- Appendix C
-
- TIMING OF TORCH
-
- The records consulted for the month of August, the time of the
debate over the date for launching TORCH, contain no indication
that the British spoke of wanting the operation to follow promptly
after the planned offensive in the Libyan Desert (LIGHTFOOT, for
which a target date had not yet been set), or that the President
alluded to the desirability of having it come well before the
congressional elections of 4 November. It is clear, however, that
Churchill considered the relation of LIGHTFOOT to TORCH. In a
message to the War Cabinet on 6 August, he stated his view that
"a victory over Rommel in August or September may have a
decisive effect upon the attitude of the French in North Africa
when 'Torch' begins."1
Following an understanding between
Churchill and General Alexander, the Prime Minister advised the
President on 26 August that if Rommel had not attacked by the
August moon, the British would attack by the end of September.2
On
17 September when Churchill had had no further notice from
General Alexander as to the definite date for LIGHTFOOT, he
inquired as to the general's intentions. General Alexander replied
that 24 October had been chosen for LIGHTFOOT, and that he had
"carefully considered the timing in relation to `Torch' and
have come to the conclusion that the best date for us to start
would be minus 13 of 'Torch' [then fixed for November 4]."3
Churchill notified the President on 22 September that " General Alexander will attack in sufficient time to
influence Torch favorably should he be successful.4
-
- It appears from the silence of the record that the President did
not introduce the November elections into the discussion of the
timing of TORCH. Unwillingness to have imputed to him, in case the
operation should fail, that partisan reasons had overruled
military judgment, may even have influenced him to acquiesce in
the later date, once he understood what the reasons were. The
postponement of TORCH (from the October date which the President
had hoped for) may have been a disappointment to the President,
but Robert E. Sherwood states that Roosevelt said at the time,
"this was a decision that rested with the responsible
officer, Eisenhower, and not with the Democratic National
Committee." 5
Another reference to the matter came during the
Casablanca Conference in January 1943, when -Marshall remarked:
"that he had felt embarrassed over the date of this operation
[HUSKY] remembering as he did the incentive which had existed for
hastening TORCH in view of the U. S. elections. In spite of that,
it had not proved possible to advance the date." The Prime
Minister said that "there had been much admiration in England
of the fact that the election had not been allowed to influence in
the slightest the course of military events. 6
- [386]
- Page created 10 January 2002
Endnotes