10 The implementation of JCS Dir 1380/5 was by SCAP Memo No. 6 (TS), 28 Nov 45, which also assigned to various staff sections the execution of the provisions of JCS Dir 1512, 13 Sep 45, and State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, Dir 176/9, 13 Oct 45.
16 SCAP GO No. 2, 2 Oct 45. On 2 October Maj Gen C. A. Willoughby was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and Brig Gen E. R. Thorpe, Chief, Civil Intelligence Section; concurrently, Gen Thorpe remained Chief Counter Intelligence Officer, GHQ, AFPAC.
17 In the period of 1947/1948, new conditions and problems facing the Occupation caused a revision of administrative and operational procedures. By order of G-2, a number of changes were made in the organization of CIS, including its name which became Occupation (Civil) Intelligence.
21 (1) SCAPIN 93, 4 Oct 45, sub: Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties; (2) SCAPIN 115, to Oct 45, sub : Answer to Pro Memoria Conc the Memo of SCAP on Removal of Restrictions on Liberties, dated 4 Oct 45.
22 Ltr, CCD to Ch CI USAFPAC, 15 Sep 45, sub: Periodic Rpt of CCD. In 319.1. Radio and press censorship was instituted on 10 September when the Japanese Government was officially notified that thereafter there would be no dissemination of news "through newspapers, radio broadcasts, or other media of publication which fails to adhere to the truth or which disturbs public tranquility." (SCAPIN 16, 10 Sep 45, known as the "Freedom of Speech and Press" directive) The directive pointed out, however, that "freedom of discussion of matters affecting the future of Japan is encouraged by the Allied Powers, unless such discussion is harmful to the efforts of Japan to emerge from defeat as a new nation entitled to a place among the peace-loving nations of the world."
37 Censorship control had been gradually relaxed as reflected in the volume of work handled by Press, Pictorial & Broadcast Division in the month preceding complete transfer to post-censorship, June 1948: (PPB CCD, Mo Stat Rpt, 30 Jun 48. In CCD 319.1.)
44 Ibid. In consonance with the CinC's general policy of relaxation of all forms of restrictive measures vis-a-vis the Japanese people, all categories of Civil Censorship operations were discontinued on 31 October 1949. This policy decision was one more decisive step toward liberalization of the Occupation and enlarged freedom of action and responsibilities on the part of the Japanese Government.
Civil Censorship, an operating agency of G-2, was instituted under JCS Directive in 1945 primarily as a preventive and security operation. It was designed to implement the broad features of the Potsdam Declaration with a view to eliminating and controlling ultra-nationalistic, militaristic, and subversive influences. The record of censorship in Japan was one of patience and liberal interpretation and steady, progressive relaxations in each successive year: authorization of locally originated radio broadcasts in February 1946, removal of pre-censorship of radio in August 1947 of books in October 1947, of magazines in December 1947 and of newspapers in July 1948.
What minor restraints then remained consisted chiefly of post-facto, sensible precautions against attempts by extremist minorities to abuse the civil liberties granted the Japanese people under a tolerant Occupation. In October 1949 even these barriers of rational protection were lifted, and the Japanese public information and communication media were on their own.
45 (1) SCAPIN 548, 4 Jan 46, sub: Abolition of Certain Political Parties, Assns, Societies and Other Organizations; (2) SCAPIN 550, 4 Jan 46, sub: Removal and Exclusion of Undesirable Pers from Pub Office.
The increase in the number of cases of subversive activity can be largely attributed to the activities of the Japan Communist Party that were inimical to the policies of the Occupation. The number of espionage cases increased with the rise in the number of repatriates returned to Japan from Soviet occupied areas. With the beginning of the repatriation program of Japanese prisoners from Soviet occupied territories, CIC organized Port Interrogation Teams to screen repatriates as they arrived at ports of entry in Japan who were believed to be of interest to CIC. Following the return of these people to their homes, a surveillance in their local prefectures resulted in the detection of espionage agents among some of such returnees.
51 441st CIC, Mo Info Rpts of Activ, Dec 45-Apr 46. Extensive courses in report writing, the jurisdiction and limitations of CIC operations, and investigative procedures were offered, along with briefings on the organization of CIS G-2, AFPAC, and SCAP. As had been the case since the first CICTS class, outside experts on all subjects related to the counter intelligence mission came as guest speakers to give the agents a thorough indoctrination.
52 For more complete coverage of PSD, see GHQ SCAP, Int Ser, Vol. IX, Operations of the Civil Intelligence Section, GHQ, SCAP, Part II (S). The mission of PSD is delineated in SCAP-FEC GO No. 13, 1 945, and in SCAPFEC Staff Memo No. 7, 1949, which required PSD to advise, guide, coordinate, inform SCAP and effectuate democratic practices and procedures in police, fire, prison and coast guard services of the Japanese Government.
