STRATEGIC:

1. America's national security and military strategies must help shape the evolving security environment of the new century if we are to maintain our position as a world leader. We must identify and prioritize the array of threats confronting the nation and dedicate the necessary resources in support of our national security strategy. The United States must pursue technological innovations that will allow us to develop new capabilities against a broad spectrum of threats. We must also exploit the information revolution and the revolution in business affairs to provide the flexibility to adapt to a rapidly changing world.
   
   
2. In light of America's numerous military engagements around the world, future intervention must become an object of national debate. An open and candid exchange will give us our best chance to ensure that sound decisions are made. Whenever possible, dissenting views must be allowed to flow forth to ensure that all sides of an issue are fully explored before an intervention is initiated. Our leaders must recognize that military force will be only one aspect of any solution and that future crises will require the sustained application of all elements of national power.
   
   
3. Procurement spending must continue to rise incrementally if we are to maintain our technological edge over potential adversaries. The Department of Defense (DoD) has reversed the declining trend in procurement budgets from the projected $41­$43 billion per year to a current budget earmarked to rise to $60 billion by 2001. This upward trend must continue and Congress must ensure that necessary steps are taken to preserve our technological edge. Given current threats to our vital interests, the defense budget must make room not only for research and development (R&D), but also for upgrading and replacing existing systems. Our current missions must be balanced with the strong need to innovateneither can be sacrificed.
   
   
4. We must make the difficult modernization decisions that may require forgoing some big-ticket items and purchasing other systems in smaller numbers. Pitting modernization against readiness creates false choices. Forcing trade-off decisions such as the mortgaging of future readiness for current readiness is counterproductive. Instead, defense planners must be prepared to make difficult choices in modernization programs. The United States must be able to generate necessary savings to maintain readiness while at the same time prepare for a true transformation. Rather than pursuing large-scale production runs that may be unaffordable under present budget constraints, we can save substantially by purchasing modern weapons in smaller buys.
   
   
5. The shrinking budget for defense R&D, particularly in the area of basic science, must be reversed. Technological innovation will remain the force behind the military's transformation. Beyond funding increases, the R&D process must shed its previous disconnected practices and become more integrated with Service specific and joint requirements in order to maximize technological innovation.
   
   
6. A robust defense industry will be indispensable to the impending transformation of the U.S. Army and the other Services. Declining defense budgets together with the post-Cold War defense industry consolidation have led to declining equity values and internal problems resulting from rapid downsizing for defense firms. By providing stable procurement budgets and rethinking its relationship with industry, the government can offer defense firms much-needed stability. Failure to do so is likely to produce a hemorrhage of scientific, engineering and managerial talent and expertise to more profitable sectors, with adverse consequences for defense modernization and innovation. Steps to ease regulations and accounting rules, as well as greater efforts to procure defense-related items from commercial vendors should be taken immediately.
   
   
7. The Armed Forces are saddled with an enormous, Cold War-era infrastructure that drains funding from the warfighters. Proposed base closures have encountered political opposition that has proved to be virtually insurmountable. Nearly forty additional bases should be closed, in addition to those that remain from past BRAC rounds, to stem the loss of resources from our Services resources that must be invested in future modernization needs.
   
   
8. The enormous consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents justify the increased effort and expense to prepare for this looming threat. The United States must press ahead with counterproliferation programs. A national missile defense (NMD) that protects all 50 states should be deployed as soon as technology permits. As required not only for NMD, but also for theater missile defense (TMD) to protect allies and U.S. forces deployed overseas, greater investment in research and development should be made. We must also heighten awareness of WMD threats among allies and friends and extend counterproliferation capabilities to them as well. Continuing efforts should be made to control "loose" Russian nuclear weapons and prevent the outflow of WMD technologies and capabilities.
   
   
9. The growing threat of chemical and biological weapons will force a transformation in the Armed Forces and put greater emphasis on increased cooperation between DoD and other governmental agencies. Joint Forces Command has already embarked on efforts to enhance civil support for WMD contingencies and consequence managementcoping with the consequences of a WMD terrorist incidentin the United States. Continuing efforts will need to be made to achieve maximum synchronization and cooperation among the various civilian and military authorities, including those at the federal, state, and local levels.
   
