- Chapter VII:
-
- ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND
STRATEGY
- January - March 1942
-
- The collapse of the ABDA Command and the continued movement of
American troops into the South and southwest Pacific raised in acute
form the great question of strategy that had been deferred by the
ARCADIA Conference-the relation between plans for U. S. Army deployment in the Pacific and plans for U. S.
Army deployment in the Atlantic. Of
some l32,000 Army troops that embarked for overseas destinations front
the beginning of 1942 through the middle of March, only about
20,000 sailed for Iceland and -Northern Ireland. During the same period
over 90,000 left for stations along the "line" Hawaii-Australia.1
Still other commitments to the Pacific: remained to be
fulfilled. To set a limit to future movements of Army forces into the
Pacific and find a basis for increasing the rate at which Army forces
would he moved across the Atlantic became, during February and March, the chief concern of General,
Marshall and his adviser on the War Department staff, and the focus of
their discussion of future plans with the, Army Air Forces and the Navy.
-
-
- During the weeks following the ARCADIA Conference the movement of U.
S. Army forces in the Atlantic went forward very slowly. As agreed at
the conference, the first convoys for Northern Ireland and Iceland were
reduced, only 4,500 troops of the 34th Division being in the first
contingent that sailed for -Northern Ireland on 15 January. At the carne
time, 1,900 troops embarked for Iceland.2
-
- The next convoy for Northern Ireland was to sail about 10 February with approxi
- [147]
- mately 15,000 troops in sip: British returning liners, their equipment
in fifteen cargo ships. The search for ships for these convoys began
almost in immediately after the first contingent Of troops for Northern
Ireland had left the United Mates. In the latter part of January 1942, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of staff (CCS) discussed a proposal for using
U. S. combat-loaded ships and accompanying
cargo vessels for one movement of Army troops to Magnet in early February.
3
By 25 January it had become evident that it would be impossible
to provide sufficient cargo ships for thin move from either the American
or British sources. The planers therefore proposed that instead of
British liners, which had little or no cargo capacity. U. S. Navy
combat-loaded transports and accompanying cargo vessels allocated to the
U. S. amphibious force be employed for one trip. The planners recognized
that this proposal had certain military disadvantages. Since the ships
would be gone for five weeks, this plan would delay possible U. S.
participation in a North African operation until 1 April; it would prevent the U.
S. amphibious force from being
employed on any other
landing operation during that period; and it would mean the temporary
suspension of amphibious training. It would be politically unwise, however, to suspend further
movements to Northern Ireland during February, and for this reason planners recommended /using the
Navy combat-loaded ships in spite of the military disadvantages. 4
-
- This plan was approved by the President and Prime Minister and
arrangements were made for its execution.5
At the same time the Chief of Staff stated
that he wished the planned movement of 4,179 men to Iceland to be
carried out and 800 additional men to be sent there in a combat-loaded
ship in the same convoy, provided housing was available.6
The delay caused
by the lack of British escort vessels postponed the sailing of
the second INDIGO-Magnet convoy from 10 February to 18 February, when
5,200 troops sailed for Iceland and 9,000 for Northern Ireland.7
-
- Deployment to the smaller Atlantic bases was largely neglected during
this period. The Army began ordering contingents of no more than a few
hundred men at a time to islands in the Caribbean, to Bermuda, and to
Newfoundland. At the same time detachment, of the Marine Corps were
sent to guard air bases in northeast Brazil. 8
-
-
- The main body of Army troops moved from January through March went to
the Pacific, most of them to Australia and New Caledonia. During January
two convoys and the Navy seatrain Hammondsport sailed for the Southwest
Pacific from San
- [148]
- Francisco, and one large convoy sailed from New York. In mid-February
the Queen Mary sailed from Boston and the Monterey and Matsonia from San
Francisco. Early in March another large convoy sailed from New York,
followed a week later by the Queen Elizabeth sailing from San Francisco
and, after the middle of the month, by a convoy from San Francisco.
These shipments to the Southwest Pacific amounted to about 79,000
troops, nearly four times the number of American troop, that left during
the same period to make the much shorter voyage across the North
Atlantic. 9
-
- Of these 79,000, about 57,000 were for Australia, 24,500 of whom were
still en route at the end of March. Of those that had reached Australia by
that time -altogether about 37,000, including those that had embarked in December aboard the Pensacola
convoy and the Poll;- as many
as 2,000 were dead or missing ( including the 2d Battalion, 131st Field
Artillery Regiment, lost in Java), and some 3,000 had been sent to the
Tenth Air Force, leaving the strength then present in Australia at about
32,000. 10
-
- Except for the third and last contingent of the 41st Division and a
tank destroyer battalion-some 8,000 men-these shipment: completed the movements to Australia and
New, Caledonia that the War Department had
planned during January and February. The air combat units that the War
Department meant to send to Australia were two heavy bombardment groups,
two medium bombardment groups, one light bombardment group, and
three pursuit groups.11
By the latter part of 1larch the last of these
units, and of the aviation units allocated to support them, had arrived,
and filler replacements were on the wav. 12
The ground units present in
- [149]
- Australia were the 147th Field Artillery Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery
Regiment (less one battalion). and the equivalent of two
regiments of antiaircraft Artillery. About 4,000 service troops (including a regiment of engineers and a quartermaster battalion) had
arrived about 12,000 more were on the wav, along with about half the
41st Division and one of the two tank destroyer battalion assigned to
Australia.13
-
- In -New Caledonia there was at garrison of about 17,000-- the task
force (code name Poppy) that had made up the greater part of the
shipment from New York on 22 January. The convoy had landed in the
latter part of February at Melbourne, and the Poppy force was there
hurriedly reloaded for New Caledonia with part of its supplies and
equipment, which had been sent separately from the west coast and had
not all arrived. It sailed on
- March and arrived at Noumea on 12 March.14
The force consisted of
a brigade of infantry two regiments, a regiment of Artillery (155-mm.
howitzers), a battalion of light tanks, an antiaircraft regiment, and a
battalion of coast Artillery. It also contained a pursuit squadron, which arrived a few days later from
Australia.15
-
- Reinforcements for -New Caledonia numbering about 5,000 left the United States
during March. The original instructions issued to General Patch, the commander
of the New Caledonia force, were to plan "on the assumption that additional forces
will not be immediately available." 16
But the original plan lead assumed that a regiment of light Artillery, to be taken from the
brigade already in Australia, would there be incorporated in the force. The War Department, having acceded to General Wavell's request to leave the entire brigade committed to the ABDA Command and having
recognized, moreover, the need to strengthen the ground defenses of Australia, was
obliged to send another regiment of artillery from the United States to New Caledonia.17
This regiment ( 72d Field Artillery, 105-mm.
