Chapter V
[1] As of 1 January there were 749,298 U.S. troops in the United Kingdom including most of eleven divisions. The divisions, in order of arrival, were: 29th, 5th, 101st Airborne, 3d Armored, 28th, 2d, 1st, 2d Armored, 9th, 82d Airborne, and 8th. The 1st, 2d Armored, 9th, and 82d Airborne Divisions had been in combat in the Mediterranean.
[2] [Robert W. Coakley] Organization and Command in the ETO (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part II), MS, I, 276-77. Hist Div files.
[3] General Montgomery came to this post with a brilliant record that dated back to World War I, in which he had been awarded the DSO and been mentioned six times in dispatches. At the beginning of World War II he commanded the 3d Division in France and, after escaping from Dunkerque, took over the 5 Corps. In 1942 and 1943 as commanding general of the British Eighth Army in Africa, Egypt, Sicily, and Italy, he achieved renown as the man who mastered Rommel.
[4] Interv with de Guingand, 1947. Hist Div files.
[5] Material on naval organization is found in Administrative History of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, 1940-1946, MS, pp. 237-47. Hist Div files.
[6] Admiral Kirk had been commander of Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet.
[7] Hall was former commander of the Eighth Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean. Wilkes from December 1942 to August 1943 had commanded the U.S. cruiser Birmingham.
[8] Ltr, H. N. Morrison to Admiral Ramsay, 4 Nov 43. SHAEF SGS file 322 (ANCXF) . Admiral Ramsay had retired in 1938 after forty-two years in the Royal Navy, the last three of which he had served as Chief of Staff, Home Fleet. At the outbreak of World War II in 1939 he was recalled to active duty as Flag Officer Commanding, Dover. While serving in this post he organized the naval forces for the withdrawal from Dunkerque. Later he helped plan the TORCH operation, commanded a task force in the Sicilian invasion, and became British naval commander in the Mediterranean.
[9] Ltr, Smith to CinC 21 A Gp, FUSAG, and AEAF, 6 Apr 43. SHAEF SGS file 322 (ANCXF) . The naval command set up was analogous to that of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. See above, Ch. III.
[10] Rpt, History of American Section, Combined Operations Headquarters, 23 Sep 43. Pre-Inv file 289.
[11] [Clifford Jones] NEPTUNE: Training, Mounting, the Artificial Ports (The Administrative and Logistical History of the ETO: Part VI), MS, I, 165, 168ff. Hist Div files.
[12] Ibid., I, 193-96.
[13] For discussion, see below, The NEPTUNE Plans: Oganization and Tactics of the Assault Forces.
[14] General Smith at the outbreak of war was serving as Secretary, General Staff of the War Department. In February 1942 he became secretary to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as American secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Appointed as General Eisenhower's chief of staff in September 1942, he served in this position in Allied Force Headquarters until the end of 1943. At that time he became SHAEF chief of staff, replacing General Morgan who became deputy chief of staff. General Eisenhower had been ordered to the United States for consultations and had sent Smith to London.
[15] Interv, F. C. Pogue with Maj Gen Kenneth R. McLean, 11-13 Mar 47. McLean said flatly that Montgomery's decision was to use a five-division front. Compare, however, notes by Lt. Col. H. Mainward (military assistant to Montgomery) on a meeting of Army commanders, 7 January 1944, where the decision reported was to try for an eight-brigade assault for four divisions each on a two-brigade front. Naval representatives said that, although eight brigades were the maximum that could be landed, they could be drawn from five divisions rather than four, if the Army preferred. Documents in Hist Div files.
[16] Mainward, notes cited n. 15. Bayeux was to be inclusive to the U.S. Army.
[17] This had been pointed out much earlier as one of the important lessons from TORCH. The Eastern Assault Force G-4 wrote: "It was fundamental to avoid intermingling of British and American Supply systems." See Lessons from Operation TORCH, 16 Dec 42. Pre-Inv file 465.
[18] Notes for the Commander-in-Chief's Meeting with the Supreme Commander on Friday 21st January 1944. Copy furnished by British Cabinet Office Hist Sec. Hist Div files.
