to be used, had first to be opened.36

Keiser alerted the 9th Infantry, still assembled two miles southwest of Kunu-ri, for the next attack on the roadblock. When Colonel Sloane reported to division headquarters for instructions around 2000, he advised General Keiser that operations over the past four days had reduced the 9th Infantry to less than half strength and that an attack could be mounted with only the four hundred to five hundred men remaining in the 2d and 3d Battalions. (The 1st Battalion was then still with the 25th Division.) Keiser told Sloane to employ all of these men and to hit the roadblock at daylight on the 30th.37

The Middlesex Battalion, according to final plans worked out between Keiser and Coulter, would be in position just south of the pass by 0800 but would not attack unless Keiser so requested. His signal for an attack would be radioed to the British. Last, Keiser worked out a no-fire line so that Sloane's artillery support would not strike the British unit.38

The Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on Line

Having returned to Korea from Tokyo with instructions from General MacArthur to prevent the envelopment of the Eighth Army, General Walker late on the 29th called a general withdrawal to a line twenty miles south of Kunu-ri and thirty miles above Pyongyang whose general trace connected the towns of Sukch'on, Sunch'on, and Songch'on. The twenty-mile retirement would take his northernmost forcesthe ROK 1st 25th, and 2d Divisionsout of the path of the Chinese closing in on Kunu-ri from the east and north, and the resulting consolidation of forces would permit a more closely knit defense with which to meet the deeper Chinese thrust down the Tokch'onSunch'on road and any similar effort over the Songch'on-Pyongyang route. Walker instructed the I Corps to face north along the Sukch'on-Sunch'on segment of the new line, the IX Corps to occupy the slightly larger sector curving to the southeast between Sunch'on and Songch'on.39

The I Corps Withdrawal

General Milburn's move to the rear was uncomplicated since the first phase of his earlier withdrawal out of the Ch'ongch'on bridgehead had taken the I Corps out of contact except on the extreme right near Kunu-ri. Milburn assigned the ROK 1st Division to the left half of the Sukch'onSunch'on sector, the 25th Division to the right. Both divisions were to withdraw at daylight on the 30th under cover provided by Col. John L. Throckmorton's 5th


Regimental Combat Team. Throckmorton's team was to remain in the Anju area to protect fords and two bridges over the Ch'ongch'on until the divisions had cleared the river, then was to move into corps reserve at Yongyu, eight miles south of Sukch'on.40

Milburn's forces peeled off from the left, moving west and south over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route. The ROK 1st Division started at 0600 and moved slowly but without incident toward an assembly near Sukch'on. The 25th Division began moving an hour later toward an assembly nearer Sunch'on. By 1430 all I Corps troops who had been above the Ch'ongch'on were below the river. Less than an hour later 5th Regimental Combat Team troops blew one Anju bridge and about 1800 destroyed the other. Milburn then instructed Colonel Throckmorton to start his withdrawal to Yongyu. But while most I Corps forces by then were moving down the Sinanju-Sukch'on segment of Route 1 by truck or afoot, troops were still coming into Throckmorton's line from the direction of Kunuri. Some were from the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, which until late afternoon had been blocked off by enemy troops behind its position northwest of Kunu-ri. Others were from Company B, 89th Tank Battalion; Company F, 27th Infantry; and the 25th Reconnaissance Company which had protected General Kean's withdrawal from the area nearer Kunu-ri not occupied by any of Throckmorton's troops. The remainder were from the 23d Regimental Combat Team, which had been covering the 2d Division's withdrawal over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road.41

Throckmorton therefore continued to man his covering position past midnight. By the time his combat team finally reached its corps reserve assembly at Yongyu on 1 December, the ROK 1st and 25th Divisions had left their temporary assembly areas to occupy their assigned sectors of the new army line.

