Chapter I

[1] Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946, MS, pp. 2ff. Hist Div files See Bibliographical Note.

[2] Ibid.; [Henry G. Elliott], The Predecessor Commands: SPOBS and USAFBI (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO Part I), MS, pp.23-24. Hist Div files.

[3] Elliott, The Predecessor Commands, pp. 2, 25.

[4] Brief of ABC-1 Conversations. Pre-Inv file 308. See Bibliographical Note.

[5] U.S. ABC-4/CS-4, 14 Jan 42. OPD files, ARCADIA Conf Bk.

[6] CCS 9/1, War Collaboration Between United Nations. Approved at CCS 4th Mtg, 10 Feb 42. See Bibliographical Note for location and nature of CCS documents.

[7] The only interservice directorate previously existing was the Joint Board founded 17 July 1903. The Joint Board, charged with coordinating all matters of joint interest to the services, consisted in 1942 of four Navy and four Army members: for the Army, the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, and the Director of the War Plans Division; for the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Aeronautics, and the Director of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations. The Joint Board was primarily concerned with administrative matters and doctrine. It continued to exist after the establishment of the Joint Chiefs although its duties and importance dwindled. It was finally abolished by executive order in August 1947.

[8] Admiral King, Annapolis graduate of 1901, served during World War I as Assistant Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, winning the Navy Cross. In 1937 he moved into the group controlling broad naval operations and was, successively, a member of the General Board of the Navy, Commander of the U.S. Fleet Patrol Force, and, with the rank of admiral, Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. He assumed command of the U.S. Fleet in December 1941. Admiral Stark, Annapolis graduate of 1903, had commanded a destroyer squadron in active service against submarines in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic in World War I, later serving on the staff of the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. He was made Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance in 1934 and four years later became Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force. The following year, 1939, he was promoted to full admiral and assumed his post of Chief of Naval Operations.

[9] The Joint Staff Mission superseded the earlier British Military Mission in May 1941. Changes in personnel up to 1944 were: Chief of the British Army Staff-Lt. Gen. Sir Colville Wemyss (to March 1942), Maj. Gen. R. H. Dewing (March-June 1942), Lt. Gen. G. N. Macready; Chief of the British Admiralty Delegation—Admiral Sir Charles Little (to June 1942), Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham June-December 1942), Admiral Sir Percy Noble; Chief of the British Air Staff—Air Marshal A. T. Harris (to February 1942), Air Marshal D. C. S. Evill (February 1942 June 1943), Air Marshal Sir William Walsh.

[10] Field Marshal Dill, Sandhurst graduate and Boer War veteran, was Field Marshal Haig's Brigadier General, Operations, during the last Hundred Days before the 1918 Armistice. He served on the General Staff in India, was Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the War Office, commanded two divisions in Palastine during the Arab rebellion, and was Commander-in-Chief at Aldershot. As Chief of the Imperial General Staff from May 1940 through 1941, he was responsible for the reinforcement of the British armies in Egypt and the Middle East and for the decision to send British troops to Greece. Promoted to field marshal in December 1941, he was sent to Washington a Head of the British Joint Staff Mission and senior British member of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

[11] Long after the Joint Chief of Staff had become an accepted functioning organization an attempt was made to give them a written charter. But it was discovered that definitions of authority at such high levels tended to confuse rather than clarify the positions of responsibility and trust established by intimate personal relationships. The attempted definition was rejected by President Roosevelt, and the corporate existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to stem from the Combined Chiefs of Staff charter.

Admiral Leahy, Annapolis graduate in the class of 1897, saw active war service against the Spanish Fleet in Santiago Harbor, in the Philippine Insurrection, and in the Boxer Uprising. During World War I, he served aboard ships of the line and also commanded a troop transport, winning the Navy Cross. He assumed command of the New Mexico in 1926 and in 1933 was made Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Four years later (then an admiral), he became Chief of Naval Operations. In 1939, retired from the service, he was appointed governor of Puerto Rico. The following year he went to France as U.S. Ambassador. It was from this post that he was recalled to active duty by the President in 1942.

[12] Combined Planners named in the original Combined Chiefs' charter were: for the U.S., Rear Adm. R. K. Turner (USN), Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow (USA), Capt. R. E. Davison (USN), Col. E. L. Naiden (AC); for the British, Capt. C. E. Lambe (RN), Lt. Col. G. K. Bourne, Group Capt. S. C. Strafford (RAF).

