Chapter III

[1] CCS 95th Mtg, 24 May 43.

[2] JCS 422/1, QUADRANT, 25 Jul 43.

[3] See Naval Int Div (Br), History of U-Boat Policy, 1939-1945, 26 Feb 43. Navy Dept files. This consists of translations of extracts from documents in the files of the U-Boat Division of the German Admiralty.

[4] Ibid. Actually the Allies in February lost 83 ships totaling 420,238 tons. See Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet (U.S. Naval Administration in World War II), MS, p. 463. Navy Dept files.

[5] Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, pp. 481ff.

[6] Berghof Conference, 31 May 43, Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences, 1943. Fuehrer Conferences is a selection of translated documents from German naval archives.

[7] Independent sailings were authorized for all ships except those carrying aviation fuel and those slower than eleven knots. See Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, p. 581.

[8] Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, p. 462.

[9] Figures are from Statistical Summary of Eighth Airforce Operations, European Theater, 14 Aug 1942-8 May 1945, Hq Eighth Air Force, 10 Jun 45.

[10] Bad weather in April reduced operations so drastically that a comparison of April sorties and bomb tonnage with May figures would be misleading. For a detailed account of operations see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, Ch. 10.

[11] CCS l09th Mtg, 16 Aug 43.

[12] General der Kavallerie Siegfried Westphal, Der Feldzug in Italien, MS, Ch. IV. Hist Div files. The story of Italian collapse and surrender is treated in full by E. M. Smyth in The Sicilian Campaign and the Surrender of Italy, a volume now under preparation in this series.

[13] Meetings at Algiers between Churchill Marshall Eisenhower, and others, 29 and 31 May 43. Min of TRIDENT Conf.

[14] CCS 102d Mtg, 16 Jul 43. The debate during July on what to do in the Mediterranean may be followed in the CCS 268 series and in CCS 103d Mtg, 23 Jul 43, and CCS Spec Mtg, 26 Jul 43.

[15] Rpt, Combined Planning Staff, 15 Jul 43, CCS 268/2; Msg to Eisenhower, 21 Jul 43, CCS 268/5.

[16] CCS 268/2.

[17] CCS 103d Mtg, 23 Jul 43.

[18] CCS Spec Mtg. 26 Jul 43.

[19] Both the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and the Joint War Plans Committee made thorough examinations of British techniques of argument and ways of meeting them. See JPS 189, Preparations for the Next U.S.-British Staff Conference, 25 May 43; JCS 422/1, QUADRANT, 25 Jul 43; Memos and staff studies in OPD file ABC 337 (25 May 43) passim.

[20] The British brought a staff of 93 to the Washington Conference in May, and in addition made considerable use of the Joint Staff Mission and diplomatic personnel already in this country. The Americans by contrast took only 56 officers to Quebec. See JPS 189 and various commentaries thereon in OPD file ABC 337 (25 May 43).

[21] Cf. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (New York, 1950), p. 28; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 61.

[22] Ismay held this position under Churchill all during the war. Before Churchill became Prime Minister, Ismay was secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Interv, F. C. Pogue with Gen Ismay, 17 Dec 46. Hist Div files.

[23] See Note by the Minister of Defence, 7 Oct 41, cited in Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 498-500.

[24] This was the interpretation of both General Barker and General Morgan on the basis of their experience on the COSSAC staff. See Intervs, F. C. Pogue with Barker, 4 Oct 46, and Pogue with Morgan, 8 Feb 47. Hist Div files. It is worth noting in this connection Churchill's impatience with the stodgy military professional which runs through his account of World War I as a kind of leitmotif. See esp. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis: 1915 (New York, 1923), pp. 540-46.

[25] Interv with Gen Ismay, cited n. 22.

[26] On the question of possible British political interests in the Mediterranean see below, p. 96, and cf. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, pp. 194, 284; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 447.

