Chapter II

[1] See [Robert W. Coakley] Organization and Command in the ETO (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part II), MS, Ch. III. Hist Div files.

[2] [Morton Yarman] TORCH and the European Theater of Operations (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part IV), MS, pp. 95ff. Hist Div files. Figures on troop strength are derived from Transportation Corps sources and indicate troops actually carried into and out of the United Kingdom. Slight discrepancies exist between them and the official troop assignment figures. A detailed account of troop build-up in the United Kingdom will be found in R. G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, a volume under preparation in this series.

[3] Rpt, Eaker to Arnold, Oct 42, cited in Yarman, TORCH, p. 119.

[4] See below, Ch. VI.

[5] CCS 169, Organization of Command, Control, Planning and Training for Cross-Channel Operations, 22 Jan 43.

[6] CCS 169/1, 25 Feb 43; cf. Cbl, Andrews to Marshall, 28 Feb 43. SHAEF SGS file 322.011/3.

[7] CCS 169/2, 2 Mar 43.

[8] CCS 74th Mtg. The directive was issued as CCS 169/3/D.

[9] COS (43) 105 (0) (Final), 8 Mar 43. Cf. Cbl, Marshall to Andrews, 22 Feb 43, cited in Min, COS (43) 28th Mtg (0), 24 Feb 43. Marshall wrote that, because of an urgency in another theater, no shipping would be available for lifts to the United Kingdom in March and April and that the amount of shipping to be available in May could not be determined. Minutes also reproduce cable (COS (W) 492) from British Chiefs of Staff to Field Marshal Dill asking Dill to elucidate the urgency in another theater and call to the attention of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff the British belief that such diversion of shipping from BOLERO constituted an abrogation of Casablanca decisions. All COS documents, hereafter cited, are located in SHAEF SGS files, unless otherwise specified. See Bibliographical Note.

[10] COS (43) 58th Mtg, 6 Mar 43.

[11] COS (43) 63d Mtg, 12 Mar 43. For General Morgan's background and experience, see Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick E. Morgan, Overture to Overlord (New York, 1950, pp. 1-28.

[12] The debate can be followed in CCS 169 series and in CCS 80th and 81st Mtgs, 16 and 23 April 1943 respectively, with additional reference to the British Chiefs of Staff (COS) papers and meetings already cited. Cf. Interv, F. C. Pogue with Gen Morgan, 8 Feb 47. Hist Div files.

[13] CCS 169 series.

[14] All quotes from Memo, Morgan for Br COS, Cross-Channel Operations, 21 Mar 43, Annex to COS (43) 148 (0), 23 Mar 43.

[15] Memo, Cross-Channel Operations, cited n. 14.

[16] COSSAC (43) 1st Mtg, 17 Apr 43. All COSSAC documents referred to are located in the collections of COSSAC papers and minutes of staff conferences in SHAEF SGS files. See Bibliographical Note.

[17] COSSAC (43) 12 (First Draft), Provisional Organization of COSSAC Staff, 25 May 43.

[18] See below. Leigh-Mallory had an anomalous appointment to make decisions on air matters without prejudice to the Air Commander-in-Chief when appointed. See COSSAC 12th Staff Mtg, 26 Jun 43.

[19] COSSAC (43) 29th Mtg, 8 Oct 43. Barker was presiding in the absence of Morgan, who was visiting Washington. See below, Ch. III.

[20] COS (43) 217th Mtg (0), 16 Sep 43; COS (43) 624 (0), 13 Oct 43.

[21] COSSAC's authority included operational control of all underground movements directed from London, the general direction of planning such movements, and the use and co-ordination of instructions on target priorities. See COSSAC (43) 58 (Final), Proposals for Control by COSSAC of SOE/SO Activities in Northwest Europe, 20 Oct 43. ETOUSA concurred by indorsement on 11 Nov 48. SHAEF G-8 file Ops C, 322.7 II; cf. COS (43) 237th Mtg (0), 5 Oct 43.

[22] Information on establishment of British headquarters from Intervs, F. C. Pogue with Lt Col H. A. Pollock (13 Dec 46), Gen Morgan (8 Feb 47), Gen Barker (4 Oct 46), and Gen Paget (6 Feb 47). Hist Div files.

[23] General Andrews was killed in an airplane crash in Iceland on 3 May 1943. Devers was assigned to the European post after having served as Chief of the Armored Force at Fort Knox since 1941.

[24] Ltr, H. N. Morrison to Admiral Little. SHAEF SGS file 322.011/2.

