REPORT ON MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA AND NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES 1916
REPORT ON
MOBILIZATION
OF THE
ORGANIZED MILITIA
AND
NATIONAL GUARD
OF THE UNITED STATES
1916
INTRODUCTORY.

In the following pages the recent mobilization is discussed under the headings which appear in the table of contents.

Many letters, telegrams, memoranda, opinions of the judge advocate general, etc., are quoted which set forth the policy of the War Department on the subjects dealt with. In themselves they supply answers to many important questions relating to the National Guard.

To publish the report of a single inspector or muster ing officer or even those of several would fail to give an accurate picture of conditions found at mobilization camps for the reason that conditions vary greatly, the preparedness in some States being far in advance of others.

Then, too, the same condition of affairs will not impress two observers in exactly the same light. The method pursued therefore has been to scrutinize carefully all reports, extracting therefrom matter falling under such various headings as “Recruiting,” “Physical examinations,” etc., in order that by noting the reports on these subjects as observed in the National Guard of States from Maine to Arizona, a fair general view may be presented to the reader. The reports of a few observers might give a view too much biased, but the considerable number whose reports are quoted and whose rank ranges from that of major general to first lieutenant, all of whom have had more or less experience in making inspection of troops, can hardly fail to present a fairly truthful estimate of conditions existing in the National Guard.

Extracts have been made from the reports of inspector-instructors on their work during the muster in of the State forces, to which especial attention is invited. In all there were 70 officers who submitted reports, 10 each from the Cavalry and Artillery, 7 from the Medical Corps, and the remainder from the Infantry. A large number of officers employed representing all the mobile arms and Medical Corps of the Army tends to eliminate bias and prejudice, and the whole presents to the reader a composite view of this element of national defense which is believed to be fair and just.

Between July 14 and August 15 a general inspection of all National Guard camps on the border was made by the assistant chief of staff, Maj. Gen. T. H. Bliss, consolidation of whose reports is here presented. Later a systematic inspection was made by the Inspector General’s Department on lines suggested by the Chief of the Militia Bureau. The main features of the reports of these inspections have been condensed for presentation here. The views of several of the department commanders are also given.

Finally the above is followed by matter on this subject collected from miscellaneous sources.
The call of June 18, 1916, followed so close upon the passage of the act of June 3, 1916, that there had not been enough time for the thorough consideration by the War Department of the new law in all of its bearings. The operation and effects of the new law in respect to mobilization and muster in were still less well known to mustering officers and State officials. Some mistakes were made but as a rule where quick decisions had to be made by mustering officers correct judgment was displayed.

The second call was made to include both the National Guard and the Organized Militia, since the latter had not in all cases been converted into the former and as it was held that the old law had not been superseded or impaired by the new law in respect to the obligations contracted under the old to perform Federal service under a call of the President. Under this ruling members of the Organized Militia were held to service under the call regardless of whether or not they had taken the new oath. A few mustering officers and State officials made the mistake of assuming that a member of the Organized Militia might release himself from service under the call by refraining from taking the new oath.

Some confusion was caused by efforts made to change State mobilization points after the call was made. Experience also shows that a number of mobilization points were not well suited to the purpose. The small number of distributing points for quartermaster supplies caused congestion and delay in the delivering of quartermaster supplies at mobilization points, but the greatest handicap was the lack of reserve supplies from which to equip the militia. Sufficient funds had never been appropriated to completely equip the militia and accumulate a reserve necessary for mobilization. The Ordnance Department, however, had on hand sufficient arms and equipment to meet the demand except in the matter of machine guns.

The demand for additional troops on the border being urgent, department commanders were directed to expedite the muster in, and to send organizations to the border as soon as they could be made ready. This injunction, along with the desire of the National Guard officers and men to make a good showing caused some undue haste. The necessary physical examinations after muster in were slighted in some organizations, and it is reported that the first units to arrive on the border were incompletely equipped and almost destitute of proper records. The muster-in process was unduly prolonged in other States owing to the difficulty of obtaining recruits necessary to fill up organizations to the required minimum strength. The listing of property before transfer from State to Federal service and the preparation of the necessary rolls and records pertaining to muster in were difficult problems for all concerned. The difficulties were increased through the inability of the War Department to supply the necessary blank forms when required.

The duties and work incident to muster in and the distractions at and near mobilization camps were unfavorable to good instruction, and little was accomplished except in the matter of recruit instruction. Upon arrival at the border, instruction was undertaken in a serious and systematic way under the direction of district com-
INTRODUCTORY.

The fact that many individuals desired to be released on account of the losses of position and pecuniary sacrifices which their military service imposed upon them is less a criticism of the individual than it is of the voluntary plan of military service.

While faithful service by the National Guard has been the rule, there is much evidence to show that the duty on the border was considered irksome, and that many believed that they had been fairly treated. The outspoken ones have assumed to judge and to declare that the emergency requiring their presence on the border was past and that it was an injustice to retain them longer in service, forgetting that the duty of a soldier is to perform the task that is set before him, whatever it may be, and that military ends are frequently attained more by the demonstration than by the actual exercise of military force.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA AND NATIONAL GUARD IN 1916.

The average reader will perhaps better understand this subject if divested of some of its legal and technical terms, and if we go back and refer briefly to the constitutional authority and to certain of the laws relating to this subject.

The principal constitutional provisions are as follows:

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. (Art. II, amendments.)

The Congress shall have power — * *
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. (Art. I, sec. 8.)

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States. (Art. II, sec. 2.)

Pursuant to this constitutional authority, Congress in 1792 enacted the first militia law, which was until 1903 the only law relating to the militia. It was to all intents and purposes, however, in many of its provisions a dead letter.

In 1903 an act was passed by Congress "to promote the efficiency of the militia, and for other purposes," popularly known as the Dick bill. This, while falling short of being an ideal law on this subject, was a long and very decided step toward placing this important factor of our national defense on a proper footing. By this act the militia was divided into two classes:

The Organized Militia to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States or Territories; the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia.

The subject of national defense and "preparedness" having in 1915 and 1916 become the main issue of the day, Congress by act approved June 3, 1916, provided, in what is known as the national defense act, for a complete reorganization not only of the Regular Army but of the Organized Militia as well.

By the terms of this act the militia consists of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than 18 years of age and, except as provided in the act, not more than 45 years of age, this militia being divided into three classes—the National Guard, the Naval Militia, and the Unorganized Militia.
The National Guard by the terms of this act consists of the regularly enlisted militia between the ages of 18 and 45 years, organized, armed, and equipped as provided in the act, and of commissioned officers between the ages of 21 and 64 years. No officer or enlisted man of the National Guard of the several States can, however, be recognized as a member of the National Guard until he shall have taken the Federal oath provided in the national defense act. Until this Federal oath was taken these State forces were known as the Organized Militia.

The national defense act is referred to so frequently in the following pages of this report, and its exact wording is so at times necessary to a correct understanding of the subject under discussion, that so much of this law as refers to the militia will be found appended to this report.

There were two calls issued for this mobilization, viz. first, that known as the first call and contained in telegram sent to the governors of the States of Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico May 9, 1916, as follows:

Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of the United States from Mexico and the necessity for the proper protection of that frontier, the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia necessary for that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed by the President to call into the service of the United States, through you, the Organized Militia of the State of [State designated], which the President directs shall be concentrated at the places designated by the commanding general, southern department, now at El Paso, Tex., and which he has been directed to communicate to you. Upon arrival of the Organized Militia at the designated rendezvous they will be mustered into the service of the United States by officers of the Regular Army designated for that purpose. Acknowledged.

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

Second, that known as the second call, and contained in telegram of June 18, addressed to the governors of all States except Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada, and in form as follows:

Having in view the possibility of further aggression upon the territory of the United States from Mexico and the necessity for the proper protection of that frontier, the President has thought proper to exercise the authority vested in him by the Constitution and laws and call out the Organized Militia and National Guard necessary for that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed by the President to call into the service of the United States through you, the Organized Militia and National Guard necessary for that purpose. I am, in consequence, instructed by the President to call into the service of the United States through you, the following units of the Organized Militia and National Guard of the State of [State designated], which the President directs shall be assembled at the State mobilization point [location named] for muster into the service of the United States.

Organizations to be accepted into Federal service should have the minimum strength prescribed for Organized Militia, the maximum strength at which organizations will be accepted and to which they should be raised as prescribed in section 2, Tables of Organization, United States Army. In case any regiment, battalion, or squadron now recognized as containing an insufficient number of organizations to enable it to conform to the prescribed United States Regular Army Organization Tablets, the President may order those units at the command discretion to complete such units may be moved to mobilization camp and there inspected under orders of the department commander to determine fitness for recognition as Organized Militia by the War Department. Circular 18, Division of Militia Affairs, 1914, prescribes the organizations desired from each State as part of the local tactical division, and only these organizations will be accepted into service. It is requested that all officers of the Adjutant General's Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Medical Corps, duly recognized as pertaining to State headquarters under table 1, Tables of Organization, Organized Militia, and not elsewhere required for duty in State administration, be ordered to camp for duty as camp staff officers. Such number of these staff officers as the department commander may determine may be mustered into the service of the United States. In case of proper camps and the purpose of proper camp administration is not served, they will be mustered out when their services are no longer required. Where recognized brigades or divisions are called into service from a State and the staff officers pertaining to those units under Tables of Organization, United States Army, will be mustered into service, and also the authorized inspectors of small-arms practice pertaining thereto. Except for these two purposes of mobilization—camp service and of the prescribed staff service with tactical units, officers of State headquarters under table 1, above mentioned, will not be mustered into service at this time. If tactical divisions are later organized, the requisite additional number of staff officers with rank as prescribed for division staff will, as far as practicable, be called into service from those States which have furnished troops to such divisions. Acknowledged.

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

In making these calls the units were selected with reference to the making up of complete divisions after arrival at the border concentration camps. Therefore not all the State troops were designated; those left behind were mostly Infantry. The call included practically all the serviceable Cavalry, Field Artillery, and auxiliary troops, these being the branches in which the State troops are relatively weak.

As the States were called upon to furnish so many units—regiments, for instance—it naturally fell to the governors to select the particular units which were to respond to the call.

In some cases the most efficient units were thus called out, but in others those named were, as shown by the records of the Militia Bureau, the least efficient.

The excitement at the moment was high, and the desire to get to the front was general, and where, due to local or political considerations, any but the most efficient units were called out, the result was disappointing, not only as a discouragement to those of the better organizations not mobilized, but the Federal Government thus failed to get the best the State was able to produce. This is mentioned as simply one of the many disadvantages inherent in a system of dual control, the Federal Government being the loser.

Pursuant to the provisions of the United States Mustering Regulations of 1914, mustering districts were established by the War Department each consisting of a State within which the place of mobilization previously designated by the War Department the militia were sent to be examined, organized, and mustered into the service of the United States.

For each geographical department a chief mustering officer and the necessary assistant mustering officers, together with such officers of the medical and other staff departments as were required, were detailed by the department commander who has by paragraph 454, Army Regulations, charge of all matters pertaining to the mobilization of the Organized Militia in his territorial department and has as a member of the department staff an officer in charge of militia affairs, and by the regulation above quoted all officers on militia or college duty in a State affected by the call automatically come under the orders of the department commander, and were available therefore for detail as mustering officers.
PROGRESS OF MOBILIZATION.

The first militia organization of the call of June 18 to reach the border was the First Illinois Infantry, which left Springfield 10.15 p. m. on June 28 to 12:20 a. m. June 29, arriving at San Antonio 5.30 a. m. June 30 to 12:15 a. m. July 1.

At midnight July 4 troops from the following-named States had reached their border stations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>1,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>4,608</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>1,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>5,836</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The longest distance was traveled by Connecticut troops, 2,916 miles. The shortest distance was traveled by Louisiana troops, 608 miles.

When we remember that the air-line distance from Paris to Berlin is only about 650 miles, we are afforded a means of comparison between distances connected with our recent concentration and those which obtain abroad.

RECRUITING FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD; BEFORE AND AFTER MOBILIZATION.

In August, 1915, recommendation came from the adjutant general of one of the States recommending that the War Department "prescribe and require a certain method of recruiting in time of war to be adopted by the militia while they are still a State force, and further to outline and put into effect a plan to be followed when the militia becomes a United States force."

Much of this problem, so far as it relates to time of war, was subsequently solved in the law embodied in section 79 of the act of Congress approved June 3, 1916, which, under certain conditions, directs that a draft be made on the unorganized militia for the purpose of keeping reserve battalions at the proper strength with the ultimate purpose of transferring men from these battalions to organizations in the field that the latter may be maintained at war strength. This provision, however, is inoperative except in time of war—during all other conditions it is still a problem to be dealt with.

A memorandum on "Recruiting for the Organized Militia" was (Aug. 23, 1915) prepared for the Chief of Staff by the Chief of the War College Division and referred to the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, for comment. This memorandum was, given in a letter (Sept. 4, 1915) to the Chief of Staff and covers the views held in the Militia Bureau so completely that it is here given in full:

1. The memorandum on the above subject prepared by the Chief of the War College Division, under date of August 23, 1915, having been referred to me for comment, I beg to submit the following:

2. The War Department now sets up certain standards in matters of organization, armament, and discipline, and requires the Organized Militia to conform to these standards in order to be entitled to certain funds appropriated by the Federal Government. The War Department sets up other standards, to which it advises the States to conform, without exacting any penalty for noncompliance.

3. The adjutant general of Massachusetts writes that his State law provides for a State recruiting system that he considers unsatisfactory. He says that, notwithstanding this State law, he can put into effect any recruiting system required by the War Department. It is believed he has reference to a provision of Massachusetts law requiring for general conformity to Federal standards of recruiting, but, as a matter of fact, the War Department is the only body that can fix such standards.

4. Aside from this Massachusetts case, it is desirable that the Organized Militia be instructed now in the recruiting system they will have to adopt when called into the United States service. It is desirable that the system used in the State service be as much like this Federal system as possible. If the War Department publishes now an order explaining the recruiting system to be put into effect when the Organized Militia is in the United States service, it is believed that the States will voluntarily adopt such system, as far as practicable, for use for State purposes.

5. It is the understanding of this office:

(a) That the Organized Militia is in the United States service from the time of its appearance at the United States recruiting center.

(b) That while the Organized Militia is in the United States service, recruiting is conducted not by the State but by the War Department.

(c) That existing orders providing for the recruitment of the Regular Army do not fully provide for conditions that may arise in the recruitment of the Organized Militia in the United States service.

6. As illustrating the character of recruiting problems to be solved, the following situations are presented:

(a) With the appearance of each unit at its company rendezvous, recruiting to war strength will presumably begin. Federal blank forms will be needed. How will these be supplied and how will the recruiting officers be instructed in their use?

(b) In view of the large number of recruits to be secured, it will probably be necessary for each company of a regiment to do its own recruiting. A. R. 840 provides for recruiting by regiment or post only.

(c) If a unit not fully recruited is ordered to its mobilization camp, will the recruiting officer learn this duty? The War College Division suggests that these matters be provided for in the order or proclamation calling the militia forth. Would it not be better to give these instructions now?

(d) The act of April 25, 1914, provides for recruit rendezvous and depots. Who composes the personnel of these establishments? What methods do they apply in regard to recruiting, training recruits, disbursing public funds, etc.? How does the recruiting officer learn his duties?

7. It is again recommended that an order be issued covering, as far as possible, the details of the recruiting system to be put into effect when volunteers are raised, for the Organized Militia called into the United States service. Confusion must result if the issuance of these instructions is delayed until the emergency occurs.

8. It is believed that the blank forms incidental to recruiting and muster in should be issued to the States and the cost charged against their allotments. It is thought that mobilization exercises should be frequently held as part of routine armory training.

A. L. MILLS,

Brigadier General, General Staff.

It was decided in January, 1916, that the United States may proceed to recruit Organized Militia in the service of the United States without reference to the wishes of the individual States concerned.

In the Mustering Regulations should hereafter read as follows:

Where a State fails to supply recruits necessary to maintain its militia organizations in the service of the United States at the prescribed strength, recruits may be enlisted or reenlisted in the manner provided for enlistment and reenlistment in Section 2 of the Volunteer Army Act of April 25, 1914.

The object desired, of course, was to get recruits promptly and with as little effort and expense as possible, and to assist the States in
this matter the Chief of Staff approved, on April 1, 1916, of the recommendation of the Chief of Division of Militia Affairs, that there be printed and issued to the militia a circular to include in one pamphlet all available information on recruiting and on the physical examination of recruits. This was issued in the shape of Circular No. 5, Division of Militia Affairs, April 6, 1916.

The next step taken was on May 26, 1916, when the Secretary of War approved of a plan for Federal recruiting in case of the Texas National Guard then in Federal service, instead of same being conducted by State authorities.

About a month later (June 23) the following letter was addressed by the Chief, Militia Bureau, to the adjutants general of the several States and of the District of Columbia:

The Secretary of War desires that the following letter of May 26, 1916, to the governor of Texas, which is self-explanatory as to its purpose, be brought to the attention of the governor, to the end that prompt and practical measures for recruiting can be taken.

"Among the problems confronting us in connection with the induction into United States service of the Organized Militia recently called forth is that of the proper recruitment and maintenance at authorized strength in the service of the United States.

"Your excellency appreciates, I am sure, the legal questions and difficulties which arise under such circumstances. It is practically impossible under the existing system and the existing law to draw clear-cut lines of demarcation which will define in every case the responsibility of the State as contrasted to the responsibility of the Federal Government. The efficient administration of troops requires, it seems to me, that such questions be approached and settled in a spirit of cooperation between the State and National Government, with the sole idea of securing efficiency by practical and prompt action.

"Gen. Funston, commanding the Southern Department, has telegraphed to the War Department requesting instructions as to his proper procedure in order to raise the Organized Militia in the service of the United States to the desired strength. Appreciating the fact that your administrative officers are busily occupied and that State agencies for recruiting would no doubt need to be organized anew, and with the further desire to avoid unnecessary expense, I have directed that the Federal recruiting agencies be utilized for recruiting for the Organized Militia in the service of the United States and that the necessary instructions be issued at once to that effect, in order that the proper strength may be promptly reached.

"In this connection it is hoped that the State authorities may see fit to lend any assistance to the recruiting parties which may facilitate their efforts.

"Trust that we shall secure from this action the results we both desire, I remain your dear governor.

Very truly yours,

Newton D. Baker
"Secretary of War.”

A. L. Mills,
Brigadier General, General Staff.

Telegraphic instructions on July 4 were issued as follows to the commanding generals of the Central and Southern Departments:

Reference to telegram to you that recruiting for militia in United States service will be conducted by Federal agencies in cooperation with State authorities, it is intended, first, that recruiting shall be done by officers in Federal service, either Regulars or National Guardsmen in the service of the United States and that recruits accepted shall take new oath, and no further act is required to make them members of organizations for which enlisted; second, that recruits shall then be sent by recruiting officers to designated camps of instruction, which, in some cases, will be convenient Army posts, with the view of service or betterment and utilizing available administrative machinery. The provisions of section 70, national-defense act, and the methods to be pursued when joint resolution 292, authorizing a draft, becomes effective have been under consideration for some time by the Judge Advocate General and you will be promptly advised when final conclusion is reached as to the methods to be pursued. Pending this information you may utilize the services of such officers and men of the National Guard already mustered into the service of the United States and still within the limits of your department for recruiting purposes as may seem expedient, physicians may be engaged to make the prescribed physical examinations if necessary, as indicated in paragraph 20, Musterings Regulations, Organized Militia.

The attention of the Militia Bureau having been called by the adjutant general of Georgia to the fact that in his State there was already a carefully prepared plan of State recruitment, the Chief, Militia Bureau, on July 5 recommended that plans already made by any State for recruiting for organizations before their actual muster into the United States service should not be disturbed, subject to the single provision that officers and enlisted men, Organized Militia, of such recruiting parties, must, under the law, present themselves for muster and can not for that reason be absent at home station on recruiting duty when the time appointed for such muster arrives.

The next step taken was on July 11, when a telegram was sent to the adjutants general of all States except Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas, as follows:

To provide proper recruiting agencies for the National Guard now in the service of the United States, adjutants general of States will submit by telegraph names of well-qualified National Guard officers at rate of three for each regiment and one for each separate battalion or other separate unit now in service of the United States with a view to their muster into United States service. Officers so named will not be above the grade of major, they should be willing to serve, and should be active members of the National Guard exclusive of those already mustered into the service of the United States as part of State's contingent under President's call.

Question having arisen as to whether the services of postmasters might as provided in section 27 of the act of June 3, 1916, be utilized in procuring the enlistment of recruits, this was answered in the negative, as the law reads: "Recruits for the Army.

Several of the inspector instructors have pointed out the fact that recruiting was most brisk when companies were at their home towns and excitement was high. After the duties of recruiting for the National Guard were taken over by the Federal service, the number of enlistments, as shown by the enlistment papers sent to The Adjutant General's Office, was:

In June prior to the second call

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Enlistments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>2,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>2,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>2,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2,109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 15,107

To go back and cite a few of the local conditions existing earlier in the year:

In February last it was realized by those connected with the National Guard of New York that a call on the National Guard was probable, and strenuous efforts were made, particularly in the two Buffalo regiments, to recruit to the proper strength. A committee in charge of the work was maintained by the recruiting office for more than a month in one of the principal office buildings in Buffalo.
Manufacturers, business men, professional men, and all newspapers supported the movement to the fullest extent, lending financial aid and much free advertising to the movement, which was terminated by a mass meeting attended by between 4,000 and 5,000 people.

The results of the campaign were, however, not as satisfactory as was hoped for; the Seventy-fourth Regiment was increased from 649 on February 7 to 678 on March 31, and the Thirty-sixth Infantry in the same period increased its strength from 469 to 720. Recruiting dodgers were widely distributed by the recruiting committee, but these were met by antipreparedness dodgers widely distributed by the leaders of labor unions and Socialists of Buffalo, in order to combat the efforts of the National Guard in their recruiting campaign. The opposition of the labor unions and Socialists is undoubtedly one of the principal causes of the small strength of the Buffalo regiments.

Somewhat later similar efforts were made in Greater New York, and for the week ending May 13, 443 recruits were secured; for that ending May 20, 511; and for that ending May 26, 538, making an aggregate of 1,492, or an increment of about 15 per cent to the enlisted strength.

Another instance of the strenuous though unsuccessful efforts to secure recruits is shown by the condition of affairs in Massachusetts, where there were on July 28 no less than 20 recruiting parties, each consisting of an officer, a sergeant, a corporal, and a private, mustered in and sent out to stations at various points in the State. On July 26, however, the senior assistant recruiting officer in Massachusetts reported that they had enlisted only 130 men. He reported at the same time that of 1,000 or 1,100 members of the Organized Militia who declined to take the new Federal oath, only 278 had reported for muster in and 100 of those had submitted applications for discharge on account of dependent relatives.

A report from Capt. ____________, Signal Corps, National Guard of__ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ __ ____
ordered to fire down a crowded street when the poor are clamoring for bread, he obeys, and sees the gray hairs of age stained with red and the life tide gush
the inspector instructor, N. G. of — , Aug. 12, 1916.)

Seventeen officers, largely physical rejections, were ordered for recruiting duty in Connecticut, inspector-instructor, N. G. of — , Aug. 12, 1916.)

Great numbers of the men were obviously physically and mentally unfit and should never have been brought—young, anemic, flat-chested boys, 18 to 20 years of age, and weighing from 90 to 105 pounds.—(Extract from report of Capt. Grissinger, M. C. on N. G. of — , July 26, 1916.)

A great deal of comment was caused during the mobilization by the presentation for muster in with the consent of the State authorities of 36 men contingently paroled from the Greendale Reformatory. These men were not given free service and their status for discharge raised questions very difficult for solution. They were enlisted under the Organized Militia oath and brought to Fort Thomas. There, with the other men of the company, they took the so-called "new oath," when it was found the musterling officer would not accept them, new muster-in rolls, with their names omitted, were made by the company commander and the papers with the new oath and contract of enlistment to which they had subscribed destroyed. Their status, therefore, was determined by the matter got into the press of an all-around unfortunate incident.—(Extract from report of Capt. Gibson, inspector-instructor on N. G. of — , Sept. 24.)

As indicated in my previous report, all attention has been devoted to getting muster in of all regiment. At least two outsiders have been commissioned as a reward for bringing in men. Two vacancies in the grade of captain now exist, and it is possible that similar or even less proper considerations will enter into the appointment of officers to fill these places. Such action would have a bad effect on the personnel. Such has occurred already, and it is unfortunate. My relations with the State authorities are such that I have felt free to advise strongly against it.

Muster in of—troops does not progress in a satisfactory way, the State authorities having largely discontinued efforts at recruiting since completion of regiment. The sanitary detachment lacks a few men and the band lacks about 20.—(Extract from report of Lieut. B. F. Ristine, Inf., inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 26, 1916.)

Since about June 1 all energies have been devoted to recruiting men. Officers have been taken away from the regiment, regardless of all other considerations and interests, and have been sent to scout the State for men, even going over into Texas. When muster in of companies was started it was necessary to transfer men from the other companies to the company to be mustered, and this has been continued and repeated until the situation has become ridiculous. The company can be said to exist strictly to any given locality. This is it is contemplated to correct by placing companies under the command of a single company officer which has the personnel is fixed, and that in each company there are many outsiders in whom no considerable interest need be taken. In some cases it has been necessary to have several or the combined officers for the purpose of transfer, and this has not tended toward good feeling.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Ristine, inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 5.)

Since last week's report the recruiting officers for war have been ordered in and State authorities have been opened up by retired officers and others, who are to secure men and forward them to this camp at State expense for training here. During the week the losses have equalled the gains, as they have been eliminating men who have been enlisted. These men are also discharging men who have dependent families.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 1.)

The adjutant general, in conversation with me this day, stated that there was no congestion in getting the required number of men if these troops could be concentrated at Fort Benjamin Harrison and later sent to the border, but that if kept indefinitely in their home towns the same recruiting troubles of the past would be repeated and interest probably quickly lost. He also stated that recent instructions regarding the acceptance of these troops at the armory at their home station would also cause embarrassment, since all armory rentals had been withdrawn, now that the organized troops had left the State, and this feature introduced difficulties that could be largely avoided if the troops could be concentrated. Aside from these questions important from a standpoint of training (particularly of new units) if they could be concentrated for that purpose alone.—(Extract from report of Capt. Clar- ence Deems, jr., 6th F. A., inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 31, 1916.)

As the troops were ordered to Texas on the 26th of June, there was not enough time for any instruction to speak of, and many men were taken only because they were uniformed. As soon as the troops left recruiting began to lessen, and as the strength of the companies leaving here was 65 taken and about 35 remaining, I doubt if ever the companies will be recruited to war strength. The recruits left here in camp will be sent to their companies when uniformed, equipped, and have had some efficient training.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. J. R. McGinness, Inf., inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 5, 1916.)

The losses of the Third Infantry on account of disqualification and other causes are so great and enlistments are so slow that I would recommend that as soon as all the men who are to be discharged are discharged; the regimental commander transfer to one battalion sufficient officers and men from the other two to bring that battalion up to authorized strength (peace) and then send it to the border; the remaining battalions to be filled up in the same way as rapidly as possible. By the time they believe, will stimulate recruiting.—(Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Inf., inspector instructor, N. G. of — , July 9, 1916.)

After the departure of the organizations and recruits for the border, orders were received to muster in parties of officers and enlisted men for recruiting duty for the National Guard. For this purpose, seven recruiting parties were mustered in for Connecticut. Each recruiting party consisted of one officer, two instructors, and one private. By the time the last recruiting party had reached their stations and were ready to enlist the recruits, the enthusiasm of the call for troops was dead and the recruiting parties had very slight success in recruiting the troops. I questioned a number of officers detailed in this duty as to the reason of their failure to secure recruits, and they were of the opinion that the large number of physically rejected men was responsible for the condition.—(Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector-instructor, on N. G. of — , Sept. 19.)

In response to the President's call of June 19, 1916, the Second Infantry, National Guard — , assembled at the company rendezvous on that date. The strength of the regiment was 48 officers and 912 enlisted men. Recruiting was commenced at once. On June 22 the strength was 46 officers and
1,217 enlisted men. On that date those who were armed and equipped were brought to the mobilization camp at — leaving one officer, one sergeant, and one corporal at each company rendezvous to care for the recruits and continue recruiting. If there had been blankets enough to care for the recruits, it would have been better to have brought them to the mobilization camp as early as June 18, 1910, when the call was made. On June 27, all recruiting parties were called in. The regimental strength was 50 officers and 1,343 enlisted men.

Several recruiting stations had been opened by the State authorities, but these were largely ineffective. A telegraph from the State authorities which stated that future recruiting would be conducted from that headquarters. This was a mistake, as at that time excitement throughout the State was high and many recruits could have been obtained. The new recruiting stations were not opened until the latter part of July. By that time the excitement had died down and numerous letters to relatives and friends from individuals in the Second Regiment, which by that time was at Laredo, Texas, had had their effect in causing very few applicants for enlistment.

The following resumé of my observations on the mobilization of the Organized Militia, State of — , is submitted:

Before the call of June 18, many of the companies had fallen below the minimum strength, and the efforts of the company commanders after the call to recruit up to war strength resulted in bringing large numbers of unfit men to the mobilization camp. I do not believe this would have been so had there been a more positive response. I have my observation that in this State at least there was very little general desire on the part of able-bodied young men to join the colors.

I do not believe the system of recruiting for the National Guard is on the proper basis. It is immensely cheaper and more satisfactory to have 50 men in a company brought to the mobilization camp, 97 per cent of whom would be accepted, than to bring 75 men and have to return 25 of them as physically unfit, with the attendant costs of rations, pay, and transportation, and the administrative difficulties of discharging them.

Officers of the Medical Corps could be placed on duty to make the rounds of all company stations, and no recruits should be finally accepted until passed by these officers. The views held by Army surgeons as to the standards required of recruits and those held by most civilian doctors are so wide apart as to bear little resemblance.

If the States are unable to meet the Army physical standards, it is demonstrated that as a military system the National Guard is a failure.

Discharging large numbers of men seems to have a depressing effect on enlistments and is bad in that effect also. Under the present system also, it is too late to change and equip men who are rejected after the call, who are not clothed and equipped at the company rendezvous and who wander about the mobilization camp in the most unkempt fashion, waiting for the inventory of property to be made and the physical units to be designated. This inventory of property is an extremely tedious process. At least one property officer to each regiment instead of one to a brigade should be provided. My recommendation where this is the chief consideration would be to hold no inventory at all but have the National Guard property officers submit requisitions for their probable requirements and fill them at once. The report of the preceding annual Federal inspection with any filled requisitions added thereto being taken as the basis of settlement with the State after the troops were mustered out.—(Extract from report of Capt. Bates, inspector-instructor on N. G. of — , Sept. 11.)

CHANGES IN MOBILIZATION POINTS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S CALL.

As far back as June, 1910, and to an extent for several years previously, the question of the selection of mobilization points had received consideration at the War Department. It was contemplated that such selection be made after consultation with the State authorities, and an effort was made to arrive at a definite decision as to the location of such points. Such a step was deemed an essential to any mobilization plan which might be devised.

Points regarded as suitable were tentatively selected and the views of State authorities invited. Blank forms were sent to them on which quite complete information was collected on such subjects as railroads, side tracks, water supply, sewage system, storehouses, target ranges, etc., Sept. 30.)

On this basis several places were selected and provisionally listed at the War Department as State mobilization camps and letters written (Sept. 11, 1911) to the commanding generals of the several divisions directing that they cause an inspection to be made of such of the camps named as were located within the limits of their commands, and after full consultation with the State authorities to determine whether or not the camps were suitable for mobilization purposes.

It was further directed that the necessary indicated data concerning each such camp be obtained and kept up to date by yearly inspection and revision. This data included a contoured map of the camp ground on a scale of 6 inches to the mile.

In order that such shelters for troops as might be constructed should be uniform in design, blue-print plans, estimates, etc., for shelters of troops at mobilization camps were made. Copies of these were sent to each State.

Although, as will be seen above, efforts were made several years ago to have mobilization camps in each State selected and prepared, this was not always done in a completely satisfactory manner.

The policy of the War Department on several points in this connection is indicated in an indorsement (2125380) of April 4, 1914, to the commanding general, Eastern Department:

1. It is essential that each State have a mobilization camp selected and prepared in time of peace, so as to prevent delay in mobilizing in time of war. A mobilization camp may or may not be suitable for a maneuver site, and attempt should not be made to combine the two, when such combination will result in poor facilities for mobilization or increased expense for making the


Mobilization of the Organized Militia, etc.

2. The purchase of maneuver sites and concentration camps for the Organized Militia is not recommended, but it is believed that each State should acquire a permanent mobilization camp. All such camps should be so prepared in peace time that troops can be made comfortable upon their arrival. Provision for adequate water supply and sanitary arrangements should be made in peace time, and the systems actually installed and kept in repairs. Where a State owns its mobilization camp, it will naturally take more interest and pride in the preparation and maintenance of the camp, with the result that, in addition to the necessities already mentioned, other facilities, such as storehouses, railroad sidings, etc., will probably be provided.

3. Sites for mobilization camps that are only temporary will always be subject to change and probably never in condition to receive troops. A change in the location of a State mobilization camp means a change in all plans of the War Department with reference to supplying and equipping the troops.

4. State authorities should be encouraged in every way possible to provide permanent mobilization camp sites and should be impressed with the fact that they alone will be responsible for any discomforts, suffering, or criticism that may result from lack of adequate preparation in peace time for such camps.

Department commanders were also directed to keep the War Department informed by telegraph of any changes in mobilization sites, which changes should not be made without good reason, as such changes create confusion in supply departments where mobilization supplies are packed and marked for shipment to mobilization points already selected. These changes promised to create so much confusion that on June 20, 1916, the following telegram was sent to the several department commanders:

Secretary War directs no change will be made by War Department from State mobilization points designated in Circular 19, Division Militia Affairs, 1914, except on your telegraphic request. Supplies are already prepared for shipment at once to the several State mobilization points listed in circular, and if any mobilization points are changed by you without previous reference to War Department, confusion must result.

Paragraph 455 (b) Army Regulations reads as follows:

Whenever an order or proclamation is issued, calling the Organized Militia or any part thereof into the service of the United States, the War Department will inform each governor concerned or the commanding general of the District of Columbia Militia of the maximum strength to which organizations will be recruited, and the Federal supply departments concerned will ship at once to the senior mustering officers at the proper State mobilization camps, without requisition, sufficient arms, equipment, and clothing to enable the organizations so called forth to be fully armed and equipped at the war strength ordered.

Just previous to the call of June 18 the mobilization camp sites for the several States were as follows:

Mobilization camp sites for the Organized Militia.

Alabama, Montgomery.
Arizona, Whipple Barracks (hasty mobilization, Tucson).
Arkansas, Fort Logan H. Roots.
California, State camp grounds, outskirts of Sacramento.
Colorado, rifle range, near Golden.
Connecticut, Niantic.
Delaware, Newcastle (State rifle range).
Florida, State camp, Duval County.
Georgia, Macon, Ga.
Hawaii, Honolulu.
Idaho, Gem State fair grounds (just outside Boise).
Illinois, Springfield.
Indiana, Fort Benjamin Harrison.
Iowa, Des Moines.
Kansas, Fort Riley, Kans.
Kentucky, Fort Thomas.
Louisiana, Camp Stafford, Alexandria.
Maine, Augusta.
Maryland, Halethorpe. 
Massachusetts, South Framingham. 
Michigan, Grayling (Hanson Military Reservation) Fort Wayne (in winter).
Minnesota, Fort Snelling, Minn.
Mississippi, Jackson.
Missouri, Nevada City.
Montana, Fort William H. Harrison.
Nebraska, Lincoln.
Nevada, Carson City.
New Hampshire, Concord.
New Jersey, Sea Girt.
New Mexico, Las Vegas (3 miles out).
New York, New Dorp (Staten Island).
North Carolina, Camp Glen, Morehead City (2 miles).
North Dakota, Fort Lincoln.
Ohio, Columbus, Ohio.
Oklahoma, Chandler.
Oregon, Clackamas.
Pennsylvania, Mount Gretna.
Rhode Island, Quonset Point (railroad station, Davisville).
South Carolina, Lexington County, near Columbia.
South Dakota, Huron (Redfield, summer).
Tennessee, Nashville.
Texas, Camp Mabry, Austin.
Utah, Fort Douglas, Utah.
Vermont, Colchester, Vt.
Virginia, Richmond.
Washington, American Lake.
West Virginia, Terra Alta.
Wisconsin, Camp Douglas, Wis.
Wyoming, Cheyenne.

During the progress of mobilization the following changes in sites were made:

---|---|---|---
Connecticut | Niantic. | | Tenth Field Artillery mobilized at East Haven. Subsequently changed back to Fort Thomas. These changes caused a delay of about 5 days in mobilizing the Kentucky National Guard.
Kentucky | Fort Thomas. | Earlington. | 
Maryland | Halethorpe. | Laurel. | 
New York | New Dorp, Staten Island | Fort Sill. | 
Oklahoma | Chandler (considered unsatisfa- catory by commanding general, Southern Department, who suggests McAlester). Approved by Secretary of War May 9. | 
West Virginia | Terra Alta. | Charleston. | 
Nebraska | Lincoln. | Fort Crook. | 

Similar changes were also made in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to facilitate supply and instruction.

It is needless to say that such changes, especially when made at so critical a time, are annoying in the extreme to those at the War Department and in the Federal supply departments who are strain- ing every effort to secure a prompt and orderly mobilization and are endeavoring to get the necessary supplies to mobilization points to equip troops at war strength.

An apt illustration of the absolute necessity for having all preparations aso to mobilization point made beforehand, and making no change after the call, is shown by the change which occurred during mobilization in West Virginia, where the mobilization site had been definitively fixed at Terra Alta and all calculations based on a mobilization at that point; but it appears that the grounds were subsequently occupied by the State as a tuberculosis sanitarium.

No report appears to have reached the War Department as to either the unsuitability or unavailability of the site at Terra Alta, and in the meantime the mobilization started at Charleston, while the Chamber of Commerce of Parkersburg made a strenuous telegraphic plea to the Secretary of War, urging that city as the most accessible
point for this purpose. The commanding general, Eastern Department, was asked how this change came to be made, and telegraphed back that—

this was done prior to the final decision of the Secretary of War concerning mobilization point; an effort was made to stop the cars as soon as the Secretary's orders were received.

In the meanwhile it appears that most, if not all, of the troops had arrived at Charleston, although the supplies had properly been sent to Terra Alta. The governor wired the Secretary of War June 28:

* * * The transfer of the troops now mobilized and ready for service from Charleston to Terra Alta is regarded by us as impractical and unnecessary and is a step for which we must of necessity refuse to accept the responsibility; if, however, it is decided to make this change, we will be pleased to turn over these troops to the United States Government at Charleston.

Matters stood thus at a "deadlock," when on July 5 The Adjutant General of the Army telegraphed the commanding general, Eastern Department, as follows:

Mobilization point for West Virginia fixed at Charleston. Direct all supplies now at Terra Alta to be shipped immediately to Charleston.

Disregarding entirely the merits of the question at issue, it should be patent to the most casual observer that this case well illustrates the dangers which beset any such system of dual control as now exists.

PREPARATION OF MOBILIZATION CAMP SITES.

As stated above, blue-print plans, estimates, etc., for shelters of troops at mobilization camps had several years ago been supplied State authorities so that in the event of mobilization such plans, etc., might be at hand and time thereby saved. In Ohio, however, it appears that the furnishing of these plans was erroneously construed to authorize expenditure of money, and before the Federal authorities were aware of it an indebtedness of $202,000 was incurred in the preparation of the mobilization camp at Camp Willis, Columbus, Ohio, for occupancy by troops in the construction of latrines, shower baths, mess shacks, storehouses, roads, in the introduction of gas, and in the installation of water and sewer systems.

The department inspector of the Central Department, who visited the camp, expressed his surprise and indignation at what he believed to be money wasted in expending it for the purposes above named, and generally in preparing a permanent camping ground upon a site which in his judgment was in no way fitted for a mobilization camp and which ought to be given up.

No dishonesty was developed, but it seems unfortunate that so much money should have been spent without authority and before even formal leases had been made for the occupancy of the land.

The inspector recommended removal of the camp to Camp Perry, Ohio, as soon as it was practicable to do so. Camp Willis was vacated September 9.

To cover this, as well as any similar expenditure which might have been made in other States, Congress was asked to make an appropriation. As finally acted upon money for this purpose was merged with the appropriation for water and sewers at military posts, $4,000,000 being appropriated in the Army appropriation bill for the year 1917, approved August 29, 1916, for both purposes.

Col. D. A. Frederick, chief mustering officer, Central Department, in reporting on muster in of National Guard, Central Department, says:

The variations (in expenses connected with mobilization sites) in various States in this department have been astounding. In the case of Ohio, the per capita cost of mobilization was about one hundred times the per capita cost in the State of Nebraska, and the only reason that can be assigned for this difference is lack of due care and economy on the part of the State authorities.

If the State has no State-owned mobilization point the camp should be located on a United States military reservation in the State or one nearest to same having the necessary space.

SHIPMENT OF RESERVE SUPPLIES TO MOBILIZATION POINTS.

The storage of all reserve supplies of the National Guard in a few depots proved to be a failure on which the chief of the Militia Bureau in a letter of July 25, said:

1. With reference to the part of this report concerning supplies and equipment where it is stated that "The mobilization thus far has demonstrated beyond question, to all who have been charged with the responsibility of forwarding supplies and preparing troops to be moved to the front, the undesirability and shortsightedness of storing the reserve supplies for the bulk of the militia of this department in one depot. Never again should it be possible to permit so unsound an arrangement to be made." It is stated that this office has consistently held that the greater the decentralization in storing supplies necessary for the equipment of troops on mobilization, the greater the rapidity and ease of issue.

In a communication of January 27, 1914, this office stated, "The nearer we can place mobilization supplies to the troops to be supplied, the better, and the less time and labor involved in authorizing such decentralization of supplies are their security, preservation, and absolute control by the Federal Government until issued at the outbreak of war."

Again, on May 6, 1915, it was stated by this officer, "The general plan for the establishment of depots with reserve supplies within the areas in which troops will be mobilized in the event of war * * * is, in the opinion of this office, an excellent one."

2. I see no reason to change my views as herein expressed, and recommend the early establishment of the six field supply depots of reserve supplies already planned, and recommend further that the question be submitted for consideration by the General Staff of the further establishment of a field supply depot in each of the 12 tactical divisional districts outlined in Circular No. 19, Division of Militia Affairs, 1914.

The establishment of a divisional field supply depot would not only assist greatly in having on hand the necessary supplies on mobilization, but would also greatly assist in the development of the system of ordinary supply and ordinary payment of National Guard troops.

3. When proper storage facilities in the form of State storehouses and State armories are available, these might possibly be utilized for the storage of reserve supplies until such time as the complete scheme of field supply depots could be put into operation.

Letter from the chief, War College Division, to the chief, Militia Bureau, August 14, 1916:

In connection with report of special inspector on mobilization camp at Sea Girt, N. J., the Quartermaster General in the fifth indorsement, August 2, 1916, on said report, states in part as follows:

"With special reference to the recommendation of the inspector as set forth in Paragraph 1, page 8, this office under date of July 17, 1916, stated that the suggestion to keep on hand in armories or elsewhere sufficient equipment for men necessary to bring the units from peace strength is worthy of careful
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

consideration, and that if this is not deemed advisable several supply points for each of the larger departments should be considered. Depots of this character should not, however, be under the control of department commanders.

Memorandum from the Chief of the Militia Bureau, for the Chief of the War College Division, September 6, 1916 (Subject: Mobilization site to be chosen for each division of the National Guard):

The question of supply depots for the storage of supplies and equipment necessary upon mobilization of the National Guard for war rests upon different considerations. Recent experiences indicate that supplies and equipment of every kind should be kept at the designated depots, and that the number of such depots should be greatly increased, but there is nothing to show that the number should be multiplied to the extent of having one for each State. The divisional plan of organization suggests a supply depot for each divisional district, which would give 12 supply depots in all. Each depot should be established at a point suitable to the prompt and economical supply of the State or group of States for which it is to serve. By such an arrangement no depot would have to supply more than six States, and probably in every case supplies and equipment would reach the mobilization camps before the troops for which they were intended were required. For better security and control supply depots for the National Guard might well be established at United States military posts, arsenals, or depots. A board of officers is now considering the question of the location of mobilization supply depots.

Steps are being taken to remedy this matter by the convening of a board of officers by the following War Department order:

Paragraph 32, Special Orders 177, War Dept., July 31, 1916: A board of officers to consist of Col. William H. Arthur, M. C., Col. Edwin B. Babbitt, O. D., Lieut.-Col. J. E. Richardson, Col. W. C. Schaefer, Capt. John L. De Witt, Q. M. C., Maj. William P. Jackson, I. G., and Capt. John L. De Witt, Q. M. C., is appointed to meet in this city at the call of the senior member of the board to submit a new plan for the supply of National Guard and Volunteers when mustered into the service of the United States military posts and depots. The board will exclude from consideration the principle of concentration of supplies for several States in a single depot. The junior member of the board will act as recorder. This matter is now in progress of adjustment, and instead of three general depots for reserve supplies for the militia the board now considering this matter will recommend 11 such depots, situated at favorable points in the country.

