Endnotes for Chapter II

1 JB 325, sers.642 and 642-1; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, App. A, pp. 133-37.

2 New York Sun, May 10, 1940.

3 Churchill's pledge was made to Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy and repeated in Kennedy's separate message to the Department of State, 15 May 1940, quoted in Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 482. His message to the President is printed in his volume, The Second World War, Vol. II, Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949) (hereafter cited as Their Finest Hour), pp. 24-25.

4 Notes on Conf in OCS, 17 May 40; Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 18 May 40. Both in WPD 4115-14. Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 615-16. See Chapter VIII, below, for details on the staff conversations begun on 9 June.

5 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 40, WPD 4175-7.

6 Memo, CofS for WPD, 23 May 40; WPD Aide-Memoire, 23 May 40. Both in WPD 4175-10.

7 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 10, WPD 4115-15; Ltr, Rear Adm Andrew C. Pickens to Adm Stark, Rio de Janeiro, 26 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Also references cited in footnote 6, above, and Hull, Memoirs, 1, 821.

8 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, pp. 161-62, and notes 29-32; Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 95-96, 106.. It is possible that the services prepared the POT of GOLD plan at the President's insistence but with no real conviction that its execution might be necessary. On the same day that the draft plan was submitted, Admiral Stark wrote a personal letter to Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in which he-indicated that the maximum foreseeable diversion of vessels to the Atlantic would be less than the number that would probably be required for the POT OF GOLD plan. Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 parts (Washington: 1946) (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Attack), Pt. 14, p. 944.

9 Notes, title: Meeting With the Business Advisory Council . . . 23 May, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

10 JB 325, set 642-4; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, pp. 163-65; Memo, WPD for CofS, 10 Jun 40, WPD 4175-12. See also Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 11-21, on war planning and the development of the situation in May and June 1940.

11 Brief of Jt A&N Basic War Plan RAINBOW 4, JPC Report, 30 May 40, in Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, App. A, pp. 144-48; Draft of RAINBOW 4 plan submitted by JPC to JB, 31 May 40, JB 325, set 642-4.

12 Ibid.

13 Ltr, JPC to JB, 31 May 40, JB 325, ser 642-4. Italics in original.

14 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1940 volume: War-and Aid to Democracies (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941) (hereafter cited as FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940), pp. 259-64.

15 Ibid., p. xxiv.

16 Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944) (hereafter cited as Lend-Lease), pp. 24-28; Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 309-14; Richard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-1943, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington: 1955), pp. 32-36.

17 Memo, Gen Strong for Gen Marshall, 15 Dec 45; Notes on Conf in OCS, 17 Jun 40. Both in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 15, pp. 1908-10, 1929-31. The alert messages of 17 June are in AG 381 (6-17-40), and the follow up papers are in WPD 4322 (Hawaii) and WPD 4326 (Panama). See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Chs. IV and X.

18 Ltr, CG Fourth Army to CofS, 28 Jun 40, OCS 14943-24. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. .VII.

19 Memo, Jt Planners for CofS and CNO, 16 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

20 Memo, Gen Strong for CofS, 17 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

21 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3. This copy is marked "Final revision." For the earlier version, dated 22 June, and the President's informal comments and decisions made on 24 June, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 110-13.

22 App. A, Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 27 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

23 Report, JPC to CofS and CNO, 26 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

24 William L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 46.

25 Ibid., p. 57.

26 Hull, Memoirs, I, 798.

27 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to isolation, p. 573, quoting note, Lord Lothian to President Roosevelt, 4 Jul 40.

28 During a visit of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, to Washington, 7-11 July 1940, the President decided to keep the fleet in Hawaiian waters for the time being. The Army at this time was still urging that strong detachments of the fleet be sent to the Atlantic to implement the RAINBOW 4 plans then being prepared. Kittredge MS, Ch. 12, p. 277.

29 A nationwide poll conducted about 1 June 1940 by Fortune magazine indicated the following state of American public opinion: nearly 94 percent of those questioned approved spending "whatever is necessary to build up as quickly as possible our army, navy, and air force"; 63 percent believed that Germany would try to seize territory somewhere in the Western Hemisphere; and 45 percent thought that it would attack American territory as soon as possible. Only 27 percent favored entering the war either at once or if Britain and France seemed sure to lose without United States armed intervention. Nearly as many favored absolute neutrality, with no aid to Britain or France whatsoever. Special Supplement to Fortune magazine, July 1940.

30 See Ch. X, below.

31 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, pp. 192, 199-205, 253, 291.

32 Watson, Prewar Plant and Preparations, pp. 168-82, presents a comprehensive account of the evolution of this program.

33 Jt Memo, CofS and CNO for President, 22 Jun 40, WPD 4250-3.

34 Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. VII.

35 For further details, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in in World War II, Vol. VI, Men and Planes (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955) (hereafter cited as AAF VI), pp. 263-71.

