EMERGENCE TO WORLD POWER 1898–1902 |
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n the latter part of the nineteenth century the United States, hitherto largely provincial in thought and policy, began to emerge as a new world power. Beginning in the late 1880s more and more Americans displayed a willingness to support imperialistic ventures abroad, justifying this break with traditional policy on strategic, economic, religious, and emotional grounds. Much of the energy that had been channeled earlier into the internal development of the country, especially into westward expansion along the frontier (which, according to the Census Bureau, ceased to exist as of 1890), was now diverted to enterprises beyond the continental United States. It was only a matter of time before both the Army and the Navy were called upon to support America’s new interests overseas. This new manifest destiny first took the form of vigorous efforts to expand American trade and naval interests overseas, especially in the Pacific and Caribbean. Thus, in the Pacific, the United States took steps to acquire facilities to sustain a growing steam-propelled fleet. In 1878 the United States obtained the right to develop a coaling station in Samoa
and in 1889, to make this concession more secure, recognized the independence of the islands in a tripartite pact with Great Britain and Germany. In 1893, when the native government in Hawaii threatened to withdraw concessions, including a site for a naval station at Pearl Harbor, American residents tried unsuccessfully to secure annexation of the islands by the United States. Development of a more favorable climate of opinion in the United States in the closing years of the century
opened the way for the annexation of Hawaii in 1898 and Eastern Samoa (Tutuila) in 1899. |
interest the abortive efforts of private firms to build an isthmian canal in Panama. American businessmen promoted establishment of better trade relations with Latin American countries, laying the groundwork for the future Pan American Union. And recurrent diplomatic crises, such as the one with Chile in 1891–1892 that arose from a mob attack on American sailors in Valparaiso and the one with Great Britain over the Venezuelan–British Guiana boundary in 1895, drew further attention to the southern continent. While economic and strategic motives contributed significantly to the new manifest destiny, it was concern for the oppressed peoples of Cuba that ultimately launched the United States on an imperialistic course at the turn of the century. Cuba’s proximity to the United States and strategic location had long attracted the interest of American expansionists.
Yet they were a small minority, and only when the Cubans rebelled against the repressive colonial policies of Spain did the general
public turn its attention to the Caribbean island. This was true in 1868, when the Cubans initiated a decade-long rebellion, and again in 1895, when they rose up once more against continuing repression by the mother country. Many Americans soon favored some kind of intervention, but President Grover Cleveland was determined that the United States should adhere to a policy of strict neutrality. Events in Cuba increasingly made this difficult. |
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have succeeded had the American battleship Maine not been sunk on February 15, 1898, in Havana harbor as a result of a mysterious explosion with a loss of 260 lives. The vessel was in port ostensibly on a courtesy call but actually to provide protection for American citizens in Cuba. A naval investigating commission appointed by the President announced on March 25 that the Maine had gone down as a result of an external explosion, a conclusion that even today is in doubt. To most Americans, however, the report indicated Spanish treachery. After diplomatic efforts failed to defuse the crisis, Congress on April 19 authorized the use of force to secure Cuba’s independence. Six days later, on April 25, Congress issued a formal declaration of war. So began the conflict that McKinley and Cleveland had tried to avoid, a war for which the country was ill prepared. The extent of unpreparedness for overseas combat varied considerably
in the two military services. In the decade preceding the war, the Navy, thanks to the efforts of career officers such as Rear Adm. Stephen
B. Luce, Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, and Benjamin Tracy, Secretary of the Navy in Harrison’s administration, as well as to the willingness of Congress to appropriate the necessary funds, had carried out an extensive
construction and modernization program. The historical writings
of Alfred T. Mahan were particularly influential in establishing the framework of a global, blue-water fleet focused on the dominance of the Navy, the establishment of refueling bases, and the aggressive protection of commerce. During the same period, the Naval War College at Newport,
Rhode Island (established in 1885 through the efforts of Admiral Luce), had provided the Navy with a strong corps of professional officers
trained in the higher levels of warfare and strategy, including the far-ranging doctrines of Mahan. |
The Army rarely had had an op-portunity for training and experi-ence in the operation of units larger than a regiment.
