- Chapter V:
-
- THE FIRST FULL DRESS DEBATE OVER STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
- December 1941 - January
1942
-
- The military conversations that began in Washington during the last
week in December 1941, which accompanied
the first wartime meetings of the President with the Prime Minister (
the ARCADIA Conference), gave the American military staffs the chance
at once to reassure and to warn the British staff concerning the
military- effects of American reaction to the Japanese attack.1
On 14
December the Prime Minister and his party, which included the British
Chiefs of Staff, had set out on H. M. S. Duke of York. The War
Department's preparations began on 18 December, on the receipt of
a short message suggesting the agenda for the meetings, sent ahead by
the British Chiefs of Staff. The British message listed five principal
topics for the conference:
- (i) Fundamental basis of joint strategy.
- (ii) Interpretation of (i) into terms of immediate Military measures,
including redistribution of forces.
- (iii) Allocation of joint forces to harmonise with (i) .
- (iv) Long term programme based on (i) , including forces to be
raised and equipped required for victory.
- (v) Setup joint machinery for implementing
(ii), (iii) and (iv). 2
-
- Several of the War Department planners, working together, hurriedly
prepared "notes" on the British message.
-
- Although the Army planners had something to say in their notes about
each of the five points raised by the British Chiefs of Staff, the
discussions among staff officers that followed and the discussions of
the military leaders with the President amounted only to a reserved
exchange of views on military dispositions in the near future.3
The
President and the military leaders were extremely cautious and went into the conference without trying to define the American position. The
preparations served chiefly to remind the President that the military
staffs believed the United States and Great Britain would have all they
could do to stop the Japanese and to remind the military staff that the.
President was anxious to undertake in the Atlantic as strong a
demonstration as possible of British and American
- [97]
- unity of purpose. The possible movements involving U. S. Army forces
fell under five main headings: (1) establishment of an air force based
in Australia; (2) strengthening of other positions in the Pacific,
especially in Hawaii; (3) reinforcement of British troops in the Middle
East; (4) "acquisition" of positions in the South
Atlantic-in northeastern Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, or on the
western or northwestern coast of Africa; and (5) relief of British
garrisons in Northern Ireland and Iceland (and of the U. S. Marine
provisional brigade on duty in Iceland). The Army was most certain of
the immediate need to undertake movements under the first heading, and
the President was most precise about the immediate need for movements
under the last heading.
-
- The exchange of views indicated that the President and Chiefs of Staff
were alike uncertain how to proceed with the discussion of strategy
until they had had a chance to talk with their British opposites. As the
conference was to show, much more clearly than had vet been shown-or
could have been shown--the President and the Prime Minister as political
leaders in some ways had more in common with each other than either had
with his Chiefs of Staff. Likewise, the Chiefs of Staff-particularly
those of the same service- might agree with one another more readily on
what could be done than they could agree with the heads of their
respective governments.
-
- Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff arrived in Washington on 22
December; the Prime Minister and the President talked over the situation
that evening. On 23 December they began military discussions with the
Chiefs of Staff. They held another such meeting on 26 December and,
after the Prime Minister's return from Ottawa, two other meetings (1 and
4 January). The Prime Minister than went to Florida for several days to rest. After
his return he and the President held two more meetings with the Chiefs
of Staff, on 12 and 14 January. Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and (usually) the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy attended along with the Chiefs of Staff and the senior planners. At
these plenary sessions at the White House the President and the Prime
Minister reached or confirmed their military decisions, after a review
of the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff. 4
-
- The Army planners apparently expected that, after the preliminary
British-American meetings, the scope of military conversations would he
extended to include the representatives of Australia, China, and the
Soviet Union.5
But the military conversations at ARCADIA-Unlike the
political conversations, which led to the drafting and signing of the
Declaration of the United Nations involved only the British and American
staffs.
- The British and American Chiefs of Staff met together twelve times
during the conference in an effort to reach agreement on the outstanding
military problems so far as
- [98]
- possible before presenting them to the President and the Prime
Ministers.6
General Marshall and General Arnold represented the Army at
these meetings, which were held in the Federal Reserve Building, and the
senior Army planner, General Gerow, or his deputy, General Eisenhower,
also attended.7
To help formulate the problems for their meetings, the
Chiefs of Staff relied on a committee of British and American planners,
who met ten times during the conference. and who in turn divided up
their work among subcommittees. The War Plans Division, the Air War
Plans Division, and (for shipping questions) the G-4 Division furnished
the Army members of these subcommittees.8
-
-
- At the opening of the conference it was evident that the British
delegation could take for granted American agreement on strategy up to
the point to which the British-American staff conversations had gone
earlier in the year. It remained the American view, notwithstanding the
dangerous situation in the Pacific, that the basis of strategy must be
collaboration among the powers at war with Germany, with the primary
object of defeating Germany. The powers at war with Germany must
increase their production of munitions and raise forces equal to the object
and, while doing so, defend themselves at home, hold their strategic
outposts as best they could, and weaken German resistance to the extent
necessary to prepare for the final assault. The fullest statement of the
American view, prepared in the War Department, was an affirmation of
American agreement on these propositions, carefully worded so as to
introduce no new element.9
-
- The British retained their by then familiar view of strategy, looking
ultimately to the establishment at various points in Europe of armored
forces which, with the help of patriot forces rallying to the cause,
would liberate occupied ,Europe and defeat Germany. Their theory of
these operations, already stated by the British Chiefs in August 1941,
the Prime :Minister restated at some length for the President, in a
document drawn up during the voyage from England.10
His aim was to make full use of the advantages that the United States
and Great Britain could expect to have-command of sea and air, and the
aid of the people of occupied Europe. He envisaged landings,
- [99]
- perhaps as early as the summer of 1943, "in several of the
following countries, namely, , Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French
Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well as in Italy and
possibly the Balkans." He explained:
- In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanised
forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by
landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential
front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding down
these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points. An
amphibious outfit must be prepared to enable these large-scale disembarkations
to be made swiftly and surely. The vanguards of the
various British and American expeditions should be marshalled by the
spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles, and, if possible, in
French Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct across the
ocean.