howitzers) sailed on 3
March with the first contingent of the 41st Division to bring the force up to the
planned strength of a triangular division, reinforced. The War Department also
added a third regiment of infantry (the 164th) and a battalion of pack Artillery
(75-mm. howitzers), which sailed later in the month with the second
contingent of the 41st Division.18
- [150]
- The Army garrisons along the South Pacific line of communications
represented a much smaller commitment. To the Fiji Islands (code name
Fantan), the link between New Caledonia and Samoa, the United
States was to send only a pursuit squadron, leaving it to New Zealand to
reinforce the ground garrison. The 70th Pursuit Squadron which with services
amounted to 725 men was put under orders early in January and arrived at
Suva at the end of that month.19
The Army garrison
for Borabora (code name BOBCAT) in the Society Islands, which was to serve
as a refueling station for convoys from the west coast to Australia, left on 27
January from Charleston, S.C. This garrison
numbered about 3,900 men, including the 102d Infantry ( less one
battalion) and an antiaircraft regiment (the 198th). 20
The Army garrisons for Christmas (code name
BIRCH) and Canton (code name
HOLLY) sailed from San Francisco on 31 January. The BIRCH garrison,
aboard the President Johnson, numbered nearly 2,000 men, including the 12th Pursuit Squadron, a battalion of
infantry, and two battalions of coast Artillery. The HOLLY garrison of about 1,100. men, aboard the
President Taylor, included two companies of infantry and mw battalions
of coast Artillery, but no pursuit squadron 9although one was
assigned to the island.21
-
- In March one other large shipment to the Pacific was undertaken the movement to Hawaii of most of the 27th
Division. The 27th was a square division the only square division sent
overseas. On 7 March two battalions of
infantry ; from the 165th Infantry and the 108th Infantry; left San Francisco aboard the Grant. On
10 March the Lurline and the Aquitania (lent by the British along with
the Queen Mary and the Queen Elizabeth), left with the 106th Infantry
and a battalion of the 105th, two batteries of field Artillery, and headquarters and medical troop. On 29 March the
Aquitania made a
second trip, with most of the remaining troops of the 165th Infantry,
two regiments of field Artillery (105th and 106th) , and a regiment
each of engineer and quartermaster troops.22
-
- The Shortage Along the Line Hawaii-Australia
-
- These shipments to the Pacific did not constitute a completed program.
In the first place, they did not fill the demand for ground forces. In
the latter part of February and again in early March, Admiral ping
proposed that the Army should garrison additional islands in the
South Pacific---Tongatabu (Tonga Island group) and Efate ( New Hebrides).
23
There
were also new requirements for troops III the
Southwest Pacific (in addition to the remainder of the 41st Division).
After the
- [151]
- return of the two Australian divisions ordered home from the Middle
East ( one of which was already on its wav ) , one Australian and one New Zealand division would still remain in the Middle East.
Early in
March, upon the opening of a new campaign in the North African desert,
the British Prime Minister requested the President to send two
additional divisions to the Southwest Pacific so that these Dominion
troops might remain in the Middle East.24
-
- Besides these new demands, the War Department had still to send to
Hawaii the ground troops it had promised to the new Army commander in
Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons. From the close of the Arcadia
Conference until the end of February, the shipment of men to Hawaii had
been entirely suspended ( except for a small movement aboard the Republic, including the advance party of the
27th Division), in favor of
the immediate execution of planned movements to the South and Southwest
Pacific.25
This delay, of which the War Department had warned
General Emmons on 12 January, left to be moved some 15,000 of the
100,000 ground troops allocated to his command, and the movement of the
greater part of the 27th Division in March left over 40,000 still to be
shipped.26
-
- There was, moreover, a deficit to be met in service troops for the
forces recently sent (and any new forces to be sent ) to the
South and Southwest Pacific. The amount of the deficit was as vet
undetermined, it being uncertain how far locally available labor would
supply the needs for unloading and warehousing cargo, construction of
facilities, laving out of roads and airfields, and other services. But
in any event the movement of over 40.000 additional ground troops to
Hawaii, two new garrisons : perhaps 10,000 men ) to the South Pacific, and
two more divisions ! about 30,000 men ) and the remainder of the 41st Division ( about 7,500 men) to the Southwest Pacific-- together with
the movement of service units to meet existing deficits and those
created by new movements-would certainly involve the continued use
throughout the spring of most of the troop shipping available in the
Pacific. It would, moreover, involve continued heavy pressure on cargo
shipping. The scheduled movement of munitions and other supplies and
equipment had not as vet caught up with the troop movements already initiated,
and supplementary shipments of supplies and equipment, as of service troops, would have to be scheduled as the limitations on what
was locally available became established.
-
- Another measure of existing deficits and prospective demands in the
Pacific was the number of airplanes needed to meet the requirements of
commands there. Beginning in the latter part of December, most of tire Army
planes dispatched from the United States had been destined-as most
of the Army troops had been destined -for AL1Stlalla, with the object of
creating a
- [152]
- "balanced" American air force in the Southwest Pacific.. By mid-March most of the air and ground crews and air
service units
assigned had arrived.27
But delays, losses, and diversions had left too
few medium and heavy bombers on hand in Australia for operations of any kind. In
mid March the force had twenty-six B-17's. Of these, twelve were then ire, shape to operate, as against an assigned strength ( for
two heavy bomber groups,) of eighty operational planes plus reserves.
There were only one or two B-25's, not in commission, as against an
assigned strength ( for two medium bomber groups) of 140 operational
planes plus reserves. Light bombers and pursuits were more nearly up to
strength. There were forty-three A-24's and one or two A-20's in
Australia, of which twenty-seven were operational, as against an assigned
strength (for one light bomber group) of fifty-seven plus reserves.
There were about 350 pursuit planes ( P-40's, P-400's, and P-39's), of
which half were operational and the rest to be repaired or assembled, as
against an assigned strength (for three pursuit groups) of 240
operational planes plus reserves. 28
-
- There was a like shortage of planes, especially of heavy and medium
bombers, throughout the I Pacific. The other major air force in the
Pacific, the Hawaiian :fir Force, had received no reinforcements since
the emergency shipments of December 1941. From January through March
there remained a great gap between the number of planes authorized and
the number present. :1s in Australia, the status of pursuit planes was
relatively satisfactory. The number on hand ( a good many of them
obsolete or obsolescent) fell from about `?00 at the beginning of January
to about 180, as compared with `?2:i authorized. The number of
light and medium bombers was about twenty-five, and the allocation of
these was decreased from thirty-nine to correspond to this actual
strength. Ninety-six heavy bombers were allocated to Hawaii, but the
number present dropped from forty-three in January to thirty-one in
mid-February. 29
-
- The drop in the number of heavy bombers present was the result of the diversion of a squadron of ,B-17's to the South Pacific, to support a
naval task force (the ANZAC Force ) that had been set up to operate in
the increasingly exposed zone east and northeast of Australia. These
were the only
- [153]
- bombers operating between Hawaii and Australia in February and March.
