-
-
- At the end of 1941, the bulk of
the nearly 100,000 Negroes then in the Army were in the branches to which
they had been allotted in mobilization plans. Three-fifths of the entire
number were almost equally divided among infantry, engineer, and quartermaster
units. Another fourth were in field and coast artillery units. The small
number remaining were scattered among all other branches. Despite the
large percentage of all Negroes who were in the infantry, including Regular
and National Guard units, only 5 percent of all infantry enlisted men
were Negroes. In the Air Corps, Medical Department, and Signal Corps less
than 2 percent of all enlisted men were Negroes. But approximately every
fourth man in the Corps of Engineers and every sixth man in the Quartermaster
Corps was a Negro. Every seventh man (14.6 percent) in the Chemical Warfare
Service was a Negro. Of all men who were unassigned or who were in miscellaneous
detachments, 27 percent were Negroes.
-
- In the next seven months, during
which the number of Negro enlisted men in the Army reached 200,000, their
distribution tended to become even more unbalanced. The proportions of
Negroes in the Quartermaster and Engineer Corps increased to the point
where it appeared possible that every non-technical unit in those branches
would soon be Negro. Proportions in the Medical Department increased slightly.
On the other hand, in the Air and Signal Corps
- [111]
- Negro representation declined
to less than 1 percent of total enlisted strength. Since the Air Corps
and the Arms and Services with Army Air Forces (ASWAAF) were increasing
in strength at a faster rate than any of the ground arms and services,
what had long been apparent now became even more obvious: the distribution
of Negroes among the arms and services had to be made more nearly equitable,
and the Air Corps, especially, had to increase its percentage of Negro
enlisted men. The overrepresentation of Negroes in engineer and quartermaster
units and their under representation in the units of other branches also
led to reconsideration of their employment in types of units, including
divisions, other than those originally provided.
-
- Selective Service pressure on
the Army to accept increasingly large numbers of Negroes as they became
available through the draft accentuated the need for new units. Selective
Service and the War Department discussed "this extremely troublesome
problem" frequently, with Selective Service, on occasion, threatening
to abandon the procedure of delivering white and Negro selectees on the
basis of separate calls as requested by the Army in favor of selection
by order number without regard to color quotas.1
The disproportionate numbers of Negroes passed over in filling Army color
quotas was proving embarrassing to Selective Service in its public relations.
The legality of the whole procedure of separate calls by color was being
questioned.
-
- War Department agencies suggested
several replies to Selective Service's
proposal to abandon calls by separate color quotas: Troop units had been
planned on the basis of population ratios and could not be altered without
a complete reorganization; Negroes in excess of 10.6 percent who happened
to be in Class 1-A could not be inducted without raising the question
of Negroes carrying more than their fair share of the military obligation
of the country; new units, especially for the Air Forces, were being planned;
and, since the Selective Service Act did not limit the obligation for
training Negroes to the Army, the Navy, too, should be requested to assume
its share of the responsibility. The War Department formally answered
Selective Service in a "non-committal" fashion stating that
it was not unmindful of the problem and that Selective Service would be
kept informed of studies of reallocation and reorganization then under
way.2
-
- In the summer of 1942, the first
critical shortage of men needed to fill units activated in excess of original
plans occurred. For July the Army sent a supplemental call for 65,000
white and Lo,000 Negro men to Selective Service. The Director of Selective
Service, Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, refused to honor the call until its
racial proportions were readjusted. He accepted a revised call for 50,000
whites and 20,000 Negroes with the understanding that the August call
would contain an even heavier proportion of Negroes. "Otherwise,
we feel," G-1 explained, "that popular demands will cause the
question to be placed before the War Manpower Board. This should be avoided
at all costs as it
- [112]
- would probably result in the Army
being forced to accept [men] from the Selective Service System in accordance
with their order numbers without regard to color." 3
-
- While successive communications
from Selective Service and the interested public were coming in, various
plans for the placement and utilization of Negro inductees were proposed
and a few of these were tried. But the only plan which would serve to
keep the backlog of selectees low enough to satisfy Selective Service
would be one that provided enough units for Negroes. Accordingly, the
arms and services were told again and again that each must make available
a proportionate share of its units for Negro enlisted men. Under the pressure
of providing sufficient units for Negroes, the organization of units for
the sake of guaranteeing vacancies became a major goal. In some cases,
careful examination of the usefulness of the types of units provided was
subordinated to the need to create units which could receive Negroes.
As a result, several types of units with limited military value were formed
in some branches for the specific purpose of absorbing otherwise unwanted
Negroes. Conversely, certain types of units with legitimate and important
military functions were filled with Negroes who could not function efficiently
in the tasks to which they were assigned.
-
-
- The branch singled out for much
of the public, political, and internal military pressure to expand its
use of Negroes was the Air Corps. Public pressures, as explained previously,
were the result of long-term campaigns which succeeded in achieving political
and press support. Military pressures came from other arms and services
and from the general staff divisions. As the lack of balance in proportionate
distribution became greater among the arms and services, the War Department
and the ground arms and services became convinced that at least part of
the answer to the problem lay with the Air Corps. If the Air Corps, rapidly
becoming the largest of the Army's branches, absorbed more Negroes, pressure
on the ground arms and services to provide more and more Negro units would
be lessened. This thinking was later applied as well to the Air Forces
as a whole, for if the Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces accepted
more Negro units, they could absorb part of the Negro personnel which
the ground arms and services would otherwise have to accept.
-
- Because of its high enlistment
appeal the Air Corps, in the earlier period of expansion, was able to
obtain a majority of its men through regular enlistment channels. Since
only selectees were affected by the Selective Service Act's racial clauses,
only that portion of the Air Corps personnel which came through the draft
was affected by rulings on proportionate Negro strength.
-
- In the fall of 1940, the Air Corps
was informed that it would receive 25,000 selectees as its 1941 spring
quota. Of these, 9 percent, or 2,250 would be Negro. The Air Corps proposed,
initially, that these Negro enlisted men be placed in "air base detachments."
These units were to be trained and employed as parts of air base groups.