[13] U.S. planning organization and techniques are considered at length in Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, a volume now under preparation in this series. (This volume is now available, LWJ).

[14] Mountbatten, who entered the Royal Navy in 1913, served at sea during World War I, for the last two years as a midshipman. After specializing in communications, he was assigned as Mediterranean Fleet Wireless Officer in 1931. Then followed assignments as commander of the Daring, the Wishart and, in 1939, the Kelly and the 5th Destroyer Flotilla in Mediterranean operations. He came to Combined Operations Headquarters after commanding the Illustrious.

[15] Paper by Lt. Col. Paddy Corbett, The Evolution and Development of Amphibious Technique and Material, read before British Staff College, Camberly, England, May 45. Hist Div files.

[16] General Paget, winner of the Distinguished Service Order and Military Cross in World War I, entered the British Army in 1907. As commander of the 18th Division in 1939 in operations in Norway, he successfully engineered its evacuation. He was promoted to lieutenant general and in 1940 was appointed Chief of General Staff, Home Forces, holding this position until he assumed command of the Home Forces in 1942.

[17] 21 A Gp, Note on the History of Planning for Operations in Northwest Europe, 30 Dec 43. Hist Div files.

[18] Jp (41) 1028, 24 Dec 41. CCS files, CCS 381 (3-23-42), par. I. This was the final version of the plan. An earlier version, JP (41) 823 (0) Draft, was dated 9 Oct 41; no copy has been located among Dept. of the Army records.

[19] Brief of ABC-I Conv. See n. 4.

[20] George C. Marshall, Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1,1941, to June 30, 1943 (Washington, 1943), p. 10.

[21] U.S. ABC-4/CS-1, 31 Dec 41. ARCADIA Conf Bk.

[22] Joint Planning Committee Rpt, General Strategy—Review by the British Chiefs of Staff, 25 Sep 41, JB 325, ser 729. OPD files.

[23] ROUNDUP Plan cited n. 18.

[24] American Liaison (41) 8th Mtg, 21 Nov 41. Navy Dept files, Ghormley Papers.

[25] Full treatment of the GYMNAST–TORCH project will be found in George F. Howe, Operations in Northwest Africa, a volume now under preparation in this series.

[26] (Marshall) Notes of Meeting at the White House with the President and the British Prime Minister Presiding—5:00 P.M. (Dictated from rough notes), 23 Dec 41. C/S file 384 (Mtgs and Confs). See Bibliographical Note.

[27] CCS 11th Mtg, 10 Mar 42.

[28] JCS 23, Annex C, 14 Mar 42. This paper is actually a composite of directives and deployment studies dating back to 30 January 1942. See Bibliographical Note for location and nature of JCS documents.

[29] Memo for CofS, 28 Feb 42. (Italics in the original.) OPD files, exec 4, env 35.

[30] JCS 23, App. II, JPS 2/6, 5 Mar 42.

[31] Capt M. McLaren, secy to Combined Commanders, Notes on the History of SLEDGEHAMMER, Sep 42. Hist Div files.

[32] The Pas-de-Calais actually was the name of a department in the center of the coast considered for invasion. But the name was used by the planners, and will here be used, in the looser sense of the coast line washed by the Strait of Dover between Dunkerque and the Somme.

[33] Memo, Brig C. V. McNabb, SLEDGEHAMMER, 17 Jul 42. SHAEF G-3 files, Ref Lib Gp D. See Bibliographical Note.

[34] The British term "maintenance" is generally equivalent to U.S. "supply."

[35] McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER, cited n. 31.

[36] This was freely admitted by General Marshall. Draft Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, The Pacific Theater versus BOLERO, undtd (sent to the President 6 May). OPD file 381 gen sec. 2, case 62. See Bibliographical Note. Cf. below, p. 30.

[37] Cbl, Roosevelt to Churchill, 9 Mar 42. OPD file ABC 311.5 (1-30-42).