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entirely new organizations. War fever soon led Congress to increase the size of the volunteer force by an additional 75,000 and to create some special forces, including 10,000 enlisted men "possessing immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates," the so-called Immunes. It also authorized more than doubling the size of the Regular Army to nearly 65,000. By war’s end in August 1898, the regular forces numbered
59,000 and the volunteers 216,000, a total of 275,000. Regardless
of whether these men were regulars or volunteers, the vast majority of them had had little or no military experience prior to the war.
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"EMBALMED BEEF" In December 1898 Nelson A. Miles, the Commanding General of the Army, made a sensational |
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Map 36 |
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(Later some infantry troops did go to Chickamauga Park, where they trained with the regular cavalry and artillery concentrated there.) |
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EMILIO AGUINALDO (1869–1964) Despite modest military abilities, Emilio Aguinaldo embodied the Philippines’ struggle for indepen- |
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While Dewey blockaded Manila and awaited reinforcements, the Filipinos rose up in revolt against their Spanish overlords. The Philippines had rebelled against Spain in 1896, a conflict that had ended only in December 1897 with a pact that had included the exile of the insurgent leadership to Hong Kong. Spain, however, did not fully live up to its part of the pact; and upon the outbreak of war between the United States and Spain in April 1898, pro-independence Filipinos once again took up arms against the Spanish. Seeking to capitalize on this development, Dewey arranged for Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of 1897 insurgent government, to return to the Philippines in May. Aguinaldo immediately sought to reassert control over the revolutionary movement, forming an army and declaring the islands independent. By the time American ground troops began to arrive at the end of June, Filipino revolutionaries already controlled the majority of the archipelago, as the Spanish Army had withdrawn to Manila and a few other key cities. The Americans thus joined the Filipinos in besieging Manila. As in the Pacific, naval developments would determine when and where the Army undertook operations in the Caribbean. During the early part of May 1898, the whereabouts of the Spanish Fleet under Admiral
Cervera remained a mystery. Lacking this information, the Army could not precisely fix the point where it would launch an attack. Nevertheless,
the War Department pushed preparations at Tampa, Florida, for an expedition under General Miles to be put ashore somewhere near Havana. But persistent rumors of the approach of the Spanish Fleet to Cuban waters delayed this expedition while the Navy searched further for Cervera. News at last reached Washington near the end of May that the Spanish admiral had skillfully evaded the American naval blockade and on the nineteenth had slipped into the bay at Santiago de Cuba. (See Map 36.) |
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Tampa had only one pier for loading ships and a single-track railroad connecting with mainline routes from the north. It could not, therefore,
readily accommodate the flood of men and materiel pressing in upon it. So great was the congestion that freight cars were backed up on sidings as far away as Columbia, South Carolina, waiting to gain access to the port. When a freight car finally did reach the port area, there were no wagons to unload it and no bill of lading to indicate what was in it. When it came to loading the ships, of which there were not enough to carry the entire corps, supplies and equipment were put on board with little regard for unloading priorities in the combat zone should the enemy
resist the landings. Once ashore, elements of the V Corps moved westward toward the heights of San Juan, a series of ridges immediately east of Santiago, where well-entrenched enemy troops guarded the land approaches to the city. On June 23, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Lawton, commanding the vanguard, advanced along the coast from Daiquirí to Siboney, which |
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then became the main base of operations. The next day, Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, the Confederate Army veteran, pushed inland along the road to Santiago with dismounted cavalry to seize Las Guásimas after a brief skirmish with rear guard elements of a retiring Spanish force. This move brought American units within five miles of the San Juan Heights, where they paused for a few days while General Shafter assembled the rest of his divisions and brought up supplies. Even in this short time, Shafter could observe the debilitating effects of tropical climate and disease on his men. He was aware, too, that the hurricane season was approaching. Consequently, he decided to launch an immediate
attack on the defenses of Santiago.