De-
- [113]
- tachments would be authorized
when Negro selectees were sent to a given air base. Although they were
to be carried in the tables of organization of air base groups, the base
"detachment" was intended to prevent mixing Negroes and whites
in the same unit. In a "corrected version" suggested by G-3,
the Air Corps substituted 250-man "training squadrons (separate)
" to be over and above the regular Air Corps allotment of selectees
and to be completely separate from air base groups. This arrangement,
by which the Air Corps allotment of selectees rose from 25,000 to 27,250
men, would prevent interference with the planned use of the original 25,000
white selectees on whom the Air Corps had counted for its combat group
expansion program.4
-
- Before activation of the first
nine aviation training squadrons in June 1941, it was explained that they
were being organized "solely to take care of the colored selectees
allotted to the Air Corps ...." 5
They were later described as activated "to aid in the many duties
which must be performed to keep in order the stations of the AAF within
the continental limits of the United States." They were intentionally
left with their duties vaguely defined so that local commanders might
have discretion in the uses to which they were put.6
-
- Aviation squadrons, as these units
were later called, were established
at every major air base. The troop basis of the Army Air Forces, by 3o
June 1 942, provided for 184 such squadrons. A total of 266 were eventually
activated.7
A few of these squadrons operated under specific tables of organization,
but the vast majority came under the bulk allotment system, under which
personnel was allotted to particular commands and headquarters which,
in turn, allotted personnel to particular units as required by the using
installation. Their strengths therefore fluctuated according to the determined
needs of the station to which they were assigned. Aviation squadrons were
thereby enabled to absorb, within reasonable limits, as many or as few
selectees at a given time as were necessary to maintain the desired distribution
of Negroes within the Air Corps.
-
- Another type of Negro unit widely
employed by the Air Forces was the aviation quartermaster truck company
or air base transportation platoon. These were technically units of the
arms and services with the Air Corps and not Air Corps units. They served
to absorb the initial proportion of Negroes allotted to the services with
the Air Corps. In December 1940, the Air Corps learned that it was being
allotted 3,627 Negro enlisted men for duty with its arms and services.
"If this is correct," the chief of the Air Corps Plans Division
observed,
- [114]
- 'it appears that every Quartermaster
Truck Company assigned to duty at Air Corps stations will be colored.
There may be additional colored personnel of some other service at a few
stations." 8
Preparations were made to receive these units, which averaged 7o enlisted
men each. It was suggested that future barracks construction at each station
provide one or two barracks units separated from others so that "necessary
segregation" would be possible if and when the allotment of Negro
troops to the Air Corps was increased further by the War Department. The
truck companies, but not the transportation platoons, were generally assigned
to service groups. Companies were organized either under definite tables
or by allotment. Platoons were generally allotment units.
-
- By the end of 1 941 the authorized
squadrons and service units with the Air Forces could no longer absorb
all of the men which the Air Forces had to take if it was to come close
to its proportionate share of Negro strength. As long as the Air Forces
did not absorb its share of the increase of Negroes, G-3 insisted, ground
branches could expect to continue to be "overloaded with colored
due in part to the fact that in the past they have absorbed a considerable
number of the colored personnel resulting from expansion of the Army Air
Forces."9
During 1942 the Army was to expand to 3,600,000 men. Of these, 337750
were to be Negroes. The Air Forces, which was to expand to 997,687 -more
than a quarter of the entire Army-was allotted 53,299 Negroes in 1942,
or 10.6 percent of its total increase of
502,822 men. This number, added to the 24,293 Negroes previously allotted
(most of whom had not yet been accepted), would give the Air Forces a
total of 77592 Negroes.10
-
- The Air Forces contended that
the maximum number of Negroes which it could use was 20,739 in the Air
Corps and 23,468 in its services, a total of 44207.11
If the Air Forces allotment were reduced, ground units would then have
to absorb the excess 33,385 Negroes in addition to the 260,158 already
allotted them. Ground forces could do so only if two white divisions in
the troop basis were converted to Negro or if two white divisions plus
several non-divisional units were deleted and unneeded Negro separate
rifle battalions were substituted. To prevent this, G-3 recommended that
the Air Forces be required to accept its 53,299 Negroes out of the 1 942
increase in the Army. The Chief of Staff approved, adding the stipulation
that air base defense units "for the number of air bases found necessary"
be organized and that Negro personnel be used for this purpose as required.12
-
- Initially 23,000 Negroes were
allotted to airdrome defense units, as the air base security battalions
were originally called. While all of the original units were Negro, the
Chief of Staff's decision required that provision be made for the future
use of similar white units. Nevertheless, except for a few white units
formed for almost immediate overseas use in specific areas, most units
activated were Negro.
- [115]
- The air base security battalions
were designed to protect air bases against riots, parachute attacks, and
air raids. They were to be equipped with rifles, machine guns, and 37-mm.
(and possibly 75-mm.) guns.13
Though there was some confusion in the minds of commanders and civilian
officials on the point, these battalions were in addition to and not substitutes
for military police, guard squadrons, and aviation squadrons. Army Ground
Forces was given jurisdiction over the activation and training of these
units. Upon completion of training, the battalions were to pass to Army
Air Forces control. From the beginning the personnel allotted to the units
counted toward the Air Forces quota of Negro troops.14
-
- The air base security battalions
were the last of the special units employed to help absorb the Air Forces
quota of Negro enlisted men. The original 1942 program called for a total
of 67 air base security battalions, 57 of them to be Negro. The program
was later expanded to a total of 103 units. Through 1943, 296 were planned,
261 of which were to be Negro. Not all of these were activated. Future
Air Forces expansion into new types of units for Negroes took place in
the Arms and Services with the Air Forces and in the combat and related
units of the Air Corps.
-
-
- The question of Air Corps flying
units for Negroes was an old one.15
In the fall of 1940, after
a public announcement in September that Negro troops were being developed
for "the aviation service," the Chief of Staff called upon G-3
to consider and make recommendations for the training of Negro aviation
mechanics with the ultimate objective of establishing a Negro combat unit.16
For weeks, Air Corps agencies found flaws in all suggestions made for
beginning this training. The Chicago School of Aeronautics, suggested
by G-3, gave flying training but not mechanic training and therefore could
not be used. The Aeronautical University of Chicago gave mechanic training,
but its students were housed in a Y.M.C.A., "which makes it manifestly
impossible to assign colored students under the existing arrangement."