The 2d Division Plan

In establishing division sectors along the IX Corps' new defense line, General Coulter attached the British 27th Brigade to the 1st Cavalry Division and instructed General Gay to organize positions from Songch'on northwestward to a point six miles short of Sunch'on. The 2d Division was to occupy these last six miles once it could disengage and withdraw from the Kunu-ri area.42

In anticipation of such a withdrawal, General Keiser and his G3, Lt. Col. Maurice C. Holden, on the 29th had considered the alternative of taking the 2d Division south over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route through the I Corps sector. This possibility was raised when General Milburn telephoned Keiser during the afternoon to inquire about the 2d Division's situation and at that time offered the use of the I Corps roads. Colonel Holden and the division provost marshal, Lt. Col. Henry C. Becker, took immediate advantage of Milburn's offer to move vari-


ous service units and a large number of southbound supply vehicles that had collected on the blocked supply road. A division headquarters advance party joined the column of trucks as it turned back north to get on the road to Sinanju at a junction just behind the position of the 23d Infantry. Colonel Gerald G. Epley, the chief of staff, apparently judged this to be the only use of the road intended by General Milburn: as the service train started over the I Corps route, he refused a division artillery request to base withdrawal plans on that axis on grounds that it was not available to the 2d Division.43

Colonel Holden attempted to make it available around 2000 when he radioed the IX Corps G-3 and asked him to clear the 2d Division's unlimited use of the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route with General Milburn. But although the G-3 reported that he obtained the requested clearance with the provision that Keiser's forces "work in on the road as they can," Colonel Holden later denied having received it. The question of permission, in any event, was soon replaced by doubt that the road's use was possible. Before 2100, Colonel Becker, the provost marshal, reported that Chinese had cut the Kunu-ri-Anju segment. The road actually was still open, but Keiser sought no confirmation of the report and, upon receipt of the IX Corps order about 0100 on the 30th, based his withdrawal plan on the use of the blocked road to the south.44

In the hour and a half after receiving Coulter's withdrawal instructions, Keiser and his staff worked out the division's order of movement. As previously planned, the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 9th Infantry were to attack to open the road at daylight. When the road was clear, the remainder of the division was to withdraw in increments: the division and division artillery headquarters first, then the engineer battalion, the remainder of the 9th Infantry with its direct support artillery and the bulk of the division's antiaircraft artillery attached, the two general support artillery battalions, the various pieces of the Turkish brigade, the 38th Infantry and its direct support artillery, the ROK 3d Regiment, and finally the rear guard composed of the 23d Infantry, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, 72d Tank Battalion, Battery B of the Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons 82d Battalion, and 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion.45

All of General Keiser's plans so far were based on the assumption that the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road was blocked only at the pass four miles south of the division command post and that the 9th Infantry would have no particular difficulty clearing it. This assumption was challenged during the night when a Chinese patrol attacked and took a hilltop from a squad of military police on the perimeter protecting Keiser's headquarters and when mortar, machine gun, and small arms fire fell for about an hour on both the division headquarters area and the nearby position of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion. But while all of this heralded the westward approach of 38th Army forces north of the


pass area, it gave General Keiser no definite evidence that the Chinese had enlarged the fire block. He responded to the nighttime activity by moving the 38th Infantry east and south from its location behind the 23d Infantry to an assembly near the exposed 15th, 38th, and 503d Field Artillery Battalions north of the division command post. Otherwise, his plans to clear the known block to the south using the 9th Infantry, then to dispatch the remainder of his division to Sunch'on, remained in effect.46

The Roadblock Below Kunu-ri

To reach the blocked pass four miles south of the 2d Division command post around daylight on the 30th, the 2d Battalion of the 9th Infantry followed in column by the mortar company and the 3d Battalion with a platoon of regimental tanks attached, left the regimental assembly southwest of Kunu-ri at 0330. Colonel Sloane intended to march down the supply road two miles beyond the division command post, then deploy a battalion on either side of the road and advance over the bordering ridges. (See Map 10.) But at 0630, no more than a half mile south of division headquarters, the leading 2d Battalion received small arms and machine gun fire from the high ground to the southwest. This fire was the first certain indication that the 38th Army had extended the fire block north of the pass.47

While the mortar company pulled back slightly to positions from which fire could be dropped on the Chineseheld height, Sloane got his vehicles out of range and deployed for assault. The 2d Battalion and Company I climbed the ridge west of the road while the remainder of the 3d Battalion moved over lower ground on the east. The Chinese gunners on the western height pulled away as Sloane's forces climbed toward them, but small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire from the next height south swept and stopped both battalions after their initial rush.48

When Sloane's assault foundered, General Keiser sent the ROK 3d Regiment to assist. Sloane used the South Koreans to relieve his forces west of the road. Once the ROK forces passed through, he intended to place all of his own troops east of the withdrawal route and again attack south.49