[27] The President was always conscious of this popular feeling. See, for example, Mtg, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and JCS on board ship, 19 Nov 43. Dep C/S file 110.00 A 48-41 dr 155. The President said "that we should not get roped into accepting any European sphere of influence. We do not want to be compelled, for instance, to maintain United States troops in Yugoslavia." See also Memo, Col Gailey (OPD) for Gen Handy, Information from the White House, 30 Jun, quoting portions of Cbl, Roosevelt to Churchill, 29 Jun 44, in reference to the British proposal to divert ANVIL resources to the Adriatic. Roosevelt wrote: "I would never survive even a minor set-back in Normandy if it were known that substantial troops were diverted to the Balkans." OPD files, exec 10, item 71 (Information from the White House).

[28] The term "United Nations" to designate the Allies was apparently first used by Roosevelt at the end of 1941. See Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 458; cf. Ibid., pp. 548-49.

[29] An exception, of course, was the President's initiative in pushing the North African operation. See above, Ch. I.

[30] Cf. on this point Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 428, 439, and Ch. XVII passim; Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 446.

[31] For instance, see JCS 83d and 84th Mtgs, 17, 18 May 43; see also above, Ch. 1.

[32] JPS 231, Adequacy of the TRIDENT Strategy, 26 Jul 43. Colonel Bessell, Army member of the JWPC, concurred in the memorandum but his concurrence did not represent War Department opinion. See JCS 444/ 1.

[33] Copy of JPS 231 (with attached buck slip) in C/S file 381 II.

[34] Morgan's notes on telephone conversation with Barker, 5 Aug 43. SHAEF SGS file 381 Ia.

[35] The original JWPC paper (JPS 231), which set forth the naval point of view, was never presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but it formed the basis for JCS 444, which did reach them. The latter paper is a slightly toned down version of JPS 231 based on the same strategic principles. The formula at the 7 August meeting was to call for a "reconciling" of the reports of the Navy planners, JCS 444, and the Army planners' rejoinder, JCS 444/1. In fact what happened was that the Army views were accepted in toto and formed the basis for the U. S. Chiefs of Staff memorandum submitted to the British at Quebec as CCS 303. See OPD file ABC 381 Europe (5 Aug 43) and ABC 337 (25 May 43).

[36] On the other hand, General Marshall was scrupulous in letting Admiral King speak first on Pacific matters.

A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute in 1901, Marshall was commissioned in the infantry. During World War I he was assigned to general staff duty and went overseas with the 1st Division, with which he served at Lunéville, St. Mihiel, Picardy, and Cantigny. He worked on the plans for the St. Mihiel offensive and then became Chief of Operations of First Army in the midst of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. In May 1919 Marshall was appointed aide to General John J. Pershing and held that assignment for the next five years. In 1936 and again in 1937 he commanded Red Forces in army maneuvers. The following year he came to the War Department first as Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, and then as Deputy Chief of Staff. After a two months' tour as chief of a military mission to Brazil in 1939, he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army.

[37] JCS 104th Mtg, 15 Aug 43.

[38] SCAEF 12th Mtg, 27 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I. Brooke was at the time refusing to make commitments on the invasion of southern France as a diversion for OVERLORD (see Ch. V). He said that "it was not militarily sound to run a war on a lawyer's agreement by making commitments ahead of time, thereby losing the necessary and desired flexibility to meet the ever changing conditions and circumstances."

[39] See n. 26. It is impossible to assess what force political consideration may have had at any juncture in the debate, for neither the Prime Minister nor the British Chiefs ever put a political argument on the contemporary record. Even at this time (1950) Mr. Churchill apparently still does not defend the Mediterranean strategy on political grounds. See Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 660-61.

[40] Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements, 11 Sep 41, JB 355, ser 707. OPD files.