17
Civilian schools could be made to take Negro students but, because of
locations, housing, messing arrangements, and concurrent civilian and
military classes, "such assignment would be unjustified without their
consent." The Air Training and Operations Division felt, therefore,
that Negro mechanic trainees should be assigned to the Air Corps Technical
School at Chanute Field where they and the facilities they were to use
would be completely under military control. The Air Plans Division on
the other hand was certain that if this assignment was made "disturbances
and possibly riots will probably ensue both at Chanute Field and the nearby
communities." As an alternative it proposed Tuskegee Institute in
Alabama as the place to initiate such a
- [116]
- course. "If colored units
are to be formed," the Air Plans Division stated, "colored schools
should be provided for their training [and] separate schools for colored
pilot training likewise should be organized." 18
The Training and Operations Division, in view of the small number of Negroes
expected and in view of the lack of qualified instructors, supervisors,
and equipment, held out for Chanute Field as "the best expedient."
19
-
- At this point of threatened impasse
General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, asked, in a marginal note, "Gen.
Johnson How should we go about training the colored mechanics for 1 squadron
with the least trouble and effort?" 20
Within a week, the Air Corps prepared a plan. It recommended to G-3 that,
"if it is imperative that negro tactical units be formed," instruction
should be undertaken to provide men for one Corps and Division Observation
Squadron, with training concentrated at "a recognized colored school,
such as Tuskegee" in order to eliminate the possibility of racial
difficulties which might occur elsewhere. "Although a definite decision
may have been reached at this time to organize colored units in the Air
Corps," the memorandum continued, "no country in the world has
been able to organize a satisfactory air unit with colored personnel."
Three years, the Air Corps remonstrated, would be necessary to train a
crew chief, two more years for a hangar chief, and a total of ten
years for a line chief.21
That a Negro combat unit could be formed in time to be of value to the
national defense at all was doubted. The day after it received this memorandum
G-3 called for the submission of a plan to train a Negro single engine
pursuit unit.22
-
- In December 1940, the Air Corps
submitted its full plan, calling for the employment Of 429 enlisted men
and 47 officers in a pursuit squadron, a base group detachment, weather
and communications detachments, and services. White noncommissioned officers
were to be used as inspectors, supervisors, and instructors for an indefinite
period of time. Initial training of technical and administrative officers
and enlisted men was to be given at Chanute Field. Negro officers, when
qualified, would replace white officers in the squadron and in administrative
positions on the squadron's base. Training was to proceed by stages through
the basic, advanced, and unit phases. The elementary phase of flying training
was to be omitted initially by utilization of Negro graduates of the CAA's
civilian pilot training courses. 23
-
- For a time, the Air Corps sought
to acquire a field in the vicinity of Chicago for the training and eventual
station of this unit.24
But the high cost of land, the presence of heavily traveled air lanes,
and the location of available sites in areas subject to bad weather and
fre-
- [117]
- quent flooding caused the Air
Corps to look elsewhere. An area in the vicinity of Tuskegee, where Tuskegee
Institute had been carrying on a CAA college Student flying training program
and where the institute's president, Frederick D. Patterson, had been
urging the location of additional training facilities, was finally settled
upon as an airfield location for flight training. This plan was supplemented
in the spring of 1941 by the authorization of a civil contract school
for elementary flying training of Negro cadets. The school, operated under
contract by Tuskegee Institute, was located near the town of Tuskegee.25
-
- Under Secretary Patterson presented
the Air Corps plan to judge Hastie for comment. Hastie had already conferred
with General Arnold about the possibility of finding Negroes with training
and experience in aircraft maintenance with a view to filling Air Corps
needs in connection with the planned project.26
Now he could see no reason, "apart from a desire for racial separation,"
which justified the establishment of a separate station for the training
of a Negro squadron. He saw many valid reasons in favor of training Negroes
in existing Air Corps installations. They included maintenance of training
standards, economical use of instructional personnel, and inculcation
of morale. Hastie observed:
-
- A squadron in the Air Corps does
not function in such a way that it can be separated from other units,
as can such an organization as a coast artillery regiment. ...Acquaintance,
understanding and mutual
respect established between blacks and whites at the three regular Air
Corps Training centers can be the most important factor in bringing about
harmonious racial attitudes essential to high morale. Indeed, I can think
of no other way of accomplishing this objective. It cannot be overemphasized
that the contacts which the Air Corps seem to fear cannot be avoided.
Such contacts should be established normally in the training centers.27
-
- Hastie predicted that "whatever
the attitude of Tuskegee may be, there would unquestionably be very great
public protest if the proposed plans should be adopted."
-
- Such protests did come from the
Negro press and public. They were to be typified in the epithet "Lonely
Eagles," applied to the Tuskegee cadets. Chicago Negroes and their
press were especially critical of the plan. General Arnold, somewhat baffled
by this turn of events, remarked later that "these people are willing
to take a chance on losing the whole Tuskegee opportunity in order to
gamble on obtaining training on different circumstances which they claim
will give them a more even break . . . . It looks as if it is a case of
the whole or nothing that this group of people are waiting for."
28
-
- In support of its plan, the Air
Corps pointed out that Randolph, Maxwell, and Moffett Fields were already
congested and that the Tuskegee site would provide a minimum of delay
in getting the training of Negroes under way. The school would be under
the direct supervision of the commanding general
- [118]
- of Maxwell Field, Alabama.29
Judge Hastie, while not concurring in the plan, withdrew his formal opposition
on 8 January 1 941. The plan was approved by Under Secretary Patterson
the same day.30
-
- While the approval of this plan
to extend the combat employment of Negroes to the Air Corps, at least
on an experimental basis, did not materially increase Air Corps absorption
of Negro selectees-the Negro units planned for Tuskegee were primarily
made up of three-year enlistees- it did serve to increase the variety
of types of units provided for Negroes.31
The 99th Pursuit Squadron was activated on 22 March 1941; it was followed
by the 100th Squadron, activated on 19 February 1942. Three school squadrons,
two air service squadrons, two fighter control squadrons, additional fighter
and training squadrons, two group headquarters, and communications, weather,
and service detachments necessary for these units and for the new airfield
were all provided in 1942. Many of these units were not filled for months
after activation. They did not, therefore, immediately affect the relative
standing of the Air Corps in the employment of its share of Negro troops.
