Endnotes for Chapter IV
1 A full history of American aid to China is given in Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I. The troop strength of a Chinese division was about that of a LT. S. regimental combat team, and its supply requirements were much less. In November 1941 the personnel strength of the thirty divisions was set by the Chinese at 10,000 each.
2 The President's signed declaration is filed in AG 400.3295 (4-14-41), 1-A.
3  Until the spring of 1941, when Mexico was safely in the U. S. camp, there had also existed the possibility that a U. S. oil embargo would cause the Japanese to buy oil from Mexico.
4 For the views of the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations on the proposed oil embargo, see Admiral Stark's testimony before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, and a memorandum from Admiral Turner to Admiral Stark on 19 July 1941, both in Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2380-84. For a more detailed discussion see Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I.
5 See account of a meeting at the White House with the Japanese ambassador on 24 July 1941, in L:. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United .States, Japan: 1931-1941 ( Washington, Government Printing Office, 1943) (hereafter cited as U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-41), II, 527 -30. Admiral Stark was present at this meeting.
6 For the current U. S. military estimate in July 1941 of the Japanese oil situation, see memo, Turner for Stark, 19 Jul 41, sub: Study of Effect of an Embargo of Trade between U. S. and Japan, Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 5, pp. 2382-84. For other accounts of the Japanese oil situation, see: (1) Oil in Japan's War, App to Rpt of Oil and Chem Div, United States Strategic: Bombing Survey (USSBS;, pp. 10, 12, 15: (2) Oil in Japan's War, Rpt of Oil and Chem Div, USSBS, p. 1; (3) Judgment-International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Part B, Ch VIII, pp. 934-35: and (4) Morison, Rising Sun, pp. 63-64.
7 (1) Msg, Gen Marshall to Maj Gen George Grunert [CG Phil Dept], 4 Apr 41, WPD 4402-8. (2) Memo, WPD [Col Anderson, Actg :ACofS1 for CofS, 15 Apr 41, sub: Stf Convs in the Far East, W PD 4402-8. (3) Msg, Marshall to Grunert, 16 Apr 41, 10. 845, WPD 4402-8. The American delegates were Capt. William R. Purnell , USN, Chief of Staff, Asiatic Fleet; Col. Allan C. McBride, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Philippine Department; and the naval and military observers in Singapore, Capt. Archer M. R. Allen, US, and Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink. (See list in ABC 092.3 (27 Mar 41).
8 Rpt, Off of CinC, China Station, 27 Apr 41, title: American-Dutch-British Convs Singapore, Apr 41 (short title, ADB), ABC 092.3 (27 Mar 41).
9 (1) Ibid. (2) The official ADB report was not received in Washington until 9 June 1941. Memo, WPD for TAG, 9 Jun 41, sub: ADB Cones, WPD 4402-18. (3) The British military mission, however, had circulated a telegraphic summary of the report in Washington on 6 May 1941. Memo, Sexy Br Mil Miss for CofS, CNO, and Br Mil Miss, 6 May 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore ADB Conf, Apr 41, WPD 4402-18.
10 Ltr, Gen Grunert, CG Phil Dept, to ACofS WPD, 2 May 41, sub: ADB Convs of Apr 21-27, 1941, Held at Singapore, WPD 4402-18. Grunert went on to point out that the conference, though it had recommended the expansion of ground and air forces in the Philippines, had made the main object of Allied naval operations the defense of Singapore, treating the support of the Philippines as "more or less incidental." He concluded, therefore: "More emphasis on the defense and holding of the Philippines is considered necessary."
11 (11 Ltr, Secy for Collaboration to Secy Br Mil Miss, 7 Jun 41, sub: Rpt of Singapore ADB Conf Apr 41, WPD 4402-18. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 8 Jul 41, sub: Rpt of ADB Convs, W PD 4402-18.
12 Ltr, CNO and CofS to Sp Army and Nav Obsrs, London, 3 Jul 41, sub: Comment on Rpt of ADB Convs, Singapore, Ape 41, WPD 4402-18. Although dated as above, this letter was not dispatched until 26 July 1941.
13 MacArthur, who had held the rank of full general as Chief of Staff, had reverted to the permanent rank of major general after that tour. In December 1937, after thirty years' service, he retired as a full general. He was promoted to the rank of full general in December 1941.
