- Chapter IX:
The Somervell Proposal for War
Department Reorganization
Although the provisions of the
reorganization of 9 March 1942 contained many seeds of conflict, as already
described, the chief reason that Somervell suggested a further change in the
logistics organization was the continuing uncertainty about the division of
responsibility between the ASF and the Supply Division (G-4), the Personnel
Division (G-1), and the Operations Division, all of the WDGS.1
In regard to ASF and G-4 difficulties,
it appeared at first that a division of responsibility existed between the ASF
and the Supply Division of G-4. At the time of the reorganization, Army
regulations indicated that basic supply planning would be carried out by the
Supply Division of G-4. Indeed these regulations specified that G-4 would
prepare "broad basic supply plans" to carry out mobilization and
strategic plans while the commanding general of the ASF would "prepare
detailed programs and plans." Such a statement would seem to imply that the
commanding general of the ASF was expected to receive his general instructions
from the War Department General Staff through its supply division, and that the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, would continue to be the top supply planner for
the Army.2
Actually, as already noted, the
arrangement was not followed during World War II. In practice the "top
supply planner" of the War Department was not the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-4, but the commanding general of the Army Service Forces. General Marshall
continually looked to General Somervell rather than to the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-4, for advice and guidance on logistical matters. At such conferences
as Casablanca, Quebec, Teheran, and other important meetings, the Chief of Staff
used Somervell and the staff of the ASF as his staff on supply, in much the same
way as he used OPD on strategy.3
Moreover, there were organizational
factors which contributed to the special status of the ASE In the first place,
on 9 March 1942 the Army Service Forces absorbed almost all of the key personnel
previously associated with G-4. This required the new G-4, Brig. Gen. R. G.
Moses, to
[138]
rebuild his staff out of other
officers, few of whom could match the experience of men like Brig. Gen. LeRoy
Lutes, Col. W. A. Wood, Jr., Col. F. A. Heileman, and Lt. Col. C. B. Magruder to
mention only a few of those who moved from G-4 to important jobs in the ASF on 9
March 1942. Even if General Moses had been able to find people of the highest
caliber, the cut in staff from 149 officers shortly before the reorganization to
11 shortly after made it difficult to assume a great deal of responsibility.4
In addition, ASF headquarters was in
close daily touch with the actual procurement and storage operations performed
by the seven technical services. The Supply Division of the General Staff was a
step removed, and could not expect to be as intimately or as expertly informed.
Then too, there was the accidental fact that the Chief of Transportation, Maj.
Gen. C. P. Gross, was a classmate and friend of General Somervell. Accordingly,
the closest relation existed between the Chief of Transportation and the
commanding general of the Army Service Forces, and transportation was the key to
overseas supply operations throughout the entire war. If the G-4 of the General
Staff had tried to go directly to the technical services for information, then
it could have been accused of attempting to short circuit the headquarters of
the ASK If, on the other hand, it sought constant and detailed information from
ASF headquarters, then it opened itself to charges of interfering with and
hampering the work of that headquarters.
On the whole, the Supply Division of
the WDGS played only a minor part in the supply phases of World War II. That
conflict inherent in this situation did not break out earlier is due to the fact
that General Moses, while G-4 in
1942 and 1943, continually subordinated himself to ASF supply planners. Under
him, the Supply Division was never disposed to engage in controversy. General
Moses seemed to realize that G-4 was a sort of fifth wheel, and acted
accordingly. Besides, he was a personal friend of General Somervell.5
However, as might well have been expected, the duplication of functions
concealed in this relationship caused trouble when a new G-4 took over.
Another potential source of conflict
between ASF and a WDGS agency lay in the overlapping of functions in the field
of personnel. The reorganization of March 1942 assigned to the Army Service
Forces the "administration of all functions which are Army-wide in scope
and which pertain to personnel as individuals, both military and civilian . . .
