- Chapter
VIII:
-
- THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION
IN THE BRITISH ISLES
-
- The program of the War Department for limiting
Arm commitments in the Pacific was In keeping
with previous understandings on British and
American strategy. But the purpose of the War
Department in advancing this program went beyond
the previous understandings and was in conflict
with the announced intentions of the Prime
Minister and his Chiefs of Staff. As General
Eisenhower had urged in February, the War Department
began planning to gather U. S. Army forces
in the British Isles as rapidly as possible,
in preparation for an invasion of northwestern
Europe across the English Channel. The reason
given by Eisenhower for beginning at once to
plan by this basis was the fear of a collapse
of the Red Army in 1942. A collapse of the
Red Army would leave Great Britain and the
United States with little prospect of victory
in northwestern Europe.1
Back of this reasoning lay the fear
of becoming committed successively to a whole
series of limited operations- -peninsular campaigns
in Europe and island campaigns in the Pacific.
Behind this fear lay the conviction that these
limited operations, would serve only to restrict
the enemies' positions without greatly reducing
their actual and potential strength, white
tying down such large Allied armies and building
up such formidable demands on overseas
supply routes as to rule out the possibility
of mounting a "decisive" campaign
against the heavily defended main position
of either Germany or Japan.
-
- There seemed to be some chance that the War
Department could avoid making such a series
of commitments. The British shared the War
Department's fears, in so far as operations
against Japan were concerned, and the U. S.
Navy shared its fears, in so far as operations
against Germany were concerned. There was a
possibility that Admiral King might accept
what could not but seem to him a very inadequate
provision for "defensive" operations
in the Pacific, in order to avoid a prolonged
involvement in secondary, campaigns against
Germany that might indefinitely postpone decisive
action against Japan. There was a parallel
possibility that, in order to assure that U.
S. Army forces would not become heavily committed
to operations against Japan, the British Chiefs
might be ready to forego their long-considered
strategy of opening in the Mediterranean several
limited offensives against Germany. There was
of course no certainty, even if the military
staffs should reach agreement on this basis,
whether the President and the Prime Minister
would accept it, restraining their desire to
commit forces to action as fast as they became
available.
- [174]
- The fiat condition of gaining approval for
the War Department's plan for concentration
in the British Isles was fulfilled when Admiral
King acquiesced in the limitation of Arm strength
in the Pacific.2
The second condition was fulfilled by
the agreement of the British Chiefs, through
their representatives in the CCS, to discontinue
active planning, far the joint British-Americal
invasion of North Africa.
-
-
- At the very end of the ARCADIA Conference
the President and the Prime Minister had agreed
to defer this operation until May, in order
that the military staffs might go ahead with
the scheduled reinforcement of Positions ill
the South and Southwest Pacific and in southeast
Asia, but it was evident that neither of them
had given up the idea and that they expected
to bring it up again in the late spring, and
that they were strongly disposed to act sooner
if they should receive an "invitation"
from the French.3
-
- After the ARCADIA Conference the planners
set out to fix the meaning of the primary assumption
of the plan-that the French authorities would
issue an "invitation." The British
planners in Washington stated that they presupposed
"Whole-hearted French cooperation,"
especially on the part of the French Fleet
units under the control of the Vichy government,
whereas the ARCADIA language seemed to allow
for "slight uncoordinated resistance."
4
The combined planners and Maj. Gen. Lloyd R.
Fredendall, who had succeeded General Stilwell
in command of the American forces assigned
to the African operation, eventually agreed
to plan on the assumption that Vichy French
authorities would be helpful and would have
bound themselves to prevent the French Fleet
units from opposing the operations.5
-
- Securing assurances of this kind from Vichy
seemed much less probable at the end of February
1942 than it had in December 1941. In December
initial successes of General Sir Claude Auchinleck's
Eighth Army offensive in Libya, which had started
auspiciously in November, had caused the British
to anticipate an early approach to Tunisia
and a trench invitation to occupy forth Africa.
By the end of January 1942 the initiative had
passed to the Afrika Korps, and the British
had fallen back to eastern Libya to establish
a defensive line that would protect Egypt.
United States and British military opinion
was unanimous that "far from cooperating,
the Vichy French will continue to aid the Axis
. . . until such time as the Axis is on the
run." 6
-
- The unfavorable turn of events in North Africa
after the ARCADIA Conference simplified the
problem for the Army planners, since it put
entirely out of the question the SUPER-GYMNASTS
operation, which they believed to be beyond
the means of the United States and Great Britain,
and unwise in
- [175]
- itself. 7
Plans were made for the invasion of
North Africa in case the trench should issue
an "Invitation" some time soon.8
But even on this assumption, the War
Department concluded that the requirements
of the operation could be met only by suspending
all movements to Iceland and Ireland, and reducing
reinforcements to Australia and Hawaii to a
"trickle." 9
Furthermore, cargo ships, which were
critical in supporting SUPER-GYMNAST, could
be made available only at the expense of the
Soviet aid program and Red Sea service. The
British, too, were held back by a want of shipping,
which made SUPER-GYMNAST" almost certainly
impossible from the British point of view,
during 1942.10
-
- The conclusion drawn by the planners after
several weeks of study vas that planning for
the invasion of North Africa was 'an academic
study and should be treated as such.11
On 3 March 1942 the CCS agreed to drop
SUPER-GYMNAST as an immediate operational possibility.12
-
- Meanwhile, the President and the Prime Minister
were also reaching agreement to lay aide the
North African project. On 4 March the Prime
Minister wrote to the President: "I am
entirely with you about the need for GYMNAST,
but the check which Auchinleck has received
; in Libya and the shipping stringency seem
to impose obstinate and long delays."13
-
- A few days later, in a message discussing
the division of strategic responsibility, the
President wrote to the Prime Minister: "It
is understood that this presupposes the temporary
shelving of Gymnast." 14
The Prime Minister, concurring in the
President's proposals for movement of British
troops to the Middle East and for deployment
of U. S. forces to the Southwest Pacific, implicitly
accepted this conclusion.15
In conformity with the agreement reached
by the CCS, the three War Department commands
were told that "no forces, material, or
shipping" would be "held in readiness"
for SUPER GYMNAST, and air force and service
units assigned to the operation would be released
immediately.16
This marked the end of the
- [176]
- planning begun in December 1941 for a combined
British-American invasion of North Africa and
opened the way for the War Department's proposal
to concentrate forces in the British Isles.
