1999 Fletcher Conference

Tuesday, November 2, 1999 8:00 to 9:00 p.m.
Keynote Address:

Beyond Joint Vision 2010

General Henry H. Shelton

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Transcript

Galvin: There will be all kinds of recommendations and all of them coming from all kinds of places, inside and outside the Beltway. Some of them, let's face it, will be very, very good and those are things that we can absorb. But Hugh is the military leader, the leader in uniform, that is ultimately responsible for everything that we'll discuss and everything that might get done or that will get done. He's responsible for advising how to do it and he's responsible for doing it. He is the top person in uniform responsible for that.

So when we're talking about strategic responsiveness, we're talking about the strategy itself and the response that we will make. I would add, by the way, as an aside that it's great to see the combination of Hugh Shelton and Bill Cohen. That's the kind of thing that we really need and that is working. But Hugh is the point man. He's the one who will set the pace and he is the one that we need to listen to tonight, not me. And so I would say, welcome, Hugh. We're just lucky to have you here and let me give you the lectern. Please, take over. And thank you for being here.

Shelton: Thank you very much, General Galvin, for your very kind words, your kind introduction, and also let me thank you for all that you have done and for all that you continue to do for our great country and for our joint military forces. I see a lot of other old friends here tonight and certainly mentors from the past and people that I'm indebted to seated across the room. Certainly happy to see our Undersecretary Rotsker here tonight, General Gordon Sullivan. Of course we've got General Crossen here as well. And a whole host of great allies in the form of General Klaus Naumann, that we work very closely with in terms of coalition and allies and that basically did yeoman's work for Operation Allied Force.

And of course Tom Schwartz and Jack Keane and another general down here, General Sir Jeremy Mackenzie from the U.K. If he and I look about the same age, it's because we are. In fact, we go back to Ranger school together. We were Ranger buddies back in 1964. He pulled me through. So I'm indebted to him. But a great officer. I'm delighted to be here with him tonight. And a whole host of others.

I'd also like to thank of course my cohort, my partner over here, General Eric Shinseki for his great leadership. As General Galvin said, a man with a great vision, great energy, who I think we're all very fortunate to have leading our Army into the new millennium. And also I might add, who's done a great job of getting this conference organized and set up. So I'd ask you to join me in giving him and the Army Staff that helped pull all this together a big round of applause.

And of course Dr. Bob Pfaltzgraff and his team have done a magnificent job of, as usual, working behind the scenes and making it all happen. So thanks to you also, Bob.

I feel very honored to be here this evening and have a chance to speak to you at what I know is a very important conference and one which I think will be also a very memorable conference based on the feedback that I've gotten from some of my guys that have been present here today. I would tell you right up front I think that today, tonight, America sits at a very special place in history. We are at a time when we're at the pinnacle of our power and yet, as we look around, we see the world changing right before our eyes.

And I believe that the future, although certainly I'd have to say up front is uncertain, is also bright with wonderful possibilities for our nation in the future. But only if we are wise enough and if we are strong enough to look at what's unfolding in front of us and prepare for them. And part of that preparation, as General Galvin mentioned, is my job as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I report to the Secretary of Defense and to the President and I advise them on matters of national security and the use of military force. I don't do it in isolation. I have some great partners in that regard and that's of course my fellow members of the Joint Chiefs.

And I think that all of us must never forget that the military force is a relatively blunt instrument. Certainly our military assets cannot substitute for other forms of national power in resolving some of the complex crises that are inherently political in nature. And as we've seen over the past decade, the urge to take action in a crisis can be somewhat overpowering. I mean, look at what happens to us. We have the crisis that's piped right into our living room. You can watch it unfold on television. And it can also make a very compelling case to use the military as an instrument to try to solve this crisis simply because we provide an attractive and a readily available option in some cases.

And sometimes the military of course is the right option as we saw in Haiti, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Where the United States chose to get involved rather than just to stand on the sidelines and not commit military forces in response to what was obviously a crisis that was unfolding. But I think we would be very foolish to think that the future will only consist of operations like the one that we've just conducted in Kosovo. On the contrary, I would submit that our response to this particular operation was very unique. No one can guarantee that the circumstances under which Operation Allied Force succeeded will be repeated.

