CMH Pub 104-4
THE GERMAN CAMPAIGNS IN THE BALKANS
(SPRING 1941)
This publication replaces DA Pam 20-260, November 1953.
Facsimile Edition, 1984, 1986
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
FOREWORD
The purpose of this study is to describe the German campaigns in the Balkans
and the seizure of Crete within the framework of Hitler's military policy
during the second year of World War II. The study is the first of a series
dealing with large-scale German military operations in Eastern Europe;
other historical studies such as Germany and Finland--Allies and Enemies
in World War II, The Axis Campaign in Russia, 1941-45: A Strategic Survey,
and German Army Group Operations in Russia will follow.
"The German Campaigns in the Balkans" is written from the German point
of view and is based mainly on original German records and postwar military
writings by Dr. Helmut Greiner, General Burkharth. Mueller-Hillebrand,
and the late General Hans von Greiffenberg. The lessons and conclusions
following each narrative have been drawn from the same German sources.
(These records and manuscripts are listed in appendix III.) Material taken
from U.S. and Allied sources has been integrated into the text, but specific
cross references have been made only in those instances where these sources
deviate from the German documents.
The work of preparing this study in English, which consisted of translating
basic German records and manuscripts, performing additional research, expanding
and then rewriting the narratives with an eye for continuity and factual
data, was done chiefly by Mr. George E.Blau of the Foreign Studies Branch,
Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In the
process of presenting the material, every effort has been made to give
a balanced account of German strategy and operations in the Balkans during
the spring of 1941.
A. C. SMITH
Major General, USA
Chief, Military History
CONTENTS
Chapter 1. The Great Powers
I. Germany
II. Italy
III. Soviet Union
IV. Great Britain
Chapter 2. Germany'. Satellites in the Balkans
I. Hungary
II. Romania
III. Bulgaria
Chapter 3. The Other Balkan Countries
Chapter 4. Political and Strategic Planning
I. Military Topography
II. Hitler's Concept of the Strategic Factors
Chapter 5. The Plan of Attack
I. The Outline Plan
II. The Timing of the Attacks
III. Second Army
IV. First Panzer Group
V. XLI Panzer Corps
Chapter 6. The Defense Forces
I. General
II. Defensive Plans
III. Training and Tactics
IV. Guerrilla Warfare
V. Fortifications
VI. Order of Battle
VII. Deficiencies and Confusion
Chapter 7. The Attack Forces
I. Command Posts
II. The Luftwaffe
III. Second Army
IV. First Panzer Group
V. XLI Panzer Corps
Chapter 8. Logistical Planning and Assembly of Second Army Page
I. The Rail Transportation Problem 42
II. The Danube as a Route of Transportation 44
III. Other Logistical Planning 46
IV. The Assembly of Second Army 47
Chapter 9. Operations
I. The Air Bombardment of Belgrade
II. The Three-Pronged Drive on the Yugoslav Capital
III. Secondary Attacks
IV. Italian and Hungarian Operations
V. The Final Drive on Sarajevo
VI. Armistice Negotiations
VII. Losses
Chapter 10. Lessons
I. General
II. Coalition Warfare
III. Assembly
IV. Other Organizational and Tactical Improvisations
Chapter 11. Conclusions
I. Yugoslav Military Unpreparedness
II. Internal Disunity
III. German Propaganda
IV. Seeds of Unrest
Chapter 12. General
I. Political and Military Events (October 1940-April 1941)
II. Military Topography
III. Strategic Factors
Chapter 13. The Defense Forces
I. Yugoslav Forces
II. Greek Forces
III. British and Imperial Forces
Chapter 14. The Attack Forces
15. The Plan of Attack
16. The Assembly Logistical Problems
1 7. Operations
I. The German Thrust across Southern Yugoslavia
II. The 2d Panzer Division Drive to Salonika
III. The Struggle across the Metaxas Line
IV. The Seizure of Western Thrace
V. Capitulation of the Greek Second Army
VI. The German Estimate of the Situation on 9 April
VII. The Breakthrough to Kozani
VIII. The Withdrawal of the Greek First Army
IX. Securing the German Rear Areas
X. The Fighting near Mount Olympus
XI. Continuation of the XL Panzer Corps Drive
XII. Regrouping of German Forces
XIII. The Last British Stand at Thermopylae
XIV. The Seizure of the Isthmus of Corinth
XV. The German Drive on Athens and across the Peloponnesus
XVI. Losses
Chapter 18. Losses
I. Employment of Armor in Mountainous Terrain
II. Air Support
III. Flying Columns
IV. Mission-Type Orders
V. Mountain Training and Equipment
VI. Patrol Activities
VII. Obstacles and Demolitions
VIII. Pacification of Enemy Territory
Chapter 19. Conclusions
Chapter 20. General
I. Strategic Factors and Planning
II. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean
III. Military Topography
IV. The Defense Forces
V. The Attack Forces
VI. The Plan of Attack
VII. The Assembly Logistical Problems
Chapter 21. Operations
I. The Initial Airborne Landings (20 May 1941)
II. The Seaborne Invasion (20 22 May)
III. The Continuation of the Struggle (21 May-1 June)
VI. Casualties and Losses
Chapter 22. Lessons
Chapter 23. Conclusions
Chapter 24. Influence of the Plans for Operation BARBAROSSA on the Campaigns
in the Balkans
I. Hasty Execution of the Balkan Campaigns
II. Hurried Redeployment from the Balkans
III. Defective Occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece
Chapter 25. Effect of the Balkan Campaigns on Operation BARBAROSSA
I. Delay of Operation BARBAROSSA
II. The Redeployment of the Ground Forces
III. The Influence on Air Operations
IV. The Balkan Campaigns as a Diversion
Chapter 26. Conclusions
APPENDICES
MAPS