Against the possibility that Sloane's renewed effort would not open the road, Keiser instructed the 38th Infantry and all division artillery except the units attached to the 23d Infantry to move to the division headquarters area. Only combat equipment was to be brought; kitchens, maintenance equipment, personal baggage, and all other nonessential impedimenta were to be left behind. Colonel Peploe's forces, previously scheduled to march near the tail of the divisional column, were now earmarked to lead the way south. Thus stripped and poised, Keiser could if necessary fight his way to Sunch'on.50


Apparently unable to raise the British by radio, Keiser sent a request through IX Corps headquarters for the Middlesex Battalion to strike north into the pass area. About the same time, Colonel Sloane dispatched his platoon of tanks south to contact the British unit. Sloane's tanks, like the platoon from the 72d Tank Battalion the previous day, weathered enemy fire without loss and reached the British below the pass about 1030. The Middlesex Battalion already had tried to clear the pass, had been stopped by strong mortar and machine gun fire, and had then taken position near Yongwon to cover 2d Division forces when they came through the pass. Sloane's tankers remained with the British to add their guns to the cover.51

Near the time that Sloane's tanks reached the British, the ROK 3d Regiment passed through Sloane's 2d Battalion. Supported by an air strike of rockets and napalm and by .50-caliber machine gun fire from a platoon of tanks from the 72d Tank Battalion (previously with the Turks) on the road, the South Koreans drove a small group of Chinese off the first hill south, then failed in two assaults to carry the ridge beyond. Altogether, the ROK regiment gained just under three-quarters of a mile.52

By noon Sloane's forces and the South Koreans had gained no more ground. Equally disturbing to General Keiser, Colonel Freeman notified him that Chinese were beginning to press the 23d Infantry just below the Kaech'on River. Although near-continuous air strikes on Kunu-ri and its vicinity so far had helped materially in holding off the enemy, the Chinese strength across the river from the regiment was growing. Freeman also had observed enemy troops moving around his right flank toward Keiser's units to the south.53

The combination of conditions above and below Keiser pushed him to the decision to run his forces through the roadblock. Whereas speculation had continued, especially among artillery units, on a withdrawal over the Kunuri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route, the latest reports from Freeman discouraged that choice as the way out. To get on that route, almost all of Keiser's forces first would have to move north to the road junction just behind the 23d Infantry which now appeared in immediate danger of seizure by the Chinese accumulating in Kunu-ri. In view of that possibility, the earlier report that the Kunu-ri-Anju road segment had been cut, and General Coulter's orders to the 2d Division to withdraw over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, General Keiser dismissed any further consideration of using the I Corps route.54

There were, on the other hand, at least two prospects that favored running the roadblock. Although Sloane had failed to clear the ridges below division headquarters, the Chinese had not exhibited any heavy firepower. The near enemy position also appeared to be shallow. His forces, Keiser reasoned,


probably could rush past it and then face only the problem of negotiating the pass farther south. Even the latter problem might already have been solved. Having no communication with the Middlesex Battalion, Keiser assumed that the British were attacking northward. Hence, the pass might be dear and a linkup with the British occur not far down the road.55

Before signaling the start of the run south, Keiser reversed previous instructions that only necessary battle gear be taken. Near noon his assistant, General Bradley, passed the word to all units to bring out all serviceable vehicles and equipment. Keiser evidently believed the Chinese opposition below him could be handled without stripping to bare combat essentials, and for a speedy trip to Sunch'on he could use all transportation available. Keiser's final order of march kept the 38th Infantry in the lead, followed by division headquarters and division artillery headquarters, next all artillery battalions except the 15th with Freeman's regiment, then the engineer battalion, and finally the rearguard 23d Regimental Combat Team. All other forces- the 9th Infantry, Company C of the 72d Tank Battalion, the ROK 3d Regiment, and troops of the Turkish brigade- were expected to work into the column ahead of the rear guard, those on foot hitching a ride wherever they could. The order to all units was to keep moving.56