-
-
- As early as August 1941, a G-2 officer had
written a paper urging the creation of a second
land front as soon as practicable to divert
German resources from the Russian front, as
the "only possible method of approach
to an ultimate victory of the democracies."
This study pointed out that a second land front
would also serve as a base for possible future
offensive operations provided its location
was in a theater containing a vital strategic
objective. Proceeding from the axiom that a
line of supporting operational bases had to
form the base line of an equilateral triangle
with assault objective at its apex, the paper
advocated a landing on the French coast in
the vicinity of Dunkerque in order to capitalize
on supporting ground and air bases in England
for mounting and protecting the assault forces.17
By the summer of 1941 the War Department
planners had come to believe ( as Admiral Stark
had earlier concluded) that very large ground
force operations in Europe would be necessary
in order to bring about the defeat of Germany.
18
But neither then nor thereafter had
they even tried to work out any plan of operations
in Europe. Nor would it have been to any purpose
for them to do so while the future scope and
scale of American involvement in the Pacific
remained entirely undefined and indefinable
-
- Finally, in March 1942, assuming that the
War Department had succeeded in fixing limits
to future claims for Army forces in the Pacific
and could ignore the prospect that Army forces
might be sent into North Africa, the War Department
staff formulated and advanced its plan for
future operations against Germany-a plan essentially
different from the plan that the British had
advanced.
-
- Preliminary American Studies
-
- General Eisenhower recommended in his '28
February study, "Strategic Conceptions
and Their Application to the Southwest Pacific"':
-
- We should at once develop, in conjunction
with the British, a definite plan for operations
against Northwest Europe. It should be drawn
up at once, in detail, and it should be sufficiently
extensive in scale as to engage from the middle
of May onward, an increasing portion of the
German Air Force . . .
-
- Eisenhower' asserted that the United Kingdom
offered the only point from which effective
land and air operations against Germany could
be attempted and pointed out that the gathering
of forces in the British Isles for a cross-Channel
assault would also protect the United Kingdom
and the North Atlantic sea lanes.19
-
- On 6 March the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee
agreed that "the only means for quickly
applying available force against the German
war machine" was "use of the British
Isles as a base area for an offensive to
- [177]
- defeat the German armed forces." 20
The committee stated the general principle:
"If the war is to be won in Europe, land forces
must be developed and trained which are capable
of landing on the continent and advancing under
the support of an overwhelming air force."
This meant "strict economy of force in other
theaters." The committee emphasized the importance
of supporting the Soviet Union as the only
power "actively and aggressively operating
against Germany" and listed as one means "a
supporting offensive in 1942" based on the
British Isles. The committee did not assert
that such an offensive was possible, but did
recommend "a maximum effort in cooperation
with the British in offensive action operations
against Germany" after minimum forces had been
allocated to secure the Pacific area.21
The planners estimated that a force large enough
to cause a "material diversion of German forces
from the Russian front" would amount to about
600,000 ground troops, supported by an air
force of some 6,500 planes. They further estimated
that after needs in the Pacific, India-Burma-China,
and other areas in the Atlantic were taken
care of, the cargo shipping available to the
Army would be sufficient to transport and maintain
in the European theater only the following
forces:
By |
Air Forces |
(Aircraft) |
Ground Forces |
1 July 1942 |
50,000 |
(700) |
51,000 |
1 October 1942 |
114,000 |
(1,400) |
191,000 |
1 January 1943 |
183,000 |
(2,300) |
252,000 |
It was evident that the Army forces that could
be moved to Great Britain in 1942 were not
enough for a major offensive, but the planners
believed that they would be "adequate to assist
effectively in such an offensive in the fall
of 1942" and could be progressively increased.
"Their prospective availability," they added,
"should enable the British to initiate an offensive
even sooner." 22
The planners were thinking in terms of a British-American
air offensive to be begun in the last two weeks
of July 1942 followed by an assault with ground
forces six weeks later. 23
They concluded that the military prospects
of the USSR were the crux of the military situation
in Europe and perhaps in the world, and that
the United Nations could most effectively assist
the Soviet Union in 1942 by:
a) delivering the maximum quantities [of] appropriate
munitions to the Red Army, and b) creating
a diversion of the maximum number of German
air and ground forces from the Russian front
by launching as strong an air and ground offensive
as it is possible to form from British and
American Forces available after all essential
strategic deployments in other theaters are
provided with the minimum forces consistent
with their missions.
The planners suggested destroying enemy forces
in the general area of Calais-Arras-St. Quentin-Soissons-Paris-Deauville
and establishing bases in that area to facilitate
the extension of offensive air and ground operations
against German military strength. The chief
purposes of this mission would be to divert
German forces from the Eastern theater and
to destroy German air and ground forces. The
planners also expected that such an operation
would call
- [178]
- forth the support of the people in occupied
Prance, and encourage other European peoples
to resist the Axis. On the all important matter
of timing, they stated
-
- An analysis of the available U. S. and British
air and ground forces indicates that the British
must furnish initially the bulk of the. forces
if the offensive is launched in time to accomplish
effective assistance to the Russians . . .
. It is not possible at this time to state
the definite date on which the combined US-British
air and ground offensive will be undertaken.
However, preparations should be based on a
D day between July 15 and August 1st.
-
- Before the deployment issue finally reached
the JCS, estimates of United States forces
had to be revised in the light of fresh commitment.
made subsequent to the original JUSSC study.
One of these commitments involved the provision
of United States shipping for the movement
of 40.000 British troops from the British Isles
to the Middle East and India, and the consequent
withdrawal of eleven lend-lease cargo ships
from railings for Burma and the Red Sea during
April and May. The second commitment was the
movement of two additional United States divisions,
One to Australia and one to New Zealand, and
the withdrawal of twenty-five lend-lease ships
from railings for Burma and the Red Sea for
this purpose. These commitments, which caused
troop transports to become the limiting factor
during the second and third quarter of 194`2,
would reduce the number of troops that could
be moved to the United Kingdom, if all other
troop movements were carried out as previously
recommended. The revised estimates were
-
-
- by July 1, 1942, only 40,000 troops,
instead of 101,000:
- by October 1, 1942, only 180,000
troops, instead of 301,000; and
- by January 1. 1943, only 390,000
troops, instead of 435,000.
