Special Publications

OPERATION URGENT FURY: THE INVASION OF GRENADA, OCTOBER 1983

Richard W. Stewart

Special Publications
CMH Pub 70-114-1, Paper
2008; 38 pages, maps, illustrations

Operation URGENT FURY: The Invasion of Grenada, October 1983, prepared by Richard W. Stewart, is an edited extract of Center historian Edgar Raines' larger account of U.S. Army operations on Grenada entitled The Rucksack War: U.S. Army Operational Logistics in Grenada, October-November 1983. The brochure tells the story of the U.S. Army's "no-notice" joint force contingency operation on the island of Grenada. Because of a deteriorating political situation on Grenada after the deposing and execution of the leader of the government by its own military, the perceived need to deal firmly with Soviet and Cuban influence in the Caribbean, and the potential for several hundred U.S. citizens becoming hostages, the Ronald W. Reagan administration launched an invasion of the island with only a few days for the military to plan operations. While the U.S. military's capabilities were never in doubt, the unexpectedly strong Cuban and Grenadian resistance in the first two days of the operation and the host of American military errors in planning, intelligence, communications, and logistics highlighted the dangers of even small contingency operations. As the first joint operation attempted since the end of the Vietnam War, the invasion of Grenada also underscored the problems the U.S. Army faced in trying to work in a joint environment with its Air Force, Navy, and Marine counterparts.

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