The following are extracts from reports of inspector instructors and others bearing on this subject, which point out the defects of the present system:

As throwing additional light on this subject it may be said that the shortage in equipment in Ohio was such as to call for an investigation by an inspector, who reported that he was unable to fix responsibility upon any individual or individuals and that the main reason for shortages was the inability of depots to supply all the articles of equipment C, and the confusion and delay was caused by the method of forwarding invoices, by shipment of property for the Ohio National Guard in cars destined for other places, and by misunderstanding between the inspector and the proper point to property on hand in the camp.

Another point to be noted is the desirability of placing war strength equipment in the hands of organizations to be on hand at all times rather than effect this issue at the time of muster in.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Olnstead, inspector-instructor, on N. G. of N. Y., Aug. 22.)

The greatest sources of delay in the work of preparing troops for service have been the items of equipment and physical examination. The troops came equipped for a strength of 81 enlisted per company. The remainder of equipment was obtained from Rock Island and St. Louis. This delay could have been avoided if the equipment for difference between war and peace strength had been stored at Camp Douglas. I believe that the property stored would have received excellent care from the quartermaster here. Troops here are examined after muster in, and over 400 per day are now being examined.—(Extract from report of Capt. L. T. Richardson, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of Wis., July 2, 1916.)

States should be required to keep on hand at all times blankets, bed sacks, and mess kits sufficient for all organizations at war strength. There should be two blankets for each man. The Montana regiment had about 200 above minimum strength. As a result nearly this number had no blankets or bed sacks or mess kits.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. A. A. Hofmann, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of Mont., Aug. 16, 1916.)

Many supplies were unreasonably slow in arriving, though the bills of lading and requisitions were made out and traced the shipment there were so many requisitions made in any manner arrive the arrival. The result was that several shipments arrived after the departure of the troops, and certain it the property had to be shipped to them, such as the first shipment returned to the depot had to be re-shipped and the receiving officer is not informed at once when a shipment is made to him and of what it consists, as frequently it was necessary to plan about the difficulty for, the matter point was that a shipment of arms took 10 days to come from Springfield Armory to Davisville, etc.—(Extract from report of Capt. T. A. Roberts on N. G. of R. I., Sept. 18.)

Articles of clothing and equipment were slow in arriving. Many requisitions were unable to obtain any article of clothing for a great many days and were forced to go around in ragged and dirty undershirts. It was the usual thing for 200 to 250 men to report each morning at sick call to get treated for severe sunburns of shoulders and arms. Although Field Hospital Corps No. 2 and Ambulance Corps No. 2 had been accepted as organizations by the Federal Government early in July, they had not at the time of my departure, on August 1, received their full equipment.—(Extract from report of Maj. J. F. Hall, Medical Corps, on N. G. of Mass.)

The Ordnance Department supplies not only arrived without requisition but as soon as the troops did, and their requisitions have been completely and promptly filled. The highest praise is due them for this efficient service. The troops of this command would have been unable to learn from the Quartermaster Department furnished the supplies which they expected to furnish without requisition. Apparently they had no idea of what was required, nor have they yet, and steps had to be taken to submit requisitions, and even those telegraphic requisitions have not been filled for the want of information mentioned above. The first shipment of socks was of an inferior grade and unfit for use, and so recommenced by the Inspector-General's Department, an officer of which, Maj. Brady, was here. More than half the socks shipped were over half the size 32 inches in the waist or under; that is to say, they were boys' sizes. These have been ordered shipped back to the supply depot at St. Louis, though it was unnecessary because some of the socks.—(Extract from report of Capt. Hughes, inspector-instructor on N. G. of Tenn., July 16.)

Equipment consisting of quartermaster and ordnance stores commenced to arrive by express on the 26th, and as soon as possible the troops were furnished with their supplies.

The hardships, confusion, and expense of mobilization in the future will be greatly reduced if the complete equipment for the National Guard is stored within the State, preferably in the storehouses at or near the mobilization points. The necessity for blank forms for mustering the National Guard into the Federal service should be with the organization, and in large measure the forms may be filled out ready for use. I am of the opinion that the colonel of the regiment, the senior major of the senior regiment of each group of units other than the Federal service should be the organization, and errors found can then be corrected. Another essential point to be noted upon as a preparation for the efficient National Guard is a frequent physical inspection, so that the examination, if one is to be made at muster in, will be of men of all whom are practical for duty in the field. At least once each year the entire personnel of the National Guard should be inspected by a medical special of the Army whose powers should be such that any found physically deficient are at once eliminated from the guard.—(Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector-instructor on N. G. of Conn., Sept. 19.)
The mobilization camps of the several States should be relocated in some cases. The Federal stores held by the State should be stored at or near the mobilization camp, and its location determined after its site had been approved by the Federal Government. Apparently, in the past mobilization camps were selected because an area of cheap land for use as camp sites was available. Modernization must be given to accessibility and the provision of proper rail, road, and water facilities and buildings or administration and the storage of supplies.—(Extract from report of Maj. Shuttleworth, inspector instructor on N. G. of Conn., Sept. 19.)

I would suggest that instead of storing the so-called war supplies in one storehouse, such as the quartermaster depot at Philadelphia for several States, that each State provide a storehouse at the point selected for the mobilization camp, and the necessary supplies be stored there. If necessary, the senior United States Army inspector instructor, assisted by one or more sergeant instructors, could take charge of this property, be accountable and responsible for it, and when mobilization takes place the property could be placed in the hands of the organizations for which it is intended in a very short time. If it be impossible to obtain such a storehouse at the point selected for a mobilization camp, it would seem that the State in nearly every case would be willing to set aside a part of the building now used as a storehouse for the supply officer of the organization to which it is assigned, and that the property could be kept apart intact and State property and to which only the Federal accountable officer could have access.—(Extract from report of Maj. V. La S. Rockwell, Cavalry inspector instructor, N. G. of Md., Sept. 7, 1916.)

Equipment.—There was a considerable shortage in cots and blankets.

Company I, Second Infantry, is without arms and equipment. Company D, Second Infantry, has no haversacks nor canteens, and Company M, Second Infantry, has no haversacks. * * * Many rifles show evidence of neglect, particularly in Companies C, D, F, G, and L, First Infantry, and Companies G and L, Second Infantry.

Less than half of the officers are provided with field glasses. None of the companies are provided with Engineer property, and they only have one flag kit of the Signal property. The hospital stores of the sanitary detachments are in bad shape.

Clothing.—Most of the men had nothing but the clothing they had on. About 75 per cent of the men wore civilian shoes, and about 25 per cent of the Government shoes were unserviceable. None of the organizations are provided with extra clothing for the surplus kits.—(Extract from report of Maj. Simons, Inspector general on N. G. of —.)

Equipment.—* * * The hospital stores of the sanitary detachment of the organization are in bad shape, but the instruments are good. None of the companies or troops are provided with Engineer property, and they have only one flag kit of Signal property. None of the organizations are provided with identification tags. Only about one-half of the officers are provided with field glasses.—(Extract from report of Maj. Simons, Inspector General, on National Guard of —, July 13.)

Clothing.—Many of the men had nothing but the clothing they wore. The shoes are practically all unserviceable. The officers stated that none of the equipment was on their papers, as they had been dropped, and that many of the men had purchased Government shoes themselves. None of the organizations are supplied with the extra clothing for the surplus kits. There were a few cotton O. D. breeches in the command, but the reserve had been purchased elsewhere.—(Extract from report of Maj. Simons, Inspector General, on National Guard of —, July 13.)

The enlisted men did not have the articles required to be packed in the surplus kits; therefore they were in need of underclothing and socks when they left. It is recommended that the reserve equipment to be uniformly complete and equip each organization to war strength be turned over to the State and that they be required to store it at a place accessible to the mobilization camp, and that they be turned over to the State for the surplus kits and properly cared for.—(Extract from report of Capt. Niles, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of Maine, Sept. 12.)
EFFECT ON THE PERSONNEL OF OATH REQUIRED BY NATIONAL-DEFENSE ACT AND LEGAL EFFECT OF REFUSAL OR NEGLECT TO TAKE FEDERAL OATH PRESCRIBED IN THIS ACT.

When the State troops were ordered out on the second call (June 18), a misunderstanding arose in some quarters as to the obligation under which men were held under the oath which they had taken, and also whether or not they were compelled to take the oath prescribed in section 73 of the national-defense act.

This was not unnatural, for the national-defense act did not become a law until June 3, and as there elapsed but 15 days before the second call was made, the new law had hardly been distributed, much less studied and digested, by those affected by it.

A test case having arisen in Massachusetts during the mobilization of the National Guard in that State, it was referred to the Judge Advocate General, whose views and the policy adopted by the War Department are clearly set forth in the following letter of the Secretary of War:

1. Correct date, June 20.

Newton D. Baker,
Secretary of War.
The number of enlisted men of the National Guard who have been inspected is 128,517; of this number 21,884 have not taken the new oath. This is according to latest information in the Militia Bureau, November 23, 1916.

One troop of Cavalry from —— refused almost to a man to take the new oath, and this delayed the muster in of that organization until the deficiency was made up on the 30th of July, when it was mustered into the service of the United States. At the mobilization camp was a complete compliance with the Organized Militia oath, and it is expected that the troops which the men sign. The question which oath is proper for the Organized Militia who refused to take the new oath under the new oath, and it is expected that the troops which the men sign.

As to the delays occasioned here were caused by the necessity for taking the oath to the United States, and as that condition can no more be found, it is sufficient to mention the fact. Good lawyers in —— consider that the oath required for the Organized Militia is quite as efficient as the oath now required on the muster-in roll or by the national defense bill. However, the new oath was taken advantage of by a certain class, and although patiently explained to them in some cases an explanation was not wanted. An answer was furnished that there was a condition precedent to muster in those men who refused to take it—in one case an entire company; they were merely ignored. When your orders were received to muster them under the Dick law the adjutant general of the State was asked to return them. He has taken the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law before the adjutant general of the State was asked to return them. He has taken the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law before the adjutant general of the State was asked to return them. He has taken the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law before the adjutant general of the State was asked to return them.

Another question has arisen as to what oath the men have taken when sworn into the service. Men of many organizations, in conformity with instructions from your office, took the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law and the muster-in oath. Many telegrams were received from prominent men in New Orleans advising the members of the National Guard to take the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law and the muster-in oath. Many telegrams were received from prominent men in New Orleans advising the members of the National Guard to take the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law and the muster-in oath.

As I understood at first that it was a condition precedent to muster in those men, it not having been considered by me that the mere presenting themselves at the batteries not to take the oath.—(Extract from report of Capt. C. S. Blakely, Fifth F. A., inspector-instructor, N. G. of ——, June 25, 1916.)

July 20 the first muster in under the Dick bill of a member of the Organized Militia who refused to take the new oath occurred. Others are expected to follow.—(Extract from report of Col. B. B. Buck, Inf., inspector-instructor, N. G. of ——, July 26, 1916.)

A great deal of discussion arose over the obligations of the new oath for enlistments in the National Guard and the muster-in oath. Many telegrams were received from prominent men in New Orleans advising the members of the National Guard to take the oath prescribed in section 70 of the new law and the muster-in oath.—(Extract from report of Capt. C. S. Blakely, Fifth F. A., inspector-instructor, N. G. of ——, June 25, 1916.)

The California troops were presented as Organized Militia and mustered in as such. They were not translated into National Guard troops under the defense act.—(Report of Capt. H. A. Hanigan, Inf., U. S. A., inspector-instructor.)

The War Department does not look with favor toward the restoration of the office of inspector of small-arms practice, for a division with the rank of lieutenant colonel, for a brigade with the rank of major, for a regiment of Cavalry or Infantry one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of captain, and for each separate or unassigned battalion of Infantry or engineers, or squadron of Cavalry, one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of first lieutenant.

When the Organized Militia was called out, these officers very properly responded to the call. So long as the officers and men of their organizations had not taken the Federal oath they had a legal status. In the hurry and confusion of mustering troops into the service of the United States, however, and due to the fact the provisions of the new law were not generally understood at the time of the recent call into Federal service of the National Guard, a number of inspectors of small-arms practice were erroneously mustered into the service of the United States as the fact appears to have been overlooked that while the Dick bill provided for inspectors and assistant inspectors of small-arms practice, the national-defense act did not.

So long as entire organizations were mustered in as Organized Militia, i.e., without taking the Federal oath of section 73, national-defense act, these officers were properly a part of the troops called into service, but when any of these organizations took the Federal oath, thus becoming National Guard, these officers had in fact no legal status.

The action of the War Department in these cases was that indicated in the following telegram sent to all department commanders:

The act of January 21, 1905 (Dick bill), provided in section 3, that in peace and war in the Organized Militia there should be an inspector of small-arms practice, for a division with the rank of lieutenant colonel, for a brigade with the rank of major, for a regiment of Cavalry or Infantry one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of captain, and for each separate or unassigned battalion of Infantry or engineers, or squadron of Cavalry, one assistant inspector of small-arms practice with the rank of first lieutenant.
service, and at other times the duties which have been performed by the incumbents of the office generally pertain to regimental officers. The observation of the War Department indicates that generally the existence of the office has in the past relieved regimental officers from a sense of responsibility for the instruction of their organizations in this most important work; and sometimes has resulted in conflict and interference. With the pay allowance provided by the national defense act company and regimental officers should be required to devote the necessary time and attention to the instruction of their organizations. If a local superintendent of target practice is desired in particular cases, there seems to be no reason why the duty can not be performed by staff and other officers of the regiments.

The War Department appreciates the unfortunate position of those inspectors of small-arms practice who were mustered into the Federal service before the provisions of the national defense act on this subject were generally understood. It is believed, however, that the proper remedy to be applied to these cases is to provide for their appointment to other positions in which they may exist. Such appointments are, of course, in the hands of the governors of the States. It is believed that as officers of the former Organized Militia inspectors of small-arms practice were, under the provisions of section 73 of the national defense act, eligible to be placed on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard, and that they should now be held to be in that status, from which, under the provisions of section 74, they may be appointed to any vacancy now existent in the active National Guard. The view of the War Department is that, while the office of inspector of small-arms practice was in effect abolished by the national defense act, it was not the intention of the act to legislate the incumbents out of office in the National Guard, nor to limit the period of adjustment as a matter of time.

It is thought, moreover, that line officers in general should qualify as instructors in rifle practice rather than to have instructors limited to the small number heretofore available as inspectors of small-arms practice. In general cases officers had been mustered into United States service as brigade ordnance officers. There being no authority of law for this, the same action was taken as observed in the cases of inspectors of small-arms practice.

### DISCHARGES FROM SERVICE AFTER MOBILIZATION BY GOVERNORS OR STATE OFFICIALS AND FAILURES TO RESPOND TO CALL.

During the mobilization of the National Guard in Nebraska the senior assistant mustering officer reported that it had come to his attention that many discharges of National Guardsmen had been made in some organizations subsequent to the call of the President and prior to the preparation of rolls for muster in. These discharges had been of two general characters. First, “By order of the governor,” the most of which being against the wishes and recommendations of the commanders of the organizations, and upon personal appeals made to the governor by relatives and friends of the discharged. The governor ceased ordering such discharges following a letter on this subject from the senior assistant mustering officer to the adjutant general of the State. Second, summary and more or less informal discharges at home stations had been made by company and other commanders of men who were considered undesirable and worthless. In Omaha the company commanders also eliminated all men whom they were satisfied were physically disqualified for service, with the result that in the four Omaha companies there were only 21 men rejected upon physical examination. This matter was referred to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for his opinion, the action in the case being as indicated in the following letter to the Commanding General, Central Department:

**MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.**

**JULY 28, 1916.**

**From:** The Adjutant General of the Army.

**To:** The Commanding General, Central Department, Chicago, Ill.

**Subject:** Discharge of certain members of Nebraska National Guard subsequent to June 18.

1. With reference to the question raised by the mustering officer at Lincoln, Nebr., with regard to the authority of the governor of Nebraska to order the discharge of men of the Organized Militia of that State subsequent to the receipt of the call of the President, June 18, 1916, and also with respect to the authority for certain discharges issued by certain militia commanders, the following opinion and recommendation of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, approved by the Secretary of War, is quoted for your information:

2. “It is stated that these discharges were issued prior to the preparation of the rolls for muster in, and it is understood that when the discharges were issued the men had not qualified as members of the National Guard. But whether they had so qualified or not, I think it is clear that subsequent to the receipt by the governor of the call of June 18, 1916, the discharges were unauthorized. Upon the issue of the call into the Federal service, if they had not so qualified, they became bound to appear for muster in, and the Federal authority alone could relieve them from this obligation. However, as the discharges by order of the governor were issued under a misapprehension by him of his powers, I concur in the recommendation of the commanding general, Central Department, that the discharges be approved and no further action respecting them taken.

With respect to the discharges issued by company and other commanders, it appears that these were of men who were considered undesirable, worthless, or physically disqualified for service, and in my opinion these discharges should also be approved and no further action be taken respecting them.

G. W. Read, Adjutant General.

A somewhat similar case arose in 1916, where 24 men took the national-defense oath, but before they were mustered into the United States service they were discharged by the State authorities.

The discharges were allowed to stand as being for the convenience of the Government under circumstances as stated, but the State authorities were informed that the action which had been taken by them was without the authority of law.

In one of the States a comparison of the muster-in rolls with lists of membership of organizations, as they existed on June 18, disclosed the fact that 1,575 names which appear on these lists do not appear on muster-in rolls. In other words, 1,575 members of the National Guard or Organized Militia of this State failed to answer the call of the President. The Federal Government did not then release, nor has it since released, these men from their obligation to serve when called by the President. Two thousand one hundred and forty-two new men were enlisted by the State authorities of this State between the time of the call and the muster in. Considerable difficulty was experienced by some organizations to obtain the required number of enlisted men. One company, which had been organized, inspected for recognition, and accepted by the Militia Bureau less than a month prior to the call of the President, brought out only about 15 men to the mobilization camp. To rehabilitate this company the officers and the enlisted men of a prospective machine-gun company then being in process of organization were taken over by the first-mentioned company. This prospective machine-gun company had, however, not been inspected for recognition or accepted by the Militia Bureau. It is not known how the officers of the first-
mentioned company, whose date of commission was May 16, were disposed of.

The State and National Guard authorities of this State, desiring to make a good record for promptness in the transition from the status of Organized Militia to that of National Guard, had taken steps to have the members of its Organized Militia take the new oath prescribed in the new national-defense act as soon as possible after the approval of this act.

The men who were on the rolls of organizations June 18 and who did not report for muster in either had or had not taken the new oath. All had taken the old oath and were in service on June 3, 1916, under that oath. That they all, whether bound by the new oath or the old, were included in the call of the President of June 18 is admitted.

It was found that all of the enlisted men, members of organizations on June 18, who reported at the mobilization camp with their companies had not taken the new oath, and some difficulty was encountered by some organization commanders to persuade some of these men to take the new oath. Some others who came to the mobilization camp as members of organizations refused to take and did not take the new oath, and some refused to sign the muster-in rolls. When such cases of refusal presented themselves organization commanders applied to the adjutant general of the State, who was in camp at the time, or to the commanding general of the guard for advice. But it appeared that no definite line of action in such cases had been decided upon, and organization commanders were finally instructed to let the men go. The State has not, as far as known, taken any action in these cases nor in those of the 1,375 men who failed to answer the call of the President and who never appeared at the mobilization camp.

When the mustering officer became urgent in his request that the State authorities take action in these cases and hold these men to service either under the provisions of the new national defense act or under those of the Dick bill, a copy of an Executive order was furnished him, which order was dated June 10, and which was to be placed in the possession of the men who had been brought to the mobilization camp, where some did and others did not take the oath. Also organization commanders, in the cases of the men who refused to take the new oath, did not know just what to do, and the adjutant general seemed to be unable to advise them what steps to take.

Based on this order, which made its appearance after the middle of July, but which is dated June 10, the National Guard authorities of this State claim that there was no Organized Militia in the State on date of call of the President of June 18, and that all the men were either in the National Guard under the new law or out of service. And this notwithstanding the fact that the organizations of this State were inspected at the mobilization camp by the mustering officer for recognition by the Militia Bureau as “National Guard” and were so recognized by that bureau upon receipt of report of such inspection and were subsequently mustered in the Federal service.

It is held that the action of the State and National Guard authorities in thus releasing from service men who had failed to take the new oath was illegal, and that the State failed in its duty when it did not adopt efficient measures to bring every absent member of the organizations included in the call of the President to the mobilization camp or to proceed otherwise against them.

The following is a report of an officer on duty in the same State:

1. In compliance with your letter this date the following is submitted:

2. A personal check made by me of muster-in rolls, physical examination forms, and list of members of — National Guard furnished by the adjutant general of the State from files of enlistment contracts at —, disclosed the following number of officers and men in the National Guard of — — on June 19, 1916, who failed to report at the call of the President, 1,575, or about 20 per cent. This does not include an entire organization from — —, mention of which will be made later. Number of men enlisted after the call and before muster in, 2,142, or about 30 per cent. Discharged for physical disability prior to departure for the border 792, or about 13 per cent.

3. I mustered in only two regiments, the — and — Infantry. In the first there were three instances of men refusing to take the Federal oath after arrival in camp. In the fourth only 15 men of the company reported at camp for muster in. * * * They were assigned to another organization of the same regiment * * * and a new organization from — — formed to take their place. In at least two instances, Companies — and —, muster in was delayed 24 hours until the captains could get the minimum number necessary to sign the muster rolls. What methods the company officers used to obtain the requisite number of men (65) I am unable to state, but a letter from the captain of Company — to a National Guard recruiting officer advises that it would be useless to attempt to obtain recruits at — — (home station of Company —) until the present feeling against the captain and his organization dies down. Affidavits have been submitted through this office that officers of Company — Infantry, resorted to threats and the use of liquor in order to obtain the required number of enlisted men.

4. The order issued by the State authorities dated June 10 was not in existence at time of muster in of these organizations or these men who were presumably discharged would never have been brought to camp. No one in camp knew of its existence—not even the adjutant general whose signature authenticates it—as evidenced by his asking as to what to do with these men who refused to take the oath.

EXECUTIVE ORDER.

1. Under the provisions of the act approved June 3, 1916, officers and enlisted men failing to immediately take the oath therein prescribed are not recognized as members of the National Guard. Enlisted men refusing to take such oath will be immediately discharged.

2. All enlisted men who do not take their required oath on or before June 15, 1916, will be discharged and their names dropped from the roll on such date.

By the governor:

The Adjutant General.
FAILURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TO RESPOND TO THE CALL OF THE PRESIDENT.

The Militia of responded to the call, not in its entirety, as there were numerous cases where sickness, absence from the State, important other obligations prevented the appearance of individuals—just how many can never be accurately determined, but the great majority responded.

The chief trouble in arose from the fact that the State authorities and a large majority of the officers of the organizations desired to present themselves in the new status of National Guards at a time when the provisions of the national defense act were but little known to the enlisted men, being chiefly understood as a six-year enlistment, which was to take the place of the periods of one, two, or three years provided by the State law up to that time. This new requirement—an obligation to serve six years—was not received with any degree of enthusiasm by the enlisted personnel of the Organized Militia. Many stated they were ready to carry out their existing contracts, but were not willing to extend their obligations to a period of six years less the time served in current enlistment. This state of affairs threatened a deadlock in some States service as National Guards, and the men when the troops reached the mobilization camp. All kinds of runners were afloat as to the requirements of the new law. A very few officers of the National Guard had authoritative copies of the law. Abbreviated reports of the law as printed in the daily papers had to be relied upon largely. These were varied and uncertain. Discussions were numerous in the camp. It was reported to the senior mustering officer several times that the men of certain organizations were positively not going to take the new oath. But finally a majority of organizations subscribed to the new oath. It became certain that the Organized Militia of would be transformed into National Guards as defined in the new law. There were, however, several hundreds of enlisted men who steadily declined to take the new oath. At this time peremptory orders to send organizations to the border at minimum strength if necessary were received. The organized militiamen who refused to take the new oath were variously told by their company and regimental officers to go to their homes and there await orders or to return to their armories, deposit their uniforms there, and do as they liked about it; that they were no longer members of the organization which was now transformed into National Guard, or that as they refused to take the new oath they were automatically released from further obligation in the matter, or to go to their homes and their discharges would be sent to them. Officers had been informed by the senior assistant mustering officer that he had nothing to do with the choice made by organizations or individual members in the matter of taking the new oath; that if they took the oath and were transformed into National Guards they would be mustered in as such, otherwise they would be mustered in as Organized Militia.

At this time it had not developed, so far as the senior assistant mustering officer was concerned, that an organization which had been transformed as National Guard and so mustered in, could also have as members those individuals who had refused to take the new oath. This fact developed and the principle was announced in telegram, headquarters, Eastern Department, July 19, 1916, relating to the muster in of a noncommissioned officer of the Organized Militia, belonging to . This instituted in the situation of organizations being composed of members of the National Guard and of the Organized Militia also.

After the muster in of the organizations of the State as National Guards, it was then seriously questioned by legal authorities in the State that any obligation to serve the United States in any military capacity rested on members of the Organized Militia who had failed or declined to take the new Federal oath, it being held by many that the national defense act operated to abrogate the Dick bill. So certain about this were the State military authorities that they began preparations to discharge all such remaining members. About 60 such discharges were prepared at the statehouse, but were not delivered because a letter dated headquarters, Eastern Department, July 11, 1916, quoting telegram from the War Department, dated July 7, was received by the adjutant general of, in which he was informed, "Members of the Organized Militia of called for by the President on June 18, 1916, who refuse to qualify as members of the National Guard under the provisions of the national defense act should be mustered for service under section 7 of the Dick bill." When this letter was received at the statehouse the discharges were destroyed or withheld and a general order was issued by the State incorporating for information of the members of the Organized Militia the department commander's letter. This order ended since organized militiamen. In response to this order 278 members of the Organized Militia presented themselves for muster in under their existing contracts of enlistment in accordance with the provisions of the Dick bill. About 100 of these, upon muster in, immediately applied for their discharge on account of dependent relatives, a majority of the applicants receiving their discharge.

It was at this time, August 4, that an application, through a writ of habeas corpus, was made by , Squadron Cavalry, Organized Militia, for his discharge from the military custody of the United States. The case was heard before , resulting in the issuance of the writ and the order of the court for the release of . The case was appealed to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The case was heard in the October term, 1916, and the order of the district court was vacated, with directions "that the petitioner be returned to the military custody from which he was taken." The issue raised in the petition for writ of habeas corpus was as to the authority of the President over , as the latter had never taken the Federal oath. It was claimed by petitioner that the Organized Militia ceased to exist on June 3, when the national defense act was approved, and that the President, therefore, had no authority to call petitioner into the Federal service. There were four other writs issued in four other cases identical with that of , which, by agreement, were to be disposed of in accordance with the decision in the case. At the present date it has not developed whether petitioner will appeal the case, 30 days being allowed for such action.
DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE AFTER MOBILIZATION ON ACCOUNT OF DEPENDENT RELATIVES.

Immediately following both the first and second calls a great number of applications for the discharge of men on account of dependent relatives were received. This gave the War Department no little embarrassment at the very time that it was making every effort to get men mustered in and forwarded to the border.

It was known when these men enlisted in the Organized Militia that they were subject to just such calls as were made on May 9 and June 18, and manifestly they never should have been allowed to enter the service. Their being on the rolls at that time proved a serious embarrassment both to the State and National Governments, which should have been foreseen by those who originally enlisted them.

The question whether General Order No. 31, War Department, 1914, relating to the discharge of enlisted men in the Regular Army on account of dependent relatives was applicable to militia after muster into the Federal service was brought to the attention of the War Department through inquiry made by the commanding general, Southern Department, May 20 on behalf of 14 enlisted men of Company I, Fourth Texas Infantry.

The view taken at this time, and so announced, was that the order in question was applicable only to the Regular Army, and was not applicable to the National Guard owing to its temporary character.

Section 29 of the act of June 3, 1916, contains a provision "that when by reason of death or disability of a member of the family of an enlisted man, occurring after his enlistment, members of his family become dependent upon him for support, he may, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, be discharged from the service of the United States or be furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve, upon due proof being made of such condition." This, however, applies only to the Regular Army.

To meet a similar need in the National Guard the following orders were published, the provisions of which are even more liberal than those in section 29 above quoted:

**BULLETIN**

No. 20, July 18, 1916

The following rules are prescribed for observance in the cases of enlisted men of the National Guard or the Organized Militia who are called into the service of the United States and who have dependent relatives:

(a) Department commanders may issue discharges to enlisted men, except noncommissioned officers, of the National Guard or Organized Militia called into the service of the United States who are serving within their respective departments, provided applications for discharge are made to them in due form, through military channels, setting forth that the applicant has one or more relatives who are dependent upon him for support, each application to be accompanied by adequate written evidence of real dependency. Applications from noncommissioned officers for discharge under the provisions referred to herein will be forwarded to the War Department for action.

(b) When it comes to the knowledge of a commanding officer, through authentic sources, that a soldier of his command has one or more dependent relatives, the soldier concerned will be informed of his right to make application for discharge on that account, and the discharge will be issued upon application if warranted by the circumstances. Should the soldier express a desire to remain in the service and at the same time decline to allow any portion of his pay to his family or dependents, the case will be reported to the War Department for final action.

(c) When an application for discharge has been finally approved, the proper recruiting agencies will be at once informed, so that the vacancy caused may be filled as promptly as possible. Recruiting and mustering officers will be enjoined to avoid the acceptance of recruits having relatives dependent upon them for support. Department commanders will report to the War Department at the close of each month the number of soldiers discharged by them under these instructions during the month for which the report is made.

[2426477, A. G. O.]

**BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:**

H. L. SCOTT,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

**OFFICIAL:**

H. F. McCANN,
The Adjutant General.

These instructions were in force only until September 25, when rescinded by Bulletin No. 36, War Department, the occasion of this being that Congress had made other provisions for the dependent relatives of national guardsmen, as indicated in General Orders, No. 42, as follows:

**GENERAL ORDERS,**

No. 42, September 1, 1916.

The following extract from an act of Congress approved August 29, 1916, and instructions relative thereto are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

1. "An act making appropriations for the support of the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, and for other purposes."

2. "That the sum of $2,000,000 is hereby appropriated out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe for the support of enlisted men at a cost of not more than $30 per month for each man, so much of said amount as the Secretary of War may deem necessary, and not more than such enlisted man has been contributing monthly to the support of his family at the time of his being called or drafted into the service of the United States or during his enlistment period in the Regular Army at the time of such call or draft of the Organized Militia or National Guard, the family of each enlisted man of the Organized Militia or National Guard called or drafted into the service of the United States until his discharge from such service, and the family of each enlisted man of the Regular Army until his discharge from active service therein or until the discharge of the Organized Militia or National Guard from such service if such enlisted man is at that time in active service in the Regular Army, which family during the term of service of such enlisted man has no other income, except the pay of such enlisted man, adequate for the support of said family: Provided, That the action of the Secretary of War in all cases provided for in this paragraph shall be final, and no right to prosecute a suit in the Court of Claims or in any other court of the United States against the Government of the United States shall accrue to such enlisted man, or to any member of the family of any such enlisted man, by virtue of the passage of this act; And provided further, That this paragraph shall not apply to any such enlisted man who shall make after the fifteenth day of July, nineteen hundred and sixteen; and the word 'family' shall include only wife, children, and dependent mothers."

2. Considering this provision, the Comptroller of the Treasury, on August 30, 1916, held that:

(a) Only the families of those men of the Militia or National Guard who were brought into the service of the United States under the call of the President are entitled to the benefits of the act. The family of a man enlisting in the Militia or National Guard of Texas, New Mexico, or Arizona after May 9, and that of a man enlisting in the Militia or National Guard of the other States after June 18, 1916, are not entitled to the benefits of the act. The amount paid to the family of an enlisted man of the Militia or National Guard may be paid to the family of such soldier until his discharge from the service.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

(b) The amount which may be paid to the family of an enlisted man in the Regular Army is the amount the soldier was contributing to the support of his family on June 18, 1916, the time of the President's general call. The family of a man enlisting or reenlisting in the Regular Army after June 18, 1916, is not entitled to the benefits of the act.

(c) The benefits of the act do not extend to the families of enlisted men of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry or the Philippine Scouts.

(d) Since members of the Regular Army Reserve had not been called to the colors and were not in active service at the time of the call of the President of June 18, 1916, which brought the Militia or National Guard as a body into the actual service of the United States, the families of members of the Regular Army Reserve are not entitled to the benefits of the act.

(e) The law is not retroactive, and its benefits, therefore, do not begin until the date of its approval, August 29, 1916.

3. Immediately upon receipt of this order the provisions thereof will be read by company and other commanding officers to all enlisted men of their commands and the men advised that they are privileged to make application for the support of their families. Men who claim to have dependent families in contemplation of the law will thereupon be furnished by their commanding officers with the forms prescribed for making application for support of families. These forms will be furnished to all department commanders for distribution to all posts and stations within the territorial limits of their commands, whether under their administrative control or not.

4. Distribution should not be made to organizations of the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry or the Philippine Scouts.

5. The application form, when executed by the men and certified to by his organization commander, will be forwarded directly to the Depot Quartermaster, Washington, D. C. To avoid delays incident to the return of these forms for distribution, the organization commanders will see that the forms are properly prepared by the men.

6. The attention of all concerned is called to the fact that the word "family" as used in the law includes only wife, children, and dependent mothers.

7. When the application is forwarded to the Depot Quartermaster, entry to that effect will be made on the soldier's descriptive list, and in the event of the soldier's death, discharge, muster-out, furlough to the reserve, or desertion, such fact will be immediately reported by the soldier's immediate commanding officer to the Depot Quartermaster, Washington, D. C., or in the Philippine and Hawaiian Department to the adjutants of those departments. In the Philippine and Hawaiian Departments, except in case of deaths which are otherwise reported, the department commanders will send by cable notification to The Adjutant General of the Army, who will at once notify the Quartermaster General.

[245574 A. G. O.]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

H. L. Scott,
Major General, Chief of Staff.
The Adjutant General.

Up to November 30 there had been $983,108.11 disbursed of the $2,000,000 appropriated by this act, of which $923,495.15 was on account of the National Guard and $59,612.96 on account of the Regular Army.

The status of enlisted men discharged from the Federal service on account of dependent relatives may at present be regarded as being held in abeyance per decision of September 6, 1916, on such cases by the Secretary of War, as follows:

Discharge as discussed in the foregoing papers should be held to release a man from service to the United States under the present call of the President, but should return him to the National Guard until such time as, under general regulations, the National Guard is reorganized and undesirable classes of enlisted men excluded therefrom.
extended, and that the interference with the work of the high-school and college boys, as well as the interference with the professional and business activities of the other militia soldiers, can be minimized as far as possible.

**Student organizations mustered out of the service of the United States.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colorado:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company A, Engineers</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Company I, First Infantry</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B, Engineers</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Band, Second Infantry</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C, Cavalry</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Minnesota:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, Field Artillery</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>Battery F, First Field Artillery</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Batteries, A, B, C, D, Tenth Field Artillery</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>Headquarters Company, Supply Company, Washington Company</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company, and Company C, First Infantry</td>
<td>124</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, Field Artillery</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not including Company C, for which no report has been received.

**DISCHARGE FROM SERVICE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYEES OF FIRMS ENGAGED IN FABRICATION OR SUPPLY OF MUNITIONS.**

The question indicated in the heading above arose immediately after the second call through inquiry made by the Secretary of the Navy requesting the release from military service of certain employees of the Washington Navy Yard who had associated themselves with the Organized Militia. It was represented that the absence of these men from the guard would seriously cripple the Navy.

The Chief of Ordnance also on behalf of a firm engaged in the manufacture of munitions of war, suggested the relief from military service of persons occupying positions of importance to the successful operation of private establishments which might be needed to serve the Government in the execution of the same purposes for which the troops were called, and whose withdrawal from their positions might interfere with such execution to a greater extent than the services with troops would forward it.

These matters having been duly considered, the following general order (G. O. No. 33, War Dept., July 29, 1916) was published to cover all such cases:

II. Members of organizations of the National Guard that have been mustered into the service of the United States, who are officers or employees of Government departments, the loss of whose services would seriously hamper any of the bureaus of those departments; members who are Government contractors; and those members who have associated themselves with the Organized Militia. It was represented that the absence of these men from the guard would seriously cripple the Navy.

The question having arisen as to the nature of discharges to be given those members of the National Guard who responded to the call of the President but who on the subsequent physical examination required by section 115, national defense act, were rejected for acceptance into Federal service owing to physical defects, the matter was referred for opinion to the Judge Advocate General, who gave opinion as follows:

1. The views of this office are desired on the request of the adjutant general of the State of Georgia for information with respect to the discharge of members of the National Guard of that State who have been called into the Federal service and who have been rejected owing to physical defects. He says that he is informed that "all members of the National Guard of this State who made inquiry had been made of the various arsenals and inspection forces and that no contractors engaged in the manufacture of characteristic and distinctive war material are hampered in the delivery of material to the Ordnance Department by the calling out of the National Guard.

**DISCHARGE FROM FEDERAL SERVICE EFFECTS A COMPLETE SEPARATION FROM THE NATIONAL GUARD, STATE AS WELL AS FEDERAL SERVICE.**

Although, as will be seen, the War Department made prompt provision for the discharge of such men of the National Guard as might, from the nature of their usual occupations, better (so far as Government interests are concerned) be so employed than performing military duty, the actual number of such discharges of all classes of Government employees was less than 150. There were about 115 employees of the Navy discharged under this order.

The Chief of Ordnance, United States Army, reported September 12 that inquiry had been made of the various arsenals and inspection forces and that no contractors engaged in the manufacture of characteristic and distinctive war material are hampered in the delivery of material to the Ordnance Department by the calling out of the National Guard.
shall be prescribed for the Regular Army, and in time of peace discharges may be given prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment under such regulations as the President may prescribe."

It is further provided in section 115 of the act that "every officer and enlisted man of the National Guard who shall be called into the service of the United States as such shall be examined as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the President may prescribe without further commission or enlistment."

I understand that the Organized Militia of the State of Georgia have qualified by taking the oath prescribed in the national defense act, so that their status can be properly regarded as members of the National Guard provided for in said act called as such into the service of the United States. I think it is clear from the national defense act that the National Guard occupies a dual status—that it is as a National force and also as State force—and further that no officer or enlisted man can remain a member of the National Guard unless he is physically qualified for Federal service. It is clear that Congress has undertook in the national defense act to prescribe the qualifications for enlistment or commission in the National Guard and has asserted on behalf of the United States the authority to prescribe the conditions under which enlistments and discharges in and from the National Guard shall be made. Section 72 of that act restricts the discharges in time of peace so that no discharges may be given in time of peace "prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment" except "under such regulations as the President may prescribe." Section 115 of the same act provides for a medical examination to determine the physical condition of the officers or enlisted men when called into the service of the United States, and I think it is clear that an officer or enlisted man, upon being examined as required by that section and found physically defective, must be discharged not only from the operation of the call into the Federal service, but also from the National Guard. In the case of an enlisted man the discharge, when ordered, should be effected by a discharge in writing, signed by the proper National Guard commander, under the provisions of section 72 of the national defense act, and should be so worded as to show that it is a discharge not only from the operation of the Federal call but also from the National Guard. With respect to a commissioned officer, I think the discharge should be ordered by the President and should purport to be a discharge from the National Guard.

The above opinion was approved by the Secretary of War.

**RESIGNATIONS OF OFFICERS.**

During the latter part of August a large number of resignations on the part of National Guard officers were received at the War Department, the policy of which was announced in the following telegram to the commanding general, Southern Department, September 4, 1916:

Secretary War is returning several tenders of resignations last received from your headquarters with his action thereon. This action will indicate to you the general policy he intends to follow. Tenders of resignations for ordinary business or family reasons will be disapproved. This will be especially true of medical officers who can not be permitted to leave their commands, which are in an unusual degree dependent upon sufficient medical attention for their efficiency. Discharges of enlisted men are no longer permitted for business or family reasons because the provisions Congress has made for support of relatives. It is not proper to permit officers to leave their commands for reasons which are not accepted in case of enlisted men. Some cases of resignation are noted where it is evident that disciplinary action and not resignation is proper. In numerous cases it is noted that officers tender resignations because they are not properly instructed to perform their duties. Such cases should be met by special instruction and not by resignation.

In the case of First Lieut. ____, Infantry, National Guard, whose discharge had been recommended by an efficiency board convened under the provisions of section 77, act approved June 3, 1916, and in whom was "found a lack of general fitness and capacity," the Secretary of War decided as follows:

In this case of resignation of First Lieut. ____, tendered because he "does not consider himself adapted to perform the duties of his position in a manner creditable to himself or the service," the colonel states that "there is nothing against his character," and that the resignation was tendered as the result of suggestions from him. There are great numbers of National Guard officers (of good habits and character as this officer appears to be) who can not thoroughly well perform the duties of their position. The Federal Government is giving them an opportunity at very great expense to itself to qualify themselves for active service. The department commander will instruct the commanding officers to see that he is trained to the highest degree possible and that when relieved from duty on the border a special report is made in his case for further guidance of the proper authorities.

The tender of resignation is disapproved.

The Adjutant General reports that up to and including November 28, 1916, the resignation of 482 National Guard officers had been accepted.

**STATUS AND DISPOSITION OF NATIONAL GUARD RESERVISTS CREATED BY THE NATIONAL-DEFENSE ACT.**

At the date of mobilization, following as it did close upon the date of the passage of the act of June 3, 1916, sections 69, 70, and 78 of said act had not begun to operate to create a National Guard Reserve. At least, there was no record in the War Department to show that any individuals had become reservists as contemplated by the law. Soon after the mobilization instances were reported of members of the National Guard whose active service of three years had been completed, and who, under the terms of the law, would pass to the National Guard Reserve. The question having been presented as to the liability to service under the President's call of members of the National Guard who would pass to the reserve while in the Federal service the Chief of the Militia Bureau took the ground that such individuals might be held and continued in active service at the discretion of the President, since as individuals they had already been included in the call. The matter having been referred to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for an opinion a contrary view was taken, and such contrary view having been approved by the Secretary of War instructions in accordance therewith were communicated to the commanding general, Southern Department, in a telegram from The Adjutant General of the Army, dated August 14, 1916, as follows:

According to opinion rendered by Judge Advocate General, dated July 20, 1916, approved by Secretary of War, National Guardsmen who have completed their three years' term active service can not under call June 18, 1916, be held for active service beyond active-enlistment period unless they so elect. Continuation in active service into period of reserve service should be as provided for in section 69, national-defense act. Reenlistment can take place only after completion full-term enlistment, including reserve period. National Guardsmen who have completed their terms active service and who do not desire to remain in service because they are not accepted in National Guard Reserve of State to which they belong and sent to their homes under proper orders, according to practice followed with reservists of Regular Army. Men who are in service without having taken oath are not National Guardsmen but Organized Militia. Such men should be given final discharge upon completion of enlistment term, there being no provision for reserve period of service under Dick law. Such may be reenlisted for a six-year term as National Guardsmen if they so desire. McCain.
ADVANTAGES OF DIVISIONAL ORGANIZATION.

The first step since the enactment of the militia law of 1903, looking to the organization of the militia into higher tactical units, was taken in 1910 in the organization of the so-called “First Field Army.” This order, set forth in General Orders, No. 35, War Department, series 1910, was adopted by the field army contemplated by this order embraced the militia organizations of New York and the New England States and the Regular Army regiments stationed in those States. It was to comprise three divisions of three brigades each. The units of the Regular Army were to be distributed among the divisions and brigades.

It became apparent, however, that this organization did not have the necessary qualities of permanency, as it comprised elements of different degrees of training and readiness for service. An organization of this character was sure to be disrupted upon the occurrence of the first emergency requiring the immediate services of the regular troops, and it was probable that a considerable time must elapse before the less thoroughly trained elements would be capable of engaging in the same character of operations as the better trained. For this reason, the project of combining militia organizations with regular troops for the formation of higher tactical units, was abandoned, and the plan to develop the Organized Militia into a complete and independently organized force, was adopted. This plan was formulated in 1912 as a result of detailed study of the question by the General Staff and the Division of Militia Affairs, and after consultation with the State authorities. The plan contemplated the formation of 12 tactical divisions corresponding to 12 groups of contiguous States. These divisions and groups as subsequently amended were as follows:

- Fifth Division, the New England States.
- Sixth Division, New York.
- Seventh Division, Pennsylvania.
- Eighth Division, Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia.
- Ninth Division, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Georgia.
- Tenth Division, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky.
- Eleventh Division, Michigan, Ohio.
- Twelfth Division, Illinois, Indiana.
- Thirteenth Division, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa.
- Fourteenth Division, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Wyoming.
- Fifteenth Division, Arkansas, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana.
- Sixteenth Division, California, Oregon, Washington, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Nevada.

At the time of the adoption of the plan the Organized Militia in the United States, comprised the following units: 1,584 companies of infantry, 64 batteries of field artillery, 80 troops of cavalry, 22 companies of engineers, 22 companies of signal troops, 15 ambulance companies, 23 field hospitals.