53 GHQ FEC MIS GS, Rpt (S) sub: Org and Functions, G-2 SCAP & FEC, 1 Apr 48. The scientific character of Occupation reforms was evident in the high caliber of its consultants. PSD employed the services of Mr. L. J. Valentine, former Police Commissioner of New York and Mr. O. G. Olander, Superintendent of the Michigan State Constabulary.
54 Months of inspection, evaluation and comparison went into development of a single PSD recommendation with approval having far reaching effect on Japanese life and welfare as well as the economic stability of their government.
55 84,000 police were trained and retrained during 1948 and early 1949. It was expected that 102,000 would be trained in 1949-1950. Modern texts and curricula were developed and revised. The National Public Safety Commission, with 46 prefectural and 1598 municipal commissions, became increasingly important in internal security, and required guidance. 125,000 police required effective arms and training in their use.
56 Continued assistance was essential since crimes, fires, illegal entrants and prison population necessitating PSD help showed no decline. PSD experts guided the Japanese Government in submitting and obtaining ample budgets on a sound basis. Amounts originally requested (subsequently reduced through PSD guidance), proposed by Finance Ministry (F/M), and recommended and obtained by PSD are shown below. Fifty-one billion yen was saved the Japanese Government without appreciable loss in effectiveness. (Figures in millions of yen)
58 Field inspections revealed that 100,000 persons were incarcerated in 65,000 capacity space. Legislation for a relatively good prison and parole system was enacted but required supervisory implementation to be effective. Technical knowledge was lacking among Japanese Government officials.
60 Twenty-three coast guard bases utilizing 46 patrol craft were established protecting 9,369 miles of coastline. Training for 10,000 personnel was inaugurated using new texts, curricula and methods. The coast guard agency was new to the Japanese Government which was utterly devoid of skilled technicians or know-how. Illicit traffic was declining.
It should be noted that this coverage was accomplished with one-third the strength of the MP's. In terms of realistic percentage, CIC executed 100 percent security coverage as compared with 57 percent Military Police coverage, but on the numerical basis of approximately 30 percent relative strength.
63 See FM-101-5, Sec. II, par. 15 (b). A modification of functions for civil intelligence missions and development of new Occupation problems resulted in a reorganization of CIS Operations Branch into four main sub-units Special Activities Branch (S/A) which dealt with left-wing subversion; General Activities Branch (GSA) which was concerned with right-wing activity, ultra-nationalism, foreign nationals in Japan, checking on conformance with SCAP directives, and screening persons subject to the purge; Compilations Branch, which gathered background information on personalities and organizations of counterintelligence interest; and the Executive Group under which was placed the Publications and Files Sections as well as a classification and control section which disseminated intelligence gathered by field agencies, collated and processed by the other branches.
65 (1) Bull No. 4, to Apr 47, Sec II, Exec Order 9835, sub: Prescribing Procedures for the Adm of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Exec Br of the Govt; (2) DA Cir 338, 28 Oct 48, sub: Organizations Considered by the AG to Have Interests in Conflict with Those of the U S.
66 In 1947 when Washington authorities became seriously concerned with the problem of internal subversion and certain organizations and publications were publicly designated by the Attorney General of the United States as Communist, subversive or Fascist, CIS was given the responsibility of implementing the loyalty check on personnel in the FEC. In applying the loyalty criteria concerning communism, three categories had been set up: (standards prescribed in D/A Cir No. 17, par 2, 18 Jan 47) membership in the Communist Party, close affiliation with the Party, and close association with known members of the Party. In the FEC, association with Japan Communist Party members and organizations was also included. Membership or sympathetic association with any of the Attorney General's list of organizations was not taken as the sole criterion of disloyalty, however, but rather as a warning to the various CIS components to be on the alert, in their mission as "watchdog of the Occupation."
67 The Japanese political situation was of continuing interest to the Domestic Subversion Desk. The information compiled by political analysts in connection with the arrest of war criminals and the conduct of the purge proved invaluable in following the complicated course of mushrooming political parties,' organizations, and individuals. The Political Subsection maintained current, detailed rosters of political parties within the Diet and a large miscellaneous file on activities within the political organizations which had potentialities of being antagonistic to the Occupation. Even after the staff reponsibility for the administration of the SCAPIN regarding undesirable personnel in public office was com- pletely taken over by Government Section, the Political Desk continued to collate, evaluate, and report information on political trends for the special purposes of civil and counter intelligence.