." 6
This sweeping power seemed to open the way for a central direction of the whole
personnel function. While The Adjutant General's office became a part of the
ASF, and a large segment of G-1 was also transferred to it, the reorganization
left responsibility split, for , G-1 was endowed with personnel authority
similar to that of the ASK7
The existence of a Logistics Group in
the Operations Division of the WDGS was also a constant challenge to the ASF, as
previously noted.8
Just as OPD looked upon a strategic logistics planning unit in ASF as a threat
to its top position in strategic planning, so ASF regarded a logistics unit in
OPD as a thorn in its side.
As General Somervell contemplated this
situation in 1943, his sense of organizational nicety was disturbed. He could
[139]
not help but believe that the formal
organizational structure in the War Department should reflect the realities of
informal relationships, and he felt that the Chief of Staff should complete the
reorganizational steps begun in 1942. A year's experience seemed to suggest the
basis for final solution of War Department structure.
Accordingly, Somervell took a somewhat
drastic step. On 3 April 1943 he wrote to the Chief of Staff proposing further
changes in the War Department organization. He insisted that these changes were
in line with the purposes behind the organization of 9 March 1942. The basic
concept upon which that organization was founded, Somervell noted, was to create
a fighting power which would consist of a directing head with a small staff, an
Army ground force, an Army air force, and an Army service force. The service
force would handle supply, administrative details, and otherwise support the
combat forces by relieving the other services of many housekeeping burdens. The
Army Service Forces, Somervell said, is "therefore, quite properly and by
design a catch-all for a large variety of functions."
In commenting on the organization of
the War Department General Staff, Somervell remarked that the need for OPD and
an Intelligence Division (G-2) was apparent. He was not so certain about the
Training Division (G-3) and thought it might be more effective as part of OPD.
But, he insisted, there was no doubt that G-1 and G-4 "duplicate largely
the work which must perforce be carried out by the Army Service Forces" and
by the supply units of the AAF. Somervell added that in matters of supply and
administration, it was often impracticable to separate policy from operations
because "the enforcement of
the policy inevitably tends to become the actual operation of that policy with
all of the extra administrative detail and personnel required for an additional
agency to do the work of another." General Somervell further pointed out
that broad operational plans originated with the Operations Division of the War
Department General Staff, but that detailed planning necessarily had to be
performed by the staffs of the three major-commands. He "seriously
doubted" whether G-1 and G-4 were generally, consulted about operational
plans. If they were consulted, they did little except perhaps to delay and
confuse the final decisions. The only possible justification for G-1 and G-4 was
to render "decisions on controversial matters which might arise between the
Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Army Service Forces . . .
." But there should be no fear that the ASF in acting for the War
Department would be inclined to make decisions favoring itself above the AAF and
the AGF, because the only reason for the existence of the Army Service Forces
was to serve the combat forces and all decisions would have to be made in their
favor. As between the two, the ASF was as disinterested as the War Department
General Staff.
Somervell then observed that there
appeared to be "some duplication of effort" between the Logistics
Section in the OPD of the WDGS and the staff of the ASE and the AAF. The
planners of the Army Service Forces were in "close and daily contact"
with the OPD, they attended General Handy's daily conferences, and they had more
detailed and more up-to-date logistical information than the OPD itself. Indeed,
one purpose of the supply planners of the ASF was "to serve the Operations
Division."