36 Tab B, Memo, WPD for CofS, --Jun 41, WPD 3807-83.

37 See Greenfield and Palmer, "Origins of the Army Ground Forces: General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-42," in The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, pp. 5ff.
Initially, the War Plans Division proposed to transfer its detailed planning functions and control over theater and task-force operations to General Headquarters about 15 September 1940. With Britain's stout resistance to German attacks, the likelihood of extensive early operations faded, and General Marshall deferred the activation of General Headquarters as an agency-for planning and directing operations until the following summer. Pets Ltr, Gen Strong to Gen Marshall, 6 Aug 40; and Memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Aug 42 (and notations thereon). Both in AGF file, Miscellaneous Correspondence, AGF Drawer 603.

38 See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch.. II.

39 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 27-28; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 549.

40 See Civilian Production Administration, Industrial Mobilization for War: Program and Administration (Washington: 1947), Ch. IV and chart on p. 37.

41 Memo, WPD for CofS, 29 Mar 40, WPD 3977-2.

42 Memo, President for SN et al., 8 Mar 40, JB 326, ser 652-1.

43 Ltr, SW to Secy State, 31 May 40, WPD 4313; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation. pp. 429-33. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding. the United States, Ch. XIII.

44 Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIV, and Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation. pp. 433-35.

45 Memo, President for Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, 4 May 40; Memo, Mr. Welles for President, 6 May 40. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

46 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 814-16; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 625-26. When France fell, French forces were withdrawn. British forces remained until relieved by American troops in February 1942.

47 Unsigned Memo, 21 May 40, OCS Conf Binder 2, Emergency Measures, 1939-40.

48 Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 May 40, WPD 4175-7.

49 Ltr, Davies to President, 23 May 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

50 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 40, and pen notations thereon, WPD 4175-9; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, notes 25-27.

51 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, p. 161 (text) and pp. 124-25 (fns.); Jt A&N RAINBOW 4, JB 325, set 642-4.

52 Hull, Memoirs. 1, 816.

53 Hull, Memoirs, I, 791-92, 816-18; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 550, 627; Kittredge MS, Ch. 8.

54 Hull, Memoirs, I, 822-24; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to isolation, pp. 688ff.; Memo, Asst Secy State Berle for President Roosevelt, 18 Jul 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

55 Documents on American Foreign Relations, July 1939 June 1940, II, 95.

56 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 697.

57 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 818-20.

58 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 690.

59 Kittredge MS, Ch. 8, p. 188 and fns.; Memo, WPD for ACsofS G-3 and G-4, 11 Jul 40, WPD 4337.

60 Hull, Memoirs, 1,818-20; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 691. The manner in which supplies to Martinique were to be controlled is illustrated by the following: On 12 August 1940, "it was agreed that the Navy should give the State Department figures of what they considered the necessary amount of gas and oil to be sent to Martinique, and the State Department would arrange with oil companies to restrict shipments to that amount." Notes on SLC mtg, 12 Aug 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 55.

61 See Ch. IV, below.

62 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 24ff.; Kittredge MS, Chs. 7, 9. When the Eureopean war began in 1939, the United States had about 153 old "four-stackers," almost all of them in storage; most of these were recommissioned as destroyers or converted to other types of vessels between September 1939 and the fall of 1940. After the destroyer-base deal, the United States had left eighty-three of the vessels, either in commission or available for recommissioning as destroyers. Statistics compiled from Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939, 1940, and 1941 editions (New York: The Macmillan Company).

63 Memo, CNO for President, 21 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Kittredge MS, Ch. 9, p. 198.

64 All of the above quotations are from Memo, President for SN, 22 Jul 40, and annotations thereon, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

65 On the work of the Century Group, see Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 746-49.

66 J. R. M. Butler, History of the Second World War-United Kingdom Military Series, Grand Strategy. Volume II: September 1939 June 1941 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957) (hereafter cited as Grand Strategy, II), pp. 244-45. Lord Lothian's suggestion of late May may have been prompted by American planning at that time for the emergency occupation of European possessions, if necessary, to keep them out of German hands.

67 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 401-02.

68 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, p. 747.

69 President's notes on Cabinet mtg, 2 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Diary of Henry L. Stimson, entry of 2 Aug 40. A microfilm copy of the Diary was examined at the Sterling Library, Yale University.

70 Memo, Lord Lothian for President, 5 Aug 40, copy sent to Under Secretary of State Welles, same date, and inclosed in Ltr, Welles to President, 8 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Hull, Memoirs, 1, 831.

71 Ltr, Welles to President, 8 Aug 40, and incls, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

72 See Ch. X, below.

73 Memo, undated and unsigned, in President Roosevelt's handwriting and atchd to Welles' memo of 8 Aug, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

74 Stimson Diary, entry of 13 Aug 40; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service: In Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948) (hereafter cited as On Active Service), pp. 356-57; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 758-60; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 406-08.