And I think any look that we take at the future requires a very clear perspective of where we are and the vector that we're headed on. And I know that perspective can be very important.

I'm reminded of the story they tell about the Army captain and the first sergeant that were out training in the field. And they'd had a very hard day of training and finally nightfall came and they decide it was time to get some rest. And so they just kicked back and lay back on their rucksacks. And just as they laid back in the darkness, the first sergeant said, "Captain, look up there. What do you see?" So the captain looked up and he said, "I see a million stars, First Sergeant." And the first sergeant said, "And Captain, what does that tell me?" Well, the captain decided he would seize on this opportunity to impress the first sergeant with just how sharp he was, intelligent and intellectual, etc. So he said, "Well, First Sergeant, astronomically it tells me there are millions of galaxies and perhaps billions of planets. Theologically, it tells me that God decreed that the universe is magnificent and that we, as human beings here on earth, are small and insignificant. And meteorologically, it tells me that tomorrow is going to be a beautiful day." Well, there was a long pause. And then the captain said, "First Sergeant, what does it tell you?" And the first sergeant said, "Captain, it tells me someone stole our tent."

So as you can see, perspective is important. And tonight what I'd like to do is give you my perspective about the future. A future I think that goes beyond our latest doctrinal vision as found in Joint Vision 2010, which I know that you've spent a lot of time talking about today, and how the United States can respond to meet the challenges that I see in the future. And of course I'd be the first one to admit that no one knows for sure what the future security environment will be like. But I think it's safe to say that it will be at least as challenging as what we have experienced in the past few years.

And I firmly believe that one of the greatest challenges that we face, that is confronting us today, is to have the foresight and the fortitude to literally take the long view, the long approach as to where we're headed in the future. Over the past few years, we've seen a lot of issues that have dominated the front page of the Washington Post and other major newspapers throughout the world and our television screens from Iraq to North Korea to Bosnia, Kosovo, and of course now East Timor.

But in today's troubled world, I think that there are many causes that we find and will continue to find that will cry out for our attention. Yet in today's troubled world, many worthy calls that cry out we have to seriously consider whether or not they require or are worthy of U.S. military intervention. We are and I think always will be by our very nature the better angels of our nature, to use Abraham Lincoln's phrase, which will often prompt us as a nation to get involved. And of course sometimes getting involved is exactly what we should do. But I think it's also very prudent to consider the unintended consequences that may accompany the well-intentioned impulses to use our military to further peace and stability.

We have gained considerable experience in this area in the past few years. And I think that we have found that sometimes sorting out the good guys from the bad is not easy. That getting in is a lot easier than getting out. And that deeply rooted ancient hatreds cannot be resolved with a short-term application of military force. I think we've got to ask ourselves some very hard questions when confronted with the momentous decision to use our military and our military strength before we lay our prestige, our word, our leadership, and, most importantly, the lives of our young men and women in uniform on the line. And I think each of these situations is serious and it merits our attention and of course certainly merits our best efforts.

For the United States, North Korea and Iraq are clearly today the most serious of these situations. Threats that could turn their regions into turmoil. But even these near-term threats will not determine the shape of the world in the first decades of the next century. It's clear to me that the future of Asia, for example, will be decided in the rise and fall of the markets of Hong Kong, in the computer chip factories of Shanghai, and on the floor of the stock exchange of Tokyo, but not in P'yongyang.

China, the world's most populous country and by most estimates already with the third or fourth largest economy in the world, with the largest conventional military, and the third largest nuclear force in the world and a country that is starting to modernize its military forces. Yet at the same time as we look at China, we find that they are trying to maintain control of an emerging and expanding capitalist economy under a communist hierarchy that embraces centralized planning and control. I think we all can see that this situation is an internal contradiction that could end up with dire consequences.