-
- It need not be assumed that great numbers of men are required. If the
incursion of the armoured formations is successful, the uprising of the
local population, for whom weapons must be brought, will supply the
corpus of the liberating offensive. Forty armoured divisions, at fifteen
thousand men apiece, or their equivalent in tank brigades, of which
Great Britain would try to produce nearly half, would amount to six
hundred thousand men. Behind this armour another million men of all arms
would suffice to wrest enormous territories from Hitler's domination.
But these campaigns, once started, will require nourishing on a lavish
scale. Our industries and training establishments should by the end of
1942 be running on a sufficient scale.11
-
- According to the Prime Minister, the British Chiefs remained in accord
with this theory of operations on the Continent and ready to urge the idea of "the mass invasion of the continent of
Europe as the goal for 1943." in three phases; first, "Closing
the ring"; second, "Liberating the populations"; and
third, "Final assault on the German citadel." 12
But the
version of British grand strategy that they presented for consideration
to the American Chief --unlike the version they had presented in August-
--was not at all explicit on the manner of invading the Continent,
although quite explicit about British aims in the Mediterranean. This
version, presented by the British Chiefs of Staff on their arrival in
Washington, began with a statement of agreed principles, leading to the
agreed conclusion "that only the minimum of force necessary for the
safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted
from operations against Germany." The British Chiefs then went on
to develop certain corollaries. First they listed the essential features
of grand strategy:
-
- The realisation of the victory programme of armaments; which first and
foremost required the security of the main areas of war industry.
- The maintenance of essential communications.
- Closing and tightening the ring around Germany.
- Wearing down and undermining German resistance by air bombardment,
blockade, subversive activities and propaganda.
- Maintaining only such positions in the Eastern theatre as will
safeguard vital interests while we are concentrating on the defeat of
Germany.
-
- In elaborating on these statements the British Chiefs developed their
theory of operations against Germany. 'The first
- [100]
- stage was that of "Causing and tightening the ring round
Germany," which they defined as "a line running roughly as
follows: Archangel--Black Sea-Anatolia-the Northern Seaboard of the
Mediterranean-the Western Seaboard of Europe." They explained
- The main object will be to strengthen this ring, and close the gaps in
it, by sustaining the Russian front, by arming and supporting Turkey, by
increasing our strength in the Middle East, and by gaining possession of
the whole North African coast.
-
- They looked forward to limited offensives on the Continent as the next
stage, conceivably in 1942 but more probably in 1943, "either
across the Mediterranean or from Turkey into the Balkans, or by
simultaneous landings in several of the occupied countries of
North-Western Europe." They proposed that the allocation of troops
and materiel should provide for carrying out such operations as a
"prelude" to the assault on Germany, the direction and scale
of which would evidently depend on the development of these limited
offensives.13
-
- It was a foregone conclusion that the British representatives would
reintroduce the concept of passing from the defensive to the offensive
in the Mediterranean. As late as October, the War Department had had a
reminder of the British adherence to this approach from Colonel Bundy,
who had talked over future plans with British officers while he was en
route to Moscow with the Harriman mission. As he reported,
they looked forward to using North Africa "as a stepping stone to
cutting Italy out, and finally closing in on the continent." As
previously instructed by General Marshall, Colonel Bundy
had been entirely noncommittal as to the War Department view. 14
-
- The American planners had remained noncommittal. They did not go so
far as to propose that the United States should either accept or reject
the British concept of the transition from the defensive to the
offensive against Germany. Before 7 December the nearest they had come
to stating a principle to govern decisions during the transitional
period was to emphasize the need for economy of effort in
"subsidiary'' theaters. They classified as subsidiary theaters
not only the Far Fast but also Africa, the Middle Fast, the Iberian
Peninsula, and the Scandinavian Peninsula, in accordance with their
premise that the plains of northwest Europe constituted the main
theater, where "we must come to grips with the enemy ground
forces." 15
At the time of the ARCADIA Conference the Army
planning staff again stated the idea of a great final offensive
"with the main effort in Western Europe," which should be
"made in conjunction with the strongest possible Russian offensive
on the Eastern Front and secondary offensives wherever feasible."
The staff was convinced that this must be the final step, seeing
"no other area in which it would be feasible from a logistics
viewpoint to transport and main-
- [101]
- tain forces required for an operation of such magnitude." 16
The Army planners were disposed to consider all other operations as
strictly holding operations and to regard with disfavor any proposal to
establish and maintain in a , "subsidiary" theater the
favorable ratio of Allied to enemy forces that would be necessary in
order to take the offensive there.
-
- It appeared to the Army staff that the United States and Great
Britain would in any event be compelled to act in accord with this view
of strategy for several months to come. Thus from the American point of
view there was no reason for dwelling on the principle for the time:
being. The staff reached the following conclusions about American and
British capabilities:
-
- It appears that the best which Great Britain can do at the present
time is to maintain its position in the British Isles and the Middle
East and to attempt to send reinforcements to the Par East. Any British
operation, other than those stated, must necessarily be of an
opportunist nature, executed with exceedingly small forces and with very
doubtful chances of success.
-
- At the present time the United States can only inadequately defend its
coasts against air raids, hold Hawaii, the Panama Canal and other
existing bases, gradually complete the relief of the British in Iceland.
reinforce the Philippines or Dutch East Indies, occupy Natal, and
possibly occupy some other base not seriously defended by Axis forces or
sympathizers (Cape Verdes or Azores) . It will be practicable and pray
be necessary to send some armored or infantry divisions to the British
Isles in the winter or spring . . . . The shortage of U. S. Hag
shipping, there bring only enough to carry about 60.000 men
simultaneously, precludes the possibility of executing more than one, or at most two, of these operations concurrently.