The Army pursuit squadrons assigned to New Caledonia, the Fijis, and
Christmas ; but not those assigned to Canton and Palmyra) were present
with their planes. But the one bombardment unit assigned to the South
Pacific-a squadron of medium bombers for New Caledonia-was due to be diverted from Australia
only late in the spring, when the flight crews
should arrive from the United States, and only over the objections of
the Army Air Forces. 30
Of all the deficiencies in the planned deployment
of Army forces on the main Pacific "line" Hawaii
Australia (as also in Alaska), the shortage of bombers, and particularly
the lack of bombers in the South Pacific, had become and was to remain
the focus of the most persistent criticism from the Navy Department and
from both Army and commanders in the Pacific. And it was the point at
which the War Department was least willing to revise and expand the
planned deployment of Army forces in the Pacific.
-
-
- The emergence of the deployment of Anne forces- and especially bomber
units-in the Pacific as a critical question of American strategy dated
from mid February. The entry for 17 February, in the private notes kept by
General Eisenhower during his tour of duty on the General Staff, gives an idea how
strongly he and his associates felt about the issue:
-
- The Navy wants to take all the islands in the Pacific--have there held by
Army troops, to become bawl for Arm. pursuit and bombers. Then! the will have a
safe place to sail us vessels. Rut they will not go farther forward than
our air (Army) can assure superiority.
-
- The amount of air required for this slow, laborious and indecisive type of warfare is going to be something that will keep us from going to
Russia's aid in time!! 31
-
- The occasion for this declaration was Admiral King's proposal, formally addressed to
General Marshall the following day, to garrison
additional islands, in particular the island of Efate, in the South
Pacific. The formal reply (drafted by Eisenhower or one of his
assistants and revised by Marshall) described the proposal as "a
joint project with rather far-reaching implications." Marshall
declared that he wanted to do anything reasonable" that would
make "offensive action by the fleet practicable," but asked
for an explanation of these questions
- a. What is the general scheme or concept of operations that the
occupation of these additional islands is designed to advance? Are the
measures taken purely for protection of a line of communications ~or is
a step-by-step general advance contemplated?
- b. What islands will be involved?
- c. What Army troops, particularly Air, will your proposal eventually involve.' I feel that a definite statement on this point is
necessary.
Requirements for troops, especially Air Forces, for operations and for
training and expansion are such that I must know definitely the extent
of each commitment.
- d. Your proposal contemplates the employment of Army forces as
occupational troops. Has the question of the availability of the Marine,
been fully explored? Ground troops, less AA, are available for
garrisons, but continuation of the practice of detailing "detachments" for
garrisons will result in destruction of the combat effectiveness of the
trained
- [154]
- Divisional teams from which these troops would have to be taken.32
-
- Marshall went on to state that -American operations in the Southwest
Pacific ~in which he included the South Pacific) must "for several
reasons be limited to the strategic defensive" so far as air and
ground forces were concerned. The first reason was the "geography
and communications of Australia" taken together with "enemy advantages in the
layout of air fields and other communications facing Australia." The second reason was the limiting
effect of the
tonnage. required for the long voyage to the far Pacific, which
restricted commitments of ground forces. The third reason was the
limiting effect of demands on the Army air force. throughout the world:
- . . . the requirements for U. S. air units in other theaters (Burma--China,
Alaska, Hawaii. Panama-Caribbean, Great Britain for German bombing, now
the Near East, a possible African expedition, and the U. S. Coastal
regions) would seem definitely to limit for some time to come the
extent to which we can provide for a further expansion in the Pacific-Australian
theatre.
-
- General Marshall acknowledged that the Navy might he able, in case
some land based air cover were provided, to "carry, on an offensive
campaign against the Japanese flank in the Southwest Pacific
theatre." He then concluded:
- I, therefore, feel that if a change in basic strategy, as already approved
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is involved, the entire situation must be
reconsidered before we become involved more seriously in the build-up of
Army ground and air garrisons in the Pacific islands.33
-
- When Admiral King repeated his proposal early in March, he requested
ground garrisons ,for only two islands- -Efate and Tongatabu- and to
this proposal the War Department quickly acceded.34
In determining the
composition of the task force for Tongatabu (code name BLEACHER), which
was to he a base of naval operations, the planners assumed that it would
probably not be attacked by major forces so long as the Allies held
Samoa, the Fijis, and New Caledonia. They provided a force to deal with
raids and to ,deny the Tonga Islands to any Japanese force moving from
the south against the Fijis or Samoa. This force, under the command of
Brig. Geri. Benjamin C. Lockwood, Jr., was similar to the one provided
for Borabora-a regiment of antiaircraft, a regiment of infantry
(reinforced) less one battalion, and a pursuit squadron the 68th which was to be sent from Australia-.- -all told, about
7,200 men.35
The
- [155]
- plan for garrisoning Efate assumed the probability of a Japanese
assault before attacking either New Caledonia or the Fijis. The Navy
agreed to provide for air defense with a Marine defense battalion and a
Marine fighter squadron. The Army agreed to send a force to Efate (code
name Roses) of about 4,900 men, consisting of a reinforced regiment of
infantry (the 24th Infantry). The force commander, Brig. Gen. Harry D.
Chamberlin, was to exercise unity of command over the joint forces.36
-
-
- The joint agreement to send these two additional garrison forces into
the South Pacific did not indicate agreement between the War and Navy
Departments on the question of Army deployment in the Pacific. The
leader in formulating the Army view was General Eisenhower. As chief War
Department operations officer for the Pacific, had recognized and had in
fact insisted that the movement of reinforcements to the ABDA area
should take precedence over "everything else-Magnet, Gymnast,
replacements in Ireland.'' 37
But he also considered this policy as necessarily
temporary.
-
- On 19 February he listed priorities for use of American shipping in
the war effort. The first priority was: "Maintenance of existing
garrisons. Defense aid to Russia. Essential supplies to IL R and
critical items, only, to China." Second priority was for approved
reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific, this to include approved new
garrisons not adjacent to the lines of communication, and possible items
of lend-lease for the Netherlands Indies. Third, came approved units and
material reinforcements for Hawaii; fourth, for Panama and Alaska.
British lend-lease had fifth priority (so far as use of American
shipping was required) ; approved reinforcements for the Caribbean area
( less Panama), sixth; continuation of Northern Ireland and Iceland movements,
seventh. Finally, Eisenhower mentioned filler replacements
for Hawaii. The above listing, Eisenhower noted, represented the degree
of urgency in actual or projected operations at the time the memorandum
was prepared.38
-
- A few weeks earlier, on 22 January, General Eisenhower had described
in his personal notes the existing disagreement over strategy and his
own solution:
-
- The struggle to secure the adoption by all concerned of a common
concept of Strategical objectives is wearing roc: down. Everybody is too
much engaged with small things of his own.