But it is Japan, not China, as we all know that is the economic engine of Asia. The Japanese are our most important ally in the region and the second largest economy in the world behind our own. It's clear to me that the destinies of China and Japan will have a tremendous impact on the future of peace and stability in the world.

And in Southwest Asia, though Iraq is still bothersome and of course we have to deal with Iraq in new ways, they are no longer our most serious threat in the region. In fact, Iraq is now a damaged regime. Internally insecure and with an armed forces that is literally a shadow of their former strength and with their nuclear acquisition programs at this point held in check. Rather than Iraq, it is Iran, armed with religious fervor and an increasingly more capable and modern armed forces that is the most powerful and long-term regional force in Southwest Asia. But the true gravity of Iran's influence is less than its missiles, its tanks, and its planes, as it is Iran's ability to influence religious conflicts in a region that is already a tinderbox of both economic and political issues.

What could prove more ominous is Iran's very clear drive to expand its influence through the pulpit into the Caucasusa drive that is very threateningthreatening to Russia, threatening to the Balkan states, and to our NATO ally, Turkey. The current situation in Dagestan and the war in Chechnya reflect this threat. The possibilities of the war in Chechnya causing further destabilization in the Caucuses is a very real and a major concern.

And in the same vein in Europe. As much as the Balkans are a very serious concern, the situation there pales when considered against what is happening on the streets in Moscow. The future of Europe will not swing on the independence of Kosovo or on the establishment of a new Serbia. It will swing on the path that Russian nationalism takes and on whether Russia can change peacefully into a nation with a stable economy and one that is governed by the rule of law. As we all know, they still have thousands of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal. And I think the most profound threat to our future security is if these weapons were to be wielded by an enemy rather than by a friend.

And of course what happens in Russia will shape the rest of Europe. Ultimately determining whether Europe will go together or fragment apart because of so much warfare that we've witnessed there in the past centuries.

I think in order to shape the strategy that has to be dealt with effectively, we have to deal effectively with the Bosnias and the Koreas, the Kosovos and the East Timors. But we must not allow them to distract us from what are the truly vital issues that loom before us. Or put another way, we cannot let the urgent overcome the important on a day to day basis. I think what we all must understand is that the developments that take place in Russia, China, Japan, and Iran are where we must place our greatest investment in time, in energy, and in diplomacy. These in essence I think are the main events.

And our second greatest challenge is transforming our current military structure into a future joint force. A force that is powerful enough to protect us, protect our interests, and to maintain our leadership in international affairs. And as all of you know, our strategy to protect our global interests requires that we maintain as a minimum the capability to fight and win two major wars nearly simultaneously. And my real concern about our future force is broader than just our ability to fight two major wars or conflicts like in North Korea or in Iran or Iraq. The fact is that in this warfighting scenario, even if it involved the two aforementioned countries, it would involve great risk, but it also is something that we would win.

Rather my concern is that to maintain a force that is powerful enough for the unexpected. And the unexpected is something that we in uniform know that we have to deal with almost on a daily basis. And as we look back at our history, our historical experiences show us that it is impossible to predict what type of a strategic environment might emerge 10 or 20 years from now. And when we read history, we find that victory does not always go to the strongest military force, but to the one that can adapt to changing situations more rapidly.

And I believe that the two MTW strategy is appropriate for the unexpected, but it must have the same kind of remarkable people in its ranks that we have today, it must have an increased emphasis on jointness and an improved technological capability over what we have today. And yet at the same time, I think we must maintain the intense understanding of how to prevail in battle that has served this nation so well for over 200 years.

Right now I think our most urgent task is to fight for the strong support of these objectives to keep our forces ready, to protect the quality of life so that we can continue to attract and retain the same kind of outstanding men and women in uniform that we have today. In these areas and others of course, as you know, we're working very hard to prepare for the future and we recognize that the linchpin of our future force is information. And a course that we have entered into already, an era of knowledgeable warfare. And information decisions, information superiority has got to be the cornerstone of our future application of force.