75 Ltr, Attorney General to SN, 17 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

76 Stimson Diary, entry of 17 Aug 40; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 357-58. See Chapter XIV, below, for the background of the Ogdensburg meeting and for further details of Canadian-American defense negotiations and the work of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense thereafter.

77 Ltr, Welles to President, 19 Aug 40, and inclosed Drafts A and B, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

78 Ibid.; Hull, Memoirs, 1, 835; Notes on Conf in OCS, 20 Aug 40, OPD Records; Memo, Gen Marshall for SW, n.d., SW file, Destroyer-Base; Ltr, SW to Under Secy State, 20 Aug 40, SW file, State Department.

79 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 408-10.

80 Memo, Adm Stark for President, 21 Aug 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

81 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 765-66.

82 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 835-40; Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 765-67; Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 410-14. The final texts of the agreements, as well as the Attorney General's opinion of 27 August, are in FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, pp. 392-405.

83 New York Times, September 4, 1940.

84 Memo of Conv between SW and Mr. Arthur B. Purvis of the British Purchasing Commission, 10 Sep 40; Pets Ltr, SW to Secy State, 14 Sep 40. Both in Stimson Diary under these dates. These two items reviewed all of the circumstances surrounding this omission and urged that it be rectified.

85 New York Times, September 4, 1940.

86 Notes on Conf in OCS, 17 Sep 40, OPD Records; Stimson Diary, entry of 1 Oct 40; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43, Ch. I. See Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 306ff., for the subsequent development of airplane allotments to Great Britain.

87 Hull, Memoirs, 1, 842.

88 Kittredge MS, Ch. 11, pp. 254-55, recording discussions between Vice Adm. Robert L. Ghormley and the British Bailey Committee, 17 to 19 September 1940.

89 Report, JPC to CNO and CofS, 28 Aug 40, WPD 4351-5; Memo, SGS for CofS, 3 Sep 40, OCS Conf Binder 3. See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. X11.

90 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, p. 391.

91 Notes on Conf in OCS, 6 Sep 40, OCS Conf Binder 3.

92 The Private War Journal of General Franz Halder, 9 vols. (hereafter cited as Halder Journal), IV, 170, entry of 23 Aug 40, OCMH files.

93 United States Navy Department, Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1940, 2 vols. (Office of Naval Intelligence: 1947) (hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences, 1940), II, 17-21 entry of 6 Sep 40. Two additional volumes covering 1941 and one volume covering 1942 (hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences, 1941 and Fuehrer Conferences, 1942) were also published in 1947.
Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had weighed the probable German reaction in advance and had decided that Hitler would not take any forceful retaliatory measures. See Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 404. In a letter of 22 August to Senator David I. Walsh, President Roosevelt stated: "In regard to German retaliation, I think you can rest quietly on that score. If Germany . . . wants to fight us, Germany will do so on any number of trumped-up charges." F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, 2 vols., edited by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duel], Sloan and Pearce, 1950) (hereafter cited as FDR Personal Letters), II, 1056-57.

94 Telg, Ambassador Grew to Dept of State, 12 Sep 40, United States Department of State, Peace and War, p. 569.

95 Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolation, pp. 775-76, draws a similar conclusion, as also do the more nearly contemporary interpretations of Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, How War Came (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942 ), p. 107, and of Hanson W. Baldwin, United We Stand (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1941), p. 107.

96 OCS brief of Stillman Memo, 19 Jul 40; Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Jul 40; and other papers. All in WPD 4250-5. See also Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1939 to June 30, 1941, to the Secretary of War, p. 5.

97 On 4 June the War Plans Division had proposed the initial induction and training of thirty-two Guard regiments of various sorts that were to be deployed if necessary to Alaska, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Trinidad-Venezuela area, and the Natal area. Memo, WPD for CofS, 4 Jun 40, WPD 4310-1.

98 This and the following two paragraphs are based principally on the references cited in footnote 96, above.

99 OCS brief of Stillman Memo, 19 Jul 40, WPD 4250-5.

100 Ibid.

101 Mr. Stillman made this surmise in July 1940; Hanson Baldwin stressed the same point in his book, United We Stand, written in or before February 1941.

102 Notes on Confs in OCS, 21 and 23 Sep 40, OCS Conf Binder 3; Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 113-15.

103 Memo, WPD for CofS, 25 Sep 40, WPD 4321-9, Sec. 1, sub: Estimate of the Position of the United States in Relation to the World Situation. This estimate was probably the joint handiwork of Colonel Clark of the Army War Plans Division and Capt. Russell S. Crenshaw of the Navy War Plans Division.

104 Jt Estimate of Situation, 25 Sep 40, WPD 4321-9.

105 Notes on SLC mtg, 5 Oct 40, SLC Min, Vol. I, Item 58.

106 Memo, Gen Strong, WPD, for CofS, 1 Oct 40, WPD 4175-15.

107 FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1940, p. 464.

108 Pets Ltr, President to SW Woodring, 20 Jun 40, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.


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