-
- We've got to go to Europe and fight-and we've got to quit wasting
resources all over the world-and still worse-wasting time. If
we're to
keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma; we've got to
begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed by a land attack
as soon as possible.39
- [156]
- The idea took more definite form in February, immediately after the
fall of Singapore, when Eisenhower had become head of the Army plans and
operations staff. He wrote: "We've got to go on a harassing defensive wept of Hawaii; hold India and
Ceylon: build up air and land
forces in England, and when we're strong enough, go after Germany's vitals.
40
Again, three days later: "We've got to keep
Russia in the war and hold India!! Then we can get ready to crack Germany through
England. 41
-
- On 28 February, Eisenhower prepared a formal study setting forth
his conclusions and recommendations on world strategy as well as on
Pacific deployment.42
The study presented an outline of world-wide
strategic objectives and their application to the Southwest Pacific. it
defined ire three main propositions what had remained indeterminate in Army, joint, and combined plans since the
ABC-1
conversations:
-
- [1] . . . in the resent of a war involving both oceans, the U. S.
should adopt the strategic defensive in the Pacific and devote its major
offensive effort across the Atlantic.
- [2] . . . we must differentiate sharply and definitely between those
things whose current accomplishment in the several theaters over the
world is necessary to the ultimate defeat of the Axis Powers, as
opposed to those which are merely desirable because of their effect in
facilitating such defeat.
- [3] The United States interest in maintaining contact with Australia
and in preventing further Japanese expansion to the Southeastward is
apparent . . . . but . . . they are not immediately vital to the successful outcome of the war. The problem is
one of determining what we can spare for the effort in that region.
without seriously impairing performance of our mandatory tasks.
-
- In dealing with the first of these three points, the memorandum
applied the "strategic axiom" that the commander should first
attack and defeat the weaker force of a divided enemy. Eisenhower
reasoned that although Germany and its satellites were stronger in
total combat power than Japan, Japan was still "relatively
stronger" since it was not at war with the Soviet Union and much
less accessible to attack by the main forces of the other Allied powers.
Moreover, it took three to four times as many ships to transport and
maintain a given American force in the Pacific as in the Atlantic. Therefore, Eisenhower
concluded, "logistic reasons, as well as
strategic axiom, substantiate the soundness of the decision to
concentrate against the European Axis.
-
- The memorandum recognized, however, that agreement upon a theater of
primary interest did not provide a detailed guide for immediate
operations, and that, even though it was correct to concentrate against
the enemy in Europe, the immediate problems of the Pacific theater
remained to be faced. "The significance of the current strategic
and tactical situation in the Southwest Pacific is important," said
Eisenhower, "both psychologically and materially, and we must be
as careful to avoid unwarranted weakness as to abstain from unnecessary
commitments." He continued:
-
- Over-simplification of the Japanese problem, because our primary objective
lips elsewhere. is likely to discount the enormous advantages
that will accrue to our enemies through conquest of India, the
domination of the Indian Ocean, the severing of all lines of
- [157]
- British communications to the Near and Middle East and the physical
junction of our two principal enemies. Important, but less critical,
advantages will accrue to thorn, also. through conquest of Australia
and the islands immediately to the east thereof.
-
- Having asserted the second main postulate, the doctrine of the "necessary"
as distinguished from the "desirable," Eisenhower listed
three objectives in the first category- -.always assuming that the
"continental United States and Hawaii, the Caribbean area, and
South America north of Natal
- were secure:
- a. Maintenance of the United Kingdom, which involves relative security of the North Atlantic sea lanes.
- b. Retention of Russia in the war as an active enemy of Germany.
- c. Maintenance of a Volition in the India Middle East Area ,shish will
prevent physical junction of the two principal enemies, and will probably
keep China in the war.
-
- On the other hand he named as "things . . . highly desirable," even approaching the necessary:
- a. Security of Alaska.
- b. Holding of bases west and southwest of Hawaii.
- c. Security of Burma, particularly because of its influence on future
Chinese action.
- d. Security of South America south of Natal.
- e. Security of Australia.
- f. Security of bases on Vest African coast and trans-,African air
route.
- g. Other areas and haws useful in limiting hostile operations and
facilitating our own.
-
- When he came to deal in detail with the Southwest Pacific-the area to
which by far the most Army forces had been committed since Pearl
Harbor-he acknowledged the interest of the United States in maintaining
contact with Australia and in containing Japanese expansion to the
southeastward. But he went on to point out that the collapse of the Malayan defenses
and loss of portions of the Netherlands Indies erased one of the
original reasons for deciding to support the Southwest Pacific--to deny to the Japanese the natural resources in those areas.
By 28 February, Japan controlled ample sources of oil and tin, and practically the
entire rubber resources of the world. Eisenhower therefore listed
present objectives, with the reservation that they were not vital to the
winning of the war:
- a. To maintain a reasonably sale line- of communications to
Australia
- b. To maintain the most advanced bases possible for eventual offensives against the Japanese Empire.
- c. To create diversions in favor of the vitally important India-Burma
area.
- d. To deny the enemy free access to the Southeastern Pacific and its
natural resources . . . .
- e. To support the battle in the N.E.I. as long as possible, . . .
-
- After a summary of the ground and air forces in the Southwest Pacific
and a review of the military situation, Eisenhower proposed that (1) New
Caledonia be garrisoned with the heavily reinforced triangular division
originally scheduled for use there; (2) the 41st Division and at
least five battalions of antiaircraft Artillery be assembled in
Australia as reserve and for occupation of island bases; (3) an
amphibious force be organized, in co-operation with the Navy, for
seizing island bases considered essential to the furthering of the
,general plan in the Southwest Pacific (4) the American air forces in
Australia be utilized in support of Java and in covering northern
Australia; (5) if resistance in Java ceased, U. S. air forces be used in support
of island bases; and (6) one medium group, one pursuit group,
- [158]
- and one light squadron be retained temporarily in Australia and, as
additional material became available, be withdraw to Hawaii to provide
a mobile reserve for employment to the southwest.
-
- Eisenhower then introduced a specific recommendation for offensive action, a proposal that followed
logically from his vices of the military situation as a whole and that
explained his other
recommendations. In elaborating on what was meant by "task of
keeping Russia in the war," he urged "immediate and definite
action," first "by direct aid through lend-lease," and second
"through the early initiation of operations that will draw off from
the Russian front sizeable portions of the German Army, both air and ground." More
specifically:
-
- We should at ones' develop,
in conjunction with the British. a definite plan for operations against
Northwest Europe. It should be drawn up at once, in detail, and it
should be sufficiently extensive in scale as to engage from the' middle
of May onward, an increasing portion of the German Air Force, and by late
summer an increasing amount of his ground forces.