14 For the correspondence preceding the creation of USAFFE and General MacArthur's appointment as its commanding general, sec Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 434-38.
15 (1) Memo, WPD for CofS, 30 Jul 41, sub: Add Armament for Phil, WPD 4560. (2) Memo, G-1 for TAG through SGS, 31 Jul 41, sub: Add Res Offs for Tng Phil Army, OCS 18136-40. (3) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, 9 Sep 41, as quoted in memo, G-3 for CofS, 4 Nov 41, sub: Reinforcement for Phil Dept, OCS 18136-103. (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, p. 438.
16 Gerow Diary, 31 Jul 41 entry, Item 1, Exec 10. 
17 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 31 Jul 41, sub: Reinforcements of USAFFE , W PD 4559. (2) For a full account of the reinforcement of the Philippines, see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, a volume in preparation for the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II, Ch. III. (3) See also Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIII.
18 (1) Memo, Col Crawford, W PD, for Gen Gerow, 15 Aug 41, sub: Reinforcements for Phil, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. (2) Memo, W PD for CofS, 14 Aug 41, same sub, WPD 3251-55. (3) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III. (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 440-44.
19 Memo cited n. 18(2). The reinforcement of the Philippines continued to hold a high priority. During September the Chief of Staff's approval was given to the shipment of the 192d Tank Battalion, which was to sail in November, and defense reserves for 50,000 men, except for ammunition, were scheduled for completion by February 1942. (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 16 Sep 41, sub: Add Tnk Bn . . ., OCS 18136-60. (2) Memo, WPD for TAG through Maj Gen Richard C. Moore, DCofS, 23 Sep 41, sub: Supplies for Phil Army . . ., WPD 4560-1.
20 The text of Ambassador Nomura's proposal of 6 Aug 41 may be found in U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 7931-41, 11, 549-50.
21 (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 354-57. (2) Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 43840. (3) Hull, Memoirs, p. 1018. (4) U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 193l-4l, II, 556-57.
22 (1) "War Department Strategic Estimate . . . October 1941," Vol. I, p. 44, W PD 4150. (2) Memo, WPD for SW, 8 Oct 41, sub: Strategic Concept of P. L, WPD 3251-60. A copy is filed under Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. With this memorandum is a draft, apparently unused, and an attached estimate of the situation as of 2 October, summarizing the WPD view of the program.
23 According to a tabulation from a special War Department monthly report on aircraft, on 30 April 1941 there were on hand: 12 B-17's; 38 B-17B's; and 59 B 17C's and B-17D's. On order as of 30 April were 512 B-17E's. ('tabulation, Tab J, Item 6, Exec 4.) Deliveries of the 512 B -17E's were scheduled to be completed by the end of July 1942. Forty-two were to be delivered by 30 November 1941. The rate of deliveries was to rise thereafter, from 35 in December to 75 in June. ([AAF] Materiel Division Estimated Schedule of Airplane Deliveries under Approved and Prospective Contracts by Type, Customer, and Model, as of November 30, 1941, Tab Heavy Bombers, Item 15, Exec 4.) See also (1) Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War, January 4, 1944, pp. 1-5, 9-11, and (2) Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 178.
24 A detailed analysis of the need for heavy bombers was made by the AAF in September 1941 in AWPD/1. See (1) Chart 1, Sec I, and (2) Tab 17, Sec II, both in Part III, App II, JB 355, see 707.
25 Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 172.Twenty-one B -17D's, flown by members of the 19th Bombardment Croup, had been ferried from Hamilton Field, California, to Hickam Field, Hawaii, on 13 May 1941. For the strength of air forces in the Philippines in 1941,see : (1) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III, and (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 448-49.
26 Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 179, 185. Out of an estimated production in the United States of 220 heavy bombers by February 1942, 165 were scheduled for delivery to the Philippines.
27 (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 180-82. (2) Memo, CofS for AWPD, 14 Aug 41, sub: Add Air Routes Hawaii to Phil, WPD 4571-1. (3) Ltr, TAG to CG USAFFE, 27 Oct 41, sub: Add Ferry Routes from Hawaii to Phil, WPD 4571-1. (4) Ltr, JPC; to JB, 28 Nov 41, sub: Alt Route in Pacific for Mvmt of Land-Based Airplanes to Far East, JB 349, ser 735.