Keiser instructed Colonel Peploe to move about 1245. Since Peploe already had organized the 38th Infantry for the ride south, there was little delay in starting. At the head of the column, Peploe's 2d Battalion riding trucks and regimental tanks passed through the 9th Infantry about 1300. The lead tank bearing three officers and eighteen men in addition to the crew received intermittent bursts of machine gun fire, but no one was hit. The men aboard the tank sprayed return fire into the heights commanding the road as they sped over the first mile and a half, then encountered a barricade. Apparently between the time that Sloane's tanks moved south during the morning and Peploe's forces started an hour past noon, the Chinese had obstructed the road with an M39 carrier, an M4 tank, and a 2'/2-ton truck lost by Keiser's forces on the 29th. Although the time taken to shove the obstructions off the road was brief, the delay started a chain reaction of halts to the rear that fixed a stop, wait, and go pattern to the entire withdrawal.57

The leading tank and its passengers received and returned fire as before while negotiating the next two and a half miles, including the quartermile length of the pass. Another quarter mile beyond the pass, a second barricade of trucks and assorted equipment lay across the road, but the driver kept his tank at full speed and rammed through it. Around the next turn of the road he passed behind the outposts of the Middlesex Battalion about 1400.58

The tank's successful one-hour run prompted a message from the British that when recorded at army headquarters pronounced the "MSR between


Kunu-ri and Sunch'on open as of 1400." But the scene along the road behind the lead vehicle belied this optimism. As Peploe's 2d Battalion with the 3d Battalion and regimental headquarters group immediately behind moved over the four-mile stretch below division headquarters, the two regiments of the 113th Division in the bordering heights began strengthening their elongated fire block. The heaviest fire fell in the pass, but the Chinese also maneuvered to bring down small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire on much of the road above the defile. The Chinese placed perhaps thirty or forty machine guns and about ten mortars in action. Most of the direct fire was delivered broadside, and much of it plunged onto the road from long range. Peploe's column nevertheless began to lose men and vehicles, especially while at a halt; as more trucks were disabled, the frequency of the halts increased.59

At each halt, riders leapt from tanks and trucks for the roadside ditches. Some fired into the heights, others only sought cover. When able to move again, drivers often left passengers behind. Of those left afoot by the destruction of their transportation or by a driver who failed to wait, the able-bodied straggled south, some managing to catch another ride. Wounded were picked up by troops following when there was room in their vehicles; for lack of space or notice, other casualties were left where they had fallen. This scrambling gradually broke down tactical unity and troop control. But despite disorganization and casualties, Peploe's forces, with some South Korean and Turkish troops scattered among them, managed to move in spurts and get through the pass a little before 1500. By the time the tail of Peploe's serial got through, the Chinese in the pass area had greatly increased their fire and were moving guns in an effort to block the quartermile cut completely.60

Coming next into the pass were the 2d Battalion and mortar company of the 9th Infantry. Colonel Sloane dispatched these two units onto the road about 1330 behind Peploe's lead serial, keeping the 3d Battalion deployed against the Chinese near the division's point of departure. Part of the ROK 3d Regiment and some Turks were mixed in. On the heels of the 9th Infantry troops came General Keiser's headquarters troops and the reconnaissance company who had begun to move immediately after learning that Peploe's first troops had gone through the pass. Right behind were the division artillery headquarters, the bulk of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry, and the division military police company. Besides the division rear guard, the division engineers, four artillery battalions, and the rest of the 9th Infantry had yet to take to the road.61

The ride south toward the pass was every bit as harrowing for this group as it had been for Peploe's men. Moving through the defile was even more painful. As Sloane's leading troops entered the pass, the Chinese loosed efilading machine gun fire from both ends of


the cut as well as plunging fire from the embankments on either side. At least twenty disabled trucks already cluttered the roadside when the first of Sloane's forces attempted to negotiate the pass, and as the enemy fire began taking an additional toll of vehicles, the wreckage in the roadway became a barrier impassable to trucks to the rear. Troops amidst and immediately behind the obstructions tried to move afoot through the pass, but the machine gun fire as well as small arms fire and hand grenades pitched down on them from above forced them to cover among the wrecked trucks. For the first time, movement through the pass came to a complete stop.62

Doubling the column then stretching two miles to the rear, General Keiser and General Bradley came south to the pass shortly before 1530. They needed no long study to see that further movement depended first on suppressing the fire being poured into the defile. While ground troops in and near the cut were making such an attempt, strong air attacks seemed the only real solution.63