[41] Both of these estimates were primarily for purposes of planning war production and not mobilization, but they are nonetheless symptomatic of the Army's expansive thinking. Cf. other estimates in early 1942 cited in K. R. Greenfield, R. R. Palmer, and B. I. Wylie, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, 1947), p. 198.

[42] JCS 293, Limited Operations in the Mediterranean in 1943-44, 7 May 43.

[43] CCS 83d Mtg, 13 May 43.

[44] The fear of a German move through Spain was frequently expressed. See, for instance, JCS 52d and 57th Mtgs, Jan 43; CCS 151/2,17 Feb 43 and JCS Spec Mtg, 26 Jul 43. Appreciation that such a move was no longer possible was contained in JCS 438/1, JIC Rpt, Estimate of the Enemy Situation, 1943-1944, European-Mediterranean Area, 7 May 43.

[45] See discussions of the Quebec Conference agenda, CCS 288 series.

[46] CCS 108th Mtg, 15 Aug 43.

[47] Ibid.

[48] CCS 303/1, Strategic Concept for the Defeat of the Axis in Europe, 16 Aug 43.

[49] CCS 303/3, 17 Aug 43. TRIDENT was the code name for the Washington Conference of May 1943.

[50] JCS 106th Mtg, 16 Aug 43.

[51] Interv with Gen Ismay cited n. 22.

[52] Capt Mansergh (COSSAC Naval Staff), Rpt on QUADRANT at COSSAC (43) 23d Mtg, 30 Aug 43.

[53] 1st Plenary (Citadel) Mtg, 19 Aug 43. OPD files, Min of QUADRANT Conf.

[54] CCS 328/1 Directive to General Eisenhower, 27 Aug 43, Annex V. The origins and development of the southern France operation will be discussed in detail by Maj. J. D. T. Hamilton in Southern France and Alsace, a volume under preparation in this series.

[55] Memo, Capt Mansergh for COSSAC, Appreciation of the Effect of the Provision of Extra Landing Craft and Shipping for Operation OVERLORD, 27 Jul 43. SHAEF SGS file (1944 Operations).

[56] COS (43) 186th Mtg (0), 12 Aug 43.

[57] Ltr, Morgan (COSSAC) to Maj Gen W. D. Morgan (CofS 21 Army Group), 18 Aug 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[58] COSSAC (43) 50, Landing Craft for OVERLORD, 10 Sep 43; Memo, Devers for COSSAC, Support Craft Required per U.S. Assault Division, 15 Oct 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[59] COS (43) 175th Mtg (0), 29 Jul 43.

[60] Memo, Adm Creasy for COSSAC, Provision of Support Craft—Progress Report, 2 Sep 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[61] Ltr, King to ComNavEu, 10 Aug 43. SHAEF SGS file 560 I.

[62] Information supplied by the British Admiralty.

[63] COS (43) 566 (0), Availability of Landing Craft (Tanks) for OVERLORD, 22 Sep 43.

[64] Cbl cited at COS (43) 209th Mtg (0), 7 Sep 48.

[65] COS (43) 596 (0), 30 Sep 43.

[66] COS (43) 236th Mtg, 4 Oct 43.

[67] Cbl, Nelson to Wilson, 27 Sep 43, cited in George E. Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB (Historical Reports on War Administration: WPB Special Study No. 11), rev. ed. (Washington, 1946), p. 29. Wilson was chairman of the Production Executive Committee, War Production Board.

[68] Mowry, Landing Craft and the WPB, pp. 33-34, 51-52.

[69] CCS 111th Mtg, 18 Aug 43.

[70] CCS 314/3, Allocation of Landing Craft (Operation OVERLORD—Vehicle Lift), 20 Aug 43.

[71] JCS 462/3, Landing Ships and Craft—Means to Increase U.S. Production, 1 Oct 43, with incl, Ltr, Vice Chief of Naval Operations to Chiefs of Bureaus, 13 Sep 43.

[72] Ltr, Morgan to Barker, 28 Oct 43. Barker Papers. See Bibliographical Note.