   
10. U.S. military operations will continue to derive greater legitimacy from multinational participation and the unique contribution of our allies will continue to be a decisive planning factor. In light of the continuing decreases in defense budgets among NATO-European countries, however, long-term allied interoperability will not be achievable. If the present downward trend is not reversed, our allies will be even less capable of contributing effectively to alliance/coalition operations. Further efforts must be made to encourage European allies to invest in modern defense capabilities for the 21st century.
    
    
11. The Armed Forces must relentlessly pursue joint capabilities and platforms and make greater efforts to shed redundancies. The development of joint doctrine and training, especially at the Joint Task Force (JTF) level, will help bind capabilities and platforms together. The DoD is also investing in the Joint Forces Command as the lead agency to conduct joint experimentation and determine future requirements. At the same time, we must recognize that some level of overlap and redundancies will be required to provide maximum depth to joint operational capabilities.
    
    
    OPERATIONAL:
    
    
12. The Army has proclaimed that "Everything is on the Table" as it pursues transformation. If the Army is to transform into a more responsive and strategically dominant force, it must be willing to make tradeoffs. However, there are legacy systems that have served the Army well and have the capability to be decisive on future battlefields under the auspices of "campaign forces." As decisions are made to determine which Army programs should be cut, which weapon systems are no longer relevant and how units are to be structured for the future, the utility of all current and planned systems must be dispassionately evaluated. The Army's war-fighting requirement demands that current capabilities be maintained until an adequate replacement in the form of the projected "objective force" is available.
    
    
13. The current Army vision to be able to deploy a brigade anywhere in the world in four days, a division in five days and five divisions in 30 days does not go far enough. Given the virtually limitless possibilities for technological advancement and innovation in the next 25 years, our goal should be to deploy a brigade on the ground anywhere in the world within two days. This takes into account not only the need to have a forcible entry capability but also to maintain the required logistics. Greater technological efforts should be especially focused on the requirements directly related to versatility, lethality, agility, and sustainability.
    
    
14. Land-based fire support has been allowed to atrophy in the Marine Corps. A recent review of Marine Corps ground-based fire support systems strongly suggests that post-Cold War artillery cuts have left the Marine Corps with serious deficiencies in this area. The HIMARS rocket system (which the Army plans to field for its light divisions) is a potential solution in conjunction with the expected fielding of the Lightweight 155-mm Howitzer. These expeditionary systems will allow the Marine Corps to gain the maximum fire support in the early phases of a combat operation.
    
    
15. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF's) would provide an ideal test bed for experimenting with concepts that could be subsequently extended to the wider joint arena. MAGTF's are uniquely suited for experimentation due to their inherent capabilities as self-contained task organized units. Because each MAGTF consists of a headquarters, ground combat, aviation and combat service support element, it can adequately simulate the other military Services (using similar equipment, tactics and procedures), without requiring the large scale participation of the other Services.
    
    
16. Even less in the early 21st century can the Air Force make the strategic assumption that forward basing will be available or accessible in future operations. We must assume that future adversaries will resort to access denial tactics, including the threat or use of WMD to impede the utilization of ports or airfields. Our allies may also be coerced into denying access to their bases. Therefore, the Air Force should reassess its reliance on tactical platforms and fully embrace the development of longer-range capabilities. Using the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) as a management tool does not solve the nodal attack problem that currently exists and will continue as long as forward basing remains an operational planning imperative. The Air Force must look beyond the current dependence on nodes to launch operations and concentrate on strategic platforms.
    
    
17. The Navy must prepare for and invest more fully in littoral operations. Future joint missions will require that naval forces work more and more closely to shorethey must be well positioned to take advantage of the growing precision of joint weapon systems and sensors in order to project power deeper inland. Although the Navy has devoted considerable effort to mine warfare and littoral anti-submarine warfare techniques, higher priority and investment must be given to such capabilities in this transformed security setting of the early decades of the 21st century.

page created 31 October 2000

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