[25] COS (43) 73d Mtg, 12 Apr 43.

[26] COSSAC Staff Conf, 1 May 43. SHAEF SGS file 337/14. At the beginning of World War II, Hughes-Hallett was serving as second in command of the Norfolk. In 1940 he became deputy director of Local Defence at the Admiralty and followed this tour of duty with appointment as chairman of the Admiralty's radar committee. He went to Combined Operations Headquarters in 1942. In August 1943 Commodore Hughes-Hallett was replaced on the COSSAC staff by Rear Adm. G. E. Creasy.

[27] There had never been any question that the British, who supplied the bulk of the naval forces, would have the Allied naval command.

[28] Administrative History, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, MS, pp. 237ff. Hist Div files.

[29] COS (43) 149 (0), 23 Mar 43; COS (43) 248 (0), 10 May 43. Also documents in British Air Ministry Collection, excerpted by U.S. Air Forces Historical Unit.

[30] D'Albiac was succeeded in January 1944 by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.

[31] For formation of U.S. commands for OVERLORD, see below, Ch. V.

[32] For full account of the Dieppe raid, see Col C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An official Historical Summary (Ottawa, 1948), pp. 64-86.

[33] The Military Force Commander was Maj. Gen. J. H. Roberts, commander of the 2d Canadian Division. Naval and air force commanders were British, Commodore J. Hughes-Hallett and Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory respectively.

[34] For the effect of the Dieppe raid on tactical doctrine, see below, Ch. V.

[35] Capt. M. McLaren, Secretary to the Combined Commanders, pointed out that the study reversed the ROUNDUP concept of maximum dispersion in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating on the destruction of any one bridgehead. Memo. Operation OVERLORD—Main Appreciation, 12 Dec 42. SHAEF G-3 file 370-43.

[36] This and the following four paragraphs are from CC (42) 108, Selection of Assault Areas in a Major Operation in Northwest Europe. A late draft (5 Feb 43) is in SHAEF SGS file, Combined Commanders Papers.

[37] A Commando was a specially trained and equipped British unit roughly equivalent in strength to a U.S. rifle battalion.

[38] Abstract from SKYSCRAPER. Plan. Hist Div files.

[39] COS (43) 61st Mtg (0), 30 Mar 43.

[40] Formal grounds for tabling the paper were that COSSAC was about to begin planning for "definite operations" and that consideration of general principles would therefore be a waste of time. General Paget, commander of 21 Army Group, and one of the Combined Commanders, believed, however, that the British Chiefs of Staff were generally unfavorable to the plan because of the huge bill for resources. His interpretation is persuasive. See Gen Paget, Notes on the History of Planning for Operations in North-West Europe, 30 Dec 43. Hist Div files.

[41] COSSAC (43) 11, Plan for a Full Scale Invasion of the Continent in 1944, 25 May 43.

[42] Note that this is the opposite of the SKYSCRAPER principle of pushing northeastward in order to maintain the pressure of the attack on Germany.

[43] COSSAC (43) 11, cited n. 41.

[44] SKYSCRAPER Plan; Memo, Gen Barker for Executive Planning Section (ETOUSA), Requirements of Landing Craft, 9 Mar 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[45] COS (43) 61st Mtg (0), 30 Mar 43. Note that the British Chiefs of Staff apparently reversed themselves on this point at the Washington Conference in May. See below, section following.

[46] Memo, 1944 Hypothesis, 15 May 43. SHAEF SGS file (1944 Operations).

[47] Memo, Landing Craft for Cross-Channd Operations, 20 Apr 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[48] JCS 71st Mtg, 30 Mar 43. The British planned to use barges and coasters in the invasion and had pointed out in April that they were busy converting barges for such use. They did state, however, that although miscellaneous vessels might be useful they ought not to be employed in the first assault. "There is no substitute for specialized landing craft in an assault against the most heavily defended coastline in the world, despite the fact that the morale of the German Army may have deteriorated sufficiently to justify an assault on the Continent." Note by Br JPS, CPS 63/1, 16 Apr 43.

[49] Lt. Hamilton S. Putnam and Lt. Craig A. Livingston, Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, Amphibious Training Command (United States Naval Administration in World War II), MS, Vol. I, Ch. VIII. Navy Dept files.

[50] This and subsequent information on British landing craft production was supplied by the British Admiralty.