-
- The decision to use only Negro
attached units with the new squadrons made it necessary to constitute
and activate several types of units of the ground arms and services not
previously planned. These included chemical, ordnance, and medical detachments
for the Tuskegee station, two signal aircraft warning companies originally
intended for task force and fighter group assignment, and signal, quartermaster,
medical, and ordnance units for the original squadrons and for the service
group. The activation of these Air Forces types of ground units gave force
to the Army's announced policy of establishing Negro units in all branches
of the service.
-
- At a press conference announcing
the decision to form a Negro pursuit squadron, Under Secretary Patterson
stated that it was of course part of the policy of the Army to have Negro
units in each branch of the service. A newsman followed with the question,
"That means a Negro tank corps?" Judge Patterson answered, "Everything."
When pressed for plans on the "tank corps," the Under Secretary
admitted that he did not know that the War Department had "gone down
into that," but an aide reminded the press that although there were
no plans for tank units, Negroes were already in the infantry.32
This could have been taken to mean that since the Infantry was one of
the arms contributing units to the Armored Force, the question of the
distribution of Negroes to that service was settled, but the statement
was taken to mean that if the Air Corps had taken Negroes, the Armored
Force would not be far behind.
-
-
- As a matter of fact, the Armored
Force had already been instructed to make a provision for Negro units.
The
- [119]
- MAJ. GEN. WALTER R. WEAVER DELIVERS
THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS
- opening the new Air Corps School
for training Negro aviators at Tuskegee.
-
- Armored Force, like the Air Corps,
had contended that, except for experimental purposes, it could not afford
during an emergency to take a proportionate share of Negroes. It was too
busy with the problems of welding a unified force out of what was essentially
a combination of arms to have time for the activation and training of
Negro armored units. The Armored Force suggested that its representation
be provided by using Negroes in lieu of white soldiers in service detachments
at the Armored Force School and Replacement Center. These detachments,
to include 574 and 403 men, respectively, would be used to provide chauffeurs,
janitors, firemen, cooks, basics, and bandsmen.33
-
- G-3 concluded that service detachments
alone would not satisfy requirements. Though the Armored Force could argue
that it was not, technically, a separate branch of the service but a combination
of arms and services which were already taking proportions of Negroes,
G-3 pointed out that the Armored Force functioned as a separate branch
of the service and was accepted by the public as such. It therefore recommended
that the Armored Force, in addition to the two service detachments, activate
the 78th Light Tank Battalion at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana, with Negro
per-
- [120]
- THE LONELY EAGLES.
- Air Corps cadets standing in
review on the field at Tuskegee.
-
- sonnel.34
This battalion was to be activated on I June 1941, with 32 white enlisted
instructors attached to compensate for the lack of a trained Negro cadre.35
Despite strong objections from the Armored Force,36
two additional tank battalions were scheduled. The 761st was activated
on 1 April 1942 and the 784th Tank Battalion a year later on I April 1943.
The three battalions, with the 78th redesignated as the 758th, formed
the 5th Armored Group, activated on 23 May 1942.
-
- In the artillery, the expansion
of the number of Negro units proceeded in an orderly fashion, in accordance
with theories developed during peacetime. On the basis of World War I
reports, it was believed that Negroes could be employed profitably in
supporting artillery units, especially in the heavier types where direct
contact, with the enemy would be least likely. Two antiaircraft artillery
regiments and one field artillery regiment were provided in the August
194o expansion.37
Two National Guard infantry regiments were subsequently converted and
inducted into the federal service as artillery units, one as field
- [121]
- artillery and the other as antiaircraft
artillery.38
One coast artillery, two more antiaircraft artillery, and three more field
artillery regiments, and a field artillery brigade headquarters were activated
in 1941.39
By the end of 1942 eight Negro antiaircraft artillery regiments, four
barrage balloon battalions, six separate antiaircraft battalions, and
two separate searchlight batteries had been activated.40
Two more searchlight batteries, which were never filled, were also constituted
and partially activated. At the same time, in addition to the one field
artillery brigade headquarters and division artillery, a total of seven
field artillery regiments, with fourteen battalions (two 75-mm. gun, two
155-mm, gun, eight 155-mm. howitzer, and two 8-inch howitzer) had been
activated.
- When antitank battalions were
re-designated tank destroyer battalions in December 1941, thus creating
what was in all major respects a new combat arm, two Negro battalions
for the new service were activated with cadres from two of the older field
artillery regiments.41
In 1942, five more Negro
tank destroyer battalions were activated, with six more scheduled for
1943. Of these latter six, four only were activated.
-
-
- Although infantry and cavalry
regiments were the traditional types of Negro combat units, expansion
in these arms did not proceed smoothly. The general plans for expansion
called for few separate infantry and cavalry regiments, and at the beginning
of mobilization all-Negro divisions were looked upon with disfavor from
almost every Army quarter.
-
- As a unit for Negroes the separate
regiment had a number of advantages over the division. The regiment was
a self-contained unit, able to operate alone. It did not require organic
supporting elements demanding personnel with knowledge, training, and
abilities which might not be easily obtained in sufficient numbers from
among available Negro enlisted men. Moreover, it did not require the extensive
pyramiding of leadership and administrative abilities which divisions
needed if they were to function efficiently. In the zone of interior,
regiments could be used as defense or school troops. Separate Negro regiments
might be attached or assigned to other units for operational purposes.
After demonstrating the quality of their fighting ability, separate regiments
might be combined into divisions if a theater commander felt that such
a move was either desirable or advantageous. Separate Negro regiments
might be employed as organic elements of divisions in which other regiments
and units were white.