17
-
-
- The British Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, had a specific reason
for proposing at once that the American Chiefs of Staff should concur in
the British view of the conduct of operations against Germany and
specifically that they should accept the conception of "Closing and
tightening the ring around Germany." The Prime :Minister was hoping
for a chance to move soon into French North Africa and wanted American
help. He was expecting a favorable American response if the war with
Japan did not force the project into the background.18
He made his
proposal at the opening meeting of the conference on 23 December at
which he and the President told the Chiefs of Staff what they wanted
done. He explained that there were 55,000 British troops and the
necessary ships ready to move into Algeria in case Empire forces should
gain a decisive enough advantage in the shifting war in the Libyan
Desert to push westward to the Tunisian frontier. He therefore
"offered for consideration the proposition that at the same time
United States forces, assuming French agreement, should proceed to land
on the 'Moroccan coast by invitation." 19
- [102]
- The current British successes in Libya were merely the latest
occasion for reviving the expectation that influential French leaders
might "incite" an Allied occupation
of -North Africa, in anticipation of their being no longer bound or
protected by the terms of the French-German armistice and their loyalty
to the government at Vichy. The Prime Minister believed it essential
to be ready to take advantage of this disposition, ill the hope
of gaining Important military objectives at small cost. He hoped to
seize the moment when the cost would be least-when French forces,
released from their allegiance to any government in metropolitan France,
might even help instead of opposing the operation -certainly much less
than it would later become, when the Germans would have established
political and military control over North Africa.
-
- The American military staff was familiar with the project of occupying
Trench North Africa. A statement of the advantages to be gained from
such a move had appeared in a report written for the ,Joint Board in
September:
-
- Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the
Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the
defense of the Western Hemisphere but also as security to British sea
communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In
French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are
potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and
satisfactory political conditions are established by the United
States. Because the British Commonwealth has but few troops available and
because of the unfriendly relations between
the British and the Weygand regime it seems clear that a large
proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this
region necessarily must be United States troops. 20
-
- In August 1041, during the stall' talks that accompanied the
conference of the President arid the Prime Minister aboard the Prince
of Wales, the British staff had mentioned the project as one of the
means by which early American intervention would "revolutionize"
the military situation. The American planners, in commenting on this
point ill late September, had advised the Joint Board that the United
States did not then have "land forces adequate in strength and
suitably equipped for operations in North Africa." They added that
the success of such an operation as the
United State might launch would depend largely on co-operation by French
forces, and that Trench co-operation was too uncertain to plan on. 21
This remained the American position till the time of the ARCADIA Conference.
-
- American planning during 1941 had provided for assembling an
expeditionary force for possible use in the South Atlantic during the
period after full mobilization. The most ambitious task contemplated for
such a force in joint Board plans under development before 7 December
was the taking of Dakar. 22
More recently, the President had drawn
special attention to this project.23
The War Department acted
accordingly.
- [103]
- General Marshall ordered Maj. Gen. Joseph -. Stilwell to Washington
with the intention of putting hire in command of an expeditionary-
force to be made ready for an operation against Dakar. 24
-
- Even this operation, according to the Army planning staff, was more
than the United States should try. 25
Col. Matthew B. Ridgway had the
occasion to explain for Vice President Henry A. Wallace why the United
States should not carry out the operation. Ridgway explained that
- . . . difficulties of troop movement and logistical support by sea of
the forces required. would in my opinion, make this a very hazardous
operation at this time, in view of shipping shortages and the ability of
German and (iceman-controlled ford's to arrive' in that area much more
rapidly than ours could.
-
- I added that in my opinion there was a psychological factor of
tremendous importance. Our first major effort must be insured of success
beyond any reasonable doubt, for failure -would react to our profound
disadvantage at home and abroad. 26
-
- For operations in North Africa, against which these objections applied
with even greater force, there was no developed Army-Navy plan, and the
President had gone only so far as to say that the area should be studied
in preparation for the ARCADIA conference.27
-
- Apart from the current lack of means, the War Department staff
objected to French North Africa as a theater of operations. The staff
held that the landing forces would be fighting at a great disadvantage,
since their lines of communication would be exposed to attack through Spanish-Morocco, and since lack of port
facilities, railroads, and roads would slow the whole operation. The
staff was also inclined to object to landings in northwest Africa as a
diversionary operation, concluding that even the attainment of the final
objective of control of all Forth Africa, although "tremendously
favorable" to the anti-Axis powers, would be only an "indirect
contribution to the defeat of the Nazis." 28
-
- After the Prime Minister had made his proposal, a far stronger
statement of these views was drawn up by 'Maj. Gen. Stanley D. Embick,
who continued to be Marshall's senior adviser on grand strategy. General
Embick objected to the British views on operations in North Africa and
the Mediterranean as "persuasive rather than rational"
and as "motivated more largely by political than by sound strategic
purposes." He objected first of all to the assumption that the
control of North Africa was of so great strategic importance, dissenting
from the "suggestion that Allied occupation of North Africa would
restore to the Allies communications through the. 'Mediterranean" and
from the "implication that North Africa would afford an advantageous
area from which to launch an invasion of Europe." He went on to
declare:
-
- It is my conviction that under present conditions North West Africa is
a theater far more favorable to the Germans than to ourselves. The
British state their man power is exhausted. They propose 5,000 as their
contribution to a joint force. This would be merely a token
contribution to the Allied force
- [104]
- that would be required if that area becomes a theater of operations
prior to the time the German military machine is materially weakened.