[51] The production lag in the LCT (4) is worth note. When the boat was ordered the United States had just come into the war; planners in England had worked out only the first tentative plan for an eventual cross-Channel attack. When the first craft was delivered in September 1942, the 1942 season for amphibious operations in the Channel was already coming to a close.

[52] Putnam and Livingston, Amphibious Training Command, cited n. 49.

[53] George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB (Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study No. 11), rev. ed. (Washington, 1946), pp. 7, 19-21, 25.

[54] One of the principal American planners noted that lack of landing craft might be one reason for the difficulty of launching an invasion in 1944, but, on the other hand, "we have never had tangible indication that the British intend to launch [a] cross-Channel operation." Penciled note on Gen Wedemeyer's copy (Copy 4) of CPS 63, Production of Landing Craft, 19 Mar 43, incl to JCS 248, 26 Mar 43. P&O Implementing Section files.

[55] JCS 71st Mtg, 30 Mar 43.

[56] Memo, W. S. Farber for Admiral Horne, Rates of Production for Landing Craft, App. A to Min, JCS 71st Mtg. Rear Adm. Farber was head of the Fleet Maintenance Division (December 1940-October 1943). Vice Adm. Horne was Vice Chief of Naval Operations for Materiel.

[57] History of the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (United States Naval Administration in World War II), MS, p. 463. Navy Dept files; cf. Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic (History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: I) (Boston, 1947), pp. 315, 326, 344, 403.

[58] Memo, Morgan for Br COS, Landing Craft Requirements for Cross-Channel Operations, 24 May 43, COSSAC (43) 5.

[59] Quoted in Memo, ASW (J. J. McCloy) for Marshall, 26 Apr 44. OPD files, misc bk. 18.

[60] JCS Mtgs, 14-19 May 43.

[61] ETOUSA approval noted in Memo, Barker for Executive Planning Section (ETOUSA), Requirement for Landing Craft, 9 Mar 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[62] JCS 85th Mtg. 19 May 43.

[63] Ibid.

[64] CPS 71, Report by Sub-Committee on Availability of Landing Craft for ROUNDHAMMER, 20 May 43. ROUNDHAMMER was the code name used at the Washington Conference for the cross-Channel attack. Conceived as an operation midway in size between the old SLEDGEHAMMER and ROUNDUP, it borrowed part of each code name.

[65] Of these, 3,257 would be supplied by the British; 1,247 by the United States.

[66] This was to represent no real problem, however. See below. Ch. V.

[67] Washington estimated only 2,760 vehicles for the follow-up divisions, thus striking an average for the five divisions of 3,730. What are called in the text "Washington estimates" are all those of the subcommittee referred to in note 64.

[68] Washington figures: LCT(3) and (4)—15 vehicles; LCT(5) and (6)—12 vehicles; LST—50 vehicles. COSSAC figures: LCT (all types)—10 vehicles; LST—60 vehicles.

[69] Memo, Brig Gen K. McLean (Br Army Ops Branch), Landing Craft Requirements (Comment on Memo by Naval Chief of Staff, 15 May), 26 May 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[70] It is interesting, in this connection, that both Washington and COSSAC planners in May were contemplating shore-to-shore sailings of the small assault craft (LCA's and LCVP's). This could have been feasible only if the force sailed from Dover to assault the Pas-de-Calais coast. The longer voyage to the Caen area could not have been made in rough Channel weather by LCA-type boats. Commodore Hughes-Hallett planned to sail a portion of the LCA's from Dover and carry the rest on LSI (S) 's. Washington planners did not contemplate carrying any of the smaller craft aboard larger ships. See Memo, Hughes-Hallett for CCO, Cross-Channel Operations: 1944 Hypothesis (Requirements for LCI (S)), 22 May 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I; cf. CPS 71, App. B, 20 May 43.

[71] See below, Ch. III.

[72] See, for instance, CCS, 288/2, 29 Jul 43, in which the British Chiefs of Staff, proposing an agenda for the Quebec Conference, wanted to "dispense with lengthy discussions on over-all strategic concepts or global strategy" and talk about specific operations.

[73] 1st White House Mtg, 12 May 43. OPD files, Min of TRIDENT Conf.

[74] CCS 87th Mtg, 18 May 43; CCS 234, Defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe (Elimination of Italy First), 17 May 43.

[75] CCS 234.

[76] CCS 235, Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe, 18 May 43.

[77] 1st White House Mtg, TRIDENT Conf.

[78] Draft Supplementary Directive to COSSAC, Amphibious Operations from the UK, incl B to CCS 250/1, 25 May 43.

