Chapter VI

[1] Diary of CinC, 17 Jun 44; Rpt, Donovan (OSS) to Marshall, 9 Jul 44. OPD file 336.2, sec. II, cases 29-47.

[2] MS # B-035 (Rogé), A History of the FFI.

[3] French Forces of the Interior, MS, pp. 9-40. Hist Div files. This is a 1,500-page history prepared in the European Theater Historical Section, under direction of Colonel S. L. A. Marshall, by United States, French, and British members of the OSS. Cited hereafter as FFI History.

[4] FFI History, p. 40.

[5] Memo, SOE, Present Value and Tempo of Resistance, 9 Oct 43. SHAEF G-3 file 322-7 II, Ops C.

[6] FFI History, pp. 344-45.

[7] Ibid., pp. 347-49.

[8] Materials sent during 1942 were as follows: 2,265 lbs. of explosives; 269 Sten guns; 388 pistols; 856 incendiaries; 3,424 abrasive products; 630 standard charges (clams); 269 cells (food, tobacco, medical equipment, etc.). FFI History, p. 351.

[9] Memo, SIS-SOE/SO Aircraft Requirements, 14 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.64.

[10] FFI History, pp. 396c-96d.

[11] Outline OVERLORD, Part II, par. 23.

[12] Progress Rpt, Operation OVERLORD, 10 Sep 43. SHAEF G-3 file 322-7 II, Ops C.

[13] Rpt, Analysis of the Resitance Movement, 9 Dec 43. SHAEF G-3 file 370-4-1, Ops C.

[14] Memo, Bull for Morgan, 5 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.64 I.

[15] The first operation took place on 20 March 1943, but supplies were sent on a very meager scale until the fall of the year. The first agents to the maquis were sent in October. FFI History, pp. 362-63.

[16] Sixth Monthly Progress Report to SHAEF from SOE/SO Hq, London, 7 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 319.1/10. The planned increase was 300 percent but bad weather interfered with operations. Of 400 sorties attempted during the month only 166 were successful.

[17] See SOE/SO Rpts in SHAEF SGS file 319.1/10.

[18] Ltr, Haskell to Donovan, 22 Feb 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.64 I.

[19] Cbl, JCS to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.64 I.

[20] Memo, Gen Bull for SHAEF CofS, SOE/SO Request for Additional Aircraft, 19 Apr 44; Memo, idem., Allocation of Additional Aircraft for SOE/SO Missions, 28 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 370.64 I.

[21] At COS (44) 163d Mtg (O) ,18 May 44, General Smith said that "latest reports" had made the Supreme Commander "discount the value of French underground organizations."

[22] See below, section on the Bombing of French Railroads.

[23] Rpt, SNCF, Les Résultats de l'Action de la Résistance dans la SNCF, 10 Nov 44, cited in FFI History, pp. 1364ff.

[24] This report, captured by the Resistance, reached London in April 1944. SOE/SO headquarters significantly commented on its statistics as follows: "It was already known that railway sabotage was considerable but no suspicion that it had reached the scale stated by the police has yet reached London." See Rpt, Appreciation of Report by Minister of Interior Vichy, Summary of Acts of Sabotage and Disorder in France 25th October-25th November, 14 Apr 44. SHAEF G-3 file 370-4-1, Ops C.

[25] In the spring of 1944 the directors of the SNCF were apparently unconvinced of the value of rail sabotage which they felt was costing the French more than the Germans. See G-2 Summary of Info, French Railways, 11 Apr 44. SHAEF G-3 file GCT 370-14, Ops C.

[26] Rundstedt Report, 25 Oct 43. See above, Ch. IV, n. 2.

[27] OKW/WFSt, KTB Ausarbeitung, De Entwicklung im Westen vom 1.I.-31.III.44. See below, n. 115.

[28] The Development of Resistance Groups with Reference to the Land Fighting in "OVERLORD" 15 Feb 44. SHAEF G-3 file 370-14, Ops C; FFI History, pp. 80ff; cf. Ninth Monthly Progress Report to SHAEF from SFHQ, London, May 1944, 10 Jun 44. SHAEF SGS file 319.1/10.

