1. This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Imperial Japanese Navy. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry, 1 Dec 39-1 Jun 42; Headquarters, Combined Fleet, 1 Jun-15 Jul 42; Staff Officer (Operations), Eighth Fleet, 14 Jul-24 Dec 42; Staff Officer (Operations), Southeast Area Fleet and concurrently on attached staff duty with Eighth Area Army, 24 Dec 42-10 Dec 43; Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 10 Dec 43-10 Mar 44; Staff Officer (Operations), First Mobile Fleet, 10 Mar-15 Nov 44; Chief, Planning Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 1 Dec 44-1 Jun 45; Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section, 1 Jun-31 Oct 45; Chief, Historical Research Section, 2d Demobilization Bureau, 31 Oct 45-1 Dec 46. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC.
5. A force composed principally of the South Seas Detachment and the Fourth Fleet will invade Guam and Rabaul. With the completion of these operations, the South Seas Detachment will move to Palau, and the Navy will assume responsibility for the defense of these areas. Army-Navy Central Agreement, op. cit.
7. An Imperial General Headquarters order dated 4 January 1942 ordered the South Seas Detachment to "invade the Bismarck Archipelago in cooperation with the Navy as soon as possible after the middle of January." Nanto Homen Sakusen Kiroku Sono Ichi Nankai Shitai no Sakusen (Southeast Area Operations Record, Part I : South Seas Detachment Operations) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Sep 46, p. 7.
9. Reinforcements included one mountain artillery battalion, and one company each of cavalry, engineers, transport troops, and field antiaircraft artillery. Aggregate strength of the Detachment was 4,886 officers and men. Nankai Shitai Sakumei Tsuzuri Showa Jushichi-nen (File of South Seas Detachment Operations Orders, 42) Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. Order No. 4, Embarkation Table of the South Seas Detachment.
10. The Kavieng occupation force consisted of two companies of the Maizuru 2d Special Naval Landing Force, totalling 500 men. The convoy left Truk on 20 January under direct naval escort of two light cruisers and three destroyers. Bisumaku Soromon Shoto Joriku Sakusen (Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon Islands) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 46, pp. 7-12.
12. There was no clear plan to the effect that the South Seas Mandated Islands and the vicinity of Rabaul should constitute the first line of defense, but they were vaguely considered as such. The Army avoided large-scale intervention in the Navy's sphere of defense responsibility (to the east of Borneo and Lesser Sunda Islands), and Army strength in the Rabaul area was kept down to a minimum. (Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)
13. "The Fourth Fleet, following the naval war games of 10-13 September 1941, expressed the opinion that, regardless of whether or not Japan desired to stage a positive offensive in the southeast, it would be necessary to occupy Surumi and Gasmata (on the southern coast of New Britain, Lae and Salamaua (eastern New Guinea) and Tulagi (in the Solomons), if only to defend Rabaul and effect routine air reconnaissance....Again, on 8 January, after thoroughly studying the plans for the Rabaul operation, the Fourth Fleet dispatched a radio to the Combined Fleet stating, "The occupation of Rabaul and Kavieng alone will not improve the situation on the southeastern front unless followed by an invasion of eastern New Guinea." (Statement by Rear Adm. Shikazo Yano, Chief of Staff, Fourth Fleet.)
14. Part IV of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, 5 Nov. 41, listed eastern New Guinea, Fiji and Samoa as areas to be either "occupied or destroyed as speedily as operational conditions permit" after the conclusion of first-phase operations, cf. n. 27, Chapter V.
15. The Navy estimated that Allied offensive strength could not be fully developed before the end of 1942, and that until then only meager forces and limited material would be thrown against the Japanese on the southeastern front. Hence, a further campaign in the New Guinea and Solomons areas would not require the commitment of large Japanese forces.
18. "Enemy air forces were situated in eastern New Guinea and Australia....and elements continued small-scale raids against the Rabaul area." Niyuginiya Kaigun Sakusen (New Guinea Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, May 46, p. 5.
23. Losses were: A converted cruiser, one converted minelayer, one Army transport and a minesweeper sunk; one cruiser, two destroyers, one seaplane tender, one minelayer, and one minesweeper damaged. Personnel killed: 126 Navy, 4 Army. Personnel wounded: 240 Navy, 5 Army. Ibid., pp. 7-9.
