Endnotes for Chapter V

1 John G. Winant, Letter From Grosvenor Square (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) hereafter cited as Grosvenor Square), p. 254; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940--43, pp. 47-50; S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. I, The Defensive (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), p. 618.

2 Testimony on 15 Jan 41, US. Dept of State, Peace and War, Doc. 195, pp. 612-18.

3 For example, less than 100 of the approximately 2,400 airplanes delivered to the British between 11 March 1941 and the end of the year were sent under lend-lease. Craven and Cate, A AF 1, pp. 318-19. Secretary of War Stimson had predicted as much when he advised the President in January, "whatever benefit Britain would derive during that period [before 1942] would be mainly in the increased morale which such passage would undoubtedly give to the British people," since American munitions output could not be greatly increased until 1942. Ind to Memo. SW for President, 22 Jan 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 20, pp. 4275-80.

4 Statement of Secretary Stimson as recorded in Min of a Conf in OSW, 17 Mar 41, OCS Conf Binder 11.

5 Statements based on percentages disclosed by Gallup surveys. Memo, Maj Gen Edwin M. Watson for President, 16 May 41, FDR Personal Letters, II, 1158.

6 Winant, Grosvenor Square, pp. 254-56; Hull, Memoirs, II, 927-28; Memo, President for Secy Knox, 1 Apr 41, Roosevelt Papers; Ltr, SN to President, 21 Mar 41, summary in Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book IV, item 1. Last two in FDRL.

7 Ltr, SN to President, 24 Mar 41; Memo, President for SN, 1 Apr 41. Both in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, p. 407.

8 Stimson Diary, entries of 7 Mar, 8 and 11 Apr, and 22 May 41; Winant, Grosvenor Square, p. 243; Arnold, Global Mission, p. 241.

9 See Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIII.

10 See Ch. I, above.

11 Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1942 ed.), p. 861 and Map 38.

12 Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 44-55; Memo, SN for President, 20 Mar 41, SW file, Navy Dept.

13 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Mar 41. On the same day Admiral Stark remarked, "if England is to be saved, we will have to get in and quickly," and went on to say that there were things the United States would have to do "which may cause war." Notes on SLC mtg, 24 Mar 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, item 13.

14 Kittredge MS, Ch. 14, p. 375, and Ch. 15, App. A, pp. 312-14; information obtained from Captain Kittredge, USN, JCS Hist Sec, in written commentary for OCMH Strategy Sec.

15 Stimson Diary, entry of 4 Apr 41.

16 Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, p. 415.

17 Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 368; Stimson Diary, entry of 10 Apr 41; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. III, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 140; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 435.
The President's scheme may have been based in part on a proposal contained in a memorandum to Harry Hopkins from his assistant, Oscar Cox, on 10 April 1941. Cox suggested "that if the Western Hemisphere is defined either in legal or geographical terms the definition be such that it would keep German raiders out of it, permit the convoying by American naval vessels of British and American ships to the end of the Western Hemisphere, and the delivery of goods in the Western Hemisphere for trans-shipment to Great Britain." Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book IV, Item 3, FDRL.

18 Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Apr 41.

19 Notes on Conf in OCS, 16 Apr 41, OCS Conf Binder 13.

20 Memo, WPD for CofS, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4402-9. The final clause quoted above referred to reports of the difficulties faced by the Churchill ministry because of the disasters overtaking the British armies in the eastern Mediterranean. The preceding day, Secretary Stimson had protested to General Marshall about criticisms of the Churchill government being made by Army officers. "I pointed out that the success of the United States depended on the safety of the British fleet; that the safety of the British fleet and its preservation depended on the preservation of the Churchill government and the life of the promise made by Churchill last summer to keep the fleet at all odds; therefore, in circulating . . . such comment, they were attacking the vital safety of the United States." Stimson Diary, entry of 15 Apr 41.

21 Notes on Conf in OCS, 16 Apr 41, OCS Conf Binder 10. The record of these 16 April conferences does not disclose General Marshall's own answers to the questions he had posed, nor has any evidence been uncovered that he or General Embick presented the Army's views, as developed in these meetings, to the President. For a more detailed account, see Watson, Prewar Plans and Preparations, pp. 386-90.