28 The reinforcement of the Philippines and the mobilization of the main part of the Philippine Army were scheduled to be carried out before the end of the winter 1941-42. (See memo, WPD for DCofS (Gen Moore), 8 Oct 41, sub: Phil, Tab A, Book :1, Exec 8 and memo cited note 38.) Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, who was called to Washington in October 1941 for instruction prior to his assumption of command of the U. S. Array Air Forces in the Far Fast, was told that the War Department recognized and was prepared to accept the risk of attack during the next few months but was going on the assumption that if hostilities came they would not begin before 1 April 1942. (See Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, William Morrow and Company, 1946), pp. 5-11.)
29 At the time the Army proposed sending a square division to General MacArthur, it had been planned to use the three ships which the Navy proposed to concert to aircraft carriers, transporting the entire force in two trips across the Pacific. ( Memo, G 4 for CofS, 26 Aug 41, sub: Indef Postponement by Navy of Conversion of Tr Transports Wakefield (Manhattan), Mt. Vernon (Washington) and the West Point (America) into Airplane Carriers, G-4/ 29717-67.1 General MacArthur had preciously stated that he would not need a division from the United States. (For an account of General MacArthur's reaction to the Army proposal, see Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, Ch. III, p. 63, MS.)
30 (1) Ltr, JPG to JB, 8 Oct 41, sub: Conversion of Tr Transports, Wakefield (Manhattan), Mount Vernon (Washington) and West Point (America) into Airplane Carriers. The Army had preciously succeeded in getting the Navy to postpone the contemplated conversion in May 1941. (2) Ltr, JB to SW, 16 Oct 41, same sub. Both ltrs in JB 320, ser 723.
31 The issue of the use of the three vessels continued to be debated but, ultimately, they were not converted to aircraft carriers.
32 Rpt, Shipping Situation at San Francisco Port of Embarkation following Pearl Harbor, prepared by Lt Col Edwin H. Cates, SFPE, OCT HB, SFPE. Some of these ships had been hastily concerted from passenger liners.
33 (1) Compilation of Papers, Tabs 1, 2, and 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. (2) Craven and Cate, AAF I, p. 192. (3) Rpt cited n. 32. The President Johnson, Bliss, Etolin, and President Garfield turned back to San Francisco and unloaded their troops on 8 and 9 December after the Pearl Harbor attack. (See below, pp. 148-51.)
34 There is considerable variation in the calculations of troop strength in the Philippines made in Washington and in the Philippine Department on the eve of Pearl harbor-based on different systems of accounting and time of reporting. The figures cited here are based on WPD sources. (See memo [WPD] for SW, 6 Dec 41, sub: Reinforcement of Phil, Tab 1, Folder Book 1, Exec 4.) For detailed breakdowns of U.S. Army personnel (by typo) in the Philippines on the rye of Pearl Harbor see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 448-49, and Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. II. The figures cited in the latter volume arc largely based on the Philippine Department Machine Records Unit strength reports at the end of November 1941.
35 (1) Compilation of Papers, Tabs 1 and 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. (2) Memo, Col Crawford for Gen Gerow, 1 Dec 41, sub: Airplanes for P. I. (3) Memo, Crawford for Gerow, 1 Dec 41, sub: .50-Caliber Am, Phil. Both in Tab A, Book A, Exec 8.
36 A full account of aid to China during 1941 is given in Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I.
37 Msg, Magruder to Marshall and Stimson, 28 Oct 41, No. 28, Tab B, Book A, Exec 8.
38 Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4389-29. The Chief of Staff used this paper as a basis of his presentation on the subject to the Secretary of State on 4 November. (Note for rcd, Col Bundy, 6 Nov 41, WPD 4389-29.)
39 Memo, CofS and C10 for President, 5 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4389-29. Another copy of this memo is filed in Tab B, Book A, Exec 8, but bears the penciled date of 4 Nov 41.
40 (1) Ltr, Stimson to Soong, 12 Nov 41, sub: Def of Yunnan and Burma Road, AG 400.3295 (4-14-41), 1-4. (2) Msg, Marshall to Magruder, 15 Nov 41, AMMISCA 82, AG 400.3295 (4-14-41 ), 1-A. (3 ) Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. I. (4) Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Doc 244, 79th Cong, 2d sess (hereafter cited as Pearl Harbor Report), pp. 337-44.
41 Memo, Gen Moore for CofS, 4 Nov 41, no sub, Def. Aid Div, China (Sect, 2. This memorandum contains General Marshall's marginal notes.