We also recognize today that as we make plans that we have to create future forces that will be able to respond rapidly in 2010 as well as in 2015 and respond to the threats, be relevant to the threats that are emerging.

Just this month, as you know, we had the Unified Command Plan published, or the UCP as we refer to it as, and I think this was a major step for us in establishing the preliminary foundations for command structure that will address two of the most compelling requirements for the future security of our nation. And that is to provide a mechanism, which is the new Joint Forces Command, for the exploration of new technologies through joint experimentation and to address the new and asymmetrical threats, some that might be directed at our homeland, that we believe our adversaries will employ in the future.

Other aspects of our future force, however, are especially fragile. Especially the area of modernization which we must keep pursuing with renewed energy. In short, we need a future force, a future joint force that can move rapidly, fight decisively, and win quickly on the land, at sea, and in the air. And at the same time, I think we are going to have to ensure that we have a force structure that has forces with greater symmetry. Forces that can tap into the power of information and to dominate the total war fighting spectrum. These then are some of the challenges that I see as we look out toward 2010 and toward 2020.

And I think to meet these challenges, we've got to have the vision, the foresight, to take the long view. In our preoccupation with the daily battles that we fight, whether it's Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Iran, or East Timor, we can't be distracted from the big issues and those big issues are the ones that will shape the world in the decades ahead. The developments in China and Russia, the stability of Northeast Asia, and of course of Europe.

And at the same time, we've got to create forces here within this country that are strong enough, talented enough, and technologically advanced enough to protect our interests and our international leadership against the challenges that it will face within the next century. And finally, I think that we must remember that the military force is a great hammer, but not every international crisis is a nail. The full power of the United States, diplomatic, economic, and moral, should be employed whenever possible to shape the international environment. But warfare should always be our last resort.

Personally, I think it's a very exciting time for those in our Armed Forces and an exciting time in the history of our military and our nation. I believe that we're on the right path towards transforming the armed forces for the 21st centurya military that will be capable of executing joint doctrine and meeting our national security objectives.

But of course there's a lot of work to be done and we certainly will need your help. We need you, each of you here tonight, and certainly you're interested in it or you wouldn't be here, to think hard about the issues. We certainly need your ideas and, befitting the heritage of our proud democracy, we also need your strenuous debate. And like all of you, I pray for a peaceful world, but my job and those of the Joint Chiefs is to prepare for the alternative just in case.

Thank you for listening to me tonight. And on behalf of all of our soldiers, our sailors, airmen, Marines, and members of the Coast Guard, thanks to each of you for your sincere interest in our national defense. Thank you very much.

Pfaltzgraff: We now have an opportunity for some questions to General Shelton. Who would like to open the question and answer period? Yes, back here. Again, please wait for the microphone and the camera should be there as well.

Charles: Yes, Kathleen Charles. And I just want to ask a couple of questions. One is how do we want to posture our future relations with NATO in terms of peacekeeping in the Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries in concert with the United Nations? And number two, how do we, as a military, both the Air Force and the Army and the Navy, want to coordinate policies whereby we could be a little bit more fast effective in the case of a nuclear problem or a war or something like this? Thank you.

Shelton: The second question was to coordinate faster and more effectively? Did I understand you correctly? Okay, thank you. Let me say first of all regarding NATO. NATO is a great organization. Of course it is a consensus organization. We are one of 19 members in that organization. And I think that has served us very well. Consensus from a standpoint of, when you ask about the rest of the region, we have been pushing very hard and, as a matter of fact, had a discussion today with the Secretary General about a Balkan strategy rather than just a Kosovo strategy or a Montenegro strategy or a whatever strategy to try to look at the area of the region.

But in dealing with any particular issue there, this is something that is done either in the military committee initially, as was led so ably by General Klaus Naumann until replaced just recently, or by the NAC, by the North Atlantic Council. And then the United States has input into that as you know. And out of that comes a consensus among the nations as to the way forward. And we get a voice in that. And of course each nation gets to vote as to whether or not they want to continue to move in that direction. So I feel very comfortable with that particular operation.