-
- The choice of northwestern Europe as the invasion point followed from
the fact that another of the three essential objectives--protecting the
United Kingdom and the -North Atlantic sea lanes--could be achieved
concurrently with building up resources in the British Isles for a
cross-Channel assault. Greater shipping economy thus could be effected
than if another " 'first priority' convoying" problem were
created by establishing a "large force at any location other than
the Northeast Atlantic.'' Indeed, asserted Eisenhower, "The United
Kingdom is not only our principal partner in this war; it offers the only
point from which effective land and air ,operations against Germany May be attempted."
-
-
- The whole subject of scheduled movements overseas and long-run strategy
had meanwhile come under study for the JCS and the CCS.43
On 1
1 February the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee, since it was already studying American aspects of the problem, was directed to
satisfy a CCS request for recommendations for over-all deployment by the United
Nations in the Pacific areas. 44
-
- The initial JUSSC papers comprised majority and minority
reports.45
Although the papers were devoted chiefly to a discussion
of the Pacific areas, they had something to say about the general
strategic situation in the world, especially as it affected the special
situation in the Japanese theater of war. Both the majority and the
minority reports dwelt on the need to sustain the Soviet war effort and
to defeat Germany first, and concluded that the European situation
indicated "the compelling necessity for economy
- [159]
- of force in other theaters in order to permit concentration of effort
against the principal objective." The minority report placed even
greater emphasis on the ideas that Germany was the principal enemy and
that it was necessary to guard against any diversion of strength from
the main objective, the defeat of Germany. Both the reports stated
-
- The availability of shipping controls all decisions concerning overseas
movements during 1942. The total capacity available to the
United Nations in 1942, even if the building program is accomplished,
will not exceed the capacity available in 1941. The shipping situation
is so critical as to necessitate effective pooling of shipping and restriction of non-military use to an absolute
minimum. The remainder must then be used on the shortest runs
practicable in the manner which will contribute most to the early defeat
of Germany.
-
- The principal point of difference between the majority and minority
reports related to the capacity of the United States and Great Britain
to provide adequate air forces and chipping in the Pacific while
conducting air operations in Europe to gain superiority over Germany in
1942 and support an invasion of the Continent. Although the reports
agreed that "the courses of action to be taken in the Japanese
theater must be such as to reduce to a minimum the diversion of forces
that might be effectively employed against Germany," the minority
report stated:
-
- The effective defense of the Western Pacific, including the defense of all the important islands desired as
bases there, would require a large proportion of our available forces,
and would jeopardize the success of the offensive against Germany.
Consequently. it must be accepted that we are unable to establish a system of bases and forces, so disposed as to
give depth to the defense
of the line between Hawaii and Australia.
-
- Thus the minority-presumably the AAF member--recommended virtual
abandonment of the Southwest Pacific. region-including Australia and the
island base chain protecting the approach to Australia from Hawaii. The
majority report declared that Australia should he held, and that sea and
air communications with Australia must be made secure if Australia were
to be supported and remain available as a base for further operations:
-
- Since communications from Australia to the westward are now liable to
constant interruption, due to the fall of Singapore, the: importance of
the Anzac area has been greatly increased. On the security of the Anzac
area depends the maintenance of communications between Australia and the
United States. Not only must New Caledonia. Fiji and other important
shore positions in the area be garrisoned. There must also be provided a
mobile air force of long range aircraft to operate with the mobile naval
surface forces.46
-
- The minority felt that Australia should be held by minimum forces and
that the defense of Australia and New Zealand should be a British responsibility. It indicated that, with the' fall of Singapore, the
importance of the Anzac area had been somewhat reduced (rather than greatly increased), since it was too distant from Japan for the waging
of a decisive offensive against Japan. The minority paper insisted that
the United States and Great Britain must accept the fact that they might
be forced to relinquish the lines of communication from the United
States to Australia if its defense should jeopardize the success of the
offensive against Germany. The lines of communication, it contended,
should be secured with the forces already provided.
- [160]
- The result of the planners' study was a significant change in
alignment. The minority member acquiesced in the view that the United
States could and should hold the line Hawaii-Australia, with the minimum
force necessary and at the same time prepare for a maximum offensive
across the Atlantic. Thereupon the argument among the planners shifted
to the question of what the minimum necessary forces in the Pacific
would be--a question on which the Navy planners, rather than the Air
planners, found themselves in the minority, insisting that more :Army
forces, especially air forces, would be needed to hold the
Japanese. 47
-
-
- The Joint Staff Planners unanimously recommended "that the JCS at
once decide on a clear course of action, and execute this decision with
the utmost vigor.48
-
- They reported irreconcilable differences among themselves and
presented three possible courses of action which different members of
their committee supported. A middle-of-the-road course-which echoed Eisenhower's
28 February study-was listed as the third alternative.
The three alternatives were:
-
- A) Ensure the security of the military position in the Pacific
Theater by strong reinforcements . . . at the expense of executing a vigorous
offensive against Germany with United States Forces. Contain Japanese forms in the southern portion of the Pacific Theater: inflict
attrition; and exert economic pressure by the destruction of vessels . .
. .
- B ) While Russia is still an effective ally, concentrate the mass of
our forces for a vigorous offensive, initially from bases in England,
with the objective of defeating Germany. Until Germany has been
defeated, accept the possibility that the Southwest Pacific: May be
lost.
- (C) Provide the additional forces in the South Pacific- Area
considered by the Joint Strategic Committee as the minimum required for
the defensive position and simultaneously begin to build up in the
United Kingdom forces intended for offense at the earliest practicable
tune. This course of action contemplates that the British would provide
the bulk of the forces for any offensive undertaken in 1992 from the
United Kingdom. 49
-
- Thus squarely presented was the issue of where the. United States and
Great Britain should make their first great offensive effort. Implicit
in any decision in favor of the third alternative was acceptance of the
United Kingdom as the major offensive base. With very little recorded
discussion the JCS agreed, on lf> March 194`?, that "of the
courses of action available," it was "preferable" for the
United States "to begin to build up forces in the United
Kingdom" and to restrict Pacific forces to the number allotted in
"current commitments." 50
-
- Concurrently the JCS considered a paper in which the War Department carefully
re-
- [161]
- viewed the related question of defense forces for Hawaii..51
This
paper, approved by General Arnold and Marshall, maintained that In
providing rapidly for adequate defense of the Hawaiian Islands it
was essential to avoid over defense, since troops and armament
assigned there were being contained by Japan without any drain oil
it: own military resources, and the amount of shipping(,, available for
other purposes was unnecessarily reduced. The Army planers estimated
that so long as the United States could keep reasonable naval
strength in the Hawaiian area and were engaging the Japanese in the
Southwest Pacific, attacks on Hawaii would be limited to naval and air
raids. The study concluded that the ground and air forces, projected by the Army, combined with the local naval
defenses would "assure
retention of the island:. prevent serious damage to installations .