[29] FFI History, p. 83.

[30] Report from SFHQ, cited n. 28. SOE and SO in April were amalgamated into a single headquarters with the title Special Force Headquarters.

[31] See Plan Vert, text in FFI History, pp. 175-87. The SNCF was generally disposed to co-operate with the Allies in passive resistance to the Germans. Resistance groups found many recruits among the employees of the railroads.

[32] FFI History, p. 388. German agents broke the codes. For German reaction, see below, Ch. VIII.

[33] Tenth Monthly Report to SHAEF from SFHQ, London, June 1944, 10 Jul 44. SHAEF SGS file 319.1/10; FFI History, p. 1474. See below, Ch. X.

[34] SHAEF (44) 25, Operational Directive to SFHQ, 23 Mar 44. SHAEF G-3 file 322-8, Ops C.

[35] Ltr, Koenig to Gen Smith, Commandement et Organisation des Forces Françaises de l'Intérieur, 9 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 322 (FFI).

[36] FFI History. pp. 364-65.

[37] Ibid., pp. 365, 544.

[38] Ltr, CofS Eighth AF to CG VIII Bomber Command and VIII Fighter Command, Objectives for Operations Eighth Air Force, 20 Oct 42; Ltr, Eaker to CG ETOUSA, 31 Dec 43, exhibit 2. Report of Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker on U.S. Army Air Forces Activities in United Kingdom Covering Period from February 20. 1942 to December 31, 1943 (cited hereafter as Eaker Rpt). AAF file 520.101A.

[39] CCS 166/1/D, The Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, 21 Jan 43. Approved at CCS 65th Mtg, 21 Jan 43.

[40] Eaker Rpt, cited n. 38; cf. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 227, 301.

[41] The principal limitation of "tactical feasibiliy" was the short range of all combat planes which, as long as the air forces were relatively small, largely prevented bomber sorties deep into Germany.

[42] Ltr, Arnold to ACofS Management Control, Research and Analysis to Fix Earliest Practicable Date for Invasion of Watern Europe, 9 Dec 42. AAF file 3842-2, Tabs for History.

[43] Memo for Gen Arnold, Report of Committee of Operations Analysts with Respect to Economic Targets within the Western Axis, 8 Mar 43. AAF file 3842-2, Tabs for History.

[44] JCS Spec Mtg, 29 Apr 43.

[45] Ibid.

[46] CCS 217, Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, 14 May 43.

[47] JCS 77th Mtg, 4 May 43; JPS 174/1, Plan for Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom, 2 May 43.

[48] CCS 87th Mtg, 18 May 43.

[49] As by agreement at Casablanca, CCS 65th Mtg; cf. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 304. The RAF was senior in experience and, at this time, preponderant in numbers. "Strategic direction" was never clearly defined nor was Air Marshal Portal ever given any clear-cut directive. In fact, however, he exercised ad hoc command over the strategic air forces as agent of the Combined Chiefs. The directive of 10 June was issued as a letter by Air Vice Marshal N. H. Bottomley to Air Force Commanders. Copy in Eaker Rpt.

[50] Study by ACofAS, The Strategic Aerial Bombardment of Europe, 10 Dec 43. AAF file 2481-2.

[51] Hq Eighth Air Force, Target Priorities of the Eighth Air Force, 15 May 45. AAF file 520.317A.

[52] Foreword by Gen Arnold to Study cited n. 50.

[53] Eaker Rpt.

[54] Joint Rpt by Min of Econ Warfare and the Air Min Int Branch, in Rpt by CofAS and CG U.S. Eighth AF on progress made by the RAF and U.S. Eighth AF in Combined Bomber Offensive, 7 Nov 43. AAF file 520.318. Ball bearing output was estimated by the Eighth Air Force A-2 to be down to 75 percent of preattack levels. See Supplement to the Strategic Aerial Bombardment of Europe—Accomplishments and Potentialities, 1 Apr 44. AAF file 2481-1.