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THE ROUGH RIDERS The 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, initially commanded by Col. Leonard Wood, was popularly known as |
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Navy Department nor President McKinley was willing to sanction this move. Just when the whole matter threatened to become an embarrassing public debate between the two services, the Spanish resolved the issue. By early July serious shortages of food and ammunition had convinced the Spanish that Santiago must soon fall. While Cervera considered flight from the port hopeless, he had no recourse but to attempt it. Officials in both Havana and Madrid had ordered him, for reasons of honor, to escape when Santiago appeared about to surrender. Finally, on the morning of July 3, while Sampson and Shafter conferred ashore, Cervera made his dash for the open sea, hoping to reach the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba. As soon as the Spanish Fleet appeared, Sampson’s squadron, temporarily under the command of Commodore Schley, gave chase and in less than two hours destroyed |
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Cervera’s force; four cruisers were crippled and run ashore, one destroyer
was beached, and another was sunk. In another tropical setting halfway around the world from Cuba, the final military episode of the war took place. On June 30 the first |
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the Filipino army that continued to surround Manila and the Americans
inside the city. After consolidating his hold over much of the archipelago,
Aguinaldo established a republic with a capital at Malolos, northeast of Manila, and made preparations to resist the United States should it attempt to assert its claims of sovereignty over the islands. As the soldiers of both sides waited anxiously to see if the U.S. Congress would ratify the Treaty of Paris, relations between the erstwhile allies deteriorated and scuffles became common. It was only a matter of time before full-scale violence erupted. |
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nized as a conventional military force, the Army of Liberation lacked training, discipline, and equipment. Worst of all, it was plagued with incompetent and inexperienced leaders. Otis, by contrast, had fewer than 20,000 men available in Manila, the vast majority of whom were state volunteers who expected to be discharged now that the war with Spain had ended. Nevertheless, the volunteers fought well: by late February
they had driven the Filipino army from Manila and crushed a revolt within the city itself. By the end of March the VIII Corps had captured the capital of the Philippine Republic at Malolos, twenty-five miles northeast of Manila and inflicted a series of sharp defeats on Filipino
forces. Aguinaldo’s army would never recover from the losses it suffered during the first weeks of the war in terms of men, materiel, and morale. Nevertheless, it stubbornly remained in the field, retiring to the north in front of the advancing Americans while additional detachments
continued to threaten Manila from the south, compelling Otis to launch several expeditions into southern Luzon to stabilize his southern flank. The summer of 1899 brought a hiatus to the campaign. The small size of Otis’ army became increasingly felt the farther he pushed from Manila, while disease and fatigue reduced some regiments by 60 percent. The onset of the monsoon season further complicated the situation, as did the political need to send the state volunteers home. Congress had attempted to meet the military needs of the new war in March when it authorized the enrollment of a temporary force of 35,000 volunteers for Philippines service. Unlike the volunteers of 1898, who had been organized by the states under officers appointed by state governors, the men of 1899 were organized directly by the federal government as U.S. Volunteers, with a term of service set to expire at the end of June 1901. By September 1899 the new U.S. Volunteer regiments, together with additional units of regulars, had begun to arrive in the Philippines; but their arrival merely offset the departure of the state volunteers, thus leaving the VIII Corps with an effective force of just under 27,000 men. Otis nevertheless was determined to press ahead with a major offensive north of Manila, an offensive that he hoped would destroy the Army of Liberation once and for all. In early October he launched a three-pronged attack. Moving up on the right, General Lawton captured San Isidro and approached San Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf in an attempt to prevent the insurgent army from retreating into the mountains. Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur of Civil War fame, in the center, pushed up the central Luzon plain, seized Tarlac, and then moved on to Dagupan. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Loyd Wheaton, on the left, went by ship from Manila to San Fabian, moving inland to defeat the insurgents at San Jacinto before linking up with MacArthur at Dagupan. The operation succeeded in destroying part of Aguinaldo’s army and dispersing the remainder, but it did not end the war. Aguinaldo escaped into the mountains of northern Luzon, and in November 1899 he ordered the remnants of his army to shift from conventional to guerrilla warfare. The change of tactics was well considered. The Philippine Islands were a labyrinth of rice paddies, mountains, and jungles pierced only by rough trails and a few primitive roads. In this arena, Filipino guerrillas enjoyed numerous advantages over the Americans, not the least of which were their familiarity with the terrain and people and their accli- |