. . and permit freedom of action to the Pacific Fleet." It
recommended that Army forces should be increased to authorized levels
as soon as possible after commitments of higher priority had been
filled. Although the Hawaiian Department had requested substantial
reinforcements in addition to those authorized is January, the JCS
accepted this recommendation on 13 March and the President approved
their decision on 13 March. 52
-
-
- Soon after these decisions were reached, a number of changes had to be
made in War Department troop commitments, all of them making it even
harder to carry out the compromise policy of holding the line in the
Pacific while, preparing for an offensive across the Atlantic. Early in
'March the Prime 'Minister had asked ,that the United Buttes send one division to New Zealand and one to Australia in addition to the
U. S. Army forces already allocated to Australia. 'The Dominions could on
that basis consent to leave one New Zealand and one Australian division
in the then critical Middle East battle none. The Prime Minister
suggested that "shipping would be saved and safety gained by the
American reinforcement of Australia and Zealand rather than by a move
across the oceans of these divisions from the Middle East. 53
The Army planners recommended that the United States agree to send
the additional divisions for w hick the Prime Minister had asked, provided
oil that -Australia and New Zealand
definitely agreed to
retain an equivalent number of troops in the Indian Ocean area. It was
not perfectly clear from the Prime Minister's message whether or not he
knew of the assignment of the 41st Division to Australia nor, therefore,
whether his proposal would require sending two divisions or only one to
the Southwest Pacific in addition to the forces already there. 54
In
- [162]
- its reply, which Roosevelt forwarded to Churchill, the CGS recognized
the importance of the area of the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and agreed that the Australian
and :dew Zealand divisions now in that area
should remain and that the United Mates would dispatch one division to
New Zealand and one to Australia as replacement for their forces as
follows:
-
- The 41st Division is leaving the U. S. by the eighteenth of this
month reaching Australia about April 10. The next convoy of half a division could
leave about April l5 and the remainder about May 15. If
the total number of New Zealand and Australian troops retained for
fighting in the Middle Fast, India or Ceylon are in excess of these two
divisions, a third U. S. division can leave for the Southwest Pacific
about May 15.
-
- These movements would require that some twenty-five cargo ships be
withdrawn from lend-lease service to the Red Sea and China.55
-
- The United States also agreed to furnish shipping to move two British divisions (40.000
men) with their equipment from the United Kingdom to
the Middle East and India in April and May. This movement would require
the withdrawal of eleven lend-lease ships from railings for Burma and the Red Sea, and was contingent on a number of important matters, namely, that during that period a North African operation not be
undertaken, the movement to Northern Ireland be limited to those troops
which the two convoys planned for the Middle East could bring over from
the United States, and movements to Iceland be stopped. This movement
would also have the effect, the U. S. joint planners estimated, of
seriously curtailing American contribution to an air offensive and virtually eliminating
American contribution to a land offensive against Germany in 1942. 56
The joint planners found that under the new commitments
the available of troop transports would become the limiting factor
during the second and third quarters of 1942, after which the availability of cargo shipping would again
control. 57
Although the
tentative commitments might possibly haw some effect on transportation
of troops to the United Kingdom, all Pacific troop movements were
expected to be carried out as indicated in the previous schedules.58
The planners suggested that should the British not be willing to launch an
offensive in the European theater in 1942, the agreed
strategic concept should be reevaluated and the possibility of concentrating
American offensive effort in the Pacific considered.
-
- One other change occurred in the JCS 23 deployment schedules when the
27th Division, previously authorized by the War Department for Hawaii,
replaced a Marine amphibious division which the JUSSC; had recommended
he sent to Hawaii.59
With the addition of these three Army divisions, Army
forces allocated to Hawaii, Australia, and the lines of
communication for 1942
- [163]
- amounted to over 275,000-about 35 percent of the total projected overseas
deployment of the U. S. Army and about half of the projected Army deployment
outside the Western Hemisphere.60
(See Chart 2.)
-
-
- The debate over Army commitments in the Pacific was accompanied, and
its outcome was very largely determined, by a clarification of American
responsibilities for military operations in the Southwest Pacific,
following on the collapse of the ABDA Command. Within the week after the
fall of Singapore the GCS accepted as virtually certain the loss of Sumatra and Java.61
On 23 February they ordered
General Wavell to dissolve his headquarters at Batavia, permitting
command to pass to the Dutch, whose forces were still engaged, with some
Allied aid, in fighting a delaying action in Java.62
Although this
transfer of authority technically placed the United States forces in the
Philippines under Netherlands command, MacArthur was to "continue
to communicate directly with the War Department." 63
The two senior
U. S. Army officers in the Batavia headquarters were ordered, upon
release by Wavell, to proceed to the two flanks of the disintegrating
ABDA area--General Brereton to India, to become Commanding General,
Tenth U. S. Air Force, with headquarters at Karachi, and General Brett
to resume command of all U. S. forces in Australia.64
These interim
readjustments marked the end of the first short-lived experiment in
international unified command for World War II.
- [164]
- MacArthur Ordered to Australia
-
- A far more important readjustment in command had meanwhile come under
consideration the transfer of General Mac-Arthur from the Philippines
to Australia.65
The War Department had opened the question of his
transfer early in February with a message to MacArthur, which stated
that in the event of the loss of Bataan peninsula there might be a
greater need for hire elsewhere, and which assured him that any order
for him to give up the "immediate leadership" of his forces in
the Philippines would come directly from the President.66
On 22 February
the President decided to order 'MacArthur to Australia to
assume command of American forces there, with the intention of getting
the Australian and British Governments to accept him "as commander
of the reconstituted ABDA Area. 67
MacArthur himself had the choice of the exact moment and manner of his
departure. He notified the War Department that he expected to leave the Philippines for Australia about 15 March.
68
-
- Division of World Into Areas of Strategic Responsibility
-
- While these readjustments in command were being made, the President
and the Prime Minister entered into negotiations to allocate strategic responsibility
as between Great Britain and the United States. The
President first introduced the subject of a division of responsibility among theaters
by the two countries on 18 February in a communication to
the Prime Minister. He wrote:
-
- It seems to me that the United States is able because of our
geographical position to reinforce the right flank Australia and New Zealand
much better than you can and I think that the L . S. should
take the primary responsibility for that immediate reinforcement and
maintenance. using Australia as the main base . . . . .Britain is better
prepared to reinforce Burma and India and I visualize that you would
take responsibility for that theater.