For the 12 tactical divisions there were required: 1,296 companies of infantry, 144 batteries of field artillery, 144 troops of cavalry, 36 companies of signal troops, 48 field hospitals, 48 ambulance companies.

There was thus a shortage of the following units: 64 troops of cavalry, 80 batteries of field artillery, 14 companies of engineers, 2 companies of signal troops, 25 field hospitals, 23 ambulance companies, and an excess of 288 companies of infantry.

The divisional plan was further developed by the publication of Circular No. 19, D. M. A., 1914, in which the quotas of auxiliary troops required to complete the tactical divisions were assigned to the several States in accordance with their population.

During the period from May 9 to October 31, 1916, there were in the Federal service the following units of the several arms and branches (exclusive of headquarters, supply, and machine-gun companies of infantry, and cavalry regiments): 1,324 companies of infantry, 107 batteries of field artillery, 123 troops of cavalry, 26 companies of engineers, 24 companies of signal troops, 26 ambulance companies, and 39 field hospitals, leaving a shortage of 37 batteries of field artillery, 21 troops of cavalry, 10 companies of engineers, 22 ambulance companies, and 9 field hospitals.

There has thus been a gain of the following units since the adoption of the divisional plan of 1912: 43 batteries of field artillery, 43 troops of cavalry, 10 companies of engineers, 22 companies of signal troops, 11 ambulance companies, and 16 field hospitals.

The above statements are based on the Tables of Organization, 1914, in force on the date of the call (June 18, 1916). It is understood that these tables are now under revision and that the result will be to considerably increase the shortage in respect to field artillery and engineers.

The above statement sets forth the shortages in respect to tactical units of the several arms and branches of service. In respect to composition of the National Guard in Federal service, i.e., the proportion existing between the numerical strength of the several arms and branches, the results differ considerably from a comparison of the number of tactical units. According to Table 2, Tables of Organization, 1914, the proportion at which the several elements enter the composition of a tactical division is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Numerical Strength</th>
<th>Per cent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>17,764</td>
<td>77.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td>10.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Troops</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Troops</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>2.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Exclusive of regimental detachments.

The strength of all units of the various arms and branches of the National Guard in service of the United States to September 30,
1916, and the percentage of each arm and branch of the total strength were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>119,134</td>
<td>77.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>10,222</td>
<td>6.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>16,210</td>
<td>10.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal Corps</td>
<td>2,299</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary Troops</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>154,230</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the last two tables, it will be seen that while there exists a considerable shortage in the number of units of auxiliary arms required to complete the divisional organization, the proportions in point of actual strength are practically complete. This apparent discrepancy is due to the relative low strength at which Infantry units have been maintained.

It would, therefore, appear that in the future development of the divisional plan, an increase in the strength of Infantry units should go hand in hand with the raising of the new units of auxiliary arms required to complete the divisional organization.

The above statements refer only to the extent to which the divisional plan evolved in 1912 has approached realization and do not consider Infantry units in excess of divisional requirements and not called into Federal service nor the field-army troops which are totally unorganized. The following Infantry units were not called into Federal service: Thirteen regiments, 3 separate battalions, 10 separate companies, or nearly the equivalent of 15 regiments. The regiments were considered surplus under the divisional plan and were therefore not called into service. By their conversion into units of the proper arm, the greater part of the existing deficiencies in field-army troops would be made up.

ACTUAL ORGANIZATION IN FEDERAL SERVICE.

While at the date of the call of the President the divisional plan was still incomplete, enough progress had been made to admit of expressing the quotas of troops required from the several States in terms of organized units instead of in bare terms of numerical strength.

Due to the immediate necessity for the presence of troops on the Mexican border, regiments were at first ordered to border stations as rapidly as they could be prepared for service. As troops were ordered to stations where their presence was most required in the order of their arrival in the Southern Department, regiments from the same division were often located at widely separated points. Many regiments were, moreover, held at their mobilization sites until other regiments were returned from the border for muster out. The result was that the divisional plan never materialized, and it was necessary to regroup the units serving on the border into provisional divisions and brigades which did not in any way correspond to the original scheme. Under instructions from the War Department, dated August 4, 1916, the commanding general, Southern Department, provided for an organization of the National Guard in Federal service into 10 provisional divisions and 6 separate brigades. At this time many of the units included in the provisional organization were located at the mobilization centers of the several States, and when they were ordered to the border, others were returned to the place of muster in, so that even the provisional organization never became a concrete fact.

VALUE OF THE DIVISIONAL PLAN.

As very few of the regiments in Federal service have, as judged by reports received to date, attained a sufficient degree of proficiency to enable them to participate with profit in the training of the higher units, the failure of the divisional plan to materialize can not be considered to have resulted in any great actual loss. Efficient participation in maneuvers and operations of the higher units implies that the lower units have been brought to a state of proficiency by the thorough and progressive training of each of the component organizations. It can not be expected with the short periods of training required of the National Guard that company, battalion, and regimental units will ever attain this degree of proficiency in time of peace or for some months after their mobilization for service. The divisional plan, even if fully carried into effect in time of peace, can not therefore be expected to result in the constitution of divisions available for immediate service.

The plan has, however, certain distinct advantages that should not be lost from view. It establishes a standard toward the realization of which all efforts can be concentrated and without which such development of the National Guard as may take place would be entirely haphazard and unregulated. The result of such a development would be a product which would be unsuited for field operations and which would have to be entirely remodeled upon the occurrence of an emergency calling for the mobilization of the National Guard. The countless details which are represented or implied in the plan would have to be worked out under very difficult circumstances. It may indeed be doubted whether any well-digested plan for higher organization could be devised if the drafting of the organizational scheme were deferred until the occurrence of the emergency. If the plan is completely realized it will enable future calls to be framed in terms of the higher units, and the process of mobilization can be decentralized by charging commanders or chiefs of staff of the divisions with the supervision of the details of the mobilization of each division. In this connection it is believed that had the recent call included all the units required for the 12 divisions, as would doubtless have been done had the emergency been more serious, the result would have been the organization of the greater part of the units required to complete the divisional organization. On such occasions the local pride of the States acts as a stimulus toward raising the assigned quotas.

Not the least of the advantages of the divisional plan lies in the power which it gives to limit the appointments of the numerous candidates for the positions of general officers which are always urged on occasion of the formation of our war armies. With exact knowl-
edge as to the higher units to be formed, general officers can be
selected to command definite tactical units instead of the units being
raised to create positions for particular persons. The divisional plan
is the concrete expression of the spirit of teamwork. As such it
represents the general interest as opposed to the interest of individuals
and should receive the active support of all who are interested in
the general welfare. Its value as the expression of a definite policy
became apparent during the recent mobilization, for it made possible
continuous and progressive action, while without it there could have
been only halting, vacillation, and conflict.

TRANSPORTATION OF NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS TO THE MEXI-
CAN BORDER AND REPly TO COMPLAINTS.

During the transfer of troops from their mobilization camps to
concentration camps on the border articles appeared in the public
press in which it was alleged that troops were "being transported in
cars lacking sufficient sleeping space"; that the cars used have been
or are being used to transport troops without light; that they had
"been sidetracked and delayed en route to accommodate private busi-
ness"; that troops en route had been obliged to seek food of citizens,
and that the supply of drinking water had been insufficient. It was
intimated that the cars used for transportation of National Guard
troops had not been inspected so as to protect the safety and health
of the troops assigned to them, and that furthermore these troops had
not been equipped with arms and accouterments required by Army
regulations for actual service in time of war.

These reports coming to the notice of Congress resulted in House
Resolution No. 299 of July 5, 1916:

RESOLUTION.

Resolved. That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, directed to trans-
mit to the House of Representatives full information as to the following mat-
ters:

First. Whether the troops of the National Guard mustered into the service of
the United States and on their way to Mexico have been, or are being, trans-
ported in cars lacking sufficient sleeping space.

Second. Whether such cars have been, or are being, used to transport said
troops without light.

Third. Whether said cars have been sidetracked and delayed en route to
accommodate private business.

Fourth. Whether the troops en route have been subsisted by the Government
in accordance with the United States Army Regulations or have been obliged
to seek food of citizens, and whether the supply of drinking water in the
cars has been sufficient.

Fifth. Whether cars used for the transportation of National Guard troops
mustered into the United States service were inspected to protect the health
and safety of the troops assigned to them, and by whom.

Sixth. Whether the troops mustered into the service of the United States, the
troops of the National Guard are equipped with arms and accouterments re-
quired by Army Regulations for actual service in time of war.

These matters were immediately made the subject of investigation
by the War Department. The reply of the Secretary of War of
July 21, 1916, published as Document 1311, House of Representa-
tives, together with the reports called for, cover the ground completely.

The reply of the Secretary of War is as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Sir: In reply to House resolution 299, I have the honor to transmit to you
the following information:

First. Troops of the National Guard mustered into the service of the United
States and on their way to the Mexican border have been, in some instances,
transported in day coaches. This was done only in cases where, due to the
urgency of the situation on the border and the large number of troops being
transported at one time, it was not practicable to delay. When day coaches were
used, three men were assigned to each four sittings, in accordance with the rule
invoked in like cases in transporting organizations of the Regular Army. In
some cases the railroad company, without extra charge, allowed each two men
to occupy four sittings. Wherever it could be done, arrangements were made to
transfer troops from day coaches to tourist sleepers en route.

Second. No cars without lights were used to transport troops.

Third. Trains were not sidetracked or delayed beyond what should be
reasonably expected, due to the great number of special trains employed, most
of them manned by extra train crews.

Fourth. Regular Army rations more than sufficient for the journey were fur-
nished to all troops either upon leaving their mobilization camps or, in accord-
ance with a prearranged plan, while en route. Where the necessary ranges
and boilers were not placed on trains, the troops were furnished in advance of
the movement with money for the purchase of hot coffee at the same rate as
troops of the Regular Army are allowed under similar conditions. No reason
existing for troops seeking food from civilians. Drinking water arrangements
were ample.

Fifth. All cars used were inspected with a view to remedying any defects or
deficiences which would imperil the health or safety of the troops assigned to
them. The inspections were made, as a rule, by the quartermaster, accom-
panied in some cases by the train commander, the train quartermaster, the
mustering officer, or the surgeon.

Sixth. As rapidly as possible, all National Guard troops mustered into the
service of the United States are being equipped with arms and accouterments
identical with those furnished the Regular Army. The delays have been due
to lack of reserve supplies kept on hand for the purpose.

The telegraphic reports rendered by the commanding generals of the Eastern,
Western, and Central Departments in reply to the inquiries above referred to,
are herewith.

Respectfully,

NEWTON D. BAKER,
Secretary of War.

The gist of the reports concerning the supply of tourist sleepers
is found in the fact that to accommodate all the troops moved with
Pullman tourist sleepers would have required approximately 3,000
such cars. The Pullman Co. owns only about 750 tourist sleepers
and supplied 625 of these for the movement. The only reason that
more were not supplied was that to have done so they would have had
to be taken from the regular passenger service. Conditions were
such as admitted of no delay, and, as the bulk of the entire National
Guard had to be moved at once, a great proportion of them had to
be transported in day coaches.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS.

Section 7 of the Dick bill provided: "That every officer and en-
listed man of the Militia who shall be called into the service of the
United States shall be mustered for service without further enlist-
ment, and without further medical examination previous to such
muster, except for those States which have not adopted the standard
Mobilization of the Organized Militia, Etc.

of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army" (see par. 19, Mustering Regulations). This not being inconsistent with the act of June 3, 1916, is still in force, but is subject to the modification of section 113 of the act of June 3, 1916, which provides that every officer and enlisted man of the National Guard who shall be called into the service of the United States as such shall be examined as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the President may prescribe without further commission or enlistment (see also par. 19, Mustering Regulations).

At the time of the call of May 9, Texas and Arizona had not adopted the standard of examination for the Regular Army, while on June 18, the Regular Army physical standard had been adopted by all the States whose troops were called out, except Delaware, Kansas, and North Carolina. The normal procedure therefore was to accept into the United States service all National Guardsmen from States which had adopted the Regular Army standard and subsequently to make the required physical examination, discharging men disqualified by the usual means of surgeon's certificate of disability. In those few States where the Regular Army standard had not been adopted, the physical examination necessarily had to precede any muster into the United States service, and only the names of those found physically qualified appeared on the muster-in roll.

Previous experience demonstrated the advisability, and mustering regulations contemplated having an adequate number of regular medical officers at mobilization camps for the purpose of exercising the functions of the Medical Department. At the time of the call of June 18, the majority of the medical officers of the regular service were in Mexico or on the border, so that only one medical officer was available for duty at each of the several mobilization camps. Even this number was secured after considerable delay and strain on the regular service. The inadequacy of but one experienced medical officer at a mobilization camp having from 4,000 to 18,000 troops, is obvious, when the responsible duties devolving upon them are taken into consideration. It is reasonable and safe to assume that the interests of the Government were not properly safeguarded where State troops were sent to the border within 10 days after mobilization. It is true that one or more reserve medical officers were sent to several of the mobilization camps to assist the regular medical officers; but the majority of them were without experience and training.

Sufficient copies of circular No. 8, W. D., D. M. A., dated May 10, 1916, were sent to the adjutant general of each State one month prior to the call, with instructions that each medical officer be furnished with a copy. This circular defined the duties of medical officers, called attention to the necessity of careful physical examination, prevention of camp diseases, importance of and instructions for the administration of typhoid and smallpox prophylaxis. Attention was called to organization and equipment. It contained also extracts from mustering regulations and much other valuable information for the guidance of medical and other officers in case the Organized Militia was called into the Federal service. This circular appears to have accomplished the purpose intended, since reports show that, with few exceptions, the medical officers carefully followed the instructions contained therein.

Complete data is not as yet available showing the number of rejections on account of physical disqualifications by States. From the data available there were 23,721 rejections out of a total of 128,517 examined, making an average of 18.45 per cent rejected on account of physical defects. This did not include those who were eliminated by the State authorities prior to muster in, the number of whom is not known.

**CAUSES FOR REJECTION.**

Causes for rejection on account of physical disqualification can not be given for each State, as the data is not as yet available. Incomplete data from five States in different sections of the country representing 55,924 persons examined, shows 5,926 rejections on account of physical disqualification and for the following causes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes for Rejection</th>
<th>Revenue of the United States Service.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venerable diseases</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor physique, under height and weight</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective vision and disease of eyes</td>
<td>741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deformity of feet and flat feet</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amputations and deformities</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gout</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective mentality</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diseases of nose and throat</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veins, arteries, and varicosities</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrocele and varicocele</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hernia</td>
<td>396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,926</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is evident that a large number of the defects noted above should have been detected even by a layman. The conclusions to be drawn are that a large number of these cases were not examined physically or that inexcusable laxity was shown on the part of the medical examiners. The States from which this data was compiled claim to have adopted the standard of physical examinations prescribed for the regular service. It would seem then that the medical departments of the Organized Militia in these States were responsible. They are no doubt partly to blame; however, the extent of their culpability pertains only to those actually examined by them. They can not justly be held responsible for those defectives who were enlisted without a physical examination, those who were examined by civilian physicians, nor those who were enlisted against the recommendation of the medical officers. It is believed that inexperienced and untrained medical officers of the National Guard, at the time of the call, did not have a clear conception of the physical requirements for military service, which is also believed to be an important factor in accounting for the large number of the personnel of the Organized Militia being found physically disqualified upon muster into the Federal Service.

The matter of physical examinations is one of the most difficult of all the problems connected with the muster in of the National Guard and the records of the Pension Office have furnished ample evidence of the absolute necessity of rigid examinations in this connection. This will be at once apparent when it is realized that in 1898, out of
an enrollment of 211,161 men, no less than 108,258 subsequently applied for pensions.

Only 30,000 of these were granted, from which it is fair to assume that over 78,000 had, to say the least, exaggerated ideas of their claims on the Government on account of physical disabilities incurred while in active service. It is reported that the 30,000 applicants whose claims were found to be valid have already cost the Government some $12,000,000.

The procedure to prevent fraud, therefore, is to make a careful physical examination of every officer and man stripped, upon his entry into the Federal service, making note of every physical defect which, though not disqualifying for military service, might in after years be presented to support a claim for a pension.

A similar examination is made upon muster out of the Federal service, particular attention being paid to any physical defect which the person examined claimed was incurred while in the military service. If these examinations are carefully made and full notes made of the results, they afford an almost certain check against subsequent fraudulent claims for pensions.

The excessive amount of work imposed upon those connected with the physical examinations upon mobilization is graphically told by Maj. Wadhams. Medical Corps, in his report on the physical inspections of the New York troops, from which report the following extract is made:

It will be noted that the rejection rate is very low. This is due to several causes, the most important will be mentioned:

(a) The adoption by the State some time ago of the War Department standard and a fairly rigid adherence thereto, which resulted in excluding from the National Guard many who formerly would have been accepted.

(b) In the great haste in which examinations were made rendered it impossible to detect all disqualifying defects.

(c) Immediately upon the publication of the President's call for the National Guard practically every organization in the State began to eliminate either by discharge or by transfer to the depot battalion those men known to be unfit.

There are many lessons for the medical officer to be drawn from this experience. Some of them are too obvious to need mention here, while a few are noted, as follows:

(a) The need of a sufficient number of trained officers and enlisted men of the medical department of the Army available as soon as the National Guard is called into the Federal service is perhaps the most important. Experience in the past has shown that within a few years after a muster in, about 20 per cent of the men so mustered will apply for pension. The great majority of such claims will be fraudulent. The only protection of the Federal Government lies in having a complete and accurate record of the physical condition of every man accepted. Civilian physicians and inexperienced National Guard officers, if depended upon to do this work, will, without doubt, become proficient in time but at a tremendous ultimate cost to the Government.

(b) In view of the experience outlined above, it seems imperative that the senior officer in the Federal service, was, presumably, in command of all troops of suitable rank were detailed to command the mobilization camp. At Camp Whiteman there was a brigadier general, National Guard of New York, in command of the State troops, who was not mustered into the United States service. The senior assistant mustering officer was a captain of the Army. As each regiment of the National Guard was mustered in the senior colonel, being the senior officer in the Federal service, was, presumably, in command of all troops in the Federal service. As each regiment left camp as soon as possible after muster in, the commanding officer changed almost from day to day. As surgeon of the camp there were frequent questions regarding sanitary measures to be enforced which arose, and it was at times a difficult matter to find who was in command. Camp administration became a difficult matter and the putting into effect sanitary measures was often very much delayed.

(c) The plan followed provided for the muster in of organizations without physical examination. The additional work this procedure entails is very great. As each man mustered in, subsequent to that time, in the Federal service, it becomes necessary to discharge those men rejected physically in the manner required by the War Department. This necessitates the preparation of certificates of disability, final statements, and a discharge certificate—all papers with which the National Guard officer is entirely unfamiliar. In some organizations in this State the muster in, the physical examination, and the departure all took place in one day. It was therefore obviously impossible to conduct with War Department orders. It seems to me inevitable that there will be a great deal of trouble in the future in clearing up the status of many of these men whose service to the United States was of a few hours' duration. Of all the organizations mustered in in this State, it was impossible to follow the prescribed procedure in but one. The exception occurred in the Third Field Artillery, which was not mustered in until August 4, and had not yet gone to the border, the organization of this regiment there was sufficient time, blank certificates of disability had been received, and the regimental commander being an officer of the Army, was familiar with the preparation of the required papers.

(d) In my opinion it would make far better results if an officer of the Army of suitable rank were detailed to command the mobilization camp. At Camp Whiteman there was a brigadier general, National Guard of New York, in command of the State troops, who was not mustered into the United States service. The senior assistant mustering officer was a captain of the Army. As each regiment of the National Guard was mustered in the senior colonel, being the senior officer in the Federal service, was, presumably, in command of all troops in the Federal service. As each regiment left camp as soon as possible after muster in, the commanding officer changed almost from day to day. As surgeon of the camp there were frequent questions regarding sanitary measures to be enforced which arose, and it was at times a difficult matter to find who was in command. Camp administration became a difficult matter and the putting into effect sanitary measures was often very much delayed.

New York is one of the two States having a complete divisional organization, and it is well known that its troops are among the foremost in preparedness; yet our system seems to have been so faulty that in order to get these troops started for the border on June 27 on a call issued June 18, that the work of the medical examiners was kept up for two nights and a day without intermission.

It may pertinently be asked, why these strenuous efforts, and why such rigid physical examinations, but Maj. Wadhams points out that "experience in the past has shown that within a few years after such muster in about 50 per cent of the men so mustered will apply for a pension. The great majority of such claims will be fraudulent.

We note that he comments on these extreme efforts to safeguard the interests of the Government by referring to the exhausting character of the work, and "during the long hours of duty it was observed that officers, as time passed, lost the power or ability to observe closely, and physical defects which should have been detected were overlooked." Certainly any system which with the extreme efforts
put forth still gives faulty and unsatisfactory results should be discarded for more rational methods.

To make a careful physical examination of every man of the National Guard called into the Federal service requires considerable time and a large number of experienced medical officers. It is believed that in future if every officer of the National Guard was examined physically each year and every enlisted man carefully examined physically as soon as practicable after enlistment or reenlistment in the National Guard by a qualified medical officer of the Regular Army, not more than 1 per cent (barring venereal diseases and acute maladies) would be found physically disqualified when called into the Federal service, and there would be no necessity for so thorough a physical examination on muster into Federal service, and the work would be greatly expedited.

APPOINTMENT OF OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY TO COMMISSIONS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD.

OFFICERS.

The general policy adopted by the War Department as to appointment of officers to commissions in the National Guard is as follows:

1. That Regular Army officers may be selected for detail as commanders of divisions or brigades.

2. That only one Regular Army officer will be detailed with each regiment of the National Guard, and this detail must be in the grade of colonel or lieutenant-colonel.

3. That Regular Army officers to be detailed as chiefs of staff of divisions will be taken only from the grade of colonel or lieutenant colonel.

Assistant chiefs of staff may be detailed from the grades of major and captain.

Individual applications under this policy will be submitted to the Chief of Staff for decision as to the individual before the detail is made. (Decision, Secretary of War, June 30, 1916 (2426227).)

Pursuant to the above policy, there had been up to September 14, 43 officers (1 lieutenant colonel, 2 majors, 25 captains, and 15 lieutenants) of the Regular Army authorized to accept commissions in the National Guard under section 100 of the national-defense act. These were appointed as follows: 3 in the grade of brigadier general, 11 in the grade of colonel, 24 in the grade of lieutenant colonel, and 5 in the grade of major.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

The legality of commissioning retired enlisted men of the Regular Army in active service in the National Guard has been referred to the Judge Advocate General of the Army, who on June 8, 1916, rendered opinion as follows:

I am of opinion that a retired enlisted man may not legally be accepted for active service, except as provided in section 11 of the act of April 25, 1914, so long as he retains the status of a retired enlisted man.

As to enlisted men of the National Guard, the several department commanders were telegraphed by the Adjutant General of the Army on August 3, granting them authority to discharge enlisted men of the National Guard to enable them to accept commissions in the National Guard when they are eligible for such commissions.

A considerable number of enlisted men of the Regular Army, both sergeant-instructors and noncommissioned officers of the line, were discharged to accept commissions in the National Guard. The provision of the national-defense act which permits such appointments is the last clause of section 74, which reads: "such other civilians as may be especially qualified for duty therein."

There is no provision for noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army being furloughed to enable them to accept National Guard commissions.

This is an unfortunate oversight in the law, for when the National Guard is mobilized it would not only be of great assistance to the State troops to have, while in active service, the temporary services of old and experienced noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army. Such service is broadening to the noncommissioned officers; the advantages of such service are therefore reciprocal. Under present laws, however, a noncommissioned officer of the Regular Army to accept service as an officer of the National Guard must be discharged, and if he is in service with the National Guard longer than three months he forfeits the advantages incident to long service in the Regular Establishment.

REPORT OF INSPECTION BY ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF.

Maj. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff, was sent by the Secretary of War to ascertain the conditions existing in the National Guard who are now camped on the border. His instructions were as follows:

Subject: Inspection trip of commands along the Mexican border.

1. The Secretary of War directs that you proceed from this city to Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and from that place begin and complete a thorough inspection of all stations and commands of the Regular Army and of the National Guard and Organized Militia along the Mexican border.

2. In making this inspection you will be guided by the verbal instructions of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff. You will make as frequent reports as possible, by wire when necessary, with recommendation of action which in your judgment should be taken by the War Department. You will confer with the commanding general of the Southern Department, keep him informed of the results of your observations, and transmit to him whatever views and instructions as to the general situation are communicated to you by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff for that purpose.

3. The commanding general, Southern Department, has been instructed to furnish you whatever assistance is necessary to enable you to carry out the foregoing order.

Approved.

Major General, Chief of Staff.

The inspections were made between July 14 and August 15. He inspected the troops in the Brownsville district, as follows:

Brownsville: First Illinois Cavalry and First and Second Virginia Infantry.

McAllen: First and Second Regiments Field Artillery, First Battalion Signal Corps, First Field Hospital, Third Ambulance Company, First Battalion of Engineers, all from New York.

Pharr: Twenty-third and Seventy-fourth New York Infantry and one ambulance company.

Llano Grande: First, Second, and Third Indiana Infantry; one Virginia field artillery; one signal company; two ambulance companies; and one field hospital; the Minnesota Brigade, consisting of the First, Second, and Third Infantry; the First and Second Nebraska Infantry; and one field hospital (Nebraska).

Merceds: Six companies Third Texas Infantry.

Donna: Four companies Second Texas Infantry.

Harlingen: Five companies Second Texas Infantry.

Tents at other points were inspected, as follows:

Laredo: The First, Second, Third, and Fourth Missouri Infantry and auxiliary troops from Missouri.

El Paso: Maryland troops: First, Fourth, and Fifth Infantry, one troop of Cavalry, one ambulance company, and one field hospital. Kansas troops: First and Second Infantry, one battery Field Artillery; First Regiment Vermont Infantry.

San Antonio: Illinois troops: First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Infantry; First and Second Field Hospital Companies; First Field Artillery; Company A, Signal Corps; Company A, National Guard; and a Battalion of Engineers. Wisconsin National Guard: First, Second, and Third Infantry; Battery A, Field Artillery; Troop A, Cavalry; First and Second Field Hospitals.


Columbus: First New Mexico and Second Massachusetts Infantry.

Douglas: First, Fourth, and Fifth New Jersey, and Third New Jersey, and auxiliary troops from that State, and Second Montana Infantry.

Warren: Company A, Signal Corps, and First Field Hospital from the District of Columbia.

Naco: Headquarters at one battalion First Arizona and First Separate Battalion District of Columbia (colored) Infantry.


Gen. Bliss's reports, in a condensed form, of inspections of troops from Brownsville to Nogales, inclusive, is as follows:

**Tents.**—Sufficient and excellent, with minor exceptions, as where one of the Indiana regiments was still in shelter tents, but large tents had been shipped by express and was daily expected.

**Clothing and shoes.**—All troops were found supplied with O. D. cotton uniforms except three Missouri regiments at Laredo and a few individuals elsewhere who were still wearing woolen clothing, but with prospects of an early supply of the cotton uniforms.

Generally men were found to be well equipped with shoes, the most notable exception being in the Third Missouri and Fourteenth New York Infantry, where about 100 or more men were reported as being without serviceable shoes.

There was a shortage of hats in the First, Second, and Third Indiana Regiments.

**Condition of camp site.**—In Brownsville district camp sites are suitable as a rule, but on account of the flat nature of the country not easily drained. This was notably the case in the camp of the First Illinois Cavalry at Brownsville, and the Third Texas Infantry at Harlingen. The soil here is gumbo. At Llano Grande, where the camp sites are excellent, well drained, as the site was on high ground and distant from the river, the tents were in a very good sanitary condition. At San Antonio they are excellent, except as to character of soil, which is gumbo and does not absorb water. At El Paso troops were encamped in three localities, the Pennsylvanians being in one body and near the drill grounds and target range. The Pennsylvanians had all of the two Michigan regiments are encamped in the southeastern section of El Paso to prevent illegal use of the international boundary. The auxiliary troops from Minnesota were encamped in the northeastern section of El Paso. At Columbus and Douglas all the sites are on flat plains drained with deep ditches; those at Warren and Naco are hilly and satisfactory. At Nogales the site of camps of the California Infantry is on low ground and liable to overflow in heavy rains, in consequence of which a change to a more suitable site farther from town is under consideration. The location of camp sites at Nogales and elsewhere was governed by a measure in facilities for piping water to the camps.

**Condition of sinks and bathhouses.**—Sinks, with few exceptions, were reported to be in excellent condition, being vaulted with covered seats and disinfected by being burned out daily with straw and oil. In the expected cases the camps had shown neither the insolvency nor carelessness in making most of the facilities available as had been done in other commands. Steps were taken to remedy this defect. Twenty-four seats per battalion is reported as the number provided, though as low as 12 seats per battalion was found and no complaint of overcrowding. There were no shower baths at McAllen or Llano Grande, the water system at these places at time of inspection just being installed.

**Cleanness of men and camp.**—The hard work in the hot sun makes clothing wash difficult, and the absence of washing facilities makes it difficult to keep clothing clean. Prospects for a remedy in the future are, however, good.

**Cooking.**—In nearly all companies and other units it was reported that they had at least one cook, and where this was not the case, a cook was provided. The only exception was when troops were in temporary camps, as at San Antonio, where in cooking, either in restaurants, construction camps, hotels, or elsewhere. On the whole there was very general satisfaction with the cooking.

Special mention was made of the work of cooks from regular organizations to give instruction, and at San Antonio by detailed four men from each regiment under instruction as bakers in the School of Bakers and Cooks at Fort Sam Houston.

In some of the camps there had been complaint for a short time after troops arrived of lack of variety of food. This defect was of short duration and soon remedied.

**Kitchens.**—These are the weak points in most camps, and their condition was found to vary all the way from excellent in the First Kansas to poor in the and First and Second Squadrons of Cavalry. As a rule the Pennsylvanians brought mess tents with them, which proved a great help. The poor average condition found is natural, owing to troops having arrived only a short time before the inspection and the change of conditions under which the personnel were obliged to work. At the time of the inspection the evaporated milk, which never before has been approved by the War Department is strongly urged by the Assistant Chief tents, and mess shelters, making a great step forward in the fly problem. The importance of proper kitchen sanitation was strongly impressed upon all organization commanders.

**Picket lines.**—These were reported as not well drained and no cover for animals anywhere, except for the animals of one ambulance company of New York and a battalion of Field Artillery of Indiana, which had provided shelter at their own expense. The loss of a few animals dying from heat would involve more expense than a simple shelter for the picket line.

An estimate for shelters was approved by the Department Commander, and its adoption by the War Department is strongly urged by the Assistant Chief.
Cots.—In the Brownsville district men were without cots, except in two Virginia regiments and in the cases of individual men who had purchased cots at their own expense. At other points most of the troops inspected were supplied with cots. Practically all of the remainder were sleeping on beds sacks stuffed with hay or straw.

Conduct and appearance of men.—All camps were orderly and men seemed contented and cheerful, except among some of the New Jersey troops at Douglas, though they were due largely to the duty being generally faultily constructed.

The physique of the officers was reported to be generally better than that of the men. The poor physical development of the men was particularly noticeable in regiments from large cities. Considerable training will be necessary before these men will be physically fit for hard field service.

Preparedness for field service.—All organizations were reported as equipped for field service, except as to horses and mules; but in no other way than in material is this the case. The men, many of whom were only recruits, appeared almost entirely ignorant of the duties of a soldier, and were poor even in the simple evolutions of company drill. Practically all the organizations had received their full allowance of wagons and harness, and some of the organizations had received animals. Some also are reported as having automobiles and a few have motor trucks. Animals are being purchased, and the deficiency in this respect is being removed as fast as material is this the case. The men, many of whom were only recruits, appeared almost entirely ignorant of the duties of a soldier, and were poor even in the simple evolutions of company drill. Practically all the organizations had received their full allowance of wagons and harness, and some of the organizations had received animals. Some also are reported as having automobiles and a few have motor trucks. Animals are being purchased, and the deficiency in this respect is being removed as fast as possible.

Transportsation.—The Indiana brigade had only nine wagons to each regiment, but practically all other organizations had received their full allowance of wagons and harness, and some of the organizations had received animals. Some also are reported as having automobiles and a few have motor trucks. Animals are being purchased, and the deficiency in this respect is being removed as fast as possible.

Roads.—The roads to all camps are passable, at Laredo and San Antonio excellent; to other camps they are good. This remark applies to dry weather. Where necessary to construct roads within the camps, the work was going on at a fair rate. A new road to the camp of the Pennsylvania Division at El Paso will soon be absolutely necessary.

Water.—In the Brownsville district camps are supplied from the local water supply of the towns near which they are located, all of which in turn receive their supply from the Rio Grande River, the water being excellent.

The water supply is reported as ample in quantity, except at Llano Grande, where the water system was just being installed, and at Columbus and the camps of the California regiments at Nogales.

As to purity, it is satisfactory at Eagle Pass, San Antonio, El Paso, Douglas, Warren, Naco, and, with slight exceptions, at Nogales. At Laredo it is reported "at present unsatisfactory," but a sanitary inspector (Lieut. Col. Munson, M. C.) has pointed out how it could be made satisfactory.

Diseases.—The number of contagious and infectious diseases have been nil, in the way of smallpox, typhoid, and diphtheria, and some venereal diseases, the latter being generally brought from mobilization camps or home stations— are reported. Practically all the men have been inoculated for typhoid and, with the exceptions of the New York regiment, vaccinated for smallpox.

The percentage of sick in the and Infantry and Squadron — Cavalry ranged at time of inspection from 5 per cent to 10 per cent, the majority of cases being diarrheal. In one instance immediate remedial action was taken up with district and department commanders and attention called to the conjunction of insanitary camp conditions, poorly constructed shacks, and a high sick rate.
plans of the War Department. These deficiencies are being made good with all possible dispatch.

At El Paso a subdepot is to be established for the Pennsylvania division at their camp, supplies for this depot being shipped to it by rail, thus lessening the work of motor and wagon transportation.

As additional troops arrive at this point their organization into divisions, each with its own supply depot, is recommended.

Some disappointment has been observed at failure of troops to be used in active operations immediately on their arrival at the border.

Depot commanders have been handicapped in a number of instances by the lack of a suitable staff, and have been obliged to pick up such officers for this duty as happened to be available within their commands. These improvised staffs have done well, but the necessity for tactical organization and accompanying staffs has been strongly emphasized by this concentration.

At Nogales the physical examination of regiments not so examined previous to departure from mobilization camps had at the time of inspection just been completed, resulting in the rejection of about 1,000 men, or approximately 10 per cent of the personnel at that point.

On the whole the general conditions, except as already mentioned, are satisfactory.

The sick rates are generally very low, men well fed and cared for, serving and being trained under the very best conditions as to health and comfort that are consistent with the requirements of soldier life. The inevitable discomforts and inconveniences of camp life are accepted by the men in a true soldierly spirit. They are contented with these conditions, and will doubtless remain so unless some misguided and misinformed people interfere and, basing their opinions on the comforts and arrangements of civil life, lead soldiers to feel that their lot is unnecessarily hard and should be ameliorated.

ANIMALS AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR THE NATIONAL GUARD.

At the time of the call the only animals in the hands of the State troops that had been purchased from Federal funds were 558 horses issued to the Field Artillery. Congress had made appropriations for the pay of mechanics and helpers to care for horses, and for forage and other supplies for 82 horses for each battery, and for 4 horses for each regimental and battalion headquarters of the Field Artillery, and the allotments to the States under the act of Congress approved May 27, 1918, and under section 1061, Revised Statutes, were made available for the purchase of these horses. Many of the States were unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain horses in this way, and in consequence only 399 horses had been purchased from Federal funds and 159 condemned Regular Army horses had been issued.

States had been required to expend a part of their Federal allotments for the purchase of field wagons, and where the allotments were not sufficient for this purpose wagons were supplied from unallotted funds. As a result of these efforts 3,882 of the 3,999 field wagons required were available at the time of the mobilization.

When the various organizations of the various States were called into the Federal Service on June 18, 1916, the War Department took immediate steps to secure the number of animals needed to equip the troops by directing all remount stations and the purchasing officers throughout the country to advertise for them as extensively as possible.

Meanwhile such animals as were on hand at the auxiliary remount depots, and also those that were being delivered under contracts for reserve purposes of the Regular Army, were utilized in equipping the National Guard and were afterwards replaced from animals contracted for on June 27. Bids were opened on June 26 and wired to the War Department, and contracts were awarded on June 27 to 26 of the lowest bidders for 42,408 horses and 18,440 mules. The necessary number of inspection boards were sent to the points of delivery to inspect and ship the animals to the auxiliary remount depots established at El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., where they were held until entirely free from shipping fever, which is prevalent among animals required to undergo a railway journey. This quarantine interval covered a period of at least two weeks. If animals were issued to troops before they fully recovered from this ailment, they would infect the well animals with the organization.

From the date that contracts were awarded for animals (June 27) to October 28, 1916, the following horses and mules were on hand, received at, and issued from the auxiliary remount depots and other points on the Mexican border:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Issued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>Mules</td>
<td>Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary Remount Depot, El Paso, Tex.:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On hand July 1, 1916</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending July 7, 1916</td>
<td>1,099</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending July 14, 1916</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending July 21, 1916</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending July 28, 1916</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending August 4, 1916</td>
<td>3,259</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending August 11, 1916</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending August 18, 1916</td>
<td>1,396</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending August 25, 1916</td>
<td>1,093</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending August 31, 1916</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending September 7, 1916</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending September 14, 1916</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending September 21, 1916</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending September 28, 1916</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending October 5, 1916</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending October 12, 1916</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Week ending October 19, 1916</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>17,934</td>
<td>5,981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Auxiliary Remount Depot, Fort Sam Houston, Tex.: | | |
| On hand July 1, 1916     | 1,439     | 290    |
| Week ending July 7, 1916 | 1,632     | 250    |
| Week ending July 14, 1916| 2,104     | 479    |
| Week ending July 21, 1916| 2,660     | 1,626  |
| Week ending July 28, 1916| 1,833     | 1,451  |
| Week ending August 4, 1916| 1,588     | 1,451  |
| Week ending August 11, 1916| 1,341     | 1,451  |
| Week ending August 18, 1916| 553      | 969    |
| Week ending August 25, 1916| 1,588     | 805    |
| Week ending August 31, 1916| 1,266     | 805    |
| Week ending September 7, 1916| 1,794     | 1,207  |
| Week ending September 14, 1916| 446      | 248    |
| Week ending September 21, 1916| 563      | 248    |
| Week ending September 28, 1916| 238      | 248    |
| Total:                 | 19,409   | 7,922  |
| Shipped to various posts on the border (Brownsville, Harlingen, Eagle Pass, Laredo, McAllen, Calexico) and issued to troops when released from quarantine: | 2,787 | 633 |
| Grand total:            | 20,200   | 7,555  |
Of the animals received at the auxiliary remount depots 1,964 horses and 2,711 mules were turned in by National Guard organizations that have been mustered out of the Federal service.

Of the animals issued from the auxiliary remount depots 8,449 horses and 2,160 mules were supplied to organizations of the Regular Army.

Were it not for the fact that foreign buyers had purchased and exported thousands of animals from the United States during the past two years double the number of horses and mules shown above would have been delivered during the same period.

In distributing animals to troops each organization was given a partial supply before attempting to issue the complete allowance to any one organization. This enabled each unit to get along until additional animals became available for issue. The prudence of this method of distributing animals is apparent.

It will be seen from the foregoing data that the War Department lost no time in obtaining the animals required to equip the militia troops, and after taking into consideration all the conditions that enter into the task of equipping a large body of troops with their quota of animals, the matter was handled as expeditiously as possible.

The department commander of the Eastern Department was authorized to purchase the following animals for the National Guard in his department: 1,861 cavalry horses, 2,685 artillery horses, 1,308 draft mules, and 268 pack mules.

Such animals as were purchased in the Eastern Department necessarily had to be purchased hurriedly. The haste in which this was done and the resulting consequences are clearly shown in the following letter:

**Headquarters Eastern Department, Governors Island, New York City, August 9, 1916.**

**From:** Department Commander.

**To:** The Adjutant General of the Army.

**Subject:** Branding, hoof marking, etc., of animals furnished National Guard, New Jersey.

1. When the troops of the National Guard of the State of New Jersey left for duty on the Mexican border some of the animals taken with them were not branded, some were not hoof marked, descriptive cards had not been made for some, and no receipts and invoices were made out covering the animals assigned to each organization, though it is understood that memorandum receipts were obtained to cover all animals.

2. In order that the contractors from whom these animals were purchased may be paid, and in order that the property officer of the State of New Jersey who received these animals from the board which inspected them for purchase may prepare his property returns, it is recommended that the commanding officer at Douglas, Ariz., where it is understood that all of the troops of the National Guard of the State of New Jersey are stationed, be directed to detail one or more officers of the Regular Army to inspect all of the animals brought with these troops and see that the following action is taken in regard to them, to wit:

(a) That all are branded "U.S."

(b) That all are hoof marked.

(c) That descriptive cards are made for all of them.

(d) That invoices and receipts are made by each respective officer for the animals turned over to him at the mobilization camp at Sea Girt, N. J.

(e) That the invoices are signed by this officer for Lieut. Col. David S. Hill, National Guard, New Jersey.

(f) That the receipts made out in favor of Lieut. Col. Hill are signed by the officer who had the animals turned over to him at the mobilization camp.

(g) That these receipts are all forwarded to the department quartermaster, Eastern Department, who will see that they are turned over to Lieut. Col. Hill and that any memorandum receipts which he holds are canceled and returned to the persons who signed them.

(h) That boards of survey are made to cover the loss of any animals between the time that they left the mobilization camp at Sea Girt, N. J., and the time of this inspection, which boards of survey should be utilized by the officers signing these receipts to cover their losses since receiving the animals.

(i) A certified list be furnished by these officers showing the number of privately owned animals which were inspected and taken over, giving a value for each of the same.

(j) A certified list be furnished by these officers showing the number of organization owned animals which were inspected and taken over, giving a value for each of the same.

3. It is requested that action be taken in this matter as soon as possible and the papers forwarded to the department quartermaster, Eastern Department, in order that the matter may be cleared up.

4. In this connection, you are informed that Capt. S. H. Barlow, National Guard of New Jersey, has been sent to Douglas, Ariz., by the State of New Jersey, to represent it and its disbursing and property officer in adjusting this matter.

Leonard Wood.

The following is a statement showing by months the number of animals issued to the National Guard from the auxiliary remount depots at El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and the number remaining on hand at those depots:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Mules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td>Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 18 to June 30</td>
<td>181 100</td>
<td>6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1 to 31</td>
<td>3,267 1,903</td>
<td>3,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1 to 31</td>
<td>6,130 4,088</td>
<td>6,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1 to 30</td>
<td>2,913</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1 to 28</td>
<td>791 2,046</td>
<td>2,046</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On July 11, 1916, the commanding general of the Eastern Department reported that the Second Maine Infantry had left for the border practically without animals and stated that unless the Government is prepared to promptly furnish animals to organizations arriving on the border it is recommended that the War Department fix a minimum number of animals for organizations to take with them in order that they may have some degree of mobility on arrival on the border, and not be entirely helpless.

The Quartermaster General reported in this connection on July 28 that a sufficient number of horses and mules were being shipped to El Paso and Fort Sam Houston, auxiliary remount depots, to promptly equip organizations arriving on the border with the necessary animals to enable them to get along until they can be equipped with the full field allowance of animals, and therefore he considered...
it not necessary to purchase animals for troops at mobilization camps in addition to those which the department authorities, Eastern Department, were authorized to buy under War Department instructions. He states that the full allowance of horses and mules has already been contracted for to equip all militia organizations called into the service of the United States, and that animals are being shipped at the rate of 6,000 per week to remount depots mentioned above, and that there were at El Paso on July 19, 2,835 Cavalry horses, 1,144 Artillery horses, 586 draft mules, 219 pack mules, and at Fort Sam Houston July 22, 1,417 Cavalry horses, 860 Artillery horses, 4,115 draft mules, and 292 pack mules.

The commanding general, Southern Department, indorsed this part on August 13, stating that the supply of animals for all organizations is being rapidly furnished. To indicate the amount and character of the work being done, the example is cited of issues from Fort Sam Houston July 22 of 859 animals. Endeavor is being made to give a partial supply to all organizations before attempting to issue completely to any one. The wisdom of issuing green animals to organizations to bring to the border with them immediately is seriously doubted. About 150 deaths have been reported in the New York division, and a board of mounted officers has reported as follows:

The board on mortality among public animals at McAllen considers that mortality is not abnormal in view of conditions of mobilization. Losses mostly occurred amongst horses purchased for the emergency of which nearly all were sick when received by organizations, and many sick when entrained.