- [122]
- This last possibility went beyond
the theory stage. The two Negro Regular cavalry regiments were assigned
from time to time after World War I to the new cavalry divisions along
with white regiments. The 9th and 10th Cavalry had so operated with white
regiments in the past, both in Indian warfare and in Cuba, where during
the Spanish-American War the 9th Cavalry had been brigaded with the 3d
and 6th Cavalry to form the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 10th Cavalry had
been brigaded with the 1st Cavalry and the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry
(Roosevelt's Rough Riders) to form the 2d Cavalry Brigade. Upon organization
of the 1st Cavalry Division in 1921 the 10th Cavalry was assigned to its
1st Cavalry Brigade and remained so assigned for a little more than a
year.42
In 1927 the 10th Cavalry, along with the 11th Cavalry, was assigned to
the 5th Cavalry Brigade of the inactive 3d Cavalry Division.43
Under the Four Army Organization in 1933, the 9th Cavalry was similarly
assigned to the 3d Cavalry Division, replacing the 11th Cavalry in the
5th Brigade, and the 24th Infantry was assigned to the 7th Brigade of
the 4th Division along with the 29th Infantry.44
Although, except for occasional maneuvers such as those of the 1st Cavalry
Division in Texas in the fall of 1929 in which the 10th Cavalry participated,
the Negro regiments were not in close contact
with the white regiments, their assignment to divisions with white troops
was not without precedent.
-
- In August 1940, when the cavalry
requirements of the Protective Mobilization Plan were revised, the 9th
and 10th Cavalry were designated for GHQ Reserve. The number of horse
cavalry divisions was reduced from six to two. The 1st Cavalry Division
was to be complete, while the 2d Cavalry Division was to have its horse
cavalry regiments "and such other elements as available personnel
and equipment permit." 45
Consideration was given at this time to including the two Negro regiments
in the Regular Army cavalry divisions.46
At the beginning of mobilization, the 2d, 3d,11th, and 14th Cavalry were
assigned to the 2d Cavalry Division. Of these, the 3d and 11th Cavalry
were not available because of their designations for other missions. Approved
plans for the placement of selective service men called for the concentration
of the 2d, 14th, 9th, and 10th Cavalry at Fort Riley, Kansas, by January
1941. "Although the Tabs showing the utilization of selective service
trainees do not definitely assign any particular regiments to the 2d Cavalry
Division the only conclusion from them," G-3 stated in October, "is
that the 2d, 14th, 9th and 10th are so assigned." 47
-
- The Chief of Cavalry objected
strenuously to this organization. "I submit,"
- [123]
- CAVALRYMEN OF THE 4TH CAVALRY
BRIGADE
- leaving West Riding Hall at
Fort Riley to March 1941.
-
- he wrote to the Chief of Staff
on 20 September 1940, "that no consideration of convenience or expediency
should govern the formation of the fighting division . . . ." More
specifically, he stated:
-
- It appears to me to be obvious
that such a unit non-homogeneous-half white and half black, cannot be
as effective as a homogeneous or all black or all white unit. There is
not only a difference in color but there is a difference in emotional
reactions. The concentration of a large body of troops in one place, approximately
half white and half black, involves the risk of bitter rivalries and racial
clashes. I consider this to be an unwise improvisation.
-
- The Chief of Cavalry opposed
not only the composition of the new division but also its proposed location.
He felt that an all-white 2d Cavalry Division should be located on the
southern border, at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, at Deming, New Mexico, or
at Fort Bliss, Texas, leaving the Negro regiments at Fort Riley, Kansas;
otherwise, the division should stay at Fort Riley, with the Negro regiments
going to Fort Huachuca or to Fort Meade, South Dakota. Nevertheless, his
chief objection was to the mixed division. "In making a decision
on this matter," he concluded,
- [124]
- "fighting efficiency should
be considered the controlling factor." 48
-
- Despite the objections of the
Chief of Cavalry, the 2d Cavalry Division was announced for organization
"early in 1941" at Fort Riley. Its 3d Cavalry Brigade was to
contain the white 2d and 14th Cavalry and its 4th Cavalry Brigade the
Negro 9th and 10th Cavalry.49
According to plan, the activation of other division elements was deferred.
Brigade headquarters troops and weapons troops were provided in February
1941 , but the division headquarters and headquarters troop was not activated
until 1 April 1941.50
The early organization and training of the division were therefore considerably
hampered. Not until November 1941 were all its remaining inactive units
authorized.51
All of its organic units, except the Negro brigade and the truck unit
of the quartermaster squadron, were activated with white troops. Aside
from its Negro brigade, which made it, in the language of the Chief of
Staff, "unique" among the divisions,52
the 2d Cavalry Division as constituted in 1941 played no special part
in the provision of units for the
placement of Negro troops, for it was able to absorb only those selectees
necessary to fill the 9th and 10th Cavalry.
- In the spring of 1942, when the
War Department decided to increase the numbers of armored and motorized
divisions, Army Ground Forces recommended that one of the new divisions
be provided by conversion of the 2d Cavalry Division, less its Negro 4th
Cavalry Brigade, to an armored division. This recommendation was approved,
with the exception that the 2d Cavalry Division was retained as a cavalry
division with only its 4th Cavalry Brigade remaining active while its
white elements were relieved and reassigned to the new 9th Armored Division.53
-
- Retention of the 2d Cavalry Division
provided for the future absorption of larger numbers of Negro selectees.
Moreover, there was always the possibility that need might arise for a
trained horse cavalry division. "Contrary to general opinion,"
Brig. Gen. Terry Allen, then commander of the 2d Cavalry Division, had
written to General Marshall, "I feel that the cavalry still has a
distinct role in modern warfare, when given proper missions and when properly
trained and led." 54
It was not considered politically expedient to reduce the cavalry arm
to one division only, nor was it considered good public relations to eliminate
the two Regular Negro regiments. This combination of factors provided
a new, all-Negro 2d Cavalry Division, ready to receive excess Negro
- [125]
- selectees should it be needed
for this purpose.55
In November the War Department directed that new units constituted for
refilling the division be ready for activation on 25 February 1943.56
On this date, the 2d Cavalry Division, the first division in World War
II to have Negro components, became the third with all Negro enlisted
men, for in the meantime two Negro infantry divisions had been organized.
-
- While the 2d Cavalry Division
was the only unit of its size actually activated with Negro and white
regiments, consideration had also been given to the formation of an infantry
division with a combination of Negro and white troops. The Chief of Staff,
in the fall of 1940, had "in mind, in case we are forced to organize
a colored division," taking the two infantry regiments scheduled
for location at Fort Huachuca, and adding a third Negro infantry regiment,
the Negro medium artillery regiment (349th Field Artillery) , and white
light artillery to form a division.57
The G-3 Division, asked for comment, replied that it did not "look
with favor on the mixing of colored and white troops in a unit (white
light artillery units in the colored Infantry Division) if there is any
way of avoiding it, especially where the preponderance of troops in the
unit are colored." 58
There is no evidence that subsequent experience with the 2d Cavalry Division
served to alter either point of view.
