1. This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Col. Ichiji Sugita, Imperial Japanese Army. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Feb 39-9 Nov 41; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Twenty-fifth Army, 9 Nov 41-23 Mar 42; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 23 Mar-9 Nov 42; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Eighth Area Army, 15 Nov 42-15 May 43; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 15 May-15 Oct 43; Chief, Intelligence Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 15 Oct 43-31 Mar 44; Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, 1Apr 43-16 Jul 45; Staff Officer (Operations), Seventeenth Area Army, 16 Jul-23 Aug 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.
3. (1) Interrogation of General Hideki Tojo, Premier and War Minister, 1941-4. (2) Statements by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, and Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.
4. Theoretical plans for an invasion of the Philippines in the event of war with the United States had previously been formulated by both the Army and Navy General Staffs as part of normal military preparedness against major potential enemies. However, until the summer of 1941, no concrete plans were seriously considered, and Army strategists saw a possibility of by-passing the Philippines and avoiding war with the United States, even if Japan embarked on operations against Britain and the Netherlands. By September, decision had been reached that such a course would be too risky, and that the Philippines must therefore be included in the overall plan of operations. (Interrogations of Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and General Tojo, previously cited.)
7. These units were identified as follows: 11th Division north of Baguio; 21st, 31st, 41st and elements of 71st and 81st Divisions in central Luzon; 51st Division in southern Luzon (Legaspi); 61st Division on Panay, 81st Division on Cebu and Bohol; 101st Division on Mindanao. By December, total Philippine Army strength was expected to reach 125,000. Ibid., pp. 14-6.
10. Data on General Staff estimate of General MacArthur's probable courses of action furnished by Col. Arata Yamamoto, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Sep 41-Oct 43.
11. When plans for the Philippines operation were studied at the special Army war games in October 1941, Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, later appointed Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Army, asked what consideration had been given to a possible withdrawal of the enemy forces into Bataan. The question was brushed aside without discussion, and it was evident that Imperial General Headquarters had formulated no definite plans to cope with that eventuality (Statement by Lt. Col. Monjiro Akiyama, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Fourteenth Army.)
13. (1) Special importance was placed on the initial air operations because it was believed that the success or failure of the Philippines operation would depend upon the annihilation of enemy air power. Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited. (2) Whether Japan could accomplish the invasion of the Philippines depended upon whether American air power could be destroyed at one blow. Hito Koryaku Sakusen ni okeru Kaigun Sakusen Jokyo (Operational Situation of the Japanese Navy in the Invasion of the Philippines) 2d Demobilization Bureau, 15 May 46, p. 1.
16. In the initial planning stage, Batangas Province, on the west coast of Luzon was also considered as a possible site for the secondary landing. Lamon Bay was chosen because it offered a shorter and less dangerous route of sea approach. Ibid., pp. 50-1.
18. The Fourteenth Army, after its assignment to the Philippines invasion, requested a strength of two and one-half first-line combat divisions for the execution of the Philippines landings, but Imperial General Headquarters refused the request. Transport tonnage allotted to the Philippines was also pared down from an originally estimated 800,000 tons required to 630,000 tons. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 48-50. (2) Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Masami Maeda, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Army.
48. The 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry, which landed at Mauban, first encountered stiff resistance by PhilippineAmerican troops deployed along the coast, and later ran into an enemy force with more than ten tanks at Piis, three miles northwest of Lucban. After beating off enemy counterattacks, the battalion succeeded in rejoining the main force. (Statement by Maj. Shoji Ohta, Staff Officer (Intelligence), 16th Division.)
49. Since the objective of the Imperial General Headquarters was to capture Manila, the main strength of the 48th Division, anxious to beat the 16th Division into Manila, was rushed to the city. (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.)