[38] The first memorandum was submitted by OPD on 27 March. The last draft bearing a date was prepared on 2 April. This was revised by General Eisenhower and the revision constituted the memorandum as finally presented to the British. This final version is undated and titled simply "Operations in Western Europe." Additional studies were made after 2 April, an analysis of U.S. troop build-up being dated as late as 6 April. For the final version and various drafts and appendixes see Pre-Invasion file 308. Copy of the original OPD memo is in AAF file 381, War Plam Sec. G. See Bibliographical Note. Discussion following is based on the memorandum plan and its appendixes.

[39] Actually it was noted that, if only U.S. shipping was available for U.S. troop and supply build-up, the invasion date would be delayed until late summer. By 1 April, it was estimated, U.S. shipping could transport only 40 percent of the forces required.

[40] Memo, Operations in Western Europe, cited n. 38.

[41] British Chiefs of Staff, Comments on General Marshall's Memorandum, 13 Apr 42, COS (42) 97 (0). C/S file 381.

[42] COS (42) 23d Mtg (0), 9 Apr 42. OPD file ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) sec. 5.

[43] Ibid. General Brooke, a graduate of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, had by 1941 acquired the reputation of being Britain's greatest expert on mechanization. For his service in France during World War I, he received the Distinguished Service Order with Bar, the Belgian Croix de Guerre, and six mentions in dispatches. In the early part of World War II, he commanded the British Second Army Corps, his defensive action making possible the evacuation of Dunkerque. He then organized and trained the British Home Forces in preparation for the expected Nazi invasion. He was made Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1941, succeeding Field Marshal Dill.

[44] Portal, an observer and fighter pilot in World War I, entered the RAF College in 1922. In the 1930's he commanded the British forces in Aden and was Director of Organization, Air Ministry. Early in World War II, he served on the Air Council and was Air Offiicer Commanding-in-Chief of the Bomber Command. He became Chief of Air Staff in October 1940.

[45] COS (42) 118th Mtg, 14 Apr 42. OPD file ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) sec. 5.

[46] War Cabinet Defence Com, DC (42) 10th Mtg, 14 Apr 42. C/S file 381. On quotation of indirect discourse, see n. 138.

[47] Churchill also made this reversal more explicitly a little later when he wrote: "The launching of SLEDGEHAMMER should be dependent not on a Russian failure but on Russian success and consequent proved German demoraliation in the West." PM, Minute for Gen Ismay for CofS Com, 10 Jun 42, Annex to COS (42) 175th Mtg. Copy in Hist Div files.

[48] Remark by Col J. E. Hull, U.S. (P) 4th Mtg, 12 Apr 42. Pre-Inv file 287 (Combined Operations Conferences). A series of meetings was held between U.S. and British planners in the course of the April conferences in London.

[49] Memo, British Staff Planners, Main Considerations Affecting The Employment on the Continent in 1943 of the Anglo-American Forces envisaged in General Marshall's Paper, undtd. OPD file ABC 381 BOLERO (3-16-42) sec. 5.

[50] War Cabinet Mtg, 14 Apr 42, cited n. 46.

[51] JCS 23, cited n. 28.

[52] There was considerable confusion in the early use of this code name, especially in the War Department where it was taken at first to indicate not only the build-up but the cross-Channel operation for which the build-up prepared. In the early days the confusion was symptomatic of a real conceptual identity between the operations. Decisions on the BOLERO build-up reflected attitudes toward the ROUNDUP attack. Cf. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 569.

[53] In general the Washington Committee dealt with basic problems of policy; the London Committee, made up of representatives of various British supply ministries and representatives of the U.S. Army, handled the more technical details of the plan. See [Herbert French] Supply and Troop Buildup in the UK (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part III), MS. Hist Div files.

[54] Elliott, The Predecessor Commands, pp. 15, 85-95. See n. 2.

[55] General Arnold, who had become Chief of the Air Corps in 1938, was directly responsible for the expansion of the American aircraft industry and the inception of the program for civilian training of flying cadets. In 1940 he was made Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and the following year was given the additional duty of Chief, Army Air Forces.

[56] General Spaatz, a graduate of West Point in 1914 and of Aviation School in 1916, served with the First Aero Squadron of the Punitive Expedition into Mexico. During World War I, he flew in combat over St. Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne, receiving the DSC. In 1940 he was an official observer of the Battle of Britain and returned to the United States to take command, first of the Air Corps Material Division and, later, of the AAF Combat Command.