-
- He specifically foresaw "continuous and heavy losses" of
troop carriers and naval escort which the United States and Great
Britain could ill afford and a serious risk of strong counterattack by
German forces through Spanish Morocco, at the end of a line of
communication "completely protected save for the short passage at
the Strait." He concluded by expressing the conviction "that
our acceptance of a commitment in North Nest Africa at this time, would
prove to be a mistake of the first magnitude." 29
-
- Whether or not Marshall shared this view, he was careful not
to say.30
What he had to bear in mind was that the Prime Minister's
proposal interested the President. As a political leader the President
was obliged to weigh essentially political as well as
"strictly" military needs in seeking common ground on which to
conduct Allied military operations. Furthermore, the Prime Minister's
proposal met one of his own political conditions for military strategy.
The President explained that
- . . . he considered it very important to morale, to give this country
a feeling that they are in the war, to give the Germans the reverse effect, to have American troops somewhere in active fighting across
the Atlantic. 31
-
- To begin "Closing and tightening the ring round Germany" was
a course of action obviously well adapted to this end. Throughout the
conference the American Chiefs of Staff avoided debate on the soundness
of the strategy of encirclement or of the proposed first step in
carrying it out, the occupation of forth Africa. General Stilwell, who
had just begun to study the Dakar operation, was reassigned to this
operation.
-
-
- The President's interest in the Prime Minister's proposal made the
preparation of a preliminary estimate on operations in French North
Africa the first business before the Chiefs of Staff and the planners.
On 26 December the planners presented a draft paper on the
"Northwest Africa Project," which served to show on what scale
the operation would have to be begun, given little or no opposition to
the landings and initial occupation and about three months before the
Germans could mount a heavy counterattack from Spain. On the critical
question of the size of the forces required, the paper was a compromise
between American and British views. The American planners estimated the
requirements for ground forces during the first three months at a
somewhat higher figure than the original British estimate, and the
ultimate requirement for both ground and air forces at about three times
the figure proposed by the British planners. They compromised on an
estimate of requirements for the first three
- [105]
- months of the operation- -six divisions (including two armored
divisions), supported by a fair sized air force (385 aircraft), and by
heavy antiaircraft defenses (114 heavy guns and 252 light guns) for
port and base facilities. The American ground forces taking part would
be an amphibious division, an armored division, and an infantry
division. The American air units !the main body of the air force) would
be two pursuit groups, one medium bomber group, one light bomber group,
and one observation group. The British would furnish three divisions,
three fighter squadrons (forty-eight planes), and the antiaircraft
units. British and American forces would each provide their own service
units.32
-
- Behind this compromise lay a serious disagreement on the concept of
,the operation. The British originally proposed using only, one American
division (a Marine division), and about four British divisions during
the first three months. The Americans originally proposed using during
the same period the equivalent of about one British and six American
divisions (including one Marine and two armored divisions). The
explanation of the difference was that the American planners
anticipated, as the British did not, a need for sending lame forces into
Algeria before the operation was over. The American planners in effect
proposed that U. S. forces should carry out the operation in French
Morocco and the British forces in Algeria, as the Prime Minister had indicated. They were willing to agree with the British planners that
the initial British landing at Algiers should be on a small scale -one
armored brigade ; about the same as an American regiment), one infantry
brigade group (about the same as an American regiment reinforced),
three fighter squadrons, and two antiaircraft regiments. But they
anticipated that ultimately the eastward extension of British and American forces from their base on the Atlantic (at Casablanca) would
involve large forces. How large, would depend on whether the area to be
held would be only the triangle Casablanca-Agadir-Oran, or would
include Algeria. Even in the former case, the American planners
calculated that a ground force of five infantry divisions and two
armored divisions, supported by an air force of seven pursuit groups and
six to eight bombardment groups ( including three groups of heavy
bombers) would he necessary. On this basis, the American estimate called
for transporting over 200,000 men to North Africa as against the
100,000 men required in the British estimate. In case the operation wire
extended further eastward to occupy and hold Algeria, the American
planners foresaw the need for a force half again as large--about 300,000
men. 33
-
- The American view, as the Army planning staff explained, was that if
"the operation is worth undertaking it should be done in sufficient
strength to give a reasonable chance of ultimate success." Although
the staff' did not regard even the forces in the American estimate as
large enough to be certain to hold against the
- [106]
- heaviest attack that the Germans might launch, the staff doubted that
the Germans considered the area of enough importance to make so heavy an
attack, and also pointed out that a force mainly dependent on the
Atlantic ports and the rail and road communications therefrom could
scarcely be much larger. 34
-
- Although it was impossible to do any practical planning by simply
splitting the difference between estimates based on two such different
views of the North African project, it was necessary for the planners to
agree at once on a tentative estimate for submission to the President
and the Prime Minister.35
They therefore settled on a temporary
compromise, whereby they presented- as upper and lower limits-two sets
of figures for ground forces and a fairly high estimate for air forces
(some 1,400 planes) with a qualification that the size of British and
French forces would be "affected by the assistance that may be
furnished by French and Spanish units in North Africa." The force
was still not large enough, from the American point of view, to achieve
the stated objective: "to hold French North Africa against possible German attacks through Spain and Italy and to
open the Mediterranean route." But by stating this objective, the
planners at least made it clear that the force had to be a large one, particularly
in air units, which had to be strong enough to undertake
"offensive air operations against Axis bases and ports in the
Mediterranean area" on which counterattacks might be based. 36
-
-
- The planners at the same time presented a preliminary study of
questions affecting the priority of projects in the Atlantic. The
principal one was availability of troopships. Even before the opening of
the conference the American staff had been well aware of the shortage of
American troop shipping.37
Possibly the British had not fully
realized how little American shipping would be available; if so, they
very soon learned. On 24 December, at their first meeting, the
British-American planners set up a special subcommittee., on which Brig.