25. On 29 June 1942 approximately 200 Australian troops attacked Japanese positions at Salamaua, followed on 1 July by a night raid on Lae by a force of about l00. Japanese naval garrison forces repulsed these attacks, suffering losses of 18 killed and 18 wounded. Niyuginia Shuyo Sakusen (Major New Guinea Naval Operations 1942) Combined Fleet Headquarters, 1943, p. 8. Cf. Vol. I, Southwest Pacific Series: Campaigns of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, Chapter III, references to the Kanga Force.
26. The carrier force of the First Air Fleet, dispatched to the southeast area in January to support the Rabaul and Kavieng operations, was withdrawn immediately after the conclusion of the operations.
28. Owing to the successive commitment of the Combined Fleet's carrier forces in the Java (February-March) and Indian Ocean (early April) operations, this could not be done until the end of April. Nanto Homen Kaigun Sakusen (Southeast Area Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Jan 47, Vol. I, p. 1.
30. "A return to negative policies, involving marking time without active operations while our enemies increase their fighting strength, would in effect render futile all our military successes, and Japan would place herself in the position of waiting for her enemies to attack without any special advantage to herself....Time is the most important factor in the war. We must make every effort to shorten the duration of hostilities, though resolving ourselves to face a protracted struggle if need be." (Extracted from the private papers of Rear Adm. Matome Ugaki, Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet.)
33. The Navy insisted on the capture of the Bismarck Archipelago....because it contained a strategic areaRabaul. Since it was very important from the Navy's standpoint, we decided to take the Bismarcks. Next, the Navy insisted that we capture Port Moresby, in eastern New Guinea. The Navy insisted on taking the Bismarcks and Port Moresby because they would be of great importance in the future, when America might attack with a large navy. Actually, the Army did not want to go into those areas because of the great distances and the problem of supplies. But the Navy asserted that they were necessary for strategic reasons, so we took the Bismarcks. The Army also agreed to take Port Moresby, but the campaign was unsuccessful. There was also this problem: the Navy wanted to take Port Darwin in Northern Australia. They insisted that we take it because the American Navy would use it as a base from which to attack Moresby and the Bismarcks. The Army, on the other hand, claimed that military operations against Australia would be difficult from the point of view of supplies. I absolutely refused to agree to the operation.... (Interrogation of Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)
35. While the discussions on Australia were still under way in Tokyo, the Dutch East Indies Force of the Combined Fleet, based at Amboina (Ceram), took the initiative in carrying out a series of landings on Western (Dutch) New Guinea, and units of the Eleventh Air Fleet carried out aerial reconnaissance of Port Darwin and Horn Island (off Cape York). The landings, effected between 1 and 20 April, were made at Fakfak, Babo, Sorong, Manokwari, Momi, Nabire, Seroei, Sarmi and Hollandia. At the time, the strategic importance of Merauke was not recognized, and no landing was envisaged here. (1) New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 10-1 . (2) Statement by Capt. Yasuji Watanabe, Staff Officer (Operations), Combined Fleet. Cf. Vol. I, Southwest Pacific Series: Campaigns of MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific, Chapter III, reference to construction of Allied air base at Merauke.
36. Japanese intelligence estimated that Allied front-line air strength in the Australia-Papua area had increased to approximately 200 planes by April, with 30-50 aircraft of all types maintained at Port Moresby. Meanwhile, it was assumed that the American Task Force (which appeared southeast of the Solomons in February) was still in the Australian area, operating in conjunction with a battleship and two to three heavy cruisers of the British Fleet. (Statement by Comdr. Kazuo Doi, Staff Officer (Operations), Fourth Fleet.)
37. Intensification of Japanese submarine operations had already been ordered by Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 60, issued 1 March 1942. Under this order, the bulk of Japan's underseas fleet (32 submarines of the Advance Force in the Pacific, and 24 submarines of the Southern Force in the Indian Ocean) was assigned to the disruption of enemy surface traffic, particularly in the areas east and west of Australia. (1) Daikaishi Dai Rokuju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 60) 1 Mar 42. (2) Statement by Capt. Tatsuwaka Shibuya, Staff Officer (Operations), Combined Fleet.