-
- Shortly before activation of the
first Negro infantry division, the 93d, in the spring of 1 942, the Chief
of Staff's office noted an increasing volume of mail asking for the organization
of a volunteer mixed Negro and white division.59
Among those urging the formation of a mixed division were a number of
widely known civilians, including Dorothy Canfield Fisher, the novelist;
Samuel McCrea Cavert, General Secretary of the Federal Council of the
Churches of Christ in America; Msgr. John A. Ryan, Director of the National
Catholic Welfare Association's Department of Social Action; and Mary E.
Woolley, former president of Mt. Holyoke College.60
Letters from organizations such as the NAACP and The Council Against Intolerance,
from their members, and from college professors and students also came
into the War Department in large numbers. Many of the letters spoke of
the symbolic importance that such a unit would have on both the national
and the international scene as an earnest of national faith in democracy
and as an answer to Japanese propaganda that the war was a color-based
conflict.
-
- In answering these letters, the
War Department pointed out that the volunteer system was "an ineffective
and dangerous" method of raising combat units and that the use of
the volunteer system
- [126]
- would interfere with the "scientific
and orderly selective processes" used by the Army. "Although,
as you point out," Mrs. Fisher was told, "it would be an encouraging
gesture towards certain minorities, the urgency of the present military
situation necessitates our using tested and proved methods of procedure,
and using them with all haste. It prohibits our initiating experiments
except where they will lead to the fulfillment of pressing military needs."
61
-
- Despite the volume of requests
for a volunteer mixed division-and such requests continued to reach the
War Department periodically until near the end of the war-when Negro divisions
were finally decided upon, the motivating influence for their formation
was more the need for additional organizations to take care of the increasing
number of Negroes available to the Army than either the military or the
public pressures involved. After Pearl Harbor, when it was obvious that
the Army would increase its total size ever more rapidly-bringing with
it more and more Negroes-the advantages of forming all-Negro divisions
gained in attractiveness and support. Divisions could absorb 15,000 and
more men each. With their elements and supporting units, furthermore,
they afforded representation in almost every arm and service. They provided,
as well, an answer to requests for a "division" without committing
the Army on the volunteer mixed unit question or on any of the possible
combinations of white and Negro units which had been suggested during
the period of planning.
-
- By the end of 1941, as the 1942
Troop Basis took shape, it appeared that the Army
of 3,600,000 men scheduled for 1942 would have a total of 71 divisions,
32 of them new infantry divisions and 4 of them new armored divisions.
The Army would have to take 177,000 new Negroes during the year as a proportionate
share of its increased strength. Even if the Air Forces and the ground
arms and services took the maximum number of Negroes in the non-divisional
units provided, a considerable excess would still remain. If all types
of units were to have Negro representation, it was argued, divisions should
be included. Infantry divisions, it was pointed out, would not have to
be built up from scratch, for separate Negro infantry regiments already
existed. They could be used to give divisions a leaven of experience.
The peacetime 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, the new 366th, 367th,
and 368th Regular regiments, and the 372d National Guard Regiment were
available for this purpose. The 366th Infantry, activated on 10 February
1941; the 372d, inducted 10 March 1941; the 368th, activated 1 March 1941;
and the 367th, activated on 25 March 1941, all had had considerable training
by the end of 1941.
-
- During the period of discussion
of the Troop Basis for 1942, estimates of the total number of divisions
needed if the Army should be called upon for offensive operations reached
200.62
That four of these (plus half a cavalry division) should be Negro did
not at the time appear to be excessive since, on a proportionate basis,
twenty divisions would have been Negro. The first of the Negro divisions,
the 93d, was planned for activation in the spring of 1942. It
- [127]
- would utilize two of the existing
infantry regiments, the 25th and the 368th, as a nucleus and expand to
full size. If the Army Air Forces took its full quota and all services
and separate units of the arms took the maximum practicable number of
Negroes, "three additional colored divisions are the minimum essential
to provide for the disposition of approximately i77,000 additional Negroes
that will enter the Army . . . ," G-3 determined. The Troop Basis
for 1942 therefore scheduled four Negro infantry divisions.63
-
- But snags developed in this program.
G-1 pointed out that if too many Negroes entered the Army in the early
months of 1942 they would have to be placed in camps where recreational
facilities were not available. G-4 could make no commitment on the dates
when suitable stations would be available for large numbers of Negroes.
Although divisions were large units which, with overstrength, could absorb
large numbers of Negroes, the problem of locations and housing, not to
mention training, was vastly more complicated for them than for non-divisional
units. The activation dates of the three additional divisions could be
placed near the end of the calendar year, but since they were to furnish
cadres to each other in turn it would be next to impossible to activate
them all at nearly the same time. It was decided to limit the activations
of Negro divisions in 1942 to two and carry the additional two divisions
into 1943. Thus, the 93d Division could provide the cadre for the 92d
Division in October 1942; the 92d could cadre another division in April
1943 and this new division could provide a cadre for the
fourth Negro infantry division in August 1943.64
The 93d and 92d Divisions were activated as scheduled, but the deferment
of the other two of the 1942 Negro divisions left 29,000 Negroes to be
placed in smaller units during the calendar year.
-
- The decision to retain the 2d
Cavalry Division, whose inactive elements were to be provided by early
1943, helped alleviate the pressure for the maintenance of a balance among
combat units. Although it was clear that they would be activated only
as a last resort, the additional Negro infantry divisions remained in
the projected troop basis for 1943 for the same reason as well as to absorb
projected increases of Ground Forces Negro strength should they be needed
for this purpose.
-
-
- The demand for service units became
an ever increasing one in the expanding Army. The provision of service
units for Negroes, especially in the Corps of Engineers and Quartermaster
Corps, was originally accompanied by little debate, for it was generally
agreed that Negro troops could be employed to advantage in such units.