[55] ACofAS Study, cited n. 50.

[56] Eaker Rpt.

[57] Target Priorities, 15 May 45, cited n. 51.

[58] Rpt, CG AAF to SW, 4 Jan 44.

[59] During 1943, 41.8 percent of the total Eighth Air Force bomb tonnage (21,362 tons) was dropped on enemy submarine yards and bases. General Eaker estimated that the net result of this large expenditure was to prevent 22 out of 200 new submarines from being built. Eaker Rpt. Cf. Memo for CofAS Evaluation of Results of Strategic Bombardment Against the Western Axis, 27 Jan 44, Tab 56 of Committee of Operations Analysts, COA History, MS. AAF files. COA's conclusion was that though "heavy attacks have been delivered against submarine manufacture and submarine operating bases, the results of these attacks have not been at all proportional to the effort expended."

[60] JCS 563, Modifications of Directive for the Bomber Offensive, 4 Nov 43.

[61] CCS 166/11, Revised Directive for Combined Bomber Offensive, 13 Feb 44.

[62] JCS 524, Plan to Assure the Most Effective Exploitation of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 9 Oct 43.

[63] JCS 125th Mtg, 29 Oct 43. Bomber losses in October amounted to 9.2 percent of the aircraft entering enemy territory. See Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations—European Theater, 17 Aug 1942-8 May 1945. AAF file 520.308A.

[64] The Mediterranean theater commander was to be allowed to use the units then assigned to the Twelfth Air Force in support of theater operations until the base objective north and east of Rome had been secured.

[65] CCS 217/1, 19 Oct 43.

[66] JCS 602, Integrated Command of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the European-Mediterranean Area, 16 Nov 43.

[67] JCS 601, Strategic Air Force Command in Operations Against Gennany, 13 Nov 43.

[68] It was JCS 602 (see n. 66) that was submitted to the British as CCS 400. British reply is CCS 400/1, 26 Nov 43. It may be supposed that British objections were also connected with their previously expressed opposition to subordinating strategic air forces to SAC.

[69] Later redesignated U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF).

[70] Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces, II, 749-56.

[71] Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, cited n. 63.

[72] Study No. 59 by U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Military Analysis Division, The Defeat of the German Air Force. AAF file 137.306.

[73] Plan signed by Gen Anderson and transmitted to Eisenhower and Portal, Plan for the Completion of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 5 Mar 44. AAF files; cf. Diary of CinC, 25 Feb 44.

[74] General Brereton, Annapolis graduate in the class of 1911, transferred to the Army after completing the Naval Academy course and, in World War I, saw Air Corps service. In 1941, after heading the Third Air Force in Florida, he was sent to the Philippine Islands as commander of the American Air Forces in the Far East. Early the following year he was appointed head of the Tenth Air Force in India. In June 1942 he was transferred to Egypt and assumed command of the Middle East Air Force, which in November became the Ninth Air Force including all U.S. Army Air Force units in the Middle East. General Brereton was given command of U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East, in addition to his Air Force post, in late January 1943. He held the two commands until he and his staff were ordered to England.

[75] Col William B. Reed (Exec CofS, Ninth AF), The Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations, MS. AAF files.

[76] [Lt Col Robert H. George] Ninth Air Force, April to November 1944 (Army Air Forces Historical Studies: No. 36), MS, p. 81. AAF files.

[77] Reed, The Ninth Air Force, cited n. 75.

[78] COS (43) 760 (O), CROSSBOW, 17 Dec 43.

[79] Ibid.; cf. COS (43) 312th Mtg (O), 22 Dec 43.At this meeting the Chiefs of Staff discussed the possibility of dispersing OVERLORD shipping to minimize the risks from expected CROSSBOW attacks.

[80] Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory" (submitted to the Supreme Allied Commander in November 1944), Fourth Supplement to The London Gazette, No. 37838, 31 December 1946, pp. 53-54.