Now as we get into the new strategic concept and get away from Article V, the collective defense issue, and start looking at out of area operations or those related to peacekeeping, I think that this same mechanism will serve us well. Again, it is consensus. We'll have a voice in that. And of course there's a lot of interest right now with the United States Congress about how the strategic concept is unfolding and what this portends for the future. And I think Senator Warner addressed you today. He's, I think, going to be conducting hearings on this particular issue and it's something that we need to discuss. But I feel comfortable with the mechanism and our involvement and the decision making process that allows us, along with the other 18, to opt out. Or to vote to go ahead.

In the other case, I think in terms of jointness among the forces. I think that in about the last 10 years we have come so far in jointness that to me, having been a brigadier in the Joint Staff 10 years ago and then having had commands in the meanwhile that put me in a joint environment, that we have come so far in the area of jointness that I think we are on a roll right now. And I think a roll that will continue because I think the more you work in the joint environment and the more you understand the capabilities that the others bring to the fray, the more you understand the power, the complementary capabilities when they are all put together on the battlefield, and how much that multiplies the overall effect of our forces.

That as we get more and more people, youngsters in particular, growing up in that environment, this is something that I believe we won't have to spend a lot of time being concerned about. You know, the Joint Chiefs right now, for example, you wear two hats. One is you're a service chief, but the other one when you walk into the "tank" is you're a member of the Joint Chiefs. And you fight like the devil to pull your programs and for your Service, but when you come into the "tank," you fight for what's best for the nation.

Now with Joint Forces Command leveraging off of the great experiments that are being done by the Services and each of them looking forward with the Joint Vision 2010 as a guideline, moving forward, but then having Joint Forces Command leveraging those experiments and pulling these capabilities together out on the battlefield, so to speak, or on the test field and putting them through the wickets. And then having a mechanism to come back in through the defense resources board or through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and having a voice in whether or not it fights together and gives you the complementary capabilities or whether it's a stand alone system. I think that will help us immensely in terms of moving forward and making sure that when we get onto the battlefield, everything works as it was designed to work.

Pfaltzgraff: Our next question? Is there someone on this side of the room perhaps? Yes, please. And again, wait for the microphone.

Melcher: Sir, Colonel Melcher. Sir, one of the issues that has come up repeatedly today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and you mentioned it again this evening as well. I tried to recount today many of the things that have been done to try and address that: Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams out in many of the states, training at city level across the country, Joint Task ForceCivil Support, and other things that have been done. But most of those are in the realm of "prepare" and "respond" as opposed to "shape." And it seems to me that shaping in this arena is one of the things that you want to do so that you don't have to respond. Could you offer some thoughts on things that we might do to shape that environment to reduce the risk?

Shelton: Thanks, I certainly will and I certainly share your concern there that that is a major issue we have to deal with and I think that we have to be very aggressive in the way that we deal with that. And I'm happy to say in a lot of cases that we are, most cases we are I think. But of course in some of those ways that it's outside of the prerogatives of the Department of Defense, but gets over into other agencies of government. But certainly trying to stop the proliferation before it ever starts is first and foremost to avoid it.

That's one of the reasons that we pressed for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in that same realm. If we could ensure that our nuclear stockpiles would be safe, this was another way of making it much harder for countries to develop new capabilities. Now they could keep what they had, but developing new capabilities that would really be of any significance almost requires testing. At least according to all of our scientists in our national labs.

And so pressing ahead in any of these areas, in each area where we can to try to hold down on anything that will keep other countries from trying to pursue weapons of mass destruction. Whether, you know, as we're working with India and Pakistan, trying to reduce tensions there, trying to get them to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and things of that type, very aggressive. Most of it done by the State Department.

When it comes to the proliferation of them and our reaction to them, that's where we enter into it. And having capabilities that can serve our nation and our citizens well, to be able to respond if in fact that happens as we are in support of other agencies of government, needless to say, be it FEMA or be it Justice or whoever, is the piece of it that we're working. And I might add, working it pretty hard right now. But any area, and I just mentioned a couple, anything that we can do, I think, to try to make it tougher and tougher to proliferate is in our best interests. And I'm happy to say a lot of behind the scenes stuff that goes on is designed to do exactly that.