By April 1942, 42 percent of all engineer and 34 percent of all quartermaster
units were Negro. Unlike those of some other arms and services these engineer
and quartermaster units, even when created to absorb men made available
by other branches' canceled allotments, were usually activated to fill
specific military needs.
-
- Although only one Negro engineer
- [128]
- general service regiment was provided
in the 1940 PMP, from the formation of the 41st Regiment in August 1940
to the end of 1942 twenty-seven engineer general service regiments were
activated with Negro enlisted men. An equal number was to be added in
later years. One engineer aviation regiment and nineteen battalions were
activated by the end of 1942, with a larger number following in succeeding
years. Separate engineer battalions, engineer water supply battalions
and companies, and dump truck and aviation engineer companies accounted
for the majority of the remaining engineer units activated with Negroes
in the period 1940-42.
-
- Quartermaster truck and service
units were always in demand in the expanding Army. Later, as more and
more troops were shipped to overseas theaters, requests for these units
were generally greater than the number and the shipping space available.
The many types of Negro quartermaster units activated between 1940 and
the end of 1942 included truck, service, car, railhead, bakery, salvage
repair, salvage collecting, laundry, fumigation and bath, gas supply,
sterilization, and pack units, ranging in size from regiments to detachments.
Before the war was over, there were more than 1,600 Negro quartermaster
companies, plus headquarters, bakery, laundry, and driver detachments,
separate platoons, and provisional units of various types and sizes. During
the same period, the Quartermaster Corps, before the establishment of
a separate Transportation Corps, organized Negro port battalions and companies.
Subsequently, the Transportation Corps itself organized a considerable
number of port and amphibian truck companies for employment at home and
overseas.
-
- In the rapid expansion of its
Negro units, the Quartermaster Corps could not avoid problems common to
other branches of the Army. As early as August 1941 the personnel requirements
of Negro quartermaster units began to exceed the current supply of trainees
graduating from quartermaster replacement training centers. To fill high
priority quartermaster units scheduled for the autumn of 1941, certain
quartermaster units were furnished men from the engineer, field artillery,
coast artillery, infantry, and cavalry replacement training centers. Each
of these centers had a surplus of Negro trainees who, as overstrength-lacking
units for assignment would otherwise present housing and assignment difficulties
for their branches. Filling high priority quartermaster units with this
surplus helped solve the problem of placing these men.65
-
- A third branch, the Chemical Warfare
Service, continued to provide units for more than its proportionate share
of Negro troops from the activation of the 1st Chemical Decontamination
Company onward. It was generally felt that Negroes could serve well in
chemical units. Additional decontamination companies were provided. Negroes
were also placed in smoke generator companies; chemical maintenance companies,
aviation; chemical depot companies, aviation; and chemical platoons, airdrome.
One chemical service, one chemical motorized, and one chemical processing
company were activated in 1942. The
- [129]
- majority of the new chemical units
for Negroes were smoke generator companies, many of them added to the
troop basis during 1942 to fill expected needs of offensive operations
being planned in that year. A number of these units were to be activated,
trained, and initially used by defense commands .66
-
- The Medical Department, as already
noted, experienced considerable difficulty in providing units for its
share of Negro selectees. The whole question of medical units, as distinct
from medical detachments with units of other arms and services, was inextricably
interwoven with that of the utilization of Negro physicians, dentists,
and nurses, which in turn was part of the larger question of the use of
Negro officers in general. Initially, Negro selectees designated for the
Medical Department could be placed in the medical detachments of Negro
regiments and battalions. As long as these were understrength, the question
of the Medical Department's increasing its proportion of Negro selectees
was primarily an academic one. But this situation, in which vacancies
exceeded the available number of men, did not last long.
-
- In the late summer and fall of
1940, the Medical Department made over-all plans for the employment of
its share of Negro troops. These plans included provisions for both officers
and enlisted men. The major feature affecting the provision of units for
Negro troops was the proposal for a separate Negro unit which became the
medical sanitary company of World War II. Originally called "medical
companies, separate, colored," by The Surgeon General's Office, these
companies were later termed sanitary companies, in conformance with the
policy that no units were to be designated by race and that no special
tables of organization were to be made for Negro troops which did not
apply to white troops as well.67
-
- The sanitary companies were originally
intended to provide ward and professional services for hospitals having
one hundred or more Negro patients, cared for in separate wards. After
it was determined that such services would be administratively uneconomical,
the units were thought of as hospital service units, containing men who
could replace the approximately 180 white enlisted men normally used as
chauffeurs, cooks, cooks' helpers, orderlies, and basics in a general
hospital. The units would be assigned or attached to general hospitals.
They would be housed, messed, and administered separately, under the command
of Negro officers. Where Negro professional personnel were assigned to
a hospital, these companies would provide messing and other facilities
for them.
-
- As they actually developed, the
medical sanitary companies became primarily labor units employed in addition
to the general hospital personnel.68
They became general service units which might be used for any duty considered
appropriate by the commander of the unit or
- [130]
- station to which they were assigned.
While the companies were to be assigned to all hospitals having l,000
or more beds, lack of funds for the construction of the necessary additional
housing delayed the activation of the sanitary companies until the need
for new Negro units to absorb the Medical Department's quota became more
pressing.69
-
- Only two medical sanitary companies
were activated in 1941. These two were activated "because of pressure
on G-1 to put colored medical personnel on duty" and not, as in the
case of certain other units, primarily for the purpose of absorbing surplus
Negro selectees.70
Fifty-four were added during 1942. A larger number was planned for 1943,
but not all of the units scheduled were activated. The 1943 companies
were available for activation whenever monthly Army Service Forces Negro
quotas could not be absorbed elsewhere.71
Thirty companies were eventually activated in 1943 and one in 1944. Many
of the 1943 companies were inactivated or disbanded in the fall of 1943
or in 1944 when more vitally needed service units were being filled for
immediate overseas use.
-
- Aside from station hospitals at
Tuskegee and at Fort Huachuca, four field hospitals, and scattered veterinary,
ambulance, and administrative units, medical sanitary companies remained
the major medical units provided for Negroes.