This matter having again been referred to the commanding general, Eastern Department, he states that comments of the McAllen board on the action taken at his headquarters in the matter of purchase of horses for the New York troops are unwarranted, as a board of thoroughly competent Regular officers, assisted by veterinarians, inspected and purchased these horses, and that similar boards purchased for Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. No horses were sick when they embarked. He states:

I deemed it highly advisable to send mounted organizations to the border without horses. It was assumed that under conditions which necessitated the mobilization, mounted troops would be required to act as such on arrival at the scene of probable military activity, and therefore all mounted organizations should have gone fully equipped with animals. The animals purchased were as a rule seasoned animals. A large portion of those for the New York troops were those which had been hired for their summer training period. The mounted troops for New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were given horses enough to mount a portion of the Cavalry organizations, and the Artillery was supplied with horses enough to at least pull the guns into position. These were the only horses they had on arrival at the border and in most instances the only horses they had for a long time afterwards.

He states that a policy which results in men 75 per cent of whom are untrained being supplied at the theater of operations with green horses, untrained and untried, is in his opinion an unsound and dangerous one. If we had had to meet conditions of actual military operations on arrival the results would have been disastrous. In case it is ever necessary to send the militia to the border again, or to call it into the service under conditions which render active operations probable, as was the case in this instance, every organization should leave with its full complement of seasoned animals.

On October 2, 1916, the Secretary of War, upon recommendation of the Chief of the Militia Bureau, authorized the issue by the Quartermaster Corps of such of the surplus horses as the law allowed and were needed for training purposes by organizations of National Guard upon being mustered out of the service of the United States. Immediately upon receipt of this authority by the Chief of the Militia Bureau telegrams were directed to the adjutants general of all states that had organizations of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and signal troops, informing them of the action of the War Department and requesting that they report by wire if horses were desired issued to such organizations of the National Guard of the State, and requesting the designation of the troop, battery or company for which it was desired horses be issued, and requesting information as to the number of horses, not exceeding 32 per troop, battery, or company, and 4 for regimental, battalion, or squadron headquarters, that could be cared for and provided proper stabling facilities by the State.

Upon receipt of this information at the Militia Bureau it was at once tabulated and The Adjutant General of the Army furnished lists thereof, with request that the commanding general, Southern Department, be furnished with the information contained in the lists and that he be directed that when the organizations referred to were returned from the border for muster out of the service of the United States the number of horses desired by the State for each organization be returned with those organizations, and further, that in view of the fact that several organizations of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Signal Corps had already been returned from the border for muster out, that the horses desired for such organizations be shipped to the States with the first mounted troops of the National Guard of that particular State that should be next returned from the border for muster out.

The action of the Secretary of War contained in the above-mentioned instructions, dated October 2, 1916, provided means whereby a large number of the animals left surplus in the hands of the Quartermaster Corps on the muster out of mounted troops could be disposed of to advantage and further enabled these National Guard organizations to be furnished with animals essential for their proper training at their home stations and without charge against National Guard appropriations. The number of animals authorized issued under the authority referred to have been 9,409 for Cavalry, 2,345 for Field Artillery, and 619 for Signal Corps.

The number of horses authorized issued to mounted organizations of the National Guard by the act of August 29, 1916, which amended section 90, act of June 3, 1916, is not exceeding 32 to any one battery, troop, or company, or 4 to a battalion or regimental headquarters of Cavalry, Field Artillery, Signal Corps, Engineer company, Ambulance company, and other mounted units of the National Guard.

Owing to the fact that the original estimates of the Militia Bureau for funds for the purpose of purchasing horses for the National Guard, issue of forage, and payment of competent help for the care of these animals, authorized by sections 89 and 90 of the act of June 3, 1916, were so materially reduced by Congress as the result of the call of the National Guard into the service of the United States, the Militia Bureau found it necessary to recommend the issue of horses only to Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Signal Corps units of
the National Guard, deeming it more advisable to make the first issue of animals to those organizations wholly mounted and to which the issue of animals was more essential for training purposes than to any other partly mounted organizations. It is the expectation, however, of the Militia Bureau to authorize the issue of horses to sanitary and engineer organizations in a limited number for training purposes as soon as Congress makes further appropriations for this purpose. Deficiency estimates have been submitted to the Secretary of War asking for funds to provide for the National Guard for the last six months of the fiscal year 1917.

SMALLPOX AND TYPHOID PROPHYLAXIS.

Circular No. 8, War Department, Division of Militia Affairs, dated May 10, 1916, issued to all States for distribution to all medical officers of the Organized Militia, appears to have been very beneficial in securing the desired results in the matter of prompt protection of the personnel of the Organized Militia against smallpox and typhoid fever. Paragraph 7 of this circular called attention to the importance of these preventive measures and the method of supplying the necessary apparatus and vaccine for mobilization camps.

The Medical Department of the United States Army deserves great credit for the prompt delivery of the vaccine, and the necessary apparatus for administering it, to the mobilization camps. All the antityphoid serum was prepared in the laboratory of the Army Medical School and represented an immense amount of labor. Circular No. 8 also contains full instructions pertaining to the administration of the antityphoid serum.

As a result of this timely circular of instructions to the medical officers of the Organized Militia and the prompt and adequate supply of the vaccine by the medical department, practically all the personnel of the Organized Militia were vaccinated against smallpox and received their first dose of antityphoid prophylaxis within from one to three days after their arrival at the mobilization camp, and with few exceptions all had their second dose of antityphoid before their departure for the border, while those who were permitted to remain in mobilization camp 20 days received their last dose within the time limit prescribed in the instructions issued. Those organizations which were ordered to the border before June 28 were given their remaining two doses after their arrival on the border, as were all other organizations whose antityphoid prophylaxis was not completed at the mobilization camps.

The administration of these preventive measures against smallpox and typhoid fever was done by the medical officers of the Organized Militia, as there were not sufficient medical officers of the Regular Army available for this purpose. As proof that these valuable protective measures were properly administered there have been no cases of smallpox on the border and only few cases of typhoid fever. While in mobilization camps two or three cases of smallpox were reported, which occurred before vaccination. Only a few cases of typhoid fever were reported, the origin of which is reputed to have been due to infection before coming to camp. As compared with conditions in the mobilization camps of 1898, this is a remarkable showing of the triumph of science over disease.

INSPECTIONS OF NATIONAL GUARD.

In the inquiry as to the condition of the National Guard, its efficiency and readiness to take its place in the first line of defense, there were really three inspections made.

First. When the National Guard was mustered in, at which time it was reported on by about 40 inspector instructors and mustering officers, 7 medical officers, as well as several special inspectors.

Second. Shortly after the arrival of the bulk of the National Guard on the border a general inspection was made (July 14 to August 15) by Maj. Gen. T. H. Bliss, Assistant Chief of Staff, an abstract of whose series of reports appears elsewhere in this publication.

Third. Subsequently thorough and detailed inspections were made by officers of the Inspector General's Department, with the assistance of a few special inspectors. It was the intention to inspect every organization, but some few were mustered out before this could be done. These inspections originated in the following manner:

On July 12 the Chief of the Militia Bureau prepared a memorandum for The Adjutant General of the Army on the subject of the inspection of the Organized Militia and National Guard in the service of the United States, suggesting in considerable detail the character of the proposed inspection, covering such subjects as the present degree of readiness and fitness for field service, and to determine the length of time considered necessary to make the organizations efficient units at war strength in campaign, etc. This memorandum was submitted to the Inspector General of the Army, who stated that there seemed to be some prospect also of tactical divisions being organized, and such inspections could be made by division inspectors with probably some assistance. He stated, moreover, that he thought it a very wise plan to begin the inspections at once, without further delay, and considered "the objects of these inspections," as outlined by the Chief of the Militia Bureau, as appropriate.

Acting on the above, a regular form of report of special field inspection (Form 20, I. G. D.) was prepared and the Special Field Inspections were commenced about July 27. The last report received was dated October 19.

These inspections were made by 22 officers—mostly of field rank—all of extended experience and nearly all from the regular personnel of the Inspector General's Department. Nine of these officers had served mainly in the Infantry, seven mainly in the Cavalry, and six mainly in the Artillery.

They were made by the following named officers:


Coast Artillery.—Maj. James F. Brady; Maj. Jacob C. Johnson, I. G.

No arrangement could easily be made which was better calculated than this to eliminate bias and prejudice.

Most of the inspections were made at border camps, others at the State mobilization camps.

The statistical data collected by these inspectors have been of great value to the Militia Bureau and this subject is treated in a subsequent chapter.

To determine the military value of these troops, inspectors were called on for "General remarks which may serve in appraising the real value of the citizen soldier on a hasty call into the Federal service and the amount of time necessary for his after development."

Especially attention is invited to these general remarks, which are abstracted here.

The replies to the questions: No. 1, present degree of readiness and fitness for service of the organization and, No. 5, length of time considered necessary to make the organization efficient at war strength in campaign, counting from date of the President's call, are especially pertinent to our inquiry. The reports under these headings have been much condensed, so as to present to the reader, within the scope of a few pages, a fairly accurate picture of the efficiency of these troops from two to four months after the call of June 18.

GENERAL REMARKS MADE BY INSPECTORS WHICH MAY SERVE IN APPRAISING THE REAL VALUE OF THE CITIZEN SOLDIER ON A HASTY CALL INTO THE FEDERAL SERVICE, AND THE AMOUNT OF TIME NECESSARY FOR HIS FUTURE DEVELOPMENT.

The essence of the general remarks of Lieut. Cols. Helmick and P. A. Wolf, under this head in reports of about 31 different inspections—25 of Infantry and 6 of Cavalry—is, in effect, as follows:

The real value of the citizen soldier is directly dependent upon the degree of training he has had and upon the completeness of his equipment. From a consideration of the data collected as to the amount of previous instruction given the National Guardsmen, the state of their equipment, and the amount of target practice which they have had, the prospects do not seem promising. * * *

The quality of instruction received since being mustered into Federal service is defective and satisfactory results in training have not been reached. It seems that governors of States have not kept their organizations fully equipped. Then, too, the fact that the organization is under State control in time of peace, with a system of administration and records different from that of the Federal Government, adds to the difficulty and length of time necessary to attain efficiency when called into the service of the United States. While the provisions of the act approved June 3, 1916, call for higher requirements for the National Guard than formerly, it seems hopeless to expect that any satisfactory degree of efficiency can be reached by National Guard troops in a reasonable length of time unless the commissioned personnel contains a sufficient number of trained officers of the Regular Army to act as instructors for the mass of untrained men comprising the regiment.

GENERAL REMARKS.

INFANTRY.

Maj. H. A. Smith, in his inspection of the —— Infantry, says:

History shows an absence of economy and efficiency following a hasty raising of soldiers. These men are not trained soldiers and would encounter in a hasty campaign all the difficulties to be encountered by any body of men undertaking an intricate business based on constantly changing conditions, and would show the same absence of results; and in the case of soldiers the stake is human lives, property, national ideals, and honor.

In his inspection of the —— Infantry, he says:

It is thought this organization would soon find itself short teamsters, cooks, mechanics, horseshoers, and other men of useful soldier's trades. Some men holding such offices are paid extra from other than Government sources.

Maj. Smith reports in another regimental inspection:

The regiment seems loosely held together. Effective leadership is lacking.

In another he says:

The officers are trained only in a small degree. Their ideas of discipline are crude and unformed. The equipment was very incomplete on muster in, and is still not complete. The militia has no dependable method of recruiting.

Maj. H. A. Smith, I. G., in his inspection of the —— Infantry, says:

The strength of the command was increased by 37.3 per cent of green men, and 29 per cent of the increased strength have been discharged on account of physical disability. Almost 50 per cent of present strength were without previous field or camp experience, and the regiment is still short nearly 500 men. New men had to be vaccinated and to receive typhoid prophylaxis. The officers had had no experience with Federal records, reports, returns, or methods of supply, and no serious military training of any kind. The existence of the organization depended on the popularity of officers and will shortly revert to the same basis. The degree of control of officers and their efficiency as leaders and instructors can under such circumstances be most limited.

Of the —— Infantry he says:

This regiment was called out in May, 1916, but shows a less degree of readiness than others with less service. The colonel, on being directed to prepare his regiment for inspection, directed the lieutenant colonel to do it, and on being informed that a regimental drill was desired remained in his tent and directed the lieutenant colonel to take the drill. It is thought that all National Guard troops have military spirit, else they would not be in the service. Their lack of efficiency is due to want of training. Thirty days' intensive training under competent officers with the least efficient regiment that the undersigned has inspected would make it equal in readiness to the most efficient.

Of the —— Infantry he says:

Forty-two per cent in green men were added to the number in service on call. Forty-nine and three-tenths per cent had had no previous field or camp training, and the regiment is now below strength about 440 men. The opinion exists in the National Guard that it is not more incumbent upon them than upon all others to defend the country. They are in for a limited time only, and having no serious military training, the limit of officers and noncommissioned officers in disciplinary control, leadership, and as instructors must soon be reached.

Maj. Smith, in inspecting the —— Infantry, says:

It is thought that all National Guard troops have military spirit, else they would not be in the service. Their lack of efficiency is due to want of training. Thirty days' intensive training under competent officers with the least efficient regiment would make it equal in readiness to the most efficient the undersigned has inspected.

Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the —— Infantry, October 4, says:

Nearly all of the regiment seem to have joined after the call. This is probably due to the fact that Federal recognition had been withdrawn from about half of this regiment prior to the call, and that after the call the organizations were inspected and recognition restored. Sixty-four per cent of the men have not attended a previous encampment, the regiment is short of men, and not now fit for active field service.
In his inspection of the —— Infantry, October 3, he says:

Over 77 per cent of the men joined after the call, and about 62 per cent of these had no prior service. Both officers and men apparently have little conception of what real discipline is, and are slow and inattentive to their duties. The regiment is not now fit for active service.

In his inspection of the —— Infantry (less Companies A, B, and C), October 6 and 7, Maj. Simons says:

Over 88 per cent of the men joined after the call and over 37 per cent of these had no former service. Sixty-five per cent had not attended a previous encampment. The regiment is not now fit for active service in campaign.

Maj. Simons, in reporting on an inspection of the mobilization camp of the —— National Guard at Fort ——, June 30 to July 3, said:

As the command reported at camp they were, in my opinion, in no way prepared for active service. There is a very large percentage of entirely new men, and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they acted at inspection, do not appear to have had much training. The spirit of the officers and men is particularly good, and they all seemed very anxious to learn. Any suggestions as to camp sanitation, instructions, or paper work is eagerly sought and, as far as possible, is taken advantage of. The troops are now, I believe, very well equipped, but have had very little proper training.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That in any mobilization camp a regular officer of high rank be assigned as camp commander, with authority to enforce proper camp sanitation and regulate the system of supply, and that as many detached officers of the regular service can be spared be detailed as instructors, with authority to supervise and direct the instruction in administration and training of the National Guard.

Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the —— Infantry, reports as follows:

The general spirit of the men is very good, and the officers inform me that most of the men desire to remain in service and are not clamoring to go home. The men are very well equipped, and have had very little proper training. The regiment has been commanded for about two weeks by an officer of the Regular Army and shows it, but this officer’s time has been so much taken up by routine papers, getting the regiment equipped, etc., that he has not had the time to devote to instruction that he should have.

In another inspection, he says:

The regiment has been commanded for about two weeks by an officer of the Regular Army and shows it, but this officer’s time has been so much taken up by routine papers, getting the regiment equipped, etc., that he has not had the time to devote to instruction that he should have.

In another inspection, he says:

The time of the officers since arrival in this camp has been largely taken up with muster-in rolls and preparation of requisitions to complete equipment. The regiment is not now fit to take the field in active operations.

Again, in two other regimental inspections, he says:

The instruction of the older men has not been thorough. It is not now fit to take the field in active operations.

In another inspection, he says:

The regiment has been commanded for about two weeks by an officer of the Regular Army and shows it, but this officer’s time has been so much taken up by routine papers, getting the regiment equipped, etc., that he has not had the time to devote to instruction that he should have.

Again he says:

This is a colored battalion, and the officers and men seem very anxious to learn. The major seems to have good control of his officers and men. The battalion needs training and proper discipline and instruction to make it efficient. A good deal of time is wasted in learning Army papers and methods, which might be taught with good results at the home station.
Out previous field service. One battalion has had a little border guard duty in the Big Bend district. The training of the regiment has been almost entirely elementary and is not by any means complete. Commendable progress has been made, and the efficiency of the regiment is above the average in training.

In the inspection of the —— Infantry, he says:

This regiment is more nearly equipped and at its present strength more nearly ready than any yet inspected by me. Its training has been almost entirely elementary, and, aside from living in tents, it has had little field training. The regiment was not ready for field service at the call, and is not ready now, but it has made good progress in training and is getting itself equipped. I believe within six months of date of call it would be in condition to render fairly efficient service.

In the inspection of another regiment he states:

Further than living under canvas, in a permanent camp, the regiment has had little or no training in field service. There are so many unknown quantities that it is impossible to more than guess at the time required to make the regiment efficient in campaign at war strength.

In the inspection of another regiment he states:

The training has necessarily been almost entirely elementary. The field experience of the regiment has consisted almost entirely in living in tents in a permanent camp. Considering the extremely large percentage of wholly untrained men, the regiment has made commendable progress, but its training is far from complete, and it is not ready for field service.

In the inspection of another regiment he says:

Aside from being under canvas in a permanent camp it has had little or no field training. The regiment was not ready for field service at the call; it is not ready now, and the question as to when it would be ready at war strength is one that involves so many uncertainties that no one could pretend to more than guess at the minimum time required—assuming the most favorable conditions.

Lieut. Col. Winn, in the inspection of the —— Infantry, says:

This regiment has had a little experience in border patrol, but its field experience has consisted largely in living under canvas in a permanent camp. Its numbers, training, and equipment it is considered above the average of regiments so far inspected by me. Its training, however, has been largely elementary, and it still has much to learn to make it really effective in campaign. The officers are earnest and have apparently taken advantage of their opportunities for professional study, but through lack of experience they are deficient in knowledge of practical tactics and of the care of their command in actual field service.

In the inspection of the —— Infantry he says:

The training has been almost entirely elementary and is incomplete. The regiment is larger than the average, and the enlisted personnel is above the average physically. Officers and men deficient in training and experience necessary for proper care of themselves, men, and animals in actual field service.

In the inspection of the —— Infantry he says:

* * * Its field training has consisted largely in living under canvas in a permanent camp in El Paso. This regiment is the largest yet inspected, and its per cent of recruits is below the average. Its training, however, has been almost elementary, and it has much to learn before it could be considered really effective in campaign.

Maj. Douglas Settle, in his inspections of the —— Infantry, —— Infantry, and —— Infantry, says, in effect, as follows:

The value of a soldier depends upon his physical condition, the completeness of his equipment, and the nature and extent of the training he has received to fit him for the duties of war. When a nation depends principally upon its citizens for soldiers, compulsory service is most desirable, if not necessary, and should be accompanied by universal military training. Even without compulsory service, it is not thought there will be, in the beginning at least, serious difficulty experienced in case of war in securing the requisite numbers of men physically fit, or in properly equipping them, but it must be borne in mind that only a very small per cent of them will have had any military training or experience. In the —— Regiment, whose physical, mental, and moral state is excellent, 44 per cent (58 per cent in the —— Regiment) are men who were enlisted under the call without prior service, while the instruction received by the remainder was so limited as hardly to qualify a nucleus of competent instructors, especially in the important grade of noncommissioned officer. It is manifest that no military organization can absorb at one time such a large per cent of untrained men and be in a state of readiness for immediate service. Besides the mistake of not maintaining organizations at war strength in time of peace there are two other defects in the National Guard system for which a remedy should be sought, viz, the dual allegiance to State and Nation and the election of officers by the men they command. A system of thorough instruction of officers and noncommissioned officers should be advised in such way the time required after the call for the development of National Guard organizations into effective military units can be materially decreased. In its present state of instruction and incomplete personnel, it is my opinion that National Guard organizations after being called into the Federal service will require from six to nine months to prepare them for offensive action against a first-class foe, and that purely volunteer organizations will similarly need one year. Against an inferior enemy the requisite development could probably be had in one-half the time stated above.

Col. Morgan, in his report of inspection of the —— Infantry, says:

With one Regular officer to the battalion it would take three months to make these men into good soldiers.

Col. Morgan reports:

The —— Infantry could be made efficient in six months if an efficient Regular officer were attached to each company.

On another regiment, Col. Morgan says:

The organization shows the effect of its camp work and life. The men look hardly and are beginning to march and look like soldiers. Of the officers, some have not made good, and should the regiment remain at the border for a determined time, they should be replaced.

Col. Morgan, in his inspection of the —— Infantry, says:

It is the best National Guard regiment at Eagle Pass in equipment and general efficiency. The colonel is a Regular, a good executive, and the regiment shows it. Regiment will be fit for the field in about two months.

Of another regiment, he says:

Three months would make them very good troops.

In his inspection of the —— Infantry, he says:

Probably 50 per cent were new men at muster in, and it will take probably six months to make the regiment a reliable military force with the assistance of proper instructors.

Col. Morgan, in reporting on the inspection of two regiments of —— Infantry, says:

With the large number of new men the result of instruction and training after two months has been good. Six months more similar training will make the regiment a reliable force in war.

Col. McDonald, in inspecting the —— Infantry, says:

There is no basis on which to rest an estimate of the time necessary to develop the citizen soldier or National Guardsmen as exemplified by these organi-
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

Col. Hunter, I. G., in his reports of inspections of First and Second Battalions, says it will require a year's training to make them efficient.

Lieut. Col. Caldwell, in inspecting the Infantry, says:

It has been commanded by Col. McLoughlin, a Regular captain, United States Infantry, for about two years. This advantage in training is apparent. The training and instruction of the regiment was carried on under adverse conditions, as it was hurriedly mustered in and shipped to the border. Officers and men intelligent, zealous, and anxious to learn. Results under these conditions very creditable.

Maj. Jackson reports at one of his inspections:

The commanding officer impresses me as being efficient. Administration very satisfactory. Discipline enforced. Course of training very satisfactory. In six months intensive training along present lines will make the organization efficient. What it needs is the services of well-trained Army officers as instructors. The real value of this organization as a fighting unit on first entry into service would have been small, though field and staff and many of the company officers appear to have devoted considerable time to the study of their duties. Practical work will bring good results in six months. Better results would be obtained if the regiment was sent away from its home station, so as to get rid of the distraction of families.

Col. Donaldson, in inspecting the Infantry, says:

This is the best-prepared regiment for field service in the brigade, but all officers and enlisted men will require much more field training before prepared to enter active field service. The commanding officer is a very capable officer, and will likely bring the regiment up to an efficient state within a very few months.

In inspecting the Infantry, he says:

This regiment was by no means prepared when the call for troops was sent out, and is not much better now. Officers are evidently appointed from personal and not professional qualifications. * * * The men have improved greatly in the past two months and have gained from 5 to 15 pounds in weight.

In his inspection of the Infantry, Col. Donaldson says:

Many men were rejected on the muster in of this regiment for physical defects. A large percentage of them were overweight. Practically every enlisted man has gained from 5 to 15 pounds during the tour of duty here. The officers generally are not much better in a physical sense, and the men are not familiar with the necessary duties pertaining to active service. Apparently all the officers were selected for the positions they hold for personal and not professional qualifications. Had this regiment been called upon for immediate active field service, the majority of the organizations would not have been prepared.

In his inspection of the Infantry, he says:

Officers and men still lack the hard physical condition necessary for proficient service, and they are gradually acquiring it. The most urgent need is trained officers and noncommissioned officers.

Of the Infantry he says:

The appearance of officers and men, their physical condition, and the observance of military duties have greatly improved. There has also been an improvement in training, but the great need is trained officers and noncommissioned officers. About 67 per cent of the men of this regiment had no military service prior to the call.

He says the same in his inspection of the Infantry.

Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the Infantry, September 1 to 6, says:

Under the present system of physical examinations the physique of the members of the organizations would take much longer. The members of the organizations would be chosen on the basis of personal qualifications, and it is not what is to be desired. Twenty-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel of this regiment was found physically disqualified on muster-in. These were replaced in general by untrained men.

Another criticism made is the totally inadequate number of instructors, which in general is limited to one instructor for each branch of the service in one or more States, which is entirely inadequate for instruction in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for this the large number of officers and men found physically disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes the system which permits this as being faulty.

This regiment lost about one-fourth of its members (24 per cent) upon physical examination, and about three-fourths of the regiment has not attended a previous encampment and have not fired. In two of the lettered companies none of the enlisted men have fired. These figures show that this is practically a "recruit" regiment. This is offset to a certain extent by having about a hundred men in it who have served in the Regular Army, and nearly all of these men have been noncommissioned officers. The State authorities have made no provision for the payment of fees by examining surgeons, and civilian surgeons were not willing to make the necessary examinations free of charge, many of the applicants were enlisted after being examined by different surgeons, as far as possible, by the company officers. This was done in some cases after the call was made.

Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the Infantry, Fort August 24 to 29, the inspector, Maj. J. C. Johnson, I. G., remarked that under the present system of making physical examinations of applicants for enlistment in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for this the large number of officers and men found physically disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes the system which permits this as being faulty.

Another criticism made is the totally inadequate number of instructors, which in general is limited to one instructor for each branch of the service in one or more States, which is entirely inadequate for instruction in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for this the large number of officers and men found physically disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes the system which permits this as being faulty.

This regiment lost about one-fourth of its members (24 per cent) upon physical examination, and about three-fourths of the regiment has not attended a previous encampment and have not fired. In two of the lettered companies none of the enlisted men have fired. These figures show that this is practically a "recruit" regiment. This is offset to a certain extent by having about a hundred men in it who have served in the Regular Army, and nearly all of these men have been noncommissioned officers. The State authorities have made no provision for the payment of fees by examining surgeons, and civilian surgeons were not willing to make the necessary examinations free of charge, many of the applicants were enlisted after being examined by different surgeons, as far as possible, by the company officers. This was done in some cases after the call was made.

He says the same in his inspection of the Infantry.

Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the Infantry, September 1 to 6, says:

Under the present system of physical examinations the physique of the members of the organizations would take much longer. The members of the organizations would be chosen on the basis of personal qualifications, and it is not what is to be desired. Twenty-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel of this regiment was found physically disqualified on muster-in. These were replaced in general by untrained men.

Another criticism made is the totally inadequate number of instructors, which in general is limited to one instructor for each branch of the service in one or more States, which is entirely inadequate for instruction in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for this the large number of officers and men found physically disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes the system which permits this as being faulty.

Another criticism made is the totally inadequate number of instructors, which in general is limited to one instructor for each branch of the service in one or more States, which is entirely inadequate for instruction in the Organized Militia the citizen soldier will be of little value on a hasty call in the Federal service. He gives as a reason for this the large number of officers and men found physically disqualified on muster-in, the loss reaching as high as 77 per cent in one company, and as a result, in the first and second regiments, all but one company was reduced below peace strength, and these losses had to be replaced almost entirely by untrained men. He criticizes the system which permits this as being faulty.

This regiment lost about one-fourth of its members (24 per cent) upon physical examination, and about three-fourths of the regiment has not attended a previous encampment and have not fired. In two of the lettered companies none of the enlisted men have fired. These figures show that this is practically a "recruit" regiment. This is offset to a certain extent by having about a hundred men in it who have served in the Regular Army, and nearly all of these men have been noncommissioned officers. The State authorities have made no provision for the payment of fees by examining surgeons, and civilian surgeons were not willing to make the necessary examinations free of charge, many of the applicants were enlisted after being examined by different surgeons, as far as possible, by the company officers. This was done in some cases after the call was made.
The regimental commander reports that most of the officers took the course at the officers' school under the direction of Capt. W. N. Hughes, instructor. After two months of work in this camp the command has acquired a good knowledge of camp sanitation and of close-order drill. The enlisted personnel is of excellent quality, with an average age of probably between 20 and 21 years. Possibly 20 per cent are 19 or under, and are not yet to their full physical capacity. The regimental commander is of the opinion that there is ample material in the enlisted personnel who, with a few months' training, would be able to replace the entire commissioned personnel. In my opinion there are enlisted men in this organization who would make better commissioned officers than some of those who at present hold commissions. I concur in the opinion of the regimental commander as to the value of the citizen soldier—that, in general, he is a man of keen intelligence, of good spirit, who has not yet attained his maximum physical development, but who, with six months' intensive training, would give a good account of himself.

Maj. Brady, C. A. C., A. J. G., in reporting on the inspection of the three regiments of Infantry at , August 18 to 29, states that he is unable to arrive at any valuable conclusions which may serve in appraising the real value of the citizen soldier on a hasty call into Federal service and the time necessary for his development, as these factors depend so largely upon the efficiency and general coordination of the various staff and supply departments, but states that he believes it would require a minimum of from four to six months of intensive training.

Maj. Brady, in his inspection of the Infantry, makes the same general remarks as above, adding that the colonel is efficiently commanding and instructing his regiment, which, however, has had very little training in marching and field exercises.

Maj. Brady, in reporting on the Infantry, is favorably impressed with both the colonel and lieutenant colonel, but states that the regiment is making satisfactory progress. It lacks considerable equipment, and it is estimated that it will require at least six months from date of call to make the regiment a satisfactory field unit.

The six Infantry Regiments were inspected by Capt. Cromwell Stacey between August 6 and 13 at .

In his general remarks he says of the and that they have been in camp over a month and the majority of the men do not know the School of the Soldier. They have no progressive system of instruction. A large proportion of the officers of these regiments turned out for drill before the inspector without belts or side arms.

Companies in both regiments were unnecessarily slow in forming for drill. Performance of guard duty poor.

Enlisted men pay very little attention to officers of their own regiment and none to officers of other regiments.

In the the inspector says: Many officers do not know where they belong at drill or what their duties are. In attacks no range given, no target indicated. Officers attempting to control their organizations in extended order by shouting out orders, and in close order they use signals. It is pitiful to watch their incompetency. The regiment would be of no value on the border. To be made efficient in any reasonable time it must be placed under a regular officer. The colonel stated that he did not think it possible to have good discipline in his regiment, as there were so many men in it who were his equals socially.

Col. Morgan, in reporting on inspection of the Cavalry, September 16, says:

This regiment has been handicapped with all the drawbacks incident to the organization of a Cavalry regiment in this country.
The horses when received were more or less suffering from the usual car fever, and some are just beginning instruction. But one regular officer is detailed with the regiment, and its camp is so isolated that the men have little opportunity of learning from observation the small items of their new business from other mustered organizations.

A regular schedule of drill has been adhered to with good results. But one horse has been lost from disease. The animals look very well kept, but many are still weak and unable to be properly drilled.

During preliminary training I consider it a mistake to isolate this regiment from the good regular cavalry regiments in the vicinity.

Col. Morgan, in inspecting Troop —, Cavalry, September 7, states:

The troop has no sanitary personnel and lacks attention from that direction. Its horses have but lately recovered generally from the shipping or other fever, and the men and horses need drill by an expert.

Its camp is isolated and not in a very good location; its sanitary condition is not as it should be. The men are not furnished with cots and the tents are not neat.

The horses are small and now in poor condition in most cases.

The troop should be camped near another cavalry organization for instruction. This I understand will be done at once.

In his inspection of the First Squadron, —, Cavalry, September 15, he says:

This squadron is a part of a provisional regiment composed of units from three states, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. It is commanded by a regular officer, Lieut. Col. James J. Hornbrook, Seventeenth Cavalry.

They were supplied with horses upon organization and later, about six weeks, and have been nursing the horses and drilling them when able. Lost 25 from sickness.

The drills have evidently been conducted in a conservative manner and with system. It will take probably six months to make an efficient regiment of the command.

In his inspection of the First Squadron of —, Cavalry at Fort —, Tex., September 15, Col. Morgan remarked that this organization had had its horses only a short time, and when received they were sick with car fever — 25 died. An immense amount of work had been done but as much more would be necessary to make that command a military asset. The principal cause of delay was the poor condition of horses, and he reported that it would require six months to fit the squadron for the field. Remarks of the same tenor were made by this inspector upon the inspection of Troop A, —, Cavalry, at the same place and date.

Maj. Conner, in his inspection of Troop —, Cavalry, July 28 and 29, says:

This troop has an experienced and capable ex-regular for its captain. The troop personnel is exceptional in intelligence and other qualities. It has a high esprit and is in earnest. Yet the troop is not ready for service. This unreasonableness is due to lack of horses and equipment of all kinds and to lack of adequate training.

As indicated above the troop is making satisfactory progress in its training, but its real value "on a hasty call into the Federal service" is nil in so far as immediate service in the field is concerned.

The amount of time required for after development of the citizen soldier is dependent upon the time needed to secure equipment, etc., and largely on the experience and ability of his officers and noncommissioned officers. For this organization it is believed that four months would suffice, provided horses and all equipment could be provided within 10 days of its muster into the Federal service.
sanitation, care of arms and equipments, care of animals, and discipline in camp and on the march.

Taking into account the conditions which have existed and do at present exist in this organization, it is practically impossible to make an estimate which will be of any value in determining the length of time necessary for the after development of the citizen soldier. With instruction and training under experienced officers, this troop could be made an efficient organization in three months from date of inspection.

Col. Donaldson says of the First Squadron —— Cavalry, August 22, that it was originally an infantry battalion and as such would in two or three months render fair service in the field, but as a cavalry organization its value now is nil, no officer or man having had any cavalry experience. No horses on hand and no instructor from the Regular Army. Men and officers generally are above the average in intelligence and will learn their duties quickly when properly instructed, but are making no progress now as far as cavalry work is concerned.

He says of the Second Squadron and one attached troop —— Cavalry:

They have had little mounted instruction, as there are no animals on hand except a few private mounts.

Capt. Donaldson says of Troops —— and —— National Guard of ——, that they have had very little mounted instruction, due to lack of horses, they having had only 16 horses every alternate day. The men appear to be above average intelligence and in excellent physical condition. With proper instruction they would develop into efficient cavalrymen.

Maj. Johnson, on September 6, reports that Troop —— Cavalry, has no mounts, which disposes of the question of its efficiency as a Cavalry organization.

Col. Chamberlain makes the same report September 7, regarding Troop ——, —— Cavalry.

Maj. Simons, in his inspection of the First Squadron, Cavalry, August 25 says:

The squadron is not supplied with horses, so that it is not possible to have any mounted exercises or to test the troops in marching. The squadron is not now fit to take the field in active operations.

In his inspection of the First and Second Squadrons, —— Cavalry, August 21, he says:

Two troops are still without horses; none of the horses are trained, and few of them are shod, so that it was not possible to have any mounted exercise or to test the troops in marching. Six of the troops were originally in the Infantry, and two were recruited on the call. These two troops are equal to or better than the others. Due to recruiting above the minimum strength on the call, the organizations were not supplied with sufficient arms, equipment and clothing to equip the increased strength. One of the squadrons is commanded by an officer of the Regular Army (captain, Twentieth Infantry), and the organizations show the effect of his experience and knowledge. This is the second organization which I have inspected which had a Regular officer in a position of authority, and the value of Regular officers in such positions is very marked. These squadrons are not now fit to take the field in active operations.

In inspecting Troop ——, —— Cavalry, August 25 he says:

Over 63 per cent of the men have not attended a previous encampment or period of field service. The troop needs disciplinary drills to steady it down. The troop is now performing patrol, guard duty and orderly service, so that the men do not get the instruction they require. The troop is not fit for field service.

He states in his inspection of Troop ——, —— Cavalry, August 26:

The troop needs disciplinary drills to steady it down. It is not now fit for field service.

Maj. Simons, in his general remarks on the inspection of Troop ——, —— Cavalry, says:

This troop was organized after the call, and 72 per cent of the men had no prior service. Most of the men are cattlemen, and understand horses and can ride. The troop has only had its horses a short time, but they seem to be making good progress with them. Both men and horses required a great amount of training to put them in condition for field service. The men are willing and the spirit of the troop seems to be good.

Maj. Settle, in his inspection of Troop ——, —— Cavalry, says:

The value of a soldier depends primarily upon his physical condition, the completeness of his equipment, and the character and extent of his training.

The average amount of drill and instruction imparted to this troop prior to the Federal call consisted of two drills of one and one-half hours' duration a week. The troop prior to the call had 16 horses, and the instruction not only covered the prescribed mounted and dismounted drill but also the care and training of the horses. At muster-in to the Federal service it was called upon to absorb 38 per cent of men without prior service or training and 60 per cent who had not participated in target firing. To reduce the time required for after development it is manifest that these organizations should be maintained at war strength in time of peace.

Cavalry can not be mobilized and developed into a state of readiness for field service as in short a period as Infantry because of the time required to train its mounts. The animals when received were below the prescribed standard for Cavalry mounts and were green and unbroken. At the date of this inspection the horses, considering the short while they had been on hand and their inferior quality, were remarkably well trained and conditioned.

The time required for the development of any units into an effective fighting machine is largely dependent upon the personnel, especially that of the officers and noncommissioned officers, and its prior training. In these respects this organization is very fortunate than the average National Guard organization, and, coming from a horse country, is in a fair state of readiness for effective service against inferior troops. For its thorough development, however, it should have at least two months more training and instruction to make it an effective troop in the field.

In his inspection of Troop ——, —— Cavalry, at ——, Tex., September 22, Maj. Settle says:

Cavalry can not be mobilized and developed into a state of readiness for field service in as short a period as Infantry because of the time required to train its mounts. The animals for that troop had been received about seven weeks previously, were below the prescribed standard, and were green and unbroken. He estimated that at least two months' more training would be necessary to make the troop effective for field service.

In his inspection of the —— Cavalry, at Camp ——, August 8 to 14, the inspector, Capt. Stacey, remarked as follows:

The officers of this squadron are generally capable, as far as education and intelligence is concerned, but professionally they are below the average of Regu-
lar Cavalry sergeants. They don't know anything about handling the saber, are ignorant of combat principles, are careless in camp sanitation, and I believe that the squadron has gone just as far as it can without outside help from a Regular officer. I do not believe that simply attaching a Regular officer to the squadron would accomplish much, as they do not realize how little they know. They don't appear to be willing to learn from the Regular service. They drill close order and drill mounted very well and seem to have devoted their entire attention to this, the least important duty of a cavalryman. They do not seem to have a correct appreciation of what Cavalry is for. They have wasted valuable time close order that might have been devoted to sketching, patrolling, reconnaissance, signaling, and extended-order exercises, all of which could have been learned without horses. If they are ever to become efficient, they will have to be attached to a Regular regiment or placed under the command of a Regular officer. If left to their horses and left to themselves, they will not be reasonably efficient in a year.

Capt. Wescott, in his inspection of Troop —, Cavalry, August 11 to 15, says:

The organization has no horses excepting one private mount. When the horses are assigned it will be safe to say that both horses and men will be green and untrained. In my opinion, the organization could have little or no value as cavalry in less than a year.

In inspecting Troop —, Cavalry, August 11 to 15, he says:

The organization has only eight horses. Most of the men of the troop are green and untrained in horsemanship. The horses to be assigned will probably be green also. In my opinion they would have little value as cavalry in any kind of service in less than a year.

Col. McDonald, inspecting Troop —, Cavalry, August 18, states:

This organization furnishes no basis on which to rest such an estimate. It was mustered in on June 28, 1916, and not furnished with horses that could be used until August 21, and then only for slow work at a walk on account of recent shipping fever. It had added to it 35 recruits. The men, though generally able to ride, are not horse trainers nor skilled horsemen. It is a mere guess as to how long it will take to train these men and horses at the present time; much depends on the quality of both, which can not be judged at a glance. The citizen soldier is not given a fair chance to show his ability to round out as a trained soldier under such circumstances, when he is handicapped by every drawback abhorred by regular officers in their training of regular commands. The law should require National Guard organizations to be always kept at the minimum number required for war service, so that on the call they could be shipped at once to the point required even before muster in, if needed for immediate use, and mustered in afterwards.

Lient. Col. Tayman, in his report of inspection of the First Squadron, —, Cavalry, says:

The adaptability is shown by the fact that after a few months' service under an officer of experience, they have become fair soldiers. The spirit displayed in the performance of the duty how engaged upon is excellent.

Artillery.

Maj. Stephens, in inspecting the First Battalion, Field Artillery, says:

They have been under the instruction of the officers of the — Battalion, Field Artillery, and have progressed rapidly. If they continue to be instructed by these regular officers, I believe they would be ready to take the field in about three months. The time necessary for the future development of the citizen soldier is dependent on so many variables that each case is likely to be different. If left to their own devices, I think it would take very much longer to develop them than when they are associated with and looked after by Regular Field Artillery officers.
Six months under competent instructors would be needed for an organization's after development, and this only provided field-manoeuvre ground is furnished the organization.

This regiment has an advantage over many in having a colonel retired Field Artillery officer; lieutenant colonel, a Regular Field Artillery officer; adjutant, an ex-Field Artillery officer; and one battery is commanded by an ex-Cavalry officer. No Regular officer has been assigned to them as instructor. They have progressed very rapidly and are having target practice, which Maj. H. L. Newbold has been detailed to supervise.

In inspecting Battery —, Field Artillery, September 27, he says:

On account of having a great many men with considerable service in this battery and the opportunities afforded them at home to work at the mounted part of the work, this battery will probably need a shorter time for its after-development than most others. This battery is ready to go into the field now and have its target practice, to which should be devoted about one month for best results. At the end of that time it should be ready for service in campaign.

Maj. Stephens reports in his inspection of the First Battalion,— Field Artillery:

The task of training green men and green horses on a hasty call into the Federal service is no doubt a big one, and it is not believed that such a task can be done in any reasonably short time unless competent instructors from the regular artillery service can be furnished. There is no doubt that a battalion such as this has a nucleus of officers and men partially trained on a hasty call into the Federal service, which makes the task of development into an efficient organization much simpler and easier than taking the entire force from untrained men. The amount of time necessary for the after-development is dependent on the amount of instruction that can be given by regular officers detailed as instructors with the organization. With one competent regular Field Artillery officer assigned to this battalion, I should judge it would be made fairly efficient for field service in about six months after the call. The commanding officer of this battalion, Maj. Tyndall, is a very able and energetic officer of the National Guard, and has taken every advantage of his opportunities to become proficient in Field Artillery.

The same remarks apply to Maj. Stephens's inspection of the Field Artillery of — (less one battalion), and in his report of that inspection, he adds:

The regimental commander, Col. George E. Leach, is one of the most enthusiastic artillery officers in the National Guard, and is as well qualified to command a Field Artillery regiment as any officer not a regular officer that I know of.

Maj. Stephens, in his inspection of Battery —, Field Artillery, September 25, says:

I consider this the best National Guard battery I have inspected. The captain is a real soldier and he has fine control over his men. He has been in the service now since about May 9, and has probably had more horses than most others in the latter part of June, or about three months. They have all had to pass through the epidemic of influenza and are now generally in very good shape, both as to condition and training, and ready for almost any kind of service, this organization contained more men used to riding and the handling of animals than are usually found in a militia battery, consequently they are probably further along in their mounted work than the average battery would be. In about two more months, provided an opportunity was given, this battery could be made into an efficient light battery in eight months time.

Col. Hunter, I. G., in his report of inspection of Batteries — and , Field Artillery, says that they have profited by having a regular officer to direct their work and that they ought to be in first-class shape in six months more work.

Capt. Westcott, in his inspection of Batteries — and , Field Artillery, says:

These batteries have only five horses each. Very few of the men have had any training in horsemanship. When horses are assigned, they will undoubtedly be untrained. Although the commanders of these batteries are intelligent men, their batteries could not be of any real value to the Government against a modern enemy in less than a year from date of call. The best artillery officer in the United States Army or in any other army could not properly train these batteries in less than one year.

training could be started. Gentling the horses and breaking them to harness and draft requires time. I should estimate three months requirement after horses received before organization could be made mobile. And then there would be required considerable time to familiarize officers and men with the real work of reconnaissance and occupation of position so as to thoroughly train each battery to work as a machine throughout. Then more drill instruction to train them to perform their proper function in battalions and in the regiment. It is difficult to see how the complete development of the regiment could be accomplished under six months even under most favorable conditions as to prompt supply of all equipment, suitable terrain to work over, and the assistance of competent regular officers as instructors, and then it is thought many of the higher officers would be in need of further training in actual campaign.

He reports, in his inspection, September 28, of the — Field Artillery:

A great many of the men and officers have had considerable prior service. They have also had some horses on hand in the batteries, so the men have had some opportunity to be trained for the mounted part of the work. This makes the time necessary for their after-development much shorter. I should judge that this regiment ought to be ready for service in about five months after call, provided horses are supplied promptly and suitable terrain for training and target practice is furnished.

Capt. Bryden, in his inspection of Battery —, Field Artillery, reports:

This organization is an average National Guard battery; the enlisted men are of average intelligence and appear ready and willing to obey instructions and to learn. The same may be said of the officers. Both officers and noncommissioned officers lack force and that confidence in themselves which comes from a thorough knowledge of their duties.

There is an easy-going unpunctual atmosphere about the battery; formations are not on time; the service of the guns is slow; and "stables" is a period devoted as much to relaxation as to grooming.

The battery has just completed three and a half months' duty in the Federal service and is now about to be mustered out. The battery commander states that at no time during this tour of Federal service, not even at service practice at which 135 rounds of shell and shrapnel were expended, had an officer of the Regular Army been assigned to the battery as instructor, and the work of the organization at this inspection showed plainly the need of such instruction. In its present state of training the value of this battery as a tactical unit is small.

