Chapter XIII
Endnotes

1 CCS Report to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, 9 Feb 45, CCS 7763, JCS and CCS Papers, G-3 Ex (TS).

2 JCS Planners Report, 29 Mar 45, JCS 521/ 13, JCS and CCS GHQ (TS).

3 JCS Radio No. WX-62774 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and CG 20AF, 4 Apr 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. J57 (TS). See Chapter XII.

4 C/S WD Radio No. WAR-67098 to CINCSWPA, 12 Apr 45, C/S GHQ S, WD No. 977 (TS).

5 CINCAFPAC Radio No. C-14442 to WARCOS, 20 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, WD No. 982 (TS).

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. General MacArthur's strategy was predicated primarily on the basis of available American resources. The consideration of possible aid from the Soviet Union was not included in these estimates.

10 CINCPOA Radio No. 280235/Z to CINCAFPAC, 28 Apr 45, C/S GHQ, Navy 625 (TS).

11 Report on CINCAFPAC-CINCPAC Conference at Manila, P.I., 16 May 45, C/S GHQ, Navy 633 (TS).

12 JCS Directive 1331/3 to CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and CG 20AF, 25 May 45, JCS and CCS Papers 6, G-3 Ex (TS).

13 GHQ, AFPAC, "Downfall" Strategic Plan for Operations in the Japanese Archipelago, 28 May 45 (TS). Hereinafter cited as: Downfall.

14 Ibid.

15 Report No. 9 to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, "Outline of Emergency Procedure for the Decisive Battle," 25 Jan 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

16 Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief of the Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, to Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

17 Report No. 10 to the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War, "Estimate of the World Situation," 15 Feb 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

18 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. I, Nov 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

19 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. IV, Oct 4 6 , pp. 37-38 Map No. 2 ; Vol. V, Oct 46, pp. 4-5, 17-21, 28-30, 32, 38, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. The Japanese coastal-combat divisions were organized specifically for beach defense and compared favorably in strength with the regular line-combat divisions. Although the coastal-combat divisions lacked the heavy artillery weapons and mobility of the regular line divisions, they excelled the latter in infantry fire power, being well equipped with rifles, machine guns, 75mm and 80mm mortars, and mountain and anti-tank guns. The training of the coastal-combat divisions was not as thorough as that of the regular divisions but it was adequate to carry out the assigned mission of all-out beach defense. The Japanese had also established civilian National Volunteer units under the Volunteer Service Act of 23 June 1945. These civilian units, organized in every prefecture, were expected to aid in rear area maintenance and repair of transportation, communication, supply, and production facilities. First Demobilization Bureau Report No. 1026, 31 Mar 46, submitted in answer to questionnaire by Japanese Liaison Section, GHQ, SCAP; Statement of Maj. Tosaku Hirano, Staff Officer, Second General Army, 21 Oct 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

20 General Defense Command, "Homeland Defense Army Operations Order A No. 2," 9 Feb 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

21 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, Nov 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

22 Imperial General Headquarters, Army Directive No. 2438, Separate Table, " Outline of Preparations for the Ketsu Operation," 8 Apr 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

23 Ibid., Separate Table, " Outline of Plans for Concentration in the Ketsu Operation."

24 Ibid.

25 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Imperial General Headquarters, Army High Command Record, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

26 Ibid.

27 Imperial General Headquarters Army Section, "Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and Spring of 1946," 1 Jul 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

28 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. III, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

29 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Air Operations Record, Dec 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Preparations for Counterattacks against Enemy Landings on the Homeland, Supplement No. 4, May 47, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

30 Imperial General Headquarters Army Section, "Situation Estimate for the Latter Half of 1945 and Spring of 1946," Jul 45, and Supplement No. 1, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC; also statements by Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, 20 May 49, and Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, 20 Aug 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

31 Ibid.

32 Allied Geographical Section, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 130, S.E. Kyushu, 31 May 45.

33 GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "Olympic," Operations in Southern Kyushu, 28 May 45. Hereinafter cited as; Olympic. This plan was later redesignated "Majestic" but is usually referred to by the former name.

34 AGS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 130, S.E. Kyushu, 31 May 45.

35 Downfall.

36 Olympic.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Downfall.

44 Olympic.

45 The estimated arrivals of enemy reinforcements are shown in the following table:

(a) Probably composed of Volunteer Defense Units.

(b) Believed elements of u/i Tank Brigade, Code Name "To."

(c) Does not include: u/i Unit, Code name "Yaku." Believed to be in Southern Kyushu. May be one of the numbered units listed hereon, u/i Unit, Code name "Ho" believed to be in Northern Kyushu. Character unknown.

* Dep refers to Depot.

** IM refers to Independent Mixed Brigade.

46 G-2, GHQ, AFPAC, "Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with Respect to Kyushu," 29 Jul 45.

47 The strategists at Imperial General Headquarters believed that, if they could succeed in inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States in the Kyushu operation, convince the American people of the huge sacrifices involved in an amphibious invasion of Japan, and make them aware of the determined fighting spirit of the Japanese army and civilian population, they might be able to postpone, if not escape altogether, a crucial battle in the Kanto area. In this way, they hoped to gain time and grasp an opportunity which would lead to the termination of hostilities on more favorable terms than those which unconditional surrender offered. Statements by Lt. Gen. Seizo Arisue, so May 49, and Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy Chief, Army General Staff, 13 Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

48 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Supplement to Vol III "Essentials of Sixteenth Area Army Ketsu Operation Plan," Sep 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

49 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Air Operations Record, Dec 46, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

50 Japanese Second Demobilization Bureau Report, Preparations for Counterattacks against Enemy Invasion Landings, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

51 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol III, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

52 Ibid.

53 GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "Coronet," 15 Aug 45. This staff study was published as a matter of interest only. It set forth the first draft of the plan formulated prior to the cessation of hostilities, and was still in an incomplete form.

54 Joint Staff Planners, "An Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," Enclosure "A," 5 5 May 45, pp. 1-2 (TS).

55 AGS, G-2, GHQ, SWPA, Terrain Study No. 132, Tokyo and Kwanto Plain, 30 May 45.

56 Joint Staff Planners, "An Outline Plan for the Invasion of the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," Enclosure "B," 15 May 45 (TS).

57 Ibid.

58 GHQ, AFPAC, Staff Study "Coronet," 15 Aug 45.

59 Ibid. CINCAFPAC Radio No. CX 28768 to WARCOS, 27 Jul 45, G-3, GHQ Admin 381/107-7 (TS). An earlier version of "Coronet" which is mentioned in General of the Army George C. Marshall's biennial report to the Secretary of War of 1 September 1945 called for an invasion by three armies: the First, the Eighth, and the Tenth; it was later decided not to use the Tenth Army in this operation.

60 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. II; also statement by Gen. Kawabe, 13 Jun 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

61 Japanese First Demobilization Bureau Report, Homeland Operations Record, Vol. II, Attached Maps Nos. 1-3, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

62 Ibid. Also statement by Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, Operations Staff Officer, Twelfth Area Army, 24 May 49, Interrogation Files, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

63 Imperial General Headquarters, Army Order No. 1353, Directive No. 2513, 20 Jun 45, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC.

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