-
- Negro military police units were
not provided until after
local experiments with Negro military police detachments showed that their
use in areas with large Negro troop populations paid dividends in better
order, better relations between troops and the military police, and better
relations with civilians in those communities which had learned to look
upon Negro military policemen as something less than a threat to local
customs. Most of these units were small detachments of men detailed to
military police duty from station complements. Among them there was little
uniformity in procedure, organization, or training. Some posts used Negro
military police on special duty assignments; others used them on a full-time
basis. Until the establishment of the Corps of Military Police on 26 September
1941, these units were generally under the direct control of post and
service commanders.
-
- The directive establishing the
new Corps of Military Police required responsible commanders to report
the designation, station, and strength, by race, of existing units.72
There were twenty-two of these detachments of Negro military police on
30 June 1942, ranging in size from two men at Fort Sam Houston, Texas,
to sixty-five at Camp San Luis Obispo, California.73
Ten Negro military police battalions (zone of interior) and three companies
were activated in August 1942. Two more battalions were scheduled, but
the War Department decided not to activate any more Negro units of this
type and they therefore received white personnel. Two Negro prisoner of
war escort com-
- [131]
- MILITARY POLICE UNIT AT COLOMBUS, GEORGIA, APRIL 1942
-
- panies were included in the 1942
Troop Basis but, on the request of the Provost Marshal General, they too
were activated with white personnel, with G-3 stipulating that future
plans provide for the use of Negroes in this duty.74
-
- The Ordnance Department provided
ammunition companies and almost no others for the receipt of Negroes.
Aviation ordnance depot and aviation ordnance supply and maintenance companies
were provided in the Army Air Forces; several medium automotive
maintenance companies in the Army
Ground Forces were activated with Negro enlisted men.
-
- Signal Corps units for the receipt
of an increased proportion of Negro enlisted men were confined to construction
and to Air Forces types of signal units. One construction company was
activated in May 1941 and saw early duty in Panama. Except for three construction
companies, and three construction battalions, all other Negro signal units
activated in 1942 were Air Forces units. These included eleven construction
battalions, two aircraft warning companies, and one service group signal
company. The Signal Corps remained below its
- [132]
- proportionate share of Negro troops
throughout the war.
-
-
- A number of miscellaneous units
were provided for Negro troops in 1940-42. Chief among these were bands,
replacement companies, postal units, service command units (SCU's) at
posts and at civilian educational institutions, and a special service
company. Various provisional units, training units, school detachments,
and overhead supply detachments were also utilized for the placement of
Negro troops. Many of these units, such as bands and replacement companies,
were needed to service Negro trainees.
-
- Occasionally, specific requests
for the activation of Negro units were made by commanders who needed additional
troops for tasks connected with the operation of their posts. Such a request
came from Fort Knox in 1942. An engineer separate battalion was needed
there to construct roads, training facilities, and firing aids in an expanded
range and training area. The Chief of Engineers, believing that all units
should be trained for future theater of operations use, objected to the
activation of units for full-time employment on local tasks. This unit
was therefore activated with the stipulation that it be trained in its
usual duties by rotating its companies between training and necessary
work and that it "not be used solely for labor while at Fort Knox."
75
-
- The commander at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia, similarly asked for authority to advance the activation date
for a medical sanitary company, ostensibly because a First Army medical
inspector had indicated that it was desirable to start training this type
of unit as soon as possible. When First Army asked for further reasons
for advancing the activation date for the unit, it developed that the
post commander expected that the organization could be used to good advantage
in mosquito control and general camp sanitation without interfering with
its training.76
-
- Truck regiments, provisional and
permanent, for use at service schools, and school detachments to replace
civilians, such as janitors and table waiters for instructors' and student
officers' living quarters and messes, accounted for a number of units
provided for Negro troops. The Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
explained its need for additional Negro enlisted men in its school detachment:
-
- Until recently, civilian colored
kitchen police and table waiters were available in sufficient numbers
to maintain officer and instructor messes without difficulty. Lately,
we have not been able to employ the required number, since a large percentage
of this labor has been drafted. Other eligible men who would be desirable
in the messes are now employed elsewhere at more attractive wages and
better working hours. The problem of securing adequate kitchen police
and table waiters is becoming more acute.77
-
- The Parachute School at Fort Benning
wanted a Negro service company to
- [133]
- 31 DECEMBER 1942
-
| Type
of Service |
White |
Negro |
Percentage of All Negroes
in Each Type of Service |
Percentage of All Men
in Army |
| Whites |
Negroes |
| Army total |
4,532,117 |
467,883 |
10.3 |
100.0 |
100.0 |
| Combat units |
1,815,094 |
92,772 |
4.8 |
40.0 |
19.7 |
| Service units |
616,851 |
161,707 |
20.7 |
13.6 |
34.5 |
| AAF and ASWAAF |
1,190,363 |
109,637 |
8.4 |
26.4 |
23.5 |
| Overhead a |
363,820 |
65,880 |
15.3 |
8.0 |
14.1 |
| RTC's |
238,500 |
27,500 |
10.3 |
5.3 |
5.9 |
| OCS |
72,200 |
800 |
1.1 |
1.5 |
0.2 |
| Unassigned |
235,289 |
9,587 |
3.9 |
5.2 |
2.1 |
-
-
a Includes replacement depots and hospitals.
-
Source: Extended from Tab B, Memo, G-3 for CG's AGF
-
- relieve its own students of such
duties as kitchen police, guarding installations, and policing training
areas, hangars, and administrative buildings.78
Other units were formed for demonstration purposes at certain schools.
Occasionally, needed units were activated overseas from experienced units
already in the theater, fillers being provided from the mainland.79
-
- The provision of certain types
of units for Negroes sometimes ran counter to local civilian customs and
attitudes toward the types of tasks for which Negroes should be trained
and employed. The Alabama State Firemen's Association objected to the
employment of Negro soldiers in the fire department at Fort McClellan.
The association wanted these traditionally "white" jobs kept
for white men.80
California longshoremen's unions objected to the formation of Negro port
battalions and stated: "This move can only be interpreted by us as
being directed against union labor." 81
Many areas objected to the use of Negro guard and air base security battalions,
on the ground that they violated local mores. The War Depart-
- [134]
- ment's assurance that these units
were being formed for military needs only and that their primary use,
after the completion of training, would be outside of the United States,
brought an end to this type of protest.