[81] COS (44) 25 (O), Probable Scale and Effect of Attack on London by Pilotless Aircraft, 10 Jan 44.

[82] COS (44) 107 (O) (Revised), Progress Report by the ACAS (Ops), 2 Feb 44.

[83] AAF Evaluation Board, Effectiveness of Air Attack Against Rail Transportation in the Battle of France, Jun 45. This is a study prepared after the war by United States air experts in collaboration with the French railroad authorities (cited hereafter as AAF Evaluation Board Study). Copy in AAF file 138.4-37. Cf. Ltr, R. D. Hughes to Maj Gen F. L. Anderson, Report of Conference at Norfolk House, 14 Jan 44. USSTAF files. See Bibliographical Note.

[84] Allied AF Bombing Committee, 6th Mtg, 24 Jan 44. USSTAF files. SHAEF representatives were General Whitefoord and General Napier (Movement and Transportation Officer).

[85] Memo for Bull, West, and McLean, 25 Jan 44. SHAEF SGS file 373.24 I.

[86] Ltr, Lt Col Lowell P. Weicker (Dep Dir Int USSTAF) to Dir Int, Future Plan for Employing Air Power in the Support of OVERLORD, 10 Feb 44. USSTAF files.

[87] Ltr, Gen Anderson (A-3, Eighth AF) to CG USSTAF, Force Required Against Railway Targets, 26 Feb 44. AAF Eighth AF files.

[88] Dir, 12 Feb 44.

[89] Plan for the Completion of the Combined Bomber Offensive, 5 Mar 44, cited n. 73.

[90] Entry 3 Mar 44, Diary of CinC; cf. ibid., Memo under date 22 Mar 44.

[91] Tedder had served during World War I with both the Army and the Royal Flying Corps. In 1938 he began a tour as Director-General of Research and Development, Air Ministry. He was Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the RAF in the Middle East during the Italian phase of African operations and in June 1941 was made Commander-in-Chief, directing air attacks against Rommel's troops and enemy shipping in the Mediterranean. After a short period with the Air Council as Vice-Chief of Air Staff, he returned to the Mediterranean early in 1943 as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Air Command.

[92] Ltr, Portal to Eisenhower, 9 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 373/1; cf. CCS 520, Control of Strategic Bombing for "OVERLORD," 17 Mar 44.

[93] Marshall's words at JCS 154th Mtg, 21 Mar 44.

[94] CCS 520 series. Final agreement is CCS 520/2, 26 Mar 44.

[95] COS (44) 93rd Mtg, 21 Mar 44.

[96] Cbl, Spaatz to Arnold, 16 Mar 44. USSTAF files.

[97] Memo, 24 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS file 373/1. Following account of the meeting is from minutes in AAF files. Mtg, To Discuss the Bombing Policy in the Period Before OVERLORD, 25 May 44, CAS/misc/61 (Final).

[98] COS (44) 273 (O), Attacks on Rail Targets in Enemy Occupied Territory, 19 Mar 44.

[99] Issued as JIC (44) 147 (O) (Final), Bombing Targets in France and the Low Countries in Relation to Overlord, 15 May 44.

[100] COS (44) 190th Mtg (O), 4 Apr 44. For the discussion on bombing of French railroads see, in addition, COS (44) 258 (O), 10 Mar 44; COS (44) 273 (O),19 Mar; and COS (44) 93rd and 95th Mtgs, 21 and 23 Mar respectively. Entries in Diary of CinC, under dates of 5, 13, and 20 Apr 44, summarize the salient points accurately.

[101] Cbl, Smith to Marshall, 17 May 44; Ismay, Minute to Prime Minister, 29 Mar 44. SHAEF SGS file 373.24 I.

[102] Transportation Targets Committee (SHAEF) 2d Mtg, 18 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 334, bundle N.

[103] Ltr to Eisenhower, 29 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 373.24 I.

[104] Dir to USSTAF. Bomber Command, and AEAF, 29 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 373.24 I.