-
- This delay in the movement of U. S. forces
to the British Isles obviously would prevent
effective American participation in an offensive
in Europe in mid-1942. The planners did not
change their general strategic recommendations
and listed several expedient that might ease
the situation in regard to troop movements
to the United Kingdom so that it might still
be possible to keep to the previous schedule.24
-
- The British Plan for 1943
-
- On 16 March, with very little recorded discussion,
the JCS settled the dispute over Army deployment
in the Pacific, stating that Army the courses
of action available" it was -preferable"
for the United States to restrict Pacific forces
to the number allotted in "current commitments"
and "to begin to build up forces in the
United Kingdom.'' 25
At a meeting of the JCS a week later,
Marshall reported that the British had presented
a paper on the possibilities of an invasion
of -the Continent in 1943, representing a quite
different view from the American paper on the
subject recommending action in 1942.26
The British study, which had been prepared
in London in December 1941, consisted of a
tentative plan for landing troops in the vicinity
of
- Le Havre in the early summer of 1943 "under
conditions of severe deterioration of German
military power." It flatly stated that
the operations would have to be postponed unless
the enemy already had been "weakened in
strength and morale" before
- [179]
- 1943. This British plan conceived of a powerful
fast-moving attack, landing troops quickly
on the Continent and advancing rapidly into
the Ruhr. For this purpose the most suitable
landing area would be cast and west of Le Havre.
In addition to the necessary RAF and Royal
Navy forces, commandos, airborne and antiaircraft
brigades, six armored divisions, and six and
one-third infantry divisions would be necessary
for the operation. American aid was viewed
as facilitating battleship cover, providing
sufficient escorts, and permitting conversion
of some British Army units for necessary administrative
duties.27
-
- At General Marshall's suggestion, the CCS
directed the combined planners to reconcile
the British views with those previously set
forth by the JCS ( in JCS 23 ) which seemed,
by implication, to recommend an invasion of
the Continent, at least by British forces,
in 1942. 28
Specifically, the planners were to report
on (1 ) the possibility of landing and maintaining
ground forces on the Continent in 1942, and
( 2 ) the possibility of an invasion in 1943.
If the latter were a possibility, the planners
were to attempt to reconcile the materiel estimates
of the British and American planners.29
-
- Combined Studies
-
- The first study prepared by the combined
planners concluded that the decisive limitation
upon the proposed invasion, for either target
date, lay in the shortage of cargo shipping.30
This differed radically from the views
of the U. S. planners, who had concluded that
troop shipping would remain the limiting factor
for the greater part of the year. The combined
planners took the position that the date of
the invasion would depend upon the amount of
additional cargo shipping that could be found.
But even in the event that cargo shipping could
be found, there were not enough landing craft
available or in sight for a beach landing either
in 1942 or 1943. After analyzing the factors
important to invasion attempts on 15 September
1942 and 1 April 1943, the combined planners
concluded that ( a ) it was not possible in
1942 to put on the Continent the ground forces
necessary for an invasion 'and provide for
their support, and ( b ) an invasion early
in 1943 was a possibility, provided the USSR
was still actively fighting and containing
the bulk of the German forces. This was an
assumption different from the one made by the
Joint Chiefs that it was very doubtful whether
the USSR could continue the fight against Germany
without the diversion
- [180]
- of German strength through the creation of
another front. These differences necessitated
further study to determine whether the Red
Army could and would continue organized resistance
even though a second front was not created
in 1942. Meanwhile, planning was to be continued
for an invasion in 1943, with a provision in
the plans for an attempt to invade the Continent
in 1942 in the event of an imminent Soviet
collapse, or the development of a critical
situation for Germany, which would make that
power vulnerable to an attack in the West.
31
-
- Eisenhower Memorandum of 25 March
-
- While this study of a future European offensive
was going on in the combined staff, the War
Department operations staff was trying independently
to reach a "coordinated viewpoint"
on the "major tasks of the war."
On 25 March Eisenhower, in a memorandum, urged
on General Marshall the necessity of deciding
on the "theater in which the first major
offensive of the United Powers must take place."
This decision, setting "the principal
target of all United Powers," was needed
to regulate training and production programs
and deployment of forces. Reiterating his comments
of 28 February, General Eisenhower stated that
the "immediately important tasks, aside
from protection of the American continent,
are the security of England, the retention
of Russia in the war as an active ally and
the defense of the Middle East . . . .
All other operations must be considered in
the highly desirable rather than in the mandatory
class." He then declared that "the
principal target for our first major offensive
should be Germany, to be attacked through western
Europe," and supported this choice with
a long list of reasons: Since the lines of
communication to England had to be kept safe
in any event, operations in Western Europe
would not involve a further dispersion of air
and naval protective forces. By using the shortest
possible sea route, the United States could
maintain a large force with a minimum strain
on shipping. The early gathering of air and
ground forces in Great Britain would carry
a sufficient threat to prevent Germany from
complete concentration against the USSR. A
cross-Channel attack represented the direct
approach by superior land communications to
the center of German might. The forward base
in England already had the airfields from which
a large air force could operate to secure the
air superiority essential to a successful landing.
A major portion of the British combat power
could be used without stripping the home defenses
of the United Kingdom. Finally, this plan provided
for attempting an attack on Germany while German
forces were engaged on several fronts.
-
- Eisenhower pointed out that the success of
the plan for taking the offensive depended
on securing complete agreement among the CGS
that the attack against Germany through Western
Europe constituted the eventual task of their
governments. With such a plan, training and
production sched-
- [181]
- ules could be adjusted, "overwhelming
air support" built up, ample ships and
landing craft found, and combat strength husbanded.
Eisenhower and his staff felt so strongly the
necessity of having "a target on which
to fix . . . [their] sights" that he declared,
"unless this plan is adopted as the eventual
aim of all our efforts, we must turn our hacks
upon the Eastern Atlantic and go, full out,
as quickly as possible, against Japan Above
all, he emphasized "the tremendous importance
of agreeing on some major objective" for
a "coordinated and intensive effort."
32
-
- On the very day that Eisenhower presented
this memorandum, General Marshall went to the
White House for lunch, together with Stimson,
Knox, King, Arnold, and Hopkins, to discuss
possible offensive operations. According to
Stimson, Marshall made a very fine presentation"
of the case for a cross-Channel attack, and
he and Marshall came away from the meeting
with the President's approval of the idea and
his order to put it "in shape if possible
over this weekend." It was at this meeting,
too, that Hopkins suggested that as soon as
the plan had been perfected by the JCS, it
should not be taken up with the British members
of the CCS, but should be taken up directly
with the highest British authorities.33
-
- Estimates for Invasion
-
- During this last week of March, while the
combined planners were trying to reconcile
American and British ideas about timing, the
Army planners began to assemble detailed data
to satisfy the presidential directive to get
the plan in shape. In so doing, the Army planners
resurveyed the possibilities of a planned invasion
in the spring of 1943 and an emergency attack,
if necessary, in the fall of 1942. G-2 estimated
the number of British forces available for
an invasion of the Continent.34
G-3 and G-4 estimated the readiness
for combat of major U. S. Army units, indicating
the status of their equipment and training
as of 15 September 1942 and 1 April 1943. By
the latter date at least eighteen and probably
twenty-one divisions would be trained and equipped.