42 (1) Tel Convs, Col Taylor, Book 1, Def Aid Div. (2) General MacArthur rejected a proposal to take obsolescent 2.95-inch howitzers and "surplus" .30-caliber rifles from the Philippines and ship them to China in return for later replacement with more modern equipment. Msg, TAG 'to CG USAFFE, 5 Nov 41, No. 476, and msg, USAFFE to TAG, 10 Nov 41, No. 814, both in AC 400.3295 (4-14-41) , 1. ( 3 ) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare, p. 238, MS.
43 Memo for red, Col Bundy, 1 Nov 41, sub: Immediate Aid to China, Tab B, Book A, Exec 8.
44 (1) Memo, Gen Chancy for CofS, 1 Sep 41, sub: Draft Agreement ADB (Rev). (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Nov 41, same sub. (3) Draft Agreement on Outline Plan for Employment of American, Dutch and British Forces in the Far East Area in event of War with Japan (Short title, ADB-2), August 1941. All in WPD 4402-18.
45 Msg, Admiralty, London, to Br Admiralty Delegation, Washington, 5 Nov 41, WPD 4402-18.
46 Msg, CNO for SPENAVO, London, 6 Nov 41, WPD 4402-18.
47 Ltr, U.S. Secy for Collab to Jt Secys, Br Jt Stf Miss, 11 Nov 41, sub: U. S.-Br Commonwealth Cooperation in Far East Area, WPD 4402-18.
48 Memo, WPD for TAG, 28 Nov 41, sub cited n. 47, WPD 4402-112.
49 (1) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 1 Dec 41, No. 1045, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. ( 2 ) Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 2 Dec 41, No. 1057, paraphrase filed WPD 4402-112. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 7 Dec 41,  1112, WPD 4622-35. This message was received on 8 December. The action copy was sent by Maj, Lawrence S. Kuter, Office of the Chief of Staff, to Col. Thomas T. Handy, for file in WPD without action, with the notation: "General MacArthur's proposed lines of action are entirely satisfactory. He states that he will go ahead unless the Chief of Staff decides otherwise. Thus, this paper would have required no answer even if the War had not broken." The date on documents used in this volume is determined by the time zone at the point of origin, unless otherwise indicated.
50 Accounts published or soon to be published fully cover the negotiations, intelligence reports, and military orders of the final weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. Much of the evidence on the American side is contained in the various investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster. See, in particular, Pearl Harbor Hearings (a summary file of the pertinent War Department Documents is contained in Items 7a and 7h, OPD Hist Unit File) and Pearl Harbor Report (a one-volume report of the joint Committee summarizing the evidence and the committee's conclusions),. Other important accounts are contained in: (1) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service; (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins; (3) Hull, Memoirs; (4) U.S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-41, II; (5) Morison, Rising Sun; (6) Churchill, Grand Alliance; (7) Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950) : (8) Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950): (9) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations; (10) Cline, Washington Command Post (11) Morton, Fall of the Philippines; and (12) Rudolph A. Winnacker, "The National Emergency, July 1940-December 1941," a monograph in OCMH Files.
51 Memo, Marshall and Stark for President, 27 Nov 41, sub: Far Eastern Sit, WPD 4544-13.
52 (1) Paraphrase of msg, Brink to WD, recd in WD, 6 Dec 41, No. 96, Item 7B, OPD Hist Unit File. (2) Msg, CINCAF Nav Opns, 6 Dec 41, Item 3, Exec 10. (3) Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 424-25, 432. (4) Craven and Cate, AAF 1, p. 191. (5) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp 389-90. (6) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 423 -24. (7) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIV. (8) Feis, Road to Pearl harbor, pp. 313 337 38.
53 (1) Pearl Harbor Report, pp. 224-25. (2) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIV. 
54 For the store of the genesis of Japanese planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor, sec: (1) Pearl Harbor Report, material from Japanese sources, pp. 52- 54; (2) Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 13, pp. 413 ff.; (3) Morison, Rising Sun, Ch. V; (4) Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, Ch. XIV; (5) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, Ch. IV, and a particularly valuable unpublished manuscript, The Decision for War" and (6) Feis, Road to Pearl Harbor, pp. 191, 193, 217, 270, 292, 294, 303, 332. Both Morton and Feis draw upon evidence gleaned from Japanese sources, including reports of the Japanese war trials.