22 Memo, CNO for SN, 16 Apr 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6. Though dated 16 April, this copy in Army files contains changes made by the President during the weekend of 19-21 April. Memo, WPD for CofS, 22 Apr 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6, indicates the President's approval of the plan as revised "for planning purposes." The Fleet's operations plan is dated 18 April 1941, but could not have been issued before the President's weekend decisions. A personal letter of Admiral Stark to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, dated 19 April 1941 (printed in Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2163-65), is the best source on the circumstances of the plan; but the postscript of the letter could not have been written before Monday, 21 April. Captain Kittredge has treated this episode in detail in Chs. 14-16 of his monograph. That the British were promptly notified is indicated by Churchill in Grand Alliance, p. 142, though they could not have been notified as early as 18 April, nor was the plan "announced."
Technically, the terms of this plan would have been applicable to Japanese naval vessels and aircraft operating east of the International Date Line. In practice-before December 1941-the Navy did not apply the plan or the plans that superseded it during 1941 to Japanese craft. See Ch. VI, below.

23 Telg, TAG to CG's First Army and CDC, 10 May 41, WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6. Information about the drafting and transmission of this message has also been derived from other papers in this file and from Stimson Diary, entry of 10 May 1941.

24 Kittredge MS, Ch. 15, pp. 408-09; Ltr, CNO to CinC Pacific Fleet, 19 Apr 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2163-65.

25 Stimson Diary, entry of 24 Apr 41.

26 Aide-Memoire, Gen Marshall for President Roosevelt, 24 Apr 41, sub: Def of Hawaii, WPD 3672-32; Stimson Diary, various entries for period 23 Apr-14 May 41; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, pp. 386-87; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 56-58; Butler, Grand Strategy, II, 502-03.

27 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 1, 28, entry of 18 Mar 41. A German staff study dated 11 March proposed an attack on Gibraltar, by troops and equipment withdrawn from the Eastern Front, as soon as German forces had penetrated to the Kiev-Smolensk line. British Cabinet Office, Historical Branch, "Operation FELIX: German Plans for Spain and the Capture of Gibraltar (June 1950)," Pt. I, Political Considerations, in Axis Plans and Operations in the Mediterranean, September 1939-February 1941, pp. 29-30.

28 Halder Journal, VI, 41, entry of 30 Mar 41.

29 Ltr, President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill; 4 May 41, FDR Personal Letters, II, 1148-50. See also Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 144-45.

30 Langer, Our Vichy Gamble. pp. 159, 407-08; Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 497-510; Leahy, I Was There. pp. 31-32; Hull, Memoirs, 11, 962-66.

31 Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, 1, 62-76, entry of 22 May 41.

32 Memo, Maj Lemuel Mathewson for Gen Gerow, WPD, 21 May 41, WPD 4224-150; Memo, Col Ridgway for Gen Gerow, 23 Jul 41, WPD 4115-52.

33 The effect of Pétain's 15 May announcement has been gauged primarily on the basis of various items in the Roosevelt Papers, FDRL, and on entries in the Stimson Diary. For Churchill's note, see Grand Alliance, p. 765.

34 Notes on Conf in OCS, 19 May 41, OCS Conf Binder 15.

35 Notes on War Council mtg, 19 May 41, SW Conf Binder 1.

36 Memo, Secy State Hull for President, 25 May 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL. On the proposed Monroe Doctrine extension, see also Hull, Memoirs, II, 959-60, and "Memo of Interview with the President, Tuesday, May 20, 1941," Stimson Diary. On the approach to Dr. Bowman, see Ltr, Dr. Bowman to President Roosevelt, 19 May 41, and other papers in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

37 Stimson Diary, entry of 23 May 41.

38 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 296.

39 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel 1. Rosenman, 1941 volume: Call to Battle Stations (New York: Harper& Brothers, 1950) (hereafter cited as FDR Public Papers and Addresses, 1941), pp. 181-94.

40 Memo, SGS for CofS, 29 May 41, OCS Conf Binder 15.

41 Memo, G-2 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 28 May 41, GHQ 381, Sec. 1.

42 Ltr, Gen Lee to Ambassador John G. Winant, 27 May 41, quoted in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 301-02.