38. Occupation of Nauru and Ocean Islands had first been ordered by the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters on 27 February 1942. The Combined Fleet assigned this mission to the Fourth Fleet, and the initial plans called for the execution of the operation in May, in conjunction with the seaborne attack on Port Moresby. These plans were not carried out, and the islands were not finally occupied until August 1942. (1) Sangokai Kaisen Gaiyo (Summary of Coral Sea Battle) Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, pp. 3, 4, 6, 7. (2) Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 2, 3, 11.
39. The Zuikaku and Shokaku, accompanied by the 5th Cruiser Division, arrived at Truk 29 April. Joint staff conferences of the Fourth Fleet and South Seas Detachment, held at Truk, had completed the operational plans by 17 April.
40. Some high-ranking Army and Navy circles thought that an air and sea war of attrition against Australia might even force that country out of the war, without the necessity of an actual Japanese invasion. (Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.)
41. The invasions of Port Moresby and Tulagi, and also of Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia, were agreed upon by the Army and Navy Operations Sections of Imperial General Headquarters in April. Immediately after this agreement was reached, the Navy Section proposed the invasion of Midway, and this proposal was subsequently included. (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)
42. Midway and the Aleutians had been included among the possible future operations enumerated in Part IV of Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 1, 5 Nov 41. (Cf. n. 36, Chapter V) From February 1942, the Combined Fleet began advocating definite plans for a Navy invasion of Midway, but the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters did not concur. Following the B-25 raid on Tokyo from the American aircraft carrier Hornet on 18 April 1942, Admiral Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, again insisted on the Midway invasion, and the plan was finally adopted by the Army and Navy Sections of Imperial General Headquarters. "The Combined Fleet obtained the concurrence of the Navy Section, Imperial General Headquarters, by insisting that, if Midway were not occupied, the possibility of repeated American air raids could not be minimized, and the Combined Fleet would not accept responsibility for them." (Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.) "The Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, was surprised to learn of the Navy's proposal to carry out the Midway operation, but since participation of only one Army regiment was requested, it agreed to cooperate." (Statement by Col. Hattori, previously cited.)
47. (1) Mo Sakusen ni kansuru Riku-Kaigun Kyotei Oboegaki (Memorandum on the Army-Navy Agreement Regarding the "Mo" [Port Moresby] Operation) 25 Apr 42, p. 2. (2) File of South Seas Detachment Operations Orders, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
50. The Deboyne Islands were occupied on 5 May, but seaplanes operated from the islands only until the following day, when the entire invasion force withdrew. Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon Islands, op. cit., pp. 41-2.
51. The 25th Air Flotilla, newly organized on 1 April to include the 4th Air Group, replaced elements of the 24th Air Flotilla in the Rabaul area on 14 April. Summary of the Coral Sea Battle, op. cit., p. 4.
52. 33 bombers and 11 fighters of the 25th Air Flotilla attacked the American group from Rabaul on 7 May, claiming one battleship sunk and another damaged. Dai Toa Senso Senkun (Koku) Dai Sampen (Battle Lessons of the Great East Asia War-Air, Vol. III) Navy Battle Lessons Analysis Committee (Air Division). pp. 76-83. These claims were subsequently proven false.
55. General sources covering the Coral Sea battle are: (1) Landing Operations in the Bismarck and Solomon Islands, op. cit., pp. 36-42. (2) Summary of the Coral Sea Battle, op. cit. (3) Battle Lessons-Air, Vol. III, op. cit. (4) Private papers of Capt. Mineo Yamaoka, Senior Staff Officer, 5th Carrier Division.
59. The Midway invasion force, with Admiral Yamamoto in command, left the Inland Sea on 29 May. The invasion date was set at 7 June. The Midway sea battle, like the Coral Sea battle a clash of air power without direct surface contact, began on 5 June (Japan time, continuing until the 7th.
61. A primary objective after the deployment of naval air strength to Rabaul had been to gain air supremacy in the Port Moresby area, and the seizure of Lae and Salamaua had been a step toward this objective. From March to July, Japanese naval planes (24th, later 25th Air Flotilla) kept up steady bombing attacks on Port Moresby, reaching a peak of 20 raids during May in which 403 planes were used. Allied losses as a result of these raids were constantly replaced, however, and after July improved anti-aircraft defenses at Port Moresby made the attacks more difficult. Low-altitude bombing became impossible, and the bombing level was raised to about 20,000 feet.