[19] Gen McLean's interpretation. See Interv cited n. 15. Eisenhower has said that in December 1943, he instructed both General Montgomery and General Smith to "seek for an intensification of effort to increase troop lift in Overlord...." Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 8 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[20] Interv with McLean; Interv, F. C. Pogue with Gen West, 19 Feb 47. Hist Div files.
[21] Interv with McLean.
[22] Eisenhower preferred a three-division assault, but made alternative plans to employ only two divisions in case the additional resources were not available. The three-division plan, actually not feasible, was dropped from reckoning in the later debate.
[23] Cbl, Smith to Eisenhower, 5 Jan 44. Eisenhower Personal Files. See Bibliographical Note. Montgomery added his personal appeal when he cabled on 10 January, "Will you hurl yourself into the contest and what we want, get for us." SHAEF SGS file 560 II.
[24] COSSAC (44) 5, Operation 'ANVIL,' 6 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.2/2 I.
[25] Cbl, Eisenhower to Smith, 6 Jan 44. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[26] The "Montgomery plan" was a convenient appellation used by General Morgan and others at the time. See Ltr, Morgan to COSSAC G-4, 13 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 800.1 I. It should not be taken to indicate, however, that the idea of an expanded assault was uniquely Montgomery's.
[27] Former calculations had varied, but all exceeded 3,000. See above, Ch. II.
[28] COSSAC (44) 9, Reply to Joint Planning Staff Questionnaire (COS (44) 11 (O) ) On Implications of Proposed Modification of Operation 'Anvil,' 8 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.2/2 I.
[29] The other requirements: 1 LSH (headquarters ship), 6 LSI (L)'s or APA's, all carrying a full complement of LCA's or LCVP's (British and U.S. ship-to-shore ferrying craft respectively), and 64 motor vehicle cargo ships. These requirements could all be met with relative ease and therefore do not figure in the struggle for adequate assault lift.
[30] Various cables in SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[31] COS (44) 5th Mtg (O), 7 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.2/2 I. Admiral Cunningham, who replaced Admiral Pound as First Sea Lord in October 1943, had entered the Royal Navy in 1898 and participated in World War I. As Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, between 1939 and 1942, he directed operations against the Italian Fleet at Taranto and Matapan and evacuated the British Army from Greece. After heading the Admiralty delegation in Washington in 1942, Cunningham was made Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, North Africa.
[32] COS (44) 35th Mtg (O), 4 Feb 44 with Annex, Minute to the Prime Minister from Gen Ismay. SHAEF SGS file 370.2/2 I; cf. CCS 465/4, Firm Recommendations with Regard to Operations "Anvil" and "Overlord," 4 Feb 44.
[33] Cbl, Hull (OPD) to Handy, 15 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 560 II.
[34] CCS 465/3, 31 Jan 44.
[35] Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower, 7 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[36] The attack toward Cisterna on 28-29 January failed. Thereafter the Allied forces at Anzio remained on the defensive until May.
[37] CCS 465/4; Minute, Ismay for the Prime Minister, cited n. 32.
[38] Cbl, Hull to Handy, cited n. 33; CCS 465/10, 21 Feb 44.
[39] See, for instance, Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[40] Various cables between SHAEF and WD 5-9 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 560 II. A divisional slice for the assault at this time was figured at 24,000 men and 2,500 vehicles (of which 1,450 were organic). See CCS 465/7, 8 Feb 44.
[41] Memo by First Sea Lord, Landing Ships and Craft for "Overlord," incl to Ltr, Hollis to COSSAC, 21 Feb 44. SHAEF G-3 file GCT 451-94-1 Ops A.
[42] See, for instance, Cbl, McCloy to Forrestal, 20 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 560 II.
[43] Ltr, Gen Brownjohn to Morgan, 29 Jul 43. SHAEF SGS file 800.1 I.
[44] Special Meeting Held in Room 126, Norfolk House, 17 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil) . Both figures actually proved pessimistic. The assault forces used 4,266 landing ships and craft, which represented 99.3 percent of all U.S. vessels on hand and 97.6 percent of all English vessels. See Report by Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force on Operation NEPTUNE. (London, 1944), I, 8, 128.