They would include two divisions trained for
amphibious operations, six armored divisions,
fire motorized divisions, and one airborne
division. By mid-August 1942 about six infantry,
three armored, and two motorized divisions
would be available.35
Army Ground Forces estimated the balanced
ground forces necessary and available for the
offensive as 975,394 for April 1943 operations
and 364,585 for September
- [182]
- 1942 operations.36
Army Air Forces drafted its own outline plan
for air operations in support of an attack
on either 15 September 1942 or 1 April 1943.
It was estimated that 733 combat aircraft would
be necessary and available by mid-September
1942 and 3,296 by April 1943.37
The Services of Supply ( SOS ) provided
estimates for the forces that could be shipped
to the British Isles and maintained there.
SOS believed that, with the shipping prospectively
available, only three and a half infamy divisions,
with supporting troops, a force of about 105,000,
or two armored divisions and supporting troops
numbering 60,000 men, could be landed in the
British Isles by mid-September. Of the more
than one million men that the War Plans Division
had estimated to be the minimum number to be
assembled in Great Britain by the spring of
1943, probably not more than 400,000 could
be transported by U. S. shipping. 38
-
- The Evolution of lice Marshall Memorandum
-
- On the basis of all the information gathered
from G--2, G- 3, and SOS, the War Department
planners on 27 March drew up an outline of
an invasion plan. This plan was a very simple
sketch of the operations, giving the area of
assault, the timing of the landings, and the
forces necessary. 39
After General Eisenhower and Colonel
Thomas T. Handy and Colonel Hull had discussed
the plan, they presented it to Marshall on
1 April, along with a memorandum repeating
strategic justification for the choice of theater.
40
General Marshall at once gave the plan
his approval and support, suggesting important
changes in language which Eisenhower and his
two assistants incorporated. Marshall and Stimson
presented the plan to the President the same
day and succeeded in winning his approval and
complete support for it immediately. 41
For some time the President had been
thinking
- [183]
- GENERAL MARSHALL AND WAR DEPARTMENT CHIEFS.
Left to right: Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold,
Maj. Gen. J. T. McNarney, General Marshall,
Maj. Gen. B. B. .Somervell, and Lt. Gen.
L. J. McNair.
-
- of "a new front on the European Continent"
and only three weeks before had told the Prime
Minister that he was "becoming more and
more interested in the establishment of this
new front this summer, certainly for air and
raids." 42
The President directed Marshall and
Hopkins to go to London to present the plan
to the Prime Minister and his military staff
and secure their agreement.43
-
- The draft, which came to be known as the
Marshall Memorandum, outlined the objective,
the timing, the combat strength, and the strategic
advantages of operations in northwestern Europe.
First, it listed the arguments for selecting
northwestern Europe for the first British-American
offensive:
- [184]
- It is the only place in which a powerful
offensive can be prepared and executed by the
United Powers in the near future. In any other
locality the building up of the required forces
would be much more slowly accomplished due
to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities
the enemy is protected against invasion by
natural obstacles and poor communications leading
toward the seat of the hostile power, or by
elaborately organized and distant outposts.
Time would be required to reduce these and
to make the attack effective.
- It is the only place where the vital air
superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary
to a major attack can be staged by the United
Powers. 'this is due to the existence of a
network of landing fields in England and to
the fact that at no other place could massed
British air power be employed for such an operation.
- It is the only place: in which the bulk of
the British ground forces can be committed
to a general offensive in cooperation with
United States forces. It is impossible, in
view of the shipping situation, to transfer
the bulk of the British forces to any distant
region, and the protection of the British islands
would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.
- The United States can concentrate and use
larger forces in Western Europe than in any
other place, due to sea distances and the existence
in England of base facilities.
- The bulk of the combat forces of the United
Stags, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied
simultaneously only against Germany, and then
only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate
against Japan.
- Successful attack in this area will afford
the maximum of support to the Russian front.44
-
- The draft went on to state that a decision
as to the main effort had to be made at once
so that the Allies could direct all "production,
special construction, training, troop movements
and allocations" to that end. The American
proposal was to direct all plans and preparations
to the "single end" of "an attack,
by combined forces of approximately 5,800 combat
airplanes and 48 divisions against western
Europe as soon as the necessary means can be
accumulated in England--estimated at April
1, 1943.
-
- The plan contemplated three main phases
- a. Preparation, involving:
- (1) Immediate coordination of procurement
priorities, allocations of material and movements
of troops and equipment.
- (2) Establishment of a preliminary active
front.
- (3) Development of preparations for possible
launching of an "emergency" offensive
[in 1942.]
- b. Cross-Channel movement and seizure of
beachheads between Le Havre and Boulogne.
- c. Consolidation and expansion of beachheads
and beginning of general advance.45
-
- The plan was based on four assumptions: (1)
the line Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Australia would
be held and Pacific garrisons increased from
present approximate strength of 175,000 to
about 300,000; (2) American commitments in
troops and ships to New Zealand, the Middle
East, and the China India theater would be
met; (3) the USSR would continue to contain
the bulk of German forces (the plan stressed
the necessity of continuing shipments of material
aid to the USSR to help keep the Red Army effective
in the war) ; and (4) Axis forces would remain
at approximately their April 1942 strength.
-
- The United States proposed to furnish about
one million men- -including thirty divisions---and
3,250 combat aircraft, for an invasion on 1
April 1943. If the British
- [185]
- made available eighteen divisions and 2,550
combat aircraft, the combined forces would
be strong enough to establish air superiority
and make a landing on a six-division front
between Le Havre and Boulogne. One American
airborne division and American and British
parachute troops would be used to slow German
reinforcements, while "strong armored
forces," drawn from the six American and
three British armored divisions assigned to
ROUNDUP, "rushed in to break German resistance"
and eventually to spearhead a general movement
toward the Belgian port of Antwerp.