[105] Minute, annexed to COS (44) 158th Mtg (O), 16 May 44.

[106] Dir to USSTAF and Bomber Command, 17 Apr 44. SHAEF SGS file 373/1.

[107] AAF Evaluation Board Study.

[108] Msg, Spaatz to Doolittle, U-63552, 8 Jun 44, in Eighth Air Force, Dir Vol 3. AAF files.

[109] AEAF Mtg to discuss bombing targets, 6 May 44. AAF file 505.25-5.

[110] SHAEF G-2, Evaluation of Rail Centre Attacks, 20 May 44. AAF file 505.26-38. These conclusion were repeated in the report of 31 May.

[111] AAF Evaluation Board Study.

[112] Seventh Army, KTB; Taetigkeitsbericht des Bevollmaechtigten Transport Offiziers beim A.O.K.7 (referred to hereafter as Seventh Army, Trans. O.), KTB 1.I-30.VI.44.

[113] OB WEST, Oberquartiermeister West (referred to hereafter as OB WEST, O.Qu.), KTB 1.I.-17. VIII.44.

[114] Seventh Army, Trans. O., KTB 1.I.-30.VI.44.

[115] OKW/WFSt, KTB Ausarbeitung, Der Westen 1.IV.-16.X11.44, cited hereafter as Der Westen. This draft War Diary (KTB), like that cited in n. 27, was written by Major Percy Schramm, OKW historian, from records and daily notes made at OKW headquarters. Until the end of 1943 the Diary was kept chronologically and supplemented by information from participants in the operations. After 1943 the diary was written up at intervals of three months or more in the form of separate narratives on the various fronts and the special problems faced by OKW. Besides official documents, Schramm made use of a Merkbuch in which he recorded informal notes on the situation meetings he attended and special interviews he held with the Deputy Chief of WFSt, General Warlimont. In view of the destruction of OKW records ordered in 1945 by General Scherff, the copies of Schramm's Ausarbeitungen for 1944 represent unique source material for OKW history.

[116] Marine Gruppenkommando West, Kriegstagebuch (referred to hereafter as Navy Group West, KTB),16.IV-30.IV.44. Navy Dept files, Tambach Collection.

[117] Der Westen.

[118] Seventh Army, Trans.O., KTB 1.I.-30.VI.44.

[119] Order, Seventh Army to subordinate corps and divisions, Beweglchmachung und Bildung zusaetzlichen Transportraumes, 7 May 44. Seventh Army KTB Anlagen 1.I.-30.VI.44.

[120] OKW/WFSt, KTB Ausarbeitung, Die Enwicklung im Westen vom 1.I.-31.III.44.

[121] Der Westen.

[122] Notes by Reich Minister Albert Speer on Confrence with Hitler on 22, 23 May 44, MS (trans). AAF files.

[123] AEAF Mtg, 6 May 44. AAF file 505.25-5.

[124] For example, two bridges south of Oisel were attacked and damaged on 10 May. The Germans decided to repair one for emergency use. On 6 June the railway engineers announced that it was operating. On that day it was bombed but suffered only light damage. The next day Allied planes returned to finish the job. The attack caused heavy damage, but the German engineers nevertheless set to work to repair the bridge and estimated that they could have it in shape again by 2 July. Allied air forces kept watch and on 29 June when the repairs were almost finished flew again to the attack. That attack at last finished the agony as three superstructures fell into the river and the Germans abandoned all thoughts of repair. See Rpts of the 6th Ry Eng Regt, May-Jun 1944, in OKH Chef des Transportwesens, General der Eisebahntruppen, Lagemeldungen (Ausschnitte) Frankreich, Band 1a, 1943-44.

[125] Seventh Army, Trans.O., KTB 1.I.-30.VI.44.

[126] AAF Evaluation Board Study.

[127] Seventh Army, KTB 1.I.-30.VI.44, 23 May 44.

[128] AAF Evaluation Board Study. Normal traffic calculated as that of 1943.

Search CMH Online
Last updated 2 March 2006