Chapter XXIII

[1] Model's suicide, later in the war, permits interpretations by his superiors and subordinates which may or may not be in accord with the facts. Even so, the OB WEST KTB does provide a reasonable guide to Model's conduct of the Ardennes operation in these last days of the offensive. Also, the OB WEST/1C-Tagesmeldungen reveal what information on the Allied dispositions and intentions was available to Model. A further check is provided by a series of postwar interrogations involving Rundstedt and Jodl. For the former see CSDIC (U.K.) # GRGG330, SRGG 1332 and SRGG 1334 (these interrogations date from July and August 1945). Jodl was interrogated by the USFET Historical Division before his execution: MS ETHINT-51 (Jodl). See also the testimony of Jodl's aide in MS ETHINT-34 (Buecks).

[2] The term elements of the 3d Armored Division" is used advisedly for CCB was operating with the 30th Division in the La Gleize sector, while Task Force Doan (Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan) was with the 84th Division west of the Ourthe. For the preceding action of these elements, see Chapter XXII.

[3] See Msg, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 25 Dec 44, SHAEF Msg file. Montgomery appears to have been kept fully apprised of the Manhay fight by the Phantom service. See Hills, Phantom Was There. See also Sylvan Diary and XVIII Airborne Corps 3 Jnl.

[4] Collins' decision is described in Chapter XXII.

[5] This failure is confirmed in the XVIII Airborne Corps Inspector General Report of Investigation, CCA, 7th Armored, Manhay, 24-25 December 1944, dated 6 January 1945.

[6] Sylvan Diary; XVIII Airborne 3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44.

[7] Like nearly all green divisions the 75th Infantry Division failed to keep or transmit really complete and useful historical records during its first combat operations. The bulk of the detailed information on the regimental actions of this division comes from the 3d Armored units to which the formations of the 75th were attached and from the combat interviews with the former. For the 289th Infantry, however, there exists the written recollections of the regimental communications officer, Capt. Walter G. Runte's study in the Advanced Infantry Officers' Course, Class No. 1.

[8] CCB, S-3 Jnl and AAR. The 474th Squadron Operations report of 25 December 1944, says that the vehicles attacked were displaying orange panels. By this date, however, some German units were using the distinctive U.S. orange insignia. The IX TAC operations summary of 25 December notes that the 7th Armored had set the coordinate P-5388 as the "no-bomb" line; everything to the east, therefore, was fair game. McGeorge's assembly area was almost exactly on the coordinates given.

[9] At 1345 on the 5th, General Kean, First Army chief of staff, called the IX TAC and said that the first priority air mission for the entire First Army was the enemy penetration at the junction of the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps. IX TAC, A-2 Jnl.

[10] The early story of Hogan's task force is told in Chapter XV.

[11] Capt. David C. Clagett, Study for the Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class 1.

[12] The price for the initial commitment of the two regiments from the 75th was relatively high. The total losses of CCA, 3d Armored, during the fighting from 22 to 31 December were 70 killed, 376 wounded, and 218 missing. Of this total the attached 289th Infantry alone lost 37 killed, 208 wounded, and 79 missing. 289th Inf AAR, Dec 44.

[13] The man who stopped the lead tank may have been TSgt. Stephen G. Andromidas of Company L (Ltr, Maj. C. W. Anderson to Maj. Gen. William F. Train, 13 Dec 60). It is also possible that these German tanks were checked by a tank destroyer of the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins and Pfc. Edwin W. Metz were awarded the DSC (both posthumously) for stopping an attack of "fourteen" enemy tanks on this date.

[14] For this phase of the action, the most useful materials are W. G. Lord, History of the 508th Parachute Infantry (Washington, 1948); 82d Abn Div, Chronology, Dec 44; 82d Abn Div, The Story of the Bulge: The Division Commander's Report; and especially the combat interviews.

[15] The German account of this action will be found in MS # P-032E. The best American account is that given in Spearhead In the West. See also journals of the 289th Infantry and CCA, 3d Armored Division. The paratroopers took the main losses in this fight: 120 casualties.

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