1 Ltr, JPC [Col Walter Krueger and
Capt John M. Mealier] to JB, 23 .Ape 35, sub:
Rev of Jt A&N Bsc War Plan-ORANGE, JB 325,
ser 546. The study of operations against Japan
had taken precedence over other studies from
the early 1920's. (See JB 325, sees 210, 237,
and 270.) The first approved plan was joint
.Army and Navy Basic War Plan ORANGE, 16 July
1924, joint Board 325, serial 228. 'this plan
was approved by the joint Board and the Secretary
of the Navy in August 1924 and by the Secretary
of War in early September 1924. !Sec Louis
Morton, "American and Allied Strategy
in the Far East," Military Review, XXIX
(December, 1949 ) , 22-39. )
2 App .4 to memo, Gen Embick, 2 Dec
35, sub: Mil Aspects of Sit that Would Result
from Retention by U. S. of a Mil (incl naval)
Commitment in P. I, JB 305, ser 573. One of
General Embick's qualifications as head of
the war plans staff was his known opinion on
this question. He had only recently finished
a tour of duty in the Philippines as commander
of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic
Bays. While there, he had taken it upon himself
to recommend the same policy, somewhat prematurely,
for though his immediate superior, the commanding
general of the Philippine Department, had indorsed
his recommendation, the War Department had
been unwilling to force the issue. ( (1) See
memo, Gen Embick for Maj. Gen Ewing E. Booth,
C.G. Phil Dept, 19 Apr 33, sub: Mil Policy
of U.S. in P. I. with 1st Ind, Hq Phil Dept,
25 Apr 33. ( 2 ) For the .Army planners' comments,
see memo, WPD, 12 Jun 33, same sub. Both in
WPD 3251-15. (3) For timid joint Army-Navy
action on the same problem in the next year,
see WPD 3251-17 and -18, and JB 325, ser 533.)
3 Records of these disputes are to
be found under JB 305 see 573; and JB 325,
sees 617 and 618. General Craig was Chief of
Staff from 1935 to 1939.
4 Jt .4&N Bsc War Plan-ORn1GF,
21 Feb 38, JB 325, ser 618, .4G 223, AG Classified
Files. This plan was approved by the Secretary
of the Navy on 26 February and by the Secretary
of War on 28 February. .Army and Navy forces
in the Philippines would be "augmented
only by such personnel and facilities as are
available locally." If war should not
break out for several years, the Army garrison
might have some support from the Philippine
Army. U. S. Army plans had already
been revised in accordance with the assumption
that the Philippine Army, in the process of
organization, would be the only source of reinforcements
in the early stages of war with Japan. (See
Army Strategical Plan ORANGE, 1936 Rev, AG
235, AG Classified Files.)
5 See the President's statement on
hemisphere defense :n a radio address on 26
October 1918. The Public Papers and Addresses
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel
I. Rosenman, 1838 Volume: The Continuing Struggle
for Liberalism (New York. 'The Macmillan Company,
1941), p. 563.
6 See reports of public opinion polls
made by the American Institute of Public Opinion,
Fortune, and the Office of Public Opinion Research
on the question of U. S. neutrality, in Hadley
Cantril, ed., Public Opinion, 1935- 1946 (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1951) pp. 966 ff.
For a history of American foreign policy from
1937 to 1940, see William L. Langer and S.
Everett (mason, The Challenge to Isolation
(New York, Harper & Brothers, 1952).
7 Ltr, Actg SJB [Comdr Robert S. Chew]
to JPC, 12 Nov 38, sub: Study of Jt Action
in Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by
Fascist Powers, JB 325, sec 634.
8 JPC study [Col Frank S. Clark and
Capt Russell S. Crenshaw, USN], 21 Apr 39,
JB 325, ser 634.
9 Ltr, SJB [Comdr John B. W. Waller]
to JB, 11 May 39, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plans-RAINBOW
1, 2, 3, and 4, JB 325, ser 642. The letter
contained the planners' proposals which the
joint Board approved.
10 Ltr cited n. 9.
11 Ltr, JPC [Capt Crenshaw and Col
Clark] to JB, 23 Jun 39, sub: Alternative Sits
set up in Directive for Jt Rainbow Plans, JB
325, ser 642. For Navy studies and staff talks
with the British, see Hist Monograph on U.,
S.-Br Nave Cooperation 1940--45, prepared by
Capt Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, of the Hist
Sec JCS, (hereafter cited as Kittredge Monograph),
Vol I, Sec I, Part B, Ch 2; and Vol I, See
I, Part D Ch 4.
12 See Ref (b), ltr, JPC [Col Clark
and Capt Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN] to JB,
9 Apr 40, sub: Jt .A& Bsc War Plans-RAINBOW,
JB 325, sets 642 and 642-1.
13 The revised directive, as quoted
in the text, is from Incl A to JPC rpt, 27
Jul 39, sub: Jt A&N Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW
1, JB 325, ser 642-1.
14 The staffs had quickly finished
outlining primary defensive plans within the
terms of reference of RAINBOW 1. Jt .A&N
Bsc War Plan-RAINBOW 1, JB 325, see 642-I.
For a discussion of RAINBOW 1, see Stetson
Conn, Defense of the Western Hemisphere, a
volume in preparation for the series UNITED
STATES .ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
15 Ltr cited n. 12.
16 Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) and his director
of plans, Rear Adm. Robert Ghormley, had already
discussed this course of action with British
naval officers during staff talks held in Washington
in May 1939. Admiral Leahy agreed in principle
to the proposed division of strategic responsibility
with the Royal Navy in wartime, but refused
to consider basing the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific
on Singapore rather than Pearl Harbor. (Sec
Kittredge Monograph, Vol I, See I, Part D,
Ch 4.)
17 (1) Navy draft study, 5 Aug :39,
on sit Rainbow 2. (2) Army second draft (Oct
39) of Rainbow 2. Both in Army files of the
JPC, Development File for Rainbow 2, JB 325,
ser 642-2.
18 This quotation IS from the Navy
draft study cited in n. 17. A fairly complete
version appears in the fourth Army draft ;fall
of 1939). The assumptions in the fourth Army
draft were rewritten and expanded by the Navy
(21 November 1939), and stood thereafter little
changed in the Navy correction of 11 April
1940 and the Army drafts of 11 May 19-10 (fifth
Army draft) and 20 May 1940 sixth Army draft).
19 See various Army drafts in .Army
files of the JPC, Development File for RAINBOW
2, JB 325 see 642-2. Along this route, the
planners noted, the United States could send
large patrol planes into the Southwest Pacific.
They also noted that Simpson Harbor at Rabaul
might well be made the base of operations against
the mandated islands.
20 Army sixth draft Rainbow 2, 20
May 40, in .Army files of the JPC, Development
File for Rainbow 2, JB 325, see 642-2.
21 In the .Army files of the JPC,
this recommendation for staff conversations
first appears as a matter of urgency in the
Navy's final revision (18 April 1940) to the
.Army's fourth draft plan Rainbow 2, although
all Army drafts contemplated staff conversations
in which specific agreements would be reached
as to the aid which the United States might
expect from the British, French, and Dutch
as a prerequisite to the assumption by the
United States of the responsibility for "sustaining
the interests of the Democratic Powers in the
Pacific." .Among the conditions stated
by the planners, was the stipulation that Britain
reinforce the Far Eastern naval forces by a
minimum of one division of capital ships and
insure the availability of Singapore to the
U. S. Fleet. (Army files of the JPC cited n.
20.)