[73] Ltr, Morgan to Hollis (Secy of War Cabinet), 2 Sep 43. SHAEF SGS file 322.011/2.

[74] Annex I to COS (43) 206th Mtg (0), 3 Sep 43.

[75] Ltr, Morgan to Devers, 2 Sep 43. SHAEF SGS file 322.011/2.

[76] CCS 75/3, System of Command for Combined United States–British Operations, 21 Oct 42.

[77] The Chiefs of Staff Conference, ABC-4, JSSC 2, 25 Dec 41. ARCADIA Conf Bk. (Marshall's words at this meeting are quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 455-57.) The principle of unity of command was embodied first in the Directive to the Supreme Commander in the ABDA Area, ABC-4/5, 10 Jan 42. ARCADIA Conf Bk. The directive assigned command over "all armed forces, afloat, ashore, and in the air," that belonged to the four participating powers (Australia, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and United States).

[78] In July General Barker had written: "It can be accepted as an absolute certainty that the PM would not, for one moment, allow the assault to be made wholly by American troops. The same is true with relation to the U.S. Government. We must be practical about this and face facts." Memo, Barker for Morgan, 4 Jul 43. Barker Papers.

[79] See, however, below (pp. 110-11) for citation of the Salerno experience in a different connection.

[80] COS (43) 416 (0), Operation OVERLORD, Report and Appreciation, 30 Jul 43, Part I, par. 40. SHAEF SGS file 381 Ia.

[81] At the first meeting of the COSSAC staff, 17 April 1943, Morgan announced that Casablanca had decided the invasion was to be commanded by a British supreme commander with an American deputy.

[82] COS (43) 206th Mtg (0), 3 Sep 43.

[83] COS (43) 525 (0), Operation "OVERLORD"—Command and Control, 11 Sep 43.

[84] COS (43) 217th Mtg (0) ,16 Sep 43.

[85] COS (43) 138th Mtg (0), 26 Jun 43. See above, Ch. II.

[86] CCS 113th Mtg, 20 Aug 43.

[87] CCS 304/2, Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander for Operation "Overlord," 12 Oct 43.

[88] CCS 304/3 and 304/4, 19 Oct 43. All the papers in the 304 series bear the title as given in note 87 except 304/1 and 304/4. The subject of these latter two is "Command and Control for Operation 'Overlord'." 8 See below, pp. 112-14.

[89] See below, pp. 112-14.

[90] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, W8967, 31 Dec 43. WD Cable log.

[91] Minute, 24 Oct 43, Annex II to Min, COS (43) 209th Mtg (0), 25 Oct 43.

[92] Ltr, Devers to Morgan (unsgd), 4 Sep 43; Memo, Comments on General Devers' Letter on Plan for Command and Control of Operation "OVERLORD." SHAEF SGS file 322.011/2.

[93] OPD file ABC 381 (22-1-43) sec. 1.

[94] The Supreme Allied Commander.

[95] Draft Memo, Col Roberts (JWPC) for General Handy for CofS, 18 Oct 43. OPD file ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43) sec. la.

[96] Ltr, Morgan to Barker, 28 Oct 43. Barker Papers.

[97] Ltr, Barker to Morgan, 3 Nov 43. Barker Papers.

[98] Ltr, Morgan to Barker, 8 Nov 43. Barker Papers.

[99] CCS 304/4, 19 Oct 43.

[100] CCS 124th Mtg, 22 Oct 43.

[101] CCS 304/7, 4 Nov 43. This is a "split" paper. The first five paragraphs of the draft directive inclosed were agreed on by U.S. and British planners. The final paragraphs, dealing with the control of the strategic air forces, were reported in two version representing opposing U.S. and British views.

[102] Cbl, Br COS to JSM, 10 Nov 43. SHAEF SGS file 322.011/2.

[103] CCS 126th Mtg, 5 Nov 43.