The personnel, including both officers and men, is good, and it is believed that with a live, energetic Field Artillery officer of the Regular Army as instructor, with a full complement of animals, a reasonable allowance of service ammunition for practice, and opportunity for at least 10 hours of instruction per day, this organization could be made into an efficient light battery in eight months time.

The same remarks apply to Maj. Stephens's inspection of the — Field Artillery:

Capt. Bryden, in his inspection of Battery —, Field Artillery, says:

This organization can be furnished. There is no doubt that a battalion such as this would be required considerable time to familiarize officers and men with the real work of reconnaissance and occupation of position so as to thoroughly train each battery to work as a machine throughout. Then more drill instruction to train them to perform their proper function in battalions and in the regiment. It is difficult to see how the complete development of the regiment could be accomplished under six months even under most favorable conditions as to prompt supply of all equipment, suitable terrain to work over, and the assistance of competent regular officers as instructors, and then it is thought many of the higher officers would be in need of further training in actual campaign.
These batteries have not made the progress which they should have made. This is due to great change in personnel, to lack of serviceable horses, and proximity of — the place of inspection, to the homes of the men. They have no well-considered program of intensive training and its enforcement. Only from three to five per cent, now in gun service, are in artillery target practice. The real value of these organizations on a hasty call into the Federal service is nil. The amount of time for the development of these organizations is not less than six months, and they only in case they are supplied with an adequate number of competent instructors.

Maj. Johnson, in inspecting the Field Artillery, says:

The personnel of this regiment is very intelligent, and they take a great interest in their work. The present organization would probably not be self-supporting in the field, due to the lack of interest by this class of men in cooking, horseshoeing, repairing harness, camp sanitation, and work of similar nature. Other organizations require more training than this one, but when once trained, they come nearer having trained men for all positions.

In my opinion, which is based upon my observations in camps of different State troops, the citizen soldier at the present state of training will be of little real value on a hasty call into the Federal service, unless there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these troops, not only in times of peace at their armories but also in their camps of mobilization. In most camps I have found that the Regular Army instructors had been taken off their regular duty and had been made mustering officers. The instruction and training of the troops in such camps were practically at a standstill. The officers were attempting drills to some extent, but they were grooping in the dark. Here it is different. There are first lieutenants, regimental and battalion staff officers, and one battery commander or officers or noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army, and the work accomplished here is in marked contrast to that accomplished in other camps. Instruction is progressive and methodical and, above all, thorough. The instruction is systematic and all work is over a final assembly of all commissioned officers is held and all mistakes, defects, and irregularities are taken up and discussed, with a view of their prevention in the future. Some of these remarks do not appear at first sight to come under the caption "Remarks which may serve in appraising the real value of the citizen soldier," etc., but I have made them here to show that the citizen soldier is of little value on a hasty call unless they are provided with competent instructors, and I am becoming more and more convinced that the number of instructors which we must use from the Regular Army must be far greater than we have used in the past, in which case a regiment is not a one-man job; it is too great a task for efficiency. And if we expect efficiency from the National Guard organizations, I believe that one Regular Army officer detailed as instructor with each company or battery is not enough. In the regular service we do not think of bringing and keeping a company up to the proper standard of efficiency with one officer, even when he has the advantage of trained noncommissioned officers as assistants. Much less can we expect to take untrained troops and bring them up to an efficient state on a hasty call, with less than one commissioned officer and possibly one sergeant instructor to a company or battery.

Maj. Johnson, in inspecting Battery — Field Artillery, says:

The personnel of this battery is very intelligent, and they take a great interest in their work; but the present organization would probably not be self-supporting, due to the lack of interest by this class of men in cooking, horseshoeing, repairing harness, camp sanitation, and work of similar nature. Other organizations require more training than this one, but when once trained, they come nearer having trained men for all positions.

The instruction of this organization is under the general direction of Col. R. M. Danford, Tenth Field Artillery, National Guard of Connecticut (first lieutenant, Fifth Field Artillery, United States Army), and under the immediate supervision of Second Lieut. C. A. Selleck, First Field Artillery, United States Army. The instruction of this organization is progressing satisfactorily. The results accomplished stand out in marked contrast to that accomplished by troops in other camps which I have inspected, where they received no instruction from Regular Army officers, their instructors having been taken off of instruction work and detailed as mustering officers.

Maj. Johnson, in his report of inspection of Battery — Field Artillery, says:

This organization appears to be interested in its work and anxious to learn. The battery was organized about three months ago, and will require much instruction and training. It will be of use for field service, unless there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these troops, not only in time of peace at their armories but also in their camps of mobilization. The battery was organized about three months ago, and will require much instruction and training. It will be of use for field service, unless there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these troops, not only in time of peace at their armories but also in their camps of mobilization. The battery was organized about three months ago, and will require much instruction and training. It will be of use for field service, unless there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these troops, not only in time of peace at their armories but also in their camps of mobilization. The battery was organized about three months ago, and will require much instruction and training. It will be of use for field service, unless there is a sufficient number of instructors from the Regular Army on duty with these troops, not only in time of peace at their armories but also in their camps of mobilization.

Col. McDonald, in inspecting Battery — Field Artillery, says:

There is no basis on which to rest an estimate in the case of this battery. The same difficulties that beset the Cavalry and Infantry are present here. Inflation by 100 per cent of recruits, no horses, no chance for target practice or combined maneuvers.

One man's guess is as good as another's as to the rate of development under these conditions.

The officers are capable men and they have excellent raw material on which to work for enlisted personnel. With proper assistance from an experienced instructor good results should be obtained at field firing and marching maneuvers in four months from date of receipt of horses. August 10, 1916.

Cpt. Smith, in inspecting the First Battalion — Field Artillery, August 4, 1916, says:

The battalion commander, Maj. H. M. Bush, is, in my opinion, a very efficient officer and is entirely capable of developing this organization into a very efficient
unit if given time. The officers of this battalion are generally good, with the exception of Capt. , whom I do not consider competent. His battery does not measure up to the standard of the other two batteries in anything. His battery kitchen was positively filthy: I scraped dirt from the kitchen table with my knife. His battery drill, mounted and dismounted, was poor. This battery has 92 horses that are owned by the State. Twenty-three were inspected and passed by First Lieut. Hunsaker, United States Cavalry, for peace training under the law of June 3, 1916, but have not yet been officially taken over by the Federal Government. The remainder of the horses are totally unfit for Cavalry or Artillery work. The battery drill mounted of this battalion at a walk and slow trot is fair. They can not drill at a gallop. It was not attempted. It will take this battalion four months to become proficient in battery and battalion drill mounted after they receive their horses. This time might be reduced some by intensive training under the direction of a Regular officer, not necessarily in command. This organization has had a progressive system of training since their arrival in this camp and the results show it. It is capable of being developed into a very efficient organization. It is not fit for any service yet.

Maj. Brady in inspecting Battery , Field Artillery, says:

Officers are educated and willing, but inexperienced. Great need of Regular officers for outline work. Due to lack of experienced officers, those in the battery are unable to outline a progressive system of instruction.

Maj. Brady, in his inspection August 27 of Battery , Field Artillery, of , reports that this battery has no horses.

Col. Donaldson, in inspecting the First Battalion, Field Artillery, says:

Men are fairly proficient in standing gun drill and officers generally can give proper commands for firing. On account of small number of horses available, mounted drill has not progressed as fast as it should. The personnel appears to be excellent.

In inspecting the First Battalion, Field Artillery, Col. Donaldson says:

Horses are necessary. Officers are anxious to progress, but organizations suffer from fact that there is no Regular officer to outline work and to offer criticisms.

Col. Chamberlain reports September 8 of Battery , Field Artillery, of , that it has no draft animals and only 30 mounts, these latter being well cared for.

INFANTRY.

In reply to the question "Present degree of readiness and fitness for field service of the organization," the answer in 89 per cent of the reports was either "fair," "poor," "unfit," "not ready," "wholly unprepared," or some reply the equivalent of this. There were 102 reports of inspections in the Infantry, and in 46 of these inspections the report of the inspector was generally as follows, or the opinion expressed was so near this that it may be so taken without material error:

Under most favorable conditions, assuming that recruits and equipment for war strength were made available on call, the regiment might be made efficient for field service against an inferior enemy in six months; against trained troops, it will require two years.

In some cases this was coupled with the condition that this progress could only be made by having a Regular Army officer on duty with the regiment.

Mobilization of the organized militia, etc.

In 14 of the earlier reports submitted, in which the inspector had made the above remarks, the department commander (Gen. Funston) expressed the opinion that such was far from a correct estimate of the present worth. He considered that with two months' additional training it could be pitted against an inferior enemy, and with six months' additional training it would have become as efficient as was possible without being in contact with an armed enemy. Later he reconsidered this action and wrote The Adjutant General of the Army, as follows:

1. In forwarding reports of department inspectors on the following organizations I have disagreed with the remarks of the inspector as to length of time which would be required for those organizations to prepare themselves for active field service. My remark was based largely on the belief that after a period of approximately six months' additional training those organizations would begin to grow stale and would no longer improve and nothing but actual field service against an enemy would improve them from that time on.

2. In view of the fact that no militia organization can become better than its officers, and the further fact that the officers have no facilities for improving themselves beyond a limited stage, I am inclined to believe that the time set by the department inspectors for these organizations to become proficient is not far from correct.

3. I therefore request that the Inspector General's Office attach a copy of this letter to the inspection reports of the following organizations:

4. In the reports of remaining organizations that go forward I shall concur with the department inspector in this matter, and do not want to do any injustice to those organizations as compared with those mentioned above on which I have made a different report.

In 37 other reports the opinion expressed was essentially as follows:

If the organization was at war strength at the time of the call and was fully equipped so that they could devote their entire time to instruction, and had at least one experienced officer of the Regular Army to each battalion, it is believed that the regiment could be made efficient for campaign in about six months.

This covers this point in about 83 per cent of the Infantry inspections (mostly regimental); the others vary considerably. In about six reports the opinion was expressed that the troops could be made ready in about three months. These were the most favorable—in the remaining 11 per cent the reports indicated that a longer period would be required. In 10 reports the inspector says:

Under their present officers it is doubtful if it will ever become efficient.

This seems to coincide with Gen. Funston's idea, expressed above, that "no militia organization can become better than its officers, and the further fact that the officers have no facilities for improving themselves beyond a limited stage."

CAVALRY.

There were in the Cavalry 33 inspections—3 of regiments, 11 of squadrons, and 19 of separate troops. In two of the troops the inspector stated that two or three months would be required to make them fit for field service, while one squadron (Texas) was reported as being already in the field. All the remaining Cavalry was reported as being either "unfit," "not ready," or "not fit for field service," etc.
In the inspection of the following organizations it was reported that there were either no animals or only a few on hand at time of inspection: Second Squadron, Georgia, inspected September 1–8; Troops A and B, North Carolina, inspected August 24–29; Troop B, Tennessee, inspected September 1–6; Troop A, New Hampshire, inspected September 7; First Squadron, Virginia Cavalry, inspected August 16–22; First Squadron, Ohio Cavalry, inspected August 8–14; Troops A and B, Michigan, inspected August 11–15. These troops and squadrons of Cavalry were called out June 18.

Horses are to Cavalry what ships are to the Navy—without animals such troops are helpless, or at best are very poor Infantry.

(Due to extra expense of transportation and risk of loss of animals from shipping fever, the Secretary of War under date of June 29, 1916, had ordered that, with but few exceptions, militia troops should receive their animals on arrival at the border.)

One-third of the reports indicated that it would require from six to nine months to make the organizations fit for service against an inferior enemy, and approximately from two to three years against trained troops. In six other reports four to six months was considered the time needed to make them ready for active service.

The Texas squadron was reported as already doing effective work at time of inspection in patrolling the border, but the inspector thought that it would require six months to make the squadron efficient for campaign service.

In no report did it appear that the organization inspected could be made ready in less than about four months.

FIELD ARTILLERY.

In the Field Artillery there were 30 inspections—6 of regiments, 8 of battalions, and 16 of separate batteries.

In 17 the organizations were reported as unfit for field service.

Six organizations, it was reported, would require only from one to three months to be ready; the remainder would require a longer time.

The following at time of inspection, between August 24 and September 8, were without horses or practically so: First Battalion, Georgia Field Artillery; Batteries A and B, Alabama Field Artillery; and Battery A, New Hampshire Field Artillery.

In reply to the question "Length of time considered necessary to make the organization efficient at war strength in campaign," the inspectors reported usually six months, but the time varied generally from two to three months to one year.

DEDUCTIONS FROM STATISTICAL DATA SECURED BY INSPECTOR GENERAL.

The statistical data collected by inspectors general at the inspections referred to in the previous chapter include organizations having an aggregate enlisted strength of 128,517, these being contained in 98 regiments and 5 battalions of Infantry; 3 squadrons, and 20 troops of Cavalry; 6 regiments, 9 battalions, and 15 batteries of Field Artillery; 3 battalions and 10 companies of Engineers; 4 battalions and 16 companies of Signal Corps; 24 ambulance companies; and 36 field hospitals.

Enlisted men transferred to organizations from other organizations after receipt of call...

Enlisted men transferred to or enlisted in the organizations included in the call...

Enlisted men who have not attended a previous encampment or period of field service...

Enlisted men who have subscribed to oath under the act of June 3, 1916...

Number who have not fired before the call...

Number that have fired and secured a rating of first class or better, secured before the call...

From a careful study and analysis of the above figures the following deductions are made:

1. The extent to which the National Guard and the Organized Militia responded to the call and passed into the Federal service may be arrived at in an indirect way through a consideration of the number of men on the rolls of the organizations at the date of call in connection with the number of men reported as having been transferred to or enlisted in the organizations included in the call after the call was issued.

2. The extent to which the National Guard and the Organized Militia responded to the call and passed into the Federal service may be arrived at in an indirect way through a consideration of the number of men on the rolls of the organizations at the date of call in connection with the number of men reported as having been transferred to or enlisted in the organizations included in the call after the call was issued.

Seven thousand four hundred and thirty-five men were thus transferred from other organizations, 60,299 men without former service, and 13,440 men with former service were enlisted after the call.

The aggregate of these three classes is 81,174 enlisted men, or 68 per cent of the total number reported upon—128,517, the remaining 47,343, or 32 per cent representing the National Guard or Organized Militia element on the rolls of the organizations in question at the date of call.
dred and fifty-seven therefore represents the number of members of 
the Organized Militia whose names disappeared from the rolls dur-
ding the transition from State service to the Federal service. This 
disappearance is explained in part as follows: 23,721 enlisted men 
were found physically disqualified and discharged, and 7,258 en-
listed men failed to respond to the call. These two classes combined 
account for 30,979 enlisted men. Deducting this number from the 
number stated as having disappeared from the rolls during the 
transition period there still remain 16,678 enlisted men to be ac-
counted for—a number nearly equal to the strength of an Infantry 
division. The absence of these men may be accounted for in several 
ways. The numbers reported as having failed to respond to the call 
or having been discharged for physical disability on muster in 
may have been understated. It is known that many discharges from 
the National Guard were issued by governors of States or State offi-
cials in the interval between the date of the call and the actual date 
of muster in, but the number so discharged can not now be ascer-
tained with any certainty. Undoubtedly some members of the Na-
tional Guard or Organized Militia on the rolls at the date of call 
were discharged by the Federal authorities after muster in and 
before the date of inspection on account of dependency or for some 
other reason. The reasons for such separations from service, and 
whether the discharges issued by State officials were valid or not, 
need not be dwelt upon, as these matters are of little concern now 
compared to the importance of the evidence which the figures afford 
as to the dependability of the National Guard in a national emer-
gency requiring its employment as a Federal force.

3. The number of men enlisted under the call without prior service 
gives an idea of the state of training of the commands inspected; but 
a more correct conception will be gained if to this number there be 
added the number of men with less than three months Organized 
Militia service at the date of call. The sum of these two is 31,262 
enlisted men, which is 63 per cent of the total number, the other 37 
per cent representing a partially trained Organized Militia element. 
Some value must attach to the partial training obtained in the Na-
tional Guard, but the disposition is to overrate its value.

4. The state of training in marksmanship for troops armed with 
the rifle is shown by the numbers giving classifications above or below 
a rating of first class, and the number which are reported as never 
having fired. Of a total of 90,817 included in the report only 21 
per cent are rated as first class or better, first class being a standard 
which is barely tolerable. Sixteen per cent can be rated as indiffer-
ent shots and 63 per cent are rated as being entirely untrained. 
Combining the two latter classes, the untrained and partially trained 
element will be represented by 79 per cent and the trained element by 
21 per cent. It is thus seen that as far as the inspection has pro-
ceeded, including as it does organizations having a total strength of 
128,517 enlisted men, 63 per cent of this strength is a raw untrained 
element and 37 per cent represents the partially trained Organized 
Militia or National Guard element, the untrained element predomi-
nating in the ratio indicated by the two percentages stated. 
Probably these percentages may be taken as establishing rules which 
might be safely applied to the entire National Guard in Federal 
service, about 150,000 men.

5. The sick record of the National Guard in Federal service, 2.8 
per cent as shown by the inspection reports, is the most favorable 
showing made by these troops.

6. The great loss in effective strength at a critical time amounting 
to about 50 per cent of the original strength, although compensated 
for in part by the transfer and enlistment of men credited with 
militia service, seems enough to condemn the system created by the 
old militia law as an effective means of making the Organized 
Militia into an effective force.

7. The operation of the law of June 3, 1916, with the far more 
rigid exacting rules and requirements, which, under its terms the Federal 
Government may now impose, might be expected in time to produce 
a great improvement. But the very exactions and requirements 
which are necessary for the attainment of efficiency will undoubtedly 
tend to produce a distaste for service in the National Guard among 
the classes of young men who have hitherto joined it for social rea-
sons, or for the sake of the recreation which the service afforded 
them. Already evidence of pronounced reluctance to serve is seen 
in the report that 21,884 members of the Organized Militia now in 
Federal service have failed to take the oath called for under the new 
defense act, these men being held to service under the Dick law.

8. Many complaints have been made that members of the Organized 
Militia have been induced to take the new oath through decep-
tion or coercion. Further evidence of reluctance to serve in the Na-
tional Guard is afforded by the large number of applications for dis-
charge from the Federal service, the considerable number of resign-
ations of officers, about 450, and the great difficulty in obtaining 
recruits for the National Guard in the Federal service. An active re-
cruiting campaign carried on all over the United States during a 
period of four months from July 1, to October 31 produced about 
15,000 recruits—a number insufficient to fill vacancies caused by dis-
charge and casualties occurring during the same period.

9. It is reported from various sources that those men who have 
served on the border have not given any the more cheerful service 
from the belief that the National Guard system with voluntary serv-
ice operates unequally and unfairly, a few bearing the burdens and 
the many, with obligations just as great, being exempt. It can not 
be expected that such men upon their return to civil life will become 
earnest advocates of such a system.

ENGINEERS.

The call of the President of June 18, 1916, included the following 
engineer troops, viz: Two battalions of 4 companies each from New 
York, 2 companies from Pennsylvania, 1 battalion of 4 companies 
(mustered in as a battalion of 3 companies and 1 separate company) 
from Ohio, 1 company each from Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, and Okla-
ahoma, and 2 companies from Colorado—a total of 20 companies. 
Company A, Engineers of Hawaii, was not included in the call.

Company C, Engineers of Pennsylvania, was formed by the trans-
fer of Company F, Fourth Pennsylvania Infantry, after the call. 
Subsequent to the call there were organized and called into the serv-
vice of the United States one company each from Virginia, South
Reports of special field inspections are not at hand for Companies A, D, and F, New York Engineers; Companies A and B, North Carolina Engineers; Company B, Texas Engineers; and Company A, California Engineers. Company A, Hawaii Engineers, was not called for Federal service. Companies A and B, Colorado Engineers, were mobilized at the State camps but were mustered out without border service. Company A, Colorado Engineers, had great difficulty in recruiting to minimum strength, not being mustered in until August 5, 1916; it should be noted that this was a student organization. The average strength per engineer company at muster into the United States service was about 100. Of this strength, with the exception of Companies B and E, New York; Company B, Pennsylvania; and Company A, Iowa, the number mustered in without prior service was from 50 to 80 per cent; the companies organized after the call were of necessity composed almost exclusively of men without prior service.

The deficiencies in equipment were mostly in the mobilization stores, i.e., the difference between that required for the peace strength and that for the strength to which the organizations were recruited for the emergency. In some instances the deficiencies were in articles which were habitually kept in State arsenals for issue at mobilization, such as identification tags, first-aid packets, socks, shoes, underclothing, cooking utensils, housewives. The inadvisability of awaiting for the time of stress to distribute equipment for organizations was made manifest. Not only should all equipment for the organization at peace strength be on hand at the home armories, so that there were approximately 850 officers and 7,500 enlisted men.

As to personnel, the opinion of almost every inspector was that the greatest handicap was a lack of trained officers and especially the lack of officers with engineering training. This defect is one which was not possible of remedy until the passage of the act of June 3, 1916, whereby engineering qualifications can be insisted upon for officers appointed or promoted after date of the act. For some time yet this disadvantage will exist. There is another phase to the question as to the qualifications of the commissioned personnel of engineer organizations: To be a success a National Guard organization must have the support of the home community, and in branches of the service which are technical, such as engineer, medical, and signal troops, the support of the local profession must be secured to demand respect. Engineering societies exist in almost every community—cities principally—in which engineer troops can be maintained. It is essential that the officers be men of standing in the engineering profession. New York has insisted, in its reorganization of the engineer troops, that only men of engineering experience be commissioned; results justify the wisdom of the policy.

It is believed, therefore, that the greatest step toward securing a reliable engineering National Guard force is to require as early as practicable a conformance to this principle; in other words, get the engineering profession in each large city behind its local organization. The satisfactory showing made by Company B, Pennsylvania En-

gineers, at this mobilization demonstrates the value of such support for it was organized from members of the Engineer's Club of Philadelphia and has had the recognition and support of that society.

None of the organizations was reported as fit for field service. One of the greatest defects noticed was the lack of training in mounted work; this is accounted for by lack of funds for supplying the necessary facilities for training in peace time. Generally speaking, the enlisted personnel was good material for engineering requirements.

On the question as to length of time necessary for training in order to be prepared for service against a trained enemy, opinions of inspectors vary, but, generally speaking, it was supposed that from three months to one year under a Regular Army officer of experience would be required.

**SIGNAL TROOPS.**

1. An examination of the field-inspection reports of 24 field companies of the National Guard, which were inspected two months or more after they were mustered into the service of the United States, discloses the fact that not one of these organizations was considered ready and fit for field service at the dates of inspection. The average length of time considered necessary to make the companies efficient at war strength in campaign was five additional months of training under Regular Army officers as instructors.

2. Some of the weak points in judging the efficiency of these companies were common to nearly all companies and were, briefly:

   a. As mounted organizations their training was defective in harnessing, saddling, bridling, and the care and use of animals.

   b. As technical organizations created only for rapid and certain communication within a division, coordination in training was overlooked which involves primarily almost perfect interior economy, administration, and management of wagons and animals, in order that every effort may be concentrated on the technique of communication by all the methods provided by wire, radio, flag, helio, etc.

   Failure in the initial steps of training means certain failure in the final test of efficiency.

   c. As an organization requiring almost perfect teamwork, discipline was lacking which insures even fair teamwork.

3. The best feature shown was a personnel composed of a large number of men trained in civilian occupations as telegraph and radio operators and aslinemen and electricians, and, with a few exceptions, a commendable zeal on the part of the organization to learn all that could be taught them.

**SANITARY TROOPS.**

1. Strength.—At the time of the call, June 18, 1916, the Medical Department consisted of 174 detachments, 31 field hospitals, and 22 ambulance companies. Since the call 8 field hospitals and 4 ambulance companies have been organized, recognized by the War Department, and mustered into the Federal service. In addition, the sanitary troops required for those line organizations having none on date of call have been organized. All detachments and units were increased in strength, the majority being brought up to war strength, so that there were approximately 850 officers and 7,500 enlisted men.
mustered into the Federal service. In addition to the above, 80 dental surgeons and 25 veterinarians were authorized mustered into the Federal service.

2. Special field inspection report.—The following data were obtained from the reports of a special field inspection made by the inspector general's department on 60 of the 65 field hospitals and ambulance companies of the National Guard from six weeks to three months after their muster into the Federal service:

(a) Personnel.—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective strength present</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>281</td>
<td>5,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-effective present</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number carried on rolls not present</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) March ability and march discipline.—Two organizations were reported as "very good," 13 as "good," 21 as "fair," 5 as "poor," and 9 organizations were not reported upon under this head.

(c) Transportation and care of animals.—Twenty-four organizations were reported as having the required number of animals, 31 were reported as having no animals, and in 5 organizations no remarks were made. The horses of 22 organizations were reported as being well cared for, of 6 the care of horses was unsatisfactory, of 2 as "fair" to "poor," and of the remainder no report was made. The horses were reported as not being shod in 3 organizations.

(d) Proficiency of officers as to discipline and as instructors.—Under this head the officers of 7 organizations were reported as "very good," of 29 as "good," of 27 as "fair," of 2 as "poor," of 11 as "bad," of 2 as "inefficient," and of 1 no report was made under this head.

(e) Proficiency of noncommissioned officers as to discipline and as instructors.—Under this head the noncommissioned officers of 1 organization were reported as "very good," of 14 as "good," of 25 as "fair," of 11 as "poor," of 1 as "bad," and as "not efficient" in 1 organization. Seven organizations were not reported upon under this head.

(f) Instruction.—The instruction of 1 organization was reported as "excellent," 1 as "very good," 8 as "good," 19 as "fair," and 11 as "poor." Twenty organizations were not reported upon under this head.

(g) Equipment.—Forty-seven organizations were reported as completely equipped except for some minor articles. Some of these had not received the required animals. Two were reported as having personal equipment only, and 11 were reported as lacking essential articles of the Quartermaster Department. Much of the equipment was of the old model. Some was obsolete and some was unserviceable.

(h) Care of the sick.—The sick of all organizations were reported as being properly cared for.

(i) Records.—The records of 9 organizations were reported as being "very good" and "good," of 19 as being "fair," of 26 as being "poor," and of 1 as being "bad." Five organizations were not reported upon under this head.

(j) Present degree of fitness of organizations for field service.—All organizations were reported as being unfit for immediate active field service.

(k) Length of time needed to make organizations fit for active field service.—This varied for the several organizations from one month to nine months. Two organizations were reported as requiring only one month's training to make them proficient for active field service. The results of this bureau show that both of these organizations were new ones, organized after the call. Neither had had any field service, nor had they been issued horses. It was safe and reasonable, under these circumstances, to assume that neither of these organizations would be found efficient for active field service in the time stated by the inspector. The average length of time needed to train and instruct 51 of these organizations to assure proficiency in the field in active campaign was reported as six months. On 5 organizations no statement was made under this head.

3. Prior to mobilization all armory and field inspection reports show that the greatest weakness of the sanitary troops, especially the units, were the inefficiency of the noncommissioned officers, inexperience and lack of knowledge in handling transportation, and little or no knowledge of rendering returns and preparing the records required by the Medical Department.

The mobilization, as indicated by the above special inspection, has demonstrated the accuracy of these reports, and the results are as anticipated.
CAMP SANITATION AND HEALTH OF THE NATIONAL GUARD TROOPS IN CAMP.

1. The majority of the medical officers of the National Guard are proficient in the subject of theoretical hygiene and camp sanitation, and a large number of the older officers have had practical experience along this line, so that they could be depended upon for making proper recommendation for the maintenance of efficient sanitation. While numerous sanitary defects were reported as existing in all organizations in the reports of the general sanitary inspections of the Regular Medical Corps, it was noted that in the majority of cases it was the fault of the organization commander in failing to carry out the recommendations of the sanitary officer. The rigid system of sanitary inspection adopted by the Medical Department for all troops on the border has produced excellent results.

2. The sick report of an organization or a body of troops in camp is a good criterion by which to judge camp sanitation. The sick report for the National Guard troops on the border, obtained from the Surgeon General's Office, shows that between July 22 and November 4, 1916, the average strength was 104,334; average sick rate per 1,000, 21.5, making an average per cent of 2.15, a remarkably low sick rate, much lower than it is for the same number of persons in civil life. During this period there have been 72 deaths, no cases of smallpox, 26 cases of typhoid fever, and 326 reported cases of paratyphoid. No deaths from typhoid fever. This is a record, it is believed, without precedent under similar conditions. Compare the above sick record with that of the second division of the Seventh Army Corps that camped at Jacksonville, Fla., between June and October, 1898, consisting for the most part of volunteer troops, and it will show a remarkable achievement in the prevention of typhoid fever. There were 4,422 cases of typhoid fever, with 281 deaths, 248 of which were from typhoid fever. Other comparisons equally remarkable could be shown, but it is believed that the above is sufficient to demonstrate the progress of the Medical Department in the matter of application of the science of medicine to sanitation and prevention of disease.

3. The remarkable contrast in the sick rate and mortality rates exhibited by the Spanish War camps of 1898 and those of the National Guard mobilization camps of the border in 1916 is directly attributable to the following factors:

(a) Great advances made in the knowledge of the cause and methods of transmission of infectious diseases and in the knowledge of preventive medicine, personal hygiene, and camp sanitation.

(b) The development and practical application by Army Medical Corps of vaccination against typhoid fever, a measure which has practically abolished the most destructive of all camp diseases from the armies of the United States.

(c) Improved methods and greater care in the handling of camp sites, and in the protection of food and water supplies, and in the disposal of wastes.

(d) Higher standard of physical requirements for volunteer and National Guard, approximating those for the Regular service.

4. The relatively large number of reported cases of paratyphoid occurred in the troops camped at McAllen, Tex., and among troops whose home stations were in New York City, and will in all probability be found to be due to paratyphoid carriers existing in one or more of these regiments. The laboratory findings, no doubt, in these cases will show that a large number of them were not paratyphoid fever. The fact that this comparatively rare disease was not prevalent among the Regular troops on the border prior to the arrival of the State troops made it appear unnecessary to administer prophylactic serum for paratyphoid to the National Guard at mobilization camp.

NOTES OF INSPECTOR-INSTRUCTORS ON WORK OF NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS DURING MOBILIZATION.

So large a proportion of inspector-instructors, inspector generals, special inspectors, sanitary inspectors, and mustering officers, and others who have worked one way or another been connected with this mobilization of the National Guard and have criticized the military efficiency of the National Guard with which they have been associated, that it is but just to say that this report would not be complete without some reference to these defects, which perhaps can best be done by quoting extracts from the reports received.

It may be asked, Why refer to these disagreeable features? The National Guard was duly turned out and sent to the Mexican border and criticisms as to how it was done are now past history.

All this is true, but in general terms it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the chief reason why this country is not further advanced in "preparedness" is that it has failed to profit by past errors, blunders, and general deficiencies.

To publish a report on the mobilization of the National Guard and devote no space to this would be accepted as a tacit admission that there was nothing on this subject to report.

The publication of the criticisms in the last mobilization will serve, therefore, as a warning what to avoid in the next one.

Unless we profit by the lessons of the past we make no progress. It must not be inferred that there were no words of commendation in the mass of reports received; on the contrary, there were many such, and these are referred to elsewhere in this report. A chain is as strong as its weakest link, and it would seem that we might profitably note where the weak links were in our recent mobilization that they may be made stronger in our preparation for the next one.
EVIDENCES OF INEFFICIENCY.

Every day I have seen the most pitiful exhibitions of helplessness at the camp headquarters. Only two days ago the quartermaster discovered 5,515 new Army wool blankets on which he did not know he had them. The regiments have been clamoring for them and the quartermaster depots have been sending civilian blankets of various types here after purchasing in open markets.—(Extract from the report of First Lieut. James G. McIloy, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Aug. 17, 1916.)

It took the regiment 15 hours to entrain on the 31st after much of its heavy impedimenta had been loaded on the 29th and 30th; as an exercise of incompetence it was entirely successful. The spectacle of field and other officers and all grades of enlisted men sweating in one chaotic headless attempt to load everything was edifying. It compared in sprawl and method by which everything had been done since the regiment mobilized.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Aug. 2.)

To a Regular officer interested in seeing an efficient national force, the situation here has ceased to be amusing—to think that the Federal Government must pay such enormous sums of money for so much inefficiency! There is a provisional division in this camp, but not one trained officer in its personnel. What can any one expect in results? It is my honest opinion that a volunteer regiment composed of field officers from the Regular Army and all other officers and men absolute recruits would be worth much more to the Federal Government after one month of training than any regiment here will be if kept in this camp under present conditions for one year.—(Extract from report of Lieut. McIloy, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Aug. 8.)

An examination of the last efficiency report cards submitted will confirm my opinion that there is nothing short of murder to send these troops into any sort of active service under some of the officers now on its roster. Many of the officers, including three field officers, have only the remotest ideas of their duties, and have absolutely no conception of even the elements of military tactics.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, June 24.)

I was detailed to muster the —— Infantry. They arrived in camp during the day of the 24th; most of the regiment was in by noon. The last battalion in procured their tents and pitched them; the other battalions waited for some one to bring them tents to them. Most of the companies on arrival brought up sufficient canvas for their troops and tentage had to be procured from the quartermaster. For a day or two there were no orders. No effort was made to dig trenches before dark on the first day of arrival, and then straddle trenches were constructed for the night. No lanterns were used to mark the location of the trenches so the men defecated at will and where they liked. The next day the commanding officer's attention was again called to this condition and along toward evening several of the companies lit dug rears. Friends and relatives from all over the State were in camp and officers and men were busy entertaining them and it was very difficult to get any military work done.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. Philip Remmington, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 14, 1916.)

I have had an opportunity to observe property throughout camp. In general, rifles and bayonets are in an awful condition, some completely covered with rust inside and out.—(Extract from report of Lieut. McIloy, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 7.)

Another point in which the officers of the guard proved exceptionally weak was in the preparation of muster rolls and other papers. In some cases this was due to lack of care and attention on their part.—(Extract from report Lieut. Garber, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 12.)

Officers and men ignorant of administration paper work and papers will be in bad shape.—(Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 5, 1916.)

The weakest point in this State seems to be the matter of paper work. Officers are unfamiliar with the forms to be used and seem unable to accomplish forms properly when given to them. My duties have been so many and so varied that I have been unable to devote the time that I should like to have given to this matter of paper work. There seems to be a great need for more instructor-sergeants, who would be able to take this matter in hand and thus render a valuable service.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. L. R. James, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 22, 1916.)

Discipline improving, but it is hard to make officers read instructions on blank forms and comply with same. They have not yet learned to obey orders promptly.—(Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 11, 1916.)

Service in —— has completely broken down; the adjutant general has done nothing since mobilization and has been steadily absent from this camp for some three weeks; his retention of the office of State property and disbursing officer has seriously hampered service in that he has not rendered checks for services and property promptly; it is most probable that his appointment was illegal at best over age limit. When I last saw him his appointment was have arrived at 64 in March, 1915; the time has now been postponed till March, 1917.—(Extract from report of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Aug. 3, 1916.)

Lack of familiarity with and a study of the regular forms and of methods of procedure on the part of the officers is now apparent and there was much delay and confusion and needless repetition. Officers and men worked night and day and were worn out on what should have been a simple affair.—(Extract from report of Capt. Emery T. Smith, Field Artillery, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 6, 1916.)

It is presumed that in spite of anything on record officers who are known to be absolutely incompetent will be mustered in; still I wish to add the following to my reports now on file in your office. For over a year I have endeavored to induce the State authorities to eliminate ——, Medical Corps, on the grounds of incompetency and unfitness, and the adjutant general has admitted that all I have said is correct, but—it is politically inexpedient. After Capt. ——, Medical Corps, United States Army, had inspected the —— regimental infirmary last winter and seen the inside of Dr. ——'s office in his home town he told me that he would be no less than murder to murder men into active service with such a man as a surgeon.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Everington, inspector-instructor in National Guard, July 1.)

Of the papers returned to me, three officers have been found physically disqualified: Maj. ——, Infantry; Maj. ——, Infantry; First Lieut. ——, Infantry. Maj. ——, Capt. —— and Capt. —— are both pensioners. This fact was never suspected by me before. A few weeks ago another field officer, who probably hoped to profit by the removal of one of these officers, gave me the first hint as to the situation. As soon as I returned to —— City (June 19) I wired to know if this was true, and soon received a telegram affirming it. Maj. —— has taken his re-election as a matter of fact, and is making no protest. Maj. —— on the other hand, is making a vigorous fight to have his physical defects waived. As he is the most competent field officer of the regiment professionally, I asked the surgeon if the defects in his case were such as could be waived without detrimen to the service. He replied in the negative. The surgeon reported him "obese; weak heart; sounds believed to be fatty." I have been urged by Maj. —— and several officers of his battalion to recommend that defects in his case be waived, but have refused to do so.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. W. G. Murchison, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 9, 1916.)

An incident of the week was the ordering in to this camp at State expense Company I, of ——. This company is not recognized by the War Department. Its strength was 3 officers and 63 men, very few of whom had regularly enlisted in the guard. The intention of the adjutant general was to have this company substituted for one of the other short companies, but on physical examination the 3 officers and 13 enlisted men were found disqualified. It was then desired to have the enlisted personnel enlist for the other companies, but the adjutant general and the whole organizing staff seemed to have the whole organizing staff to the contrary. The expense to the State for this was about $1,500.—(Extract from report of Capt. W. T. Bates, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 15, 1916.)
The incompetency of National Guard officers in general causes the greatest delay in mobilization. Their inability or neglect to do their individual share of the work, even after being informed or shown, requires some one else to do it or see that it is done. Consequently a few competent officers can do all the work. For political reasons incompetents are not eliminated.—(Extract from report of Capt. J. Malcolm Graham, Infantry, musketer officer, National Guard of Sept. 11, 1916.)

The — troops, less Company — Engineers, left here the 19th instant for designated border stations. They were very well clothed and equipped for the field, but their lack of training is something deplorable. With the possible exception of the two officers commissioned from sergeants of the regular service, there is not one of them fitted for the work. Only after many of them are capable enough men and with proper instruction will make good officers, but it will be a long hard pull for them, because the senior officers are just as inefficient, or more so, than the juniors. My experience here has more fully convinced me than ever before that National Guard organizations should never have an officer above the grade of lieutenant colonel. He would fill every need during times of peace, and then when the troops were called into the field for active service an officer of known efficiency should be selected from the regular service and assigned to the regiment by the President as colonel. There would then be a foundation from which to build. This would probably result in a speedy elimination of the most incompetent and insure the reorganization of the personnel upon a practicable moment. It would also make sure that the discipline and instruction of the regiment would be conducted along proper lines from the very beginning, and would not be a case of “the blind leading the blind.” The above may appear a rather severe arraignment of the troops with whom I have been on duty for the past year, but I believe it is justified by the facts. Officers in whom I had confidence proved themselves incapable when put to the test. Not that some of them lack native ability, but because of the fact that their duty has been taken up with making a living in civil life, and, as one officer expressed it, the military part of it has been a sort of diversion for many of them.-(Extract from report of First Lieut. W. G. Murchison, Infantry, inspector-instructor National Guard of July 24, 1916.)

When the reports of physical examinations were submitted by the surgeon there were cases to be incompletely and absolutely handled. In fact, on one occasion, a company commander did not hesitate to scratch off the name of some man who had failed to appear and substitute that of some other man for whom he (company commander) had no report of physical examination.-(Extract from report of Lieut. A. A. Hoffman, Infantry, inspector-instructor, on mobilization of — Militia, Aug. 18, 1916.)

I still find a great many companies with their small arms completely covered with rust, inside and out. They look as though they had just spent a week at the bottom of a creek. In some regiments no attempt is made to clean them.-(Extract from report of Lieut. McIlroy, Inspector-instructor, on National Guard of July 23.)

The fault lay with the company commanders, who had no control over their men. This straggling rendered it extremely difficult to keep accurate records, but in spite of it I think we have succeeded in doing what could be done. 21 were found disqualified, and it would have taken the strength of 114 men was ordered to report at a certain hour the following day for physical examination. When they reported there were 40 men missing. On inquiring it was stated they had probably jumped on a freight train and gone back to the bottom of a creek. In some regiments no attempt is made to clean them.-(Extract from report of Lieut. J. W. Griesinger, Medical Corps, United States Army, National Guard of July 28, 1916.)

LAXITY IN PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS.

The large number of rejections for physical causes have been freely commented upon by medical officers, inspector-instructors, inspectors general, and others. They throw so much light on this important subject that extracts from these reports are here reproduced:

"The entire time for the last two weeks has been given up to the physical examination of the troops of the — National Guard at Camp —. It is painfully apparent that the civilian doctors used in the previous examination of the men of the — National Guard are not familiar with the requirements for Army standard of physical fitness. Also that the men they have examined have not been seen by them with their clothing off. For example, men have been sent to me who weigh 91 pounds, and are 5 feet 1 inch in height. Others with double inguinal hernia.

Unless some other rule is laid down this method of examination will be carried out again in inspecting recruits for the organization at their home stations, with the second rejection of a large number.

The medical officers of the Organized Militia are not well drilled in the examination of recruits.

It is thought that the company commander could be given a course in the examination of recruits, as is done with officers of the Regular Army when detailed for recruiting duty, and be a part of his efficiency record, that he will at least have the clothing removed, weigh and take the height, and in time know the apparent causes for rejection. If the senior regimental medical officer or the inspector-instructor visited his home town they could pass on any cases in doubt. Have the medical officer ordered to make one or two trips a year to the home stations of each of the companies of his regiment to look over the men taken by the organization commanding officer as recruiting officer.— (Extract from report of Maj. E. L. Ruffner, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, National Guard of July 16, 1916.)"

Nothing but praise can be given the Ohio National Guard for the spirit in which after the first regiment saw so many men rejected the rest of them have accepted the inevitable in rejections when their turn came. The first regiment tried to take the case of two officers rejected over our heads, but being sustained by the department commander no further attempt was made by anyone. Many cases of officers and men who were rejected for hernia have had this operated upon and will be ready for service soon. One company of Infantry is now convalescing from this operation.—(Extract from report of Maj. E. L. Ruffner, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, National Guard of July 5.)

That physical inspection of National Guard officers and men upon entry into the service, and officers upon promotion, be no longer intrusted to National Guard surgeons, but be taken over by the Medical Corps of the Regular Army in the most direct manner possible. Such inspection should be a condition of pay. — Smallpox and tuberculosis inoculations should follow each physical examination and be compulsory.—(Extract from report of Col. Morton, special inspector, on National Guard of July 16.)

"The physical requirements in the State are the same as those in the Federal service. The examinations of the State surgeons do not appear to have been at all thorough. The regiments have a large number of individuals who are not up to the physical requirements will be found in the other organizations.

The surgeon estimated that about 20 per cent of the men would be rejected physically. There are quite a number of Indians in the Infantry regiment, and they are generally among the physical specimens. (Extract from report of Maj. W. H. Simmons, L. G., on N. G. of July 13.)"
cases. From the general appearance of the command, I am of the opinion that about this percentage of the men who are not up to the physical requirements will be found in the other organizations.—(Maj. W. H. Simon's report on Inspection of National Guard of —.)

Pursuant to instructions contained in letter dated Militia Bureau, Washington, D. C., June 30, 1916, I report on the Mustering Regulations as follows:

The regulations for mustering the Organized Militia into the service of the United States are clear and can be understood by all concerned, and no change is recommended except in one particular, namely: The law prescribes that the militia in such States and Territories as shall have adopted for enlistment and reenlistment the standard of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army shall be physically examined and mustered into the service of the United States without prior physical examination. (Par. 2, p. 12.)

However, a physical examination of the whole organization is subsequently held as per (4), paragraph 2, and experience has shown that in this examination from 3 to 5 per cent are found physically deficient.

As it is desired that the maximum strength shall go forward to the concentration point and as only the maximum can be mustered in, it is not possible to determine in advance what the strength will be after the physical examination required per subhead (d), paragraph 2. Much delay is thus caused in discharging the physically unfit and filling up the organization again by recruiting.

It would facilitate the work greatly and be far more satisfactory to all concerned if, where physical examination is to be held at all, it be held before muster in and not after.

The law should be changed accordingly, except where the new militia law makes the present method unnecessary. By holding examination first, the troop or company commanders would know beforehand their effective strength and could fill up to the maximum in advance and not be left in doubt till time was running out, and often with insufficient time for recruiting.—(Report of Maj. M. M. McNamee, Cavalry, Inspector-Instructor, — National Guard, July 8, 1916.)

The personnel as a whole is good, but several men were brought by organization commanders who are absolutely unfit for military service, one instance of this being of a man with double inguinal hernia and vitia dexter who was unable to count the fingers of a hand held up before him at a distance of 24 feet. This is due to the fact that although — provided by legislative enactment in 1910 that the standard of physical examination for enlistment of the Organized Militia should be the same as that for the Regular Army, there has been nonobservance rather than observance of this statute from the beginning. In order to be certain that the statute has been observed, I have required all organizations to submit to me physical examination blanks properly made out and signed by the doctors who made the examination of the organization before leaving their home stations. (This examination was made by order of the State authorities.) When I discovered on examination of the blank that the man was evidently and unquestionably unfit for military service, I recommended to the organization commander that his name be not entered on the muster rolls for I would not muster into the service regardless of the fact that some of them are practically blind, some almost totally deaf, some suffering with acute gonorrhea, and the like. It is needless to say that this is rather confusing.—(Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, — National Guard, July 1, 1916.)