Before General Eaker undertook the assignment of establishing VIII Bomber Command, he had been on special duty with the RAF in England in 1941, observing and flying new types of fighters and observing British fighter control methods.

[57] Elliott, The Predecessor Commands, pp. 130ff. See n. 2.

[58] See Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: I, Plans and Early Operations January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, 1948), pp. 654, 655ff.

[59] See, for instance, his letter to Dill, 17 Aug 42, stating his belief that the July decisions had altered not only the strategy agreed upon in April but also the fundamental strategic agreements made at ARCADIA. C/S file TORCH I; cf. Cbl to Eisenhower, 6 Aug 42, draft in Memo, Handy for Classified MC. OPD file 381, ETO, sec. 2. Marshall wrote: "Torch operation is of necessity a substitution for Roundup and not a postponement of the same except for unexpected developments." See below, pp. 29-30.

[60] McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER, cited n. 31.

[61] Ibid.

[62] COS (42), 51st Mtg, 8 Jun 42 (0). SHAEF SGS files; cf. McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER. The War Cabinet approved the new principle on 11 Jun 1942.

[63] Interv with Gen Barker, WD, 4 Oct 46. See Bibliographical Note.

[64] Joint Memo, Combined Commanders for Br COS, 17 Jun 42. Pre-Inv file 281, Combined Commanders Papers.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Memo, Churchill for Marshall. Operation ROUNDUP, 15 Jun 42. Hist Div files.

[67] McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER.

[68] Memo, The Pacific Theater versus BOLERO, cited n. 36. Proposals to reinforce Australia would have increased ground forces by 25,000 troops, air forces by 100 planes. Another 215 planes were to be sent to the South Pacific.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Memo, Roosevelt for Marshall, 6 May 42, OPD file 381, gen sec. 2, case 62.

[71] Memo, Roosevelt for Secy of War, CofS, Gen Arnold, Secy of Navy, Adm King, and Hopkin, 6 May 42. C/S file 381.

[72] McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER.

[73] Notes on White House Mtg, cited in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 563. The Molotov visit is treated at length by Sherwood, pp. 544-68.

[74] JIC (92) 193 (Final), German Strength and Dispositions in 1943 under Certain Hypotheses, 21 May 42. SHAEF SGS files, Combined Commanders Papers.

[75] See CCS 27th Mtg, 19 Jun 42. Mountbatten had come to Washington earlier in the month, primarily to discuss the problems of landing craft.

[76] Ltr, 19 Jun 42, cited in Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), pp. 420-23.

[77] Memo, CCS for information, Minutes of an Informal Meeting . . . held in General Marshall's Office, June 19, 1942. OPD file ABC 381 (3-16-42) sec. 2.

[78] Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 425.

[79] Notes on War Council Mtg, 22 Jun 42. C/S file, Secy of War Confs, Vol. II. The War Council meeting at which General Marshall reported on the White House meeting was attended by the Secretary of War and Under and Assistant Secretaries as well as by Generals Arnold, McNair, Somervell, Knudsen, McNarney, Surles, and Eisenhower.

[80] Quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 592.

[81] Notes on War Council Mtg, 29 Jun 42. C/S file, Secy of War Confs, Vol. II.

[82] CCS 83/1, Offensive Operations in 1942 and 1943, 24 Jan 42, Encloses memorandum by Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay reporting conclusions of a meeting held at the White House on 21 June.

[83] Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 30 Jun 42. OPD file 381, ETO, sec. I.

[84] Diary, Office of the Commander in Chief, 5 Jul 42. Cited hereafter as Diary of CinC. See Bibliographical Note.

[85] McLaren, Notes on SLEDGEHAMMER.

[86] See JCS 24th Mtg, 10 Jul 42.

[87] Draft Cbl in C/S file 381.

[88] JCS 24th Mtg, 10 Jul 42.

[89] Memo, King and Marshall for President, 10 Jul 42. C/S file BOLERO.

[90] Tel, Roosevelt to Marshall, 14 Jul 42. C/S file BOLERO.

[91] Memo, Marshall for King, 15 Jul 42. C/S file WDCSA 381 War Plans Sec.

[92] Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower, 13 Jul 42, C/S file BOLERO.