43 Memo, Gen Burns for Mr. Hopkins, 31 May 41, Calendar of Hopkins Papers, Book III, Item 7, FDRL.

44 Memo of Conv, Dept of State, 17 May 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Memo, Lt Col Charles W. Bundy for ACofS WPD, 23 May 41, WPD 4422-3; Hull, Memoirs. 11, 939-41. See also, Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 366-70, and Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning, 1941-42, pp. 44-50, on the background of the Azores directive.

45 Memo, WPD for CofS, 24 Jan 41; WPD study, n.d. [early February 1941?]. Both in WPD 4422.

46 WPD Memo for File, 16 May 41, WPD 4422-2; Memo, CNO for CofS, 22 May 41, sub: Analysis of Plans for Overseas Operations, OPD Exec 13, General Malony Binder 1.

47 Msg, Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, 24 Apr 41, Churchill, Grand Alliance, pp. 143-45; Msg, Adm Ghormley to CNO, 7 May 41, cited in Kittredge MS, Ch 16, note 45, p. 326.

48 Ind, title: Emergency Expeditionary Force Plan, to Memo, WPD for CofS, 15 May 41, WPD 3493-11.

49 Ltr, CNO to CinC Pacific Fleet, 24 May 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, pp. 2168-70; various papers, dated 23 May-2 Jun 41, WPD 4422-3, WPD 4422-4, WPD 4232-5, WPD 4232-10, WPD 4232-11, AG 353 (5-23-41), Sec. 1, AG 370.5 (5-26-41), OPD Exec 13. Also, Notes on War Council mtg, 26 May 41, SW Conf Binder 1; Diary of Brig Gen Leonard T. Gerow, entries of 29 May and 2 Jun 41, OPD Exec File; Leighton and Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-,43, pp. 68-71.

50 For details of the negotiations with Brazil during this period, see Ch. XI, below, and Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 518ff.

51 Pars. 2 and 3, Navy Western Hemisphere Def Plan No. 2, 16 Apr 41, copy in WPD 4351-98, Sec. 6; Notes on SLC mtg, 21 Apr 41, SLC Min, Vol. II, Item 20.

52 Study dated 22 May 1941, inclosed as Tab A to Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 41, WPD 4224-155.

53 Memo, WPD for CofS, 27 May 41, and atchd Tab A, WPD 4224-155. War Plans had produced a study on the possibilities of a Dakar operation on 7 May 1941 (copy in OPD Exec 13). The planners also dismissed an occupation of the Cape Verde Islands as a practicable alternative to the Brazilian proposal; unless United States or other friendly forces also held Dakar and the adjacent African coast, the Cape Verdes would be untenable. Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Jun 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 7.

54 Memo, Lt Col Lee S. Gerow for Gen Gerow, 27 May 41, and Incl, WPD 4422-5.

55 Stimson Diary, entry of 6 Jun 41.

56 President's notation, dated 4 Jun 41, on Ltr, JPC to JB, 28 May 41, JB 325, set 694; Memo, WPD for ACsofS G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4, 6 Jun 41, WPD 4422-8.

57 Cablegram, ALUSNA Lisbon to OPNAV, 26 May 41, copy in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

58 Memo, President for Secy State, 31 May 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL; Hull, Memoirs, II, 940.

59 Ltr, Under Secy Welles to President Roosevelt, 4 Jun 41, inclosing Memo, British Embassy for Dept of State, 2 Jun 41, Roosevelt Papers, FDRL.

60 Memo, CNO for CofS, 22 May 41, OPD Exec 13, General Malony Binder 1; Memo, OCS for CofS, 31 May 41, WPD 4175-22.

61 Memo, WPD for CofS, 14 Jun 41, OPD Exec 4, Item 7.

62 Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 523.