It needs but a casual glance at the list of men who were rejected at the physical examination following the muster in to convince that what was prescribed by a law prescribing the standard of physical examination for this State it has never been observed. Every organization is losing heavily and most of the men who are rejected are rejected for some grave physical defect.—(Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, — National Guard, July 12, 1916.)

Capt. Sloan recommends that all men brought to mobilization camp with serious and apparent physical defects be transported and subsisted at the expense of the Government and returned to the company headquarters. He noted many cases of men brought to and kept at the — camp for a considerable period suffering from such serious physical disability that they could not perform any military duty, and these men cost the Government thousands of dollars in pay, transportation, and subsistence.—(Letter of Capt. A. B. Sloan, Infantry, United States Army, Fort —, Aug. 9, 1916.)

The examination of companies each day more and more fully demonstrates how farcical the standard of physical examination as established in this State must be. From one-third to one-half of the men brought here and mustered in are being discharged for physical disability as a result of the examination made by the Regular Army surgeon.—(Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Infantry, inspector-instructor, — National Guard, July 20, 1916.)

If the character of the physical examination required for enlistment in the National Guard of other States—even though the law prescribed that it must be the same as that required for enlistment in the Regular service—has been the same as that in —, then in practice it has been farcical and the Government has lost thousands of dollars in bringing men who are absolutely unfit for military service to the mobilization camps and in sending them back because of the failure to pass a physical examination by the examining surgeon. Many men were brought to this camp. Men were brought to this camp, as members of organizations, who were suffering from diseases and who had physical defects which absolutely unfit them for any kind of military service. Among these men were numbered some with double hernia, some with trachoma, men with insufficient vision, men with mitral insufficiency, acute gonorrhea, and an examination by the surgeon of many organizations seemed more like a free clinic than the testing out of physical fitness of men to do duty as soldiers in the service of the United States. The only remedy for this is, I believe, to have every man who is brought to a mobilization camp to be examined by a member of any organization, examined by the camp surgeon (who should be an officer of the Medical Corps of the Army) as soon as possible after his arrival there; and if he is found physically disqualified that he be refused muster-in. If this be done in the future and the officer responsible for bringing him be required to pay for the transportation and subsistence of the man from the company rendezvous to the mobilization camp and return, this practice would be stopped and the Government would be saved many thousands of dollars.—(Extract from report Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, Aug. 9.)

Approximately 700 men out of the 3,000 or more examined physically were found physically unfit for service. This included 3 officers.—(Extract from report of Capt. Hughes, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, July 16.)

A large per cent of the officers who have been rejected are using all the political influence they possess to have their disabilities waived, regardless of what the disability may be.—(Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, July 16.)

The national defense act, which allows pay for the company officers, should make it possible for all recruits to be examined physically by a doctor, for which he should receive pay, and should evolve a system by which company officers are held strictly responsible for accepting recruits who had not been
The mobing in of the — militia has progressed very slowly, there
being constant trouble from the causes mentioned in my report of the 28th
ultimo. I would again call attention to these, namely, the need for physical
standards for the militia and the need for supervision over the legality of
enlistments. One of these under such amount of Federal supervision as will
accomplish the results.

The State troops arrived here on May 12. Physical examinations were
taken without delay, and when it became apparent that there was to be a large
percentage of rejections all efforts of the State authorities were directed to
getting defects waived—at first almost regardless of nature or degree of defect.
Paragraph 457, Army Regulations, relating to the "length and character of
service," was invoked, and it was two weeks before any outstanding could be
reached which would make clear what was and what was not a sufficient cause
for rejection.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. B. F. Ristide, Infantry,
inspector-instructor, National Guard of —- July 5.)

The undersigned reports and desires to emphasize strongly the need for hold-
ing the States strictly to the standards of physical requirements; also the need
for Federal supervision of the legality and regularity of enlistments. From the
experience here in it seems impossible to exaggerate the importance
of these points.

Rejections on account of physical disqualifications have been about 33 per
cent. Roughly, there have been 1,000 officers and men accepted and 500 re-
jected. An estimate of the cost to the Government per man of the latter (com-
pared with data) may be made conservatively at $20,000 on one regiment of Infantry and a battery of Field
Artillery.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. B. F. Ristide, Infantry, In-
pector-instructor, National Guard of —- June 29, 1916.)

In six cases officers have been rejected physically, this number including the
regimental adjutant and two company commanders. Of the latter, the one who
had been accepted on the authority of the department comman-
der. Rejection of officers results very badly both to the individual and the
organization. Under the new law no officer should be carried without exami-
nation by surgeons of the Regular Army.—(Extract from report of Lieut.
Ristine, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —- July 5.)

Fifty-six officers and 1,427 enlisted men were mobilized. Of these, 5 officers
and 406 enlisted men were physically rejected by the examining surgeon, and
minor defects were waived in the cases of several officers. The State had
adopted the Regular Army standard for the examination of recruits in so far
as the enlistment blank, orders, and instructions were concerned, but the actual
examinations must have been very lax in many cases. It is recommended that
a physical examination by a medical officer of the Regular Army of all recruits
enlisted since the last examination held each year, and that Federal recogni-
tion be withheld from any man who fails to pass the examination.—(Extract from report of Capt. 
Niles, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —- Sept. 12.)

Out of a total of 1,181 enlisted men mustered in the Infantry regiment,
387 have already been discharged as physically disqualified. The physical
defects of a few have been waived, and some requests to have defects waived
have not been heard from. In round numbers, over 400 men were found physi-
ically unfit for service. Seven officers have been rejected because of being
physically disqualified, another will be as soon as he returns to camp, the
physical defects of two have been waived, and I am waiting to hear from the
request for waiver in case of another. This out of a strength of 53 officers and 1,143 enlisted
men were rejected (1 officer submitted to an operation for hernia immedi-
ately upon rejection and was later accepted without having been discharged).

Frequently the form was merely signed. Only rarely was it completely filled
out.—(Extract from report of Maj. Edw. A. Shuttleworth, Infantry, inspector-
structor National Guard of —- September 19, 1916.)

The best record among militia medical officers was made by Capt. Charles
F. Jump, Medical Corps, who had examined Company A with a strength of
68. Only one man was rejected after muster-in.

The poorest record was made by Capt. —- commanding Company —- who is a practicing physician, and who examined the men in his company.

Out of a strength of 65, 22 were rejected after muster-in—nearly 26 per cent.

The poorest record among the civilian doctors was made by a Dr. —- who was then on duty at —- Company —-.

City. Dr. —- examined this company and out of 132 accepted by him, 64 were rejected, and it is evident that the physical disabilities were accepted, so the Army surgeon in-
formed me. I reported his case to the department, and as I had
been told that he had been ordered before an examining board to take
back his classification, I asked him to fill out the necessary blank for entry into the Regular Service.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Hoffman, Inspector-instructor, on —- National Guard, Aug. 16.)

It is supposed to have adopted the Regular Army standard of physical
examination. An interesting fact in connection herewith is that in the
Infantry 22 per cent of enlisted men were discharged for physical disability when examined under direction of Federal medical officer.—(Extract from
companies recruited to the maximum, and as a result the organizations arrived
at the mobilization camp with a large number of recruits who, without training and in some cases without equipment. Upon the departure of the
organizations from their home stations, a recruiting officer and party was left
in each armory to continue the work of recruiting, and such recruits as were
then enlisted were sent to the mobilization camp with uniform without equipment. These recruiting officers were generally inexperienced and the medical examination
work was done by men generally ignorant of the requirements of the physical
examinations. There was a noticeable deterioration in the quality of
the men sent forward after the arrival of the organizations, in one marked
case, out of a detachment of 12 recruits sent forward 10 were physically
rejected at the mobilization camp without uniform with the
assistance of a medical officer or a physician; these cases being for such given
physical disabilities as hernia, flat feet, loss of opposing molar teeth, defec-
tive ears, etc.

If the evil of a peace strength organization is to be continued a better method
of recruiting from peace to war strength must be determined. Two of the
regimental adjutants with a carefully selected personnel of from 12 to 20 men
would be a great improvement over the method used during the last mobiliza-
tion.

This mixed up, the arrangement of the examination. An interesting fact in connection herewith is that in the
infantry 22 per cent of enlisted men were discharged for physical disability when examined under direction of Federal medical officer.
Eleven per cent of the officers mustered in were rejected by medical examiners. However, many were reinstated. As soon as an officer was rejected, it meant that the muster-in of this division would proceed along the lines of the Regular Army, and that at least 30 per cent were rejected physically.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. McIlroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 7, 1916.)

About May 20, 1916, a rigid system of physical examination, corresponding to that for the Regular Army, was instituted by medical inspectors and surgeons in almost all of the States which had not adopted the medical standard.—(Extract from report of Maj. H. J. Hunt, Infantry inspector-instructor, —, July 9, 1916.)

Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the Regular Army, and that questions of waiver of physical defects found be considered at that time and not at the time of mobilization. The absence of regulations connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and men have been rejected for physical disability in each company. It is expected to get reliable work from the civilian physicians, and it would be a keen delight to me to find some way to prevent some of them from getting any pay for examining some of the men they accepted and reporting them as fit for service in any respect. The principal troubles have been of a nature that would not appear to the casual examiner, such as myself on recognition, but which must have been known to the doctors if they made any sort of an examination. Some of these physicians have lost the most are reduced to a little below the minimum, but I do not believe there will be any trouble in recruiting, as the regiment still appears to be very popular.—(Extract from letter from an inspector-instructor on National Guard of —.)

It does not seem advisable to defer the physical examination until after muster in is completed as contemplated in paragraph 24D. Experience with troops has demonstrated that even in a State that has adopted the standard of medical examination prescribed for the Regular Army, there will be a great number of men found defective. In that State, those found defective were 10.47 per cent. It is believed that the physical examination should come first no matter whether the State has adopted the regular standard or not. The physical examination will always be the controlling factor. The examination and transfer of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering-in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men thus brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with muster-in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Col. E. M. Lewis, senior mustering officer, —, July 6.)

Things are shaping up here slowly, but on the whole satisfactorily. Ten of the troops have been mustered and the medical examination about six has been completed. The latter examination has demonstrated how uselessly we expect to get reliable work from the civilian physicians, and it would be a keen delight to me to find some way to prevent some of them from getting any pay for examining some of the men they accepted and reporting them as fit for service in any respect. The principal troubles have been of a nature that would not appear to the casual examiner, such as myself on recognition, but which must have been known to the doctors if they made any sort of an examination. Some of these physicians have lost the most are reduced to a little below the minimum, but I do not believe there will be any trouble in recruiting, as the regiment still appears to be very popular.—(Extract from letter from an inspector-instructor on National Guard of —.)

The most marked defect disclosed to date is the fact that although this State has adopted the standard for physical examination required for the Regular Army, this standard has by no means been rigidly adhered to. In the Eighth Regiment alone, of the seven companies so far reported, an average of 41 officers and men have been rejected for physical disability in each company. It is thought that this average is somewhat high and that it would be a great improvement over the method used during the last mobilization.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. McIlroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 23, 1916.)

While this State has adopted the Regular Army form for physical examinations, 50 per cent of the enlisted force had not been examined on June 19, 1916; this made it necessary to have the examination connected with the mobilization and not at the time of mobilization.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. Max. B. Garber, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, June 25, 1916.)

By the medical examiners.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. McIlroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 23, 1916.)

About May 20, 1916, a rigid system of physical examination, corresponding to that for the Regular Army, was instituted by medical inspectors and surgeons in almost all of the States which had not adopted the medical standard.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. McIlroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 23, 1916.)

About May 20, 1916, I called a conference of several of the leading medical officers of the National Guard of — with the medical examiner and myself. We all knew of our own knowledge that while we had officially adopted the medical standard of the United States Army, that the details and requirements of that standard had not been carried out. To protect the interests of the Government, I thereupon decided, and so ordered, that the muster-in of this division would proceed along the lines of theRegular Army and that at least 30 per cent were rejected physically.—(Letter of H. G. Disbrow to Adjutant General, United States Army, —, June 25, 1916.)

Maj. Koerper reports * * * did not have the physical standard of the Regular Army and that an average of 30 per cent were rejected physically.—(Letter of Maj. H. J. Hunt, Infantry Inspector-instructor, —, July 9, 1916.)

It was inevitable that much pressure was brought to bear upon the medical officers who conducted the examination, and as a result many recruits were enlisted who should have been rejected for physical disabilities; every effort was made by organization commandants to take to the mobilization camp their companies recruited to the maximum, and as a result the organizations arrived at the mobilization camp with a large number of recruits who were without training and in some cases equipment. Upon the departure of the organizations from their home stations, a recruiting officer or party was left in each armory to continue the work of recruiting, and such recruits as were then enlisted were sent to the mobilization camp without equipment. These recruiting officers were generally inexperienced, and the medical examination was conducted by physicians generally ignorant of the requirements of the physical examination. There was a noticeable deterioration in the quality of the men enlisted as the result of the examination. In one company, out of a detachment of 12 recruits sent forward 10 were physically rejected at the mobilization camp. Many of the officers who took the examination and transferral of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men thus brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with muster-in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army, and that as the result of the examination connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and transferring of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with mustering in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army, and that as the result of the examination connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and transferring of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with muster-in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Col. E. M. Lewis, senior mustering officer, —, July 6.)

The most marked defect disclosed to date is the fact that although this State has adopted the standard for physical examination required for the Regular Army, this standard has by no means been rigidly adhered to. In the Eighth Regiment alone, of the seven companies so far reported, an average of 41 officers and men have been rejected for physical disability in each company. It is thought that this average is somewhat high and that it would be a great improvement over the method used during the last mobilization.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James G. McIlroy, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 23, 1916.)

While this State has adopted the Regular Army form for physical examinations, 50 per cent of the enlisted force had not been examined on June 19, 1916; this made it necessary to have the examination connected with the mobilization and not at the time of mobilization.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. Max. B. Garber, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, June 25, 1916.)

The medical examinations before enlistment in the National Guard, both of officers and men, were more carefully made, and I recommend that all officers of the National Guard be examined physically during their first year of service as such and at intervals thereafter of not more than five years, and that questions of waiver of physical defects found be considered at that time and not at the time of mobilization. The absence of regulations connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and transferring of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with muster-in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army, and that as the result of the examination connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and transferring of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not necessarily be taken over at the beginning of the mustering in process, but the responsibility for the health of the men brought about a situation by which officers who have given years of their lives in preparation for active service with their organizations, have been thrown out at the physical examination connected with muster-in. This has resulted also in leaving organizations depleted of officers at the very time when they most needed them.—(Extract from report of Maj. Koerper of the Medical Corps, United States Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army. It was conducted with the same care as would have been done in the regular Army, and that as the result of the examination connected with muster-in has at least the minimum strength. The preparation of the muster rolls and transferring of property can easily be accomplished in half the time that it takes to examine the men physically. The property need not
While the physical examination was being conducted Capt. Leisenring and myself inspected and took over the property of the division. We commenced on June 25 and ended on the afternoon of July 5. Capt. Castlemain had entire charge of the muster rolls and of the muster in. He completed his work on Sunday morning July 10 and the last regiment left for the border that afternoon, the entire division having been mustered in and entrained for the border in two weeks.—(Extracts from report of Capt. D. H. Biddle, inspector-instructor, July 20, 1916.)

LACK OF TRAINING AND UNFITNESS FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

The amount of work being performed by some of the organizations was not what it should be. This matter was taken up with the camp commander, and I believe that same will be remedied immediately. It is recommended that instructions be issued to all camp commanders to the effect that, weather permitting, inspection and distribution of eight hours physical drill under the Koehler system shall constitute a part of the daily training. This in addition to a short period of exercises after reveille. For this drill an officer should be selected who is peculiarly fitted for same, otherwise desired results will not be accomplished.

No instructions in signaling, aiming and pointing, or gallery practice. Instruction in first aid not satisfactory.—(Extract from report of Col. J. L. Chamberlain, inspector general, department inspector, on conditions at mobilization camp, Fort , August 19, 1916.

Col. S. W. Miller, Tenth Infantry, special inspector, reports, July 15, in his report of inspection of mobilization camp of the National Guard of .

"The various units of the , division will require several months of field training to prepare them for service under war conditions."

INEFFICIENCY OF COMMAND FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

"As the command reported at camp they were, in my opinion, in no way prepared for active service. There is a very large percentage of entirely new men and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they conducted themselves in the surplus kit bags, and the men suffered from the lack of underclothing, as there was none on hand to issue to them.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Ristine, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 18.)

The regiment arrived at the mobilization camp without the articles required in the surplus kit bags, and the men suffered from the lack of underclothing, as there was none on hand to issue to them.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Ristine, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 20.)

There was a lack of intelligence of National Guard officers as to how to dispose of clothing under paragraph 490, Army Regulations, section 5, which suggests a handbook of property accountability. Our present system of property accountability is scattered in such a variety of places that National Guard officers have neither the time nor knowledge to grasp it.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Farnum, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 18.)

The command is, in my opinion, in no way prepared for active service. There is a very large percentage of entirely new men, many of them immature boys, and the older men, as judged by the manner in which they conducted themselves at inspection, do not appear to have had much training. The spirit of the officers and men is very good, and they seemed anxious to learn.—(Extract from report of Maj. Simons, inspector general on National Guard of , July 1, 1916.)

None of the organizations of the National Guard are ready for active service, and none will be until they have had a considerable period of careful training under competent instructors.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. James W. Everestington, Infantry inspector-instructor, National Guard of , July 1, 1916.)

While every request of mine is promptly acted upon and there has not been the slightest friction, it is evident that the State authorities considered this as a State camp, and that any attempt on my part to speed up the muster in will not of much avail. They have just awakened to a realization of the unfitness of this regiment for field service and feel that they owe it to the "boys " to keep them here until they have received the proper training of the game and can take better care of themselves. The work of reorganization, which is still in progress, could have been finished within a few hours at any time, but they are afraid that once the regiment is mustered in it will be immediately sent to the border.

If an emergency arises that demands that untrained troops be interposed between the Mexicans and unarmed Americans, they are ready to respond at once, but it is believed that nothing else short of an order to be ready for muster in within a specified time, or not at all, will materially hasten the muster in. If no such orders are given, they will probably be ready to be mustered in about two weeks.—(Extract from report of Capt. W. T. Bates, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , July 3, 1916.)

The troops are practically untrained, and a recent telegram from the department commander informs me that Gen. Funston recommends that they be held here for the purpose of training.

Another fact that has been demonstrated beyond question is that State troops coming to mobilization camp are almost always poorly equipped. They lack uniforms, shoes, and, in fact, must be fitted out to a very large extent from the property which is only available after their muster into service.—(Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , July 20.)

The large number of physical rejections and the corresponding number of recruits caused the regiment, as a whole, to be poorly instructed and trained. Many of the rejected officers had been rejected physically, and the remainder were not efficient noncommissioned officers. The regiment should have been kept at the mobilization camp, under an intensive training schedule, for at least a month before it would have been even fairly efficient in field service.—(Extract from report of Capt. E. W. Niles, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of , Sept. 12.)

The necessity for hardening the men by marching them has been brought to the attention of the regimental commander repeatedly, beginning with the first day in camp; to date the command has taken one march 3 miles long. A better physical requirement could not be made by the command 15 day, after practically a month of service. The little training they have received has not been systematically or scientifically conducted.—(Extract from report of Lieut. James W. Everestington, inspector-instructor, National Guard of , July 22.)

NECESSITY FOR ADDITIONAL OFFICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AT MOBILIZATION POINTS.

I believe, as a result of my experience in this camp, that a field officer of the Regular Army should be ordered to each mobilization camp as its commanding officer and that he should be given the necessary administrative staff for the camp, these last to also be from Regular establishments. It seems almost needless to say that it is not to be expected that the average National Guard officer, no matter how willing he may be, is able to handle the administrative problems which naturally arise in a mobilization camp, for as a rule he has had little or no experience in such things. To place them in such a position means added expense and slow work. To expect the mustering officers,
in addition to their other duties, difficult at best, to be issuing quartermasters, commissaries, ordinance officers, and the like, does not observe the best interest of the Government. This is especially true where they must either do all of the work themselves, even to the making out of memorandum receipts, invoices, and other necessary papers, or else have the major part of it done wrong.

A full inspection of four mobilization camps, I am of the opinion that there should be two mustering officers of the Regular Army on duty at each of these camps, at least during the most active period of the mobilization.—(Extract from report of Capt. Albert B. Sloan, Inspector-instructor, National Guard, Aug. 16, 1916.)

Unless an officer has unusual physical vigor and capacity for work, the mental and physical strain, together with loss of sleep, is certain to impair his efficiency and delay the mobilization.—(Extract from report of Col. T. Q. Donaldson, inspector general, on National Guard of —, July 11.)

In a large mobilization camp of this kind everything could be expedited very much if one or two adjutants or sergeant majors were Regular officers of experience.—(Extract from report of Lieut. McIlroy, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, June 26.)

I believe that in all camps of this character, if permitted by law, the camp commander, camp quartermaster, and camp adjutant should be Regular officers detailed by the department commander, as much friction and lost motion would in this way. I believe, be avoided. My experience in a mobilization camp in 1888 and 1889 convinces me of this.

Lack of knowledge of clerical work, and in some cases of education, on the part of some of the officers is adding to the difficulty attending the preliminary work of mustering in, and the lack of sufficient armory instruction in the past will unquestionably delay the period when these troops can be stated to be reasonably ready for field service.—(Extract from report of Capt. Sloan, inspector general, on National Guard of —, June 20.)

A post quartermaster sergeant and an experienced regimental or battalion sergeant major should be detailed for duty with the senior assistant mustering officer at the very beginning of operations. The order designating the senior assistant mustering officer should include the detachment of the Regular officer, reasons for this are obvious.—(Extract from report of Col. Buck, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, June 28.)

It is thought that in every case, upon mobilization, an officer of the Regular establishment should be attached to each regiment for the purpose of instruction in the administration of the camp. (Extract from report of Capt. James M. Love, jr., inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Aug. 1, 1916.)

I recommend that in any mobilization camp a Regular officer of high rank be assigned as camp commander, with authority to enforce proper camp sanitation and regulate the system of supply, and that as many detached officers of the regular army as can be spared be detailed as instructors to supervise and direct the instruction in administration and training of the National Guard.—(Extract from report of Maj. Simons, inspector general, on National Guard of —.)

I believe no one is in a better position to see the utter hopelessness of the dual system of control than the mustering officer, the terrific needless expense to the Federal Government, through destruction, and loss of clothing, equipment, and arms, and payment of large numbers of men who are discharged for physical disability, the vast amount of work and time required to organize a mobilization camp. The lowest ranking one of the four appears to be the camp commander.—(Extract from report of Lieut. McIlroy, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, July 23.)

The greatest friction which arose in camp was due to the fact that the officers were not sufficiently trained in the paper work required for the Regular Army, and the execution of this work, which runs so smoothly in the Regular Army, was a constant puzzle to the Militia officers and absorbed almost the major portion of the mustering officer's time in giving instruction in this matter. It is believed that hereafter the Militia Bureau should insist more rigidly on the use of all forms prescribed by the Regular Army for the National Guard not in the use of the United States.—(Extract from report of Capt. Hughes, Inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, July 16.)

I further believe that every regiment should have an inspector-instructor constantly on duty with it, and while so serving he should be commissioned as the de facto lieutenant colonel, and have complete supervision and authority over recruiting. This will give him the necessary authority to keep the records in shape, while in no way minding him responsible for the procurement of recruits.—(Extract from report of Lieut. Kemper, Inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, July 11.)

Mobilization, course of instruction for officers on. —The mobilization of the troops on the present large scale of operations is a business that requires much skill and experience. In a report recently made here of Capt. Sloan, inspector general, on the National Guard, he said that it is necessary to get the mobilizing troops course of instruction given to the officers covering the duties of officers at time of mobilization. It also demonstrated that where an important order, such as General Order 29, War Department, June 29, 1915, is issued that a course of study for all officers should be prescribed covering such a general order.—(Extract from report of Capt. H. A. Hanglan, infantry, inspector-instructor, —, Aug. 3, 1916.)

In this connection it may be stated that there was published to the Organized Militia of California a pamphlet in the shape of a general order, (No. 14 of May, 1916) containing "Rules and Regulations for the Mobilization of the Organized Militia and Volunteers when called into the service of the United States by the President." This little pamphlet of 55 pages, indexed, gives an excellent outline of the duties of all connected with the mobilization of State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others connected with the National Guard.

There was a shortage of competent clerks to prepare the important records, and much hasty, rushed, as we were, mistakes were bound to occur. If everything was not to be done at once, the property of the State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others connected with the National Guard.

There was a shortage of competent clerks to prepare the important records, and much hasty, rushed, as we were, mistakes were bound to occur. If everything was not to be done at once, the property of the State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others connected with the National Guard.

In this connection it may be stated that there was published to the Organized Militia of California a pamphlet in the shape of a general order, (No. 14 of May, 1916) containing "Rules and Regulations for the Mobilization of the Organized Militia and Volunteers when called into the service of the United States by the President." This little pamphlet of 55 pages, indexed, gives an excellent outline of the duties of all connected with the mobilization of State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others connected with the National Guard.

There was a shortage of competent clerks to prepare the important records, and much hasty, rushed, as we were, mistakes were bound to occur. If everything was not to be done at once, the property of the State forces and reflects credit on the compiler, as it contains in condensed form data pertaining to mobilization in constant demand by officers and others connected with the National Guard.
I believe an ideal force to muster in a division would be approximately as follows:

One senior mustering officer as executive officer, one lieutenant as adjutant, two officers to inspect and take over property, one officer to have charge of the muster rolls and muster in, one surgeon, preferably a major. — (Extract from report of Capt. Hiddle, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of ———, July 20.)

At every mobilization camp a Regular officer with experience in the work should be detailed as camp quartermaster, and the National Guard quartermasters, if any are mustered in, should be assigned as assistants, without regard to rank.

A Regular officer of appropriate rank should be assigned as camp commander, with authority to issue orders in the name of the department commander covering all details as to camp administration, and to supervise recruiting in the State. He should see that the whole administrative work belonging to units of the camp should be devoted to instruction and organization.

An officer of the Medical Corps, United States Army, should be on duty at each mobilization camp as camp surgeon and sanitary inspector. He should supervise all matters pertaining to sanitary troops as an inspector-instructor. — (Extract from report of Capt. G. M. Holley, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of ———, Aug. 17, 1916.)

Letter of Col. B. B. Buck, Infantry, mustering officer from Framingham, Mass., June 28, 1916, recommends that all troops be held at armories until the mustering officer and his assistants are established at mobilization camp. He believes it a great mistake to rush troops from their home stations until the mobilization camp is thoroughly prepared.

Col. Buck recommends that a post quartermaster sergeant and an experienced regimental or battalion sergeant major be detailed at the outset to help the mustering officer.

Capt. Kemper reports the absence of experienced clerks and stenographers for his office and that of the proper officer at a time when they were greatly needed. — (Letter of Capt. J. B. Kemper, Infantry, senior mustering officer, Mount Gretna, Pa., July 11, 1916.)

All the sergeant instructors on duty in Pennsylvania, save two, were put on duties under the property officer with which they were not familiar. — (Letter of Capt. J. B. Kemper, Infantry, senior mustering officer, Mount Gretna, Pa., July 1, 1916.)

LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF FORMS, BOOKS, RETURNS, ETC.

Report inspector-instructor, Idaho, July 22, 1916, paragraph 5, states that officers of the National Guard of ——— were exceptionally weak in the preparation of muster rolls and other papers. In some cases it was due to lack of care and attention on their part.

Lt. Garber recommends that a brief and thorough explanation of the relation of the United States and the States, their powers and duties with respect to the National Guard, be placed in the hands of National Guard officials, as they know little regarding military law, regulations, terms, and usage.

Lt. Garber recommends a three-months' school for quartermasters, and the instruction in the preparation of muster rolls and other company papers be a part of instruction for officers. — (Letter of Lt. M. B. Garber, inspector-instructor, Idaho.)

Report inspector-instructor from ———, July 6, 1916: Capt. Smith noted much delay, confusion, and needless repetition because of lack of knowledge of regular forms and methods of procedure, causing officers and men to wear themselves out over simple matters.

The apparent shortcomings at the mobilization camp were lack of familiarity with Army regulations, Army orders, methods of procuring supplies, making out ration returns. — (Letter of Capt. E. T. Smith, Field Artillery, inspector-instructor.)

Capt. Hobbs reports that officers and men are ignorant of administrative paper work, and papers will be in bad shape. Same officer reports in letter, July 11, 1916, paragraph 7, it is hard to make officers read instructions on blank forms and comply with same. — (Letter of Capt. H. P. Hobbs, inspector-instructor.)

Mobilization of the Organized Militia, Etc.

Letter of Lieut. P. Remington, Infantry, inspector-instructor, July 14, 1916, paragraph 15, reports that Form No. 2 was distributed to the Third Infantry, National Guard of ———, at 2 p. m. one day with instructions to make them out immediately, but at 6 p. m. only two or three companies had started work on the forms. It was necessary to assemble all the officers and give them direct orders before they would start to work.

OBJECTIONS TO SIGHT-SEEERS AND NONCOMBATANTS.

As soon as the Second Infantry arrived at the camp it seemed as though every relative of every officer and enlisted man was present in the camp. There was a general feeling that war was certain and that these troops were going into actual service. The scenes at times were pathetic; mothers and wives were everywhere in evidence and constantly showing their concern. I was harassed from morning until night by mothers and wives seeking the release of their sons and husbands from military duty. — (Extract from report of Capt. H. A. Husband, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of ———, Aug. 4, 1916.)

Muster ing officers receive instructions to attend to duties which in their variety and quantity would all but swamp a well-regulated, long-established brigade headquarters, with trained personnel and office room, facilities, and materials at hand. If his duties are to be properly discharged, he must be given a little time at least to prepare for their proper performance. The special significance of this lies in the fact that everybody whom he calls to his assistance is put to work on matters which are new to him and which are governed by new instructions hourly received. Windstorms blowing the papers away, anxious mothers demanding the release of their sons of tender age, newspaper reporters using every known resource to secure the basis upon which to write stories, orders to send to find people they do not know, lights which burn low and finally fall out, telephones choked with messages official and unofficial, sight-seeing crowds, etc., come with the rush of an avalanche, until a little time is put aside to organize for business intervention to exorcise the curious public and return them to their homes. — (Extract from report of Col. B. Buck, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of ———, June 28, 1916.)

I do not think the above troops are at all fit for field service, by lack of training. However, I consider it wise that they were sent to the border as soon as there were formed the floods of visitors in camp. All such distractions, it would be out of the question to train and harden them where they were. — (Extract from report of Col. C. G. Morton, special inspector, on National Guard of ———, July 5, 1916.)

Training.—Discipline and training are far from satisfactory. I have observed the enlisted men in camp and on the street, and I failed to see a single case of drunkenness or disorder, and their good behavior was a subject of favorable comment generally on the part of civilians. I am of the opinion, however, that the colonel will never be able to put his recruits in shape for field service until he gets it away from the city, and I recommend that it be sent to a training camp as soon as practicable. — (Extract from report of Col. Donaldson, inspector general, on National Guard of ———.)

On Sunday, July 2, the camp was crowded with visitors, variously estimated at from 25,000 to 50,000. All the surrounding areas were polluted with excreta, as there was no provision in this respect for such crowds. — (Extract from report of Maj. Truby, Medical Corps, on sanitary conditions in camp of National Guard ———.)

VALUE OF CORRESPONDENCE SCHOOLS.

This camp has amply proven the value of the correspondence schools. — (Extract from report of Maj. Truby, Medical Corps, on sanitary conditions in camp of National Guard ———.)
This is fortunate, as the medical skill of many of the regimental surgeons is not entirely satisfactory. The forms and papers required seem to be fairly well understood by all surgeons, particularly those who attended camp at Tobyhanna, Pa., last year. I have had no chance as yet to look into the training of the Hospital Corps men. They are mostly new men, but are of excellent quality.—(Extract from report of Lt. Col. Page, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of — July 9.)

In preparing the first copy of the muster-in roll of the various companies of the Third Infantry, Wisconsin National Guard, I assembled the clerks and first sergeants and formed a class of them. I gave them full instructions covering each step in the preparation of the rolls and answered questions and had corrections made on the spot. Excellent progress was made in this way. Bad weather made it necessary to allow the clerks to work in their tents for the preparation of the other two copies of the roll. Much better progress would have been made undoubtedly had it been possible to keep the men together for the preparation of all three rolls, and in future I would certainly advise anymusting officer whenever possible to assemble all of the clerks of organizations to be mustered in and to have them do all their work in his presence. They will then be free from all interruptions from company commanders and will be kept from many errors.—(Extract from report of Capt. R. H. Wescott, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of — July 4, 1916.)


As a result of my observations here I would recommend that:
(a) That the relation of the United States and the States, their powers and duties with respect to the National Guard, be more fully defined. The average State official knows little regarding military law, regulations, terms, and duties with respect to the National Guard, and little if any help could be derived from this study. A brief and thorough explanation will remove many difficulties.
(b) That a three months' school for regimental quartermasters be established and all quartermasters be required to attend.
(c) That instruction in the preparation of muster rolls and other company papers be included in the course of instruction for officers.
(d) That officers be thoroughly instructed and impressed with the idea that organization records must be kept well understood by all officers, particularly those who attended camp at Tobyhanna, Pa., last year. I have had no chance as yet to look into the training of the Hospital Corps men. They are mostly new men, but are of excellent quality.—(Extract from report of Lt. Col. Page, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of — July 9.)

In preparing the first copy of the muster-in roll of the various companies of the Third Infantry, Wisconsin National Guard, I assembled the clerks and first sergeants and formed a class of them. I gave them full instructions covering each step in the preparation of the rolls and answered questions and had corrections made on the spot. Excellent progress was made in this way. Bad weather made it necessary to allow the clerks to work in their tents for the preparation of the other two copies of the roll. Much better progress would have been made undoubtedly had it been possible to keep the men together for the preparation of all three rolls, and in future I would certainly advise anymusting officer whenever possible to assemble all of the clerks of organizations to be mustered in and to have them do all their work in his presence. They will then be free from all interruptions from company commanders and will be kept from many errors.—(Extract from report of Capt. R. H. Wescott, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of — July 4, 1916.)

As a result of my observations here I would recommend that:
(a) That the relation of the United States and the States, their powers and duties with respect to the National Guard, be more fully defined. The average State official knows little regarding military law, regulations, terms, and duties with respect to the National Guard, and little if any help could be derived from this study. A brief and thorough explanation will remove many difficulties.
(b) That a three months' school for regimental quartermasters be established and all quartermasters be required to attend:
(c) That Instruction in the preparation of muster rolls and other company papers be included in the course of instruction for officers.
(d) That officers be thoroughly instructed and impressed with the idea that organization records must be kept well understood by all officers, particularly those who attended camp at Tobyhanna, Pa., last year. I have had no chance as yet to look into the training of the Hospital Corps men. They are mostly new men, but are of excellent quality.—(Extract from report of Lt. Col. Page, Medical Corps, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of — July 9.)

In preparing the first copy of the muster-in roll of the various companies of the Third Infantry, Wisconsin National Guard, I assembled the clerks and first sergeants and formed a class of them. I gave them full instructions covering each step in the preparation of the rolls and answered questions and had corrections made on the spot. Excellent progress was made in this way. Bad weather made it necessary to allow the clerks to work in their tents for the preparation of the other two copies of the roll. Much better progress would have been made undoubtedly had it been possible to keep the men together for the preparation of all three rolls, and in future I would certainly advise anymusting officer whenever possible to assemble all of the clerks of organizations to be mustered in and to have them do all their work in his presence. They will then be free from all interruptions from company commanders and will be kept from many errors.—(Extract from report of Capt. R. H. Wescott, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of — July 4, 1916.)

The present system of transfer of property from the State to the Federal Government is cumbersome, requires an enormous amount of paper work, and is certainly unnecessary. It is done under pressure of a state of necessity and is not in the nature of making it out properly was all new and had to be learned from the first, requiring a great deal of the time of all officers that should have been spent in other ways.

These records should all be kept in peace time. Reports and returns of all kinds should be made to the militia bureau as now required by Regular troops to the War Department.

If left to the State military department, the inspection and correction of the requisitions returned to Eastern Department for muster out would have been made undoubtedly had it been possible to keep the men together for the preparation of all three rolls, and in future I would certainly advise anymusting officer whenever possible to assemble all of the clerks of organizations to be mustered in and to have them do all their work in his presence. They will then be free from all interruptions from company commanders and will be kept from many errors.—(Extract from report of Capt. R. H. Wescott, Infantry, inspector-instructor, National Guard of — July 4, 1916.)
The mustering officer should have detailed with him a competent clerk as chief clerk who is conversant with the Army methods of business and paper work. It was found impossible to get a civilian clerk at this camp who had the necessary qualifications—true, there were clerks—men who could fill the position being employed and not willing to give up their positions for temporary employment.—(Extract from report of Capt. J. C. Waterman, Infantry, senior mustering officer, National Guard of — —, Sept. 5, 1916.)

The one thing, in my opinion, that is vastly more detrimental to rapidity and efficiency than everything else put together is the avalanche of papers and forms to be made out incident to muster in, these requirements being suddenly launched upon officers and men unaccustomed thereto and unfamiliar with the particularity insisted upon.—(Extract from report of Capt. A. M. Shipp, Infantry, National Guard of —, Sept. 6, 1916.)

As I have been on duty from 19 to 21 hours a day since arrival at this camp (excepting the last day or so), it has been impracticable to render the first weekly report desired by the department.—(Extract from report of Capt. Raymond Sheldon, Infantry, Inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, July 6, 1916.)

Three months' bitter experience with National Guard officers in the preparation of Medical Department records and returns have convinced all of the regular medical officers in this district of the futility of expecting even approximate correctness. This office has become a huge clearing house for the correction of papers and records, and only by marking out the required forms for the militia medical officers to sign can the demands of the War Department be satisfied. Gross stupidity on the one hand and utter indifference on the other are the factors involved, and yet one can not but feel sympathy for these officers suddenly confronted with an overwhelming mass of unfamiliar papers.

Both the militia and reserve officers complain loudly of the clerical work of our department, and many have informed me of their intention to separate themselves from the service solely on account of the regulations governing preparation of medical papers and forms to be made out incident to muster in, these requirements being so poorly studied by the men that they claim they can not master. In my opinion, this is the greatest stumbling block, and the cards of some organizations are enough to give one blind staggerp. The sick and wounded report is the great stumbling block, and the ease of mastery, if one will only intelligently study the manual, but I fear our efforts are futile. The sick and wounded report is the great stumbling block, and the cards of some organizations are enough to give one blind staggerp.

Despite the preparation of a set of model cards for each organization, no improvement is apparent, and we have abandoned hope of teaching these men anything. Some have the affrontery to state their knowledge of our papers is equal to or superior to ours, and to prove their contention produce evidence that so-and-so taught them to do this way or that.

This naturally brings up the question, what have the inspector-instructors assigned the militia for some years been doing? You may lead a horse to water but you can not make him drink, and I fear we can never make these militiamen realize the responsibility attached to their commissioners, unless we adopt a simpler form of records which require but little study.—(Extract from a personal letter, Oct. 4, 1916, from an officer of the Medical Corps who is an inspector-instructor.)

A system which in time of peace permits militia officers to attain positions of rank which involve functions of command which in time of war they are imperfectly fitted to perform is a system so harmful to the Nation's defense, so universally criticized by students of military history, as to require no further criticism. Yet the present mobilization exaggerates its application on a scale never before reached in the history of our country.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. B. E. Grey, Infantry, Inspector-instructor, National Guard of —, Sept. 7, 1916.)

MORE TIME NEEDED FOR MOBILIZATION.

Additional time should be allowed for the training of troops before leaving their State. Of the many recommendations of the inspectors-instructors which I have seen on this subject, none has stated less than three months as the necessary period. This time is required for administrative, as well as for tactical training. Company officers should learn how to handle questions relating to rations, clothing, etc.; staff officers should learn their various duties; company commanders and adjutants about the machinery of the command may be in smooth working order when called upon to meet unusual situations.—(Extract from report of Capt. Ralph McCoy on National Guard of —.)

All reports of inspectors-instructors indicate that a minimum of three months should intervene between the call for the National Guard and the sending of them to the front.

It is a great mistake to rush troops from their home stations (armories) to mobilization camp before the mobilization camp is ready to receive them, as the difficulties in the way of establishing and organizing a working force in the office of the mustering officer are so great that the essentials are apt to be overlooked in attending to the multitude of minor though insistent duties which spring up every 30 seconds during the day. —(Extract from report of Col. John D. W. Newland, Inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —.)

With the idea of perhaps preventing similar errors in future it is believed that mounted organizations of the militia should not be sent from place of company rendezvous to concentration point without first being placed in a company camp for a reasonable time. This was forcibly brought to my attention by the difference in the condition of troops leaving from Van Cortlandt Park and those leaving from Camp Whitman. In the first instance there was no mobilization, horses were purchased hurriedly, equipment was lacking for recruits, and the paper work connected with the muster in was necessarily hurried too much. In the other instance a well-organized camp, with plenty of equipment and supplies, made the orderly muster in, equipment, and entraining of troops possible. It is realized that rush orders were received for the train should leave out of New York City, but the advantage gained in time by not permitting them to effect mobilization was largely offset, I believe, by the advantages and quicker efficiency to be gained by less haste at the beginning.—(Extract from report of First Lieut. Dawson Olmstead, Field Artillery, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —.)

Everyone was working under great pressure—time appeared to be a factor—and, in my opinion, this great rush defeated one of the objects of a mobilization camp, the proper equipping of the troops for the duty for which intended.—(Extract from report of Capt. W. H. Wilson, Inspector-instructor, on National Guard of —, Sept. 5.)

COMMENDATION.

Where there is so much to be criticized it is a pleasure to note what inspectors have to say in a different vein—that of commendation.

During the encampment the discipline was excellent. The absence of drunkenness was remarkable; both officers and men appeared to be earnest and willing to do all that was required of them.—(Extract from report of Capt. Hani-gan, Inspector-instructor, on mobilization of National Guard of California.)

Maj. Phalen, Medical Corps, United States Army, inspector-instructor, commends Lieut. Col. Jacob Frank, chief surgeon, Illinois National Guard, and states that the fact that the Illinois troops were protected from smallpox and typhoid before leaving camp was largely due to his energy and administrative ability.

I have a pleasant report to make to you, and you can verify it later. We are told that we have the best camp in this district, 60 miles long, and we were told the other day by a witness—a witness, a senator, a witness, a senator, a witness.—(Extract from report of Capt. Deems, inspector-instructor, on Indiana Battalion of Field Artillery.)

I wish to record that all possible assistance was given me by the State authorities. A motor car and driver was placed at my disposal at any hour, day or night. The senior medical officer of the State, Col. Harlow Brooks, a man of the highest professional accomplishments, assisted me in every way in maintaining a sanitary camp and in the care of the sick. It required only a suggestion from me to secure the purchase of a new motor ambulance for the transfer of the seriously sick and operative cases to the nearest
CIVIL hospital, 25 miles away. * * * The State board of health sent a representative to the camp and established a temporary laboratory, where all necessary bacteriological work and water analysis were made. * * * This spirit of cooperation and cheerful desire to assist in every possible manner furnishes in retrospect the most encouraging recollection in what was otherwise a most trying experience.—(Extract from report of Maj. Wadhamns, Medical Corps, on physical examinations in New York National Guard.)

Capt. Hanigan commends the performance of duty by Lient. Col. D. A. Smith, Quartermaster Corps, National Guard of California. He states that Lient. Col. C. A. Dukes, Medical Corps, and Capt. E. S. Loizeaux, Medical Corps, California National Guard, performed their duties faithfully and well. He also commends First Lient. R. K. Barry, Medical Corps, National Guard of California.


Both Lient. Col. David S. Hill, Quartermaster Corps, and Lient. Col. William G. Schaufler, surgeon general, were uniriting in their cooperation with the mustering officers.

The personnel of both these departments of the National Guard had been carefully trained by their chiefs and rendered very efficient service.—(Extract from report of Col. Styer, inspector-instructor, on mobilization of National Guard of Oct. 18.)

All matters connected with the encampment and mobilization, Wisconsin National Guard, have been ably managed by the adjutant general of the State, who is entitled to full measure of credit for the excellent conditions noted in this report.—(Indorsement of department commander, July 22, on report of Col. George K. Hunter, Inspector General, on inspection of National Guard of Wisconsin.)

Capt. Hughes states that the Ordnance Department supplies arrived not only without requisition but as soon as the troops did, and requisitions on this department have been completely and promptly filled. The highest praise is due them for this efficient service.—(Letter of Capt. W. N. Hughes, Jr., Infantry, inspector-instructor, Nashville, Tenn., July 16, 1916.)

Commandary mention should be made of Lient. Col. Benton Long, of the governor's staff, who reported in camp, without pay or status, and volunteered as an assistant to the property officer and worked night and day without regard to hours. His services as well as those of Maj. George H. Smith, Quartermaster Corps, who also volunteered to assist the property officer, were invaluable.—(Extract from report of Capt. Kemper, inspector-instructor, National Guard of Pennsylvania, July 11.)