- We would supplement you in any May we could. just as you would
supplement our efforts on the right flank.69
- [165]
- A few days later the British Chiefs of Staff indicated that they were
thinking along similar lines.70
-
- On 7 March the President proposed that the world be divided into three general
areas for the prosecution of the war against the Axis: (1) the Pacific area,(2)
The Middle and Far East area, and
(3)
the European and Atlantic area. The first region would be an American
responsibility, the second British, and the third combined American and
British.71
On the new day General Marshall discussed the issue at
the White House. 72
-
- General Eisenhower meanwhile prepared a study along the lines of the
President's proposal., Eisenhower defined the three areas of strategic
responsibility as follows:( 1) The Pacific area, which included the
American continents, China. Australia, New Zealand. and Japan, but
excluded Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, was to be an area of American
responsibility. (2 ) The Indian Ocean and Middle East area- the Indian
Ocean and all land areas contiguous thereto west of Singapore, and the
Middle and near East was designated an area of British responsibility,
with American assistance limited to material aid from surplus
production. It was stipulated that the United States should have access
to bases in India and routes to China within this area.(3) Europe and the Atlantic, in which the major effort against Germany was
to be made, was to be an area of British-American joint responsibility.
-
- Eisenhower further proposed, following the sense of the 7 March White
House meeting, that the CCS exercise general jurisdiction over grand strategy and the allocation of war material m all areas, in addition to
direct supervision of all strategic and operational matters in the
European and Atlantic area. In tile Indian Ocean and Middle East urea
the British Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction: in the Pacific
area the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were to exercise jurisdiction.73
-
- On 9 March the President sent a personal message to the Prime
Minister asking him, ill vice, of the developments in the Southwest
Pacific area since the ARCADIA Conference, to consider the operational
simplification that had been proposed in Washington. The operational
responsibility for the Pacific area would rest on the United States,
with decisions for the area being made in N1'ashingoon by the L;. S.
Chiefs of Staff in consultation .with an advisory council representing
Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands Indies, China, and possibly
Canada. The supreme command in the Pacific area would be American. The
middle area-extending from Singapore to and including India, the Indian
Ocean. Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Libya, and the -Mediterranean-would be a
British responsibility, but the United States would continue to allocate
to it all possible munitions and vessel assignments. The third area
-Europe and the Atlantic would be a joint British-American responsibility
and would include definite plans for establishment of a new front on the
European Continent. "I am becoming more and more interested in the
establishment of
- [166]
- WAR PLANS DIVISION, March 1942. Left
to right: Col. St. Clair Streett; General
Eisenhower,
Chief; Col. A. S. Nevins; Brig. Gen. R.
IV. Crawford; Col. C. A. Russell; and Col.
H. A. Barber, Jr.
-
- thin new front this summer," the President added. 74
-
- The Prime Minister replied on 18 March, generally concurring in the
President's proposals and stating that he and the British Chiefs of
Staff saw "great merits in simplification resulting from American
control over Pacific sphere and British control over Indian sphere and
indeed there is no other way." The Prime Minister implicitly accepted
the postponement of a combined North African operation and movements of American troops to the United Kingdom as
necessary corollary to the use of shipping few deployment
to the Southwest Pacific and movement of British troop, to
the Middle East. With the undemanding that British and American
efforts everywhere could be directed by "machinery of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directly under you and nit'," the
Prince Minister also approved the President's proposals for "executive
conduct" of the war.
-
- In regard to the Pacific: theater, Churchill wrote:
- On supreme and general outlook in Pacific we are both agreed
on the paramount importance of regaining the initiative against
- Japan . . . . We assume that any large-scale
- [167]
- methods of achieving this would be capable of being discussed by combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington . . . .
-
- And in summing up:
- . . . I feel that your proposals as I have ventured to elaborate and
interpret them will achieve double purpose namely (a) integrity of
executive and operational action and lb) opportunity of reasonable
consultation for those whose fortunes are involved. 75
-
- Creation of SWPA and POA
-
- While the President and the Prime -Minister were reaching agreement on
the worldwide division of strategic responsibility, the JCS were
considering the subdivision of the Pacific theater, which they assumed
would become a responsibility of the United States. The Navy was primarily
concerned with the "threat to the line of communications
between the Americas and Australia-New Zealand," and Admiral King
had made the first formal proposal for revision of command arrangements
in the Southwest Pacific immediately after the fall of Singapore.76
The War Department planners considered various alternatives suggested by
Admiral King.77
At the same time the War Department informally told
Brett of its agreement with the principle expressed by the New Zealand
and Australian authorities meeting in Melbourne that operations in the South and Southwest Pacific based
on Australia should be under unified command.78
-
- The JCS, after studying the recommendations of the Australian and New Zealand Governments, adopted instead the
law's vices that New Zealand belonged with the line of communication, and proposed the establishment of a new "Australian area" that would include only "the
Australian continent and the direct enemy approaches thereto, a strategic entity appropriate for unified
command" 79
Eisenhower pointed out that since Australia
had to serve as a base for all military operations in the Southwest
Pacific: there were obvious disadvantages in setting up an Australian
area which would not include New Zealand, New Caledonia, and the
Philippines. Accordingly the War Department recommended extending the
area to include these islands and proposed giving the area, so extended,
the "more descriptive designation" of "the Southwest
Pacific Area." 80
General Marshall proposed to the joint Chiefs
that
- [168]
- the "Southwest Pacific Area" be established as a Subarea
command in the Pacific theater "to comprise all land areas in the
Pacific for which the U. S. is made responsible, southwest of the line Philippines, Samoa
( both inclusive), thence south along the meridian of
170° W." The participating governments--Australia, New Zealand,
the Netherlands Indies, and the United States---would select a supreme
commander whose directive would be prepared by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff in collaboration with representatives of these governments. The
sea and island areas in the Pacific Ocean northeast of the Southwest
Pacific: Area would be known as the North Pacific Area and "placed
under the command of a U. S. Navy officer. 81
-
- The JCS acting "in anticipation of final approval of the division
of the world into three major theaters," thereupon modified their
proposal by extending the boundary of the area northward to include the
Philippines and renaming the area the Southwest Pacific Area. But they
retained the separation of Australia from New Zealand and Mew Caledonia,
ruling that the defense of these islands, as the Navy insisted, was
essentially a part of the defense of the lines of communication from the
United States. 82
-
- On this basis the JCS proceeded to set up commands in the Pacific
theater, in effect making the Army responsible for operations in Australia and to the north and northeast, to and including the
Philippines-the Southwest Pacific Area-and making the Navy responsible for operations in the rest of the
Pacific theatre---the Pacific Ocean Area-except for a small Southeast Pacific
area (for which no command was established).83
(See Chart 2.) General
MacArthur was to be Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area (SNVPA )
. Admiral Chester W. , who was in command of the Pacific Fleet, was to
become Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (POA), directly controlling the South Pacific subarea through a
deputy whom he would designate. 84
-
- Organization of SWPA
-
- On 10 March, in anticipation of General MacArthur's arrival in
Australia, the War Department had sent to General Brett the following
instructions, as approved by the President:
-
- Within the hour [of General MacArthur's arrival in Australia] you will
call upon the Prime Minister or other appropriate governmental official
of Australia, stating that your
- [169]
- call is made by direction of the President. You are to notify the
Prime Minister that General MacArthur has landed in Australia and has
assumed command of all U. S. Army forces therein. You will propose
that the Australian Government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme
Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and will recommend that the
nomination be submitted as soon a, possible to London and Washington
simultaneously. 85
-
- On 11 March MacArthur and his party left Corregidor for Mindanao, from
which planes were still able to operate. When he arrived in Australia
six days later, the War Department announced that he would be supreme
commander in that region, including the Philippines, "in accordance
with the request of the Australian Government. 86
On the same
day Roosevelt sent a personal message to Churchill telling him of
MacArthur's arrival in Australia and explaining that both the Australian
and New Zealand Governments had suggested appointment of an American
supreme commander in the Southwest Pacific. "This action,"
the President stated, "will in no wav interfere with procedure of
determining strategic areas and spheres of responsibility through
established channels." 87
-
- On 18 March the War Department sent MacArthur a long summary of
the plans for command arrangements as of that date, telling him drat the
President had approved his assumption of "Supreme Command in Australia and region to
north, including the Philippine," and that upon completion of
British-American negotiations he probably would be appointed formally as
commander of the Southwest Pacific Area. 88
-
- The first tank facing MacArthur after his arrival in Australia was to
consolidate the organization of the land, sea, and air forces of the
United States and Australia that had been put under his command.