-
- The admittedly weak point in the American
plan was that merchant shipping and landing
craft would not be available in sufficient
quantity by the time that aircraft, ground
equipment, and ammunition could be supplied.
However difficult it might be to make up shortages
in the latter categories, it was evident that
shipping and landing craft were the limiting
factor.46
It was estimated that American troop
shipping could transport only about 40 percent
of the forces required by 1 April 1943, leaving
some 600,000 men to be transported by shipping
from British or other sources. American shipping
alone could not move the entire ford until
late summer of 1943, but it was anticipated
that after the British had completed their
movement of reinforcements to the Middle and
Far East, they could aid in the movement of
United States troops to England. Even so, it
appeared uncertain whether there would be enough
cargo shipping. 47
The lack of sufficient landing craft--7,000
were considered essential- presented even more
serious problems, which could be met only through
an accelerated construction program.48
-
- Finally, the 'Marshall Memorandum presented
in some detail a "Modified Plan"
for the "emergency" invasion that
might have to be launched in September or October
1942. 49
This landing operation would take place
if the situation on the Soviet front became
so desperate that only a British American attack
in the west would prevent its collapse, or
if the German position in Western Europe "critically
weakened." The maximum forces that could
be transported across the Channel would be
used if and when this operation were launched.
Landing craft would be sufficient to sustain
only about five divisions, half British and
half American, at any time in the fall of 1942.
In any case, only three and one-half American
divisions, including the Northern Ireland force,
could be shipped to the United Kingdom by 15
September 1942, and only about 700 American
combat aircraft would be available.
-
- Apart from this contingent emergency operation,
the only American activity scheduled for 1942
was the inauguration of air
- [186]
- attacks and minor coastal raids, which would
be of some help to the USSR and would make
"experienced veterans of the air and ground
units," as well as raise the morale of
both the troops and the general public. 'the
planners dwelt on the advantage to be derived
in the long preparatory phase by giving the
troops in the United Kingdom "intensive
and specialized training," beginning with
"fundamentals of technique in loading
and unloading of boats," and advancing
through "constant raiding by small task
forces." The whole program presented was
directed toward a main effort in 1943 and,
in this respect, was quite different from the
program earlier proposed by the JUSSC: and
by General Eisenhower, which assumed a 1942
attack was possible and necessary. 50
-
- The London Conference
-
- The American representatives arrived in the
British Isles on 8 April and, during the following
week, met with the British Chiefs of Staff
in London to discuss the American proposal.
The meetings were devoted primarily to general
strategy; little attention was paid to clarifying
the problems of shipping and landing craft
upon which the invasion so heavily depended.
At the first meeting, Marshall explained that
"the reason for his visit was to reach
a decision as to what the main British-American
effort was to be, and when and where it should
be made." He emphasized the importance
of arriving at a "decision in principle"
as soon as possible so that production, allocation
of material, training, and troop movements
could go forward.51
-
- Throughout the meetings the American representatives
dwelt on "two main considerations."
The first of these was that the Red Army should
be maintained as an effective fighting force
in 1942. Indeed, Colonel Wedemeyer later stated
on the ground and in the air to gain combat
experience. Such experience, incidentally,
would lead to improvements in equipment. that
this was the "main objective" of
the American plan. The second was that the
U. S. Army, then being built up and trained,
should engage in active operations on the ground
and in the air to gain combat experience. Such
experience incidentally, would lead to improvements
in equipment.52
-
- One reason the Americans were anxious for
a speedy decision on the Bolero plan was that
it might check the tendency to disperse forces
ore secondary tasks.53
Early in the conference the British
argued that it was essential to hold the Middle
East whatever else happened, and also showed
great concern for the Indian Ocean area. The
Americans could not agree to the primary importance
of the Middle Fast, India, and Burma since,
as Wedemeyer put it, they were sure the military
objective of Germany ire 1942 was the destruction
of the Russian armies. While Wedemeyer agreed
that Japanese successes should not be allowed
to go so far as to prevent the defeat of Germany,
he warned that the Allies must expect some
loss of territory in the Pacific in order to
concentrate on Germany. 54
In attempting to win British agreement,
the
- [187]
- American representatives exploited the basic
line of strategic argument developed during
the previous two months. As Wedemeyer phrased
it:
-
- The United Nations must adhere to the broad
concept of strategy, viz, that Germany is our
principal enemy . . . [and therefore] the dissipation
of our combined resources . . . should be discontinued
or at least held to a minimum, in consonance
with the accepted strategy of concentration
on offensive operations in the European theater.
with concurrently defensive operations in all
others.55
-
- In reply to a British call for American fighters
in the Middle East to enable the British to
assemble a reserve in the United Kingdom for
continental operations, Marshall stated that
current American commitments to the Southwest
Pacific, 'Middle last, and other theaters would
be fulfilled, belt that additional reinforcements
would have to be carefully limited 56
Marshall emphasized that it was essential
for the United Nations to focus attention on
the main project -offensive operations on the
Continent- -lest it be reduced to the status
of a "residuary legatee" for which
nothing was left.57
-
- The American representatives explained that
the flow of American troops and aircraft to
the United Kingdom would not reach large proportions
until the fall of 1942, because of shipping
limitations and other American commitments.
Marshall pointed out that by the end of August
the United States commitments to reinforce
the Pacific, and the garrisons in Northern
Ireland and Iceland should be completed. He
hoped, therefore, that by mid-September five
groups of air forces and three and a half Army
divisions could be moved to Great Britain.
Until that date the shipping restrictions were
so great that no forces, other than those required
for minimum defensive purposes, could be transported
to the British Isles. As far as the timing
of the emergency operation in 1942 was concerned,
Marshall said that he could not press for one
before September since a substantial American
land force could not be sent over before then.
If action became necessary before September,
such American forces as were in the British
Isles would be available. His own belief was
that it might be necessary to take action on
the Continent in the next few months, either
because the Soviet Union would be in a serious
position or because a favorable opportunity
would present itself.58
-
- On 14 April the British Chiefs of Staff accepted
the American proposal, agreeing that planning
should begin immediately for a major offensive
in Europe in 1943 and for an emergency landing,
if necessary, in 1942.59
On the evening of the same day, at a
meeting of the War Cabinet Defence Committee
attended by Marshall and Hopkins, the Prime
Minister formally accepted the "momentous
proposal" of the American representatives
and predicted that the "two nations would
march ahead together in noble brotherhood of
arms." 60
- [188]
- As General Marshall was hell aware, this
agreement was only a beginning in dealing with
a very treacherous problem. Everyone agreed,
"in principle," he reported, but
"many if not most" of the participants
held "reservations regarding this or that."