[140]
General Somervell therefore recommended
that G-1 and G-4 Divisions of the WDGS be abolished, that the Logistics Group in
the OPD be eliminated, and that the Deputy Chief of Staff be assigned the
function of deciding "controversial questions" which might arise
between the three commands. These changes were "in the interest of
efficient conservation of personnel, and in conservation of effort." If the
changes were approved, the ASF would absorb the personnel thus released in
appropriate assignments in the Army Service Forces. 9
General Somervell's memorandum came as
a bombshell to the War Department. It was referred to all of the staff divisions
of the General Staff for comment. The very fact that General Marshall turned the
memorandum over to these divisions indicated that he was not inclined to accept
the changes suggested. As should have been expected, the recommendations were
strongly opposed by the staff divisions.10
The objections to his recommendations
did not discourage Somervell. On 1 June 1943 he submitted another . proposal,
through the medium of an ASF paper attached to a memorandum to Marshall, dealing
with the organization of service activities in overseas theaters. In this paper
he once more suggested that the G-1 and G-4 Divisions of the General Staff be
abolished because their activities largely duplicated work done by the ASF and
the AAF. It again expressed the opinion that G-3 would probably be more
effective as a part of the Operations Division of the General Staff. Much of the
reasoning previously put forth in Somervell's other memorandum to the Chief of
Staff was repeated. The paper mentioned again that there was little need for
either G-1 or G-4 to serve as an
umpire between the three major commands. It added that if the suggested
elimination of G-1 and G-4 should prove in practice to be undesirable, it would
be relatively simple to reestablish them.11
The opposition to General Somervell's
proposals was again almost unanimous. This is understandable because basically
the proposal would make the Army Service Forces a logistics command post of the
War Department in much the same manner as the Operations Division was the
strategic command post. If adopted, the commanding general of the ASF would be
both a staff and command officer. In short, the General Staff would be abolished
and OPD and ASF would dominate the field.
As already indicated, OPD's opposition
to the proposal probably stemmed from the fear that it would not be able to hold
its own against the ASK Operational plans depended so heavily on logistics that
in time OPD might have become subordinate to the Army Service Forces.
Particularly in a postwar period, experience had shown that service elements
increased their power at the expense of other elements. Through the control of
allotments, funds, and personnel, a service commander could practically run the
Army. The bugaboo of the old "bureaus" and their struggle against the
General Staff idea was recalled, and an OPD study pointed to the possibility
that the Chief of Staff might lose control of the Army. General Handy of the
Operations Division strongly supported the staff concept, opposed what he called
Somervell's attempt
[141]
to abolish the staff, and endorsed the
strengthening of G-1 and G-4 by returning many of the functions they had lost.
At the same time, OPD vigorously defended its own Logistics Group and felt that
its abolition would be a step backward. 12
Even
General Moses, the G-4, who usually supported Somervell's program, went along
with the opposition on this issue. In a memorandum to Somervell on 3 June, he
noted that he approved the "basic thought" of a service commander for
all operating ground forces, but expressed the belief that the Service Forces
commander should not also be a "staff officer." die objected
emphatically to the elimination of the "staff system taught to all of us
before the war and in common use everywhere now." He added that the
memorandum discussing this subject was "too one-sided" for
presentation to the Chief of Staff and that it contained "erroneous
statements." 13
In particular, G-4 felt it had an essential role to play as an arbitrator
between the Ground Forces, the Air Forces, and the Service Forces, and in
overseeing the operations of the ASF itself.
General McNair, the commanding general
of the Army Ground Forces, also opposed the ASF proposal. In a memorandum to
Somervell, he pointed out that the ASF staff "aggregates over 20,000, while
G-1 and G-4 of the War Department aggregates 90. If there is duplication of
personnel and effort, it is in your house. In general, the modern headquarters
is a fearful and wonderful thing." Nor was McNair impressed by the argument
that General Staff divisions tended to interfere in operations. No one could
delineate between policy making and operations and the whole question was
"quite irrelevant." There could be only one kind of command of combat
forces or of theaters of operations, "over-all command," and there was
no "such animal as administrative
command."