[93] Memo, Roosevelt for Hopkins, Marshall, and King, Instructions for London Conference,—July 1942, sgd orig in C/S file 381. This memorandum was drafted by the War Department, but Roosevelt made considerable changes in it, omitting the Pacific threat, and weakening the War Department's paragraph on commitment to ROUNDUP. The War Department draft on the latter point read that if SLEDGEHAMMER were given up, then the Allies should continue "our planned activities and present commitments in other areas. We should proceed with ROUNDUP preparations." In Roosevelt's revision, these two sentences were struck out. War Department draft included in Diary of CinC.

[94] Combined Staff Conf, 20 Jul 42. C/S file 319.1.

[95] Memo, 21 Jul 42, WP (42) 311. C/S file BOLERO.

[96] Memo (prepared by Gen Eisenhower with advice of Gens Clark and Lee and Col Barker), Conclusions as to the Practicability of SLEDGEHAMMER 17 Jul 42. Diary of CinC.

[97] Ibid. Italics in original. General Marshall agreed that SLEDGEHAMNER was not an operation he would choose if choice were possible. He believed, however, that choice was not possible, that "time was tragically against us." Memo for the President, 28 Jul 42. C/S file 319.1.

[98] Memo, Marshall for the President, cited n. 97.

[99] Cbl, 23 Jul 42. C/S file 381.

[100] CCS 94, Operations in 1942/3, 24 Jul 42. This paper states the decisions of the London Conference.

[101] Memo for Marshall, Survey of Strategic Situation, 23 Jul 42. Diary of CinC.

[102] CCS 94, cited n. 100.

[103] Cited in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 611.

[104] Admiral Leahy, General Arnold, and General McNarney.

[105] Cbl, 25 Jul 42. C/S file 381; Memo, Gen Deane for Admiral Willson, 25 Jul 42. C/S file WDCSA 381 War Plans Sec.

[106] Agreed at CCS 33d Mtg, 25 Jul 42.

[107] Later changed at British request in order to maintain appearance of an all-American operation and provide continuity of U.S. command in case the deputy had to take over. [Morton Yarman] TORCH and the European Theater of Operations (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part IV), MS, p. 20. Hist Div files.

[108] General Marshall speaking at CCS 33d Mtg. This controverted an earlier (1 July) recommendation by the Combined Commanders that the ROUNDUP supreme commander also be charged with home defense of Great Britain. CC (42) 27, Notes on System of Command for Operation ROUNDUP. SHAEF SGS files, Combined Commanders Papers.

[109] At the CCS 34th meeting, 30 July, there was considerable vagueness expressed as to whether the TORCH decision had been made. Leahy and Dill "had the impression" that it had. Admiral King believed the President and Prime Minister had not yet decided to "abandon ROUNDUP in favor of TORCH."

[110] Memo, Gen W. B. Smith for JCS, Notes of a Conference Held at the White House at 8:30 P.M., July 30, 1942, 1 Aug 42. OPD files, exec 5, item 1, tab 14. General Smith reported: "The President stated very definitely that he, as Commander-in-Chief, had made the decision that TORCH would be undertaken at the earliest possible date."

[111] Cbl, JSM to Br COS, 31 Jul 42. OPD files, POD Super BOLERO, exec 1, tab 10; Memo, Marshall for WD Classified MC, Commander for TORCH, 6 Aug 42, OPD file 381, ETO, sec. 11, case 16.

[112] Yarman, TORCH, p. 18. See n. 107.

[113] The decision to do TORCH, as has been indicated, was primarily the President's, but Churchill had repeatedly taken the initiative in urging it. In April 1944 Churchill declared that he would "personally assume responsibility before God for the decision to do TORCH." See Ltr, Gen Wedemeyer to Gen Handy 13 Apr 44. OPD files, OPD Misc, bk. 18.

[114] Cbl, Br COS to JSM, 13 Aug 42. Excerpts, supplied by British Cabinet Office Hist Sec, are in Hist Div files.

[115] CCS 91, Strategic Policy and Deployment of United States and British Forces, 7 Jul 42; CCS 97, Strategic Hypothesis for Deployment of Forces in April 1944, 24 Jul 42.

[116] JCS 26th Mtg, 28 Jul 42.