Pfaltzgraff: Next question. Yes.

Frye: General Elton Frye. With the Senate's refusal to tender advice and consent on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with the pressure to move forward with the national missile defense and break out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, with the protracted delay in further strategic arms reductions, there's a lot of concern that the fabric of negotiated restraint may be unraveling. You made reference to your concern about dealing with Russia. And my question is a very straight forward one. What do you think can be done to restore the lost momentum for a cooperative approach to these problems between the United States and Russia?

Shelton: Okay, thank you. Great question. And let me say that, first and foremost, I think that there are a lot of perspectives that go back to the captain and the first sergeant in terms of our own national security and what argues best for our national security, as you know. Certainly the ABM Treaty has served us well for a number of years. There are those that argue now that it's antiquated and that to maintain this ABM Treaty right now is, if it precludes us from fielding a national missile defense, is not the right answer either. So I get both sides of it everywhere I go.

But I think that, number one, establishing and engaging Russia is extremely important from our standpoint and I can assure you that within DoD we, in fact, are reaching out. We just came to a military agreement just a couple of days ago for 24 exchanges next year at the military level. General Kabashny and I will have to meet to sign that, but that's a positive step forward to regain this relationship that we've had.

I think that when it comes to national missile defense, for example, we need and have sat down already with the Russians to explain that this is not designed to stop their nuclear arsenal. I mean, at a max, we're talking about a few rogue missiles that would be fired at us and our ability to stop that. Certainly nothing of the magnitude that would ever stop what they could throw at us or potentially the Chinese in a few years or even right today.

And so I think that we need to engage, as we are trying to do with them, to work to amend the ABM Treaty, but not, if we can, keep from doing away with it. I think it still serves a useful purpose in terms of, again, back to the point of non-proliferation and being concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But it's a very complicated issue as you know. It's a policy issue and you make the decision based on what you think is best for the nation. My recommendation would be based on what I think is best for our national defense.

Pfaltzgraff: We have time for two or three more questions. All the way over here in the back.

Audience Member: General, a recent story in the Early Bird talked about offensive nuclear or, I'm sorry, offensive information warfare. And one of the criticisms in the story was that the doctrine isn't fully formed. What is being done on a doctrine for information warfare, offensive information warfare?

Shelton: Well, as you know, we've had offensive information warfare for a good number of years. And I think, first of all, let me go to information operations and talk about what it consists of. Because, as you know, it includes deception, operational security, psychological operations, even public affairs. All of this is woven together. Computer network defense, computer network attack. And too often, as one of the articles that appeared in the New York Times appeared, to make it look like we had gone after computer network attack. And we did, but another element of it is electronic warfare.

And the electron that we used out of VA6's, they're computers that they use to control their missiles. And so in that respect, we did. But in terms of how it was pictured in the New York Times, it was like we had gone after their financial systems or whatever and of course we did not. We've got a joint pub out on information ops. Those that have read it have been very complimentary about it. I think it pulls it all together. The Services have been complimentary about it. And we have seen for the first time now interagency national level programs that are starting to move pretty well in several areas with information ops. But it's pulling together all of these.

And the final piece of it, I mean, we're trying to protect our networks now. As you know, we have a Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (JTF­CND). But in the long term, before we had ever used a computer network attack or even really pressed hard in that capability, that is a policy issue that will have to be resolved at the top levels of our government and it involves a tremendous number of agencies that have an interest in that, departments and agencies that deal in that arena.

But I think we're seeing now programs develop that move all the pieces of information ops along just like an execution matrix that we're all familiar with in terms of an operation. And so we're making great headway. I'd like to tell you that it's up and running full speed and we can do it and it's automatically an annex to every op order, so to speak. It's not, but it's getting there pretty quickly because people are beginning to see the advantage of doing it that way. And as a matter of fact, Allied Force, that kicked in late, but kicked in very strong and was working very well toward the end of that operation. And so we learned a lot from that and that's carrying over now into some planning and other areas.