63 Winant, Grosvenor Square, , pp. 194-95. In timing the incidents of this period, the author has also profited from an examination of the President's appointment books in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

64 Stimson Diary, entry of 5 Jun 41.

65 Winant, Grosvenor Square, p. 203.

66 Stimson Diary, entry of 2 Jun 41.

67 Notes on War Council mtg, 3 Jun 41, SW Conf Binder 1; Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Jun 41.

68 Stimson Diary, entry of 3 Jun 41. There is an unsigned and undated report in the GHQ-OPD INDIGO "A" file, discussing the merits of the two operations. It concludes that unless the United States were prepared to enter the war as an active belligerent, it should not undertake either an Iceland or an Azores expedition. If one had to be undertaken, the report favored the Azores. This may be the staff report delivered by the Chief of Staff to Mr. Stimson on 3 June.

69 Stimson Diary, entry of 5 Jun 41.

70 Memo, WPD for CofS, 5 Jun 41, OPD Exec 13; Gerow Diary, entries of 4 and 7 Jun 41. For a detailed survey of the Iceland operation and its background, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, Guarding the United States, Ch. XIV.

71 Information obtained from Captain Kittredge, USN, JCS Hist Sec, in written commentary for OCMH Strategy Sec; Stimson Diary, entries of 6 and 18 Jun 41, and "Memo of Talk with Sec Knox at Woodley, 20 June 41"; Butler, Grand Strategy, II, 507.

72 Winant, Grosvenor Square, p. 204; Hull, Memoirs, II, 973.

73 WPD draft of Memo, CofS for CNO,--Jun 41 (dated in pencil, 6 Jun 41, and stamped "Not used") and Incls, WPD 4422-7; unsigned and undated staff report in GHQ-OPD INDIGO "A" file.

74 Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41.

75 Memo, CofS for Under Secy State, 17 Jun 41, AG 380 (5-18-40), Sec. 2.

76 Memo, Actg ACofS G-2 for CofS, 18 Jun 41, WPD 4516.

77 Stimson Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41; Memo, CofS for WPD, 21 Jun 41, WPD 4516.

78 Draft of Ltr, SW to President, 19 Jun 41, in Stimson Diary. Instead of sending this letter, Mr. Stimson presented his views in person when he went with General Marshall to see the President on 19 June.

79 Gerow Diary, entry of 19 Jun 41.

80 The Army Air Forces rated the General Headquarters Air Force at zero strength as of 1 July 1941-that is, there were no trained combat air units in the continental United States available for employment with overseas expeditionary forces. Memo, AAF for WPD, 7 Jul 41, WPD 3774-28.
The Air Forces was in the midst of a tremendous expansion that absorbed all of its available combat planes in training.
In general, the Army's weakness in effective combat strength at this time was due to factors beyond its control. The Army's numerical strength had increased fivefold during the preceding year, a pace the expansion of the American munitions industry simply could not match. Furthermore, a large proportion of the American munitions output was going to Great Britain. Marine combat forces had priority in the munitions supply that was available. General Marshall summarized the Army's predicament when he remarked, "whether we will have anything left after Britain and the Marines get theirs, I do not know." Notes on War Council mtg, 3 Jun 41, SW Conf Binder 1.

81 United States Navy Department, translation of Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote War Logs for period 1 January 1941 to 31 December 1943 (hereafter cited as B.d.U. War Logs), entry of 20 Jun 41; Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 1, entry of 21 Jun 41.
Under this directive as clarified, submarine commanders were permitted to attack naval vessels in the war zone only when the vessels were "definitely established as enemy ships from cruisers on up," or when the vessels themselves were unmistakably attacking. Fuehrer Conferences, 1941, II, 3, entry of 10 Jul 41.

82 Ltr, SW to President, 23 Jun 41, original in Roosevelt Papers, FDRL, and printed in Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 303-04.

83 This summary of the June 1941 estimate was embodied in a paper circulated at a conference in the Secretary of War's office on 16 September 1941. Copy in OCS file, Conferences (9-21-41).

84 See Ch. X1, below.

85 Memo, ASW for SW, 24 Jun 41, SW file, War Plans.

86 Ltr, Adm Stark to Capt Charles M. Cooke, Jr., USN, 31 Jul 41, Pearl Harbor Attack, Pt. 16, p. 2175.

87 Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 574-75; Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, pp. 74-79; Kittredge MS, Ch. 19, pp. 539-52; Stimson Diary, entries of 5, 8, and 21 Jail 41.

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