I feel that it is due the officers and men of the National Guard of Rhode Island that I comment on the excellent discipline that was maintained during the whole camp. As far as I know, there were but two cases during the camp that called for even troop discipline, and no summary court was even appointed. In view of this fact that much liberty was given to the troops, this record seems to me to be most commendable.—(Report of Capt. T. A. Roberts, Cavalry, inspector-instructor, on mobilization of Organized Militia of Rhode Island, Sept. 18, 1916.)

The spirit manifested by the enlisted men was good. In very few cases did the men fail to do their duty by seeking their discharge on any excuse.—(Extract from report of Capt. Hamilton, inspector-instructor, on National Guard of Nebraska, July 15.)

The Organized Militia of Iowa I believe tried faithfully to do its share in the tentative divisional organization. It mustered out an extra regiment of Infantry and started its proportion of Cavalry, etc. By this it has actually promoted out of the service some of the most able men in the guard, thus losing rank in the brigade. As they are enthusiasts for the service, it is probable that they will be found in it again; but it is recommended that if the divisions are formed for drill in the higher requirements of

an Army that these men be recognized. I especially recommend Maj. David S. Fairchild, chief surgeon, and Maj. Elliot E. Lambert, Quartermaster Department.

We were at first many times out of forms, due partly to the extreme carelessness of the militia clerks. The State adjutant general gave me great assistance in every way, even to the printing of forms required. He is an able man and willing to assume necessary responsibility. The assistant mustering officers were of great assistance and worked unceasingly to accomplish the work properly in the shortest space of time. They generally retained pleasant relations with the several officers with whom they had contact.—(Extract from report of Col. George H. Morgan, Cavalry, senior mustering officer, National Guard of Iowa, July 16, 1916.)

REPORTS OF DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS.

Extract from report of the commanding general, Eastern Department, on the mobilization of the militia in the Eastern Department, June 19 to July 17, 1916:

* * * Of the men mobilized not more than 25 per cent can be considered as reasonably well-instructed soldiers (64 per cent of the militia have had one year or more of service; 36 per cent less than one year). A considerable number of the long-service men have had to drop out, some because of age, some because of business or family reasons, and many because of physical unfitness. Only a small proportion of the recruits have had previous military training. Very few are prepared for immediate field service, and practically all were without sufficient experience in fieldwork to take care of themselves under campaign conditions.

The number of really effective organizations is very small. There is a fine spirit of willingness among officers and men in most organizations, but unfortunately this can not take the place of organization and training, nor can it replace the lack of trained noncommissioned officers and officers in sufficient numbers.

The percentage of rejections varied greatly, but, generally speaking, has been heavy and has indicated the physical standards required by the Government. Of the men mobilized not more than 25 per cent can be considered as reasonably well-instructed soldiers (64 per cent of the militia have had one year or more of service; 36 per cent less than one year). A considerable number of the long-service men have had to drop out, some because of age, some because of business or family reasons, and many because of physical unfitness. Only a small proportion of the recruits have had previous military training. Very few are prepared for immediate field service, and practically all were without sufficient experience in fieldwork to take care of themselves under campaign conditions.

The officer in charge of the Philadelphia depot and his assistant have done all that men could do to overcome the handicap of a faulty system, and whatever delay there has been in the distribution of supplies is, so far as I can learn, in no way chargeable to them.

The supplies and equipment were made out of the reserve supplies for the bulk of the militia of this department in one depot. Never again should it be possible to permit so unsound an arrangement to be made. It has been pointed out repeatedly that it would be a physical impossibility to ship the supplies from one depot and get them out with any degree of promptness or with such equality of distribution as to time as would make a prompt and orderly mobilization possible. Hereafter, if the system is to be continued, every militia regiment and separate organization which has a fireproof armory and reasonably secure storage rooms should have it. The additional supplies necessary to bring it to full war strength. The supplies and equipment for those which have not such facilities should be stored in the nearest arsenal, depot, or post, so that a prompt distribution of equipment may be made possible. Under the present system at least three times more time was used in getting supplies to the organizations than would have been required had a system been in force which was based upon an appreciation of the value of time as an element in mobilization.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

TRANSPORTATION.

Nearly all organizations have had to be furnished with a certain amount of transportation in the way of draft animals, and all mounted organizations have had to be furnished with mounts. Generally speaking, the organizations were not well-organized. Here and there, an organization was found with a few animals. The result of this method of providing animals is that green and unbroken animals, soft and without preparation for work, have been hurriedly bought and turned over to organizations made up of green men, without any knowledge or training for animals in the field. The result has been a great loss of animals, and a condition which in combination insures a high degree of inefficiency and a great loss of animals. All organizations should have in future some of the transportation elements. For the infantry and some of the auxiliary troops there should be at least one quarters motor truck, and a limited number of animals. For the mounted arms, a nucleus of suitable mounts should be maintained, and an option should be secured on a sufficient number of suitable animals to bring the command promptly to war strength. The mounted arms should also have at all times a certain amount of motor transport, for moving supplies, etc. We can not afford to hold a full equipment of animals through the long intervals of peace, but we can and should make some arrangement for promptly securing through an option suitable animals. These animals should be used during the summer encampments, and their fitness tried out. Of course, this all means a considerable outlay of money, but if we are to have any degree of military efficiency for our mounted troops, this or a similar system must be adopted. The present system of mobilization and supply of animals would have meant disaster, so far as the mounted arms are concerned, had we had actual contact with an enemy.

RESERVES OF MEN FOR THE MOBILIZATION.

These must be provided. The present regiments, troops, batteries, and other units which are going to the front, with few exceptions, are not effective organizations. They are made up of largely untrained, wearing an equipment and carrying arms with which they are little familiar. They are unprepared to meet trained troops and are lacking in that solid foundation of training and experience in practical work and exercise which are imperative in the making of good troops. The press and people of the country note the trains going to the front filled with men in uniform, and are unaware of the fact that they are not a trained, effective fighting force. Months of hard work will be required before these troops will be fit to take the field against an enemy.

When the regiments are brought to full war strength the forces on the border will be made up largely of untrained men, probably to the extent of 75 or 80 per cent. There is beginning to be an inadequacy of supplies, even at this early stage of the mobilization.

These conditions and others pointed out are those which have been foreseen by all who have been familiar with conditions existing in the Organized Militia. It is the result of officers or men, but the natural result of an unsound system. Fortunately, the military situation which confronts the country is one in which the element of danger from an attacking force is relatively small, and the time one in which we can to a large extent take advantage of the situation.

The delays in shipment are in no way chargeable to the railroads, as they have proceeded as rapidly as possible. The men and officers of the militia have been willing and in most instances enthusiastic. The blame for existing conditions does not rest upon them. They have done what they could to overcome the defects of a system which has always rendered a high degree of efficiency unattainable.

It will be at least six weeks or two months after the organizations have reached the border before they will have reached full war strength and be completely equipped, and it is safe to say that it will be fully three months after muster in before they are as a whole able to render reasonably effective service in campaign against our present possible enemy. It would be much longer if they were required to meet first-class troops.

Taking the militia of the department as a whole it can be stated that the best of the militia has gone to the front, while the remaining regiments will require a good deal of time for preparation. Recruiting is going to be slow and difficult, and from the present outlook it will be very hard to fill the regiments up to full strength. This is due very largely to the change of conditions on the border and the increasing improbability of immediate active service.

I believe that no further organizations should go forward until thoroughly prepared and equipped, including the full complements of animals for draft and riding. If it has been done there is no need to provide the organizations on the border, then the organizations should be sent to the border as soon as possible in order that they may take over their animals and begin to receive instruction in their use and care.

The mobilization to date indicates that the militia system as conducted is wholly inefficient and can not be depended upon to produce promptly an effective military force. To rely upon it in time of real war would be to insure disaster. When it is remembered that we have already spent four weeks of intense effort in assembling 54,000 troops, out of a call for 131,000, on the border, and that these troops are as yet unprovided with transport or mounts, and, further, that fully 75 per cent of them are without needed instruction; that our cavalry is largely without training as such, and that much of our artillery has had little or no training, the imperative necessity for a radical change of system is apparent.

MUSTERING OFFICERS.

Muster ing officers have rendered excellent service. The plan of turning over the inspector-instructors to the department commander for use as mustering officers has been thoroughly satisfactory. The officer in charge of militia affairs has through these officers been able to conduct very efficiently the many and complex details arising at mobilization camps.

MOBILIZATION CAMPS.

The mobilization camps on the whole have been satisfactory; some of them were not well chosen, but this was a matter which only experience could demonstrate. The mobilization camps for recruits for organizations at the front have been and are being transferred to military posts, where the recruits can be received, equipped, and given some training before being sent to the front. This will result in a saving in money and in personnel and will, I believe, increase efficiency, as it would be difficult to maintain working organizations at the State mobilization camps without mustering into the United States service a larger number of officers than will be necessary for the proposed system.

RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION.

There has been considerable difficulty in securing tourist sleepers, and a large portion of the troops have had to make a considerable part of the move in day coaches. While this has been uncomfortable, there has been no serious hardship. Generally speaking, the railroad companies have promptly responded to calls for transportation. Care has been taken to have cars provided with light and water, and all trains, so far as known, have been carefully inspected.

TRAVEL RATIONS IN CAMP.

Rations in camp have been reported generally as satisfactory.

TRAVEL RATIONS EN ROUTE.

Almost without exception sections have been provided with kitchen cars or improvised cooking cars, so that men exercising ordinary intelligence and initiative could prepare coffee and the necessary food. There have been a considerable number of instances of alleged shortage of food, but thus far indications are that the shortage, whenever it existed, was due to inexperience or carelessness. The travel ration is sufficient, and ample has been provided for the journey.

The handling of the ration by the militia, both at mobilization camps and en route, indicated the need of developing trained field cooks in militia organizations.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

PURCHASE OF ANIMALS.

Boards were organized under the emergency orders to hurry troops to the front, and large numbers of animals were purchased for troops of New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, and small numbers of animals sufficient to furnish troops with the necessary wagon transportation for use about camp were purchased for several other States. This was necessary because organizations were practically without animals. At present the bulk of the militia in camp is asking for draft animals, and all the mounted organizations are requesting that mounts be furnished them before going to the front.

The general price for animals has been satisfactory, and it has been comparatively easy to secure good animals from agencies which have been collecting for foreign Governments.

SHORTAGE OF QUARTERMASTER'S SUPPLIES.

The shortage of quartermaster's supplies in a considerable number of lines developed during the second week, and purchases of certain articles had to be made in the open market.

THE CLERICAL FORCE.

The clerical force of the department has rendered signally efficient service, working from 16 to 18 hours a day in many instances.

BLANK FORMS.

There has been considerable difficulty in securing certain classes of blank forms. This has been remedied.

A full report will be submitted on completion of the mobilization. The present report is intended simply to outline briefly the general situation and to indicate that much must not be expected of these troops until they have had several months' training.

Leonard Wood,
Major General United States Army.

[Indorsements.]

1. The following supplementary report to the one forwarded July 17, 1916, is submitted:

2. Briefly reviewing the situation presented, attention is particularly invited to the following salient points:

(a) Thirty per cent of the number of enlisted men in the State service at the date of the call of the President, June 18, 1916, were discharged because of physical disability. Such a proportion of ineffectives is amazing when it is considered that Delaware and North Carolina are the only States in this department that have not adopted the standards of the Regular Army physical examination prior to entry into the service. The lax methods, in this connection, that must have been employed are well demonstrated in the cases of Georgia and Kentucky, both of which States average for each organization presented 50 per cent physical rejections and the unnecessary monetary loss incident thereto in the way of "pay, clothing, and keep" of such men, they being entitled to such from the date they responded to the call of the President, will be a considerable item. As the mobilization has proceeded, the paramount idea seems to have been on the part of the States to simply supply men regardless of their physical qualifications or disqualifications. In many instances a strong effort has been made to bring about the mustering into service of physically unfit men and to prevent the mustering out of the service of those who are physically unfitness for active duty.

(b) Of the total number responding to the call of June 18, on July 31 there remained in mobilization camps in this department practically 34 per cent. Departures have been delayed primarily because of lack of equipment, and, secondarily, the inability of organizations to recruit to the authorized minimum peace strength. This feature, as well as the number of recruits received for organizations that have been forwarded to the Southern Department, which is 72 per cent of the number required to recruit such organizations to war strength, is believed to be a result of increasing improbability of immediate active service, but regardless of the cause, the facts as stated remain.

* * *

With reference to shortages, especially in the Ordnance and Quarter-master Departments, this developed early in the mobilization and has indicated a condition of serious shortage in these departments. The Adjutant General on June 27 telegraphed these headquarters as follows:

"With reference to your request for authority to communicate directly with depots in matter of ordnance material, Chief of Ordnance reports mobilization of militia has practically exhausted small reserve supply in hands of his department, and that it is essential that limited amount of stores remaining on hand should be held subject to order of War Department to meet most urgent needs."

This statement is significant and indicates very clearly what would have happened had we occasion to meet an enemy who was prepared or to meet a force of any strength. This matter will be handled more in detail in the final report. Serious shortages have developed in the Quartermaster Department in the very early stages of the mobilization, and indicated, the department as a whole is wholly unready to meet the demands of war even under conditions of minor gravity, in the military sense, which characterized our possible clash with Mexico.

(d) The system of furnishing horses through collecting them in the Middle West and sending them to the frontier to be assigned to untrained mounted organizations on arrival has been a pronounced failure and should never be resorted to again. Mounted organizations have been held for months without horses awaiting shipment to the border. On arrival it will require additional months to train the men for the mounted service, and an equally long time to train the mounts. These organizations should have had their horses assigned to them in camp and their training conducted there.

To assemble the men and animals of mounted organizations in the theater of war and in the immediate presence of a presumptive enemy, in my opinion, is a most unwise and hazardous procedure.

3. The evidence as gathered for the period as covered by this report serves only to emphasize the correctness of the statements made in the previous report, and has fully justified the recommendations made in preceding years to the effect that reserves of men and animals must be provided in time of peace. Arms and equipment sufficient to arm and equip regiments at war strength must be kept in the armories or in depots under Government control as near as possible to the troops concerned. The present system of concentrating supplies has been an absolute failure, has caused much delay and a great and unnecessary outlay of money incidental to shipping by express, etc. This department has been stripped of clerical officers, cooks, bakers, and technical troops in a desperate effort to take care of and render more efficient this largely untrained, largely unequipped force of militia. This mobilization has demonstrated a condition which should never be allowed to occur again, and has shown conclusively that we could not have possibly met even a small well-prepared force with any hope of success. It is not the men and officers in the militia who are at fault, but rather the system. If this demonstration of the entire unreliability and workability of our present militia system proves to be sufficient to bring about the adoption of a sound, rational system, the lesson will be well worth what it cost.

Leonard Wood,
Major General, United States Army.

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL DEPARTMENT, Chicago, Ill., October 19, 1916.

From: Department commander.

To: The Adjutant General of the Army.

Subject: Report concerning recent National Guard mobilization.

In compliance with letter from The Adjutant General of the Army, dated September 18, 1916, the following report on the National Guard mobilization in the Central Department is submitted:

(a) The degree of promptness with which these troops have assembled, and where they have been slow, the reasons for such tardiness.

72981-16-9
1. The assembly of the troops at their respective State mobilization camps was practically, and in some cases entirely, completed as follows:
  
  By June 23, Missouri, Wisconsin.
  By June 24, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas.
  By June 25, Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, North Dakota.
  By June 26, Wyoming.
  By June 28, Iowa, Minnesota, South Dakota.
  By July 2, Ohio. The desirability, or in some cases the necessity, of recruiting certain organizations to minimum strength was the main reason for the delay in the assembling of such troops as reached their mobilization camps on June 25, 26, and 28. The delay in the case of Ohio was primarily due to the fact that the site selected for mobilization camp was absolutely unsuitable and secondarily, to the fact that the State authorities considered it necessary to construct a semipermanent camp with shelters, sewer systems, etc., all of which resulted in unusual expense for work of no permanent value, and much of which was entirely unnecessary. Every effort was made by department headquarters to expedite the assembling of the Ohio troops, but it was impossible to get the State authorities to hasten assembly. It was 10 days after the call before the first Ohio regiment arrived at camp. Before this time two Illinois regiments had already left for the border, and the troops in several other States of this department were practically ready to leave, having been mustered and physically examined and their property checked.

  In many respects, especially those of economy, National Guard troops should be mustered in at their respective armories, thus saving the transportation of rejected officers and men to the mobilization camps and return, the great loss of time to the individuals concerned, unusual delay in replacing them, and their pay during that period.

  (b) The degree of preparedness evinced upon assembly, covering organization, supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State.

  (c) The degree of preparedness as affecting preparedness. In no State was the National Guard prepared to take the field at once. In most cases this unpreparedness was mainly due to the faulty system under which the National Guard is organized, supplied, and controlled. In others, the State authorities were partially responsible.

  The—due to lack of proper organization, could not be sent to the border until July 9, and even then it was without machine gun company. A machine-gun company was later organized, but it was not complete and did not join its regiment until the latter returned from the border in September. The regiment had practically to be reorganized after arrival at its mobilization camp, thereby greatly delaying its preparation for the field. A machine-gun company was later organized, but it was not complete and did not join its regiment until the latter returned from the border in September.

  The various units of State organizations were not up to minimum strength, or were so close to minimum strength that the discharge of the physical examination disqualified them in many cases far below the minimum. This lack of strength was in many cases a cause of delay in assembling, and of still greater delay before the troops, after arrival at camp, could be considered even reasonably ready for the field. The Wyoming battalions were still below strength on July 31, when they were sent to the border. In Colorado it was so difficult to get recruits that many units, months after their assembly, were still little more than skeleton organizations.

  Proper supervision, inspection, and instruction of National Guard companies, batteries, and troops, coupled with proper and efficient command thereof, should suggest that each such unit should have, first and foremost among its enlisted men capable and efficient commanders, officers and men capable of properly operating the various units. In many instances the importance of requisites are competent blacksmiths and forgers, with the necessary forgers’ and blacksmiths’ tools, etc., on hand to shoe and care for the animals.

  (d) Criticisms and comments on regulations and methods, with suggestions and recommendations which will enable the department to inaugurate such changes as will insure greater smoothness and expedition in future mobilization.

  The Wisconsin troops as a whole, were upon date of call, better equipped for immediate field service than were the troops of any other State. The contrast between the Wisconsin troops and those of some of the other States, and those of some of the States and those of some of the departments and the Federal authorities was remarkably marked. The total shortage is the fault of the State authorities and how much is the fault of the Federal authorities it is impossible to state. It proved very difficult in some cases impossible to obtain some types of equipment to meet the demand. The Federal authorities, however, can only in part be blamed for these deficiencies, as the Federal authorities did not have sufficient on hand to supply the needs of the National Guard. For the best judge of what was needed in the particular case. During the early days of the mobilization, any attempt at progressive training would have been worse than useless, as the energies of all were fully occupied in attending to the physical needs of the troops and pushing the arrangements to expedite departure for the front. The troops remaining in mobilization camps after the first rush of troops to the border had passed were given regular drill and instruction—the amount and kind varying in the different camps.

  2. The Wisconsin troops and some of the Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Kansas organizations were probably the best trained at the time of muster. The South Dakota Regiment, Colorado troops, and the two Wyoming battalions were probably in the poorest shape as regards both organization and training.

  There was a general shortage of engineer and signal equipment. Some of the deficiencies were evidently before the troops were called out in Federal service, and hence was probably the fault of the State authorities. The Army authorities, of the total shortage is the fault of the State authorities and how much is the fault of the Federal authorities. There is probably more difficulty of the Federal authorities to be held responsible. The troops in most cases were well supplied with ordnance equipment and ammunition, but the transportation of the balance of the equipment necessary to equip troops to war strength. In some cases equipment was supplied to a single organization, and some troops were equipped partly with provosts and partly with automatic pistols.

  Many National Guard organizations were deficient in shoes and blankets, as well as in many less important articles of uniform and equipment. The State authorities were partially responsible for these deficiencies, as the Federal authorities did not have sufficient on hand to supply the needs of the National Guard. The 2nd Illinois regiment was well supplied, and the shoes and clothing was also conspicuous by its absence. In most organizations, at date of call, soldiers were not provided with more than an average of 1 blanket, 1 woolen uniform, 1 O.D. shirt, 1 pair of shoes, and 1 suit of underwear.

  No militia organization appeared at mobilization camp completely armed, clothed, equipped, and ready to take the field. The lack of equipment ran all the way from a shortage of a few minor articles to a serious shortage of essential supplies of equipment, clothing, etc.

  The degree of progress made in training the troops thus mobilized.

  Orders given or measures taken for the instruction of National Guard troops at their mobilization camps after muster into the service of the United States:

  1. The degree of progress made by the organizations in training. In this department, no fixed schedule of training was ordered from these headquarters, it being considered that the senior Regular Army line officer on the ground, acting as instructor as well as mustering officer, was the best judge of what was needed in the particular case. During the early days of the mobilization, any attempt at progressive training would have been worse than useless, as the energies of all were fully occupied in attending to the physical needs of the troops and pushing the arrangements to expedite departure for the front. The troops remaining in mobilization camps after the first rush of troops to the border had passed were given regular drill and instruction—the amount and kind varying in the different camps.

  2. The Wisconsin troops and some of the Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, and Kansas organizations were probably the best trained at the time of muster. The South Dakota Regiment, Colorado troops, and the two Wyoming battalions were probably in the poorest shape as regards both organization and training.
The National Guard as now organized and controlled is not as a whole a dependable or efficient force, can never be made to, and is excessively expensive. Any force required on the Regular Army would increase it in numbers sufficient to meet all emergencies and form an effective first line ready for immediate call and dispatch anywhere.

This recent mobilization confirms the opinion that there should be no National Guard unit above the regiment which will eliminate all National Guard line general officers, very few, if any, of whom are competent to properly exercise the functions of even brigade command, and if the adjutants general of the several States could be appointed and selected by a central system of examination of them—their records and service—and not be appointed for political reasons, great improvement would come in the administration of their offices, in competent advice to their respective governors and efficient control of the State forces.

Criticisms and comments on the mobilization and suggestions for future changes are given below under the headings—Personnel, Recruiting, Mobilization points, Supply, Instruction, and Administration.

1. PERSONNEL.

All States in the Central Department have, theoretically, adopted the physical standard prescribed for the Regular Army. Practically no effort has been made in any State to enforce or properly apply this standard in enlisting men for the National Guard. The percentages of rejection upon physical examination held after muster into the United States service are as follows: Colombo, 10 per cent; Illinois, 11 per cent; Indiana, 21 per cent; Iowa, 8 per cent; Kansas, 16 per cent; Michigan, 15 per cent; Minnesota, 13 per cent; Missouri, 12 per cent; Nebraska, 15 per cent; North Dakota, 12 per cent; Ohio, 20 per cent; South Dakota, 4 per cent; New York, 17 per cent; Wisconsin, 13 per cent; Wyoming, 4 per cent. In a number of individual companies the percentage of rejections ran from 30 to 35 per cent and higher. One Indiana battery, recently recognized by the Federal Government and accepted into service under the law, came to mobilization camp with 137 enlisted men, of whom 52 were rejected upon physical examination held the day following muster in.

Under the law no unit can be accepted into the Federal service under a certain fixed minimum strength prescribed by the President. At the same time the law prescribes that any unit having the required minimum must, if called out, be mustered into the Federal service prior to the physical examination that is made under the supervision of the regular mustering officer. Companies of the National Guard numbering about 40 men at the time of the President's call on June 18 were recruited to minimum strength by going into the highways and byways and enlisting any men obtainable. The officers concerned appreciated the fact that many of the men who were enlisted under these circumstances would undoubtedly be rejected upon the physical examination which would follow the muster in, but under the provisions of the law they had to attain a certain minimum strength, and in order to do so were practically forced to enlist any applicants whose physical defects were not strikingly apparent. One regiment (Eighth Ohio Infantry) had approximately 500 men, who were so enlisted, rejected upon physical examination held after muster in.

No advantage whatever was derived either by Federal or State Government from having organizations report at mobilization camps with a fictitious strength caused by the influx of such hastily enlisted and physically unfit recruits. Under the law, however, it was necessary that all such men (even those who were absolutely unfit for service) be still enrolled as members of the organization, and report to their homes. This expensive procedure was necessarily followed out in the case of over 9,000 National Guardsmen in this department alone. The money necessarily paid out for them by the Federal Government was absolutely wasted.

I recommend that the officers and enlisted men of the National Guard be examined physically at least once a year by medical officers of the United States Army, and that men found physically unfit be discharged at once.

2. RECRUITING.

Whatever the duty assigned to the National Guard, and whether or not it be mustered into the Federal service, it continues to remain essentially a State force. In this it differs from other Federal troops. To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. With the State troops in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in the continued existence of the organization retain interest. The appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.

The fact that as a rule fully one-third of the members of the various organizations were, upon muster in, unriveted recruits or men of but a few months' service made it impossible to regard any unit as properly trained. The influx of raw recruits at any time cuts down very greatly the efficiency even of well-trained organizations. In the case of the hastily recruited, many of whom it is especially necessary that in time of emergency such influx be not permitted, and they should not be accepted into Federal service unless up to minimum strength at time of call.

Some modification should be made in the physical requirements for admission of National Guard officers and men when the organizations are transferred to Federal service. It is unreasonable to require the same physical standard of training for Federal service as is required for the Regular Army. Some of our most excellent officers can not pass the required eye test without their glasses, but can see perfectly with glasses. Regulations should be prepared showing the deviation from the standard permitted under certain circumstances. The requirements should also be modified for officers and men of mature years and long service.

Whether or not the physical requirements governing acceptance of officers and enlisted men are modified as above suggested, it is necessary that the department commanders be given authority to waive minor defects in weight, height, eyesight, etc. The fact that during the early part of the past mobilization all such applications for waiver had to go to the War Department resulted in the loss of many valuable officers and men and in considerable delay and dissatisfaction all around.

If the National Guard is in any sense of the word to be what its name implies, steps must be taken to obviate discharging, after the guard is called out, a large proportion of the enlisted men on account of weight or height or for other reasons. Members of the guard who, in time of peace, become residents of another State, should be at once discharged. The company rolls should contain the names of only such men as are actually doing service with the guard when called out. At the same time of national emergency the appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.

To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. With the State troops in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in the continued existence of the organization retain interest. The appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.

To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. With the State troops in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in the continued existence of the organization retain interest. The appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.

To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. With the State troops in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in the continued existence of the organization retain interest. The appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.

To recruit for the Regular Army all that is necessary is for a recruiting officer at any station to enlist a suitable man. At once he becomes available to fill any vacancy in the Regular Army. The Regular Army is in no way local. The recruit loses all local interest and his home largely loses interest in him. With the State troops in large cities and companies in smaller communities are essentially local; the personnel of any such organization belong to a limited neighborhood. The home town entertains an intense interest in the continued existence of the organization retain interest. The appointment of officers selected, either directly or indirectly, by the men whom they are to command is a vital fault still existing in many States.
by the Federal Government for each recruit enlisted in a sum of money equal
to the average cost of a recruit for the Regular Army delivered and enlisted
at the regular United States Army recruiting depots.

After enlistment the Federal Government to have full charge of instruction,
equipment, etc., the recruits being forwarded for this purpose to the mobilization
camp designated for troops of that State. All recruits will there be fully
equipped and given all necessary training before being assigned to units or
forwarded to the front for assignment. Individual preferences should, of
course, be considered so far as possible, as it would tend to make recruiting
enlistments more suitable to home organizations.

By the above plan the forces best calculated to appeal to the people would
be used to stimulate recruiting, and it would cost the Federal Government only
for accepted recruits. The State losses nothing provided reasonable care is
exercised in securing suitable applicants, and the Federal Government is fully
protected.

3. MOBILIZATION POINTS.

The mobilization camps in many States of this department were not at all
suited to the purpose. The site at Columbus, Ohio, was unsuitable and most
of the money spent in preparation of this camp was wasted. The camp was
abandoned as soon as the troops left.
The Infantry of the Illinois National Guard were mobilized at the State
Fairgrounds at Springfield. This site proved convenient enough under the
circumstances, but was unsuited for more than temporary use.
The mobilization point for the Nebraska troops was the State Fair Grounds
at Lincoln, a site entirely unsuited for the purpose, having no room for drill
ground and being situated on low ground, subject to overflow.
The South Dakota mobilization camp, near Redfield, is inconvenient of access
and unsuited for camp purposes. The South Dakota regiment and the Nebraska
troops might much better have been mobilized together at Fort Crook. Similarly
the North Dakota regiment should have been mobilized at Fort Snelling
with the Minnesota troops. This would have simplified supply and been less
expensive than to have a separate camp, as was required by the War Department
orders.
The Wyoming National Guard should have been mobilized at Fort D. A.
Russell instead of just outside the reservation. Similarly the Colorado troops
should have been mobilized at Fort Logan rather than at their rifle range at
golden, where the water supply was uncertain in quantity.
Except in the comparatively rare cases where suitable tracts of land are
owned by States and set aside for the training and mobilization of the National
Guard, existing Army posts and United States reservations within the State
should have been utilized wherever practicable. This would greatly have
expedited the mobilization of 1916.

Sites for future mobilization should be selected with the utmost care by a
board of specially qualified officers. Accessibility, good railroad connections, a
reasonable amount of drill ground and a target range permitting practice up to
600 yards are absolutely essential. The fact that the mobilization camp would
be the logical place for the assembling and training of newly formed regiments
and also be considered and, if practicable, the ground available should include areas of varied terrain suitable for field training
of recruits and small units.

Upon the selected site should be built the necessary office buildings and
suitable storehouses for ordnance, quartermaster, and other stores. These
buildings should be permanent.

4. SUPPLIES.

Under present regulations the equipment needed to cover the difference be-
tween peace and war footing is supposedly shipped automatically to the various
National Guard organizations at their designated mobilization camps. Prac-
tically, however, this does not work. The stores should be available at the
armory or mobilization camp at all times.

Complete supplies for the entire National Guard of a State (less the equip-
ment and clothing actually in the hands of the men or at their armories)
should be kept throughout the year in the proper storehouses of the respective
mobilization camps. Each of these camps should be in charge of a regular
officer, whose duty it would be to see that the prescribed amount of supplies
is kept on hand at all times. The storehouses at mobilization camps would in
effect be subdeposits or distributing points of the existing quartermaster, en-
gineer, signal, and ordnance depots. All National Guard requisitions for equip-
ment and camp equipment should be filled from these subdeposits and the stores
issued replaced promptly by shipment from one of the main central depots.
This would result in the supplies on hand being constantly "turned over,"
thereby preventing deterioration. The quantity of supplies kept on hand
should be based on actual needs of the troops with reasonable provision made
for equipment which might be required at the last moment.

A complete supply of blank forms needed upon muster in and for the routine
administration and supply of the entire State National Guard after its muster
into the Federal service should be kept on hand at all times in the various
armories or mobilization camps.

In the recent mobilization operations and quartermaster supplies were, so long
as they lasted, shipped direct from the various War Department stores to States
with view to cover anticipated increase from peace to war strength. Many
States receive more than in excess of their needs and later had to be reshipped
from or at the depots because the troops remained practically at minimum strength, while other States were badly
handicapped by a failure to receive sufficient supplies to equip troops actually
in camp. Supplies received at any camp in excess of needs had to be reshipped
as shipped back to the depots before organization had been completed and restocked
for States in need of them.

Most of the National Guard organizations were fairly well provided with
harness and wagons, but practically none had horses or mules. They were
impossible to purchase in quantity in the few days available to them. In many States
horses were obtained locally. Under more elastic regulations governing the purchase
of animals, suitable horses could in many cases have been secured
at or near home stations and mobilization camps and the regiments could
have gone to the border completely equipped with transportation. It is of
the highest importance that regulations governing the purchase of animals be so
modified as to make it not only possible but eminently practicable to purchase
horses locally in open market.

The issuing of 32 horses to each National Guard battery or troop is a step in
the right direction. In addition, the commanding officer of each mounted
National guard organization should be required to have and to keep up to date
at all times a list of suitable horses available locally and sufficient in number
to cover the needs of the organization. These horses should be inspected annually by regular officers and an option taken on each at an agreed
price, the owner agreeing to bring him, upon demand, to mobilization camp or
other designated point and turn him over to proper authorities at the price
agreed.

Machine guns were lacking for a number of regiments in this department.
This lack was in part supplied before regiments left for the border, but in most
cases machine guns and equipment were not received before leaving this depart-
ment. Every infantry and cavalry regiment should have had a full
quantity of machine guns; and the men who are to operate the guns should be
thoroughly acquainted with the same and should know how to make the usual
and necessary repairs.

In case of future mobilizations taking place before complete supplies are on
hand for all National Guard troops, more latitude should be allowed the senior
muster ing officer, or camp quartermaster, who should be authorized to purchase
locally articles needed by the troops and which cannot be supplied by the Army
depots. Nonuniform articles might just as well be purchased locally as be
purchased at distant points and then shipped to mobilization camp, as was done
in many instances in the mobilization of 1916.

Uniformity of uniform clothing on hand in the depots was entirely insufficient
in time to meet the demands. The depot quartermasters did their best to supply defi-
ciencies by making open-market purchases, but in some cases articles purchased
were unsuitable. Nebraska troops, for instance, were furnished light-weight
and light-colored cotton blankets purchased in the St. Louis depot in open
market when heavy woolen blankets, similar to regulation, could have been pur-
chased in Nebraska at a reasonable price and furnished promptly to troops.
Ohio troops had at this time more blankets than were needed and later returned
a large quantity to St. Louis.

In some cases troops were delayed at their mobilization camp by the late
arrival of hats, shoes, or underclothes. In some cases authority was obtained
to make local purchases, but in others the troops had to await shipment of
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

The Regular Army should be increased sufficiently to meet all emergencies and requirements and be kept up to maximum strength by enlistments that will be available should a proper system of universal compulsory training and service be required of all citizens of suitable age under proper laws to be enacted by Congress.

The following are extracts from report of November 1 of Col. Frederick, the chief mustering officer of the Central Department:

The mobilization points for National Guard in this department were designated by the War Department; in many cases they were unsuitable for more than temporary use. Apparently, in the designation of these mobilization points, the factors of an area large enough for drill and instruction, as well as for transportation, good roads, accessibility, sanitation, and water supply, were overlooked in whole or in part. Except in the cases of Missouri, Wisconsin, and possibly Michigan, existing Army posts and United States reservations should have been utilized. The North Dakota troops should have been mobilized at Fort Snelling, Minn.; South Dakota and Nebraska at Fort Crook, Neb., etc. A list of the mobilization points in this department, with dates of arrival of the units of the National Guard thereto and the date of completion of muster in of the organizations, is hereto attached and marked “B-1” and “E-2.”

The muster in of the National Guard of this department was greatly handicapped by the shortage of necessary blank forms and delay in the receipt of additional blank forms requested by telegraph. Telegrams showing the numbers and amounts of forms required were sent your office on June 20, June 21, and June 24. Some of the forms asked for did not arrive at these headquarters until July 20. This office appreciates the fact that, due to the urgency of the situation and the large number of troops ordered mustered in, the delay in receipt of forms was unavoidable, but for future mobilization there should be kept on hand at all times at department headquarters or at designated mobilization points the maximum number of blank forms that can be used.

The National Guard should have a system of annual physical inspection by regular medical officers, so that the large percentage of rejections could be done away with upon muster in to Federal service and the efficiency and strength of the units would not later be confirmed by you or by the Judge Advocate General. The one exception was that this office decided that the President alone had authority to commission National Guardsmen already in Federal service.

The results of the physical examination of the National Guardsmen called into service on June 18 is shown by States herewith and marked “D-1 to 14,” inclusive. The remarkable variation in the number of rejections in different units, running from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 34 per cent, shows that there is no uniform physical standard in the National Guard. This is a matter that should receive immediate and serious consideration, and the National Guard should be rigidly held to the same standard as is prescribed for the Regular Army.

The National Guard should have a system of annual physical inspection by regular medical officers, so that the large percentage of rejections could be done away with upon muster in to Federal service and the efficiency and strength of personnel be kept up approximately to that required in orders. All members of the National Guard must be kept up to date on smallpox and other vaccinations so that the administration of these vaccinations be not required upon mobilization for Federal service, and the resulting delay and confusion at mobilization points be thereby avoided.

The Physical standard in the National Guard is not the same as in the Regular Army. The standard should be the same, and some steps, either by annual examination or by a system of penalizing the State, should be placed in effect to keep out of the National Guard officers and men who are not fitted for field service. The high percentage of rejections, which in one organization—Company A, Signal Corps, Nebraska—reached 34 per cent, shows a lamentable lack of appreciation of the physical requirements of a soldier.

CONCLUSION.

There is but one conclusion to be drawn from what goes before, and that is that the National Guard as now dually organized and administered is not efficient or dependable, can not be made so in any reasonable time, and it should therefore remain solely as a State force, under State control and for State purposes, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution.
The system of responsibility and accountability for Government property in the hands of the National Guard should be the same as that in vogue in the Regular Army. The present system of transferring all property in the hands of the State to the United States upon the mobilization of the National Guard is cumbersome and useless. It results in confusion and an undue amount of work at the mobilization camps, as well as in more or less delay in dispatching troops to concentration camps.

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN DEPARTMENT, 

From: Commanding general, Southern Department.
To: The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Report concerning recent National Guard mobilization.

1.Replying to letter (2461974) from your office, dated September 18, 1916, I report as follows concerning the mobilization of the National Guard of States within this territorial department:

(a) Promptness of assembly.—Assembly is deemed to have been completed by muster in.

(b) Degree of preparedness evinced upon assembly, covering organization, supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State.—Detailed information was wired to the War Department immediately upon completion of muster in for each regiment, separate battalion, or other separate unit.

(c) Degree of progress in training troops thus mobilized and measures taken for their instruction at mobilization camps.—The troops were mobilized at permanent camps or stations of Regular Army organizations and were instructed by the officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army on duty at these camps and stations. The other three States were mobilized at States’ mobilization camps and garrisonsed military posts, and in both cases the equipment at the mobilization point was available for instructional purposes. At these latter points special details of Regular officers were made to assist in the instruction of the National Guard. In either case the instruction of the National Guard was necessarily slow and incomplete. Nearly all arrived in the department with olive drab winter clothing. As concentration took place in the hot season, this worked considerable hardship on the troops and necessitated the issue of supplies and equipment which should have been furnished at the mobilization point instead of at the concentration point. There was a serious lack of blank forms of all kinds, which resulted in delays in the preparation of records and reports and in the instruction of the National Guard in the use of these forms.

(d) Comments on the mustering regulations.—These were found generally workable. They have been modified and improved as a result of the experience arising in their application. There was not at first a sufficient distribution of the pamphlet, and many organizations are still without a copy.

The main fault which still remains, and which demands radical treatment, is the process of muster in, which is too complicated and takes too much time and labor. The mere fact that there are so many regulations condemns it. The process must be simplified so as to be applicable in a real emergency. The troops when called out should be ready for muster in, and the emergency being real, the troops offered by the State should be accepted at once and sworn into Federal service. It would seem that this desirable condition can be brought about by an insistence in peace times on the physical requirements and by the abolishment of the present complicated property accountability and transfer regulations. Federal inspection in peace times should include a physical examination. With the new provisions of the national-defense act as to pay and property responsibility, it would seem that a peace accountability could be devised which would avoid any inspections, inventories, and transfers of property on mobilization.

It has been suggested that there should be a patrol at all times and kept up to date in each company office a separate muster-in roll for each member. The record of each officer and man should be entered on a standard mobilization punch card. The personnel of the New Mexico regiment was weak and the organization was unstable. It almost went to pieces when the physical standards were applied. There was urgent need for the services of this regiment. As finally mustered in, its enlistment membership included at least 40 per cent of men who would not have been acceptable for the Regular Army. The main efforts of the organizers had been directed to obtaining 65 men for each company; and the other States had brought in many that were manifestly unfit. The result was an organization of the required strength on paper, but with the weakness of a mere paper organization.

In a lesser degree this padding process was evident in the composition of the Arizona regiment, and the elimination of the physically unfit, and the mobilization of the National Guard in the department without sufficient tentage, cots, mosquito bars, and other articles of the equipment C class, which are not included in the regular circular referred to above. Very few organizations reached this department equipped for service in a hot climate. Nearly all arrived in the department with olive drab winter clothing. As concentration took place in the hot season, this worked considerable hardship on the troops and necessitated the issue of supplies and equipment which should have been furnished at the mobilization point instead of at the concentration point. There was a serious lack of blank forms of all kinds, which resulted in delays in the preparation of records and reports and in the instruction of the National Guard in the use of these forms.

Reasons for slowness:

Arizona: Mobilization point changed after the call (to facilitate supply and instruction). Principal delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition from some organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await reinstatement. Majority of the companies arrived at mobilization point under minimum strength.

Texas: Promptness of movement was commendable. Mobilization point was changed after the call (to facilitate supply and instruction). When personnel was examined at mobilization point the rejections for physical unfitness threw out 35 to 50 per cent of each company. These had to be replaced by recruitment to minimum strength of 65 men before muster in.

Arkansas: Principal delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition from 13 organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await reinstatement. The 2 regiments finally came to the border with about 60 per cent of olive drab minimum strength.

Louisiana: Delay caused by withdrawal of Federal recognition from some organizations. They had to remedy defects, be reinspected, and await reinstatement.

Oklahoma: Principal difficulties arose from shifting of mobilization point. Chandler dropped as unsanitary; units ordered to Oklahoma City; later to Fort Sill, Okla.

(c) Degree of progress in training troops thus mobilized and measures taken for their instruction at mobilization camps.—These were found generally workable. They have been modified and improved as a result of the experience arising in their application. There was not at first a sufficient distribution of the pamphlet, and many organizations are still without a copy.

The main fault which still remains, and which demands radical treatment, is the process of muster in, which is too complicated and takes too much time and labor. The mere fact that there are so many regulations condemns it. The process must be simplified so as to be applicable in a real emergency. The troops when called out should be ready for muster in, and the emergency being real, the troops offered by the State should be accepted at once and sworn into Federal service. It would seem that this desirable condition can be brought about by an insistence in peace times on the physical requirements and by the abolishment of the present complicated property accountability and transfer regulations. Federal inspection in peace times should include a physical examination. With the new provisions of the national-defense act as to pay and property responsibility, it would seem that a peace accountability could be devised which would avoid any inspections, inventories, and transfers of property on mobilization.

It has been suggested that there should be a patrol at all times and kept up to date in each company office a separate muster-in roll for each member. The record of each officer and man should be entered on a standard mobilization punch card.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

The following organizations were included in the President's call:

California: One brigade of three regiments of infantry, one squadron of cavalry, one battalion of field artillery, one company of signal corps, one ambulance company, one field hospital.

Idaho: One regiment of infantry.

Montana: One regiment of infantry.

Oregon: One regiment of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one battery of field artillery.

Utah: One squadron and two separate troops of cavalry, one battery of field artillery.

Washington: One regiment of infantry, one troop of cavalry, one company of signal corps.

The supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State, were generally ample and indicated a proper degree of preparedness. The supplies, equipment, etc., so far as lies within the responsibility of the State, were generally ample and indicated a proper degree of preparedness.

Training orders were published by most States, but no attempt was made to carry them out. The organizations were held at State camps for a short time only, during which the members of the commands were physically examined, inoculated for typhoid and smallpox and were called upon to perform various other duties in connection with the establishment of camp so that but little progress was made in training. The State of California published a very

MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC. 141

Washouts on the railroad caused several days' delay for companies of Montana troops, but all organizations were at the mobilization camps seven days after date of call.

Washouts on the railroad caused several days' delay for companies of Montana troops, but all organizations were at the mobilization camps seven days after date of call.

Answer. (c) Training orders were published by most States, but no attempt was made to carry them out. The organizations were held at State camps for a short time only, during which the members of the commands were physically examined, inoculated for typhoid and smallpox and were called upon to perform various other duties in connection with the establishment of camp so that but little progress was made in training. The State of California published a very
complete order for the mobilization of United States Militia, which included a schedule of instruction.

Question. (d) Criticisms and comments on regulations and methods with suggestions and recommendations which will enable the department to inaugurate such changes as will insure greater smoothness and expedition in future mobilization.

Answer. (d) The United States Mustering Regulations appear to have answered the purpose for which it was intended until the passage of the national-defense act. The changes in laws, methods of procedure, and the adoption of new blank forms have rendered the present mustering regulations practically useless and have been the source of much confusion, delay, and extra paper work on the part of those connected with the work of mobilization. The mustering regulations should be revised to conform to the new law, modifications in forms, and other changes which the War Department has, through experience, found necessary to make by telegraphic orders.

*Physical examination.*—It should be specifically stated in the mustering regulations what the physical examination for muster in shall consist of and what blank forms are to be used. Questions regarding finger prints, outline finger cards, typhoid inoculations, vaccination, kinds of forms to be used, etc., have been the source of much telegraphic correspondence.

*Transportation.*—The travel pay or transportation to be furnished upon muster out should be clearly stated in regulations. The various interpretations placed upon War Department telegraphic orders on these subjects have given rise to much unnecessary correspondence.