Pfaltzgraff: Okay, our next question? Yes, please. And then you will be next.

Rosen: Sir, Mark Rosen, Booz, Allen, and Hamilton. Doing Vision 2010, sir, was a great step forward for the military because it was truly the first joint vision and the next version of Joint Vision. Someone said a criticism of the previous vision is it has a focus on the in-theater piece absent the more strategic piece. And I'm thinking particularly the power projection piece. Do you see in the next JV version, whatever it might be, a shift from the focus of in-theater platforms and concepts to the strategic piece, in particular, power projection? Because, after all, there's no capability that's more joint than the projection capability. Thanks, sir.

Shelton: Well said. And to give you a short answer, I think what we need in the next one, in Joint Force 2020 or Joint Vision 2010 modified or whatever revised, we probably do need to have a little better balance. The toughest thing to do is to project power in such a manner that you are ready to fight when you are live and then it just flows in seamlessly. And we've got a lot of initiatives that are ongoing in that regard. We now have an agreed upon position by all the Services that the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), the standard for developing a TPFDD, is now 72 hours or will be very shortly.

Of course in order to do that, all of your systems that you use to do it have to have a common base or have to be able to be interoperable. That's not the case today, but it's moving in that direction and with the agreement of all the Services. And I think in the next one we've got to strike a balance between the emphasis placed on in-theater, which of course is where you're going to fight and win. But in order to fight and win, you've got to get there first. And as the last general said, he who gets there firstest with the mostest is the one that wins. So getting there quickly ready to fight and win is important and we do need to have a better balance in that. And I would predict that it will be.

Pfaltzgraff: There's another question right back here.

Dekowsky: General, Dennis Dekowsky, Captain, United States Navy. I used to hear, as I was growing up in the military, "two MTWs," more recently, "two nearly simultaneous MTWs." I don't want to be accused of learning only the lesson of the last war, but having watched Allied Force, what I am concerned about is something I don't hear addressed. And that's "two not quite simultaneous MTWs."

If I look at the number of low-density, high-demand forces that were tied down in Kosovo, I look at the number of precision strike weapons used in Allied Force, I'm concerned that if we go to one MTW, we commit so many forces that when it comes time for the second MTW, not to mention the other lesser included bad guys of the world like the Mohamar Khadafy's act up, we could be in big trouble. And what will make up for the low-density, high-demand forces and the precision strike weapons will be U.S. lives. How will we prevent that from happening?

Shelton: Okay, great. Thank you. Well, let me say first and foremost, when we talk about two MTWs, although some look at Kosovo and say "could we still have fought two MTWs?" Kosovo was an MTW and we have never claimed that we had two and a half or three MTWs worth. And in essence, for Kosovo, we committed an MTW's worth of air. Now what did we do differently that we would not do if, let's say, we had not been deployed there?

First and foremost I think is the fact that we didn't go to full mobilization. We didn't do that right up front. As you know, we did pick up Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up and did pick up a lot of our Reservists and brought them on active duty. But we also kept carrying out a lot of our other peacetime activitiesSouthern Watch and Northern Watch. We had some of the biggest days in history during that, that were flying in those two operations. We kept going over in Korea although we did take a carrier out and put some prepared-to-deploy forces on the West Coast. We kept operations going except for ISR in some cases for Charlie Wilhelm.

But we've always said, and part of the Quadrennial Defense Review was, peacetime ops have to stop and we turn and fight in two directions and we go the full mobilization. We didn't do that. On precision strike weapons, we used less than 10 percent of the inventory on precision strike. As I said several times to the press, the arsenals of democracy are deep. And they are.

Now I could also tell you in certain selective categories I was quite concerned and I woke up with a cold sweat a couple of nights at two in the morning. Things like CALCAMs that were running in short supply and is a tremendous weapon. But we also had some good news. The JDAM, the Joint Direct Attack Munition, came on. It had only been in production six months, $20,000 a copy compared to $750,000 with a TLAM or a CALCAM. And it turned out to be, as you know, a very, very precise weapon that paid great dividends. And of course we turned the burners up full speed and a couple of those areas are wide open and opened up other lines, etc. And we actually came out with more than we started with when it was all over.