Gen. Brehon B. Somervell; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and his
adviser on transportation, Col. Charles P. Gross, represented the Army,
to investigate shipping requirements and availability of shipping. 38
This
subcommittee
- [107]
- submitted a formal report on 26 December, with only a general
statement on the British shipping shortage but with a complete breakdown
of all American troop shipping. The total troop lift of existing
American flag shipping of all types, including some ships not as yet
converted to military use, came to about 200,000 men, but a very great
part of it was already committed to maintaining present Army and Navy
forces overseas and to sending reinforcements already ordered. The
subcommittee calculated that the maximum American troop lift available
for new operations in the Atlantic by mid-January would be about 25,000. Additional capacity would gradually become available in the
Atlantic for new operations--about 18,000 by 1 February, about 15,000
more by 1 March, and an additional 24,000 by 1 April.39
-
- The three divisions, air forces, and service units that would compose
the American part of the planners' estimated three months' force would
run well over 60,000 men. On this basis, the planners pointed out in
their study on priorities that so far as they could see there would be
no prospect of any other major troop movement in the Atlantic: for at
least three months if the North African operation were undertaken.
Similarly, the diversion of British shipping to the operation would
"seriously curtail" the projected series of troop movements from the British Isles to the Middle Fast and thence to the Far
East. 40
-
-
- These reports, taken together, raised a question to which the Chiefs
of Staff and the planners, British and American alike, needed an answer
before they could go very far: Should actual preparations for the North
African operation, which might or might not be undertaken, take
precedence over the loading and dispatch of troops for movement in the
North Atlantic? The North African operation would obviously take
precedence over other operations in the Atlantic-the occupation of
Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, the Canary Islands, and
Dakar-which were also contingent on negotiations with foreign powers and
for which there would be little or no need if the North African
operation were to be launched. The movement of troops to Northern
Ireland and Iceland was in a different category. As the British and
American staffs had recognized in making their plans earlier in 1941,
British forces were already overextended. Any new British commitments
overseas would increase rather than decrease the need for American
troops in the British Isles and Iceland. The American forces sent to
Iceland and Ireland would either add protection against invasion or
allow the release of seasoned British troops from the defense of the
home islands in order to strengthen British positions in
- [108]
- the Middle and Far East. Although there was no immediate prospect of
an invasion of the British Isles, the British could dispatch
reinforcements to the Middle and Far East- or undertake the occupation
of French North Africa--during the first half of 1942 only by
considerably increasing the risk of an invasion of the British Isles
during the summer. On these grounds, the American planners not only
appreciated but were inclined to emphasize the need for deploying U. S.
Army forces in the North Atlantic.
-
- The plan adopted at the outset of the ARCADIA Conference, in
accordance with the wishes of the President and the Prime Minister, was
to carry through the already planned relief of British troops and U. S.
marines in Iceland by a U. S. Army division and to send a force of two
or more divisions to relieve the British garrison in Northern
Ireland.41
The Army had at once proceeded to set up a Northern
Ireland force ( code name MAGNET) composed of the 33d, 34th, and 37th
Divisions, with an armored division attached, together with air
forces.42
In addition to releasing British troops for service in more active theaters, the President and the
Prime Minister expected that the arrival of American forces in the
British Isles would be encouraging to the British people and hoped that
the replacement of British by American forces in Ulster might improve
relations with the Irish Free State, which were of considerable
practical military importance.43
The President looked forward to
the early relief of the U. S. Marine brigade in Iceland. Admiral King
was very insistent on this point, objecting to the further retention on
garrison duty of a very sizeable portion of the small U. S. forces then
trained for landing operations.44
-
- The Army was ready to make the forces for the initial movements
available at once. The division sent to Ireland did not need to be fully
trained or equipped and therefore could be sent without affecting the
Army's readiness to undertake overseas operations.45
The only thing
that delayed the movements was that all U. S. troopships then available
in the Atlantic would be needed to transport the U. S. forces required
for the initial occupation of French Morocco. Similarly, all available
British troop lift would be needed to move the British forces. The
specific question before the Chiefs of Staff and the planners was
whether all the ships should be held for the North African operation, or
whether
- [109]
- THE CHIEF OF STAFF AND THE SECRETARY OP WAR. General
Marshall conferring with Henry L. Stimson.
-
- some of them could he used for the movement of troops to Iceland and
the .British Isles. They thus had the occasion to point out to the
President and the Prime Minister that if the North African operation
were undertaken, the relief of British troops in Ireland and Iceland
would have to be postponed.
-
- The President and the Prime Minister, in their opening conference with
the Chiefs of Staff, had given no indication of whether, they would
give precedence to the projects in the North Atlantic or to the
projected forth African operation if they had to choose. To be sure,
Field Marshal Sir
- John Dill had said at the fiat meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, in
answer to a direct question from General Marshall, that the North
African project would take precedence over the relief of the British
garrisons, but the planners needed a clear declaration of policy.46
How necessary it was, became evident on the afternoon of 26 December
when the Chiefs of Staff and the senior planners met with the President
and the Prime Minister to consider the problem.
-
- Sir John Dill and General Marshall in turn explained that there was
certainly not
- [110]
- enough shipping to go around. Marshall recommended that ships should
be gotten together "and made ready for contingent use." The
President then declared the time was not right to invade North Africa
and suggested that, since it was so uncertain when the right time might
come, it was worth considering whether they should not go ahead with
plans for the movement to Northern Ireland, with the understanding,
however, that so long as the ships were in port, they might still be
diverted to the North African operation.