[45] Memorandum on Implications of the SHAEF Proposal to Reduce the Allocation of Landing Ships and Landing Craft, 17 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[46] Montgomery's opposition was voiced in a letter inclosing staff comments on the 17 February memo cited in note 45. He reversed himself at SCAEF 5th Mtg, 18 Feb 44. SHAEF SGC file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[47] Minute, Ismay to Prime Minister, 19 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[48] COS (44) 53d Mtg (O), 19 Feb 44.
[49] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[50] Cbl, 23 Feb 44, reproduced as CCS 465/11, 24 Feb 44.
[51] Cbl, CCS to SHAEF, 26 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil); cf. CCS 465/11 and CCS 147th Mtg, 27 Feb 44.
[52] SCAEF 6th Mtg, 26 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 387/11 (Supreme Commanders Conferences). General Smith demurred despite his previous advocacy that ANVIL be abandoned. Smith said he "felt that there was little necessity for sending this message [suggested by Eisenhower], and feared that it would give the impression of changing our minds too quickly" Cf. below, n. 55.
[53] Cbls in SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil).
[54] Cbl, COS to JSM, 29 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil). These were craft which by decision at Cairo were allocated to the Mediterranean from production previously earmarked for the Pacific. see above, Ch. III.
[55] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 9 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil). He added that the Italian situation was not developing in a way to increase the likelihood of ANVIL and that the demands of OVERLORD on the other hand were making it inevitable to draw on ANVIL resources. "This being the case, I think it is the gravest possible mistake to allow demands for ANVIL to militate against the main effort even in the matter of time and certainty of planning."
[56] Cbl, Marshall to Eisenhower, 16 Mar 44. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[57] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 21 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 381 I (Overlord-Anvil). Eisenhower said nothing in this message about a later mounting of ANVIL. He recommended pressing offensive operations in the Mediterranean "initially in Italy and extending from there into France as rapidly as we can." Specifically he suggested that the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theater be directed to assist OVERLORD by containing the maximum number of enemy forces and to do this by "the highest possible tempo of offensive action." Mediterranean plans, he suggested, should include "the mounting of a positive threat against the south of France or the Ligurian coast with provision for taking immediate advantage of RANKIN [enemy collapse] conditions should they occur."
[58] The ANVIL problem, however, was far from settled. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff had yielded only on the timing; they still wanted the assault mounted at a later date. The British were equally insistent on outright cancellation. The debate continued until 1 July when the Prime Minister at last conceded the U.S. argument (though he remained unconvinced). The southern France invasion, scheduled at that time for 15 July, was subsequently postponed and at last mounted on 15 August under the code name DRAGOON. Details of the later ANVIL debate will be found in F. C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, and Major J. D. T. Hamilton, Southern France and Alsace, volumes now under preparation in this series.
[59] NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan by ANCXF, CinC 21 A Gp, and CinC AEAF, pars. 103-104. Pre-Inv file 247.
[60] FUSA Operations Plan NEPTUNE, 25 Feb 44. 12th A Gp file 370.2; Second British Army, Outline Plan, 4 Feb 44. Pre-Inv file 631A.
[61] It should be observed that this whole section represents the enemy dispositions and preparations only as known by Allied commanders. It should be compared with Chapters IV and VII and with the operational chapters VIII through X. Allied intelligence, on the whole, however, was accurate and complete before the invasion.
[62] See e.g., 4th Div FO 1, Annex 2a, 15 May 44. Division field orders are in the collection of European theater operational records.
[63] JIC (44) 210 (O) (Final), Opposition to OVERLORD, 20 May 44. SHAEF SGS files (JIC Papers).
[64] See Ch. VII for discussion of types of German divisions. "Limited employment" was a G-2 term for which there was no German equivalent. It meant simply a unit which in the opinion of the G-2 had less than full combat value. For classification by the Germans of their own divisions, see below, Ch. VII, n. 66.
[65] Annex I to FUSA plan cited n. 60.
[66] 4th Div FO 1,15 May 44.
[67] JIC (44) 215 (O), Periodic Review of Conditions in Europe and Scale of Opposition to 'OVERLORD,' 25 May 44.
[68] CCS 454/6, Review of Conditions in Europe (10 May 44),17 May 44; cf. JIC paper cited n. 67.
[69] See, e.g., CCS 454/5,14 Apr 44.