It would require "great firmness"
to avoid "further dispersions."61
The reservations applied directly to
the projected operation for 1942 and only indirectly
to the projected operation for 1943, the fate
of which was certain to be determined by the
decision made about the 1942 operation. The
Prime Minister has since recorded that he did
not even at that time believe that the contingent
operation for 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) would prove
feasible; that he regarded the proposal as
merely one additional proposal to be considered
during the spring along with the operations
he himself wanted to undertake ; the North
African operation and possibly one in Norway);
and that his satisfaction in receiving General
Marshall's proposal and his readiness to accept
it grew out of his anxiety lest the United
Mates continue to direct its main efforts to
the Pacific.62
-
- The Prime Minister did not express these
broad reservations at the time of the conference.
The one explicit reservation on the British
side was the determination to strengthen and
secure the precarious British positions in
Egypt and in the Indian Ocean area. The Prime
Minister and his staff were both more explicit
and more united in their determination to hold
these vital positions in the British sphere
of strategic responsibility than were the President
and his staff to hold the line Hawaii-Australia,
for which the United States was responsible.
It remained uncertain whether, for the sake
of mounting a cross-Channel operation, the
British Would withhold reinforcements needed
in the Middle East and India, as the Americans
proposed to withhold reinforcements needed
in the Pacific.
-
- During the conference the British Chiefs
made it quite clear how important they considered
the Middle Fast and India to be. After the
conference the Prime Minister went over the
same ground in a message to the President.63
The range of disagreement between the
British and American staffs over the defense
of that whole area was within the same relatively
narrow limits as the disagreements within ,the
Army and between the War and Navy Departments
on the defense of the Pacific. Maj. Gen. Dwight
D. Eisenhower had stated in yew strong terms
the importance of preventing a junction of
Japanese and German forces somewhere east of
Suez and west of Singapore. General Marshall
had made it plain that he, too, believed in
collaborating with the British' to meet any
emergency in the area. But Marshall also believed
in taking a calculated risk there, as in the
Pacific, for the sake of building up a powerful
offensive force in the British Isles.
-
- The question did not become critical during
the London conference. The situation in the
Libyan Desert had cased somewhat since the
middle of -March. The British Chiefs agreed
to drop the proposal that the JCS had made---to
send an American air force to Egypt equipped
with planes from British allocations. Nor did
they press their demand for U. S. Navy reinforcements
to
- [189]
- meet the crisis that had developed in the
Indian Ocean. In lieu of both these projects,
they accepted the very modest temporary expedient
of strengthening the American bomber force
in India (General Brereton's Tenth Air Force)
and putting it at the disposal of the British
India Command for operations in the Indian
Oceans.64
The broad question of the relation between
this newly accepted American proposal and the
long-standing commitments of the British in
the Middle East and India simply remained open.
-
- From the American point of view there was
little more to say than what the President
said in answer to the Prime Minister's declaration
of the British concern over the defense of
Egypt and the Indian Ocean. The President tried
to reassure the Prime Minister that the juncture
of German and Japanese forces seemed remote
but agreed that a close watch must be kept
on the situation. "In the meantime,"
he added, "we have had a good crack at
Japan by air [the Doolittle raid] and I am
hoping' that we can make it very difficult
for them to keep too many of their big ships
in the Indian Ocean." 65
-
-
- The fact that the London agreement involved
no discussion with the British of the defense
of the Middle East and India, parallel with
the previous Army--Navy discussion of the defense
of the Pacific, was a direct result of the
irregular manner in which the American proposal
was drawn up and presented. The course of action
urged by the War Department was at variance
with the long-standing plans and expectations
of the British Chiefs of Staff. Any agreement
that was not preceded by and ,based upon a
full and explicit analysis-even if not by a
reconciliation-of the differences was liable
to be upset at any tune by a reassertion of
the differences.
-
- The War Department stall was naturally disposed
to make the most of the London agreement. As
Eisenhower noted upon Marshall's return, ".
. . at long last, and after months of struggle,
. . . we are all definitely committed to one
concept of fighting! If we can agree on major
purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin
to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing
around in the dark." 66
It was in this spirit that the American
planners in Washington approached the problem
of working out a detailed, long-range plan
for the concentration of American forces in
the British Isles. This phase of the planning
(which bore the code name Bolero) was the only-
phase in which the Washington stalls, British
and American, were deeply involved. Detailed
planning for the operations themselves-SLEDGEHAMMER,
the contingent operation in case of an emergency
in 1942, and ROUNDUP, the scheduled operation
for 1943-was to be carried on, appropriately
enough, in London. 67
-
- The BOLERO plan covered the preparatory phase
of mounting the cross-Channel
- [190]
- operation, involving 1) immediate coordination
of procurement priorities, allocations of material
and movements of troops and equipment and 2)
the establishment of a preliminary active front."
Only the most hurried and superficial investigation
of the complex logistic problems involved had
been made before the London conference, and
the conference contributed very little to an
understanding of them or to agreement about
them. Everything remained to be done.68
-
- Phasing of Troop Movements
-
- The first thing that the planners in Washington
tried to do was to schedule the shipment of
troops for the next few months. As long as
SLEDGEHAMMER remained a possibility, it was
important to move as many ground divisions
and supporting units to the United Kingdom
as was possible before September. In the short
run, this need was even more pressing than
that of hastening troop movements to relieve
future congestion in the BOLERO program. Cargo
shipments, on the other hand, were distinctly
secondary as far as SLEDGEHAMMER was concerned
but of prime importance to Bolero. Thus, the
requirements of SLEDGEHAMMER and BOLERO not
only overlapped but competed in determining
shipments during the summer. For BOLERO, moreover,
the problem of long-range scheduling was far
more important than that of total shipping
resources. The ratio of available troop shipping
to cargo shipping at any given time was likely
to be entirely unrelated to actual deployment
needs.
-
- The results of early efforts to acquire troop
shipping over and above what had been scheduled
for Magnet were not encouraging. It appeared
that, if ships were to be provided to meet
Army and Navy commitments for Bolero, .British
and American shipping schedules would have
to be drastically rearranged and aid to Russia
and other Allies would have to be reduced.
This was a choice the President and the Prime
Minister were loathe to make.69
But by early June, as a result of the
preliminary search for shipping and rearrangement
of schedules by Washington and London authorities,
the shipping prospects seemed more hopeful.