The Prime Minister strongly questioned the conclusion that there was not
enough shipping. Recollecting that during World War I two million men
had been moved to Prance in five months, he asked how it was possible
that the United States and Great Britain could not now move a quarter of
a million men in three months. He felt that the shipping could be found,
and concluded by saying that he would be "frightfully unhappy if he
had to adjust between expeditions." No formal decision was
reached at the meeting, but as the rest of the discussion showed, the
Chiefs of Staff had in fact made their point, although they did not
answer the Prime Minister's question.47
-
- The Army and Navy went ahead, as the President had suggested, to
prepare for the first movements to Ireland and Iceland. The British
Chiefs of Staff, after corresponding with authorities in London, agreed
to Admiral King's proposal that the U. S. marines in Iceland be relieved
on the arrival of the first U. S. Army contingent. 48
On 1 January the
President and the Prime Minister formally approved a motion introduced by Marshall to load the first shipments for Iceland and Northern
Ireland, on the basis, as stated by the President, that it should be
done in "such a manner that these operations could be halted if
other considerations intervened." The ships, which were then being
loaded were to sail on 15 January, with 14,000 troops for Northern
Ireland and 6,000 for Iceland (4,500 to relieve the marines), but they
could be unloaded and used for the North African operation, with six
days' delay, if the decision to do so were taken before 13
January. 49
As soon as the President and the Prime Minister had
reached this tentative decision, the War Department established an Army
headquarters in England, under the command of General Chaney, the
special Army observer in London, who was designated Commander, United
States Army Forces in the British Isles ( USAFBI ) , to whom the
Northern Ireland force ( but not the Iceland force) would report. This
command was intermediate between the informal "nucleus
mission," of which he had been in charge, and a theater command,
which the War Department did not set up until late in the spring. 50
-
-
- Having brought to the attention of the President and the Prime
Minister the fact
- [111]
- that there was not enough shipping to go around, the Chiefs of Staff
on the next day went over the planning committee's initial report on the
North African operation (which had been given the British code name
GYMNAST). Both the British and American Air members, Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal and Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, were deeply disturbed
that so large an air force was allocated. Portal explained
- . . . that in allocating planes, the largo strategy must be the
primary consideration, rather than local requirements; that in the
matter of Greece it was realized that there was an insufficient number
of troops and planes, vet those available were allocated despite the
expectations that this force: would be knocked down. Although this
happened, the strategic importance of this operation was great because
it delayed the attack on Russia for two months. 51
-
- General Marshall made it clear that he did not believe in taking in
North Africa the kind of risk that the British had taken in Greece. He
was perfectly willing that the paper should go back to the planning
committee for further consideration, but he declared-in words
reminiscent of Colonel Ridgway's remarks on the Dakar operation-that
- . . . this operation might result in the first contact between
American and German troops. Success should not be jeopardized by failure
to provide adequate means. A failure in this first venture would have an
extremely adverse effect on the morale of the American people. 52
-
- The planners, reconsidering their compromise paper in the light of the
remarks of Portal and Marshall, could not agree on the scope of the operation and the size of the force it would
ultimately require. They reported to the Chiefs of Staff that it was
"premature" for them to make any recommendations on those
points 53
The Chiefs of Staff in turn recognized that an operation on the
scale acceptable to the American staff would have an effect not only on
projects in the North Atlantic-the only effect the planners had as yet
considered-but also on the reinforcement of positions in the Pacific. On
31 December they returned the subject to the planning committee to be
restudied in the wider context of strategy and in the light of the
American conviction that the operation, even though it must still assume
political preparation, would not rely on the ready collaboration of
French forces in North Africa nor on a weak German reaction. 54
-
- The study made from this new point of view added to the evidence that
any operation the American staff would be willing to undertake was
beyond the means available. On the assumption that it was necessary to
prepare to meet opposition, the assault convoy must include not only
assault troops but also armored units, and the landing forces must at
once have air support. They must take airfields and unload large
quantities of fuel and essential equipment. The first convoy must
include aircraft carriers, to protect the convoy and the initial
landings, and, if possible, to carry the first complement of planes to
be flown in to the seized airfields. This was only the most important of
the new problems of amphibious operations, on which neither the British
nor the American planners could speak with any great confi-
- [112]
- dence as yet. How long it would take to land a single convoy at
Casablanca was an important factor. The expedition would for a long time
be dependent on the port of Casablanca, partly because other Atlantic
ports could not take ocean-going vessels, and partly because there would
not be enough air and naval cover for more than one port. With the long
period for unloading at Casablanca (estimated at ten to fourteen days)
went a correspondingly great risk of submarine attacks, especially on
aircraft carriers accompanying the assault convoy. The capacity of the
port of Casablanca was a limiting factor determining not only how long
it would take to unload the assault convoy but also how long it would
take to unload the initial three months' forces, supplies, and
supporting units through that port. The planners expected this phase to
take four months, no matter how many ships were available. Incomplete
and conflicting intelligence presented another problem. The military
planners did not know what to make of the various reports on the
attitude of French leaders and troops and hesitated to plan in ignorance
of vital operational data, in particular with reference to
airfields. 55
-
- The experience of dealing with such a problem, although useful, was
discouraging. On 4 January Admiral Turner, the senior Navy planner,
reported to Admiral Stark and Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in
Chief, L. S. Elect, that the planning committee believed that
- . . . it will be impracticable in the near future to capture French
North Africa if important resistance is encountered. Therefore, it is
considered that no plan should be made for such a project at this time. It is recommended that the
Chiefs of Staffs issue a directive on this point. 56
-
- In the afternoon the problem was discussed at great length, first in a
staff meeting of American officers held by the Secretaries of War and
Navy and then in an American-British meeting convened by the President
and the Prime Minister.57
At the latter meeting the President and the
Prime :Minister confirmed the decision of 1 January to go ahead with the
first shipments to Northern Ireland and Iceland. As the Prime Minister
was well aware, these movements themselves constituted an important, if
indirect, contribution to the opening of an offensive in the
Wediterranean.58
He was verve emphatic on the need for them and
concluded that the planners should go ahead with SUPER-GYMNAST, "but
make no diversion of shipping on the Ireland relief; that we should take
no real ships from real jobs; and that we could talk about the matter
again in a few days." 59
-
- The ARCADIA Study of the North African operation ended inconclusively.