62. Order of battle and disposition of assigned units of the Seventeenth Army as of 1 July were as follows: Commanding General (Lt. Gen. Haruyoshi Hyakutake) and Army Headquarters at Davao (moved to Rabaul 24 July); South Seas Detachment at Rabaul; Kawaguchi Detachment (35th Infantry Brigade), Aoba Detachment (elements of 2d Division, previously in Java), 41st Infantry Regiment (Yazawa Force), and 15th Independent Engineers at Davao, in the southern Philippines. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 6-7, 18-20, 41.
63. The Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive of 12 June stated: The Commanding General, Seventeenth Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall immediately formulate plans for the capture of Port Moresby by employing a land route from the east coast of New Guinea and, to facilitate this planning, will occupy a section along the Mambare River with elements of the Army. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
66. At this stage the Combined Fleet informed the newly activated Eighth Fleet that Port Moresby, even if taken by a land advance, would be difficult to hold and of dubious strategic value unless heavy equipment, including antiaircraft and naval defense guns, not transportable over the Owen Stanley Range, were moved in by sea. To accomplish this, the Combined Fleet proposed new amphibious operations around the southeastern tip of New Guinea as a step toward setting up a coastal supply route over which high-speed transport vessels might operate. (Statement by Vice Adm. Gunichi Mikawa, Commander-in-Chief, Eighth Fleet.)
69. Later staff analysis of the New Guinea operations freely acknowledged the lack of careful preliminary reconnaissance as a contributory cause of Japanese failure. One of these studies stated: "Before the start of any operation, reconnaissance and investigation must be made in detail. Study of terrain and communication routes from military geographies and aerial photographs is of vital importance. It is preferable to rely upon Army rather than Navy planes for reconnaissance for land operations. The Navy, because of its special characteristics, lacks the proper experience to estimate and reconnoiter routes and terrain." Lessons from New Guinea Operations, Japanese document translation published in ATIS Enemy Publication No. 285, 18 Jan 45, p. 3.
70. "At the beginning of the present action (New Guinea Operations), both the Army and Navy were defective in the interpretation of aerial photographs and estimated that roads would permit the passage of practically all motor vehicles...We found many errors. Many places in the jungle (steep slopes, swampy ground, and narrow sections of road) were not seen in the photographs. Therefore, in mountain areas, particular care is necessary in photographic interpretation." Ibid., p. 3.
72. The 82d Naval Garrison Unit had approximately 1,300 troops and was under command of Comdr. Kashin Miyata. The attacks of Gabmatsung and Mubo were begun on 21 July by forces of one company each. Major New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
73. Native reports at this time claimed that the Australians, in anticipation of further attacks, had moved farther inland, setting fire to installations at their Wau, Bulolo and Bulwa air bases. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
76. A radio dispatch from Col. Yokoyama to Maj. Gen. Horii, South Seas Detachment commander reported that the Yokoyama Advance Force "reached the vicinity east of Kokoda on the morning of 28 July. Defeated an enemy force of about 1,200 men and attacked Kokoda the same night. Kokoda occupied at dawn 29 July." Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 41-2.
79. The Eighth Fleet, according to original plan, was to be activated for participation in the New CaledoniaFiji-Samoa operations. When these operations were cancelled following the Midway Battle, the activation was delayed until 14 July, when it was carried out with the object of replacing the Fourth Fleet as the Navy's operating force in the Southeast area. (The Fourth Fleet was then assigned only to defense of the mandated islands and the Gilbert and Wake Islands areas.) The Eighth Fleet formally took over on 27 July, when its headquarters reached Rabaul.
80. This amphibious force was to time its departure to follow the break-through of the South Seas Detachment to the southern side of the Owen Stanley Range. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 39. It was estimated that this would occur by the end of August.
82. On 6 August three transports sailed from Rabaul under naval escort, carrying reinforcements for Buna. With the Guadalcanal attack, however, their fighter cover was diverted to the Solomons, and the convoy returned to Rabaul. Japanese losses thus far in transporting troops to eastern New Guinea were one transport lost and one transport and three escort vessels damaged. New Guinea Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
83. Following the occupation of Tulagi in May 1942, it was found that a portion of Guadalcanal Island was equally suitable for the construction of an air base, and the Fourth Fleet dispatched two naval construction units on 1 July to undertake this project. By 3 August, one airstrip and a dummy field had been roughly completed.(Statement by Rear Adm. Yano, previously cited.)