[104] The directive was issued through COSSAC, saving the letter of SAC's right to appoint his subordinates.

[105] COS (43) 717 (0), Formation of an Allied Expeditionary Air Force, 17 Nov 43. Air Defence of Great Britain replaced Royal Air Force Fighter Command. "Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory" (submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in November 1944), Fourth Supplement to The London Gazette No. 37838, 31 December 1946, pp. 37-38.

[106] After the paper referred to in note 101 (dtd 4 Nov 43), the next CCS memorandum on command (CCS 304/8) was dated 6 January 1944.

[107] For full text of this directive see below, App. B.

[108] Interv with Gen Ismay, cited n. 22; cf. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 439.

[109] Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 615.

[110] Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 439.

[111] Ltr, Col Edwards (OPD) to Gen Edwards (CofS ETOUSA), 5 Sep 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence. Colonel Edwards wrote: "The newspapers have just announced and rather firmly, that SAC is to be Gen. Marshall and suggest that Gen. Eisenhower may be C/S [Chief of Staff of the Army]. This should clear the atmosphere."

[112] Interv with Gen Ismay, cited n. 22.

[113] See the account in Katherine T. Marshall, Together: Annals of an Army Wife (Atlanta, 1946), pp. 69ff.

[114] CCS 408, Command of British and U.S. Forces Operating Against Germany, 25 Nov 43; CCS 126th Mtg, 5 Nov 43. During a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on shipboard on the way to Cairo, President Roosevelt said that it was his idea "that Marshall should be commander-in-chief against Germany commanding all British, U.S., French and Italian troops." JCS Mtg, 15 Nov 43. Dep C/S file 110.00 A 48.41 dr 155.

[115] CCS 408/1, 26 Nov 43.

[116] Ltrs, Devers to Marshall, 18 and 19 May 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence.

[117] Ltr, Devers to Marshall, 6 Jul 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence.

[118] Ltr, Barker to Devers, 30 Aug 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence.

[119] For Eisenhower's appraisal of Bradley's qualifications, see Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 215.

[120] See Cbls, Marshall to Eisenhower, No. 5968, 25 Aug 43; No. 6595, 1 Sep 43; No. 6904, 4 Sep 43. WD Cable log.

[121] Cbl, Devers to Marshall, W4421, 13 Sep 43. WD Cable log.

[122] Marshall's views on command in Europe are stated in Cbl, Marshall to Devers, R3267, 18 Sep 43; Dir to Devers, 24 Sep 43. OPD Misc Exec office file.

[123] Cbl, AGWAR to ETOUS, 18 Sep 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence.

[124] Ltr, Marshall to Devers 24 Sep 43. OPD file ABC 381 (22-1-43) sec. 1.

[125] Cbl, Marshall to Devers, R5583, 11 Nov 43. WD Cable log.

[126] Ltr, COSSAC to CinC 21 A Gp, Operation 'OVERLORD,' 29 Nov 43, COSSAC (43) 76.

[127] Ltr, Col Edwards (OPD) to Gen Edwards, 7 Sep 43. Pre-Inv files, Devers Correspondence.

[128] Montgomery, however, never received the formal designation of ground commander, and there actually remained some confusion, at least on his part, as to the duration of his command over ground forces on the Continent. The ground commander problem will be fully discussed by F. C. Pogue in The Supreme Command, a volume under preparation in this series.

[129] CCS 125th Mtg, 29 Oct 43.

[130] Cbl, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 486, 24 Oct 43. WD Cable log.

[131] CCS 379, Operations in the Mediterranean, 26 Oct 43.

[132] CCS 379/1, 29 Oct 43.

[133] CCS 379/5, 4 Nov 43. At the Cairo Conference, the date for transfer of the craft was extended to 15 January 1944. CCS 132d Mtg, 30 Nov 43; Cbl, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 281, 1 Dec 43. WD Cable log.

