The Army

The Army's most important mission remains to close with and destroy an enemy force. It is a task that no other Service can replicate. There is no substitute for a rapid, deployable land powera force that adversaries cannot ignore and only the presence of the Army in sufficient numbers can assure that circumstances on the ground can be changed to meet U.S. national security goals. This includes not only the separation of hostile forces but also restoring and preserving the peace in the post-conflict setting. Yet the Army presently lacks sufficient mobility and agility to arrive at the scene of a conflict with overwhelming combat power quickly enough. The Army's overly centralized structure impedes rapid deployment and current efforts are too limited in scope.

The hallmarks of a more strategically responsive Army must include maximum deployability, versatility, agility, lethality, survivability, and sustainability. The Army will develop the C3I capabilities necessary to allow its forces to shift missions quickly along the conflict spectrum while reducing their combat-support and combat-service-support requirements. Reducing the support and logistics "tail"which comprises 90 percent of the Army's lift requirements and inhibits mobilitywill create a more efficient force. This will require future Army equipment to be designed for transport by C-17 aircraft to the theater of operations. The Army equipment must also be compact enough to permit C-130 aircraft to shift assets and materiel quickly within a given theater. Finally, the Army must continue its efforts to dramatically reduce each unit's repair parts stockpile by standardizing equipment components as fully as possible.

The Army must become not only more mobile, but also more lethal. The distinction between light and heavy units must be erased in the transformation process. If it is to harness the potential of advanced technology, the Army must immediately focus on fielding smaller, lighter, more lethal, more survivable, and more fuel-efficient combat vehicles. Technologies must be pursued that enhance survivability by providing low-observable protection against enemy fire, as well as capabilities for long-range target acquisition, deep targeting, early attack, and first-round kills. Future artillery systems should be able to achieve first-round kill using smaller-caliber guns to reduce the heavy burden of resupply. An all-wheeled vehicle fleet will provide a solution to the Army's mobility dilemma by reducing lift tonnage by 50 to 70 percent compared to heavy tracked vehicles.

The Army currently anticipates that the outcome of this retooling process will be the ability to deploy a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours; a division within 120 hours; and five divisions within 30 days. The question remains whether the capability to put a Medium Brigade on the ground in four days is fast enough. Technological advancements and innovation in the coming years could make an even more rapid deployment possible for the initial entry force. Nevertheless, speeding the deployment pace further will give the national command authority a genuine deterrent by assuring that U.S. ground forces can reach the scene of a crisis before an adversary can properly react. Such a responsive force will confer on the United States a pronounced advantage wherever it must intervene. When the Army attains this level of strategic responsiveness our political leaders will have a range of ground options more akin to a variable rheostat than an on-off switch.

The Marine Corps

The Marine Corps has historically been our nation's most expeditionary service. As the Marine Corps plots its course for the future, its vision must remain consistent with the operational concepts of expeditionary warfare. The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) concept will be revived in an effort to enhance the ability of the Marine Corps to take part in joint expeditionary operations. The new MEB would be able to deploy rapidly and marry up with the pre-positioned equipment carried by maritime squadrons based overseas. However, the Marine Corps currently lacks the force structure to equip the new MEB with a fully independent headquarters.

The future Joint Force must be more sustainable and versatile. The Marine Corps fits into this future force in three important ways. First, the pre-positioning concept provides the Marines with a generous measure of sustainability. The lift cost of sustaining a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of 16,000 Marines for 30 days would come to 250 C-141 equivalents. Yet a single Maritime Pre-positioning Force (MPF) ship can provide the same support. Second, the occasional demands for long-term U.S. military commitment call for endurance of the type provided by the Army and the Air Force. Sustainability takes on even greater importance during such extended missions. And third, the future force will clearly be an expeditionary force that is capable of both combined-arms warfare and lesser missions. This expeditionary approach begins with the Marine Corps. Forces must be versatile enough to transition from relief operations to combat operations without missing a beat. They must be sustainable enough to reach the battle with everything needed to get the job done.

The Navy

Sea control is a familiar concept to Navy strategists, since this has been the Service's traditional contribution to joint warfighting. Sea control assures the flow of power-projection forces to a theater of operations and guarantees access to the oceans over which the vast majority of the world's commerce still flows. But the new battlespace includes not only sea control, but also airspace, cyberspace, and land control. Battlespace control encompasses defeating the attempts of an adversary to deny U.S. forces access to forward operating areas. Missiles, mines, minesweeping and submarines are inexpensive and potent means available to prospective opponents and will remain so. The time and effort the Navy has devoted to mine warfare and littoral antisubmarine warfare techniques represent an excellent start but fall short of what is necessary given the future international security landscape. Future missions and interventions will require the Navy to act in direct support of ground forces as a routine matter. This support will manifest itself through close air support and upgraded, precision naval gunfire. The Navy must expand its battlespace beyond littorals and beach operations further inland, but alsoand most importantlythe Navy must remain dominant in littoral and beach operations. In the realm of battlespace attack, as naval forces capitalize on the growing precision of joint weapons and sensors they must stand ready to project power deep inland. Connecting and improving sensor and targeting systems would allow these forces to pinpoint mobile targets in real time, thereby accelerating the tempo of combat operations dramatically. Sea-based logistics, in concert with strategic airlift, will be the key to sustaining joint and coalition forces throughout the battlespace.

The Navy's role in joint strategy is to contribute to forward-deployed forces as a basis for other instruments of U.S. national powerdiplomatic, political, and economicto foster stability and shape the security environment in regions of major U.S. national interest. Sea control will remain the critical prerequisite for forward presence. In the future, however, the Navy will strive to dominate a second operating domain: cyberspace. Future maritime dominance will require a shared, real-time understanding of the battlespace. Rapid improvements in information technology promise to equip dispersed, mobile naval forces with preemptive information superiority.

The Air Force

The past year has witnessed two major applications of U.S. military forceOperations Desert Fox and Allied Forceboth of which had relied heavily on air power. These operations have helped to shape the Air Force's vision of its future role in the Joint Force. The Air Force leadership must build on existing core competencies such as aerospace superiority, global attack, global mobility, information superiority, precision engagement, and agile combat support. Determining how these competencies fit into 21st century national security objectives is their primary intellectual task. Preparedness, readiness, modernization, equipment, and the future strategic concept will be particular areas of focus.

The Air Force is now challenged to assess whether its current training plans will develop the necessary leadership qualities to lead a transformed service. Identifying shortfalls between the present force and future requirements is the Air Force's greatest challenge. In the future the reliability of our allies is not assured and, as such, planning for the unimpeded use of forward bases is a flawed assumption. The Joint Forces and Air Force especially must prepare to operate with greater self-sufficiency. The tenets underlying U.S. Marine expeditionary forceslean, mobile, and lethalwill serve as a model for the Air Force. Above all, the USAF leadership will seek to innovate and experiment with new concepts and force structures. The challenge will be to craft a truly expeditionary aerospace force suited to a new security environment that can function over long periods, if necessary without depending upon forward basing as an operational necessity.

The Joint Force

We must combine the efforts of each Service to build a more effective Joint Force. At the same time, expanded R&D and procurement budgets on the part of NATO European and other allied governments are essential to interoperability within a combined force for allied/coalition operations. Greater sharing technology such as precision weaponry may be part of the solution. As we endeavor to heighten the level of joint cooperation and interoperability we should remain skeptical of excessive zeal in the quest to eliminate all redundant capabilities. Some degree of overlap is critical to maintain the depth of the joint operating capability. Striking a balance will be a crucial function of the newly activated Joint Forces Command, which was assigned the task of joint experimentation.

page created 31 October 2000

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