Each repatriate to Japan was required to provide personal information: his name, destination, permanent address, registered address, branch of military service, military rank or civilian occupation, unit, place of internment, education and, if interrogated code indicating type of information supplied. One copy of each card bearing such information was forwarded to the ATIS Central Interrogation Center in Tokyo, and the duplicate was used to establish in G/A Branch a central repatriate file providing locator cards on adult Japanese repatriates and a supplementary file of all military men, organized by internment camps in which they spent the longest period. The purposes of the file were wide and varied. It offered to G-2 user agencies the possibility of locating uninterrogated repatriates after their processing at the port had been completed. It helped ATIS Central Interrogation Center locate subjects for re-interrogation, and aided CIC in checking addresses of repatriates of counter intelligence interest whose whereabouts were uncertain.
68 441st CIC Det, Mo Info Rpts of Activ, Dec 46 and Dec 47. Cases of this nature processed through Special Projects Section increased from 453 for the month of December 1946 to 1,575 during December 1947, although a case load chart could not adequately indicate the labor involved. During December 1947, for example, of 139 cases completed in headquarters on JCP activities, 357 investigations were run in field units.
75 ATIS furnished translation, interrogation, and interpreter service to key civil and military sections in SCAP and GHQ, as well as to subordinate units, and procured and processed documents for evacuation to Washington. The large volume of work handled is indicated by the following figures
During 1947 and 1948, ATIS translated monthly an average of 17,117 pages from issues of 45o different newspapers and magazines. An average of 13,234 communications per month from the Japanese to the CinC and the Allied Council was translated and analyzed to sample public opinion trends among the Japanese people. Those requiring action were forwarded to the responsible Occupation agency. (G-2 GHQ FEC, ATIS Hist Rpt, 1947-48
81 One third of this number was concentrated in the Kansai area (mainly in Kyoto, Hyogo and Osaka Prefectures), the remainder being scattered throughout Japan, with fairly heavy concentrations in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Yamaguchi, Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Aichi, Okayama and Shiga Prefectures.
82 CIS Periodical Sum No. 17, 15 Jun 47. While not concerned normally with smuggling activities either of persons or materials, CIC unit commanders were instructed to maintain close observation and report immediately all possibilities of subversive activities connected with illegal entrants (e. g. the smuggling into Japan of Communist literature). Cases which indicated no activity of counterintelligence jurisdiction were turned over to the local Military Government or tactical unit for disposition. (Ltr, HQ 441st CIC Det, 26 Aug 47, sub: Handling of Illegal Repatriates.)
84 (1) Sp Rpt, Compilations Br, 15 Dec 47, sub: Korean Smuggling Activities. (2) In Nagano Prefecture the Chief of Police reported that the majority of Koreans had no regular occupation and 60 to 80 percent were alleged blackmarketeers or bootleggers. (CCD Intercept JP/TOK/60053, 14 Oct 47) (3) In an attempt to obtain rationed goods for illegal sale, Koreans frequently resorted to the simple expedient of exaggerating the number of persons in a family or continuing to draw rations for individuals who had left the community. This "ghost population" was a problem in almost every Korean settlement. In one instance, four Koreans succeeded in obtaining ration books for 838 persons, with bogus official documents. By forging "Removal of Residence" certificates and pretending to reside in several villages simultaneously, they were able to amass approximately 300 bales of rice in a few weeks. (S/I, CIC Area 28, 4 Aug 47, sub: Arrest of Koreans.)
86 Interpreting the demand for "racial autonomy" as a refusal to comply with the law, the Education Bureau ordered Korean schools closed and, when they continued to operate in defiance of the ban, undertook to close them. Demonstrations, petitions, and a spectacular series of disturbances featuring sitdown strikes, imprisonment, and intimidation of local officials and various other types of agitation extended over several weeks.
From 23 to 26 April 1948 Koreans in Kobe defied all authority, rioted, wrecked the governor's office, and forcibly detained prefectural officials until they signed, under duress, statements rescinding the order to close Korean schools and directing the release of all Koreans held in connection with the disturbance. (S/I, CIC Area 8, 25 Apr 48, sub Korean Educational Strife.) In Osaka, 7,000 Koreans stormed and wrecked the prefectural governor's office following the arrest of 100 agitators and resorted to violence when police attempted to eject them. (S/I, CIC Area 9, 28 Apr 48, sub: Koreans Hold Mass Meetings and Demonstrations in Osaka City.) Rioting continued in both cities even after police had taken the ringleaders into custody. Both Japanese and Occupation Military Police reinforcements were called into action. Subsequently, the education issue was settled when Korean leaders agreed to comply with the original Education Ministry order. (G-2 GHQ FEC, Daily Int Sum No. 2096, 3 May 48.)
87 (1) Ltr, MID, WD 350.09, pars. 3 (1), 4c (2), 9 Oct 45, sub: Far East Int Requirements; (2) SCAP GO r3, Functions of CIS, 2 Oct 45; (3) JCS Dir 1538, 5 Oct 45, sub: Provisions for the Coordinated Exploitation of Japanese Int Targets of Inter-departmental and International Concern; (4) SCAP GO 15, 9 Nov 45, sub: Japanese Civilian Int Targets.
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