[134] Cbl, CCS to Eisenhower, FAN 271, 5 Nov 43. WD Cable log.

[135] CCS 126th Mtg, 5 Nov 43.

[136] 2d Plenary Mtg at Cairo, 24 Nov 43. OPD files, Min of SEXTANT Conf.

[137] See CCS series 365, Future Operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

[138] See above, Ch. I.

[139] Cbl, Deane to JCS, No. 51, 9 Nov 43. WD Cable log.

[140] Ltr, Barker to Morgan, 20 Oct 43. Barker Papers; JCS 533/7, Recommended Line of Action at Next U.S.–British Staff Conference, 18 Nov 43.

[141] Min of Mtg, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and JCS, l9 Nov 43, cited n. 27. Cf. below, n. 144.

[142] The principal U.S. representatives were Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and Maj. Gen. John R. Deane. Deane, following the conference, was to establish a U.S. military mission to the Soviet Union. The British were represented by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay.

[143] General Deane reported in detail to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a series of cables in October and November 1943. See esp., Cbls No. 2, 19 Oct; No. 4, 21 Oct; No. 28, 29 Oct; No. 34, 31 Oct; No. 47, 6 Nov; No. 51, 9 Nov. WD Cable log. The story of the conference is briefly but accurately told in Deane's book: John R. Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York, 1947), pp. 16ff., 35.

[144] See Mtg, Roosevelt, Hopkins, and JCS, 19 Nov 43, cited n. 27. At that meeting Marshall expressed the opinion that the British might like to "ditch" OVERLORD now in order to go into the Balkans. Roosevelt thought the Russians might press for an attack up the Adriatic to the Danube to tie up with Russian forces entering România.

[145] JCS 127th Mtg, 22 Nov 43.

[146] Ibid.

[147] 2d Plenary Mtg, 24 Nov 43.

[148] CCS 409, "OVERLORD" and the Mediterranean, 25 Nov 43.

[149] CCS 131st Mtg, 26 Nov 43.

[150] This and the following narrative of the Tehran (EUREKA) Conference are from the official U.S. minutes of the meeting, bound with the minutes of the Cairo (SEXTANT) Conference. OPD files. The records kept by the U.S. and British secretaries of the plenary political-military meetings at Tehran were not afterward co-ordinated. For purposes of the discussion here, however, the discrepancies are unimportant and the U.S. minutes have been used throughout.

[151] This can readily be deduced from the records and was specifically stated by Colonel (now Brig. Gen.) Bessel in conversation with the author, 5 March 1947. It is further confirrned by statements of General Ismay to Dr. F. C. Pogue, in the interview cited above, note 22.

[152] Cbl, Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 492, 29 Oct 43. WD Cable log.

[153] JPS 249, Plan for Invasion of Southern France, 9 Aug 43.

[154] Unnumbered Memo, Operation Against Southern France, 29 Nov 43. OPD file ABC 384 Europe (5 Aug 43) sec. 9a.

[155] It is clear that the Soviet views had force in the conference because they were also American views. For a plausible analysis of President Roosevelt's role at Tehran see Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 789ff.

[156] Plenary Mtg, 29 Nov 43. Statement not reported in British minutes.

[157] CCS 424, Amphibious Operations Against the South of France, 5 Dec 43.

[158] CCS 133d Mtg, 3 Dec 43.

[159] This decision and its impact on strategy in Burma as well as on U.S.–China relations will be discussed in full by C. F. Romanus and R. Sunderland in Command Problems, 1940-1944, a volume under preparation in this series.

[160] CCS 135th Mtg, 5 Dec 43; JCS 132d Mtg, 28 Nov 43.

[161] Cbl, R6820, 11 Dec 43. WD Cable log.

[162] CCS 428 (rev), Relation of Available Resources to Agreed Operations, 15 Dec 43.

Search CMH Online
Last updated 2 March 2006