55 According to Robert E. Sherwood, the best informed opinion in Washington on the we of Purl Harbor was that "further Japanese aggression was imminent and that it would come in the Southwest Pacific, its probably objective bring the Kra Isthmus, which joined the mainland of Thailand and Burma with the Malay Peninsula, six thousand miles from Pearl Harbor." (Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 424.)
56 Published sources cover very fully the sequence of events and reports on 7 December. See Pearl Harbor Hearings and Pearl Harbor Report, also memoirs of various public figures, in particular the notes of Harry Hopkins made at the close of the day (Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 430-34). Apparently the first news of the attack that reached the War Department was a Navy message stating " This is not drill." It was signed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and delivered to the Office of the Chief of Staff by a Navy enlisted roan. The authors arc indebted to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow for filling a gap in the records with their recollections on this point. (1) Ltr, Gen Deane to Maj Gen Orlando Ward, 29 Mar 51. (2) Ltr, Gen Gerow to Gen Ward, 21 Mar 51. Both in OCMH Files. (3) See also Pearl Harbor Hearings, Part 11, pp. 5235, 5351.
57 The only official paper on presidential approval of Army execution of  RAINBOW 5 is a penned note signed by General Marshall which stated, "I read to the President and Mr. Hull our message to MacArthur in Manila and to Commanders of Defense Areas, overseas garrisons, etc. They were approved orally." General Gerow added, "Handed to me by  C/S 4:50 PM Dec, 7/41." (Filed with WPD 4544-20)
58 At the Army staff meetings, held in the mornings of 8 through 12 December, the War Plans Division was represented by its chief, General Gerow, who was usually accompanied by another officer from the division. The Army Air Forces was represented by General Arnold or Brig. Geri . Carl Spaatz, or by both. (OCS Notes on Confs, Decisions by CofS, DCsofS, and Other Info, Dec 41. Cf. min, Confs in OCofS, 8-12, Dec, WDCSA CofS Confs, IL) At the Joint Board meetings held during the afternoon on 8, 9, 10, and 13 December, Generals Bryden and Grow, and either General Spaatz or General Arnold were also in attendance. (See min, JB mtgs. )
59 For movement of antiaircraft units and equipment in the United States, and of planes, ammunition, and units to Hawaii and Panama, and Marshall's insistence on "follow up," see minutes of meetings cited n. 58., For these arid other early movements of troops and equipment, and staff action in connection therewith, sec, in particular: (1) papers in WPD Msg File 1, WPD 3449, 3807, 4622, 4624, and (2) Hq ASF fibs under CofS, G-1,Mar-Jun 42.
60 Craven and Cate, AAF I, pp. 175-93, 201. The Far Eastern fir Force, like the U.S. Army as a whole, was in the process of being organized. Figures on planes give some indication-but only an indication - of how far it was from being ready. Of 165 modern B-17's allocated, 35 were in the Philippines, 33 of which were in commission, Of 240 modern pursuit planes allocated, 107 (P-40's) had arrived, of which about 90 were in commission, Larger total figures published on various occasions incorporate numbers of obsolete or obsolescent craft, of little or no value in combat.
61 Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 8 Dec 41, . 1133, WPD Msg File 1, 108. The figure given for pursuit planes includes P-35's. For the full story, see: (1) Craven and Cate, AAF I, Ch. VI, and (2) Morton, Fall of the Philippines.
62 Toward the end of November the eight destroyers and one of the two cruisers of the Asiatic Fleet had been withdrawn to the south in two forces, one to Balikpapan on Makassar Strait, and one to Tarakan in the Celebes Sea. The "striking force" that remained in the Philippines-one light cruiser (Houston) and a seaplane tender (Langley )- was ordered south to Makassar Strait on 8 December. (See Morison, Rising .Sun, pp. 154, 193)
63 The Navy apparently reached the conclusion very quickly that it was impossible to get reinforcements to the Philippines under existing circunstances. General Gerow so reported at a meeting of the General Council on the morning of 9 December. (1) See conf in Bryden's Off, 9 Dec 41, OCS Binder 29. (21 The formal statement of WPD is in memo, WPD for CofS, 12 Dec 41, sub: Brief Current Strategic Est, WPD 4622-37.