50. (1) There were two opinions with respect to the mission of the 48th Division: (a) That it should concentrate exclusively on the occupation of Manila; and, (b) that it should advance a strong element to the right bank of the Pampanga River and begin preparations for an attack against Bataan Peninsula. A cool appraisal of the enemy situation would have revealed that serious Philippine-American resistance in the Manila area was out of the question, but indecision with regard to these conflicting opinions was allowed to determine the disposition of the division. It proved impossible to dispel the preconceptions, accompanied as they were by failure to recognize the relationship between Corregidor and Bataan and their effect on the value of Manila. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 115-6. (2) "A small group wished to prevent the withdrawal of MacArthur from Manila. Most of us expected the forces to flee to Mariveles and leave the Philippines. The capture of Manila was the main objective..... At that time we did not realize the value of Bataan as a defensive position." (Interrogation of Col. Motoo Nakayama, Senior Staff Officer, (Operations), Fourteenth Army.)
54. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., p. 118. (2) "In order to prevent the withdrawal (to Bataan) we ordered air force units to bomb the bridges along the route from strafe truck convoys on the road.... Too few air units were assigned the task.... to be effective." (Interrogation of Lt. Col. Hikaru Haba, Staff Officer (Intelligence), Fourteenth Army.)
56. (1) Vital installation in Manila and Cavite, set afire by the enemy, were burning, and looting by the native population had broken out. Ibid., p. 124. (2) Large fires were ragin inside the city, and although it was reported that the Japanese residents had been released from custody, their situation was not clear. Therefore, despite the earlier Army order, it was decided to occupy the city. Statement by Col. Moriji Kawagoe, Chief of Staff, 48th Division.
57. Upon entering the city, the advance guard confirmed the fact that the Japanese colony of approximately 3,500 had already been released from custody by the American military authorities upon the evacuation of General Headquarters to Corregidor. Maj. Gen. C.A. Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had charge of the internment of the Japanese colony, had summoned the Japanese Consul General, Mr. Katsumi Niiro, and released the internees to his custody on 27 December. (Statement by Mr. Katsumi Niiro, former Japanese Consul General in Manila.)
64. Reasons for the Army's actions were: (1) the difficulty of using artillery in the heavily forested area; and (2) desire to conserve ammunition for the attack on Corregidor. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
* American Editor's Note: It is of historical interest that General MacArthur's Director of Intelligence, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, became involved in this landing. On his return to Mariveles after a staff visit to General Wainwright's headquarters in Bagac, General Willoughby was in the vicinity of Agloloma Point at the time of the Japanese landing. As senior officer in the area, he took command of the sector defense forces, belonging to the 1st Provincial Constabulary Regiment, and personally led a series of sharp counterattacks to stop the Japanese advance. Aided by the dense forest terrain along this coast, he was able to deceive the Japanese as to his real strength until reinforcements entered the action on the next day.
66. (1) Casualites of the Fourteenth Army between 9 January and 8 February were 6984. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Suppl., op. cit. (2) "By this time losses, including those not reported to Army, were so great that....only 2,500 rifles were available on the line." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.
67. General Homma's estimate of the enemy situation on Bataan at this time placed the Philippine-American strength at two corps, one operating in the narrow west coast sector with one division and one in the east coast sector with three divisions. The enemy troops were emplaced in a defensive position of great depth and complex organization extending from south of Bagac east along the northern slopes of Mt. Samat to south of Orion. An enemy map showing the extent of the American positions on Bataan had been found in a barracks at San Fabian, and a study oft his map confirmed the intelligence reports concerning the formidable nature of the defense line. The discovery that Bataan was so well organized came as an unpleasant surprise to the Japanese. (1) Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp, 198-9, 227; (2) Interrogation of Col. Kawagoe, previously cited.
* American Editor's Note: The organization of Bataan Peninsula for protracted defense began early in 1940, in complete secrecy. Two officers, subsequently on duty with General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, in Tokyo, were associated with this enterprise: Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, Chief Engineer, and Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby, Director of Military Intelligence. General Willoughby was G-4 of the Philippine Department, 1939-40. Both officers remained on the staff of General MacArthur throughout the campaigns on the Southwest Pacific Area.