[70] Naval Expeditionary Force Planning Memoranda-Section I, 26 Dec 43. SHAEF AG file 045.93-2.
[71] This battery figured in the ground fighting later. See below, Ch. X.
[72] NCWTF Int Bull 2, 29 May 44.
[73] As compared to an estimated maximum range of 25,000 yards for the 155-mm. guns.
[74] NCWTF Int Bull 1, 21 May 44.
[75] COS (44) 393 (O), Clearance of Underwater Obstacles, 3 May 44. SHAEF SGS 800.8; cf. Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 6 May 44, in which he lists first among the "worst problems of these days" the problem of how to remove underwater obstacles. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[76] FUSA Int Note No. 18, 24 Apr 44. Pre-Inv file 631A.
[77] Memo, Gen Kean (FUSA CofS), for Gen Bradley, 20 Apr 44. Pre-Inv file 631A. H Hour had been fixed in February at about half-flood.
[78] V Corps Breaching Plan, Underwater and Beach Obstacles, 17 Mar 42, prepared jointly by CG V Corps and Comdr 11th Amph Force. Pre-Inv file 647.
[79] NCWTF Int Bull 1, 21 May 44.
[80] NEPTUNE Monograph, prepared by Comdr Task Force 122, Apr 44. Pre-Inv file 252.
[81] For various estimates see AEAF Over-all Air Plan, 15 Apr 44. 12th A Gp file 370.2; JIC (44) 210 (O), 23 May 44; NCWTF Int Bull 1, 21 May 44.
[82] "Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory" (submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in November 1944), Fourth Supplement to The London Gazette No. 37838, 31 December 1946, pp. 40-41, cited hereafter as Leigh-Mallory, Despatch.
[83] Lion-sur-Mer – Courseulles – Arromanches, and Colleville–Vierville.
[84] The regional nomenclature here, not entirely consistent with current French usage, is derived from NEPTUNE Monograph, pp. 26-31. See n. 80.
[85] See, for instance, Second Br Army/83 Group, 2d TAF, Plan, 20 Mar 44. Pre-Inv file 631A.
[86] Montgomery, Brief Summary of Operation "OVERLORD" as Affecting the Army, 7 Apr 44. Photostatic copy with Montgomery's penciled corrections in Hist Div files.
[87] NEPTUNE-Comparison of Methods of Employment of Additional Resources. SHAEF G-3 files, bundle A-l (Pre-D-Day Planning Papers).
[88] Beaches UTAH and OMAHA were first designated X and Y respectively. The final code names were published by First Army in Amendment 1 to FUSA plan, 3 Mar 44.
[89] Amendment 1, 2 March 1944, to NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan (see n. 59) added as a second priority task the development of the beachhead south toward St. Lô "in conformity with the advance of Second British Army." In the light of Second Army's mission to protect the left flank of First Army, this made a kind of circular relationship which amounted to telling both armies to keep pushing abreast.
[90] COSSAC (43) 36, 28 Jul 43.
[91] Combined Rpt, The Dieppe Raid, Sep 42, Part V. SHAEF G-3 files, bundle A, item 9.
[92] CO Rpt, Lessons Learnt in the Mediterranean, 14 Oct 43. Pre-Inv file 661.
[93] CCS 120th Mtg, 24 Sep 43. Eisenhower's recommendations were made in a letter to Marshall, 17 Jul 43. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[94] Cbl, Marshall to Devers, R 6441, 1 Dec 43. WD Cable log.
[95] App. to CCS 496, 26 Feb 44. The gist of the planners' opinion was simply that it seemed "unwise to make any important changes in our airborne organizations until further tests in actual combat have been made." See Greenfield et al., Organization of Ground Combat Troops, p. 349.
[96] COS (44) 140 (O), Airborne Forces for OVERLORD, 7 Feb 44.
[97] Ibid. The difficulties of training air crews for airborne operations were discussed in detail in a memorandum by the Chief of Air Staff (COS (44) 135 (O) ), 6 Feb 44. An excerpt follows:
"The crew after passing out of the [Operational Training Unit] O.T.U. (3 months' course) and being 'converted' to the handling of heayy aircraft by day and night, require some 30 hours' basic training which consists mainly of map reading from low altitudes. The crew must also receive instruction on the use of radio aids to navigation.