General Arthur had been instructed to take over from General Brett the
command of L. S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) but the day after his
arrival the War Department rescinded these instructions, explaining that
as supreme commander of an international command he would not be "eligible
to retain direct command of any national force." The War Department
informed him that Brett, therefore, should "temporarily resume his
position as Commanding General of USAFIA," indicating further that,
upon the reorganization of commands in the Pacific, Brett should command
Allied air forces in Australia, an Australian officer should command
Allied ground forces, and Vice Admiral Herbert F. Leary should command
Allied naval forces.89
- [170]
- By agreement between MacArthur and the Australian Government, Brett
was at once put in command of combined air forces, and MacArthur soon
thereafter relieved him of responsibilities for USAFIA 90
These
responsibilities, primarily for the operation of American base
facilities in Australia, reverted to Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, who
in fact had had a fluctuating and uncertain share of these
responsibilities ever since his arrival with the first American troop convoy
in Australia in December. 1lacArthur proposed that they should
continue to include command of American grounds forces in
Australia.91
But the War Department continued to insist on the need
for a combined ground command, under an Australian officer, in line
with the precedent of the ABDA Command. The War Department emphasized
the importance of following that precedent, noting that it had been developed "after much
difficulty," and explained shat it had
been set to avert a situation where the supreme commander of ABDA area (
Wavell j might have personally become "to intimately involved in defense of Singapore and Burma
and not sufficiently detached in point of view to lake care of
interests of Philippines and -Netherlands fast Indies." The War
Department concluded : "This basis for Supreme Commander has been
accepted as the policy to ,guide ire future combined operations of
United Nations . . . .92
-
- MacArthur at once fell in with the policy outlined by the War
Department for command of combined air, ground, and naval forces and proposed that Barnes' command be set up as an American
service command,
with purely administrative and supply functions, separate from
Australian administration and supply, which would continue to be under
the Australian Government.93
-
- Directive to MacArthur
-
- The formal directive naming MacArthur as Supreme Commander, Southwest
Pacific Area, and Admiral Nimitz as Commander in (chief, Pacific Ocean
Area, was issued by the JCS on 30 March and promptly approved by the
President. The two first and most important points in the mission as-
- [171]
- signed to MacArthur were to "hold the key military regions of
Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan, and in
order to check the Japanese conquest of the Southwest Pacific Area"
and to "check the enemy advance toward Australia and its essential lines of communication . . .94
Although his directive included the
provision that he should "prepare to take
the offensive," the mission assigned him was primarily defensive,
in accordance with the strategy in the Pacific. that the U. S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff had developed in March. He was to maintain the American
position in the Philippines and protect communications and route
shipping within the Southwest Pacific Area. He was directed to exert
economic pressure on the enemy by destroying his transport vessels and
to support the operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean and
Indian theaters.
-
- There were certain broad limitations on MacArthur's authority. As
supreme commander, he was authorized "to direct and coordinate the
creation and development of administrative facilities and the broad
allocation of war materials," but was declared ineligible to
command directly any national force and was not responsible for the
internal administration of the respective forces under his command.
-
- The JCS reserved to themselves the exercise of jurisdiction over all
matters pertaining to operational strategy, with the Army Chief of Staff acting as
agent for the JCS. General jurisdiction over grand strategic policy and
related factors including the allocation of forces and war materials was
given to the CCS.
-
- Finally, and most tellingly, the scope of General MacArthur's operations was restricted not by his directive
but by the policy that the War Department had meanwhile adopted to
govern the
deployment of Army forces in the Pacific. The War Department
undertook to bring to full strength the air units already assigned to
Australia-two heavy bomber groups, two medium bomber groups, one light
bomber group, and three pursuit groups-and to send to Australia the 41st
and 32d Divisions. As soon as MacArthur arrived in Australia, the War
Department informed him that Army commitments to the Southwest Pacific
Area would he limited to these units, the limits being "fixed by shortages in shipping, which is of the utmost seriousness, and
by critical situations elsewhere." 95
The implications of the War
Department's policy were quite as important as the explicit limitation
on authorized strength. The rate at which the War Department met its
commitments to the Southwest Pacific Area and the state of training of
the troops that were sent might also be cut for the same reason that the
authorized strength itself was limited in order to meet other
commitments. Under its adopted policy, moreover, the War Department was
not likely to demand, and still less likely to obtain, the commitment of
sufficient naval reinforcements to the Southwest Pacific to enable
General MacArthur to conduct any offensive operations, even
- [172]
- when his air units should be reorganized and equipped and his divisions
adequately trained for combat operations. The forces at his
disposal y, were only a small fraction of those he would need only make
good the pledge he had given the Philippine nation and to avenge the
defeat and imminent surrender of the remnants, hungry and bitter, of the U. S. Army Forces
in the Far East.96
- [173]
- Page created 10 January 2002
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