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mation to the region’s enervating tropical climate. Aguinaldo, realizing that he lacked the resources to conduct a coordinated, conventional defense, organized his forces into a number of highly autonomous regional
commands, each of which included a core of full-time "regular" soldiers backed by part-time militiamen. Together, these forces waged a war of ambushes, raids, and surprise attacks designed to keep the Americans
off balance. Although some guerrillas wore uniforms, many did not; and even those who freely did changed into civilian clothes and hid their weapons to disguise their true identity from American patrols. This "chameleon act," whereby the guerrillas transformed themselves into obsequious "amigos" in the blink of an eye, made them difficult to counter, especially given the Army’s lack of familiarity with Filipino language and customs. Complementing the guerrillas in the field was a clandestine civil-military organization that acted as a shadow government in the villages, enforcing insurgent edicts, raising recruits, collecting supplies and "taxes," and gathering intelligence on American activities. Since many of the leaders of the resistance were from the middle and upper classes, they were able to exploit the oligarchic nature of Philippine society and the system of patron-client relationships upon which it was based to further the movement’s influence over the people. Using a mixture of genuine nationalism, paternalism, propaganda, and terror (including the assassination of pro-American Filipinos), the leaders of the resistance maintained their control over the population despite their inability to defeat the U.S. Army in the field. In fact, military victory was never the aim of Filipino leaders after 1899. Instead, they sought to undermine America’s will to continue the struggle by harassing U.S. military forces. The Filipinos were well aware that many Americans opposed the government’s venture in imperialism, and they consciously played to this audience. Realizing that 1900 was an election year in the United States, they sought to stir up as much trouble as they could in the hope that a disenchanted electorate would replace McKinley with the avowed anti-imperialist, William Jennings Bryan, in the presidential election. Otis responded to the changed circumstances of the war by dividing the VIII Corps into several geographical commands, each of which was responsible for the pacification of a particular region of the Philippines. Regiments assigned to these districts were further broken down and dispersed among hundreds of small posts, most of which were located in or near towns. The posts served three purposes: they helped protect the population from guerrilla intimidation; they interfered with the ability of the population to provide food and recruits to the guerrillas; and they served as launching pads for innumerable small-unit patrols and raids into the bush in search of the guerrillas and their bases. The dispersion caused many difficulties in terms of logistics, morale, and command and control, while the effects of disease and fatigue threatened to undermine the effectiveness of many small garrisons. Nevertheless, the aggressive posture adopted by the Americans kept the guerrillas dispersed and on the run, thereby undermining both their ability and their will to continue the war. Tactically the Army performed well during the guerrilla phase of the Philippine War. Guerrilla ambushes, while frustrating and difficult |
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to prevent, were rarely devastating and could be countered by sound tactics and proper security measures. Meanwhile, the Americans attempted
to take the war to the enemy, sending small columns to search for and destroy his camps and supply bases while other units made night raids on villages to round up suspected insurgent leaders. The clandestine nature of the enemy’s organization frequently frustrated these operations, but over time the Americans gradually eroded the insurgents’ capability to resist. Of particular assistance in spreading control and separating the guerrillas from the ordinary citizens was the growing number of Filipinos who agreed to take up arms in American service—over 15,000 by war’s end in such organizations as the Philippine
Constabulary, the Philippine Scouts, and various other police and paramilitary organizations. Bullets were not America’s only answer to Filipino resistance, however, for Otis was not just the commander of American military forces in the Philippines but the military governor as well. Following McKinley’s instructions to "win the confidence, respect, and admiration of the inhabitants of the Philippines," both Otis and General MacArthur who succeeded him in May 1900 worked to restore the norms of civil society. They built schools and roads, refurbished markets, and introduced improved systems of health and sanitation. They offered amnesty to guerrillas willing to turn themselves in and rewards to those who handed over their weapons as well. They restored government services, at first using American officers as governing officials but gradually transferring political control to Filipinos, beginning in the towns and villages. They were aided in their work by a body of American civilian commissioners led by William H. Taft that became the