Somervell's proposals tended to disrupt the "unity of
over-all command." McNair concluded:
I believe in your ASF because you are
essentially the commander of the zone of interior. . . But I do not admit that
you are responsible for the logistic operations in the War Department or in
overseas theaters. G-4 is the proper adviser of the Chief of Staff on logistic
policies, even though such is not the case today due to the force of your
personality.14
It is doubtful whether McNair clearly
understood Somervell's proposals. Certainly the concept of a service commander
was not intended by any means to impair the responsibility of the corps, the
Army, or the theater commander for service activities. Rather the proposal was
only expected to give a combat commander what the ASF thought would be a more
adequate organizational arrangement for performing his supply and service
activities. The crux of the situation was acknowledged by McNair in his
admission that Somervell was, in fact, the G-4 of the War Department as well as
the commanding general of the Army Service Forces. The question was whether a
subordinate commander should also be a major staff adviser to the Chief of
Staff.
In addition to reflecting the realities
of War Department organization as it operated during the war, Somervell's
recommendations further evidenced the peculiar composition of the ASF itself.
Before 9 March 1942, as noted earlier, G-4 of the
[142]
War Department General Staff and the
Office of the Under Secretary of War had jointly supervised the procurement and
supply operations of those large War Department units which were now called
technical services. Instead of serving as a staff' officer supervising these
technical services, however, Somervell had become a commander with direct
authority to issue orders to these agencies. Yet Somervell still looked upon
himself as the G-4 of the War Department and, in fact, he had become General
Marshall's principal adviser on all supply and movement matters.
The kind of formal relationship
Somervell envisaged did in fact exist between General Marshall and General
Arnold. As the commander of the AAF, Arnold was far more than the head of a
training and supply command within the United States. He and his staff were the
principal War Department agents directing air operations in overseas theaters.
This special status of the commanding general of the Army Air Forces during the
war has been recognized in the official history of the AAF. ". . .
Regardless of the legal position of the AAF as a service and training
organization without combat functions, its chief was in fact a most powerful
agent in the conduct of war, in the several theaters." 15
In overseas commands, the head of the Air Forces was also the chief air planner
for the commanding general. In a letter to General Spaatz on 30 July 1942,
Arnold clearly indicated his idea of desirable organization for air activities:
"In connection with planning," he wrote, "I would like to have
you see Eisenhower and get him to accept your headquarters as his air planning
unit. Get him to use you in that way as he is the head of the United States
Armed Forces in Europe. I want him to recognize you as the top air man in all
Europe." 16
The organizational difficulty within
the War Department was simply that the concept of staff organization, as
advanced by the Harbord Board in its recommendations of 1921, had apparently
been frozen in the minds of most Army officers. Confronted with a situation
involving numerous separate operating units, the War Department had developed
the concept of a general staff which enabled a commander to deal effectively
with all of these agencies. Few seemed to realize that when the number of
subordinate operating units was reduced, one of two situations could result: the
prior staff organization might become unnecessarily elaborate, or the
subordinate commanders would now have a much larger point of view and
accordingly be prepared to present plans which previously had depended on staff
endeavor.
Following the rejection of Somervell's
reorganization proposals, the General Staff assumed the offensive and sought to
reestablish its position. The subsequent history of the relations between G-4
and the Army Service Forces is a case in point.
On 2 July 1943, the Secretary of War
created a 'War Department Procurement Review Board with instructions to examine
procurement plans and machinery of the ASF and the AAF.17
From a technical point of view, the recommendations of the board were important,
for they brought
[143]
about changes in the calculation of the
Army Supply Program.18
But these technical changes are not of major interest here. The board commented
several times that G-4 should check the methods used to calculate the Army
Supply Program or otherwise exercise supervision over the ASR Thereafter, the
influence of G-4 was greater, or at least ASF found it expedient to keep G-4
fully informed about what it was doing.