[79] There is some confusion on the term "follow-up." The Washington agreement reads five divisions in the assault and two in the follow-up. By later usage, however, this is a misnomer. The follow-up as generally used in the planning period and as consistently used in this book means divisions not taking part in the initial assault but preloaded in craft and shipping to come in immediately behind the assault units. Build-up units are those landed on subsequent trips by craft already employed in the assault and follow-up waves—or more generally any units which are not actually on board ship at the time the assault is mounted.

[80] See below, Ch. VI.

[81] CCS 242/6. Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, 25 May 43.

[82] For additional details on WADHAM see V Corps History (Paris, 1945), p. 20.

[83] COSSAC (43) 4 (Final), Operation 'Starkey,' 26 Jun 43.

[84] COS (43), 207th Mtg, 4 Sep 43; cf. Morgan, Overture to Overlord, pp. 100-103.

[85] COS (43) 416 (0), Operation OVERLORD, Report and Appreciation, 30 Jul 43, cited hereafter as Outline OVERLORD. Department of the Army files contain several copies of the plan. The one used is in SHAEF SGS file 381 Ia.

The OVERLORD Plan consists of a Digest, three main parts: (I, Selection of a Lodgement Area; II, Appreciation and Outline Plan for the Opening Phase up to the Capture of Cherbourg; III, The Development of Operations after the Capture of Cherbourg), and twenty-four appendixes (with maps) which include discussions of alternative courses of action and studies of special problems. Digest of the plan is reprinted below as Appendix A.

[86] COSSAC (43) 11th Mtg, 19 Jun 43.

[87] Outline OVERLORD, App. C.

[88] COSSAC (43) 13th Mtg, 2 Jul 43.

[89] These beaches in the event were the center of the OVERLORD assault after the operation was expanded from three to five assaulting divisions. The first two beaches were British in both the COSSAC and the later plan. The last-named (Colleville-Vierville) was the beach later called OMAHA.

[90] JP (43) 260 (Final), Commentary on Operation OVERLORD, 3 Aug 43. SHAEF SGS file 381 Ia.

[91] Presumably at the same time as the seaborne landings, although the plan does not make this clear.

[92] A quiet spell was defined as a period in which the maximum wind force was nine knots.

[93] [CIifford Jones] NEPTUNE: Training, Mounting, the Artificial Ports (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part VI), MS, II, 112 ff. Hist Div files.

[94] COSSAC (43) 29, Strategical Background, Cross-Channel Operation, 1944, 25 Jun 43.

[95] The leftover craft included 195 LCM (1)'s, 376 LCM (3)'s, and 660 LCVP's. Outline OVRLORD, App. Z.

[96] Although the plan stated that the limiting factor was the capacity of defended beach exits to pass vehicles inland, General Morgan later complained that the weakness of the planned follow-up was due to shortage of suitable landing craft. COSSAC (43) 57 (Final), 30 Sep 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[97] Outline OVERLORD, Part II, par. 85.

[98] Ibid., Part II, par. 96.

[99] COSSAC (43) 29, cited n. 94.

[100] COSSAC (43), 13th Mtg, 2 Jul 43.

[101] The diversion against southern France was later planned as an actual operation under the code name ANVIL; the feint against the Pas-de-Calais remained a threat, planned and carried out as Operation FORTITUDE.

[102] Interv with Gen Barker, 4 Oct 46. Hist Div files.

[103] JCS 442/1, Operation OVERLORD, 6 Aug 43; cf. Marshall's statement to the same effect at CCS 108th Mtg, 15 Aug 43.

[104] 1st Plenary Mtg at Tehran, 29 Nov 43. OPD files, U.S. Min of EUREKA Conf.

[105] Outline OVERLORD, Part II, par. 118.

[106] Ibid., Part III, par. 44; cf. Commentary on Operation OVERLORD (cited note 90), in which the planners point out that the advance calculated up to D plus 14 was sixty miles as compared with the advance of the right flank of Eighth Army in Sicily of only thirty miles in three weeks against much less serious opposition.

[107] CCS 169/8/D, 23 Apr 43.

[108] COSSAC (43) 2, 29 Apr 43.

[109] COSSAC (43) 9, Plan for Return to the Continent in Face of German Disintegration, 22 May 43.

[110] COSSAC (4) 40 (Final), Plan RANKIN, 13 Aug 43.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid.

[113] The relation of RANKIN C to later occupation plans (ECLIPSE) will be dealt with by F. C. Pogue in The Supreme Command, a volume now under preparation in this series.

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