90. About this time an intelligence report from Moscow to the effect that, owing to heavy losses, the Americans were contemplating withdrawal from Guadalcanal, reached the Navy General Staff. This report was relayed to the Southeast Area Force in a radio sent 16 August by Rear Adm. Shigeru Fukudome, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section.
92. A radio dispatch from Lt. Gen. Moritake Tanabe, Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff, to the Commanding General, Seventeenth Army, on 12 August, stated: "The scope of operations for the recapture of strategic points in the Solomon Islands will be decided by the Army Commander on the basis of his estimate of the enemy situation. The Army General Staff believes that it is feasible to use the 35th Infantry Brigade and Aoba Detachment if the situation demands. However, since tactical opportunity is a primary consideration under existing conditions, it is considered preferable, if possible, to recapture these areas promptly, using only the Ichiki Detachment and Special Naval Landing Forces." Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 52.
99. The new plan called for the commitment of the Seventeenth Army's Aoba Detachment, previously scheduled for use in the New Guinea operations, together with the main body of the 2d Division, transferred from Java. Every effort was to be made to land heavy artillery for the support of ground operations, but if sufficient heavy weapons could not be transported, naval units were to lay down a bombardment of enemy positions to pave the way for the general attack. (1) Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 96-8. (2) Southeast Area Naval Operations, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 21-2.
101. By 22 August nine fighters had flown in from Rabaul and begun operating from the Buna airfiled. After completion of the South Seas Detachment debarkation operations, however, the entire fighter unit was withdrawn on 23 August to be used in the Guadalcanal campaign.
102. (1) The 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, and remaining rear echelon units of the South Seas Detachment landed in the Buna area on 2-3 September, completing the movement. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 84-7. (2) The total strength of Japanese forces thus far sent to Buna for the Papuan campaign was now approximately 14,000 broken down as follows:
There were no further reinforcements or replacements until the middle of November 1942. Cf. Chapter VIII. (Above statistics compiled by the writer and by Maj. Kengoro Tanaka, Staff Officer (Operations), Eighteenth Army, on the basis of all available documentary and other sources.)
107. A company commander of the Kure 3d Special Naval Landing Force recorded in his diary: "We have to take constant cover in the jungle. We cannot send up any smoke at all, for if detected by the enemy, we can't escape bombing and machine-gun strafing....We are soaking wet from head to foot and so uncomfortably cold that we are at our wits' end." (Ibid., p. 11.)
111. Some members of rear-guard units and isolated groups could not be evacuated and were left in the area to find their way through the jungle back to Buna. The horrible suffering experienced by these men was told in a diary picked up by the Allied forces, which read: "30 Aug. Beginning of the retreat....into the mountains with a grenade splinter through my right hand....rotting of the feet makes it difficult to walk....sleeping in the mountains with the rain falling almost incessantly. It is harder to bear than death. 15 Sep. Our troops have not arrived for 14 days. I have been waiting patiently, but I am beginning to lose consciousness.... potatoes.... potatoes.... my wife.... my mother. 22 Sep. Engaged a large enemy force.... lost all our weapons and have only the clothes we wear. Nothing to eat....25 Sep. I have fever and am nearly unconscious but holding on. 26 Sep. Our forces haven't arrived yet.... no use waiting.... I'm mad..... 28 Sep. I detest rain...." (This is the last entry.) Extract from diary of 3d Class Petty Officer Morita, Yokosuka 5th Special Landing Force. (ATIS Current Translations No. 2, 11 Nov 42, p. 17.)
112. An unidentified member of the Sasebo 5th Special Naval Landing Force recorded the details of the attack in his diary, as follows: "At 1130 we anchored at the mouth of a certain river. A single enemy plane flew over. We were making up enough food to last for three meals and were scheduled to sail at 1530, when at about 1230 ten enemy fighters came over and attacked both the landing craft and our troops with machine-gun fire and bombs. The seven landing craft caught fire simultaneously. We fought back, but what could we do against fighter planes? Eight dead, six badly wounded, 30-40 slightly wounded. With all the landing craft destroyed by fire, our future movement is a problem. We should retire immediately, but without radio we have no means of communication, so the only thing we can do is wait for assistance." (ATIS Current Translations No. 14, 18 Jan. 43, p. 4.)