Fighter-bombers responding to an earlier call for air support from Keiser began pounding the ground bordering the pass about the time the two generals completed their reconnaissance and returned to their command vehicles now just north of the pass. Near 1630, after movement through the pass had been blocked for more than an hour, Keiser conferred with his G-3, Colonel Holden, and momentarily considered abandoning all vehicles and taking his troops out cross-country. But by then the air strikes were, beginning to have an effect. Mosquito control pilots reported that it was impossible to miss the Chinese clustered in the heights on either side of the road, and to make sure of hitting their targets, pilots flew in so low that the men in the pass expected the planes to crash. Machine gun bullets from the aircraft struck the rocky embankments less than seventyfive yards above the men in the cut, and burning napalm spilled onto the road to set several vehicles afire. As the air strikes dampened the Chinese fire, Keiser sent two light tanks from his reconnaissance company to bulldoze a path through the wrecked vehicles in the pass. The column of troops and trucks could move south again, although they continued to receive some fire from the surrounding heights. Darkness fell and forced away the supporting planes before the last of this portion of the division column entered the pass, but the column moved steadily toward safety.64

As the last of the military police company and a few troops of the 38th Infantry at the end of this section descended from the quieted pass, some fire ranged in on their left flank. Just below the pass, where the road jogged west, crossed a stream, then turned south again a short distance beyond, was the small village of Karhyon-dong. After receiving the strong air attacks in the pass heights, part of the Chinese blocking force took cover in Karhyon-


dong and trained a few automatic weapons and mortars to the northwest. This fire would be the heaviest faced in the pass area by the last section of Keiser's column, which included four artillery battalions, the division engineers, and the remainder of the 9th Infantry. Whereas the 23d Regimental Combat Team originally was scheduled to bring up the rear over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, the long delay caused by the Chinese fire block to the south coupled with enemy pressure from the north had prompted Colonel Freeman to choose another way out; by dusk his forces already were moving over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route.65

The 17th Field Artillery Battalion, the only 8inch howitzer unit in Korea, led the last section of Keiser's column. After passing through sporadic machine gun fire, the battalion halted in midafternoon just below the village of Wa-dong, a little over two miles north of the pass. Following one stiff exchange of fire with nearby Chinese forces, the 17th started to move again at dark. The battalion negotiated the pass without trouble, but, on descending and turning west to ford the stream west of Karhyon-dong, a howitzer tipped over and rolled into a deep gulley. When an artilleryman went into the gulley to destroy the gun, lights turned on to help him see attracted mortar fire from Karhyon-dong. Harassed by continued fire, the remaining tractors and howitzers crossed the stream slowly and one at a time. It was midnight when the battalion got out of the fire, but losses were light in spite of the slowness. The battalion suffered 1 killed and 16 wounded and lost 1 howitzer, 22 vehicles, and 11 trailers.66

The 37th Field Artillery Battalion, next in column, suffered more than double the 17th's losses. By the time the 105s of the 37th cleared the ford west of Karhyon-dong, the battalion had lost 35 men killed, wounded, or missing, and had left 10 howitzers, 53 vehicles, and 39 trailers strewn along the road to the rear. But, like the 17th, the 37th was still intact.67

To the rear, the story was different. Whereas the 503d and 38th Field Artillery Battalions, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, and remainder of the 9th Infantry had started down the road behind the 37th, only a trickle of troops and trucks would come through the pass. Although some of the Chinese had climbed down from the bordering heights to firing positions nearer the road, none so far had made an assault on the division column. But after dark, just below the division's point of departure, strong Chinese forces opened attacks against the two remaining artillery battalions and the engineers. Vehicles knocked out during the assaults blocked the raod in considerable depth, and enemy fire during and following the assaults defeated all attempts to remove the obstructions. Only a few troops near the head of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion managed to break away and continue down the road. The others, including the remainder of the 9th Infantry caught at the very end of the division column, abandoned all


guns, equipment, and remaining vehicles and left the road to make their way to Sunch'on cross-country. Not all succeeded in getting past the Chinese around them. Of those who did, the last straggler would not reach safety for some days to come.68