By then the estimated number of United States
troops that might be shipped in time for SLEDGEHAMMER
had been raised from 101,000 to about 150,000.
For Roundup in April 1943, it then seemed that
over 890,000 United States troops would be
present in the British Isles.70
The early movements were scheduled so
as to build, first, an air force and, second,
a ground force in the United Kingdom in time
for offensive operations on the Continent in
1942. The schedule also took account of the
creed for service troops in the United Kingdom
to prepare for the troops to follow. By early
June about 40,000 troops had arrived or were
en route. Of these, 15,000 were in the 1st
Armored Division, 15,000 in the 34th Infantry
Division, and the remainder in the air and
antiaircraft units and theater headquarters.
71
- [191]
- The Landing Craft Problem
-
- The most critical item in the planning of
all the invasion operations was the provision
of landing craft. The idea of using large numbers
of specially constructed craft for landing
operations was so new that no generally accepted
doctrine had been developed. The Army knew
very little about landing craft and, during
the first years of the war, the Navy was urging
other types of construction, with the result
that landing craft requirements were not determined
until too late to affect SLEDGEHAMMER.72
-
- The United States program for mass production
of landing craft got under way in April 1942.
A White House conference on 4 April resulted
in a tentative construction program being set
up under which the United States was to make
available 8,200 craft in the United Kingdom
for Roundup, of which 6,700 were to be carriers
for small tanks and vehicles. The objective
for SLEDGEHAMMER was 2,500 craft, including
2,000 tank and vehicle carriers. This number,
supposed to be sufficient to move two infantry
divisions and two regiments of tanks in one
,trip, did not correspond to the expected U.
S. troop participation in SLEDGEHAMMER. But,
as Eisenhower wrote, if SLEDGEHAMMER Comes
off at all, "it will be carried out with
whatever personnel and equipment is actually
available at the time. The maximum portion
of the landing equipment set up for the main
BOLERO plan which can be made available by
the time of execution of the `Modified' plan
is the desirable amount.73
-
- The London conference had not gone into the
matter of the types of landing craft and the
numbers of each type that would be required,
and no one expressed doubt whether sufficient
craft could be produced in time. Although War
Department planners had furnished him with
a somewhat higher estimate, General Marshall
proposed 7,000 for ROUNDUP, a figure that turned
out to be much too low.74
It was obvious that the British had
given a great deal more thought than the Americans
to the problem of landing craft, and they took
the initiative in the discussions. From the
first they questioned the emphasis of the American
construction program on small craft. A British
spokesman pointed to the difficulty of moving
large numbers of the small craft across the
Atlantic in the limited shipping available
and urged greater emphasis upon United States
construction of larger vessels that could cross
the ocean under their own power. He also pointed
out that larger craft were necessary for crossing
the Channel and establishing beachheads.75
-
- It was not until the first part of May that
British objections to the small landing craft
program became emphatic, and by then the American
procurement program was four or five weeks
old and a good many craft of the smallest types
were scheduled for delivery.76
The issue was resolved at a White House
meeting on 5 May at which the British suc-
- [192]
- cessfully presented their objections to the
American production program.77
At the President's direction, a new
program of requirements was drawn up based
on a shift to larger, ocean-going landing craft.78
-
- The very next day the "Special Committee
on Landing Craft for the Continent," a
subcommittee of the Washington BOLERO committee,
of which General Eisenhower and Colonels Hull
and Wedemeyer were members, met to prepare
a statement for the President on the availability
of landing craft for operations in September
1942 and April 1943.79
At the meeting the planners agreed that
small craft could apparently be made available
in considerable numbers for an operation in
September 1942, but that the production of
ocean-going tank landing ships (ATL's) could
be increased only by giving it precedence over
other construction, including priorities for
hulls, engines, and equipment. General Eisenhower
described this meeting in his personal notes.
"This morning I attended a committee meeting
on `landing craft' at which were discussed
the questions on which I begged the answers
last February. Who is responsible for bldg
landing crafts' Will the number of each type
be sufficient' etc.2 How . . . can we win this
war unless we crack some heads?" 80
-
- On 14 May General Somervell and Vice Adm.
Frederick J. Horne, Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
submitted to the President a comprehensive
study, with an estimate of the number of landing
craft that could be made available by 15 September
1942 and by April 1943. With an estimated force
of from three to four American divisions in
the United Kingdom by September, the landing
craft estimated as available could carry assault
elements to the number of 21,000 men, 3,000
vehicles, and 300 tanks. For ROUNDUP, current
plans called for an assault force of approximately
77,000 men, 18,000 vehicles, and 2,250 tanks,
which meant that the United States would have
to build some 765 craft of several types by
March 1943. Construction in time would be physically
possible only if landing craft were given priority
over all other items in the defense program
of production.81
As a result of this study and other findings,
the President two days later called a meeting
attended by General Marshall, Admiral King,
Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nelson, Chairman
of the War Production Board (WPB). A number
of expedients and proposed solutions were considered,
but no decision was reached except that the
program of antisubmarine construction and carrier
building would not be delayed for any other
project. The President, General marshal recorded,
did not indicate the next steps to be taken,
other than to say that "work must be gotten
under way as quickly as possible." 82
-
- The landing craft program was heavily handicapped.
The responsibility for procurement and for
co-ordination of the program was given to the
Navy, already bogged down in heavy naval construction
schedules. Both the Navy and the shipyards
to which
- [193]
- contracts were let were inexperienced in
building the larger W pea of landing craft,
and the problems they faced were unprecedented.
The landing craft program had to compete with
other programs already begun, for marine engines,
steel, and other material. The new program
for ATI.'s and Giant Y's (large landing craft,
infantry) meant a reversal of policy for the
Navy which had been concerned chiefly with
shipbuilding and wish construction of small
landing craft- -personnel carriers---for ship
to-shore operations. During the first quarter
of 1942 landing craft had been low on the priority
list because the threat of German submarines
necessitated the construction of destroyer
escorts. Navy leaders continued to defend the
naval shipbuilding program against a higher
priority for landing craft. Only briefly- -in
the summer of 1942- was the landing craft program
to be given priority over all other shipbuilding.83
-
- Reorientation of Mobilization Programs
-
- The adoption of the BOLERO-ROUNDUP strategy
entailed a re-examination and reorientation
of plans and programs of all kinds-- -production
and allocation priorities, troop basis calculations,
long-range deployment estimates, and even the
Victory Program. Of course, many items besides
landing craft were in short supply. Production
and distribution plans would have to be reviewed,
and many of them changed, in keeping with the
undertakings agreed on in London. The JCS and
the President soon decided on a way of determining
priorities in the production of munitions and
requested the War Production Board to increase
production for a "decisive land and air
offensive involving amphibious operations"--aircraft,
ships, tanks, and guns as well as landing craft
and amphibious equipment.84
-
- To help the -Munitions Assignments Board;
MAB in the distribution of British and American
munitions, the CCS, toward the end of March
1942, had developed a general guide.85
The CCS had grouped the several theaters
of war in three general classes according to
strategic importance and the imminence of combat
operations. "Priority A" included
the United Kingdom (but only in respect to
air operations), the Middle Fast, India-Burma,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands
on the lines of communication from the United
States. Next came Hawaii and the United Kingdom,
which were assigned "Priority B,"
for ground forces operations. The rest of the
world was classed as "Priority C."