"When proficient as a crew and familiar with their equipment they begin training with troops, firstdropping a few parachutists, then full 'sticks' and thence passing on to tugging gliders.
"Finally the very highly organized system of assembly, take-off, manoeuvre and approach has to be learned and practiced. Some idea of the skill and practice required may be gained by realizing that one aircraft with fully loaded glider takes off in the dark from each airfield every 30 seconds; that over 800 aircraft and 440 tows have to arrive at the right place at the right time after a night flight; and that it is intended to land some 440 gliders in 20-30 minutes at their destination.
"All this training after the O.T.U. stage at present takes 2 months and is then dependent on weather. No cut is possible without risking failure."
[98] NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan, Amendment 1, 2 Mar 44.
[99] Ltr, Marshall to Eisenhower, 10 Feb 44. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[100] Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 19 Feb 44. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[101] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Mar 44. Eisenhower Personal Files.
[102] Memo for SAC, 23 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 373/2 I; Airborne-Air Planning Committee 9th Mtg, 28 Apr 44. ETO file 337 (Conferences (Secret) ), I AR-16-Dr 1. See Bibliographical Note.
[103] VII Corps revised FO, 28 May 44.
[104] COS (43) 552 (O), Airborne Forces, 20 Sep 43.
[105] Ltrs, 29 and 30 May. SHAEF SGS file 373/2 I.
[106] NEPTUNE Initial Joint Plan, par. 63.
[107] 101st Abn Div FO 1, 18 May 44.
[108] Change reads that the 116th Infantry will "prepare to defend the D-day objective from La Cambe (excl) west to Isigny (incl) and the eastern banks of the Vire River north thereof." This compared to the second change, 18 May, which gave the 116th Infantry the mission to "prepare to defend the D-day phase line from La Cambe (exclusive) west to Isigny (exclusive) . . . prepare to cross the Aure River west of Isigny for an attack on Isigny from the southeast."
[109] 1st Div G-3 Jnl.
[110] General Gerow, Notes on V Corps Plan, undtd. Pre-Inv file 670.
[111] The revised VII Corps Field Order of 28 May makes no mention of cutting the peninsula, but contemplates an advance to Cherbourg on the Valognes axis with the corps' left flank resting on the Douve River.
[112] This was done at the recommendation of General Bradley. See Ltr, Bradley to 21 A Gp, 26 May 44, quoted in Memo for SHAEF G-3, 4 Jun 44, Status of Planning, 21 Army Group. SHAEF G-3 file GCT, Ops A (21 Army Group General). Build-up schedules were then changed to delay the bringing in of port repair and operating units and allow additional combat troops to land in the early phase. The 79th Division was attached from Third Army to VII Corps and was ordered to begin landing on D plus 8. See VII Corps revised FO, 28 May 44.
[113] Memo, Col Partridge and Lt Col Bonesteel for Gen Bradley, 15 Dec 43. 12th A Gp file 370.03 (Invasion). Similar doubts had been expressed at the RATTLE Conference, held from 28 June to 2 July to discuss tactics of the assault. See discussion of Mountbattens Memo on the RATTLE Conference at COS (43) 155th Mtg (O), 12 Jul 43.
[114] Ltr, 14 Dec 43.12th A Gp file 370.03 (Invasion).
[115] NEPTUNE:, Initial Joint Plan, pars. 58-59.
[116] NEPTUNE, Initial Joint Plan, pars. 54-56 cf. [Charles H. Taylor] Omaha Beachhead (Washington, 1945), p. 31.
[117] Dieppe Rpt, cited n. 91.
[118] Address by Maj Gen Roberts (Dieppe Military Force Commander), at Assault Training Center, 7 Jun 43. Adm file 491. See Bibliographical Note.
[119] Proposed revision of Field Manual 31-5, Landings on a Hostile Shore, 1 Jul 43. Adm file 491.
[120] Interv with Brig Gen Paul W. Thompson, cited in Jones, NEPTUNE, I, 204.
[121] Cf. Commentary on Exercise PIRATE, 1 Oct 43. Pre-Inv file 661.
[122] Address by Brig Gen Norman D. Cota at Assault Training Center Conf, Jun 43. Adm file 491.