64 Memo [WPD] for CofS [6 Dec 41], sub: Transports for Phil, Tab 3, Folder Book 1, Exec 4. This paper lists current status of transports for the Philippines as of 6 December. The five ships escorted by the Pensacola after the convoy left Hawaii were the Holbrook and Republic, carrying troops and equipment, and the Meigs, Bloemfontein, and Admiral Halstead, carrying equipment and munitions.
65 Min, JB mtg, 9 Dec 41.
66 Msg (originator WPD) Marshall to MacArthur, 7 Dee 41, No. 736. Marshall added the pledge to the message drafted by WPD. (Sec draft filed WPD 444-20.) This draft was evidently extracted from the volume prepared by WPD (Folder Book 1, Exec 4 cited n. 64) during the afternoon and evening of 6 December and taken to Marshall on the morning of 7 December to be gone over with The President. The volume included proposed messages to sand to commanders in the field in the event of war with Japan. Marshall added the pledge (and made one other addition) to the proposed message for MacArthur, presumably before receiving news of the attack, since it does not include a reference to the attack. The volume includes a copy of the message as corrected by Marshall.
67 Min, mtg in OCofS, 0815 hours, 10 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Conf, II. Gerow's assistants were Colonels Bundy and Handy. Bundy, the chief of the Plans Croup, WPD, was killed two days later in the crash of a plane en route to Hawaii, and Handy succeeded him as chief of the Plans Group.
68 Min cited n. 67.
69 Min, JB mtg, 1445 hours, 10 Dec 41.
70 (1) Msg, OpNav CTF 15, 10 Dec 41, WPD msg File 1,383. (2) Memo, WPD for Comdr D.H. Harries, RAN, Australian Attaché, Australian Legation 12 Dec 41 sub: Msg to U.S. Mil Attaché, Australia, WPD 4628-1. For measures taken by the War Department to alert General Barnes at sea and General MacArthur in Manila to the change in instructions, see memo, WPD for CNO, 12 Dec 41, sub: lugs for Transmission ( Convoy to Brisbane), W PD 4628, and memo, WPD for CSigO, 12 Dec 41, sub: Msg for Transmission (Convoy to Brisbane), WPD 4628. The message was sent on the same day to MacArthur as message No. 776.
71 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 13 Dec 41, no number, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec 8. This message was in answer to the War Department message . 776, cited n. 70.
72 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 14 Dec 41, no number, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec 8. This message was in amplification of the message of 13 December. It was followed by a second message in amplification, in which MacArthur stated that he was ordering Barnes to dispose air units and start ferrying planes, but that he could do nothing more till he had an answer to his previous messages.
73 Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 12 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File. 1, 707. The message was received and circulated in the War Department on the afternoon of 14 December. MacArthur reported that he had in commission (as of 14 December) six B-17's, two B 18's eighteen P-40's, six P-35's, and five obsolete observation planes. (Msg, MacArthur to TAG, 15 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 710.1
74 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 395-96.
75 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 15 Dec 41, No. 787, WPD 4544-31.
76 (1) Note for red, Gen Gerow, 15 Dec 41, Tab MacArthur, Book 1, Exec 8. (2) Memo, Gen Arnold for CofS, 15 Dec 41, sub: Aerial Reinforcements for Hawaii and P. L, WPD Msg File 1, 772.
77 Memo (no originator) for CofS, 17 Dec 41, no sub, Hq ASF files under CofS, GS (1), May-Jun 42.
78 Note for rcd cited n. 76 (1) .
79 Msg . 787 cited n. 75. Plans and preparations for this movement had been under way for a week. Sec (11 min, conf in OCofS, 9 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Confs, II, and (2) memo, Col Bissell for ACofS WPD, 9 Dec 41, sub: Mtg in Gen Arnold's Off, 9:30 Dec 9, 1941, WPD 3807-105.
80 Msg, Magruder to SW, 11 Dec 41, AMMISCA 95, WPD Msg File 1, 747.
81 For an interim War Department answer to Magruder's message, cited n. 80, sec msg, Stimson to Magruder, 13 Dec 41, Tab China, Book 1, Exec 8. The President communicated with the Generalissimo on 14 December making the definite proposal for the conference in Chungking. See Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. II.