Forces in training were to be given 100 percent
of equipment and ammunition except in criti-
- [194]
- tally short items. 86
The acceptance of the Bolero plan necessitated
an amendment to this directive. The effect
of the amendment, as adopted early in June,
was that "forces assigned to operations
on the continent of Europe" were placed
in Priority A and were to continue to have
first priority at all times after large operations
on the Continent were begun.87
-
- It was also necessary to estimate the total
forces that would be present in each theater
on given dates, since the assignment of munitions
to the various theaters depended on the size
of the forces present. For this purpose the
War Department planners, in early April, prepared
a survey of proposed deployment of American
forces for 1942.88
-
- According to this survey almost 540,000 ground
forces would be in overseas theaters by 30
June, and this number would increase to more
than 685,000 by December 1942. Of this number,
about 43,000 ground troops would be in the
United Kingdom by a0 June including one infantry
and one I armored division) and 185,000 by
31 December ( including two infantry divisions,
two infantry motorized divisions, and three
armored divisions). Ten American air combat
groups with a strength of 37,900 men were projected
for the United Kingdom for 30 June and forty-two
air combat groups, totaling l51,000 ,men, for
the end of the year.
-
- The British then supplied similar information
on proposed British deployment for 1942, and
the British document combined with the American
survey constituted "The Tentative Deployment
of United Nations for 1942." 89
The CCS accepted this as a guide for
the assignment of munitions. 90
Though revisions were made later in
the summer, it served the immediate purpose
of providing an approximate calculation of
Allied armament requirements for preparing
to take the offensive.
-
- Finally, the BOLERO plan entailed a review
of the War Department Troop Basis. The Army's
mobilization schedule. as established in the
War Department Troop Basis for 1942, called
for a total strength of 3,600,000 enlisted
men by 31 December 1942. In May the President
approved an increase in the, Throop Basis from
3,600,000 to 4,350,000 by the end of 1942.
Of this 750,000 increase, approximately 300,000
were for necessary services to support
- [195]
- BOLERO and 150,000 were for additional air
requirements for BOLERO. 91
Air units were listed as first priority,
essential service units second, ground forces
third, and additional service units to lay
the ground work for the troops to follow, fourth.92
This tentative Troop Basis, the War
Department emphasized, was flexible and would
permit substitutions and changes in priority.
-
- At the same time the Victory Program, the
Army's pre-Pearl Harbor estimate of its equipment
requirements, came under close scrutiny. Since
the 1941 Victory- Program was premised on a
strategic policy of offensive operations in
Europe, which was still official British-American
policy, the War Department planners concluded
that no cuts should be made, and that the rate
of production of materiel should be increased.93
-
- Establishment of the European Theater
of Operations
-
- In the latter part of May, while the mobilization
programs were being reviewed in Washington,
General Eisenhower, accompanied by Generals
Arnold and Somervell, and Maj. Gen. Mark W.
Clark, made a trip to the United Kingdom to
observe the progress of planning for BOLERO
there. On this trip Eisenhower served as Marshall's
representative in discussions with General
Chaney and American and British planners. He
outlined to the British Chiefs of Staff the
American position on the over-all command organization
for ROUNDUP-that one man and not a committee
must be in command. General Eisenhower reported:
"It is quite apparent that the question
of high command is the one that is bothering
the British very much and some agreement in
principle will have to be reached at an early
date . . . ." However, no one thought
it necessary as vet to name the supreme commander
for, ROUNDUP, and, as far as SLEDGEHAMMER was
concerned, it already had been decided that
an emergency operation in 1942 would be under
British command.94
Eisenhower got the impression that the
British were skeptical about SLEDGEHAMMER and
this impression was reinforced by Vice Adm.
Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations,
in his talks with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff
in Washington a few days later.95
-
- Upon his return to the United States on 3
June, General Eisenhower observed: "Our
own people are able but . . . it is necessary
to get a punch behind the job or we'll never
be ready by spring 1943 to attack. We must
get going." 96
Within a week General Marshall announced
the establishment of a European Theater of
Operations for the U. S. Army (ETOUSA) and
selected Eisenhower, himself, as commander.
97
By agreement of the U. S. War
- [197]
- and Navy Departments, and under the principle
of unity of command, ETOUSA was to be a joint
command in which the Army exercised planning
and operational control over all U. S. Navy
forces assigned to that theater.98
The Commanding General, ETOUSA, was directed
to co-operate with the fortes of the British
Empire and other nations but to keep in view
the fundamental rule "that the forces
of the U. S. are to be maintained as a separate
and distinct component of the combined forces.
-
- The stage was now set for sending the new
American commander and his staff. On 10 June
Marshall informed the British Chiefs of Staff
that General Eisenhower would soon leave for
London with General Clark, designated to command
the U. S. II Army Corps.99
Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Air commander,
left the same morning and Rear Adm. Henry K.
Hewitt, chosen to be Admiral -Mountbatten's
naval opposite, was to leave within the week.
-
- These were the fiat steps in gearing the
command organization of U. S. forces to the
contemplated major offensive in the European
theater. General Marshall, in informing General
Chaney of Eisenhower's appointment, explained
the reason for the change. It was necessary
to have as commanding general in the ETO an
officer who was "completely familiar with
all military plans and affairs and who has
taken a leading part in the military developments
since December seventh.100
Eisenhower was soon to have a chance to show,
as a commander, the great adaptability he had
shown as a staff officer, for, ironically enough,
before he and his party actually arrived in
London- 24 June--the whole view of strategy
that he had urged was being superseded in favor
of the Prime 'Minister's long-cherished plan
for invading North Africa.
- [197]
- Page created 10 January 2002
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