This development did not substantially
change ASF relations with G-4 although two conflicts, one toward the close of
1944 and the other in 1945, did take place. On 24 September 1944 ASF requested
the War Department for permission to disregard computed requirements for a two
front war in 1945 when those requirements exceeded production capacity as of
December 1944. This request was contrary to a memorandum from G-4. Early in
October the Deputy Chief of Staff told General Somervell that his proposal was
generally acceptable. He indicated that G-4 would gradually adjust total
requirements for all supplies downward. But since G-4 did not wish to make
revisions until 1 July 1945, Somervell, on 13 October again wrote the Chief of
Staff. He argued that the progress of the war to date was such that the War
Department could afford to take the risk of not building additional production
facilities for items of equipment whose demand would increase in 1945. The Army
Service Forces had prepared a separate procurement program for the war against
Japan, and contractors had already been informed of the expected changes in
production schedules occasioned by the shift from a two-front to a one-front
war.19
This time Somervell's recommendation
was officially accepted, and the ASF was instructed not to attempt to procure
supplies in the first half of 1945 in excess of existing production capacity.
Thus the reluctance of the Supply Division to approve a reduction of supply
requirements as of 1 January 1945 was overruled.
Another conflict between ASF and G-4
arose after V -J Day over the subject of reserve supplies to be kept by the
Army. The Army Service Forces suggested that items such as guns, tanks, and
ammunition, which would continue to be of use to the Army, should be retained,
while other items of general supplies, such as tents, axes, clothing, building
equipment, trucks, and railroad rolling stock, should be released. Somervell
believed that such a policy would make a substantial contribution toward easing
civilian shortages. G-4 objected to the ASF proposal because it feared that the
War Department might have difficulty in the postwar years in obtaining
appropriations to purchase new supplies.20
Confronted by conflicting recommendations, the Secretary of War (now Mr.
Patterson, the former Under Secretary) in November 1945 appointed a board of
officers to review both proposals. Eventually, a compromise was effected.
That such difficulties arising from the
anomalous relationship of the ASF and G-4 did not become more formidable was
largely the result of Somervell's own aggressive behavior in pushing the work of
[144]
the ASK On supply matters in particular
there was no one in the War Department General Staff, especially in G-4, who
felt it necessary to question the performance of the ASF. Had that performance
ever been less than exemplary, the record of ASF General Staff relationships
might well have been very different.
In the spring of 1943 Somervell was
interested not only in a reorganization of the WDGS but also in setting up a
standard organization for supply and service activities performed within large
combat units and in overseas theaters. The "basic idea" for the
memorandum on organization of service activities in theaters of operations,
signed by Somervell on 1 June 1943, was "to effect unity of command-of
linking responsibility and authority-over-all supply and administrative matters
in each theater and in each tactical unit through one individual responsible to
the commander both as a staff officer and as the commander of service
troops." One purpose of the proposal was "to eliminate the present
duplications between the administrative side of the General Staff (G-1 and G-4),
the special staff, and the commanders of certain supply and administrative
areas, units, and installations by bringing them under a single logistical
control at both the staff and line levels." A second purpose was to reduce
the number of special staff officers reporting directly to a military commander.
In essence, Somervell's suggestion
amounted to this. A military commander, whether of a division, an army, an army
group, or of a theater of operations, should have a small staff made up of two
units, one on intelligence and the other on operations. He would then have such
subordinate combat commanders as might be assigned to his command, plus a single
individual commanding all services,
supply, and administrative activities. This supply commander would advise the
operations staff on the administrative and supply aspects of all proposed
military operations and would similarly advise the commanding general himself.
He would then be responsible for executing supply and service aspects of the
proposed military operations. In a sense, these recommendations did no more than
suggest a standard organization for large combat commands and overseas theaters
similar to the arrangement which in reality already existed for the War
Department in the United States.21
In October 1943 the War Department did
suggest a standard organization for overseas theaters and published instructions
"for the information and guidance of all concerned." 22
One part of the circular dealt with the organization of large combat units, such
as corps and armies; another with the organization of a "communications
zone." The circular suggested that, in the interests of economy and
efficiency, unnecessary decentralization and dispersion of supply activities
should be avoided. Consolidated supply and repair depots were more efficient
than small establishments and the storage of theater supplies in a few rather
than many places would simplify inventory control and reduce inventory levels.