On 10
- [113]
- January, as a basis for future planning, the British planners
reintroduced the estimate for the first three months' force on which the
committee had originally agreed to compromise. Except for the first
American and the fiat and second British convoys, they presented even
these estimates as "guesses" of what the task force commander
might consider necessary, and the guesses included no estimate of air
strength. The British did not propose what, for planning purposes,
should be taken to be the total strength required for the operation.
Their purpose was in fact only to present "a suggested convoy
programme" that would fully utilize the limited port capacity of
Casablanca. This schedule indicated that the maximum forces that could
be landed (including two convoys to Algiers) during the four months
following the first sailings would be some 180,000 troops ( about half
British and half American). 60
-
-
- At this point in the conference, planning for troop movements in the
Atlantic finally converged with planning for troop movements in the
Pacific. It then appeared that- -quite apart from the availability of
troop shipping and the capacity of the port of Casablanca-the proposed
shipping schedule was far too ambitious for any North African operation
begun before the latter part of May 1942. The factor that actually
limited American participation in any North African operation begun
before that time would be the shortage of cargo vessels in the Atlantic
that would result from the desperate effort to contain the Japanese in the South and
Southwest Pacific.61
-
- During the conference the American planners had been getting impatient
with the protracted study of movements in the Atlantic because it was
holding up decision on movements to the Pacific. They expected the
Japanese might "overextend" themselves until they had isolated
the projected American base in northern Australia.62
By the end of
the first week of the conference, the British staff, like the American
staff, began to show concern over the danger to the northern and eastern
approaches to Australia and New Zealand. The British, quite apart from
their dismay at the Japanese advances in Malaya and Burma, were obliged
to consider the security of Australia and New Zealand, if they were to
keep forces from these dominions in North Africa and in India, as they
very much wanted and needed to do. The British planners accordingly
began to consider sympathetically the American planners' views. They
brought up for discussion the whole question of the defense of the air
ferry route from Hawaii to Australia, together with the Nay's project
for establishing a refueling station at Borabora (some 2,300 miles south
of Hawaii in the Society Islands which, like New Caledonia, were in the
hands of the Free French).63
The American planners
- [114]
- agreed that, besides arranging for local defense of Palmyra,
Christmas, Canton, Samoa, and Borabora, the United States should
consider helping Australia and New Zealand with the defense of New
Caledonia and the Fiji Islands, if the Australian and New Zealand
Governments could not make adequate provision for it.64
-
- While waiting for information on the Fijis and New Caledonia, the War
Department was rapidly drafting orders for shipments to the "island
bases" in the South Pacific that were the Army's
responsibility.65
the projected garrisons were 2,000 for Christmas
Island and 1,000 for Canton Island. 66
In the next lower priority came a
force of about 4,000 troops, requested by the Navy to garrison a
refueling station on Borabora on the convoy route to Australia.67
The orders called for only small Army contingents at these bases, on
the assumption, clearly expressed by Marshall, that the Navy ,would
relieve the Army garrisons in case of heavy attack.68
In addition,
the Army undertook to send a pursuit group (700 men) to Suva to
supplement the New Zealand garrison. The Navy at the same time went ahead with its preparations to garrison Palmyra and American Samoa.
-
- During the closing days of the conference, the American staff also
projected additional forces for the Southwest Pacific. In view of the
growing possibility of air raids on northern Australia, the first step (
using the largest British liners on the Pacific run) was to add
antiaircraft units (numbering, with necessary services, about 10,000
troops) to the pursuit units and art air base group (numbering about
6,000 ) already approved for shipment. These 16,000 troops were in
addition to projected shipments of 10,000
air troops.69
A further increase was involved when it appeared
that, for the next six months, Australia would have no forces available
to send reinforcements to New Caledonia, where there was only a
company-sized Australian garrison anti some 3,700 ill-equipped Free
French troops. The planners regarded this island as the logical target
of a Japanese attempt to gain control of the northern and eastern approaches
to Australia and New Zealand, because-, it was large enough to be
strongly held and contained important nickel mines.70
Adequate defense
for New Caledonia was especially important since the local Free
French authorities in control of the island were threatening to prohibit
future work on a large airfield there, lest its completion serve as an
additional temptation to the Japanese to occupy the is-
- [115]
- CHIEF OF WAR PLANS DIVISION AND HIS DEPUTIES,
January 1942.
Left to right: Brig. Gen. Robert W. Crawford;
Brig. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower;
and Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief.
-
- land.71
In anticipation of a decision to send additional U. S.
reinforcements to the Pacific, the War Department staff organized a task
force of about 16,000 troops ( a heavily reinforced infantry brigade,
about 10,000 men plus supporting service units; , under Brig. Gen.
Alexander M. Patch, with a view to their possible employment as a
garrison for New Caledonia.72
Together with this force, the staff also planned to send about 5,000 additional
troops for Australia, including air replacements and engineer units
urgently requested by General Brett. This convoy brought to about 37,000
the number of Army troops that the American planners were preparing to
send at once to the Southwest Pacific, with 10,000 more to follow.
- liven before this last addition was made, the proposed shipments to
the South and Southwest Pacific exceeded the troop lift then available
in the Pacific. The -American Chiefs of Staff accordingly asked the
British Chiefs of Staff to consider diverting
- [116]
- troopships from the Atlantic specifically to get reinforcements to
Australia with all possible speed. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed to
refer the question at once to General Somervell and his British
opposite, Brigadier Vernon M. C. Napier, for study and recommendations,
and later in the same meeting instructed them to study also the
possibility of sending American forces to New Caledonia.73
-
- Under their new directive the shipping experts quickly- came forward
with a solution that gave unquestioned precedence to American shipments
to Australia and British shipments to the Near and Far Fast, at the
expense of the North African operation, the reinforcement of Hawaii, and
the movements in the North Atlantic. On the basis of the recommendation
of the shipping experts, the American Chiefs of Staff on 12 January
proposed to reduce the Iceland convoy of 15 January from 8,000 to 2,500; the Ireland convoy, from 16,000 to 4,100.