[123] These were M-4 medium tanks equipped with detachable canvas "bloomers"—accordion-pleated screens which when raised were capable of floating the 3-ton tanks by displacement. They had a duplex drive—twin propellers for swimming and the normal track drive for overland. From the duplex drive came their common name "DD's."
[124] Assault Training Center, Training Memos, ASLT-4, 15 Jan 44 and ASLT-1, 1 Mar 44. Adm file 491.
[125] For further details of the landing scheme as applied on OMAHA, see Taylor, Omaha Beachhead, pp. 30-33.
[126] COS (43) 770 (O), 7 Jan 44.
[127] COS (43) 464 (O) ,12 Aug 43.
[128] Ltr, Ramsay to CinC 21 A Gp, Effects of Naval Bombardment of Heavily Defended Beaches, 18 Feb 44. Pre-Inv file 676.
[129] Comb Rpt, The Dieppe Raid, Part V.
[130] FUSA plan, Annex 21, 25 Feb 44.
[131] Cbl, Eisenhower to Marshall, 20 Mar 44. Eisenhower Personal Files; cf. Cbl, Br Admiralty to Br Adm Div (JSM), 28 Mar 44, Annex IV to COS (44) 295 (O), 29 Mar 44.
[132] Amendment No. 1, 1 May 44 to Operation NEPTUNE, Naval Orders. 12 A Gp files, dr 89.
[133] FUSA plan, Annex 12, 27 May 44.
[134] Ltr, Gerow to CG, FUSA, Prearranged Naval and Air Bombardment Plan, 13 Mar 44. Pre-Inv file 676.
[135] AEAF Overall Air Plan, 15 Apr 44. 12th A Gp file 370.2.
[136] See below, Ch. VI.
[137] Calculations are from statistics in Leigh-Mallory, Despatch, pp. 46-47.
[138] Also called "transport areas."
[139] FUSA plan, Annex 12 (Fire Support), 2d Rev, 27 May 44.
[140] Ibid.
[141] AEAF Overall Air Plan, cited n. 135.
[142] FUSA plan, Annex 12, 27 May 44.
[143] In early planning it was thought that cratering of beaches would be an important tactical by-product of this bombardment, and troops were briefed to expect to find cover in shell and bomb holes. See proposed revision of Field Manual 31-5, 1 Jul 43. Adm file 491. RATTLE Conference, however, assumed cratering to be an "adverse" effect of bombing from the Army point of view. See RATTLE Conf 3d Mtg, 29 Jun 43. SHAEF SGS file 337/6. Actually the only significant cratering that took place was at Pointe du Hoe. See below, Ch. IX.
[144] Light cruisers also participated and the Force U plan called for the battleship Nevada and the heavy cruiser Quincy to fire their five-inch batteries at beach targets. See Naval Task Force U, Operations Order, Annex D, 15 May 44.
[145] Norfolk House Mtg, 24 Apr 44, to consider the engagement of beach targets in the U.S. First Army area. ETO 337 (Conferences (Secret)) 1 AR-16-Dr 1.
[146] CO Rpt, Lessons Learnt in the Mediterranean, 14 Oct 43. Pre-Inv file 661.
[147] Address by Col H. F. G. Langley (COHQ), at Assault Training Center Conf, 1 Jun 43; cf. proposed revision of Field Manual 31-5. Both in Adm file 491.
[148] Address by Col M. W. Brewster, Chief, Tactics Subsection, at Assault Training Center Conf, 1 Jun 43. Adm file 491.
[149] Western Naval Task Force had nine LCG (L) 's armored and equipped with multiple rocket projectors; sixteen LCT (A) 's equipped to carry medium tanks; and six LCT (HE) 's, similar to the LCT (A) but with less armor protection. There were also eleven LCF's mounting AA-guns. Two LCT (A)'s or (HE)'s were to carry a platoon of tanks between them. The fifth tank could fire rockets if desired. FUSA plan, Annex 21; cf. Western Naval Task Force, Operation Plan, 21 Apr 44.
[150] Some of the parties assigned to the 29th Division would operate with the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions. FUSA plan, Annex 21.
[151] AEAF Overall Air Plan, 15 Apr 44.
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Last updated 2 March 2006 |