The recommendations also emphasized that it was essential to clear ports of
debarkation rapidly. A general concept was set forth that the hospitals, the
signal service, the engineer construction service, and the transportation
service of the communications zone should serve the entire theater.
[145]
Organization charts attached to the
circular sketched a desirable organization for a theater of operations. Under
the headquarters of the theater, there were four component commands: two armies,
an air force, and a communications zone. This same chart indicated the component
parts of the suggested communications zone. These were six in number, consisting
of a Base Section, an Intermediate Section, an Advanced Section, a
Transportation Service, a Communications Service, and a Construction Service.
Four supporting charts suggested desirable organization for a section (whether
base, intermediate or advanced), a port, and a depot.
The War Department circular, however,
said nothing about the relationships which should exist between the commanding
general of the communications zone and the commanding general of the theater of
operations. It was apparently assumed that there would still be a G-4 on the
staff of the theater commander and that there might even be such "special
staff officers" as the commander desired.
Thus, in the European Theater of
Operations for the invasion of France, there was a communications zone with a
commanding general. There was also a G-4 section in Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Forces, which also served as the G-4 of the American commanding
general (Eisenhower). There was a medical officer for the commanding general of
the theater, separate from the medical officer in the communications zone. For
the most part, however, the chief engineer, the chief quartermaster, signal
officer, and other such officers in the communications zone also served as the
chief of the service for the theater as a whole. This arrangement caused
considerable confusion.
Not all overseas theaters adopted the
pattern suggested by War Department
Circular 256. Many variations continued to exist, in part because General
Marshall believed that the overseas commander should make such organizational
arrangements as he thought desirable. At the same time he encouraged Somervell
to develop close and direct communication between ASF headquarters and supply
officers in the field through overseas visits. This was as far as the Chief of
Staff would go. 23
General Somervell never succeeded in
obtaining a revision of the War Department General Staff that reflected the
actual situation which made him in fact the Chief of Staff's principal adviser
on supply matters. Potentially, he might have occupied a similar status on all
personnel matters. But he was never to have this status formalized in official
orders.
Somervell conceived of the ASF as a
supply and service command which was prepared to do for the War Department Chief
of Staff everything that before 1942 had been performed by G-1, G-4, all the
units of the so-called special staff, and the OUSW He felt that this role should
be formalized in the War Department structure and in overseas commands. He was
in effect the advocate of a wholly new concept of staff and command for the
Army.
Never at any time did he question the
command role of the Chief of Staff of the Army. Nor did he question the need for
a "general staff." He said only that formally the Chief of Staff
should organize his staff into two units-an intelligence unit and an operations
unit. Somervell recognized also that the operations unit would necessarily have
to be large; it probably would
[146]
require personnel and troop
organization groups as well as a logistics group within it. But Somervell
thought the real planning should be carried on in the headquarters of the Army
Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Army Service Forces.
General Marshall's attitude toward the
Somervell proposals can only be deduced from the events. There is no evidence
that he discouraged Somervell from submitting his suggestions. But neither did
he push them after he received them. Marshall probably regarded the whole issue
as theoretical, or perhaps as relatively unimportant. He was undoubtedly fairly
well satisfied with War Department organization as it was functioning in 1943.
The proposed changes would not have made any real change in Somervell's status,
and Marshall was presumably more interested in the realities than in the
formalities of individual position and authority. With his well-known belief
that "details" should be left to the overseas commanders, Marshall was
also satisfied to let personalities and performance in the theaters of
operations determine the desirable and workable organizational arrangements. He
could see no real reason for making a change in 1943, and so he let his staff
argue as they wished the niceties of organizational structure. For the duration
of the war nothing came of the whole discussion. Somervell's authority remained
as before. In fact he was still the supply staff and the supply command of
the War Department when the war ended.[147]
Page Created June 13th 2001
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