legislature for the Philippines in the fall of 1900. Although soldiers and civilians sometimes clashed over their respective authority and the speed at which the transition from military to civilian rule should take place, both worked toward the mutual goal of restoring law, order, and administration to the Philippines. By the end of the first full year of guerrilla warfare, the Americans had clearly gained the upper hand. Hounded by American forces (which had reached an all time high of 70,000 men) dispirited by McKinley’s reelection, and tempted by American promises of future peace and prosperity, one Filipino leader after another laid down his arms and returned to civil life. For those who refused to come in from the bush, MacArthur stepped up the pressure, permitting the use of imprisonment, deportation, execution, and the confiscation and/or destruction of property to punish guerrillas and their supporters to a greater degree than had been permitted heretofore. MacArthur and Taft complemented this firmer wielding of the sword by a greater extension of the olive branch, creating in December 1900 the Federalist Party, a Filipino political organization that supported American rule in return for the establishment of representative government and increased local autonomy. The party proved an effective tool in competing with resistance leaders for the allegiance of the Filipino people. Then, in March 1901, a small band of American soldiers and Filipino auxiliaries led by Brig. Gen. Frederick Funston dealt the resistance a further demoralizing blow when they succeeded in capturing Aguinaldo through a ruse. By July 1901 sufficient progress had been made to permit the establish- |
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FREDERICK FUNSTON (1865–1917) A born adventurer who lacked formal military training, Frederick Funston fought alongside Cuban |
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ment of full civilian rule in many parts of the Philippines under Taft, who became Governor-General of the Philippines. |
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One important argument advanced for retaining the Philippines was that they would serve as a convenient way station on the way to China. The dominant problem in China at the end of the nineteenth century was its threatened partition by the Great Powers, who sought to carve up the weak Manchu Empire into a number of colonies, protectorates,
and "spheres of influence." The United States had no territorial
ambitions in China and opposed partition, largely because it feared losing access to China’s lucrative commercial markets. Consequently, in September 1899 the United States announced its preference for what it termed an Open Door policy in China in which everyone would enjoy equal access to trading rights. |
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"I’LL TRY, SIR!" Company E, 14th Infantry, part of the allied relief expedition to Peking, held a position directly opposite |
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Seymour in an attempt to relieve the foreign quarter in Peking. Vastly
outnumbered, the relief column failed to reach the imperial capital. Meanwhile, on June 17 coalition warships bombarded the Taku forts guarding Tientsin, the port city nearest to Peking. Regarding both the Seymour expedition and the assault on the Taku forts as hostile acts, the Chinese government declared war on the coalition nations and added its own troops to those besieging the foreign legations. Meanwhile,
coalition forces besieged Tientsin, which finally fell to assault on July 13–14—an assault that cost the 9th Infantry eighty-eight casualties when coalition commanders committed the regiment to an ill-considered
attack over marshy ground that stalled under heavy fire. |
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ARMY WAR COLLEGE When Secretary of War Elihu Root took office in 1899, the Army lacked a senior service school. The of- |
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relieved the legation quarter. The following day, Capt. Henry J. Reilly’s Light Battery F of the U.S. 5th Artillery shattered the gates of the city’s inner wall with several well-placed salvos, opening the way for the allied troops to occupy the central Imperial City. |
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Nevertheless, the intervention in China represented one more instance of America’s changing role in world affairs. Although many Americans still believed that the nation could adhere to its historic principles of isolationism, America’s growing economic and political interests abroad demanded otherwise. The dawn of the twentieth century had heralded the first stirrings of the United States as a world power; and as events in Cuba, China, and the Philippines had demonstrated, changes would be needed in many long-established institutions and policies to meet the requirements posed by the nation’s growing role in world affairs.
1. How did political considerations influence the planning and execution
of military operations in Cuba, the Philippines, and China? Do similar considerations influence military operations today? R R Birtle, Andrew J. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency |
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Other Readings Alger, Russell A. The Spanish-American War. New York: Harper, |
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Go to: |
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Last updated 25 August 2005
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