Companies should be recruited to war strength before leaving company rendezvous.

Several new units were organized after the departure of troops included in the first call.

2. The entire work of mobilization was promptly and successfully accomplished.

W. L. Sherriff,
*Brigadier General, U. S. Army.*
1. The instruction of the National Guard may be divided into two periods: first, that received at the mobilization camps; and, second, that received at the border.

2. The periods of time during which organizations were at mobilization camps varied from a few days to several months. For those organizations at the mobilization camps, two weeks or less, the amount of instruction received was negligible, due to several reasons, among which may be mentioned that the time of officers of the Regular Army, who were their instructors normally, was wholly occupied in mustering duties involving the supervision of paper work and the inspection and transfer of property. Had additional Regular Army officers been detailed to mustering duty leaving the inspector-instructors to continue their duty with the National Guard in their capacity of instructors, not much better results would have been attained, for the reason that the time of the National Guard officers was almost wholly absorbed in preparing the necessary mustering papers, in equipping and handling the large influx of recruits for which they had no prior records. A little was learned, no doubt, in the nature of messing, interior economy, camp sanitation, personal hygiene, and perhaps individual instruction not beyond the school of the squad and company.

3. For those organizations at the mobilization camps more than two weeks, the instruction in general was still unsatisfactory, due primarily to the lack of Regular Army officers to act as instructors; to the unsuitability of the ground in the vicinity for tactical instruction, the organizations being confined to the roads; the lack of suitable target ranges; and in the case of mounted troops, to the lack of animals for mounted instruction.

4. The organizations arriving on the border were in different stages of instruction, though the difference was not very great due to the large number of recruits without prior service in all organizations. It was therefore necessary to devote a large amount of time to the elementary recruit instruction. The standardization of the subjects and methods for the necessary instruction in the different arms was not available for ready reference with regard to troops in the status of approximately one-fourth partially trained troops, three-fourths recruits, and many of the officers only partially trained. Even with an exact and approved method of training, the results will always depend upon the individual experience, energy, and ability of the instructors.

5. These organizations were not sent to the border in their partially trained condition for the purpose of instruction. They were sent for duty there in a grave emergency, because they were the only troops available, even though not yet ready and fit for active field service. The instruction that could be given at that time was incidental to service. However, it was soon realized that additional instruction should be undertaken, and a number of Regular Army officers were assigned to the organizations as instructors. At least one to each battalion or squadron was needed, but that number could not be spared from the regular organizations. Instruction and responsibility for discipline and efficiency go hand in hand. Neither these
instructors nor the few Regular Army officers commissioned in the National Guard, the latter in general from a lack of sufficient rank, were in a position of authority to carry into full effect their plans of instruction.

6. In general the instruction on the border can not be said to have been satisfactory, for the reasons already given and due, in addition, to the lack of suitable target ranges for small arms and service practice; and the limited amount of ammunition available for such practice; to the excessive heat, which in the summer months reduced the hours available for instruction; to the divided duties of service and instruction; to the friction and time due to inexperience spent in paper work; interior economy and property responsibility. The greatest fault was the lack of systematic instruction, which, covering 8 or 10 hours a day, should commence first with the individual and progress, upon proficiency, by successive steps to the squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, brigade, and division. In many cases this was undertaken, yet the progress made was too fast—was not based on proficiency. Precision, uniformity, and thoroughness were lacking in the successive stages, and the final result could not be other than unsatisfactory. In general at the end of five months' service, with few exceptions, the organizations as a whole were reported as still not ready and fit for active field service against a well-trained enemy.

Field Artillery.—None of the States having Field Artillery, with the possible exceptions of Colorado and Kansas, have mobilization camps that afford adequate facilities for the training of Field Artillery in field exercises and target practice. When the mobilization was ordered many of the batteries had difficulty in recruiting to the peace strength, and as a result they were not in a condition to be sent to the Southern Department before the shipment of troops was discontinued. In the meantime horses for all batteries were purchased and concentrated in the Southern Department, with a view to issuing the animals when the batteries arrived. As a result of these conditions 25 of the batteries embraced in the original call were left in State camps without their quota of horses and without other facilities for field training. More than half of the inspector-instructors and eight of the sergeant-instructors of Field Artillery received State commissions, and the majority of them joined the troops in the Southern Department. The remaining inspector-instructors and sergeant-instructors were not sufficient to supply all of the State camps. As a partial remedy for this situation eight batteries were sent to Tobyhanna, Pa., and supplied with sufficient horses for training. Four of them were composed of students and graduates of Yale University. Under the able administration of Col. Robert M. Danford, Tenth Militia Field Artillery (first lieutenant, Fifth United States Field Artillery) these batteries made remarkable progress. The students and the men at the camp who were not students applied themselves with a willingness that was highly creditable, and their zeal did not cease when they learned that they would not go to the Mexican border, and that the entire summer would be spent in the routine of a training camp. In the technical service of the guns and in the mounted duties they were developed in accordance with the best practices of the Regular regiments. A conspicuous feature of the training at this camp was the course in physical exercises conducted by First Lieut. O. A. Dickinson, Twenty-fifth Infantry. While Lieut. Dickinson's success was due in a measure to his superior qualifications as an instructor his work demonstrated the value of this training for the National Guard. It is believed that it should form an important part of armory training, and with skilled instructors it would be of great benefit to the men and would serve as an attractive feature of the drills. This camp was not only a demonstration of what can be accomplished in preparing our young men for the service of the country but it was a tribute to the patriotism and the democracy of the great university whose sons came forth at their country's call. They took upon themselves the burden of practical preparedness, and by so doing they qualified themselves by experience to perform their part in arriving at a rational solution of a problem that is vital to the welfare of the nation.

Horses were sent to the First Battalion, Colorado Field Artillery, and the training of these batteries progressed satisfactorily. At the remaining camps there were no horses except such as were hired by the States or were on hand at the time of the mobilization. The Alabama and the Georgia batteries were entirely without horses. On August 29, 1916, the Chief of the Militia Bureau invited attention to the conditions, with reference to artillery, and requested that all batteries in the State camps, with the exception of those composed of students of colleges and schools, be sent to the Southern Department and supplied with horses as promptly as possible. This action was taken September 27, 1916. In view of the great loss of time that resulted from leaving batteries in State camps, in the future all Field Artillery units should be mobilized at the established Field Artillery training camps, and horses should be furnished them at these camps as promptly as practicable after the call is made. Inspector-instructors and sergeant-instructors can then be utilized as far as their numbers permit for all batteries, and the training can proceed in accordance with the methods provided by the War Department for the annual camps of instruction.

MISCELLANEOUS.

LIST OF PROPERTY FOUND SHORT AT MOBILIZATION.

The remarks of the inspectors general that the governors of States have not kept their organizations fully equipped—the Dick law required States, from funds allotted to them, to keep their forces "sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for active duty in the field," a requirement set forth in detail in Circular No. 10, Division of Militia Affairs, 1915.

A list of all the various articles short is published in table 17, accompanying the Report on the National Guard for 1916, the main items of which are as follows:

- First-aid packets
- Cartridge belts, caliber .30
- Litters with slings
- Cartridge-belt suspenders
- Bridles, Cavalry
- Currycombs
- Bridles, watering
- First-aid pouches
- Canteens
- Knives
- Canteen straps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-aid packets</td>
<td>2,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge belts, caliber .30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litters with slings</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartridge-belt suspenders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridles, Cavalry</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currycombs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridles, watering</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-aid pouches</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteens</td>
<td>1,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canteen straps</td>
<td>3,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lariats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

212  216  207  157  237
Mobilization of the Organized Militia, Etc.

Extracts from report of Capt. ___, inspector-instructor, on the muster out of the Infantry:

All of the property was in a poor condition. A large percentage of it was unserviceable. All of the property showed neglect and an absolute lack of care. The small arms were in a specially poor condition. Nearly all of the rifles and pistol holsters were very rusty and dirty. All of the rifle stocks were scratched and battered. An effort was made, through the commanding officer, to have the rifles cleaned, but there was no apparent results.

In spite of over four months' Federal service, the accountable officers, with one exception, knew very little about how to keep property records or return receipts. No returns for property had been made. I found the officers, with a very few exceptions, to be inefficient, indifferent, and practically worthless as officers. They had very little control over the enlisted men. Most of them had to be prompted several times before they would prepare any of the required forms. The companies drilled better in close and extended order, but aside from this the regiment as a whole was apparently no more efficient than when it left. Discipline was much more lax than it was in June.

Capt. ___, Infantry inspector-instructor, on duty with the reports from Camp certain riotous and disgraceful proceedings which occurred upon the muster out of that regiment. He states that written instructions were sent the colonel concerning police of camp and dispositions of Government and State property, etc., and when the time had arrived that these orders should have been executed Capt. got the colonel to accompany him in an inspection of the camp. They found that practically nothing had been done, as ordered; that men were gambling in plain view of the colonel and many were drunk. He ordered the colonel to have the camp cleaned up at once, and stated that he would make another inspection in an hour or so. The colonel had "officers' call" sounded, with a view to having this done. This was about dark, and although orders had been given that all automatic pistols and ammunition be called in, hundreds of rifle and pistol shots were fired by officers or men, or both, and the night was made hideous with yelling and cries. One shot took effect, killing Cook of Company.

Capt. ___ states that neither the colonel nor lieutenant colonel seemed to have any control over their men. Col. ___ stated personally that he had discovered and sent out of camp two wagon-loads of liquor in the morning, but that much had since been introduced. He said that if his men got much liquor no one would be able to handle them. The disorder becoming greater, Capt. ___ ordered Col. ___ to assemble his regiment at once and get it out of camp, so as to prevent more serious trouble and possible clash between the white and colored troops, to say nothing of trouble between the townspeople and colored troops.

He says the conduct was the most disgraceful and unsoldierly he had ever known, and there was absolutely no discipline after dark, and there was nothing to do but get the regiment out of camp and on its trains. Much of the trouble was due to the fact that the men had just received two months' pay.

In forwarding the report the department commander said that it was apparent that the officers had no control over the men.

The National Guard at War Strength.

It is to be regretted that the system of voluntary enlistments militates against keeping the National Guard at war strength.

One of the leading causes of inefficiency is the maintaining of organizations normally at peace strength and increasing them to "war strength" when required for service. The guardsman at best can be but imperfectly trained, and to fill organizations with raw recruits when called for active service is a serious handicap.

If the guard could be kept at war strength it would mean a saving of expense, for the pay of the officers, upkeep of armories, etc., are the same whether the strength be minimum or maximum, and it is to the interest of the Federal Government to give military training even though that training be elementary in character to the greatest number.

With the National Guard kept at maximum strength the problem of storage of reserve supplies is in a measure solved automatically, in such event there being no recruiting to war strength it is no longer necessary to keep reserve supplies to outfit the number of men added to organizations during mobilization. A considerable reserve must of course be kept on hand, but not the vast quantities needed where only the minimum strength is kept enrolled.

Lastly, but most important of all, if war strength were the rule, organizations would presumably go from the mobilization to the concentration points with ranks filled with men all of whom will have had some degree of training; a marked contrast with the mobilization just completed where organizations were only at minimum strength at the outset, and this minimum immediately depleted by—

(a) Men found physically unfit.
(b) Men who immediately sought discharge on account of dependent relatives.
(c) Men discharged by State authorities after the call.
(d) Men who refused to take the Federal oath and were permitted by the mustering officers to return to their homes.
(e) Men who failed to respond to the call.

When all the above deductions were made there was in a great proportion of the organizations really only a skeleton of trained men...
left, and the vacancies were necessarily filled by the enlistment of raw recruits.

Such makeshifts in the way of preparation will surely mean disaster in an encounter with an enterprising enemy who has only a fair degree of preparedness. Ours has been not even fair; it has unquestionably been poor.

**WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE, FOR THE UNITED STATES, FIRST-LINE TROOPS.**

The reports from inspector-instructors, medical officers, special inspectors, and inspector generals amply support the contention that we have no National Guard troops really fit for the first line of defense. This naturally brings us to the question as to what should be the qualifications for first-line troops.

A few illustrations in our own service may throw some light on this important subject. On February 24, 1912, the Twenty-second United States Infantry received an order about noon to leave Fort Sam Houston, Tex., for border duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

On March 9, 1916, the Tenth United States Cavalry received telegraphic orders at 11.30 a.m. to proceed from its station, Fort Huachuca, for Douglas, Ariz., for field duty. It left about noon the next day and has been under canvas somewhere on the border ever since.

The point to be emphasized in these cases, and in innumerable similar ones which could be mentioned, is that the troops have left their stations on short notice with trained men, fully armed and equipped, prepared to immediately encounter an enemy and to remain in the field for an indefinite period of time.

This is the degree of preparedness which from experience in this country has been found to be absolutely essential to meet public demands—nothing less will suffice.

Indeed, with increased facilities for transportation and for the transmission of information, the tendency is toward a more complete preparedness; this to a degree that can be expected only from the professional soldier.

The National Guard may perhaps be likened to the volunteer fire departments so popular years ago in our large towns. They were composed of the elite of the young men of the town, whose generous public spirit in so giving their services in extinguishing fires can not be too strongly commended. When a fire broke out, whether by day or night, the members of the department, no matter in what engaged, dropped their occupations and rushed to the scene of action—often at considerable personal inconvenience and loss.

But even with this sacrifice the desired end was frequently not attained, for even with the most strenuous efforts, before the fire brigade could assemble and get to work the conflagration would have reached a point beyond control.

Clearly this means of fire protection, particularly as towns grew in size, was unsatisfactory and it became apparent that the saving in insurance rates alone would amply justify the employment of paid fire departments, having constantly on hand day or night a crew of men trained in the use of the latest appliances for extinguishing fires and exercised in methods of getting to the scene of fire with the least possible delay.

The paid fire department, then, corresponds to the troops required for the first line of defense, and we have no more right to expect from citizen soldiers the degree of preparedness absolutely needed for first-line troops than to expect that volunteer fire departments with a personnel composed of young men daily engaged in business pursuits will afford adequate fire protection under existing conditions in our great cities.

The patriotism and self-sacrifice of the National Guardsman no one would think of disputing; all honor to them, for they form a valuable asset in our scheme of national defense; but the rôle which they are to play is not in the "first line," although many of the leaders in their extreme advocacy of the merits of the National Guard, and with rather crude ideas as to what should constitute first-line troops, would put them in this category, a place for which the recent mobilization shows these troops to be unqualified, and for which, from the very nature of the case, they never can be fitted. The sooner this idea is abandoned the better it will be for all concerned.

The following is from an officer of wide experience, who has had exceptional opportunities for observing conditions and "feeling the pulse," as it were, of the National Guard along the border:

**REPORT ON NATIONAL GUARD ALONG THE BORDER.**

At the present time practically all officers and enlisted men of the various National Guard units along the border are primarily interested in when they are to be sent home. Though little discontent is openly expressed, there is a considerable amount of it. This discontent is apparently due:

1. To a belief that they have not been properly supplied.
2. That, at least in the beginning, they were not properly cared for.
3. To a lack of proper training.
4. To a lack of understanding as to the proper functions of Federal officers and supply department.
5. To a realization that the present system unequally distributes the burden of military service.
6. To a belief in the part of many that the troops are not really needed along the border.

No. 1 is due (a) to the ignorance of many of the National Guard officers as to what to get, how to get it, and frequently how to use it after gotten; (b) failure of the Quartermaster Department and Ordnance Department to properly equip all individuals and units with the latest style equipment in the proper models and sizes.

No. 2 is due (a) to the unnecessary Inconveniences caused by the ignorance of militia officers of the proper methods of taking care of their men; (b) the belief prevalent amongst the majority of Americans that they are entitled to every comfort and that any deprivation is a hardship. They do not understand
what field service really is and consequently are prone to believe that the living methods and exertions demanded by such service is unnecessarily high. 

No. 5: On the whole the militia expect everything to be shown them and everything to be done for them. The Federal officers and departments naturally expect that the militia officers should reasonably well understand the steps necessary to supply and train their respective units, in too many cases this has caused inconvenience and worse to the militia. Many militia organizations were unable to enlist competent cooks or horseshoers, with the result that they have lived poorly, while their animals have gone unshod. In many cases this includes the blame on the Federal authorities instead of realizing that it is their duty to do so.

No. 6: The great majority do not understand the necessity which caused them to be brought to the border, consequently they are inclined to believe that it is not their move and that they are making sacrifices for nothing.

All this causes the great majority of the men and officers to want to go home. The home-going of some units has increased this desire.

It is generally considered that it will be very difficult to hold the majority of the men on their return to their home stations, and equally difficult to recruit men to take their places. Some of those now in service will move out of the State; others live in towns where there are no militia organizations, others live in the country, and are of the opinion of members of the regular service. Many will refuse to take the new oath. Also it is considered that public opinion will be against any attempt to compel those men who do not want to do service. The militia will again be called out for a period of service, and many will stay willingly until their organizations are mustered out then resign.

With very few exceptions those officers who were the most ardent supporters of the militia provisions of the present national defense act believe that it will be impossible to raise the numbers required. Most of them think that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep units now in existence above the prescribed minimum.

There is a great variety of opinions as to what steps will have to be taken to produce a proper force. There is a practical unanimity of opinion that the present system does not work. The indications are that one of the immediate results will be the authorization of the raising of several more or all of the increments of the regular army now provided for by law. This primarily for the reason that the national guard does not wish further service such as it has just had, and that volunteers can not be called for until the national guard has been called out.

Table showing, by States, the aggregate strength of National Guard mustered into the Federal service, the war strength of the organizations called into service, number short of war strength, and per cent of war strength furnished.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>War strength</th>
<th>Number of men furnished</th>
<th>Number of men short of war strength</th>
<th>Per cent of war strength furnished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Washington</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Rhode Island</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Delaware</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Oregon</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>1,633</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Utah</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Michigan</td>
<td>5,467</td>
<td>4,940</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Missouri</td>
<td>5,905</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>95.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Wisconsin</td>
<td>5,159</td>
<td>2,592</td>
<td>2,567</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Minnesota</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>4,277</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. District of Columbia</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. New Jersey</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>2,272</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ohio</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>939</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Michigan</td>
<td>9,081</td>
<td>4,363</td>
<td>4,718</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Wisconsin</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td>4,275</td>
<td>2,636</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Washington</td>
<td>6,416</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>4,724</td>
<td>69.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. West Virginia</td>
<td>1,915</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. New York</td>
<td>15,501</td>
<td>11,318</td>
<td>4,183</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Ohio</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Michigan</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>5,289</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Wisconsin</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>6,192</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Minnesota</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. North Dakota</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. South Dakota</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>2,612</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Colorado</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>2,043</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table showing, by States, the aggregate strength of National Guard mustered into the Federal service, etc.—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Aggregate strength of National Guard mustered</th>
<th>Per cent of war strength furnished</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>2,349 (1,039)</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6,993 (3,802)</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>8,556 (4,032)</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>6,756 (4,024)</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>4,191 (2,208)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>3,149 (1,327)</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>1,913 (1,024)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>13,711 (7,056)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>6,185 (3,228)</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>1,915 (1,025)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Dakota</td>
<td>2,015 (1,043)</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>26,350 (13,686)</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>6,871 (3,610)</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Dakota</td>
<td>6,414 (3,208)</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>1,093 (546)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>3,985 (1,910)</td>
<td>48.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>3,876 (1,923)</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>2,091 (1,093)</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>1,158 (531)</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>5,886 (2,635)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>3,830 (1,915)</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>267,925 (125,096)</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total strength of National Guard organizations not called into service of the United States—Continued.

By November 1, 1916, 16,856 men of the National Guard and Organized Militia in the Federal service were discharged for the following causes:

- For physical disability: 10,182
- On account of dependent relatives, etc.: 6,323
- For fraudulent enlistment: 94
- For return to Government positions: 191
- Dishonorably: 46
- To enter United States Military Academy: 2
- Sentence of civil court and Illegal enlistment (1 each): 2
- Paragraph 75, Mustering Regulations, and by order of Secretary of War: 2
- Unservicable to service and other causes: 24

Total: 16,856

New organizations recognized by the War Department between June 18, 1916 (date of call), and Dec. 1, 1916, and mustered into the Federal service.

### MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Date recognized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>First Cavalry</td>
<td>Sept. 21, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Field Hospital No. 1</td>
<td>July 22, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Troop A, First Squadron Cavalry</td>
<td>June 27, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Battery B, First Battalion Field Artillery</td>
<td>June 28, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 21, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 22, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Field Hospital No. 2</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>Field Hospital No. 2</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Field Hospital No. 3</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>June 26, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>June 26, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>June 26, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>July 10, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Battery D, Field Artillery</td>
<td>June 26, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>Battalion (First Corps Cadets)</td>
<td>June 30, 1916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Battalion (First Corps Cadets)</td>
<td>June 30, 1916</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Number of National Guardsmen mustered out of the Federal service to Dec. 1, 1916.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Mustered Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>3,024</td>
<td>1,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>3,040</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>3,365</td>
<td>3,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>7,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>5,445</td>
<td>1,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>3,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>7,556</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>49,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,726</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aggregate strength of National Guard troops in the service of the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mustered Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1916</td>
<td>82,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1916</td>
<td>110,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31, 1916</td>
<td>111,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 30, 1916</td>
<td>105,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 31, 1916</td>
<td>102,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 30, 1916</td>
<td>96,447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXTRACTS FROM NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT.

The following are sections (57 to 119, inclusive) of the act of June 3, 1916, which relate to militia and are here appended for convenience of reference:

SEC. 57. COMPOSITION OF THE MILITIA.—The militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied males citizens of the United States and all other able-bodied males who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States and of the several States and Territories; persons in the military or naval service of the United States; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States, shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to age, and all persons who because of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such person shall be established under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall be exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity; but no person so exempted shall be exempt from militia service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant.

SEC. 59. EXEMPTIONS FROM MILITIA DUTY.—The Vice President of the United States; the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United States and of the several States and Territories; persons in the military or naval service of the United States;customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy yards of the United States; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States, shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to age,
tactical units, and may detail officers either from the National Guard or the Regular Army to command such units: Provided, That where complete units are organized within a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia the commanding officer thereof shall not be displaced under the provisions of this section.

SEC. 65. CHIEFS OF STAFF OF NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS.—The President may detail one officer of the Regular Army as chief of staff and one officer of the Regular Army or the National Guard as assistant to the chief of staff of any division of the National Guard within the service of the National Guard organization: Provided, That in order to insure the prompt mobilization of the National Guard in time of war or other emergency, the President may, in the discretion of the President, detail one officer of the Regular Army as chief of staff for each fully organized tactical division of the National Guard.

SEC. 66. ADJUTANTS GENERAL OF STATES, AND SO FORTH.—The adjutants general of the States, Territories, and the District of Columbia and the officers of the regular force of the National Guard shall make such returns and reports concerning the same as may be required by the Secretary of War.
prior to the expiration of terms of enlistment under such regulations as the President may prescribe. 

Sec. 73. Federal oath for National Guard officers.—Commissioned officers of the National Guard of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia now serving under commissions regularly issued shall continue in office and be paid according to the provisions of the laws authorizing the organization and maintenance of such organizations; Provided, That said officers have taken, or shall take and subscribe to the following oath of office: "I, , do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of , against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and of the governor of the State of ; that I make this obligation freely, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office of in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of , upon which I am about to enter, so help me God."

Sec. 74. Qualifications for National Guard officers.—Persons hereafter commissioned as officers of the National Guard shall not be recognized as such under any of the provisions of this act unless they have been selected from the following classes and shall have taken and subscribed to the oath of office prescribed in the preceding section of this act: Officers or enlisted men of the National Guard; officers on the reserve or unassigned list of the National Guard; officers, active or retired, and former officers of the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps; graduates of the United States Military and Naval Academies and graduates of schools, colleges, and universities where military science is taught under the supervision of an officer of the Regular Army, and, for the technical branches and staff corps or departments, such other civilians as may be especially qualified for duty therein.

Sec. 75. The provisions of this act shall not apply to any person hereafter appointed an officer of the National Guard unless he first shall have successfully passed a physical, moral, and medical examination before the President shall prescribe. The examination to determine such qualifications for commission shall be conducted by a board of three commissioned officers appointed by the Secretary of War from the Regular Army or the National Guard, or both.

Sec. 76. Filling of vacancies when drafted into Federal service.—All vacancies occurring in any grade of commissioned officers in any organization in the military service of the United States and composed of members of said organizations provision of this act shall be filled by the President, as far as practicable, by the appointment of persons similarly taken from said guard, and in the manner prescribed by law for filling similar vacancies occurring in the volunteer forces.

Sec. 77. Elimination and disposition of officers.—At any time the moral character, capacity, and general fitness for the service of any National Guard officer may be determined by an efficiency board of three commissioned officers, senior in rank to the officer whose fitness for service shall be under investigation, and if the findings of such board be unfavorable to such officer and be approved by the official authorized to appoint such an officer, he shall be discharged. Commissioned officers of the National Guard may be vacated upon resignation, absence without leave for three months, upon the recommendation of an efficiency board, or pursuant to sentence of a court-martial. Officers of said guard rendered surplus by the disbandment of their organizations shall be placed in the National Guard Reserve. Officers may, upon their own application, be placed in the said reserve.

Sec. 78. The National Guard Reserve.—Subject to such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, a National Guard Reserve for each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, and shall consist of such organizations, officers, and enlisted men as the President may prescribe, or members thereof may be assigned as reserves to an active organization of the National Guard; Provided, That members of said reserve, when engaged in field or coast-defense training with the active National Guard, shall receive the same Federal pay and allowances as enlisted men of like grade on the active list of said guard when likewise engaged: Provided further, That commissioned or enlisted reservists shall receive any pay or allowances out of any appropriation made by Congress for National Guard purposes.

Sec. 79. Reserve battalions for recruit training.—When members of the National Guard and the enlisted reserve thereof of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia shall have been brought into the service of the United States in time of war, there shall be immediately organized, or from the unorganized militia, in such State, Territory, or District, one reserve battalion for each regiment of Infantry or Cavalry, or each independent Artillery, or each twelve companies of Coast Artillery. Reserve battalions shall consist of four companies of such service arms, excepting such battalions provided for by the President to be organized from the members of three or more regiments of the National Guard of any State, Territory, or District shall have been brought into the service of the United States, the reserve battalions of such regiments may be organized into provisionally regiments of field officers and enlisted units. If for any reason the voluntary enlistments to keep the reserve battalions at the prescribed strength, a sufficient number of the unorganized militia shall be drafted into the service of the United States, to maintain such reserve battalions at the proper strength. As vacancies occur from death or other causes in any organization in the service of the United States and of men taken from the National Guard, men shall be transferred from the reserve battalions to the organizations in the field so that such organizations may be maintained at war strength. Officers for the reserve battalions provided for herein shall be drafted from the National Guard Reserve or Coast Artillery companies of the National Guard or the Officers Reserve Corps, such officers to be taken, if practicable, from the States, respectively, in which the battalions shall be organized. Officers and noncommissioned officers returned to their home stations because of their inability to perform active field service may be assigned to reserve battalions for duty, and all soldiers invaluated home shall be assigned to and carried on the rolls of reserve battalions until returned to duty or until discharged.

Sec. 80. Leaves of absence for certain government employees.—All officers and employees of the United States and of the District of Columbia now serving under commissions regularly issued shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency rating on all days during which they shall be engaged in field or coast-defense training ordered by the President or by the provisions of this act.

Sec. 81. Militia bureau of the war department.—The National Militia Board created by section eleven of the act of May twenty-seventh, nineteen hundred and three, section twenty-four of the act of January twenty-first, nineteen hundred and nineteen, and the other officers, from the date of the establishment of this act, shall be abolished. The Militia Division now existing in the War Department shall hereafter be known as the Militia Bureau of said department, shall, like other bureaus of said department, be under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of War, and shall not form a part of any other bureau, office, or other organization, but the Chief of the Militia Bureau shall be ex officio a member of the General Staff Corps; Provided, That the President may, in his discretion, assign to duty in the Militia Bureau as assistants to the chief thereof not to exceed one colonel and one lieutenant colonel of the National Guard for terms of four years, and any such officer while so assigned shall, subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe, receive out of the whole fund appropriated for the support of the militia the pay and allowances of an active Army officer having the same rank and length of service as said National Guard officer whose prior service in the Organized Militia shall be counted in ascertaining his rights under this provision.

Sec. 82. Armament, equipment, and uniform of the national guard.—The National Guard of the United States shall, as far as practicable, be uniformed, armed, and equipped with the same type of uniforms, arms, and equipment as the Regular Army for the Regular Army.
MOBILIZATION OF THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, ETC.

...shall direct what disposition, by sale or otherwise, shall be made of them; and shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of War that the National Guard of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia is properly organized, armed, and equipped for field service, funds allotted for the purchase of such property, as well as the proceeds of such sale as are not charged against the State allotment issued for the use of the National Guard that the property shall have been made in accordance with the provisions of this act, and the funds so received shall be credited to the appropriation to which they shall be applicable.

SEC. 88. Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard shall be available for the purchase and issuance of field equipment, small arms, and field guns, including all accessories, shall be furnished without charging the cost or value thereof, in accordance with the Regular Army standards for the use of Field Artillery and Cavalry of the National Guard, and shall be available for the purchase, under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, for the use of such organizations, condemned Army horses which are not longer fit for service, but which may be suitable for the purposes of instruction, such horses to be sold as now provided by law when said purposes shall have been served.

SEC. 89. Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard shall be available for the purchase and issuance of forage, shoeing, and veterinary services, and supplies for the Government horses issued to the use of the National Guard, the credit for the ultimate return of such property in kind shall be allowed to such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia.

SEC. 90. Funds allotted by the Secretary of War for the support of the National Guard shall be available for the purchase and issuance of uniforms, equipment, and for the purchase, for the use of such organizations, condemned Army horses which are not longer fit for service, but which may be suitable for the purposes of instruction, such horses to be sold as now provided by law when said purposes shall have been served.

SEC. 91. Discipline to conform to that of Regular Army.-The discipline (uniform, equipment, and the Regular Army, and the training shall be carried out by the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia so as to conform to the provisions of this act.

SEC. 92. TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.—Each company, troop, battery, and detachment in the National Guard shall assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, not less than forty-eight times each year, and shall, in addition thereto, participate in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, at least fifteen days in training each year, including target practice, unless such company, troop, battery, or detachment shall have been excused from participation in any part thereof by the Secretary of War; Provided, That credit for an assembly for drill or for indoor target practice shall be given unless the number of officers and enlisted men present for duty at such assembly shall equal or exceed a minimum to be prescribed by the President, nor unless the period of actual military duty and instruction is extended by such officer and enlisted man at such assembly by which he shall be credited as having been present shall be of at least one full and one-half hours' duration and the character of training such as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.

SEC. 93. THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War shall cause an inspection to be made at least once each year by inspectors general and, if necessary, by other officers of the Regular Army detailed for that purpose, to determine whether the amount and condition of the property in the hands of the National Guard is satisfactory; whether the officers and enlisted men possess the physical and other qualifications prescribed; whether the organization of the commands and enlisted men thereof are sufficiently armed, uniformed, equipped, and being trained and instructed for active duty in the
field or coast defense; and whether the reports are being kept in accordance with the requirements of this act. The reports of such inspections shall serve as the basis for deciding as to the issue of and retention by the National Guard of the military property provided for by this act and for determining what organizations and individuals shall be considered as constituting parts of the National Guard within the meaning of this act.

SEC. 94. ENCAMPMENTS AND MANEUVERS.—Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Secretary of War is authorized to provide for the participation of the whole or any part of the National Guard in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense instruction, either independently or in conjunction with any part of the Regular Army, and there may be set aside from the funds appropriated for that purpose and allotted to any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, such portion of said funds as may be necessary for the maintenance, subsistence, transportation, and other proper expenses of such portion of the National Guard of such State, Territory, or the District of Columbia as shall participate in such encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field and coast-defense instruction; and the officers and enlisted men of such National Guard while so engaged shall be entitled to the same pay, subsistence, and transportation as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army are or hereafter may be entitled by law.

SEC. 95. When any part of the National Guard participates in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense instruction at a United States military post, or reservation, or elsewhere, if in conjunction with troops of the United States, the command of such part may be given to any of the officers and men assembled for such encampment, maneuver, or other exercise as may be directed by the Secretary of War or requested by the governor or by the commanding officer of the National Guard there on duty.

SEC. 96. USE OF REGULAR ARMY PERSONNEL.—The Secretary of War may detail one or more officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army to attend any encampment, maneuver, or other exercise for field or coast-defense instruction of the National Guard, who shall give such instruction as the commanding officer of the National Guard, or the commanding officer of any part of the National Guard temporarily engaged in the encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, may direct. The commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command may appoint special officers and men for this purpose.

SEC. 97. When any portion of the National Guard shall participate in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises, including outdoor target practice, for field or coast-defense instruction, under the provisions of this act, it may, after being duly mustered, be stationed at any time and from such muster for the period from the date of leaving the home rendezvous to date of return thereto as determined in advance, both dates inclusive; and such payment, if otherwise correct, shall pass to the credit of the disbursing officer making the same.

SEC. 98. NATIONAL GUARD OFFICERS AND MEN AT SERVICE SCHOOLS, AND SO FORTH. Under such regulations as the President may prescribe, the Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Territory or the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia, detail any number of selected officers or enlisted men of the National Guard to attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school of the United States, except the United States Military Academy; or to be attached to an organization of the same arm, corps, or department to which such officer or enlisted man shall belong, for routine practical instruction at or near an Army post during a period of field training or other outdoor exercises; and such officer or enlisted man shall receive, out of any National Guard allotment of funds available for the purpose, the same pay, allowances, and subsistence to which an officer or enlisted man of the Regular Army would be entitled for attending such school, college, or practical course of instruction under orders from proper military authority, while in actual attendance at such school, college, or practical course of instruction; Provided, That in no case shall the pay and allowances authorized by this section exceed those of a captain.

SEC. 99. DETAIL OF OFFICERS OF REGULAR ARMY TO DUTY WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War shall detail officers of the active list of the Army to duty with the National Guard in each State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and such officers, when so detailed, may accept commissions in the National Guard, with the permission of the President and the President and Secretary of War, without vacating their commissions in the Regular Army or being prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein. The Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Territory, or the commander in chief of the District of Columbia, detail any number of officers or enlisted men of the Regular Army for duty with the National Guard. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the detail of retired officers as now provided by law.

SEC. 100. NATIONAL GUARD, WHEN SUBJECT TO LAWS GOVERNING REGULAR ARMY.—The National Guard when called as such into the service of the United States shall, from the time they are required by the terms of the call to respond thereto, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to officers and enlisted men of the permanent military service, either on the active list or on the retired list, is not contemplated by existing law.

SEC. 101. SYSTEM OF COURTS-MARTIAL FOR NATIONAL GUARD.—Except in organizations of the United States courts-martial in the National Guard shall be of three kinds, namely, general courts-martial, special courts-martial, and summary courts-martial. They shall be constituted like and have cognizance of the same subjects, and possess like powers except as to punishments as similar courts provided for by the laws and regulations governing the Army of the United States, and the proceedings of courts-martial of the National Guard shall follow the forms and modes of procedure prescribed for said similar courts.

SEC. 102. DETAIL OF OFFICERS OF REGULAR ARMY TO DUTY WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War shall detail officers of the active list of the Army to duty with the National Guard in each State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and such officers, when so detailed, may accept commissions in the National Guard, with the permission of the President and the President and Secretary of War, without vacating their commissions in the Regular Army or being prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein. The Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Territory, or the commander in chief of the District of Columbia, detail any number of officers or enlisted men of the Regular Army for duty with the National Guard. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the detail of retired officers as now provided by law.

SEC. 103. DETAIL OF OFFICERS OF REGULAR ARMY TO DUTY WITH THE NATIONAL GUARD.—The Secretary of War shall detail officers of the active list of the Army to duty with the National Guard in each State, Territory, or District of Columbia, and such officers, when so detailed, may accept commissions in the National Guard, with the permission of the President and the President and Secretary of War, without vacating their commissions in the Regular Army or being prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing therein. The Secretary of War may, upon the recommendation of the governor of any State or Territory, or the commander in chief of the District of Columbia, detail any number of officers or enlisted men of the Regular Army for duty with the National Guard. But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the detail of retired officers as now provided by law.

SEC. 104. In the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, the commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command may appoint special courts-martial for his command; but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except a commissioned officer, for any crime or offense made punishable by the military laws of the United States, and such special courts-martial shall have the same powers of punishment as do general courts-martial, except that fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed $100.

SEC. 105. In the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, the commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, brigade, regiment, detached battalion, or other detached command may appoint special courts-martial for his command; but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except a commissioned officer, for any crime or offense made punishable by the military laws of the United States, and such special courts-martial shall have the same powers of punishment as do general courts-martial, except that fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed $100.

SEC. 106. All courts-martial of the National Guard, not in the service of the United States, shall be constituted like and have cognizance of the same subjects, and possess like powers except as to punishments as similar courts provided for by the laws and regulations governing the Army of the United States, and the proceedings of such courts shall follow the forms and modes of procedure prescribed for said similar courts.

SEC. 107. The commanding officer of each garrison, fort, post, camp, or other place, may appoint special courts-martial for his command; but such special courts-martial may in any case be appointed by superior authority when by the latter deemed desirable. Special courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to military law, except a commissioned officer, for any crime or offense made punishable by the military laws of the United States, and such special courts-martial shall have the same powers of punishment as do general courts-martial, except that fines imposed by such courts shall not exceed $100.
No sentence of dismissal from the service or dishonorable discharge, imposed by a National Guard court-martial, not in the service of the United States, shall be executed until approved by the governor of the State or Territory concerned, or by the commanding general of the National Guard of the District of Columbia.

In the service of the United States, presidents of courts-martial and summary court officers shall have power to issue warrants to arrest accused persons and to bring them into the presence of the court, which shall have power to order the production of books and papers, and to sentence for a trial whenever such persons shall have disobeyed an order in writing from the convening authority to appear before such court, a copy of the charge or charges having been delivered to the accused with such order, and to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum to and for the person or persons and the books and papers of witnesses and the production of books and papers, and to sentence for a refusal to be sworn or to answer as provided in actions before civil courts.

All processes and sentences of said courts shall be executed by such civil officers as may be prescribed by the laws of the several States and Territories, and in any State where no provision shall have been made for such action, and in the Territories and the District of Columbia, such processes and sentences shall be executed by a United States marshal or his duly appointed deputy and in the District of Columbia it shall be the duty of any United States marshal to execute all such processes and sentences and make return thereof to the officer issuing or imposing the same.

Pay for National Guard Officers.—Certain commissioned officers on the active list belonging to organizations of the National Guard of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard shall receive compensation for their services, except during periods of service for which they may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers of corresponding grades in the Regular Army, as follows, not to include longevity pay: A captain $300 per year and the same pay shall be paid to every officer of higher rank than that of captain, a first lieutenant $240 per year, and a second lieutenant $200 per year. Regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War shall determine the amount and character of service that must be rendered by officers to receive this pay for specific parts of the service. Enlisted adjutants, and majors and captains in command of field hospital companies, field hospital companies, or sanitary troops shall receive the pay herebefore authorized for a captain.

Pay for National Guard Enlisted Men.—Each enlisted man on the active list belonging to an organization of the National Guard of a State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, participating in the apportionment of the annual appropriation for the support of the National Guard, shall receive compensation for his services, except during periods of service for which he may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as an enlisted man of corresponding grade in the Regular Army, at a rate equal to twenty-five per cent of the initial pay now provided by law for enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army: Provided, That such enlisted man shall receive the compensation herein provided if he shall have attended not less than forty-eight regular drills during any one year, and a proportionate amount for attendance upon a lesser number of such drills, not less than twenty-four; and no such enlisted man shall receive any part of such compensation except as authorized herein, and provided that no compensation shall be payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property lost or damaged in the execution of the duties of his office, and to such officer or enlisted man as may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secretary of War.

The compensation, if any, to which any person may be entitled shall be determined in like manner: Provided further, That periods of any actual military duty equivalent to the drills herein prescribed (except those periods of service for which members of the National Guard may become lawfully entitled to the same pay as officers and enlisted men of the corresponding grades in the Regular Army) may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secretary of War.

All amounts appropriated for the purpose of this and the last preceding section shall be expended by the officers and enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps of the Army, and all disbursements under the foregoing provisions of this section shall be made as soon as practicable after the thirty-first day of the fiscal year ending December of the thirtieth day of June of each year and upon pay rolls of each State and the District of Columbia and the Washington Territory: Provided, That stoppages may be made against the compensation payable to any officer or enlisted man hereunder to cover the cost of public property lost or damaged in the execution of the duties of his office, and to such officer or enlisted man as may be accepted as service in lieu of such drills when so provided by the Secretary of War.

Except as otherwise specifically provided hereunder the provisions of this article and the last preceding section shall be paid to any person not on the active list, nor to any person over sixty-four years of age, nor to any person whose military duty as to which he renders or has rendered service shall have ceased to be a part of military service. Regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of War shall provide for the apportionment of the benefits of such pension laws.

Mobilization of the Organized Militia, etc.

Mobilization of the Organized Militia, etc.
thereof to higher rank in organizations composed of members taken from the
and all ranges which may have already been constructed in whole or in part,
and rifle practice in all sections of the country. And that all ranges so established,
corps, or department of the Regular Army, through appointments of officers
with funds provided by Congress shall be open for use by those in any branch
of the military or naval service of the United States and by all able-bodied
males capable of bearing arms, under reasonable regulations to be prescribed
as may be available for use in conducting such rifle practice.

SEC. 114. TEMPORARY VACANCIES IN REGULAR ARMY DUE TO DETAILS TO THE
NATIONAL GUARD.—In time of war the temporary vacancies created in any grade
not above that of colonel among the commissioned personnel of any arm, staff
corps, or department of the Regular Army, through appointments of officers
to higher rank in organizations composed of members taken from the
National Guard, shall be filled by temporary promotions according to seniority
in rank from officers holding commissions in the next lower grade in said arm, staff
corps, or department, and all vacancies created in any grade by
such temporary promotions shall be in like manner filled from, and thus cre-
ate temporary vacancies in, the next lower grade, and the vacancies that shall
remain thereafter in said arm, staff corps, or department, and that can not be filled by temporary promotions, as prescribed in this section, may be
filled by the temporary appointment of officers of such number and grade or
grades as shall maintain said arm, corps, or department at the full commis-
sioned strength authorized by law: Provided, That in the staff corps and de-
partments subject to the provisions of sections twenty-six and twenty-seven of
the act of February second, nineteen hundred and one, and acts amendatory
thereof, temporary vacancies that can not be filled by temporary promotions as
hereinbefore prescribed shall be filled by temporary details in the manner pre-
scribed in said sections twenty-six and twenty-seven and acts amendatory
thereof, and the resulting temporary vacancies in the branches of the Army
from which the details shall be so made shall be filled as hereinbefore in this
section prescribed: Provided further, That officers temporarily promoted or
appointed under the terms of this section shall be promoted or appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for terms that
shall not extend beyond the war or the passing of the emergency for which
additional forces were brought into the military service of the United States,
and at the termination of the war or the passing of the emergency said officers
shall be discharged from the positions held by them under their temporary
commissions or appointments, and officers detailed as herein authorized shall
be relieved from their temporary details: And provided further, That officers
temporarily promoted under the provisions of this section shall not vacate
their permanent commissions nor be prejudiced in their relative or lineal stand-
ing in the Regular Army.

SEC. 115. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION.—Every officer and enlisted man of the
National Guard, who shall be called into the service of the United States as
such, shall be examined as to his physical fitness under such regulations as the
President may prescribe, without further commission or enlistment: Provided,
That immediately preceding the muster out of an officer or enlisted man called
into the active service of the United States he shall be physically examined
under rules prescribed by the President of the United States, and the record
thereof shall be filed and kept in the War Department.

SEC. 116. NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL ACT.—Whenever any State shall,
within a limit of time to be fixed by the President, have failed or refused to
comply with or enforce any requirement of this act, or any regulation promul-
gated thereunder and in aid thereof by the President or the Secretary of War,
the National Guard of such State shall be debarred, wholly or in part, as the
President may direct, from receiving from the United States any pecuniary
or other aid, benefit, or privilege authorized or provided by this act or any
other law.

SEC. 117. APPLICABLE TO LAND FORCES ONLY.—The provisions of this act in
respect to the militia shall be applicable only to militia organized as a land force
and not to the Naval Militia, which shall consist of such part of the militia as
may be prescribed by the President for each State, Territory, or District:
Provided, That each State, Territory, or District maintaining a Naval Militia,
as herein prescribed, may be credited to the extent of the number thereof in
the quota that would otherwise be required by section sixty-two of this act.

SEC. 118. NECESSARY RULES AND REGULATIONS.—The President shall make all
necessary rules and regulations and issue such orders as may be necessary for
the thorough organization, discipline, and government of the militia provided for
in this act.

SEC. 119. ANNUAL ESTIMATES REQUIRED.—The Secretary of War shall cause
to be estimated annually the amount necessary for carrying out the provisions
of so much of this act as relates to the militia, and no money shall be expended
under said provisions except as shall from time to time be appropriated for
carrying them out.