But having said all that, low-density, high-demand is still a concern and we in fact after this are plusing up in a couple of those areas already. And as we look to the future, I think particularly as we go into the next QDR, that is an area that's got to have some really serious look at it and we already are giving it that. We started even before Kosovo. But this is an area where the normal peacetime requirements exceed the numbers that you actually need to fight two MTWs.

That having been said, we fought differently in Kosovo than we ever planned to fight or that we did fight in Desert Storm or had planned to fight in a warfight scenario in Korea. We were doing what I call man to man coverage of our fighters, for example, with DA-6s in Kosovo. Whereas, it had been designed for zone defense. So we've got some lessons learned out of this and some resource issues that have got to be addressed.

Pfaltzgraff: We have time for one more question before we finish. Yes, please, back here.

Trotso: Colonel Trotso from the War College. Sir, you mentioned that the military is a great hammer but not every international crisis is a nail. The President, in his speech before the U.N., seemed to present a view that most, if not all, international crises are in fact nails. It seems to me that this is a very important issue as we look to the future in terms of the appropriate force structure, first tempo concerns, as well as even modernization programs. So I wondered if you could comment on what you think are the appropriate criteria for the use of that military hammer?

Shelton: Okay, thanks. Well, I think, first of and foremost, you have to stop and figure out what your objectives are that you're attempting to accomplish. Because it is in fact the objectives that will tell you whether or not the military can, as you analyze the issue, whether or not you can achieve those objectives through the use of military force. There are many other criteria that you could apply to it, but I think if you go back and look at Kosovo, you will find that there was a disconnect, albeit a small one, between political objectives, state objectives, and what force could achieve.

And I'll go back to what General Klaus Naumann said many times. You know, if you're going to take step one, you better be prepared for step six. You know, if you're going to threaten force, you better be prepared to go all the way to whatever capital you want to go to to achieve it if in fact your political objectives may require you to do that. But in this case, we were able to use force, achieve our military objectives, which in fact achieved our political objectives. And to be frank, we always thought it might, but we always knew that it would not necessarily.

So I think that's the first thing that you want to look at is: what are your objectives and can the military achieve that objective? If it is, then you get into the use of force in general, you know. Is it in our national interest? Our vital national interest? Is it going to pass, as I say, the Dover test? You know, let's don't go through Somalia again where we commit our great men and women in uniform and then the first time we suffer casualties decide it's not worth it. Let's decide up front that our national interest is at stake, and we're willing to pay the cost to win. And then when we do that, then use the force overwhelmingly. Go for the jugular vein. Let's don't dally around, which is an incremental approach. And the list goes on and on. But certainly our national interests, whether or not you can achieve your objectives and then how you apply the force are the key things that I start looking at right up front when you first present the problem or when I see the first flash on the television screen.

Pfaltzgraff: Thank you. And I'd like now to turn the meeting to General Shinseki for his concluding comments and thanks to the Chairman for being here. General Shinseki.

Shelton: Thanks very much.

Shinseki: Well, I'd just like to thank the Chairman again for making the time to be with us. This is a bit of a surprise. I thought that we were going to conclude today here with comments from others, but let me just say that for the first day of this year's Fletcher Conference, my congratulations to Bob Pfaltzgraff. I know several times today there have been references to Rick Shinseki of the United States Army being a part of this and I just want to set the record here straight before we end the day.

This is for all of us. All of us in this business of national security where we think that we have this opportunity, all the Services, members of Congress and Defense, members of industry, to being what we think is a very important discussion on national security in this last year of this century as we prepare for the future of the 21st.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, let me just thank you for making time to be with us tonight. We know the demands on your schedule and we thank you for standing here and taking some tough questions. Thank you very much.

Pfaltzgraff: This then ends our evening session.