In view of this debacle, Colonel Freeman had made a wise choice in electing to withdraw over the Kunu-ri-Sinanju-Sukch'on route. By early afternoon he was convinced of the improbability that the 23d Regimental Combat Team could withdraw via the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road before dark and was deeply concerned over the pressure being exerted against his forces by the Chinese concentrated in and around Kunu-ri. Twice, at 1430 and an hour later, Freeman reported to division headquarters-although by feeble and interrupted radio contact-that the 23d's situation was becoming increasingly precarious. He made the earlier report to General Bradley and at that time proposed that he be allowed at least two hours before darkness or when in Freeman's judgment the situation became critical to withdraw the combat team using the I Corps roads. Although the weak radio signal caused some confusion at division headquar-


ters as to Freeman's exact plan, General Bradley at 1600 authorized him to put the plan into effect.69

In preparation, Freeman invited the commander of the 38th Field Artillery Battalion and the officer in charge of the rearmost troops of the 9th Infantry, both nearby and not yet able to move south over the Kunu-ri-Sunch'on road, to join in withdrawing through the I Corps sector. Both declined. Therefore, only the combat team's attachments- Battery B of the 82d Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion, the 72d Tank Battalion less Company C, and the 15th Field Artillery Battalion- would accompany Freeman's infantry. With the agreement of the commander of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, Freeman decided not to take the howitzers out. For one reason, the fewer towed pieces on the road, the less chance there would be of having the column blocked by an accident at a sharp turn or defile. Second, he wanted the guns in action up to the moment of withdrawal to discourage any pursuit by the Chinese then pressing his position.70

In the hour and a half before sunset Freeman spotted all available transportation on the road behind his rearguard position, then began peeling troops from the front a battalion at a time, beginning with the easternmost. The 15th Field Artillery Battalion meanwhile began a phenomenal shoot, firing all ammunition on hand in just over twenty minutes at deep and close-in targets. After gunners exploded thermite grenades in the already damaged tubes, the artillerymen boarded their trucks and joined the withdrawal. A noticeable and prolonged lull in enemy fire followed the heavy artillery bombardment, and forward observers watched the Chinese hurriedly dig in to the front of the infantry positions being vacated. Colonel Freeman credited the artillery action with having made a safe withdrawal possible. Under continued air cover, his leading troops made their way behind the 5th Regimental Combat Team's position near Anju by sunset; by dark his last troops-from the 3d Battalion and 72d Tank Battalion-were clear of the rearguard position; and just before midnight, the combat team closed in an assembly area near Sukch'on.71

A count rendered on 1 December listed 2d Division battle casualties at 4,940 for the last half of November. Of these, 90 percent, or about 4,500, had been incurred since the 25th. Officer casualties alone numbered 237 and touched most grades and branches. These losses represented one-third of the division's actual strength of 15,000 on 15 November, and when reconciled with nonbattle casualties, replacements, and returnees, left the division 8,662 men short of authorized strength, Equipment losses were equally heavy. In addition to hundreds of trucks and trailers, the major losses included 64 artillery pieces, almost all of the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion's equipment, and between 20 and 40 per-


cent of the signal equipment carried by the various division units.73

Although this early tally of losses was not wholly certifiable, the figures clearly showed the 2d Division no longer effective. While the 1st Cavalry Division stretched itself thinner to cover the sector of the new army line originally assigned to the 2d Division, General Keiser on 1 December began moving his depleted division to Chunghwa, about ten miles south of Pyongyang, for rehabilitation.74


1 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2109, 29 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50.

2 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl, 29 Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to January 1952 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, n.d.).

3 Rad, GX 30074 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 28 Nov 50.

4 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50; 1st Cav Div G3 JnI, 29 Nov 50; 1st Cavalry Division, Korea, June 1950 to January 1952.

5 Ibid.

6 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50.

7 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

8 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov 13 Dec 50."

9 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

10 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

11 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."

12 I Corps Intel Sums 226 and 227, 29 Nov 50; I Corps PORs 233 and 234, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div WD, Nov 50.

13 Rad, GX 30085 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 29 Nov 50.

14 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."

15 "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov13 Dec 50."

16 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

17 Ibid.; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."

18 Ibid.; Futrell, The United Stales Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, pp. 328-29, 377-78.

19 2d Div G3 Jul, Entry 72, 29 Nov 50.

20 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

21 Ltr, Lt Col Maurice C. Holden to Maj Roy E. Appleman, 26 Feb 52; "Turkish U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50."