By using the troop
lift thus released, together with the Kungsholm (then allocated to
the State Department-troop lift, 2,900 ) and two American vessels then
on the youth American run (combined troop lift, over 2,000), the United
States could send 21,800 troops to the southwest Pacific-General Patch's
task force and essential ground service units for the Australian force.
The United Mates thus could still keep in readiness on the cast coast
the Navy combat loading vessels which could lift a Marine division (12,000 men).74
-
- This disposition of American troop shipping did not mean the
discontinuance of the North Atlantic convoys. Shipments to Iceland could
go on at ,a rate of as many as 2,500 troops a month. The British
planners were willing to recommend arranging British schedules so as to
help keep up shipments to Northern Ireland.75
By the end of
February over 20,000 troops would be dispatched to Northern Ireland. On
this basis, the initial effect in the North Atlantic was to postpone by
about a month the release of the first British division in -Northern
Ireland and the U. S. Marine brigade in Iceland. 76
-
- The President and the Prime 'Minister were by then quite ready to
accept these consequences of the evident need to give precedence to
the defense of the Southwest Pacific. There was not much question but
that, in addition to the effect on deployment in the North Atlantic, the
withdrawal of American troopships from the Atlantic would have the
effect of postponing a full-scale planned operation in North Africa. The
Prime 'Minister and the President also accepted this consequence, the
more readily because the Prime Minister foresaw that the reported
arrival of German reinforcements in Africa would postpone the date at
which German forces would be pushed back to Tripoli, and because the President had o rip received reports
indicating that negotiations with French authorities could be put off
for a while. The President was still interested in a North African
operation, and wanted to know as definitely as possible when it could
begin, so as not to start negotiations
- [117]
- prematurely, for, as he pointed out, as soon as negotiations were
begun the German Government would learn of them. He stressed the need of
landing before the Germans would have had time to react, Mating that
assault forces should actually he loaded before negotiations here begun.77
-
- General Marshall at once answered to the point by observing that the
factor limiting American participation in the North African operation
would not be transports but cargo shipping. 78
The following day the American planners elaborated upon this answer in a report to the Chiefs
of Staff. They concluded that the mounting of the full-fledged North African operation would have to await the return from the Southwest
Pacific not only of the troop transports-due back about the third week
of April-but also of the cargo ships required by the troop movements
to the Southwest Pacific-. -which were not due back till after the
middle of May. Furthermore, American participation in any
operation that might be mounted earlier would depend on finding eight
cargo vessels to match the troop lift provided by the Navy combat
loaders. If the interim operation were to be speeded up by diverting
troopships from the Hawaii and North Atlantic runs, still more cargo
shipping-thirteen to fifteen vessels---would have to be found.79
-
- There was a simple reason why cargo chipping at this point replaced
troop shipping as the critical factor. It required far more tonnage to
establish forces in a new and largely undeveloped area directly in the
path of the main Japanese offensive than to supply the same number of troops sent
as reinforcements to
areas better developed and less immediately threatened. Once the greater
part of American troop shipping was diverted to the garrisoning of the
island bases in the South Pacific, the development and local defense of
the Australian air base, and the development of air operation: north of
Australia, the: ratio of tonnage to troops greatly increased. General
Eisenhower commented, "Somervell (G-4)
did a good job finding boats. We'll get off 21,000 men . . . to Australia; but I don't know when we can get all their equip. and supply
to them. Ships! Ships!" 80
All we need is ships!'' The great -New York
convoy that was to leave for the Southwest Pacific was only a part of
what was rapidly becoming a major movement of American and British
troops for the purpose of containing the Japanese advance. The projected
American shipments, besides the 21,000 troops in the Mew York convoy
to the Southwest Pacific, then included the garrisons for the island
bases (nearly 8,000 ) and three convoys from the west coast to Australia-the first
(7,000 troops) ready to sail, the second (14,000 troops) to sail at the end of the month, the third
(11,000
troops) to sail some time in February.81
The initial shipments
required to house and feed these force, to provide them with guns and
ammunition. planes, fuel, and engineer equipment would amount to well over
a half-million tons of cargo (over and above what they could obtain
locally).
- [118]
- Apart from the consequences for the timing of the North African
operation, the trees demands for cargo shipping brought the President
and the Prime Minister to another Problem. The Shipping experts, after making as
estimate of cargo shipping, concluded that the effort to contain the
Japanese advance would require seven additional cargo ship, and they
recommended that the ships he obtained by cutting lend-lease shipments
to the Soviet Union by about 30 percent during the trees three or four
months. 82
This recommendation the President and the Prime
Minister would not accept, but they agreed to divert the seven ships to
the Army's needs and to leave it up to Mr. Hopkins and Lord Beaverbrook
to find some way or other of securing equivalent tonnage to meet the
scheduled shipments to the soviet Union. 83
-
- Neither the President nor the Prime Minister gave up their determination to launch the North African
operation. They were willing to postpone it until the end of May in
order to deal with the Pacific crisis, but if the moment came to act,
they very ready to start the operation with what they had. The
reaffirmed their position on 14 January, the last day of the
conference:
-
- The President then stated that if the Germans
should move into the Gymnast area in the interim, the thing to
do would be to utilize whatever forces were available.
-
The Prime observed that in this case we should make a slash with
whatever forces were available and, if necessary, operate
on the guerrilla basis. 84
-
- The American planners could scarcely doubt that once the Japanese
offensive was contained, if not before, the North African operation
would again become the first question of American-British strategy.
- [119]
- Page created 10 January 2002
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