[117] CCS 97/2, 8 Aug 42. See discussion in CPS (Combined Planning Staff) 28th Mtg, 7 Aug 42. OPD file ABC 370 (7-2-42).

[118] CCS 94.

[119] JCS 28th Mtg, 11 Aug 42.

[120] JCS 36th Mtg, 6 Oct 42.

[121] JPS 32d Mtg, 31 Aug 42. OPD file ABC 370 (7-2-42). See also notes on this meeting, 2 Sep 42. OPD file ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. II.

[122] Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 29 Jul 42. OPD file ABC 381 (9-25-41), sec. III.

[123] See JCS 97 series which contains the gist of the running argument between General Arnold and Admiral King. For more detailed treatment of this subject see W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: II, Europe—Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago, 1949), pp. 280-82.

[124] JCS 97/5, 26 Oct 42; JCS 39th Mtg, 27 Oct 42.

[125] CCS 91, cited n. 115. This paper, however, was never approved by the Combined Chiefs.

[126] CCS 97/3, Strategic Hypothesis as to Deployment of Forces in April 1944,14 Aug 42. Approved at CCS 36th Mtg.

[127] Cbl, Eden to Halifax, quoting Cbl, Churchill to Roosevelt, 22 Sep 42. C/S file ETO.

[128] Quotation from Cbl, Roosevelt to Churchill, in Cbl, Churchill to Roosevelt, 18 Nov 42, incl in JCS 153, Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Near East.

[129] Cbl, Churchill to Roosevelt, cited n. 128.

[130] Memo, Handy for CofS, 8 Nov 42, American-British Strategy. C/S file 381.

[131] JCS 149/D, Charter of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 7 Nov 42.

[132] JCS 167, Basic Strategic Concept for 1943, 11 Dec 42.

[133] JCS 167/1, 20 Dec 42. The revision was done in the JCS 46th meeting. The revised paper, JCS 167/1, was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as CCS 135.

[134] CCS 135/2, American-British Strategy in 1943, 3 Jan 43.

[135] JCS 167/5, 10 Jan 43.

[136] Minutes of a Meeting at the White House on Thursday, 7 January 1943, at 1500. OPD files, POD exec 10, item 45.

[137] Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: I) (Boston, 1947), p. 410. Over 1,770 ships were lost from all causes during the year.

[138] CCS 55th Mtg, 14 Jan 43. Bound volumes containing the official U.S. minutes of the Casablanca (SYMBOL) Conference are in the OPD files. A single copy of the British official minutes is in the SHAEF SGS files. For all combined conferences the U.S. and British minutes are identical, but the latter include, in addition, the meetings of the British Chiefs of Staff at Casablanca. Since none of the minutes were stenographic, quotations here and throughout the text reproduce only secretarial summaries and paraphrases of the speakers' words.

[139] Note by Minister of Defence, 25 Nov 42, WP (42) 543, annex to 3d Br COS Casablanca Mtg. SHAEF SGS file 337/5, British Min of SYMBOL Conf.

[140] CCS 58th Mtg, 16 Jan 43.

[141] See above. p. 24.

[142] 1st Br COS Casablanca Mtg. See n. 138.

[143] Admiral King speaking at CCS 58th Mtg.

[144] Air Marshal Portal at CCS 58th Mtg.

[145] CCS 58th Mtg.

[146] Marshall speaking at 2d ANFA Mtg, 18 Jan 43. The ANFA meetings were those presided over by the President and Prime Minister.

[147] CCS 60th Mtg, 18 Jan 43.

[148] 2d ANFA Mtg.

[149] CCS 56th Mtg, 14 Jan 43.

[150] CCS 60th Mtg, 18 Jan 43.

[151] CCS 155/1, Conduct of the War in 1943,19 Jan 43.

[152] CCS 58th Mtg.

[153] CCS 169, Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Opertions, 22 Jan 43.

[154] 2d ANFA Mtg.

[155] CCS 67th Mtg, 22 Jan 43.

[156] 3d ANFA Mtg, 23 Jan 43.

[157] Ibid.

[158] CCS 166/1/D, The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, 21 Jan 43. See below, Ch. VI.

[159] As noted above, it does not appear from the records that this was actually an important consideration. The strategic concept underlying Mediterranean operations was the much more general idea of attrition.

[160] 2d ANFA Mtg.

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