22 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

23 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

24 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

25 I Corps Opn Dir 28, 29 Nov 50.

26 I Corps PORs 234 and 235, 29 Nov 50; 24th Div WD, Nov 50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50.

27 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50.

28 1st Cav Div G3 Jnl. 29 and 30 Nov 50; 7th Cav Hist Rpt, Nov 50.

29 24th Div WD, Nov 50; I Corps POR 234, 29 Nov 50.

30 24th Div WD, Nov 50.

31 Ibid.

32 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1456, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div WD, Nov 50.

33 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 72d Tk Bn Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2107, 29 Nov 50.

34 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entries J-1459, J-1457, and J-1475, 29 Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2114, 29 Nov 50.

35 Rad, IXACT-402, CG IX Corps to CG 27th Brit Brig, 29 Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpts 2101 and 2110, 29 Nov 50.

36 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

37 Ibid.; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 269.

38 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2164, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

39 Rad, GX 30090 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 29 Nov 50.

40 Rad, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 30 Nov 50; 1 Corps POR 236, 30 Nov 50; 1 Corps WD, Nar, Nov 50; 25th Div Hist, Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50.

41 I Corps WD, Nar, Nov 50; 1 Corps WD, 30 Nov 50; 25th Div 01 24, 30 Nov 50; 5th RCT Unit Rpt 109, 1 Dec 50; 5th RCT S3 Jul, 30 Nov 50; 24th Inf WD, Nov 50; 89th Med Tk Bn Unit Rpt, Nov 50; 25th Div Recon Co WD, Nov 50.

42 IX Corps Opn O 6 (confirms fragmentary orders already issued), 30 Nov 50.

43 Ltr, Holden to Applemen, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 58, Nov 50.

44 2d Div WD, G3 Activ Rpt, Nov 50; IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2140, 29 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 61, Nov 50.

45 The order of march is given in 2d Div Arty POR 98, 1 Dec 50.

46 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div WD, Nov 50; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p.57; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50.

47 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 270.

48 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 270-72.

49 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 272-73.

50 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Entry 63, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

51 IX Corps G3 Spot Rpt 2174, 30 Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 309.

52 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 273, 276-79.

53 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52.

54 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50.

55 Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Marshall, River and the Gauntlet, pp. 280-81.

56 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50.

57 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 289-94.

58 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 30 Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 286-87.

59 2d Div G2-G3 Jnl, Entry J-1490; 30 Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Eighth Army G3 Jot, 30 Nov 50; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 287-88.

60 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 288-90, 306-07.

61 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318, 326.

62 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 310-311, 318.

63 Ibid., p. 320.

64 Eighth Army G3 Briefing Rpt, 1 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Entry 2147, 30 Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953, pp. 237-38; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 318-19, 326-27, 331-32; 2d Div G2 Jul, Entry 1490, 30 Nov 50.

65 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 340; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Ltr, Col Paul L. Freeman to CG, 2d Inf Div, 9 Dec 50, sub: Withdrawal of the 23d Infantry From KUNU-RI.

66 17th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Ltr, Holden to Appleman, 26 Feb 52; Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 58-60; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 342-44.

67 37th FA Bn WD, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 347.

68 Comd Rpt, 503d FA Bn, Nov 50; Comd Rpt, 38th FA Bn, Nov 50; Hist Rpt, 2d Engr C Bn, Nov 50; 9th Inf Hist, Nov 50; Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, pp. 347-61.

69 Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, Maj Gen J. S. Bradley to Maj Roy E. Appleman, 2 Apr 52.

70 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 328; Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50.

71 Marshall, The River and the Gauntlet, p. 329; Ltr, Col Freeman to CG, 2d Div, 9 Dec 50; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nov 50; Comd and Unit Hist Rpt, 72d Tk Bn, Nov 50.

72 2d Div Pers Per Rpt no. 12, 1 Dec 50. This report shows the following breakdown:

Unit Auth
15-30 Nov 50
1 Dec 50

9th Inf




23d Inf




38th Inf




Div Arty




72d Tk Bn




2d Engr Bn




2d Med Bn




2d MP Co




2d Recon Co




2d QM Co




702d Ord Co




Div Band




2d Repl Co




Div Hq Co




Div Hq




2d Sig Co




Med Det Div Hq












73 2d Div WD, Nov 50; 2d Div Arty WD, Nov 50.

74 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50.

page created 2 February 2001

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