THE ORGANIZATION OF GROUND COMBAT TROOPS. By Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley. ( 1947, 1983; 540 pages, 24 tables, 11 charts, 5 illustrations, bibliographical note, glossaries, index, CMH Pub 2-1.)

This work opens with a history of General Headquarters (GHQ), U.S. Army, established in July 1940 under the direction of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who would later command the Army Ground Forces. During the period of initial mobilization General Headquarters had the responsibility for training field forces, a task that in March 1942 was given to the Army Ground Forces. The history of GHQ is therefore essential to an understanding of the reorganization that brought the Army Ground Forces into existence. The remainder, and greater part, of the volume is a series of six studies focusing on major problems presented by the mobilization and organization of the ground combat army and the efforts of General McNair to solve them. A final study deals with the reorganization of the ground forces for redeployment against Japan.

The unpleasant discovery late in 1942 that the dual role of combatant power and "arsenal of democracy" was overtaxing the effective resources of the United States, in both manpower and industrial capacity, together with a continued shortage of shipping, forced the government to reconsider the size and shape of its military forces. As a consequence the ground forces underwent a drastic reorganization to meet limitations imposed by higher authority. General McNair welcomed this as an opportunity to produce leaner and more mobile organizations within the Army Ground Forces without loss of firepower and with a gain, as he believed, in capacity for offensive action. In general, he sought economy of force by combating the swing

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toward specialization that had occurred as the traditional arms were mechanized and motorized and as new arms sprang up around the development of instruments of war such as the tank and tank destroyer and antiaircraft artillery. He sought by a diversity of means for a better balance between specialized and general purpose units. He contended also for a better balance between combat and service forces. The two principles on which he counted most heavily were pooling and reinforcement. Since economy of forces continues to be jeopardized by the tendency toward specialization and overweight in noncombat elements, the successes and limitations of General McNair's drastic experiment in 1943, here presented and analyzed with reference to the conditions of World War II, should be instructive to those responsible for the effectiveness of the Army.

For the student of national policy the studies in this volume, particularly the studies of mobilization, have an instructive bearing on the question of how large an effective force the United States can deploy in a war fought overseas.

(In the lists that follow, the six studies comprised in this volume are arbitrarily assigned numerical designations 1 to 6.)

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