114. When the unit was ready to board the rescue ship, its commander, Comdr. Tsukioka, addressed the men as follows: "We are all thin with lack of food, but when we board the ship, do not show a haggard countenance. There is a saying that the Samurai displays a toothpick even when he has not eaten. This is an example worth emulating at the present time." (ATIS Current Translations No. 14, op. cit., p. 6.)
115. Details of the Isurava action are as related to the writer by Maj. Mitsuo Koiwai, commander, 2d Battalion, 41st Infantry Regiment, one of the few surviving officers of the South Seas Detachment. Maj. Koiwai stated that two companies of the 144th Infantry's 2d Battalion, which carried out the flank assault on 29 August, lost the majority of their officers, both commissioned and non-commissioned.
117. Directions Regarding Economy in the Use of Ammunition and Provisions, South Seas Detachment Hq., 1 Sep 42. (File of Nankai Shitai Operations Orders, 16 Aug-15 Oct 42, ATIS Enemy Publications No. 33, 12 Aug 43, p. 10.)
118. The importance of the supply problem in causing the failure of the land drive on Port Moresby was stressed in subsequent Army staff studies analyzing the New Guinea operations. One of these studies stated: "This operation has been greatly influenced by insufficient transport. Inability to move supplies seriously diminished front-line combat strength. Transport activity decreased because it was impossible to move by day, and halts were unavoidable after rains. The difficulty of transporting supplies by pack-horse increased, and the number of horses decreased. When men were used, only small quantities could be carried because of the large number of sick and the difficulty of negotiating the mountain inclines. Also, the carriers themselves consumed half of the provisions they carried while on the way." (Lessons From New Guinea Operations, Jul 42-Apr 43, ATIS Enemy Publications No. 285, 18 Jan. 45, pp. 3-14.)
119. The 4th Infantry Regiment of the 2d Division was already contained in the Aoba Detachment. The main body of the Division (16th and 29th Infantry Regiments) was assigned to the Seventeenth Army on 29 August and completed its movement from Java to Rabaul on 29 September, by which date its commitment on Guadalcanal had been decided. Under the tentative plans formulated in August, one portion of its strength was to be used in the amphibious operation against Moresby, while the remainder was to reinforce the South Seas Detachment land drive.
122. Daikaishi Dai Hyakunijushichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 127) 31 Aug 42. (Text of Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 1246, 31 Aug 42, was identical in substance)
126. Upon leaving Buna, the troops had been issued rice rations sufficient, on the basis of the normal ration, for only eight days. These rations, however, were to last for 16 days, allowing only half the normal ration per day. Later during the advance the allowance was further reduced to a maximum of one go (0.3 pint), or one-sixth the normal daily ration. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 88.
129. Japanese intelligence indicated a marked reinforcement of Allied strength in New Guinea after the beginning of September. Approximately 10,000 Australian troops (2d Division) and 2,000 American infantry and marines were estimated to be in the Port Moresby area, while the transport of ground troops to the Milne Bay-Samarai area also showed a sharp increase. This, coupled with stepped-up air reconnaissance over the Buna area, pointed to the strong possibility of a landing attempt in that area. Southeast Area Operations Record, Part II, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 87, 184.
131. The 41st Infantry Regiment had been held in reserve at Kokoda since its relief by the 144th on 5 September. As of 20 September, it had over 1,700 effectives, whereas the 144th Regiment, after fighting to Ioribaiwa, was down to less than one-half its original strength of 2,932.
132. The conference on the Seventeenth Army order lasted from 1700 on 23 September until 0400 the next day. Some members of Maj. Gen. Horii's staff strongly opposed withdrawal on the ground that the supply situation was no better in the Kokoda area, and even favored pressing on toward Port Moresby in the hope of capturing enemy food supplies. (Statement by Maj. Koiwai, previously cited.)
134. On 14 October, a non-commissioned officer of one of the companies of the Stanley Detachment recorded in his diary that he had become acting company commander after its four officers had all been killed or wounded. The company had only four out of 17 non-commissioned officers left, and was down to a total strength of 42 men out of its normal strength of 178. (ATIS Current Translations No. 15, 22 Jan 43, p. 22.)