82 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 10 Dec 41, No. 198, WPD 4544-26. For early War Department hopes of Soviet intervention in the Far East, see: (1) min, mtg in OCofS, 10 Dec 41, WDCSA CofS Confs, II: (2) notes by WPD offs with copy of msg ;No. 198, cited above, WPD 4544-26: (3) WPD study, title: Gen Strategic Review, incl with memo, WPD for CofS [23 Dec 41], sub: Gen Strategic Review, WPD 4402-136; and (41 paper, no addresser, no sig, n.d., title: Assistance to the Far East, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8.
83 Msg, Stalin to Chiang Kai-stick, 12 Dec 41, translated copy, initialed by Gen Gerow and Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Tab China, Book 1, Exec 8. Ambassador Maxim Litvinov  had earlier stated to the President the desire of the Soviet Government to remain neutral. (See min cited n. 82 (1).)
84 (1) Memo, WPD for TAG, 2 Jan 42, sub: Strategic Policy, Far Eastern Theater, Tab Misc, Book 2, Exec 8. (2) Memo, WPD for CofS, 3 Jan 42, sub: Relief of the Phil, WPD 4639-2. (3) Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 4 Feb 42, No 201. (4) memo, WPD for TAG, 8 Feb 42, sub: Far Eastern Sit. Last two in Tab MacArthur, Book 3, Exec 8.
85 See, for example, ltr, Col Brink to CofS, 25 Dec 41, sub: Inter-Allied Conf, Singapore, Dec 18, 20, 1941, WPD 4544-31. This is the final report of the Singapore conference. The American position is summarized in the final sentence of a statement sent by General MacArthur and Admiral Hart, which Colonel Brink read and distributed: "We reiterate the strategic policy enunciated by President Roosevelt:-The Far East area is now the dominant locus of the war and the most rapid and concentrated effort should be made by convergent action of the Allies."
86 For the President's proposal for conversations in Moscow, sec copy of msg, President to Stalin [15 Dec 41], Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.
87 Msg, Brink to Marshall [via British channels], 21 Dec 41, OCS 18136-179.
88 (1) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 17-22. (2) Paper, n.d., no sig, title: Assistance to the Far East, Tab A, Book A, Exec 8. 1 his paper probably represents the first effort to stag what should be done in the Southwest Pacific.
89 Memo, WPD for CofS, 17 Dec 41, sub: Plan for Australian Base, WPD 4628-1. General Eisenhower was the action officer.
90 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Magruder for Brett, 17 Dec 41, WPD 4628.
91 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 17 Dec 41, No. 31, WPD 4628. (2) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to U.S. Mil Attaché, Brisbane, for Barns, 17 Dec 41, No. 30, WPD Msg File 1, 972. (3) Ltr, Moore to Brett, 19 Dec 41, AG 381 (12-31-41).
92 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 396-97.
93 (1) Msg, Clagett to U.S. CsofS [via Australian radio channels], 22 Dec 41, Tab ABDA Reps, Book 1, Exec: 8. The message was delivered to WPD by Commander Harries of the Australian Navy just before noon on 23 December. (2) See msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 18 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 970, for MacArthur's directions and expectations.
94 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Dec 41, No. 40, WPD Msg File 1, 1293.
95 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 23 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1340.
96 (1) Msg, MacArthur to :Marshall, 21 Dec 41, No. 22, WPD Msg File 1, 1186. (2). Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 22 Dec 41, No. 3, WPD Msg File 1, 1222.
97 Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to MacArthur, 24 Dec 41, WPD 3633-27.
98 (1) Msg (originator WPD), Marshall to Brett, 24 Dec 41, WPD Msg File 1, 1382. (2) See also, msg (originator WPD), Marshall to U.S. Mil Attaché, Melbourne, for Brett, 25 Dec 41, No. 41, WPD 4628-3, Tab ABDA Reps, Book 1, Exec 8.
99 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 2.5 Dec 41, no number, WPD Msg File 1, 1462. General Brereton was in command of the B 17 force that was moved south. The B-17's had bran operating front Port Darwin for several days.
100 Notes on mtg at White House, beginning at 1800, 24 Dec 41, of President and Prime Minister and others, sent by Brigadier L. C. Hollis of Br Jt Stf  Miss to "Secretary General to the United States Chiefs of Staff," Tab Collab, Book 1, Exec 8.
101  As approved by Marshall, 28 Dec 41. Sec extract from memo, AAF for CofS, 26 Dec 41, sub: Air Units . . ., WPD 3807-107.

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