68. On 4 or 5 February, Colonel Masami Ishii, Staff Officer of the Southern Army, reported to General Homma and instructed him that General Terauchi desired the attack continued. Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.
69. "We decided to hold the Bagac-Orion line and reorganize in preparation for the next phase of the attack. On 16 February we informed the Southern Army through Colonel Ishii that, with our present strength, the attack could not be continued." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.
74. The naval air contingent arrived at Clark Field on 17 March. While remaining assigned to Eleventh Air Fleet, these bombers and their escort fighters supported the Bataan operations of the Fourteenth Army for a period of two weeks. The first sortie was flown 24 March. Battle Lessons of Great East Asia War, op. cit., pp. 93, 95.
76. "We knew that for the first time in our career we would be opposed by artillery and tanks-in China we never had to worry about that. I requested flame throwers and antitank guns for the operation, but we only received two flame throwers for the division and about two antitank guns." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, 4th Division commander.
77. General Homma wrote with regard to the battle for Bataan: "During the Russo-Japanese War, Port Arthur fell more than four months after the first general attack. Port Arthur was a permanent fortress and considered to be impregnable, and yet it fell. All the more, there is no reason why the attack on Bataan Peninsula, which is a field position, should not succeed. There is no reason in the world why this army cannot do what the attacking forces did to Hongkong and the fortress of Singapore. Jungles are indeed a headache, but, with adequate preparations, the human mind is capable of conquering the forces of nature." Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, Suppl., op. cit., pp. 18-9.
79. On 19 February Lt. Gen. Maeda was relieved as Fourteenth Army Chief of Staff by Imperial General Headquarters and replaced by Maj. Gen. Wachi, who arrived 1 March. Commenting on his relief General Maeda said: "In the first place, I never approved of the attack against Bataan. I knew that there were strong defensive positions and that a great effort would be required for its capture. I had advised that Bataan be isolated and the remainder of the Philippines occupied. Under a blockade, Bataan would gradually weaken and fall in the natural course of events." Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Maeda, previously cited.
87. (1) Extracted from the private papers of Col. Arao, previously cited; (2) Dai Niji Bataan Koryakusen Sento Shoho (Detailed Battle Report on Bataan Operations, 2d Phase) 1st Artillery Headquarters, Fourteenth Army, Jun 42, Attached Chart III.
90. Fourteenth Army on 17 April estimated that the Corregidor garrison consisted of five coast artillery regiments, of which two were Filipino units. Armament ranged from 155mm to 300mm guns. Philippine Operations Record, Phase One, op. cit., pp. 328-30.
92. The 4th Division commander justified the decision to make the initial landings on the narrow part of the island rather than at Morrison Point on the head of the Corregidor on the ground that, since only two battalions could be lifted at one time (due to shortage of landing barges), the narrow part ofhte island offered the best chance of striking a concentrated blow. It was hoped to cut the island in half in this manner. Interrogation of Lt.Gen. Kitano, previously cited.
(Statistics compiled by 1st and 2d Demobilization Bureaus, Japanese Government)
102. During the first two and one-half months of the war there were no notable sea battles. On 24 January four U.S. destroyers raided Balikpapan anchorage in Borneo and sank three ships. In February and March the Japanese sea offensive was intensified. On 27 February Japanese fleet units, which had sortied in support of the Java operations, encountered a combined ABDA task force in the Java Sea, 60 nautical miles northwest of Surabaya. A running battle ensued in which the Japanese, while losing no ships, sank two Allied cruisers and two destroyers. The remnants of the Allied fleet attempted to escape from the Java Sea through Japanese controlled exits. In this endeavor further actions were fought on 1 March, resulting in the sinking of three more Allied cruisers and two destroyers. Three destroyers alone succeeded in escaping. Ranryo Higashi Indo Koryaku Sakuyen (Netherlands East Indies Naval Invasion Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 49, PP. 32, 63-7.